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ISSN 1977-091X |
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Official Journal of the European Union |
C 133 |
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English edition |
Information and Notices |
Volume 60 |
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Notice No |
Contents |
page |
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IV Notices |
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NOTICES FROM EUROPEAN UNION INSTITUTIONS, BODIES, OFFICES AND AGENCIES |
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European Commission |
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2017/C 133/01 |
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2017/C 133/02 |
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V Announcements |
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COURT PROCEEDINGS |
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EFTA Court |
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2017/C 133/03 |
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2017/C 133/04 |
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2017/C 133/05 |
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2017/C 133/06 |
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PROCEDURES RELATING TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF COMPETITION POLICY |
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European Commission |
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2017/C 133/07 |
Prior notification of a concentration (Case M.8297 — GE/Baker Hughes) ( 1 ) |
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2017/C 133/08 |
Prior notification of a concentration (Case M.8411 — Safran Group/China Eastern Air Holding) — Candidate case for simplified procedure ( 1 ) |
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(1) Text with EEA relevance. |
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EN |
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IV Notices
NOTICES FROM EUROPEAN UNION INSTITUTIONS, BODIES, OFFICES AND AGENCIES
European Commission
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27.4.2017 |
EN |
Official Journal of the European Union |
C 133/1 |
Euro exchange rates (1)
26 April 2017
(2017/C 133/01)
1 euro =
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|
Currency |
Exchange rate |
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USD |
US dollar |
1,0893 |
|
JPY |
Japanese yen |
121,35 |
|
DKK |
Danish krone |
7,4395 |
|
GBP |
Pound sterling |
0,84903 |
|
SEK |
Swedish krona |
9,5605 |
|
CHF |
Swiss franc |
1,0835 |
|
ISK |
Iceland króna |
|
|
NOK |
Norwegian krone |
9,3485 |
|
BGN |
Bulgarian lev |
1,9558 |
|
CZK |
Czech koruna |
26,947 |
|
HUF |
Hungarian forint |
311,93 |
|
PLN |
Polish zloty |
4,2241 |
|
RON |
Romanian leu |
4,5338 |
|
TRY |
Turkish lira |
3,8991 |
|
AUD |
Australian dollar |
1,4559 |
|
CAD |
Canadian dollar |
1,4792 |
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HKD |
Hong Kong dollar |
8,4757 |
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NZD |
New Zealand dollar |
1,5806 |
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SGD |
Singapore dollar |
1,5206 |
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KRW |
South Korean won |
1 231,89 |
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ZAR |
South African rand |
14,4178 |
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CNY |
Chinese yuan renminbi |
7,5061 |
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HRK |
Croatian kuna |
7,4725 |
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IDR |
Indonesian rupiah |
14 482,59 |
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MYR |
Malaysian ringgit |
4,7357 |
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PHP |
Philippine peso |
54,278 |
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RUB |
Russian rouble |
61,7554 |
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THB |
Thai baht |
37,548 |
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BRL |
Brazilian real |
3,4521 |
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MXN |
Mexican peso |
20,6261 |
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INR |
Indian rupee |
69,8490 |
(1) Source: reference exchange rate published by the ECB.
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27.4.2017 |
EN |
Official Journal of the European Union |
C 133/2 |
Commission notice on current State aid recovery interest rates and reference/discount rates for 28 Member States applicable as from 1 May 2017
(Published in accordance with Article 10 of Commission Regulation (EC) No 794/2004 of 21 April 2004 (OJ L 140, 30.4.2004, p. 1))
(2017/C 133/02)
Base rates calculated in accordance with the Communication from the Commission on the revision of the method for setting the reference and discount rates (OJ C 14, 19.1.2008, p. 6.). Depending on the use of the reference rate, the appropriate margins have still to be added as defined in this communication. For the discount rate this means that a margin of 100 basis points has to be added. The Commission Regulation (EC) No 271/2008 of 30 January 2008 amending Regulation (EC) No 794/2004 foresees that, unless otherwise provided for in a specific decision, the recovery rate will also be calculated by adding 100 basis points to the base rate.
Modified rates are indicated in bold.
Previous table published in OJ C 73, 9.3.2017, p. 5.
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From |
To |
AT |
BE |
BG |
CY |
CZ |
DE |
DK |
EE |
EL |
ES |
FI |
FR |
HR |
HU |
IE |
IT |
LT |
LU |
LV |
MT |
NL |
PL |
PT |
RO |
SE |
SI |
SK |
UK |
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1.5.2017 |
… |
-0,10 |
-0,10 |
0,76 |
-0,10 |
0,45 |
-0,10 |
0,12 |
-0,10 |
-0,10 |
-0,10 |
-0,10 |
-0,10 |
0,70 |
0,44 |
-0,10 |
-0,10 |
-0,10 |
-0,10 |
-0,10 |
-0,10 |
-0,10 |
1,83 |
-0,10 |
1,10 |
-0,36 |
-0,10 |
-0,10 |
0,78 |
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1.4.2017 |
30.4.2017 |
-0,08 |
-0,08 |
0,76 |
-0,08 |
0,45 |
-0,08 |
0,16 |
-0,08 |
-0,08 |
-0,08 |
-0,08 |
-0,08 |
0,83 |
0,44 |
-0,08 |
-0,08 |
-0,08 |
-0,08 |
-0,08 |
-0,08 |
-0,08 |
1,83 |
-0,08 |
1,10 |
-0,36 |
-0,08 |
-0,08 |
0,78 |
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1.3.2017 |
31.3.2017 |
-0,08 |
-0,08 |
0,76 |
-0,08 |
0,45 |
-0,08 |
0,16 |
-0,08 |
-0,08 |
-0,08 |
-0,08 |
-0,08 |
1,05 |
0,53 |
-0,08 |
-0,08 |
-0,08 |
-0,08 |
-0,08 |
-0,08 |
-0,08 |
1,83 |
-0,08 |
1,10 |
-0,36 |
-0,08 |
-0,08 |
0,78 |
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1.1.2017 |
28.2.2017 |
-0,07 |
-0,07 |
0,76 |
-0,07 |
0,45 |
-0,07 |
0,16 |
-0,07 |
-0,07 |
-0,07 |
-0,07 |
-0,07 |
1,05 |
0,75 |
-0,07 |
-0,07 |
-0,07 |
-0,07 |
-0,07 |
-0,07 |
-0,07 |
1,83 |
-0,07 |
1,10 |
-0,36 |
-0,07 |
-0,07 |
0,78 |
V Announcements
COURT PROCEEDINGS
EFTA Court
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27.4.2017 |
EN |
Official Journal of the European Union |
C 133/3 |
Request for an Advisory Opinion from the EFTA Court by Norges Høyesterett dated 14 December 2016 in the case of Torbjørn Selstad Thue and the Norwegian Police Federation (Politiets Fellesforbund) v the Norwegian Government, represented by the Ministry of Justice and Public Security
(Case E-19/16)
(2017/C 133/03)
A request has been made to the EFTA Court dated 14 December 2016 from Norges Høyesterett (the Supreme Court of Norway), which was received at the Court Registry on 14 December 2016, for an Advisory Opinion in the case of Torbjørn Selstad Thue and the Norwegian Police Federation (Politiets Fellesforbund) v the Norwegian Government, represented by the Ministry of Justice and Public Security on the following questions:
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1. |
Is the time spent on a journey ordered by the employer, to and/or from a place of attendance other than the employee’s fixed or habitual place of attendance, when such travel takes place outside normal working hours, to be considered working time within the meaning of Article 2 of Directive 2003/88/EC? |
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2. |
Insofar as travel as described in Question I is not by itself sufficient to be classified as working time, what is the legal test and the relevant elements to be considered in the assessment of whether the time spent on travel should nonetheless be deemed to constitute working time? As part of this question, an opinion is requested on whether an intensity assessment should be made of the amount of work performed while travelling. |
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3. |
Does it have any bearing on the assessments under Questions I and II how often the employer specifies a place of attendance other than the fixed or habitual one? |
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27.4.2017 |
EN |
Official Journal of the European Union |
C 133/4 |
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT
of 15 December 2016
in Case E-1/16
Synnøve Finden AS v The Norwegian Government, represented by the Ministry of Agriculture and Food
(Product coverage of the EEA Agreement — Dairy products — State aid — State resources — Effect on trade and distortion of competition — Freedom of establishment)
(2017/C 133/04)
In Case E-1/16, Synnøve Finden AS v the Norwegian Government, represented by the Ministry of Agriculture and Food — REQUEST to the Court under Article 34 of the Agreement between the EFTA States on the Establishment of a Surveillance Authority and a Court of Justice by Oslo District Court (Oslo tingrett) concerning the interpretation of the Agreement on the European Economic Area, and in particular Articles 31 and 61 thereof, the Court, composed of Carl Baudenbacher, President and Judge-Rapporteur, Per Christiansen and Páll Hreinsson, Judges, gave judgment on 15 December 2016, the operative part of which is as follows:
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1. |
Article 61 EEA must be interpreted as meaning that a mechanism, provided for by national regulation, according to which an undertaking is granted NOK 0,50 per litre for a quantity limited up to 100 million litres for the distribution of certain products, some of which fall within the scope of the EEA Agreement, constitutes a State aid measure, provided that the referring court, having regard to all the facts before it and the guidance provided by the Court, finds that there is an intervention by the State or through State resources, that the intervention is liable to affect trade between EEA States, that it confers a selective advantage on the beneficiary and that it distorts or threatens to distort competition. Such a finding by the referring court would render the scheme subject to the notification requirement laid down in Article 1(3) of Part I of Protocol 3 to the Agreement between the EFTA States on a Surveillance Authority and a Court of Justice. |
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2. |
In the event that a State aid scheme is inseparably linked to certain products not exclusively outside the scope of the EEA Agreement, the measure as a whole must be notified to the EFTA Surveillance Authority. |
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3. |
A national court will not have cause to assess a State aid scheme in light of the freedom of establishment in Article 31 EEA, unless it can be assessed separately in law from the State aid measure. |
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27.4.2017 |
EN |
Official Journal of the European Union |
C 133/5 |
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT
of 22 December 2016
in Case E-3/16
Ski Taxi SA, Follo Taxi SA and Ski Follo Taxidrift AS v The Norwegian Government, represented by the Competition Authority
(Article 53 EEA — Restriction of competition by object — Public procurement — Submission of joint bids through a joint management company)
(2017/C 133/05)
In Case E-3/16, Ski Taxi SA, Follo Taxi SA and Ski Follo Taxidrift AS v the Norwegian Government, represented by the Competition Authority — REQUEST to the Court under Article 34 of the Agreement between the EFTA States on the Establishment of a Surveillance Authority and a Court of Justice by the Supreme Court of Norway (Norges Høyesterett) concerning the interpretation of the Agreement on the European Economic Area, and in particular Article 53 thereof, the Court, composed of Carl Baudenbacher, President and Judge-Rapporteur, Per Christiansen and Páll Hreinsson, Judges, gave judgment on 22 December 2016, the operative part of which is as follows:
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1. |
For an agreement to be regarded as a restriction of competition by object within the meaning of Article 53(1) EEA, it must reveal a sufficient degree of harm to competition. It does not suffice that it is simply capable, having regard to the specific legal and economic context, of resulting in the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition. |
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2. |
In order to determine whether an agreement between undertakings or a decision by an association of undertakings reveals a sufficient degree of harm to competition, regard must be had to the content of its provisions, its objectives and the economic and legal context of which it forms part. When determining that context, it is also necessary to take into consideration the nature of the services affected, as well as the real conditions of the functioning and structure of the market or markets in question. In addition, although the parties’ intention is not a necessary factor in determining whether an agreement between undertakings is restrictive, there is nothing prohibiting the competition authorities, the national courts or the Court from taking that factor into account. |
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3. |
An agreement reveals a sufficient degree of harm to competition that it may be considered a restriction of competition by object only if its harmful nature is easily identifiable. That assessment cannot go as far as a full examination of its actual or potential effects. Nor can it amount to carrying out an assessment of the pro- and anticompetitive effects and thus to applying a rule of reason. |
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4. |
In order to determine whether the submission of joint bids through a joint management company reveals a sufficient degree of harm that it may be considered a restriction of competition by object, regard must be had to the substance of the cooperation, its objectives and the economic and legal context of which it forms part. The parties’ intention may also be taken into account, although this is not a necessary factor. |
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5. |
Since the submission of joint bids involves price-fixing, which is expressly prohibited by Article 53(1) EEA, consideration of the economic and legal context may be limited to what is strictly necessary in order to establish the existence of a restriction of competition by object. However, such an assessment needs to take into account, albeit in an abridged manner, whether the parties to an agreement are actual or potential competitors and whether the joint setting of the price offered to the contracting authority constitutes an ancillary restraint. |
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6. |
While the disclosure of the joint nature of the bids to the contracting authority may be an indication that the parties did not intend to infringe the prohibition on agreements between undertakings, that, in itself, is not a prerequisite for determining whether an agreement may be considered a restriction of competition by object. |
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27.4.2017 |
EN |
Official Journal of the European Union |
C 133/6 |
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT
of 22 December 2016
in Case E-6/16
Fjarskipti hf. v The Icelandic Post and Telecom Administration
(Provision of telecommunications services — Directive 2002/21/EC — Electronic communications network — Electronic communications service — Public communications network)
(2017/C 133/06)
In Case E-6/16, Fjarskipti hf. v the Icelandic Post and Telecom Administration — REQUEST to the Court under Article 34 of the Agreement between the EFTA States on the Establishment of a Surveillance Authority and a Court of Justice by Reykjavík District Court (Héraðsdómur Reykjavíkur) concerning the interpretation of Article 2 of Directive 2002/21/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 March 2002 on a common regulatory framework for electronic communications networks and services (Framework Directive), the Court, composed of Carl Baudenbacher, President, Per Christiansen (Judge-Rapporteur) and Páll Hreinsson, Judges, gave judgment on 22 December 2016, the operative part of which is as follows:
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1. |
The definition in Article 2(a) of Directive 2002/21/EC of the term ‘electronic communications network’ must be interpreted as encompassing a system allowing for the conveyance of signals written as an SMS message on a user’s end device, connected through a web browser, via the internet, to the PHP script software on a telecommunications undertaking’s web domain, which receives the signals, processes them and conveys them in turn to an SMS server in the undertaking’s communications system, which then conveys them over a network to the recipient telephone number. |
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2. |
The definition in Article 2(c) of Directive 2002/21/EC of the term ‘electronic communications service’ encompasses a service that consists of the conveyance of signals which takes place on a communications network, as described in the first question, irrespective of whether a fee is collected for such a service, provided that the service is normally provided for remuneration. |
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3. |
The definition in Article 2(d) of Directive 2002/21/EC of the term ‘public communications network’ must be interpreted as covering a network as described in the first question, used to provide services as described in the second question, irrespective of whether those services are made available only to the subscribers of the particular undertaking, provided that the network is used wholly or mainly for the provision of such publicly available services. |
PROCEDURES RELATING TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF COMPETITION POLICY
European Commission
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27.4.2017 |
EN |
Official Journal of the European Union |
C 133/7 |
Prior notification of a concentration
(Case M.8297 — GE/Baker Hughes)
(Text with EEA relevance)
(2017/C 133/07)
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1. |
On 20 April 2017, the Commission received notification of a proposed concentration pursuant to Article 4 of Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 (1) by which General Electric Company (‘GE’, USA) acquires within the meaning of Article 3(1)(b) of the Merger Regulation sole control over Baker Hughes Incorporated (‘BHI’, USA) by way of purchase of shares. |
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2. |
The business activities of the undertakings concerned are: — for GE: broad and diversified range of activities, including GE’s oil and gas manufacturing and technology solutions spanning across subsea & drilling, rotating equipment, imaging and sensing; — for BHI: provision of oilfield services on a global scale to oil and gas exploration and production companies with a focus on the drilling and evaluation of wells as well as on the completion and production of wells. |
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3. |
On preliminary examination, the Commission finds that the notified transaction could fall within the scope of the Merger Regulation. However, the final decision on this point is reserved. |
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4. |
The Commission invites interested third parties to submit their possible observations on the proposed operation to the Commission. Observations must reach the Commission not later than 10 days following the date of this publication. Observations can be sent to the Commission by fax (+32 22964301), by email to COMP-MERGER-REGISTRY@ec.europa.eu or by post, under reference M.8297 — GE/Baker Hughes, to the following address:
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(1) OJ L 24, 29.1.2004, p. 1 (the ‘Merger Regulation’).
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27.4.2017 |
EN |
Official Journal of the European Union |
C 133/8 |
Prior notification of a concentration
(Case M.8411 — Safran Group/China Eastern Air Holding)
Candidate case for simplified procedure
(Text with EEA relevance)
(2017/C 133/08)
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1. |
On 21 April 2017, the Commission received notification of a proposed concentration pursuant to Article 4 of Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 (1) by which the undertakings Safran Landing Systems SAS of France, and China Eastern Airlines Co. Ltd of China acquire within the meaning of Article 3(1)(b) and 3(4) of the Merger Regulation joint control over a newly created company constituting a joint venture by way of a purchase of shares. |
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2. |
The business activities of the undertakings concerned are: — for Safran Landing Systems SAS: the manufacturing of aircraft landing gear and braking systems; Safran Landing Systems SAS belongs to Safran SA of France. — for China Eastern Airlines Co. Ltd: the provision of air transport services on international, domestic and regional routes; China Eastern Airlines Co. Ltd belongs to Chinese state-owned enterprise China Eastern Air Holding. — for the joint venture: the provision of single-aisle commercial aircraft landing gear maintenance, repair and overhaul services in China. |
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3. |
On preliminary examination, the Commission finds that the notified transaction could fall within the scope of the Merger Regulation. However, the final decision on this point is reserved. Pursuant to the Commission Notice on a simplified procedure for treatment of certain concentrations under the Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 (2) it should be noted that this case is a candidate for treatment under the procedure set out in this Notice. |
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4. |
The Commission invites interested third parties to submit their possible observations on the proposed operation to the Commission. Observations must reach the Commission not later than 10 days following the date of this publication. Observations can be sent to the Commission by fax (+32 22964301), by email to COMP-MERGER-REGISTRY@ec.europa.eu or by post, under reference number M.8411 — Safran Group/China Eastern Air Holding, to the following address:
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(1) OJ L 24, 29.1.2004, p. 1 (the ‘Merger Regulation’).
(2) OJ C 366, 14.12.2013, p. 5.