JUDGMENT OF THE GENERAL COURT (Sixth Chamber)

21 January 2026 (*)

( EU trade mark – Application for the EU word mark PAYKIT – Absolute ground for refusal – Descriptiveness – Article 7(1)(c) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 – Equal treatment – Principle of sound administration )

In Case T‑78/25,

Synonym Software, SA de CV, established in San Salvador (El Salvador), represented by P. Olson, lawyer,

applicant,

v

European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO), represented by T. Frydendahl, acting as Agent,

defendant,

THE GENERAL COURT (Sixth Chamber),

composed of P. Škvařilová-Pelzl, President, D. Kukovec (Rapporteur) and R. Pezzuto, Judges,

Registrar: V. Di Bucci,

having regard to the written part of the procedure,

having regard to the fact that no request for a hearing was submitted by the parties within three weeks after service of notification of the close of the written part of the procedure, and having decided to rule on the action without an oral part of the procedure, pursuant to Article 106(3) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court,

gives the following

Judgment

1        By its action under Article 263 TFEU, the applicant, Synonym Software, SA de CV, seeks the annulment of the decision of the Fourth Board of Appeal of the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) of 28 November 2024 (Case R 1577/2024-4) (‘the contested decision’).

 Background to the dispute

2        On 10 October 2023, the applicant filed an application for registration of an EU trade mark for the word sign PAYKIT.

3        The mark applied for covered goods and services that are in Classes 9, 36 and 42 of the Nice Agreement Concerning the International Classification of Goods and Services for the Purposes of the Registration of Marks of 15 June 1957, as revised and amended, and correspond, for each of those classes, to the following description:

–        Class 9: ‘Software; downloadable software for generating cryptographic keys for receiving and spending cryptocurrency; downloadable software for generating cryptographic keys for receiving and spending crypto assets; downloadable software for generating cryptographic keys for accessing documents, files, and data; downloadable software for generating cryptographic keys for establishing and accessing subordinate cryptographic key accounts; downloadable computer software for managing electronic payment transactions using distributed ledger technology (DLT); downloadable payment gateway software for linking e-commerce websites to credit card processing networks; computer software relating to financial matters and financial transactions; payment software; e-payment software; online payment software; computer software platforms for financial transactions; authentication software; downloadable software for payment protocol interfaces; downloadable software for facilitating online payments; downloadable software for peer-to-peer data transfers; downloadable software for payment method matching’;

–        Class 36: ‘Financial services; cryptocurrency payment processing; stablecoin payment processing; credit card payment processing services; blockchain-based payment verification services; electronic payment services involving electronic processing and subsequent transmission of bill payment data; merchant services, namely, payment transaction processing services; bill payment services provided through a website; bill payment services provided via an electronic wallet; payment verification services using distributed ledger technology (DLT); providing an internet website portal in the field of financial transaction and payment processing services; payment processing services in the field of cryptocurrency; payment processing services in the field of crypto assets; payment processing services in the field of cryptographic key-based transactions; payment processing services in the field of peer-to-peer payments; electronic commerce payment services, namely, establishing funded accounts used to purchase goods and services on the Internet; processing of credit card payments; processing of electronic wallet payments; payment processing and administration; electronic commerce payment services; conducting cashless payment transactions; processing of electronic payments; processing of payments by cryptocurrency’;

–        Class 42: ‘Software as a Service (SaaS); providing online, non-downloadable software; providing on-line non-downloadable software for generating cryptographic keys for receiving and spending cryptocurrency; providing on-line non-downloadable software for generating cryptographic keys for receiving and spending crypto assets; providing on-line non-downloadable software for generating cryptographic keys for accessing documents, files, and data; providing on-line non-downloadable software for generating cryptographic keys for establishing and accessing subordinate cryptographic key accounts; application service provider (ASP) featuring e-commerce software for use as a payment gateway that authorizes processing of credit cards or direct payments for merchants; providing temporary use of on-line, non-downloadable software for processing electronic payments; providing temporary use of on-line, non-downloadable software for processing payments by cryptocurrency; providing open-source toolkit software for user interface integration and developing customized payment processing solutions; platform as a service (PAAS) featuring computer software platforms for payment processing; providing temporary use of on-line, non-downloadable software for payment protocol interfaces; providing temporary use of on-line, non-downloadable software for facilitating online payments; providing temporary use of on-line, non-downloadable software for peer-to-peer data transfers; providing temporary use of on-line, non-downloadable software for payment method matching; providing subscription-based temporary use of on-line non-downloadable software for peer-to-peer technology; providing subscription-based temporary use of on-line non-downloadable software for payment processing; providing subscription-based temporary use of on-line non-downloadable software for cryptographic keys; providing subscription-based temporary use of on-line non-downloadable software for payment protocol interfaces for online payments; providing subscription-based temporary use of on-line non-downloadable software for subordinate key account creation and use; providing subscription-based temporary use of on-line non-downloadable software for payment method matching; providing subscription-based temporary use of on-line non-downloadable software for facilitating payments’.

4        By decision of 7 June 2024, the examiner refused the application for registration of the mark, on the basis of Article 7(1)(b) and (c) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 June 2017 on the European Union trade mark (OJ 2017 L 154, p. 1), read in conjunction with Article 7(2) of that regulation.

5        On 5 August 2024, the applicant filed a notice of appeal with EUIPO against the examiner’s decision.

6        By the contested decision, the Board of Appeal dismissed the appeal on the ground that the application for registration was caught by the absolute grounds of refusal set out in Article 7(1)(b) and (c) of Regulation 2017/1001 in respect of all the goods and services referred to in paragraph 3 above. According to the Board of Appeal, the mark applied for was descriptive of the goods and services in question and therefore lacked distinctiveness. Moreover, since the applicant had made a subsidiary claim before the examiner that the mark applied for had in any event acquired distinctive character through use within the meaning of Article 7(3) of that regulation, the Board of Appeal referred the case back to the examiner for him to rule on that question.

 Forms of order sought

7        The applicant claims that the Court should:

–        annul the contested decision or, in the alternative, partially annul that decision in relation to the goods and services which are not payment-related;

–        register the mark applied for in respect of the goods and services covered by the application;

–        order EUIPO to pay the costs.

8        EUIPO contends that the Court should:

–        dismiss the action;

–        order the applicant to pay the costs in the event that a hearing is convened.

 Law

 Jurisdiction of the Court

9        In the applicant’s second head of claim, it seeks an order that EUIPO should register the mark applied for. In that regard, it is sufficient to recall that when exercising judicial review of legality under Article 263 TFEU, the Court has no jurisdiction to issue directions to the institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of the European Union (see order of 26 October 1995, Pevasa and Inpesca v Commission, C‑199/94 P and C‑200/94 P, EU:C:1995:360, paragraph 24 and the case-law cited; see also, to that effect, judgment of 25 September 2018, Sweden v Commission, T‑260/16, EU:T:2018:597, paragraph 104 and the case-law cited). The second head of claim must therefore be rejected on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.

 Substance

10      The applicant puts forward, in essence, three pleas in law, the first alleging infringement of Article 7(1)(c) of Regulation 2017/1001, the second alleging infringement of Article 7(1)(b) of that regulation, and the third alleging infringement of the general principles of equal treatment and sound administration. The Court considers it appropriate to change the order in which the applicant’s pleas are dealt with and to examine the first plea first, before moving on to examine the third plea and lastly the second plea.

 First plea in law, alleging infringement of Article 7(1)(c) of Regulation 2017/1001

11      In support of its first plea, the applicant alleges that the Board of Appeal infringed Article 7(1)(c) of Regulation 2017/1001 in holding that the mark applied for was descriptive.

12      EUIPO disputes the applicant’s arguments.

13      Under Article 7(1)(c) of Regulation 2017/1001, trade marks which consist exclusively of signs or indications which may serve, in trade, to designate the kind, quality, quantity, intended purpose, value, geographical origin or the time of production of the goods or of rendering of the service, or other characteristics of the goods or service are not to be registered. Under Article 7(2) of that regulation, Article 7(1) is to apply notwithstanding that the grounds of non-registrability obtain in only part of the European Union.

14      For a sign to be caught by the prohibition set out in Article 7(1)(c) of Regulation 2017/1001, there must be a sufficiently direct and specific relationship between the goods and services in question to enable the relevant public immediately to perceive, without further thought, a description of the goods and services in question or one of their characteristics (see judgment of 2 December 2020, BSH Hausgeräte v EUIPO (Home Connect), T‑152/20, not published, EU:T:2020:584, paragraph 15 and the case-law cited).

15      A sign’s descriptiveness cannot be assessed other than by reference to the goods or services concerned, on the one hand, and by reference to the understanding which the relevant persons have of it, on the other (see judgment of 25 October 2005, Peek & Cloppenburg v OHIM (Cloppenburg), T‑379/03, EU:T:2005:373, paragraph 37 and the case-law cited).

16      In the present case, the applicant does not dispute the Board of Appeal’s finding that, in essence, the goods and services in question target both the public at large and professionals whose level of attention varies from average to high. Moreover, as the Board of Appeal pointed out, since the mark applied for is made up of English words, namely ‘pay’ and ‘kit’, the relevant public by reference to whom the suitability for protection of the mark applied for must be assessed is the English-speaking public of the European Union.

17      It is in the light of those considerations that the applicant’s arguments must be examined.

–       Meaning of the mark applied for

18      The Board of Appeal found, in essence, that, in view of the meaning of the word elements ‘pay’ and ‘kit’, the mark applied for will be perceived by the relevant public, immediately and without further thought, ‘as a reference to a toolkit or set of tools designed to enable and optimise financial transactions, potentially enhancing efficiency and security’.

19      Specifically, with regard to the word element ‘pay’, the Board of Appeal found that the examiner correctly relied on the definition of the verb ‘pay’ given in the Collins dictionary, which reads: ‘when you pay an amount of money to someone, you give it to them because you are buying something from them or because you owe it to them. When you pay something such as a bill or a debt, you pay the amount that you owe’.

20      With regard to the term ‘kit’, the Board of Appeal found that the examiner was also correct in basing the meaning of that term on the definitions given in the Collins dictionary and the Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English Online, which refer, respectively, to ‘a set of tools, supplies, construction materials, etc, for use together or for a purpose’ and to ‘electronic equipment, especially computers and computer software’.

21      The applicant disputes those findings of the Board of Appeal.

22      In the first place, it claims that the Board of Appeal erred in its assessment of the meaning of the mark applied for by basing it on an incorrect definition of the word ‘pay’. The quotation from the Collins dictionary given in paragraph 19 above is not as such a definition of the word element ‘pay’ but merely lists examples of the use of that word.

23      In adopting an incorrect definition of the word ‘pay’, the Board of Appeal treated the mark applied for not as the mark PAYKIT, but as the mark PAYMENT TOOLKIT. Although the applicant submits that the latter mark is descriptive of the goods and services at issue, it claims that this is not the case as regards the mark applied for, which is, at most, allusive or suggestive of those goods and services.

24      In the second place, the applicant submits that there is no proper connection between the verb ‘pay’ and the noun ‘kit’ and that, contrary to what the Board of Appeal maintains, their juxtaposition is not grammatically correct.

25      EUIPO disputes the applicant’s arguments.

26      As a first consideration, it should be recalled that although the average consumer normally perceives a mark as a whole and does not analyse its various details, the fact remains that, when perceiving a word sign, the average consumer will break it down into word elements which, for him or her, suggest a concrete and immediately understandable meaning or which resemble words known to him or her (see judgment of 1 February 2023, NFL Properties Europe v EUIPO – Groupe Duval (DUUUVAL), T‑671/21, not published, EU:T:2023:33, paragraph 57 and the case-law cited).

27      As is apparent from the findings of the Board of Appeal set out in paragraphs 18 to 20 above, the word elements ‘pay’ and ‘kit’ are commonly used words, each suggesting a concrete and immediately understandable meaning for the relevant public, with the result that that public will identify them as distinct words in the mark applied for.

28      As a second consideration, clearly the meanings of the word elements ‘pay’ and ‘kit’ identified by the Board of Appeal are well known and listed as such in the dictionaries referred to in paragraphs 19 and 20 above, with the result that there is no reason to call them into question. Furthermore, the applicant does not put forward any specific, substantiated argument to show that the definition of those terms, in particular of the word ‘pay’ given in paragraph 19 above, is incorrect. On the contrary, some of the definitions of the term ‘pay’ put forward by the applicant fully corroborate the meaning of that term adopted by the Board of Appeal.

29      As a third consideration, as regards the applicant’s assertion that the allegedly incorrect definition of the term ‘pay’ led the Board of Appeal to perceive the mark applied for not as PAYKIT, but as the mark PAYMENT TOOLKIT, clearly that assertion stems from a misreading of the contested decision. Besides the fact that that decision does not contain any reference to the latter mark, it should be noted that the Board of Appeal consistently identified the mark applied for as PAYKIT. Moreover, as EUIPO correctly stated, the fact that the Board of Appeal found that the mark applied for conveyed a particular semantic content for the relevant public, namely that of a ‘payment toolkit’, does not mean that it would have perceived the mark applied for as being the mark PAYMENT TOOLKIT.

30      As a fourth consideration, with regard to the applicant’s line of argument set out in paragraph 24 above, clearly the applicant failed to demonstrate why there was no possible connection between the verb ‘pay’ and the noun ‘kit’ and how the juxtaposition of those words is not grammatically correct.

31      It should be noted, moreover, that the combination of verbs and nouns is a linguistic construction that is very common in English. In that regard, EUIPO, correctly, refers to examples of compound nouns similar to ‘paykit’, commonly used by the English-speaking section of the relevant public, such as ‘playground’, ‘haircut’, ‘carpark’ and ‘swimsuit’.

32      As a fifth consideration, in so far as the applicant states that the meaning of the mark applied for identified by the Board of Appeal is vitiated by an error of assessment, it should be recalled that a mark consisting of a word composed of elements, each of which is descriptive of characteristics of the goods or services in respect of which registration is sought, is itself descriptive of those characteristics, unless there is a perceptible difference between the word and the mere sum of its parts. That presupposes that, because of the unusual nature of the combination in relation to the goods or services, the word creates an impression which is far enough removed from that conveyed by the simple combination of meanings of its constituent elements that it is more than the sum of its parts (see judgment of 26 July 2023, Yayla Türk v EUIPO – Marmara Import-Export (Sütat), T‑315/22, not published, EU:T:2023:432, paragraph 58 and the case-law cited).

33      In the present case, given that the elements ‘pay’ and ‘kit’ are easily and immediately recognisable, that their combination is not unusual in relation to the goods and services in question and that the expression ‘paykit’ complies with the grammatical rules of the English language, it must be held that that expression does not create an impression on the part of the relevant public sufficiently removed from that produced by the mere juxtaposition of its constituent elements to be more than the sum of those elements (see, to that effect, judgment of 13 July 2022, Brand Energy Holdings v EUIPO (RAPIDGUARD), T‑573/21, not published, EU:T:2022:450, paragraph 39).

34      Consequently, the Board of Appeal correctly found that the relevant public would understand the expression ‘paykit’ as a reference to a toolkit or set of tools designed to facilitate and optimise financial transactions, potentially enhancing efficiency and security.

–       The link between the mark applied for and the goods and services in question

35      With regard to the link between the mark applied for and the goods and services in question, the Board of Appeal found that that mark directly conveyed a purely informative message, which serves to highlight the kind and intended purpose of the goods and services it designates, namely tools and platforms designed to facilitate and optimise financial transactions. It thus concluded that the mark applied for conveyed obvious and direct information regarding characteristics of those goods and services and the link between that mark and the goods and services in question was sufficiently close for the sign to fall within the scope of the prohibition laid down by Article 7(1)(c) of Regulation 2017/1001, in conjunction with Article 7(2) of that regulation.

36      The applicant submits that the Board of Appeal was incorrect in so far as it concluded that the mark applied for was descriptive of the goods and services in question. First, it claims in essence that the link between that mark and the goods and services referred to in paragraph 3 above is not sufficiently close for that mark to come within the scope of Article 7(1)(c) of Regulation 2017/1001, since the relevant public will not immediately and without any further thought associate the meaning of the mark applied for with the characteristics, intended purpose or kind of those goods and services. The sign applied for might be regarded at most as being suggestive or allusive.

37      Secondly, the applicant alleges that the Board of Appeal merely used general reasoning in respect of all the goods and services in question, without taking account of the fact that they are goods and services that are described in broad terms, some of which are not ‘tools’ or in any way linked to financial transactions, nor did it disclose in a clear manner the reasons for rejecting the registration of the trade mark applied for in relation to each of those goods and services.

38      EUIPO disputes the applicant’s arguments.

39      For the purposes of applying Article 7(1)(c) of Regulation 2017/1001, it is appropriate to examine whether, from the point of view of the relevant public, there exists a sufficiently direct and specific link between the sign applied for and the goods and services in question.

40      It should be noted that, where registration of a mark is sought in respect of various goods or services, the Board of Appeal must determine specifically that none of the grounds for refusal of registration listed in Article 7(1) of Regulation 2017/1001 applies to the mark, in relation to each of those goods or services, and may reach conclusions which differ depending upon the goods or services in question. Therefore, when refusing registration of a mark, the Board of Appeal is required to state in its decision its conclusion for each of the goods and services specified in the application for registration, regardless of the manner in which that application was formulated. However, where the same ground for refusal is given for a category or group of goods or services, the competent authority may limit itself to using general reasoning for all of the goods or services concerned (see judgment of 15 November 2023, Medela v EUIPO (THE SCIENCE OF CARE), T‑97/23, not published, EU:T:2023:719, paragraph 24 and the case-law cited).

41      In the present case, as a first consideration, the goods in question in Class 9 all constitute software which is intended either for general applications or for financial services, with the result that they share the same nature and, in some cases, the same intended purpose. Similarly, the services in question in Class 36 all constitute financial services which encompass general payment processing, with the result that they share the same intended purpose. Lastly, the services in question in Class 42 all constitute services relating to the provision of software and platform services which are intended either for general applications or for financial services, with the result that they share the same nature and, in some cases, the same intended purpose. Consequently, in the light of the case-law cited in paragraph 40 above, the Board of Appeal was entitled to find that the goods in question in Class 9, the services in question in Class 36 and the services in question in Class 42 were categories of goods or services, within the meaning of that case-law, and to conduct an assessment of the registrability of the sign applied for, supplying general reasoning for each of those categories.

42      As a second consideration, it should be noted that in paragraphs 31 to 34 of the contested decision the Board of Appeal also carried out a detailed analysis of the link between the mark applied for and each category of goods and services  in question that contains no errors of assessment.

43      In view, first, of the perception of the expression ‘paykit’ by the relevant public as a set of tools, including software, designed to facilitate and optimise financial transactions and, secondly, of the fact that the goods in question in Class 9 are computer software intended in some circumstances for financial services, such as managing cryptocurrency and electronic payments, the relevant public will understand immediately that the mark applied for refers to software which provides essential tools for managing digital currencies, including generating cryptographic keys and facilitating secure online payments, as the Board of Appeal correctly found in paragraphs 31 and 32 of the contested decision.

44      Likewise, taking into account the fact that the services in question in Class 36 constitute financial services which encompass general payment processing, the relevant public will immediately understand that the mark applied for refers to the fact that those services offer the required tools or means to handle payments, as the Board of Appeal correctly stated in paragraph 34 of the contested decision.

45      Lastly, with regard to the services in question in Class 42, as the Board of Appeal correctly stated in paragraph 33 of the contested decision, in view of the fact that those services are linked to the provision of software intended in some circumstances for financial services, such as payment processing, the mark applied for will immediately be understood by the relevant public as describing services that provide integrated tools and platforms for supporting payment processes and related software functionalities.

46      Therefore, the mark applied for has a sufficiently direct and specific link with the goods and services in question and will be perceived by the relevant public as an indication of the nature and intended purpose of the goods and services in question. As a result, contrary to what the applicant alleges, that mark is not suggestive or allusive, but is clearly descriptive.

47      In the light of all the above considerations, the Board of Appeal was correct in so far as it concluded that the mark applied for had to be regarded as descriptive of the goods and services in question, for the purpose of Article 7(1)(c) of Regulation 2017/1001.

48      Consequently, the first plea must be rejected.

 Third plea in law, alleging infringement of the general principles of equal treatment and sound administration

49      By its third plea, the applicant alleges, in essence, that the Board of Appeal infringed the general principles of equal treatment and sound administration. First, according to the applicant, the Board of Appeal ought to have taken into account EUIPO’s previous decision-making practice, in particular the fact that marks similar to the mark applied for had, at least partly, been registered. Secondly, the applicant complains that the Board of Appeal failed to take into account the fact that the mark applied for has already been registered in the United Kingdom for goods and services identical to those referred to in paragraph 3 above.

50      EUIPO contends that the applicant’s arguments must be rejected.

51      In the first place, with regard to registrations previously made with EUIPO which are, according to the applicant, comparable to the mark applied for, it should be noted that, according to case-law, the legality of the decisions of Boards of Appeal which are adopted in the exercise of circumscribed powers and are not a matter of discretion must be assessed solely on the basis of Regulation 2017/1001, as interpreted by the Courts of the European Union, and not on the basis of EUIPO’s previous decision-making practice, which, in any event, cannot bind the Courts of the European Union (judgments of 15 September 2005, BioID v OHIM, C‑37/03 P, EU:C:2005:547, paragraph 47, and of 10 September 2015, Laverana v OHIM (BIO PROTEINREICHER PFLANZENKOMPLEX AUS EIGENER HERSTELLUNG), T‑571/14, not published, EU:T:2015:626, paragraph 22).

52      EUIPO is indeed under a duty to exercise its powers in accordance with the general principles of EU law, such as the principle of equal treatment and the principle of sound administration. In the light of those two principles, EUIPO must, when examining an application for registration of an EU trade mark, take into account the decisions already taken in respect of similar applications and consider with especial care whether it should decide in the same way or not (see judgment of 10 March 2011, Agencja Wydawnicza Technopol v OHIM, C‑51/10 P, EU:C:2011:139, paragraphs 73 and 74 and the case-law cited).

53      That said, the way in which the principles of equal treatment and sound administration are applied must be consistent with respect for legality. Moreover, for reasons of legal certainty and, indeed, of sound administration, the examination of any trade mark application must be stringent and full, in order to prevent trade marks from being improperly registered. That examination must be undertaken in each individual case. The registration of a sign as an EU trade mark depends on specific criteria, which are applicable in the factual circumstances of the particular case and the purpose of which is to ascertain whether the sign at issue is caught by a ground for refusal (see judgment of 10 March 2011, Agencja Wydawnicza Technopol v OHIM, C‑51/10 P, EU:C:2011:139, paragraphs 75 and 77 and the case-law cited).

54      In the present case, the mark applied for is caught by one of the grounds for refusal set out in Article 7(1) of Regulation 2017/1001. Since the Court held in paragraph 47 above that the Board of Appeal had correctly concluded that registration of the mark applied for was incompatible with that regulation, the applicant cannot successfully rely on EUIPO’s previous decision-making practice in order to invalidate that conclusion.

55      In the second place, with regard to the registration of the trade mark PAYKIT in the United Kingdom, it should be noted that, according to settled case-law, the EU trade mark regime is an autonomous legal system which pursues objectives peculiar to it; it applies independently of any national system. Consequently, the registrability or protectability of a sign as an EU trade mark must be assessed by reference only to the relevant EU rules. Accordingly, EUIPO and, if appropriate, the EU judicature are not bound by a decision given in a Member State, or indeed a third country, that the sign in question is registrable as a national mark (see judgment of 20 October 2021, Square v EUIPO ($ Cash App), T‑210/20, not published, EU:T:2021:711, paragraph 95 and the case-law cited).

56      The applicant cannot therefore complain that the Board of Appeal failed to take into account, for the purposes of assessing the registrability of the sign in question, the fact that the mark applied for has already been registered in the United Kingdom.

57      Consequently, the third plea must be rejected.

 Second plea in law, alleging infringement of Article 7(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001

58      In its second plea, alleging infringement of Article 7(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001, the applicant claims, in essence, that the mark applied for is not devoid of any distinctive character.

59      EUIPO disputes the applicant’s arguments.

60      Article 7(1) of Regulation 2017/1001 makes clear that for a sign to be ineligible for registration as an EU trade mark it is sufficient that one of the absolute grounds for refusal listed in that provision applies (see judgment of 29 January 2025, Coswell v EUIPO (Biorepair), T‑1128/23, not published, EU:T:2025:108, paragraph 64 and the case-law cited).

61      In the present case, since it has been found that the mark applied for was descriptive of the goods and services in question within the meaning of Article 7(1)(c) of Regulation 2017/1001 and since that ground alone justifies the refusal of registration, the second plea, alleging infringement of Article 7(1)(b) of that regulation, cannot usefully be raised in this case and must therefore be rejected.

62      In the light of all the foregoing, the action must be dismissed in its entirety.

 Costs

63      Under Article 134(1) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings.

64      Although the applicant has been unsuccessful, EUIPO has applied for the applicant to be ordered to pay the costs only in the event that a hearing is convened. Since no hearing was held, each party must be ordered to bear its own costs.

On those grounds,

THE GENERAL COURT (Sixth Chamber)

hereby:

1.      Dismisses the action;

2.      Orders Synonym Software, SA de CV, and the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) each to bear their own costs.

Delivered in open court in Luxembourg on 21 January 2026.

*      Language of the case: English.