This document is an excerpt from the EUR-Lex website
Document 52013SC0207
COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF THE IMPACT ASSESSMENT Accompanying the document Legislative proposals to update the regulations on the Single European Sky — SES2+
COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF THE IMPACT ASSESSMENT Accompanying the document Legislative proposals to update the regulations on the Single European Sky — SES2+
COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF THE IMPACT ASSESSMENT Accompanying the document Legislative proposals to update the regulations on the Single European Sky — SES2+
/* SWD/2013/0207 final */
COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF THE IMPACT ASSESSMENT Accompanying the document Legislative proposals to update the regulations on the Single European Sky — SES2+ /* SWD/2013/0207 final */
COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF THE IMPACT ASSESSMENT
Accompanying the document Legislative proposals
to update the regulations on the
Single European Sky — SES2+
1. Problem definition The Single European Sky (SES) initiative aims
to improve the overall efficiency of the way in which European airspace is
organised and managed. The experience gained with SES I since 2004 and
SES II since 2009 has shown that the principles and direction of the SES
are valid and warrant a continuation of their implementation. But the
initiative is experiencing delays in its implementation. The SES 2+
package should improve implementation of SES II by focusing on certain
institutional matters, as well as on further performance improvement of air navigation
service provisions. The first problem area addressed in the
SES2+ impact assessment is the insufficient efficiency of Air Navigation
Service (ANS) provision. ANS provision remains relatively inefficient in
terms of cost- and flight efficiency, as well as of capacity offered. This is clear
when compared with the United States, which covers airspace of a similar size.
In the US, the airspace is controlled by a single service provider, as opposed
to 38 en-route service providers in Europe. The US service provider controls
almost 70 % more flights with 38 % fewer staff. The main causes for
this difference in productivity are Europe’s shortcomings in setting up and
enforcing the performance scheme, ineffective supervisory authorities and the disproportionally
high number of support staff working for the service providers. The second key problem addressed is a fragmented
ATM system. The European ATM system consists of 27 national authorities
overseeing over a hundred Air Navigation Service Providers (ANSPs), with the expected
differences in systems, rules and procedures. There are many additional costs
caused by Europe having a large number of service providers, each procuring
their own systems, mostly training their own staff, creating their own
operating procedures and being limited territorially to providing services in a
small airspace. To overcome fragmentation, the SES has introduced the idea of
cross-border Functional Air Blocks (FABs) and a centralised Network Manager to
run certain network-level services. However, FABs are not yet performance-oriented
and the Network Manager remains too weak. The SES 2+ initiative will affect most
ANSPs, Member State authorities, airspace users, the Commission and EASA. Problems, drivers and root causes 2. Subsidiarity Articles 58, 90, and 100 of the Treaty on
the Functioning of the European Union extend to air transport the objectives of
the internal market in the context of a Common EU Transport Policy. Actions by Member States alone cannot
ensure the optimal building of capacity and safety, whilst reducing the cost
levels of EU air traffic management services. In agreeing to the SES I and
SES II packages, Member States acknowledged that fragmentation of European
airspace, driven by national rules and geographical borders, is at the centre
of the problem. 3. Objectives General
objective: Improve the competitiveness of the European Aviation
system vis-á-vis other comparable regions, and in particular develop further
the Single European Sky initiative Specific
objectives: SO1: Improve
performance of Air Traffic Services in terms of efficiency SO2: Improve utilisation of air
traffic management capacity Operational
objectives: OO1: Ensure
that the provision of Air Navigation Services is transparent, based on market
principles and customer value. OO2: Strengthen the role of the National
Supervisory Authorities OO3: Strengthen the process of setting up
targets and enforcing the performance scheme (including the reinforcement of
the Performance Review Body/Performance Review Unit (PRB/PRU) OO4: Strategic redirection of FABs OO5: Strengthen the governance and
operational scope of the Network Manager 4. Policy options Based on analysis and stakeholder
consultation, a broad set of measures in six policy domains have been identified,
all with the potential to address all the problem drivers described above. Root cause of problem areas || Policy domains || Policy options considered Problem Area 1: Insufficient efficiency of Air Navigation Service provision ANSPs are to a great extent natural monopolies || 1: Support services || 1.1 — Do nothing 1.2 — Functional separation of support services 1.3 — Structural separation of support services ANSP operations lack customer focus || 2: Focusing ANSPs on customer needs || 2.1 — Do nothing 2.2 — Improved consultation and sign-off on certain investment plans by airspace users. 2.3 – 2.2 plus giving airspace user groups a role in ANSP governance Ineffective regulatory role of NSAs || 3: Ineffective role of NSAs || 3.1 — Do nothing. 3.2 — Introduce mutual cooperation, EU-level coordination and pooling of experts 3.3 – 3.2 plus institutional separation of NSAs from the ANSPs Inefficient governance mechanism for setting up the performance scheme || 4: Performance scheme governance mechanism || 4.1 — Do nothing 4.2 — Reduced Member State involvement in the target setting process. The PRB under Commission supervision. 4.3 — Allow Member States to directly nominate the PRB, but let the PRB set targets itself, without comitology. Problem Area 2: A fragmented ATM system FABs are not performance-driven, and the current set-up has insufficient added value || 5: Refocusing of FABs || 5.1 — Do nothing. 5.2 — Create more prescriptive and enforceable targets/criteria for FABs 5.3 — Create a more flexible and performance-driven FAB model 5.4 — Top-down approach, with a new entity created from the PRB and the Network Manager to design service provision Weak role and limited scope of the Network Manager || 6: The role of the Network Manager || 6.1 — Do nothing 6.2 — Move operational governance to industry and simplify EU and state governance of strategic matters 6.3 — Create a joint undertaking of industry to run the Network Manager 6.4 — As option 6.2 or 6.3, but with a role for Eurocontrol built around the Network Manager and a more comprehensive centralised service provider, and including airspace design in the broad sense Policy Option 1: Support services[1]. The first option is to do nothing (1.1). Support
services can also be functionally (option 1.2) or structurally (option 1.3) separated.
In case of functional separation, ANSPs would need to internally organise
provision of support services, so that these can be
clearly distinguished as a separate business unit. If structural
separation is chosen, assets and staff required for
support service provision would be transferred to a separate organisation
independent from the core air traffic control service provider. Policy Option 2: Focusing ANSPs on
customer needs. The first option is to do nothing
(2.1). The second option (2.2) requires improved airspace user consultation and
enables airspace user-groups to ‘sign-off’ on ANSP
investment plans. Option 2.3 builds on option 2.2 by adding a compulsory
management/supervisory board seat for each of the three airspace user groups
(airlines, military aviation and general/business aviation). Policy Option 3: Ineffective role of
National Supervisory Authorities (NSAs). The first
option is to do nothing (3.1). Option 3.2 focuses on creating closer cooperation
between the NSAs and encouraging exchange of best practice and pooling of
national experts under EASA. Option 3.3 builds on option 3.2 but requires NSAs’
full institutional separation from the ANSPs they oversee, instead of the
current functional separation. Policy Option 4: Performance scheme
governance mechanism. If the
do nothing option (4.1) is chosen, it would be
impossible to reach the initial 2020 SES objectives. With
option 4.2, the process of setting targets would be shortened and the
possibility for Member State influence would be reduced. Option 4.3 would turn
the existing setting upside-down by allowing Member States (instead of the
Commission) to nominate PRB members, while adhering to strict independence
criteria. The PRB would then set targets itself and the comitology process
would be entirely eliminated to ensure process speed and efficiency. Policy Option 5: Refocusing of FABs. The do nothing option (5.1) would enable
the slow process to continue and wouldn’t increase the FABs’ focus on performance.
Option 5.2 would replace the current FAB criteria with prescriptive targets.
Option 5.3 would make the FABs more flexible tools for improving performance.
Airspace design would be increasingly moved to the Network Manager (the level
above FABs). In option 5.4, a central planning entity would be created to
redesign EU airspace based on 4-6 major concession blocks. Policy Option 6: The role of the Network
Manager. In the do
nothing option (6.1), the Network Manager would continue to develop based on
the current legal scope and functions. In option 6.2, a two-level governance
system would be created. Member States would still retain a veto right in matters
relevant to national sovereignty, but industry would ensure operational
governance. In option 6.3, the Network Manager would become an Industry Joint
Undertaking. Like options 6.2 and 6.3, option 6.4 would require governance
reform to improve industry’s role. A key additional feature of option 6.4 is
the concept of centralised services in which certain new ATM services driven by
SESAR-related data would be centralised. 5. Assessment of impact Given the strong focus on cost-efficiency,
the main impacts of this initiative are economic and social, whilst the
environmental impacts are mostly indirect. 5.1. Integrated structure and support services Option 1.2 (functional separation) brings limited benefits,
mainly in terms of transparency of costs related to support services. Option
1.3 (structural separation) is more likely to encourage ANS competition
and drive down costs for air operators. However, efficiency gains could result
in more demanding working conditions and reduced employment in the ANSPs. Hence,
option 1.3 is the most performance-optimised one, while option 1.2 brings
incremental performance improvements with fewer redundancies and distress for ANSP
employees. 5.2. Focusing ANSPs on customer needs Both option 2.2. (improved consultation
and sign-off) and 2.3. (governance board) would have a positive
impact on overall efficiency and capacity, but also some negative impact on
employment conditions in ANSPs. While the benefits of option 2.3 are marginally
higher than those of option 2.2, option 2.3 carries higher risks and would be
more difficult to implement politically. Therefore, option 2.2 seems to have
the best balance between short- and long-term costs and benefits. 5.3. Ineffective role of NSAs Option 3.3, which adds institutional separation to option 3.2 (mutual
cooperation and expert pooling), gives higher benefits, but there
are high associated political risks. Although the risks associated with option
3.2 are lower, its benefits are also significantly smaller. Therefore, option
3.3 is the preferred one. 5.4. Performance scheme governance mechanism Options 4.2 and 4.3 have similar broad outcomes,
but carry major differences in associated (political) risks. For option 4.2 (reduced
Member State involvement), the risk is linked to the likelihood of Member
States achieving agreement on the proposal. Option 4.3 (direct nomination of
the PRB by Member States, without comitology) carries a considerable risk
of the EU losing control of the performance scheme. The choice is based on the risk
assessment, which tips the scales in favour of option 4.2. 5.5. Refocusing of FABs Option 5.4 (top-down FABs) has by
far the highest possible efficiency and capacity benefits, but is also
politically very difficult to implement and contains some serious technical
feasibility risks. Option 5.3 (flexible FABs) provides roughly the same
benefits as option 5.2 (prescriptive targets), but is better aligned
with the underlying principles of the performance scheme. It also carries
additional potential if combined smartly with other options. It could therefore
be recommended as the preferred option, on the condition that a deadline is set
for revising the FAB concept. 5.6. Role of the network manager Option 6.4 (Eurocontrol as expanded Network
Manager) brings the greatest efficiency and capacity benefits. The
only question is whether it should be combined with the governance model in
option 6.2 (operational governance by industry) or 6.3 (industry
Joint Undertaking). Option 6.3 has a slight edge, because the organisation
could seek efficiencies more actively if it is fully industry-run than if the Member
States in governance continue to defend their national status quos.
Since the Network Manager providing centralised services would be an ANSP like
any other, it would be logical to favour industry management and choose a
combination of options 6.4 and 6.3 as the preferred option. 6. Comparison of options In total, 20 policy options in 6 different
policy domains were assessed. The options were further combined to form 3
policy scenarios: Policy scenario 1: Baseline || Policy scenario 2: Risk-optimised || Policy scenario 3: Performance-optimised Do nothing || Option 1.2 Functional separation of support services || Option 1.3 Structural separation of support services Option 2.2 Improved consultation and sign-off || Option 2.2 Improved consultation and sign-off Option 3.2 Mutual cooperation and expert pooling || Option 3.3 3.2+ Institutional separation of NSAs from ANSPs Option 4.2 Reduced Member State involvement || Option 4.2 Reduced Member State involvement Option 5.2 Prescriptive FAB targets || Option 5.3 Flexible FABs Option 6.3 Industry Joint Undertaking || Options 6.4+6.3 Industry Joint Undertaking + Eurocontrol as expanded Network Manager Options 2.3, 4.3 and 5.4 were discarded as politically
too risky and with limited or uncertain benefits. Option 6.2 was dropped as its
benefits would be only marginal compared to the baseline. Scenario 2 seeks to secure moderate
improvement, with minimal political risks, given that the most politically
contentious options, such as structural separation of support services (option
1.3) and institutional separation of NSAs from the ANSPs (option 3.3) are left
out. However, this excludes the possibility of applying option 5.3 (creation of
more flexible FABs), as this would make sense only if ANSP services were
unbundled. Scenario
3 carries a higher risk of opposition, but has the potential to considerably improve
performance by introducing more ambitious policy options and by creating synergies
between the options. Comparison of policy scenarios || Policy Scenario 1 Baseline scenario || Policy scenario 2: Risk-optimised || Policy scenario 3 Performance-optimised* SUMMARY OF IMPACTS Economic impacts: || || || Cost efficiency || 0 || >€ 250 M p.a. || >€ 780M p.a. Flight efficiency || 0 || >€ 1.6 Bn p.a. || >€ 2 Bn p.a. Capacity/Delays || 0 || >€ 120 M p.a. || >€ 150 M p.a. Administration costs || 0 || € -7.9-9.7 M p.a. || € -13.8-16.8 M p.a. Macroeconomic impacts || || || GDP p.a. 2020/2030 || 0 || ~€ 600 M/ € 700 M || ~€ 750 M/€ 900 M Employment 2030 || 0 || ~+10 000 || ~+13 000 Of which airline employment 2020/2030 || 0 || + || ~+500/+3000 Social Impacts: || || || Employment and working conditions for workers in || || || NSAs || 0 || + || ~+80 jobs ANSPs || 0 || ~ -3400 || ~ -9400 Safety || 0 || + || ++ Environmental impacts || || || Noise || 0 || 0 || 0 Emissions || 0 || ++ || ++ EFFECTIVENESS/ EFFICIENCY/ COHERENCE Effectiveness: || || || Specific objectives: || || || SO1: Improve performance of ATS in terms of efficiency || 0 || ++ || +++ SO2: Improve utilisation of ATM capacity || 0 || + || + Efficiency, excluding macro-economic impacts || 0 || Net benefits ~€ 1960 M p.a. || Net benefits ~€ 2915 M p.a. Coherence || 0 || + || ++ As regards effectiveness, the difference
between the two scenarios is made narrower by the common choice of the
performance scheme in option 2.2. However, in terms of efficiency, the
small additional administration costs in scenario 3 triple the cost-efficiency
gains, resulting in about 1 billion more in direct benefits than in scenario 2.
In addition, both scenarios would trigger growth in the aviation sector, which
should create 10 000 jobs if scenario 2 is chosen, and some 13 000
jobs if scenario 3 is chosen. As regards coherence, the performance-optimised
scenario fits in better with the overall ideology of the performance scheme
within the SES framework. In conclusion, the performance-optimised
scenario 3 is considered to be the preferred policy choice. 7. Monitoring and evaluation The Commission will evaluate whether the
objectives of the initiative were achieved, once in 2015 and again in 2020. If
they weren’t, the Commission will consider which additional steps need to be
taken in order to achieve them. Performance will be monitored via the
Performance Review Body’s annual reports on the performance of the EU’s ATM
system, and via the monthly reports issued by the Network Manager. The key
indicators are: Specific objective || Monitoring indicators SO1: Improve performance of Air Traffic Services in terms of efficiency || · Delays (min/flight) · ANSP-related costs to users · Reduction in average flight extensions · Reduction in emissions SO2: Improve utilisation of air traffic management capacity || · En-route flight efficiency · Improvement in runway throughput at currently capacity-constrained airports [1] Services such as aeronautical information,
communication, navigation, surveillance or meteorology, which support the core
air traffic service providers.