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Document 32026R0885

Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2026/885 of 21 April 2026 implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/2642 concerning restrictive measures in view of Russia’s destabilising activities

ST/7796/2026/REV/1

OJ L, 2026/885, 21.4.2026, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg_impl/2026/885/oj (BG, ES, CS, DA, DE, ET, EL, EN, FR, GA, HR, IT, LV, LT, HU, MT, NL, PL, PT, RO, SK, SL, FI, SV)

Legal status of the document In force

ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg_impl/2026/885/oj

European flag

Official Journal
of the European Union

EN

L series


2026/885

21.4.2026

COUNCIL IMPLEMENTING REGULATION (EU) 2026/885

of 21 April 2026

implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/2642 concerning restrictive measures in view of Russia’s destabilising activities

THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,

Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

Having regard to Council Regulation (EU) 2024/2642 of 8 October 2024 concerning restrictive measures in view of Russia’s destabilising activities (1), and in particular Article 13(1) thereof,

Having regard to the proposal from the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy,

Whereas:

(1)

On 8 October 2024, the Council adopted Regulation (EU) 2024/2642.

(2)

On 18 December 2025 the European Council adopted conclusions, in which it strongly condemned all recent hybrid attacks against the European Union and its Member State.

(3)

The Union remains unwavering in its condemnation Russia’s malign activities directed against the Union, its Member States, international organisations and third countries.

(4)

In view of the gravity of the situation, the Council considers that two legal persons should be added to the list of natural and legal persons, entities and bodies set out in Annex I to Regulation (EU) 2024/2642.

(5)

Regulation (EU) 2024/2642 should therefore be amended accordingly,

HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION:

Article 1

Annex I to Regulation (EU) 2024/2642 is amended in accordance with the Annex to this Regulation.

Article 2

This Regulation shall enter into force on the date of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union.

This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States.

Done at Luxembourg, 21 April 2026.

For the Council

The President

K. KALLAS


(1)   OJ L, 2024/2642, 9.10.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/2642/oj.


ANNEX

In Annex I to Regulation (EU) 2024/2642, the following entries are added under the heading ‘B. Legal persons, entities and bodies’:

 

Name

Identifying information

Statement of Reasons

Date of listing

‘18.

Euromore

a.k.a. Euroview

a.k.a. Euroview Media

Address: Avenue Ariane 5, 1200 Brussels, Belgium

Website: https://euromore.eu/, https://euroview.media

Euromore is a media platform which operates within the pro-Kremlin information architecture as an unofficial media relay, intended to amplify, recycle, and legitimise Russian narratives and disinformation targeting European audiences. Euromore recurrently disseminates content challenging the legitimacy of Union institutions and justifying Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine. Its editorial line consistently converges with talking points promoted by the Kremlin, particularly regarding the alleged responsibility of NATO and the Union in the conflict in Ukraine and the delegitimisation of the Ukrainian authorities.

The platform regularly hosts contributors known for their dissemination of conspiracy-driven narratives or disinformation, allowing those contributors to retain public visibility and to continue their influence activities. Euromore’s website appears to have been cleaned up and to contain only an article complaining about Western sanctions targeting propaganda media. However, the URL is still active, albeit now referring to the new name “Euroview Media: euroview.media”, and relays RT and Sputnik content.

Therefore, Euromore is supporting, involved in and facilitating actions or policies attributable to the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten stability or security in the Union or in third country (Ukraine), through engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting and otherwise facilitating the use of information manipulation and interference.

21.4.2026

19.

The Foundation for the Support and Protection of the Rights of Compatriots Living Abroad (Pravfond)

(Russian: Некоммерческая организация “Фонд поддержки и защиты прав соотечественников, проживающих за рубежом”)

Address: Arbat Street, 55/32, Moscow, 119200, Russian Federation

Place of registration: Moscow, Russia

Date of registration: 21.11.2011

Registration number: 1117799023330

Website: www.pravfond.ru

The Foundation for the Support and Protection of the Rights of Compatriots Living Abroad (Pravfond) constitutes a core instrument of the Russian Federation’s foreign influence and propaganda strategy.

Founded and financed by the Russian state, the Foundation is fully embedded within the Kremlin’s soft power architecture and operates as a para-institutional relay for official narratives. Pravfond’s legal and analytical output is systematically used to reinforce key Kremlin talking points, notably allegations of the “nazification” of Ukraine, claims of widespread “Russophobia,” and assertions of systematic persecution of Russian-speaking populations in neighboring states.

The Foundation channels funds to actors closely linked to pro-Kremlin influence networks. The Executive Director of Pravfond has publicly expressed support for President Vladimir Putin and for Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine. In parallel, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov has praised the Foundation’s “consistent work” in countering alleged xenophobia, neo-Nazism, and attempts to falsify history, thereby confirming Pravfond’s direct integration into the Kremlin’s official communication and conflict-legitimation strategy.

Therefore, Pravfond is responsible for, implementing, supporting, involved in and facilitating actions or policies attributable to the Government of the Russian Federation, which undermine or threaten sovereignty and stability in the Union or in a third country (Ukraine), through planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting and facilitating the use of information manipulation and interference.

21.4.2026’.


ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg_impl/2026/885/oj

ISSN 1977-0677 (electronic edition)


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