Appeal brought on 17 July 2024 by Çolakoğlu Metalurji AŞ, Çolakoğlu Dış Ticaret AŞ against the judgment of the General Court (Eighth Chamber, Extended Composition) delivered on 8 May 2024 in Case T-630/21, Çolakoğlu Metalurji and Çolakoğlu Dış Ticaret v Commission

(Case C-498/24 P)

(C/2024/5225)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Appellants: Çolakoğlu Metalurji AŞ, Çolakoğlu Dış Ticaret AŞ (represented by: J. Cornelis, F. Graafsma, advocaten)

Other party to the proceedings: European Commission

Form of order sought

The Appellants claim that the Court should:

Pleas in law and main arguments

In support of the appeal, the Appellants rely on six grounds of appeal.

First, the Contested Judgment misapplied the chapeau of Article 2(10) of Regulation (EU) 2016/1036 (2) of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2016 on protection against dumped imports from countries not members of the European Union (‘basic Regulation’) in ruling that the commission paid to ÇOTAŞ constituted a factor affecting price comparability.

Second, the Contested Judgment misapplied Article 2(10)(i) of the basic Regulation and distorted the evidence in ruling that the Appellants do not constitute a single economic entity.

Third, the Contested Judgment misinterpreted Article 2(10)(i) of the basic Regulation; distorted the evidence; and misapplied the right to be heard in ruling that the amount of the commission could be adjusted and that the Commission did not make a manifest error of assessment in quantifying the amount of the adjustment.

Fourth, the Contested Judgment misinterpreted Article 2(10)(j) of the basic Regulation regarding the treatment of hedging operations.

Fifth, the Contested Judgment misinterpreted relevant WTO jurisprudence in concluding that a quarterly calculation was not required.

Sixth, the Contested Judgment distorted the evidence before it by ruling that (1) it was not shown that the changes in the cost of production impacted price comparability; (2) fluctuations in the cost of production concerned only one product type; and (3) that the unequal distribution covered only 3 out of 23 product types.

(1)   OJ 2021, L 238, p. 32.

(2)   OJ 2016, L 176, p. 21.