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Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee – Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the EU roadmap to fight drug trafficking and organised crime (COM(2023) 641 final)

EESC 2023/05604

OJ C, C/2024/4066, 12.7.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/4066/oj (BG, ES, CS, DA, DE, ET, EL, EN, FR, GA, HR, IT, LV, LT, HU, MT, NL, PL, PT, RO, SK, SL, FI, SV)

ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/4066/oj

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Official Journal
of the European Union

C series

C/2024/4066

12.7.2024

Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee

Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the EU roadmap to fight drug trafficking and organised crime

(COM(2023) 641 final)

(C/2024/4066)

Rapporteur:

Christian MOOS

Referral	European Commission: 28.2.2024
Legal basis	Article 304 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
Section responsible	Section for Employment, Social Affairs and Citizenship
Adopted in section	12.4.2024
Adopted at plenary session	25.4.2024
Plenary session No	587
Outcome of vote (for/against/abstentions)	147/1/7

1. Conclusions and recommendations

1.1.

Combating organised crime requires more European cooperation and coordination and adequately funded security authorities. Member States need to provide their customs administrations and police forces with adequate human and technical resources, decent pay and working conditions and continued training.

1.2.

Combating the abuse of drugs and hard drugs necessitates a more differentiated, whole-of-society approach. From a civil society perspective, drug use should be tackled more by means of preventive and accompanying measures and less through repression.

1.3.

The special focus on ports is warranted by the volume of trade passing through them, but this must not mean that steps to tackle other routes and points of access are neglected.

1.4.

Use of the term ‘public-private partnership’ (PPP) is very unfortunate when applied to cooperation between public authorities and private parties in the given context. The Commission should speak of a multi-actor approach instead.

1.5.

The European Economic and Social Committee (EESC) welcomes all effective initiatives for dismantling criminal networks. Banking secrecy and the existence of tax havens, money laundering and corruption are of the utmost importance for organised crime.

1.6.

1.7.

The EESC urges Member States to invest sufficiently in their public administrations and to speed up their digitalisation to counter organised crime.

1.8.

It is important to include trade unions representing police and customs officials in order to properly identify their human resources and equipment needs and take into account their expertise.

1.9.

Drug addicts are victims and not perpetrators, as long as their use of drugs does not give rise to crime associated with acquiring those drugs or to dangers to third parties. The EESC strongly recommends studying the experiences of countries and regions where the use of certain drugs is now tolerated and/or the use of cannabis has been decriminalised.

1.10.

The EESC recommends that there be more initiatives to protect Europeans and especially young people from the dangers of addiction and that these not concentrate only on hard drugs. Confiscated funds should be used for prevention projects.

2. General comments on the EU roadmap

2.1.

The EESC agrees with the European Commission that organised crime is a major security threat facing Europe. Combating organised crime requires more European cooperation and coordination and adequately funded security authorities at EU and, first and foremost, Member State level. Combating the abuse of drugs and hard drugs necessitates a more differentiated, whole-of-society approach, however, and cannot only be based on law enforcement. The role of civil society is crucial here. It is not just an add-on.

2.2.

Drug abuse causes enormous health, social and economic damage. It harms not only addicts, but also their relatives and entire communities. It jeopardises social order and goes hand in hand with – and even encourages – many offences and crimes, including the most serious ones.

2.3.

Drug trafficking and organised crime are not just cross-border phenomena; they always have a geopolitical dimension too. Organised crime can undermine state structures and ultimately lead to failing states or state capture by dictatorial regimes with mafia-style ruling elites. This impacts international relations and the international security order.

2.4.

Organised crime is always associated with serious violations of fundamental and human rights. It contributes to the destabilisation of liberal democracies. Where organised crime has a great deal of informal power, it reinforces authoritarian tendencies.

2.5.

The fight against organised crime is essential for countering not only corruption and money laundering, but also funding for terrorist networks, human trafficking and other crimes. EU Member States must work together and with third countries, with effective support from the Union, to enforce law and order and secure a state monopoly on the use of force against gangs, clans and mafia-style networks. In this, strict compliance with rule of law standards is a sine qua non.

2.6.

There is still not enough confiscation of assets. These measures should be stepped up and the EU should set targets (e.g. a minimum percentage) for the social reuse of confiscated assets for public drug prevention campaigns and civil society projects in this domain, especially targeted at young people.

2.7.

So-called ‘narco-states’ play an important role in world-wide drug trafficking. The European Commission and the EEAS must have enough resources to hamper the inflow of illicit substances at source. The EU’s Global Gateway strategy can offer economic alternatives for people in the countries producing these substances.

2.8.

Particular focus must be placed on the financial sector; relevant expertise in the security authorities must be fostered, as well as cooperation with fiscal authorities. Banking secrecy and the existence of tax havens are much more important for organised crime than e.g. individual drug deliveries via European harbours.

2.9.

Drug addicts are victims and not perpetrators, as long as their use of drugs does not give rise to crime associated with acquiring those drugs or to dangers to third parties. Bearing this in mind, the EESC strongly recommends studying examples of decriminalisation of the use of hard drugs, e.g. in British Columbia (Canada), Oregon (USA) and Portugal. The legalised use of drugs can lead to more preventive and health-oriented measures and can redirect resources. It may effectively bring down crime rates associated with the acquisition of drugs by end-users. It may provide them with safer conditions and reduce the impact on public life and security. Portugal registered a decrease in drug deaths from 369 in 1999 to 30 in 2016. What is more, the total number of heroin addicts decreased significantly, as did that of new HIV and hepatitis C cases.

2.10.

From a civil society perspective, drug use should be tackled more by means of preventive and accompanying measures and less through repressive measures. The resources necessary for effectively combating organised crime would be more targeted if they were directed against criminal networks and, above all, their financial assets and mechanisms than on sanctioning drug addicts. In this context, it is important to recall that the number of deaths caused by legal addiction (tobacco, alcohol) is much higher than that of illegal addiction. According to the European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction (EMCDDA), there were 6 166 deaths caused by drugs in the EU in 2021. According to the Commission, nearly 700 000 Europeans die annually because of illnesses caused by smoking or vaping. Alcohol abuse likewise accounts for hundreds of thousands of early deaths.

2.11.

Civil society organisations should be actively involved in further implementation of the 2021-2025 EU Strategy to tackle organised crime, as well as the EU Agenda on Drugs. They provide the bulk of assistance services. Moreover, they provide vital support to social and healthcare systems and have relevant knowledge and experience.

2.12.

It is equally important to include social partner organisations and, specifically, trade unions representing police and customs officials in the fight against organised crime. The involvement of police and customs officials is key to being able to anticipate and effectively limit potential hazards for investigators and inspectors, and also to properly assess and plan human resources and equipment needs and adopt a bottom-up approach to taking on board technical expertise. This is particularly the case for the upcoming evaluation of the Drugs Strategy in 2024.

2.13.

Given the critical state of the rule of law in certain EU Member States, it is no longer possible to ensure full respect for fundamental rights and the rule of law. In the EESC’s view, if it is no longer the case that the authorities of all 27 EU Member States cooperate on the basis of respect for fundamental rights, such cooperation should be secured instead by means of the enhanced cooperation procedure.

3. Comments on further initiatives

3.1.

The EESC welcomes all effective initiatives for dismantling criminal networks, as long as they comply with the rule of law. The same applies to the further consolidation of police cooperation and the exchange of information between law enforcement authorities, as well as associated digitalisation measures.

3.2.

Given the extremely rapid developments on the illicit drugs market and the development and spread of increasingly dangerous synthetic substances, the Committee particularly welcomes the upcoming launch of the activities and stronger powers of the European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction (EMCDDA) – shortly being renamed European Union Drugs Agency (EUDA) – as well as the future drug alert system.

3.3.

The EESC welcomes the fundamental objectives of the proposal to reform the Customs Union (COM(2023) 257 final). It is important to strengthen customs administrations and their cooperation both among themselves and with law enforcement authorities in order to prevent unsafe and illegal goods being imported into the EU.

3.4.

The EESC does, however, point out that customs reform must also be workable with a view to the European Ports Alliance that is now being proposed. While the Commission’s proposal aims to strengthen ports and hubs, the concern is that proposed operational governance at EU level could ultimately weaken the powers of customs administrations and lead to a reduction in customs offices outside the specified logistics hubs. Such weakening would be rejected both by businesses, which need short distances and regional knowledge, and by the trade unions concerned.

3.5.

Essentially there should be a strong focus on identifying and strengthening the specific operational needs of the relevant Member States’ authorities as regards the allocation of powers. National governments have a material responsibility here.

3.6.

Where deeper cooperation between all 27 EU Member States is still difficult and with supra-national approaches losing momentum as a result, targeted cooperation between groups of Member States should be prioritised, as is also the case with the support of Europol and Eurojust and which has already led to successes in the fight against criminal drug networks.

3.7.

The European Multidisciplinary Platform Against Criminal Threats (EMPACT) and the Operational Network Against Mafia-Style Criminal Groups are successful tools in the fight against drug trafficking. They need to be expanded and strengthened. From a civil society perspective, however, it is always important to ensure that police and law enforcement cooperation does not lead to abuse by authorities in Member States or third countries that do not – or no longer – operate according to the rule of law.

3.8.

The EESC would like to see more initiatives to protect Europeans and especially the young people from the dangers of addiction and for these to not only concentrate on hard drugs. In terms of health risks, heavy alcohol abuse, for instance, makes alcohol a hard drug too. It also causes considerable social damage, such as children suffering from drunk and abusive parents, and alcoholics no longer being fit for the labour market.

4. Evaluation of priority measures and actions

4.1.

The EESC underlines the importance of ports as entry points for drugs and the precursors needed for the production of synthetic drugs. The proposed Ports Alliance, together with optimal EU-wide digital connectivity between customs authorities, constitutes a useful approach. Funding under the Customs Programme is to be welcomed.

4.2.

In order for the customs community to be the first line of defence against the trafficking of illegal and dangerous items, as the Commission puts it, Member States need to provide their customs administrations and police forces with adequate human and technical resources and continued training. For example, regular checks on containers are hampered when customs authorities are not endowed with adequate human resources or equipment, as is the case in many Member States. This opens up access to port facilities for criminal networks and reduces the frequency of controls. It also increases security risks for customs officials and is not compatible with responsible risk management.

4.3.

The EESC is looking ahead with interest to the Schengen evaluation, the proposal for Council recommendations and the studies commissioned on maritime transport data and on the needs of law enforcement authorities in the rail and road transport sectors. Since it is true that criminal networks are adaptable, it is not enough to monitor only given logistics hubs more closely. The special focus on ports is warranted by the volume of trade passing through them, but this must not mean that steps to tackle other routes and points of access for illicit trafficking – like airports, roads and rail – are neglected.

4.4.

Use of the term ‘public-private partnership’ (PPP) is very unfortunate when applied to cooperation between public authorities and private parties such as port operators in order to strengthen them against infiltration by criminal networks. PPPs represent a sub-delegation of public tasks to private parties that perform a public service with a view to profit. There cannot and must not be any question of PPPs being used in these cases. These are tasks for public authorities. What is meant by the Commission should be called a multi-actor approach instead. Voluntary cooperation, such as with private shipping companies, should be in the latter’s own interest, as they may, in case of doubt, be held liable for crimes committed by their employees. Preventive cooperation, for example between Europol and financial service providers, absolutely makes sense.

4.5.

In the EESC’s view, the planned project teams and expert teams should involve the workers’ representatives of customs staff in order to ensure optimal health and safety during coordinated customs activities. Training and adequate human resources are pivotal.

4.6.

The EESC advocates better cross-border law enforcement coordination between police and customs authorities, and better cooperation between law enforcement and judicial authorities, as well as regular dialogue between judicial authorities, in order to avoid unnecessary barriers to the launch of investigations. Other administrative domains, particularly local government, also need to be integrated into the overall strategy. The Commission has thankfully announced practical guidelines for 2024.

4.7.

Digitalisation of public administration, including that of EU Member States’ financial and security authorities, is not uniform, despite harmonised European legislation to that end. The EESC urges Member States to invest sufficiently in their public administrations and to speed up their digitalisation, since it is only with the greatest possible interoperability and data availability in real time that European cooperation to counter organised crime can be stepped up in a way that is likely to succeed.

4.8.

The EESC welcomes the move away from the focus on individual offenders in order not only to catch ‘small fish’ but also to drain entire nets. To this end, measures monitoring money flows are very important, as is the future Anti-Money Laundering Authority (AMLA). The creation of AMLA should not, however, lead to a duplication of structures; it should be a useful complement to the activities of Member States’ authorities.

4.9.

The EESC seconds the Commission’s call for Member States to make full use of the tools available in the Schengen Information System (SIS) to combat organised crime.

4.10.

The development of an IT tool to monitor the darknet would be very useful, as this is not yet available in some Member States. In principle, such tools should be directly available for specific investigations by Member State authorities.

4.11.

The Committee supports the aim of harmonising legal definitions. Heavier criminal sanctions should target perpetrators in criminal networks. The EESC deems users of illicit drugs and drug addicts in general, be they legal or illegal, to be victims of their use of dangerous substances. The EESC calls for much more support for these victims and their families.

4.12.

There needs to be more preventive work and offers of support; this is mainly provided by civil society organisations as part of their non-profit activities, as well as by government bodies. In this context, the EESC welcomes the multidisciplinary and multi-agency approach to crime prevention and the Commission’s clear reference to implementation of the European Pillar of Social Rights.

4.13.

The communication remains silent as to the prospect of a uniform EU approach to the legalisation or non-legalisation of certain drugs. Individual EU countries already have extensive experience of the consequences for drug use and the development of organised crime.

4.14.

Given that drug trafficking is an international phenomenon and, as noted above, even has a geopolitical dimension, the international cooperation measures proposed by the Commission make sense. Nevertheless, the question does arise as to whether the EU has sufficient influence on the world stage to influence third countries accordingly. The power of the single market alone will not be enough for this. Better coordination of European foreign and security policy also seems essential in this context, as well as a whole-of-society approach, as described above.

4.15.

The approach involving more flexible rules on scheduling drug precursors is to be welcomed. However, this may entail an increased enforcement burden, since a broader range of substances will need to be tested and monitored. In many Member States the existing customs laboratories are not enough. The network of customs laboratories therefore needs to be expanded.

Brussels, 25 April 2024.

The President

of the European Economic and Social Committee

Oliver RÖPKE

ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/4066/oj

ISSN 1977-091X (electronic edition)

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