(1)

Council Regulation (EU) 2023/194 (1) fixes for 2023 the fishing opportunities for certain fish stocks applicable in Union waters and, for Union fishing vessels, in certain non-Union waters. The total allowable catches (TACs) and measures functionally linked to the TACs set by Regulation (EU) 2023/194 should be amended in order to take into account the outcome of consultations with third countries.

(2)

Regulation (EU) 2023/194 sets a provisional Union quota for cod (Gadus morhua) in Svalbard waters and international waters of the International Council for the Exploration of the Sea (ICES) subarea 1 and division 2b for the period from 1 January 2023 to 31 March 2023. In order to allow fishing activities to continue, it is necessary to replace that provisional Union quota by a definitive Union quota for that stock for 2023. The Council should therefore set the Union quota for cod in Svalbard waters and international waters of ICES subarea 1 and division 2b based on the reference TAC for northeast Arctic cod and the Union’s historic fishing rights. The definitive Union quota for cod in Svalbard waters and international waters of ICES subarea 1 and division 2b for 2023 should be set at the level of 15 629 tonnes, which corresponds to the percentage indicated in paragraph 3, point (a) of the EU-Norway political understanding in relation to the fisheries in ICES subareas 1 and 2. The Union quota for cod in Svalbard waters and international waters of ICES subarea 1 and division 2b should be allocated to the Member States in accordance with Council Decision 87/277/EEC (2), subject to the adaptations necessary due to the withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the Union as set out in Annex 36(E) to the Trade and Cooperation Agreement between the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community, of the one part, and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, of the other part (3).

(3)

Regulation (EU) 2023/194 sets a provisional Union quota for Greenland halibut (Reinhardtius hippoglossoides) in international waters of ICES subareas 1 and 2 for the period from 1 January 2023 to 31 March 2023. In order to allow fishing activities to continue, it is necessary to replace that provisional Union quota by a definitive Union quota for that stock for 2023. The definitive Union quota for Greenland halibut in international waters of ICES subareas 1 and 2 for 2023 should be set at the level of 1 711 tonnes. The level of that Union quota corresponds to 9,25 % of the TAC for Greenland halibut in ICES subareas 1 and 2 for 2023, as proposed by the Union at the North-East Atlantic Fisheries Commission, namely 18 494 tonnes, in line with the ICES advice.

(4)

Regulation (EU) 2023/194 does not set the fishing opportunities for redfish (Sebastes spp.) in international waters of ICES subareas 1 and 2 for 2023. In order to allow fishing for that stock to commence once the relevant fishing season starts on 1 July 2023, the Union quota for redfish in international waters in ICES subareas 1 and 2 should be set based on the average of the three highest annual Union catches of redfish in international waters of ICES subareas 1 and 2 in the period from 2013 to 2022.

(5)

Regulation (EU) 2023/194 should therefore be amended accordingly.

(6)

The fishing opportunities provided for in Regulation (EU) 2023/194 apply from 1 January 2023. The provisions introduced by this Regulation concerning fishing opportunities should therefore also apply from 1 January 2023. Such retroactive application does not affect the principles of legal certainty and protection of legitimate expectations, as the fishing opportunities concerned are increased or have not yet been exhausted. Given the urgency of avoiding any interruption of fishing activities, this Regulation should enter into force on the day of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union,

(1)

Pursuant to Article 50(2)(a) of Regulation (EU) No 1151/2012, Türkiye’s application to register the name ‘Suruç Narı’ was published in the Official Journal of the European Union (2).

(2)

As no reasoned statement of opposition under Article 51 of Regulation (EU) No 1151/2012 has been received by the Commission, the name ‘Suruç Narı’ should therefore be entered in the register,

(1)

Pursuant to Article 50(2)(a) of Regulation (EU) No 1151/2012, France’s application to register the name ‘Haricot de Soissons’ was published in the Official Journal of the European Union (2).

(2)

As no statement of opposition under Article 51 of Regulation (EU) No 1151/2012 has been received by the Commission, the name ‘Haricot de Soissons’ should therefore be entered in the register,

(1)

Annexes I and II to Regulation (EC) No 1925/2006 establish the list of vitamin and mineral substances, and for each of them the forms, which may be added to foods.

(2)

Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2020/16 (2) authorised the placing on the market of nicotinamide riboside chloride as a novel food for use in food supplements as defined in Article 2 of Directive 2002/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council (3), for the adult population.

(3)

As the initial authorisation of this substance as a novel food as set out in Implementing Regulation (EU) 2020/16 concerned only food supplements, the substance has been included in the list set out in Annex II to Directive 2002/46/EC by Commission Regulation (EU) 2021/418 (4). Following an application for extension of the use of nicotinamide riboside chloride as a novel food to cover also its use for nutritional purposes as a source of niacin, in particular, in meal replacements, the Commission requested the European Food Safety Authority (‘the Authority’) to deliver an opinion on such extension of use in accordance with Regulation (EU) 2015/2283 of the European Parliament and of the Council (5) and, following the outcome of that assessment, to evaluate in the context of Regulation (EC) No 1925/2006, the safety and bio-availability of that substance when added to the foods in question. On 14 September 2021, the Authority adopted a scientific opinion on the extension of use of nicotinamide riboside chloride as a novel food (6).

(4)

It follows from that opinion that the use of nicotinamide riboside chloride in foods is not of safety concern as a source of niacin provided that certain conditions are fulfilled. Those conditions are set out in the authorisation of this substance by Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/1160 (7).

(5)

In accordance with Article 3(1) of Regulation (EC) No 1925/2006, only vitamins and/or minerals listed in Annex I, in the form listed in Annex II to that act may be added to foods. Based on the Authority’s favourable opinion and on the authorisation as a novel food as set out in Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/1160, nicotinamide riboside chloride should be included in in Annex II to Regulation (EC) No 1925/2006 as a form of niacin.

(6)

The Advisory Group on the Food Chain and Animal and Plant Health was consulted and its comments were taken into consideration.

(7)

Regulation (EC) No 1925/2006 should therefore be amended accordingly.

(8)

The measures provided for in this Regulation are in accordance with the opinion of the Standing Committee on Plants, Animals, Food and Feed,

(1)

Regulation (EEC) No 2821/71 empowers the Commission to apply Article 101(3) of the Treaty by regulation to certain categories of agreements, decisions and concerted practices falling within the scope of Article 101(1) of the Treaty which have as their object the research and development of products, technologies or processes up to the stage of industrial application, and the exploitation of the results, including provisions regarding intellectual property rights.

(2)

Article 179(2) of the Treaty calls upon the Union to encourage undertakings, including small and medium-sized undertakings, in their research and technological development activities of high quality, and to support their efforts to cooperate with one another. Cooperation between undertakings on research and development can contribute to achieving the objectives of the European Green Deal (3).

(3)

Commission Regulation (EU) No 1217/2010 (4) defines categories of research and development agreements that the Commission regarded as normally satisfying the conditions laid down in Article 101(3) of the Treaty. That Regulation expires on 30 June 2023. In view of the overall positive experience with the application of that Regulation and the results of the evaluation of that Regulation, it is appropriate to adopt a new block exemption regulation.

(4)

This Regulation aims to facilitate research and development while at the same time effectively protecting competition. This Regulation also aims to provide adequate legal security for undertakings. The pursuit of those objectives should take account of the need to simplify administrative supervision and the legislative framework to the greatest extent possible.

(5)

Below a certain level of market power, it can in general be presumed, for the application of Article 101(3) of the Treaty, that the positive effects of research and development agreements will outweigh any negative effects on competition.

(6)

For the application of Article 101(3) of the Treaty by regulation, it is not necessary to define those agreements which are capable of falling within the scope of Article 101(1) of the Treaty. In the individual assessment of agreements under Article 101(1) of the Treaty, account has to be taken of several factors, and in particular the structure of the relevant market.

(7)

Cooperation in joint or paid-for research and development and in the exploitation of the results is most likely to promote technical and economic progress if the parties contribute complementary skills, assets or activities to the cooperation.

(8)

Consumers can generally be expected to benefit from the increased volume and effectiveness of research and development through the introduction of new or improved products, technologies or processes, a quicker launch of such products, technologies or processes, or a reduction of prices brought about by new or improved products, technologies or processes.

(9)

The joint exploitation of results can take different forms, such as the production and distribution of products, the application of technologies or processes, or the assignment or licensing of intellectual property rights or communication of know-how required for such production or application that substantially contribute to technical or economic progress.

(10)

In order to justify the exemption established by this Regulation, the joint exploitation should relate to products (including goods and services), technologies or processes for which the use of the results of the research and development is indispensable.

(11)

Moreover, all the parties should agree in the research and development agreement that they will all have full access to the final results of the joint research and development, including any arising intellectual property rights and know-how, for the purpose of further research and development, and for the purpose of exploitation, as soon as the final results become available. Access to the results should generally not be limited as regards the use of the results for the purposes of further research and development. However, where the parties, in accordance with this Regulation, limit their rights of exploitation, in particular where they specialise in the context of exploitation, access to the results for the purposes of exploitation may be limited accordingly. Furthermore, where academic bodies, research institutes, or undertakings which supply research and development as a commercial service without normally being active in the exploitation of results participate in research and development, they may agree to use the results of research and development solely for the purpose of further research and development.

(12)

Depending on their capabilities and commercial needs, the parties may make unequal contributions to their research and development cooperation. Therefore, in order to reflect, and to make up for, the differences in the value or the nature of the parties’ contributions, a research and development agreement benefiting from the exemption established by this Regulation may provide that one party is to compensate another for obtaining access to the results for the purposes of further research and development or exploitation. However, the compensation should not be so high as to effectively impede such access.

(13)

Where the research and development agreement does not provide for joint exploitation of the results, the parties should agree in the research and development agreement to grant each other access to their respective pre-existing know-how if such know-how is indispensable for the purpose of the exploitation of the results by the other parties. Any compensation (for example, licence fees) charged should not be so high as to effectively impede access to the know-how by the other parties.

(14)

The exemption established by this Regulation should be limited to research and development agreements that do not afford the undertakings the possibility of eliminating competition in respect of a substantial part of the products, technologies or processes in question. It is therefore necessary to exclude from the block exemption agreements between competitors whose combined share of the market for products, technologies or processes capable of being improved, substituted or replaced by the results of the research and development exceeds a certain level at the time the agreement is entered into.

(15)

Where one party finances several research and development projects carried out by competitors with regard to the same products, technologies or processes, it cannot be excluded that anti-competitive foreclosure effects may arise, in particular where that party obtains the exclusive right to exploit the results vis-à-vis third parties. Therefore, as regards paid-for research and development agreements, the benefit of the exemption established by this Regulation should be limited to agreements under which the combined market share of all the parties involved in the connected agreements, namely the financing party and all the parties carrying out the research and development, does not exceed a certain level.

(16)

However, the exemption established by this Regulation should not be subject to a market share threshold where the parties to the research and development agreement are not competing undertakings in respect of products, technologies or processes capable of being improved, substituted or replaced by the products, technologies or processes arising from the agreement. This includes, for example, agreements relating to the development of products, technologies or processes that would create an entirely new demand, or research and development that is not closely related to a specific product, technology or process, or is not yet targeted at a specific objective.

(17)

There is no presumption that research and development agreements are either caught by Article 101(1) of the Treaty or that they fail to satisfy the conditions of Article 101(3) of the Treaty where the market share threshold set out in this Regulation is exceeded or other conditions of this Regulation are not met. In such cases, it is necessary to conduct an individual assessment of the research and development agreement under Article 101 of the Treaty.

(18)

In order to ensure the maintenance of effective competition during the joint exploitation of the results of the joint or paid-for research and development, provision should be made for the block exemption to cease to apply if the parties’ combined share in the market for the products, technologies or processes arising from the research and development exceeds a certain level. However, the exemption should continue to apply irrespective of the parties’ market shares for a certain period after the commencement of joint exploitation, so as to await stabilisation of their market shares, in particular after the introduction of an entirely new product, and to guarantee a minimum period of return on the investments involved.

(19)

The exemption established by this Regulation should not apply to agreements containing restrictions which are not indispensable to the attainment of the positive effects generated by a research and development agreement. In principle, agreements containing certain types of severe restrictions of competition, such as limitations on the freedom of parties to carry out research and development in a field unconnected to the agreement, the fixing of prices charged to third parties, limitations on output or sales, and limitations on effecting passive sales of the products, technologies or processes arising from the joint or paid-for research and development should be excluded from the benefit of the exemption established by this Regulation, irrespective of the market share of the parties. In this context, field of use restrictions do not constitute limitations of output or sales, and do not constitute territorial or customer restrictions.

(20)

The market share thresholds, the non-exemption of certain agreements and the conditions provided for in this Regulation generally ensure that the agreements to which the block exemption applies do not enable the parties to eliminate competition in respect of a substantial part of the products, technologies or processes in question.

(21)

Agreements between undertakings which are not competing suppliers of products, technologies or processes capable of being improved, substituted or replaced by the results of the research and development and which satisfy the conditions of this Regulation will only eliminate effective innovation competition in exceptional circumstances. It is therefore appropriate to enable such agreements to benefit from the exemption established by this Regulation irrespective of market share and to address any exceptional cases by way of withdrawal of the benefit of the exemption established by this Regulation. The exemption of such agreements pursuant to this Regulation is without prejudice to the competitive assessment of research and development agreements that do not meet the conditions of this Regulation or agreements in respect of which the benefit of the exemption established by this Regulation has been withdrawn.

(22)

This Regulation should indicate typical situations in which it may be considered appropriate to withdraw the benefit of the exemption established by it, pursuant to Article 29 of Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 (5).

(23)

As research and development agreements are often of a long-term nature, especially where the cooperation extends to the exploitation of the results, the period of validity of this Regulation should be fixed at 12 years,

(1)

Regulation (EEC) No 2821/71 empowers the Commission to apply Article 101(3) of the Treaty by regulation to certain categories of agreements, decisions and concerted practices falling within the scope of Article 101(1) of the Treaty which have as their object specialisation, including agreements necessary for achieving such specialisation.

(2)

Commission Regulation (EU) No 1218/2010 (3) defines categories of specialisation agreements which the Commission regarded as normally satisfying the conditions laid down in Article 101(3) of the Treaty. That Regulation expires on 30 June 2023. In view of the overall positive experience with the application of that Regulation and the results of the evaluation of that Regulation, it is appropriate to adopt a new block exemption regulation.

(3)

This Regulation aims to ensure effective protection of competition and to provide adequate legal security for undertakings. The pursuit of those objectives should take account of the need to simplify administrative supervision and the legislative framework to the greatest extent possible.

(4)

For the application of Article 101(3) of the Treaty by regulation, it is not necessary to define those agreements which are capable of falling within Article 101(1) of the Treaty. In the individual assessment of agreements under Article 101(1) of the Treaty, account has to be taken of several factors, and in particular the structure of the relevant market.

(5)

The benefit of the exemption established by this Regulation should be limited to those agreements for which it can be assumed with sufficient certainty that they satisfy the conditions of Article 101(3) of the Treaty. Below a certain level of market power, it can in general be presumed, for the application of Article 101(3) of the Treaty, that the positive effects of specialisation agreements will outweigh any negative effects on competition.

(6)

This Regulation should apply to agreements concerning the manufacture of goods and the preparation of services. The preparation of services refers to activities carried out upstream of the provision of services to customers (for example, cooperation in the creation or operation of a platform through which a service will be provided). The provision of services to customers falls outside the scope of this Regulation, except where the parties agree to jointly provide services prepared under the specialisation agreement.

(7)

Specialisation agreements are most likely to contribute to improving the manufacture of goods or the preparation of services and their distribution if the parties have complementary skills, assets or activities, because, in that case, the agreement allows them to focus on the manufacture of certain goods or the preparation of certain services and thus operate more efficiently and supply the products more cheaply. Given effective competition, it is likely that consumers will receive a fair share of the resulting benefits.

(8)

Such benefits can arise first from agreements whereby one or more parties fully or partly give up the manufacture of certain goods or the preparation of certain services in favour of another party or parties (‘unilateral specialisation’); second, from agreements whereby two or more parties fully or partly give up the manufacture of certain but different goods or the preparation of certain but different services in favour of another party or parties (‘reciprocal specialisation’), and third, from agreements whereby two or more parties undertake to jointly manufacture certain goods or prepare certain services (‘joint production’).

(9)

The application of this Regulation to unilateral and reciprocal specialisation agreements should be limited to scenarios where the parties are active on the same product market. However, it is not necessary for the parties to be active on the same geographic market. In addition, the concepts of unilateral and reciprocal specialisation should not require a party to reduce capacity, as it is sufficient if they reduce their production volumes.

(10)

To ensure that the benefits of specialisation materialise without one party leaving the market downstream of production entirely, unilateral and reciprocal specialisation agreements should only be covered by this Regulation where they provide for supply and purchase obligations. Supply and purchase obligations may be, but do not have to be, of an exclusive nature.

(11)

This Regulation should apply to joint production agreements entered into by parties that are already active on the same product market but also by parties that wish to enter a product market by means of the joint production agreement. The concept of joint production agreement should not require the parties to reduce their individual activities regarding the manufacture of goods or preparation of services outside the scope of their envisaged joint arrangement.

(12)

It can be presumed that, where the parties’ share of the relevant market for the products which are the subject of a specialisation agreement does not exceed a certain level, the agreement will, as a general rule, give rise to economic benefits in the form of economies of scale or scope or better production technologies, while allowing consumers a fair share of the resulting benefits.

(13)

Where the products covered by a specialisation agreement are intermediary products that are fully or partly used captively by one or more of the parties as an input for their own production of downstream products which they subsequently sell on the market, the exemption conferred by this Regulation should also be conditional on the parties’ market share on the relevant market for those downstream products not exceeding a certain level. In that case, taking into account the parties’ market share only at the level of the intermediary product would ignore the potential risk of foreclosing or increasing the price of inputs for competitors at the level of the downstream products.

(14)

There is no presumption that specialisation agreements are either caught by Article 101(1) of the Treaty or that they fail to satisfy the conditions of Article 101(3) of the Treaty where the market share threshold set out in this Regulation is exceeded or other conditions of this Regulation are not met. In such cases, it is necessary to conduct an individual assessment of the specialisation agreement under Article 101 of the Treaty.

(15)

The exemption established by this Regulation should not apply to agreements containing restrictions which are not indispensable to the attainment of the positive effects generated by specialisation agreements. In principle, agreements containing certain types of severe restrictions of competition, such as the fixing of prices charged to third parties, the limitation of output or sales, and the allocation of markets or customers should be excluded from the benefit of the exemption established by this Regulation, irrespective of the market share of the parties.

(16)

The market share threshold, the non-exemption of certain agreements and the conditions provided for in this Regulation generally ensure that the agreements to which the block exemption applies do not enable the parties to eliminate competition in respect of a substantial part of the goods or services in question.

(17)

This Regulation should indicate typical situations in which it may be considered appropriate to withdraw the benefit of the exemption established by it, pursuant to Article 29 of Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 (4).

(18)

In order to facilitate the conclusion of specialisation agreements, which can have a bearing on the structure of the parties, the period of validity of this Regulation should be fixed at 12 years,

(1)

For cyantraniliprole, maximum residue levels (‘MRLs’) were set in Annex II to Regulation (EC) No 396/2005.

(2)

As regards cyantraniliprole, an application for import tolerances pursuant to Article 6(2) and (4) of Regulation (EC) No 396/2005 was submitted for that substance used in Canada and in the United States on potatoes, ‘tropical root and tuber vegetables’, ‘cucurbits with inedible peel’, Chinese cabbages/pe-tsai, other leafy brassica, ‘lettuces and salad plants’, ‘spinaches and similar leaves’ (except spinach), parsley and minor oilseeds (i.e. linseeds, poppy seeds, sesame seeds, mustard seeds, pumpkin seeds, safflower seeds, borage seeds, gold of pleasure seeds, hemp seeds and castor beans). The applicant provided data showing that the authorised uses of that substance on these crops in Canada and in the United States lead to residues exceeding the MRLs provided for in Regulation (EC) No 396/2005 and that higher MRLs are necessary to avoid trade barriers for the importation of those crops into the Union. A second application pursuant to Article 6(1) of Regulation (EC) No 396/2005 requesting a modification of the existing MRLs was submitted for apricots.

(3)

In accordance with Article 8 of Regulation (EC) No 396/2005, both of those applications were evaluated by the Member State concerned and the evaluation reports were forwarded to the Commission.

(4)

The European Food Safety Authority (‘the Authority’) assessed the applications and the evaluation reports, examining in particular the risks to consumers and, where relevant, to animals, and submitted a reasoned opinion on the proposed MRLs (2). It forwarded this opinion to the applicants, the Commission and the Member States and made it available to the public.

(5)

As regards cyantraniliprole in apricots, potatoes, ‘tropical root and tuber vegetables’, ‘cucurbits with inedible peel’, Chinese cabbages/pe-tsai, other leafy brassica, escaroles/broad-leaved endives, ‘spinaches and similar leaves’ (except spinach) and parsley, the Authority concluded that further consideration by risk managers was required as some information on the toxicity of cyantraniliprole degradation products in processed products was not available. Since the Authority concluded that the consumers’ exposure to those degradation products is low and that the safety margin is wide, it is appropriate to propose setting the MRLs derived by the Authority for cyantraniliprole in all of those products.

(6)

As regards cyantraniliprole in lettuces, the Authority concluded that further consideration by risk managers was required concerning the choice of the data set for deriving the MRLs. Based on the information provided by the Authority, it is appropriate to propose setting the MRL for cyantraniliprole in lettuces at 15 mg/kg based on the residue data on open leaf lettuces.

(7)

As regards all other modifications to MRLs requested by the applicants for cyantraniliprole, the Authority concluded that all requirements with respect to completeness of data submission were met and that the modifications to the MRLs requested by the applicants were acceptable concerning consumer safety on the basis of a consumer exposure assessment for 27 specific European consumer groups. In its assessment the Authority took into account the most recent data on the toxicological properties of the substance. Neither the long-term exposure to this substance via consumption of all food products that may contain it, nor the short-term exposure due to high consumption of the relevant products showed a risk that the acceptable daily intake or the acute reference dose is exceeded.

(8)

Based on the reasoned opinion of the Authority and taking into account the relevant factors listed in Article 14(2) of Regulation (EC) No 396/2005, the proposed modifications to the MRLs fulfil the requirements of that article.

(9)

Regulation (EC) No 396/2005 should therefore be amended accordingly.

(10)

The measures provided for in this Regulation are in accordance with the opinion of the Standing Committee on Plants, Animals, Food and Feed,

(1)

On 13 December 2022, the Codex Alimentarius Commission adopted new Codex maximum residue limits (CXLs) for acetamiprid, bixafen, chlorothalonil, clofentezine, clothianidin, cyprodinil, difenoconazole, ethiprole, fenhexamid, fenpicoxamid, fenpyroximate, fluensulfone, fluopyram, flutianil, imazalil, isoprothiolane, isoxaflutole, mandipropamid, metconazole, methoprene, methoxyfenozide, prothioconazole, pydiflumetofen, pyrasulfotole, pyraziflumid, quinoxyfen, spinetoram, spiropidion, tebuconazole, thiamethoxam, trifloxystrobin, and trinexapac-ethyl (2).

(2)

Maximum residue levels (MRLs) had been set for those substances in Annexes II, III and V to Regulation (EC) No 396/2005, except for ethiprole, fluensulfone and pydiflumetofen, for which no specific MRLs were set nor were those substances included in Annex IV to Regulation (EC) No 396/2005, so the default value of 0,01 mg/kg laid down in Article 18(1), point (b), of that Regulation applies.

(3)

In accordance with Article 5(3) of Regulation (EC) No 178/2002 of the European Parliament and of the Council (3), where international standards exist or their completion is imminent, they are to be taken into consideration in the development or adaptation of food law, except where such standards or relevant parts would be an ineffective or inappropriate means for the fulfilment of the legitimate objectives of food law or where there is a scientific justification, or where they would result in a different level of protection from the one determined as appropriate in the Union. Moreover, in accordance with Article 13, point (e), of that Regulation, the Union is to promote consistency between international technical standards and food law while ensuring that the high level of protection adopted in the Union is not reduced.

(4)

The European Food Safety Authority (‘the Authority’) assessed the risks to consumers and produced a scientific report (4). In cases where the Authority had identified a potential consumer health risk, the Union presented reservations (5), (6) to the Codex Committee on Pesticides Residues on the CXLs proposed. This was the case for the following pesticide/product combinations: acetamiprid (all products), chlorothalonil (all products), clofentezine (all products), clothianidin (all products), difenoconazole (all products), ethiprole (all products), fenpyroximate (lemons and lime, pummelo and grapefruits), fluensulfone (all products), imazalil (all products), isoprothiolane (all products), metconazole (all products), methoprene (all products), prothioconazole (all products), pydiflumetofen (all products), pyrasulfotole (all products), pyraziflumid (all products), quinoxyfen (all products), spinetoram (tea, green, black), spiropidion (all products), tebuconazole (all products), thiamethoxam (all products), trifloxystrobin (all products), and trinexapac-ethyl (all products).

(5)

Those CXLs for which the Union did not present a reservation to the Codex Committee on Pesticides Residues since the Authority did not identify risks for consumers in the Union, can therefore be considered safe. This is the case for certain CXLs for bixafen, cyprodinil, fenhexamid, fenpicoxamid, fenpyroximate, flutianil, isoxaflutole, mandipropamid, methoxyfenozide and spinetoram. Those CXLs should therefore be included in Regulation (EC) No 396/2005, except where they relate to products which are not listed in Annex I to that Regulation or where they are at a lower level than the current MRLs. Thus, no change should be made as regards the MRLs for fluopyram.

(6)

Based on the scientific report of the Authority and taking into account the relevant factors listed in Article 14(2) of Regulation (EC) No 396/2005, the appropriate modifications to the MRLs fulfil the requirements of that article.

(7)

Regulation (EC) No 396/2005 should therefore be amended accordingly.

(8)

The measures provided for in this Regulation are in accordance with the opinion of the Standing Committee on Plants, Animals, Food and Feed,