EUROPEAN COMMISSION

Brussels, 26.4.2018

COM(2018) 236 final

COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS

Tackling online disinformation: a European Approach

1.Introduction

The exposure of citizens to large scale disinformation, including misleading or outright false information, is a major challenge for Europe.

Our open democratic societies depend on public debates that allow well-informed citizens to express their will through free and fair political processes. Media have traditionally played a key role in holding public authorities to account and in providing the information that enables citizens to form their own views on societal issues and actively and effectively participate in democratic society. In Europe, traditional media is subject to a wide range of rules on impartiality, pluralism, cultural diversity, harmful content, advertising and sponsored content. Democracy in the European Union rests on the existence of free and independent media. 1

Today, the Internet has not only vastly increased the volume and variety of news available to citizens but has also profoundly changed the ways citizens access and engage with news. Younger users, in particular, now turn to online media as their main source of information. The easy availability of diverse quality information has the potential to make democratic processes more participatory and inclusive.

Yet, new technologies can be used, notably through social media, to disseminate disinformation on a scale and with speed and precision of targeting that is unprecedented, creating personalised information spheres and becoming powerful echo chambers for disinformation campaigns.

Disinformation erodes trust in institutions and in digital and traditional media, and harms our democracies by hampering the ability of citizens to take informed decisions. Disinformation also often supports radical and extremist ideas and activities. It impairs freedom of expression, a fundamental right enshrined in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (Charter). 2 Freedom of expression encompasses respect for media freedom and pluralism, as well as the right of citizens to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas "without interference by public authorities and regardless of frontiers".

The primary obligation of state actors in relation to freedom of expression and media freedom is to refrain from interference and censorship and to ensure a favourable environment for inclusive and pluralistic public debate. Legal content, albeit allegedly harmful content, is generally protected by freedom of expression and needs to be addressed differently than illegal content, where removal of the content itself may be justified. As the European Court of Human Rights has concluded, this is particularly important in relation to elections. 3  

Mass online disinformation campaigns are being widely used by a range of domestic and foreign actors to sow distrust and create societal tensions, with serious potential consequences for our security. Furthermore, disinformation campaigns by third countries can be part of hybrid threats to internal security, including election processes, in particular in combination with cyberattacks. For example, Russian military doctrine explicitly recognises information warfare as one of its domains. 4

The spread of disinformation also affects policy-making processes by skewing public opinion. Domestic and foreign actors can use disinformation to manipulate policy, societal debates and behaviour in areas such as climate change, migration, public security, health 5 , and finance. Disinformation can also diminish trust in science and empirical evidence.

The online platforms that distribute content, particularly social media, video-sharing services and search engines, play a key role in the spread and amplification of online disinformation. These platforms have so far failed to act proportionately, falling short of the challenge posed by disinformation and the manipulative use of platforms' infrastructures. Some have taken limited initiatives to redress the spread of online disinformation, but only in a small number of countries and leaving out many users. Furthermore, there are serious doubts whether platforms are sufficiently protecting their users against unauthorised use of their personal data by third parties, as exemplified by the recent Facebook / Cambridge Analytica revelations, currently investigated by data protection authorities, about personal data mined from millions of EU social media users and exploited in electoral contexts.

The rise of disinformation and the gravity of the threat have sparked growing awareness and concerns in civil society, both in EU Member States and internationally. In March 2015, the European Council invited the High Representative to develop an action plan to address Russia’s on-going disinformation campaigns, 10 which resulted in establishing East Stratcom Task Force, effective as planned since September 2015. In a June 2017 Resolution, the European Parliament called upon the Commission “to analyse in depth the current situation and legal framework with regard to fake news and to verify the possibility of legislative intervention to limit the dissemination and spreading of fake content." 11 In March 2018, the European Council stated "social networks and digital platforms need to guarantee transparent practices and full protection of citizens' privacy and personal data." 12 The Joint Declaration on Freedom of Expression and "Fake News", Disinformation and Propaganda, adopted in 2017 by Special Rapporteurs appointed by international organisations, 13  provides a focused treatment of the application of international human rights standards to this phenomenon.

Several Member States are currently exploring possible measures to protect the integrity of electoral processes from online disinformation and to ensure the transparency of online political advertising. 14

It is clear, however, that while the protection of the electoral process lies primarily within the competence of Member States, the cross-border dimension of online disinformation makes a European approach necessary in order to ensure effective and coordinated action and to protect the EU, its citizens, its policies and its Institutions.

This Communication has been developed taking into account the extensive consultations with citizens and stakeholders. The Commission set up in late 2017 a High-Level Expert Group to advise on this matter. The Group delivered its report on 12 March 2018. 15 The Commission also launched a broad public consultation process, comprising online questionnaires that received 2,986 replies, 16 structured dialogues with relevant stakeholders, 17 and a Eurobarometer opinion poll covering all 28 Member States. 18

This Communication sets out the views of the Commission on the challenges associated with disinformation online. It outlines the key overarching principles and objectives which should guide actions to raise public awareness about disinformation and tackle the phenomenon effectively, as well as the specific measures which the Commission intends to take in this regard.

2.Scope and causes of online disinformation

2.1.Scope

Disinformation is understood as verifiably false or misleading information that is created, presented and disseminated for economic gain or to intentionally deceive the public, and may cause public harm. Public harm comprises threats to democratic political and policy-making processes as well as public goods such as the protection of EU citizens' health, the environment or security. Disinformation does not include reporting errors, satire and parody, or clearly identified partisan news and commentary. This Communication is without prejudice to the applicable legal rules at Union or national level relating to the issues discussed, including disinformation containing illegal content. 19 This Communication is without prejudice to ongoing approaches and actions in relation to illegal content, including as regards terrorist content online and child sexual abuse material.

2.2.The context and main causes of disinformation

The proliferation of disinformation has interrelated economic, technological, political, and ideological causes.

First, the spread of disinformation is a symptom of wider phenomena that affect societies facing rapid change. Economic insecurity, rising extremism, and cultural shifts generate anxiety and provide a breeding ground for disinformation campaigns to foster societal tensions, polarisation, and distrust. Organisations and agencies of influence (be they undertakings, states, or non-governmental organisations with a stake in political and policy debates, including sources external to the EU) can use disinformation to manipulate policy and societal debates. The impact of disinformation differs from one society to another, depending on education levels, democratic culture, trust in institutions, the inclusiveness of electoral systems, the role of money in political processes, and social and economic inequalities.

In the long term, tackling disinformation will only be effective if accompanied by clear political will to strengthen collective resilience in support of our democratic bearings and European values.

Second, the spread of disinformation takes place in the context of a media sector undergoing profound transformation. The rise of platforms active in the media sector has deeply affected journalists and professional news media outlets, which are still generally seeking to adapt their business models and find new ways to monetise content. Moreover, some platforms have taken on functions traditionally associated with media outlets, entering the news business as content aggregators and distributors without necessarily taking on the editorial frameworks and capabilities of such outlets. Their economic incentives lead them to capture a large users' base by exploiting network effects and to maximize the time users spend on their services by privileging quantity of information over quality, regardless of the impact.

Third, social networking technologies are manipulated to spread disinformation through a series of sequential steps: (i) creation; (ii) amplification through social and other online media; and (iii) dissemination by users.

(i) Creation of disinformation

Disinformation is a powerful and inexpensive – and often economically profitable – tool of influence. To date, most known cases have involved written articles, sometimes complemented by authentic pictures or audiovisual content taken out of context. But new, affordable, and easy-to-use technology is now available to create false pictures and audiovisual content (so called "deep fakes"), offering more potent means for manipulating public opinion.

(ii) Amplification through social and other online media

A variety of drivers provide a fertile ground for the spread of disinformation online. The mechanics of the proliferation of disinformation are:

–Algorithm-based: The criteria algorithms use to prioritise the display of information are driven by the platforms' business model and the way in which this privileges personalised and sensational content, which is normally most likely to attract attention and to be shared among users. By facilitating the sharing of personalised content among like-minded users, algorithms indirectly heighten polarisation and strengthen the effects of disinformation.

–Advertising-driven: Today's digital advertising model is often click-based, which rewards sensational and viral content. This model relies on advertising networks operated by agencies that ensure real-time placement of ads based on algorithmic decision-making. This facilitates the placement of advertisements on websites that publish sensationalist content appealing to users' emotions, including disinformation.

–Technology-enabled: Online technologies such as automated services (referred to as "bots") artificially amplify the spread of disinformation. These mechanics can be facilitated by simulated profiles (fake accounts) which have no authentic user behind them, sometimes orchestrated on a massive scale (referred to as "troll factories").

 (iii) Dissemination by users

Users themselves are also playing a role in disseminating disinformation, which tends to travel more quickly on social media due to the propensity of users to share content without any prior verification. The ever-increasing volume and speed of content flowing online increases the risk of indiscriminate sharing of disinformation.

3.A European approach to tackle online disinformation

Given the complexity of the matter and the fast pace of developments in the digital environment, the Commission considers that any policy response should be comprehensive, continuously assess the phenomenon of disinformation, and adjust policy objectives in light of its evolution.

There should be no expectation that a single solution could address all challenges related to disinformation. At the same time, inaction is not an option.

In the Commission's view, the following overarching principles and objectives should guide action to tackle disinformation:

·First, to improve transparency regarding the origin of information and the way it is produced, sponsored, disseminated and targeted in order to enable citizens to assess the content they access online and to reveal possible attempts to manipulate opinion.

·Second, to promote diversity of information, in order to enable citizens to make informed decisions based on critical thinking, through support to high quality journalism, media literacy, and the rebalancing of the relation between information creators and distributors.

·Third, to foster credibility of information by providing an indication of its trustworthiness, notably with the help of trusted flaggers, and by improving traceability of information and authentication of influential information providers.

·Fourth, to fashion inclusive solutions. Effective long-term solutions require awareness-raising, more media literacy, broad stakeholder involvement and the cooperation of public authorities, online platforms, advertisers, trusted flaggers, journalists and media groups.

Building on all gathered input, the Commission intends to take the following actions. They complement the General Data Protection Regulation, which will apply across the EU as from 25 May 2018, and which will strengthen protection of the personal data of users of online platforms. 26 The General Data Protection Regulation clarifies the notion of consent and includes the key concept of transparency of processing. It also clarifies and harmonises the conditions under which personal data can be further shared (“further processed”).

3.1.A more transparent, trustworthy and accountable online ecosystem

The mechanisms that enable the creation, amplification and dissemination of disinformation rely upon a lack of transparency and traceability in the existing platform ecosystem and on the impact of algorithms and online advertising models. Therefore, it is necessary to promote adequate changes in platforms' conduct, a more accountable information ecosystem, enhanced fact-checking capabilities and collective knowledge on disinformation, and the use of new technologies to improve the way information is produced and disseminated online.

3.1.1.Online platforms to act swiftly and effectively to protect users from disinformation

There are growing expectations that online platforms should not only comply with legal obligations under EU and national law, but also act with appropriate responsibility in views of their central role so as to ensure a safe online environment, to protect users from disinformation, and to offer users exposure to different political views.

Overall, platforms have not provided sufficient transparency on political advertising and sponsored content. They also have not made sufficient information available on the use of strategic dissemination techniques, such as paid human influencers and/or robots to market messages. This has been a major driver of initiatives in some Member States and third countries adopting measures on transparency around political advertising online.

The Commission calls upon platforms to decisively step up their efforts to tackle online disinformation. It considers that self-regulation can contribute to these efforts, provided it is effectively implemented and monitored.

To this end, the Commission will support the development of an ambitious Code of Practice, building on the Key Principles proposed by the High Level Expert Group 27 and committing online platforms and the advertising industry to achieve the following objectives:

–Significantly improve the scrutiny of advertisement placements, notably in order to reduce revenues for purveyors of disinformation, and restrict targeting options for political advertising;

–Ensure transparency about sponsored content, in particular political and issue-based advertising; this should be complemented by repositories where comprehensive information about sponsored content is provided, such as the actual sponsor identity, amounts spent and targeting criteria used. Similar mechanisms should be put in place so that users understand why they have been targeted by a given advertisement;

–Intensify and demonstrate the effectiveness of efforts to close fake accounts;

–Facilitate users' assessment of content through indicators of the trustworthiness of content sources, based on objective criteria and endorsed by news media associations, in line with journalistic principles and processes, transparency regarding media ownership and verified identity;

–Dilute the visibility of disinformation by improving the findability of trustworthy content;

–Establish clear marking systems and rules for bots and ensure their activities cannot be confused with human interactions;

–Empower users with tools enabling a customized and interactive online experience so as to facilitate content discovery and access to different news sources representing alternative viewpoints; provide them with easily-accessible tools to report disinformation;

–Ensure that online services include, by design, safeguards against disinformation; this should, for example, include detailed information on the behaviour of algorithms that prioritise the display of content as well as development of testing methodologies;

–Provide trusted fact-checking organisations and academia with access to platform data (notably via application programming interfaces), while respecting user privacy, trade secrets, and intellectual property; this will enable them to better understand the functioning of related algorithms and better analyse and monitor disinformation dynamics and their impact on society.

Actions pursuing these objectives should strictly respect freedom of expression and include safeguards that prevent their misuse, for example, the censoring of critical, satirical, dissenting, or shocking speech. 28 They should also strictly respect the Commission's commitment to an open, safe and reliable Internet.

3.1.2.Strengthening fact checking, collective knowledge, and monitoring capacity on disinformation

Fact-checkers have emerged as an integral element in the media value chain, verifying and assessing the credibility of content based on facts and evidence. They also analyse the sources and processes of information creation and dissemination. Fact-checkers' credibility depends upon their independence and their compliance with strict ethical and transparency rules.

A dense network of strong and independent fact-checkers is an essential requirement for a healthy digital ecosystem. Fact-checkers need to operate on the basis of high standards, such as the International Fact-Checking Network Code of Principles. 29

In addition, many aspects of disinformation remain insufficiently analysed and access to online platforms' data is still limited. An effective response requires a solid body of facts and evidence on the spread of disinformation and its impact. Additional data gathering and analysis by fact-checkers and academic researchers should include the following activities:

–Continuously monitoring the scale, techniques and tools, and the precise nature and potential impact of disinformation;

–Identifying and mapping disinformation mechanisms that contribute to digital amplification;

–Contributing to the development of fair, objective, and reliable indicators for source transparency; and

–Sharing knowledge with news media, platforms and public authorities to enhance public awareness about disinformation.

Providing better access to online platforms' data and a secure space to analyse and exchange information are key requirements.

3.1.3.Fostering online accountability

Identification of the source of disinformation by ensuring its traceability throughout its dissemination is essential to accountability, as well as to increase trust in identifiable suppliers of information and encourage more responsible behaviour online. For instance, a user could choose to only engage with others on online platforms that have identified themselves.

To this end, the Regulation on electronic identification 30 provides a predictable regulatory environment for the online cross-border use, recognition and enforcement of electronic identification, authentication and trust services that could be relied upon to foster the development and the voluntary use of systems for the secure identification of suppliers of information based on the highest security and privacy standards, including the possible use of verified pseudonyms.

To facilitate the investigation of malicious online behaviour, as indicated in the Joint Communication on Cybersecurity presented in September 2017, the Commission will continue to promote the uptake of Internet Protocol version 6 (IPv6), which allows the allocation of a single user per Internet Protocol address. It will also pursue its efforts to improve the functioning of and the availability and accuracy of information in the Domain Name and IP WHOIS 31 systems in line with the efforts of the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) and in full compliance with data protection rules.

Taken altogether, these would also contribute to limiting cyberattacks, which are often combined with disinformation campaigns in the context of hybrid threats.

3.1.4.Harnessing new technologies

Emerging technologies will further change the way information is produced and disseminated, but they also have the potential to play a central role in tackling disinformation over the longer term. For instance:

–Artificial intelligence, subject to appropriate human oversight, will be crucial for verifying, identifying and tagging disinformation;

–Technologies for media to enable customizable and interactive online experiences can help citizens discover content and identify disinformation;

–Innovative technologies, such as blockchain, can help preserve the integrity of content, validate the reliability of information and/or its sources, enable transparency and traceability, and promote trust in news displayed on the Internet. This could be combined with the use of trustworthy electronic identification, authentication and verified pseudonyms; and

–Cognitive algorithms that handle contextually-relevant information, including the accuracy and the quality of data sources, will improve the relevance and reliability of search results.

The Commission is active in the field of emerging technologies, in particular through its Next Generation Internet initiative. 32  

3.2.Secure and resilient election processes

The security of election processes, the basis for our democracy, requires particular attention. Disinformation now forms part of a wider array of tools used to manipulate electoral processes, such as hacking or defacing websites or gaining access to and leaking personal information about politicians. Cyber-enabled operations may be used to compromise the integrity of public information and prevent the identification of disinformation sources. This is critical during election campaigns, where compressed schedules may prevent timely detection of disinformation and response.

With a view to the 2019 European Parliament elections, the Commission has encouraged 34 the competent national authorities to identify best practices for the identification, mitigation and management of risks to the electoral process from cyberattacks and disinformation. In the Cooperation Group established under the Directive on the security of Network and Information Systems (NIS Directive), Member States have started to map existing European initiatives on cybersecurity of network and information systems used for electoral processes, with the aim of developing voluntary guidance.

3.3.Fostering education and media literacy

The life-long development of critical and digital competences, in particular for young people, is crucial to reinforce the resilience of our societies to disinformation.

The Digital Education Action Plan, adopted by the Commission in January 2018, 35 highlights the risks disinformation poses for educators and students and the urgent need to develop digital skills and competences of all learners, in both formal and non-formal education. The Digital Competence Framework for Citizens, developed by the Commission, sets out the wide mix of skills needed by all learners, from information and data literacy, to digital content creation, to online safety and well-being. 36  

Because of the cross-border dimension of disinformation, the EU has a role in supporting the dissemination of good practice across the Member States to increase citizens' resilience, and the Commission can further strengthen its actions addressing young people and adults:

·The Commission steers the Media Literacy Expert Group and supports pilot project such as ‘Media Literacy for All’. 38  

·The Audiovisual Media Services Directive recognises the importance of media literacy, 39 and its revision aims at strengthening the monitoring of actions undertaken by the authorities of Member States on media literacy. 40  

·The Commission supports a number of initiatives, including through the Erasmus+ programme, on Internet safety, digital well-being and, digital skills that aim at fostering a critical awareness of citizens – in particular, young people – of the digital environment, which in turn helps strengthen digital media literacy.

·Member States, social partners and education organisations share experience and good practice on digital education through the EU's Working Group on Digital Skills and Competences. 41  

·The Commission encourages Member States to mobilise resources and include in their educational policies digital citizenship, media literacy, the development of critical-thinking skills for the online environment, and awareness-raising activities on disinformation and online amplification techniques. Support for teachers, including training and sharing of good practice is vital in this respect.

3.4.Support for quality journalism as an essential element of a democratic society

Quality news media – including public media – and journalism play an important role in providing citizens high quality and diverse information. By ensuring a pluralistic and diverse media environment, they can uncover, counterbalance, and dilute disinformation.

In an evolving digital environment, there is a need to invest in high quality journalism, reinforce trust in the key societal and democratic role of quality journalism both offline and online, and encourage quality news media to explore innovative forms of journalism.

There is also a need to rebalance the relation between media and online platforms. This will be facilitated by a swift approval of the EU copyright reform, which will improve the position of publishers and ensure a fairer distribution of revenues between right holders and platforms, helping in particular news media outlets and journalists to monetise their content.

Journalists and media professionals should also further embrace the opportunities offered by new technologies and develop the necessary digital skills to enable them to use data and social media analytics, with a view to enhancing fact-finding and verification.

Finally, public support to media and public service media are very important to the provision of high quality information and the protection of journalism in the public interest. Member State support measures in view of achieving objectives of common EU interest, such as media freedom and pluralism, have been declared compatible with EU State aid rules, as demonstrated by Commission Decisions on media aid. 47  

3.5.Countering internal and external disinformation threats through strategic communication

Communication and awareness-raising by public authorities is an integral part of the response to disinformation. In addition to detection and data analysis, strategic communication requires suitable outreach activities to counter false narratives. The measures set out in Section 3.1 will make detection and analysis of online disinformation more accurate and timely, and will facilitate strategic communication about Europe and EU policies.

This is particularly important since the EU is often a target of disinformation campaigns designed to undermine its Institutions, policies, actions and values. The sources of such activities can be domestic or external, the actors private or public – and they carry out their activities both on EU territory and in third countries. As noted, in 2015 the East Stratcom Task Force was set up within the European External Action Service to address Russia's on-going disinformation campaigns, in recognition of one important dimension of this challenge. Similarly, the EU Hybrid Fusion Cell was established in 2016 within the EU Intelligence and Situation Centre to monitor and address hybrid threats by foreign actors, including disinformation, aimed at influencing political decisions inside the EU and in its neighbourhood. These institutions, together with the recently established European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats, form the basis of a strengthened European response, 50 and are important elements in the cooperation between EU and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation to improve European resilience, coordination and preparedness against hybrid interference.

4.Conclusion

A well-functioning, free, and pluralistic information ecosystem, based on high professional standards, is indispensable to a healthy democratic debate. The Commission is attentive to the threats posed by disinformation for our open and democratic societies. This Communication presents a comprehensive approach that aims at responding to those serious threats by promoting digital ecosystems based on transparency and privileging high-quality information, empowering citizens against disinformation, and protecting our democracies and policy-making processes. The Commission calls on all relevant players to significantly step up their efforts to address the problem adequately. It considers that the actions outlined above, if implemented effectively, will materially contribute to countering disinformation online. However, the Commission will continue its work is this area.

By December 2018, the Commission will report on progress made. The report will also examine the need for further action to ensure the continuous monitoring and evaluation of the outlined actions.

(1) http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/newsroom/image/document/2016-50/2016-fundamental-colloquium-conclusions_40602.pdf

(2) Article 11, Charter. Article 6(1) of the Treaty of the European Union confers binding force on the Charter and states that it "shall have the same legal value as the Treaties."

(3) See e.g. Case of Bowman v. The United Kingdom (141/1996/760/961) http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-58134 .

(4) https://www.rusemb.org.uk/press/2029

(5)  In the area of vaccine hesitancy, the Commission is proposing a Council Recommendation including specific measures to monitor and tackle disinformation in this area. See COM (2018)245/2

(6) http://reports.weforum.org/outlook-14/top-ten-trends-category-page/10-the-rapid-spread-of-misinformation-online/ .  

(7) https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/eurobarometer-internet-users-preferences-accessing-content-online .

(8) Digital News Report 2017, Reuters Institute, https://reutersinstitute.politics.ox.ac.uk/risj-review/2017-digital-news-report-now-available .

(9) http://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/index.cfm/survey/getsurveydetail/instruments/flash/ surveyky/ 2183 .

(10) http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2015/03/20/conclusions-european-council/  

(11) http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//NONSGML+TA+P8-TA-2017-0272+0+DOC+PDF+V0//EN .  

(12) http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2018/03/23/european-council-conclusions-22-march-2018/ .  

(13)  Joint Declaration on Freedom of Expression and "Fake News," Disinformation and Propaganda , http://www.osce.org/fom/302796?download=true .

(14) Some Member States have adopted – or are planning to adopt - measures regarding political advertising. These include inter alia the recent French draft law on false information and non-binding guidelines proposed by the Italian regulator.

(15)   https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/final-report-high-level-expert-group-fake-news-and-online-disinformation .

(16)   https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/summary-report-public-consultation-fake-news-and-online-disinformation .

(17)   https://ec.europa.eu/epsc/events/high-level-hearing-preserving-democracy-digital-age_en and https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/fake-news .

(18)   http://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/index.cfm/survey/getsurveydetail/instruments/flash/ surveyky/2183 .

(19) Commission Recommendation of 1 March 2018 on measures to effectively tackle illegal content online (C(2018) 1177 final), https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/commission-recommendation-measures-effectively-tackle-illegal-content-online .

(20)   https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/first-findings-eurobarometer-fake-news-and-online-disinformation .

(21)   https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/summary-report-public-consultation-fake-news-and-online-disinformation .

(22)   http://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/dae/document.cfm?doc_id=17211 .

(23)   https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/public-consultation-role-publishers-copyright-value-chain-and-panorama-exception .

(24) Measuring the reach of "fake news" and online disinformation in Europe, Reuters Institute https://reutersinstitute.politics.ox.ac.uk/our-research/measuring-reach-fake-news-and-online-disinformation-europe .

(25)   https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/summary-report-public-consultation-fake-news-and-online-disinformation .  

(26) Regulation 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC.

(27)   https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/final-report-high-level-expert-group-fake-news-and-online-disinformation , p. 32 of the HLEG report .

(28) As the European Court of Human Rights has observed, freedom of expression applies not only to information and ideas that are favourably received or inoffensive, but also to those "offend, shock or disturb." Handyside v. United Kingdom, App. No. 5493/72 (7 December 1976), § 49.

(29) The International Fact-Checking Network (IFCN) Code of Principles is for organizations that regularly publish nonpartisan reports on the accuracy of statements by public figures and major institutions and other widely circulated claims of interest to society, https://www.poynter.org/international-fact-checking-network-fact-checkers-code-principles .

(30)  Regulation 910/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 July 2014 on electronic identification and trust services for electronic transactions in the internal market and repealing Directive 1999/93/EC.

(31) https://whois.icann.org/en

(32)   https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/next-generation-internet-initiative .

(33)  Freedom on the net 2017 report, Freedom house, https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-net/freedom-net-2017 . 

(34)  Commission recommendation of 14.2.2018 on enhancing the European nature and efficient conduct of the 2019 elections to the European Parliament,  https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=OJ%3AL%3A2018%3A045%3ATOC .

(35)   https://ec.europa.eu/education/sites/education/files/digital-education-action-plan.pdf .

(36)   https://ec.europa.eu/jrc/en/digcomp/digital-competence-framework . 

(37)   https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/summary-report-public-consultation-fake-news-and-online-disinformation .

(38)   https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/2016-call-proposals-pilot-project-media-literacy-all  

(39) The Audiovisual Media Services Directive states that “the development of media literacy in all sections of society should be promoted and its progress followed closely” (Recital 47).

(40) In its general approach, the Council has included an obligation for Member States to promote and take measures for the development of media literacy skills. This requirement is currently being discussed by the co-legislators as part of the revision of the Audiovisual Media Services Directive.

(41)   https://ec.europa.eu/education/policy/strategic-framework/expert-groups/digital-skills-competences_en  

(42)   https://www.betterinternetforkids.eu/web/portal/saferinternet4eu .

(43)   https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/digital-skills-jobs-coalition .

(44)   https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/specific-actions-digital-education-action-plan .

(45)   https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/digital-opportunity-traineeships-boosting-digital-skills-job .

(46)   http://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/index.cfm/survey/getsurveydetail/instruments/flash/ surveyky/2183 .

(47)  The Commission notably has approved aid for news agencies (e.g. SA.30481, State Aid in favour of Agence France-Press (AFP), France, http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=3_SA_30481 ), general press aid schemes (e.g. SA.36366, Production and innovation aid to written media, Denmark, http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=3_SA_36366 ) and schemes targeting publications with limited advertising revenue (e.g. SA.47973 French Press Aid 2015 Decree France, http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=3_SA_47973 ).

(48) Regarding public service broadcasting, specific detailed guidelines are in place (Communication from the Commission on the application of State aid rules to public service broadcasting, OJ C 257 of 27 October 2009, p.1). Depending on the type of support envisaged, the guidelines for R&D&I aid (Communication from the Commission — Framework for State aid for research and development and innovation, OJ C 198 of 27 June 2014, p. 1) and the General Block Exemption Regulation (Commission Regulation (EU) No 651/2014 of 17 June 2014 declaring certain categories of aid compatible with the internal market in application of Articles 107 and 108 of the Treaty, OJ L 187 of 26 June 2014, p. 1, as amended by Commission Regulation (EU) 2017/1084 of 14 June 2017, OJ L 156 of 20.6.2017, p. 1) may also be relevant.

(49) State aid transparency public search page: https://webgate.ec.europa.eu/competition/transparency/public/search/home?lang=en .

(50)  Joint Framework on countering hybrid threats: a European Union response, Joint Communication to the European Parliament and Council of 6 April 2016, JOIN(2016) 18 final, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52016JC0018&from=en .