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Document 62008CN0309

Case C-309/08: Action brought on 11 July 2008 — Commission of the European Communities v Republic of Poland

OJ C 247, 27.9.2008, p. 7–8 (BG, ES, CS, DA, DE, ET, EL, EN, FR, IT, LV, LT, HU, MT, NL, PL, PT, RO, SK, SL, FI, SV)

27.9.2008   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 247/7


Action brought on 11 July 2008 — Commission of the European Communities v Republic of Poland

(Case C-309/08)

(2008/C 247/12)

Language of the case: Polish

Parties

Applicant: Commission of the European Communities (represented by: A. Nijenhuis and K. Mojzesowicz, acting as Agents)

Defendant: Republic of Poland

Form of order sought

declare that, by failing to ensure the proper implementation in national law of Directive 2002/21/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 March 2002 on a common regulatory framework for electronic communications networks and services (Framework Directive) (1), in particular Article 3(2) and (3) concerning the requirements that national regulatory authorities be independent and that they exercise their powers impartially and transparently, the Republic of Poland has failed to fulfil its obligations under that directive;

order the Republic of Poland to pay the costs.

Pleas in law and main arguments

Poland has failed to ensure an effective separation of regulatory functions from activities linked to the exercise of rights of property or control.

The Polish State has extensive shareholdings in numerous telecommunications undertakings. At the same time, the national regulatory authority in Poland is appointed by the Prime Minister, who is entitled freely to dismiss it at any time without providing reasons and on whom the Minister for Finance and the Minister for Infrastructures are also fully dependent.

The absence of provisions defining the duration of the term of the national regulatory authority and the lack of an exhaustive list of conditions allowing for its dismissal results in its being dependent to a significant extent on the Prime Minister and fails to guarantee that those market participants in which the State holds shares will be treated in the same way as other market participants.


(1)  OJ L 108, 24.4.2002, p. 33-50.


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