Provisional text

OPINION OF ADVOCATE GENERAL

BIONDI

delivered on 12 March 2026 (1)

Case C‑845/24 P

Silgan Holdings, Inc.,

Silgan Holdings Austria GmbH,

Silgan International Holdings BV,

Silgan Metal Packaging Distribution GmbH,

Silgan White Cap Manufacturing GmbH

v

European Commission

( Appeal – Competition – Agreements, decisions and concerted practices – Metal packaging market – Initiation of an investigation procedure by the European Commission at the request of a national competition authority – Period for re-allocation – Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 – Commission Notice on cooperation within the Network of Competition Authorities – Principle of good administration – Obligation to state reasons )

I.      Introduction

1.        In this appeal, Silgan Holdings, Inc., Silgan Holdings Austria GmbH, Silgan International Holdings BV, Silgan Metal Packaging Distribution GmbH and Silgan White Cap Manufacturing GmbH, companies belonging to the same group of companies (together ‘Silgan’), seek the annulment of the judgment of the General Court of 2 October 2024, Silgan Holdings and Others v Commission (T‑589/22, EU:T:2024:662; ‘the judgment under appeal’), by which that court dismissed their action against Commission Decision C(2022) 4761 final of 12 July 2022 (2) (‘the contested decision’), (3) relating to proceedings under Article 101 TFEU. In summary, the Commission, at the request of the Bundeskartellamt (Federal Cartel Office, Germany; ‘the national competition authority’) initiated proceedings against Silgan, among others. The national competition authority asked the Commission to initiate the proceedings since loopholes in the German law applicable at the time did not allow effective penalties to be imposed on those companies, since it was not possible to identify all the companies responsible for the infringement owing to the corporate restructuring out of the Silgan companies. At the end of the proceedings, the Commission found (4) a single and continuous infringement of Article 101 TFEU in the metal packaging sector in Germany from 11 March 2011 to 18 September 2014. It therefore imposed a fine on Silgan of EUR 23 852 000, reduced by 10% under the settlement notice. (5)

2.        In the judgment under appeal, the General Court rejected on the merits all the pleas raised in support of the action against the Commission’s decision.

II.    Legal context

A.      Regulation No 1/2003

3.        In this appeal, Article 11(3) and (6) of Regulation No 1/2003 (6) on the implementation of the rules on competition laid down in what are now Articles 101 and 102 TFEU is relevant.

4.        Article 11(3) and (6), headed ‘Cooperation between the Commission and the competition authorities of the Member States’, provides:

‘3.      The competition authorities of the Member States shall, when acting under [Article 101 or Article 102 TFEU], inform the Commission in writing before or without delay after commencing the first formal investigative measure. This information may also be made available to the competition authorities of the other Member States.

…

6.      The initiation by the Commission of proceedings for the adoption of a decision under Chapter III shall relieve the competition authorities of the Member States of their competence to apply [Articles 101 and 102 TFEU]. If a competition authority of a Member State is already acting on a case, the Commission shall only initiate proceedings after consulting with that national competition authority.’

B.      Commission Notice on cooperation within the Network of Competition Authorities

5.        The functioning of Regulation No 1/2003 is detailed in the Commission Notice on cooperation within the Network of Competition Authorities (7) (‘the Cooperation Notice’). In particular, with regard to the present appeal, paragraph 18 of the Cooperation Notice provides as follows:

‘Where case re-allocation issues arise, they should be resolved swiftly, normally within a period of two months, starting from the date of the first information sent to the network pursuant to Article 11 of [Regulation No 1/2003]. During this period, competition authorities will endeavour to reach an agreement on a possible re-allocation and, where relevant, on the modalities for parallel action.’

6.        Paragraph 19 of the Cooperation Notice provides:

‘In general, the competition authority or authorities that is/are dealing with a case at the end of the re-allocation period should continue to deal with the case until the completion of the proceedings. Re-allocation of a case after the initial allocation period of two months should only occur where the facts known about the case change materially during the course of the proceedings.’

7.        Section 3.2 of the Cooperation Notice, headed ‘The initiation of proceedings by the Commission under Article 11(6) of the [Regulation No 1/2003]’, explains how the initiation of proceedings works. In particular, it points out that two situations can arise, the second of which is where one or more national competition authorities have informed the network that they are acting on a given case. The second situation, which is relevant to the present appeal, is governed by paragraph 54. Specifically, paragraph 54 provides:

‘The second situation is where one or more NCAs have informed the network pursuant to Article 11(3) of [Regulation No 1/2003] that they are acting on a given case. During the initial allocation period (indicative time period of two months, see paragraph 18 above), the Commission can initiate proceedings with the effects of Article 11(6) of [Regulation No 1/2003] after having consulted the authorities concerned. After the allocation phase, the Commission will in principle only apply Article 11(6) of [Regulation No 1/2003] if one of the following situations arises:

…

(d)      There is a need to adopt a Commission decision to develop Community competition policy in particular when a similar competition issue arises in several Member States or to ensure effective enforcement;

…’

III. The appeal

8.        The present appeal centres around the functioning of the system of cooperation between the Commission and the competition authorities of the Member States, as outlined in the Cooperation Notice, in the specific circumstance in which re-allocation is requested after the initial allocation period. Specifically, the question concerns the competence of the Commission and the time limit for initiating proceedings, after the national competition authority has already begun the investigation and during which it emerges that loopholes in the national law applicable at the time do not allow the relevant undertakings to be sanctioned effectively.

9.        In particular, Silgan asks the Court to set aside the judgment under appeal, annul the contested decision and order the Commission to pay the costs of the proceedings at both instances.

10.      The Commission and the Federal Republic of Germany, which was an intervener at first instance, ask the Court of Justice to dismiss the appeal and order Silgan to pay the costs. The Council of the European Union, which was also an intervener at first instance, asks the Court of Justice to dismiss the appeal to the extent that it calls into question the General Court’s assessment of the lawfulness of Article 11(6) of Regulation No 1/2003.

11.      In support of its appeal, Silgan puts forward five grounds of appeal, all of which are contested by the Commission. The first ground alleges a misinterpretation and misapplication of the principle of subsidiarity. The second ground alleges a misinterpretation and misapplication of the prohibition on misuse of powers. The third ground alleges misinterpretation and misapplication of the principle of proportionality. By its fourth ground, Silgan alleges that the General Court misinterpreted and misapplied the principle that the administration is bound by its own decisions. The fifth ground alleges misinterpretation and misapplication of the Commission’s obligation to state reasons. At the Court’s request, the present Opinion will focus on the fourth ground.

12.      Silgan’s argument, in the fourth ground of appeal, is divided into four parts.

13.      The first part alleges a misinterpretation of the principle that the administration is bound by its own decisions. The second part alleges a misinterpretation of the binding effect of the Cooperation Notice. The third part alleges an error of law in the interpretation of paragraphs 19 and 54 of the Cooperation Notice. The fourth part alleges an error of law in the interpretation of the Commission’s duty to state reasons.

14.      However, for the purposes of my analysis, I consider it beneficial to reorganise those four parts by order of importance, and shall start by examining the third part. I shall then examine the first, second and fourth parts together. The reason for this is that the third part of the fourth ground of appeal addresses the central issue of this appeal, namely the power of the Commission to initiate proceedings at the request of the national competition authority.

A.      Preliminary observations

15.      As a preliminary point, it is necessary to outline the background to the present case. As the reader will no doubt be aware, Regulation No 1/2003 established a system of parallel competences under which the Commission and the competition authorities of the Member States may apply Articles 101 and 102 TFEU. Together, they form a network, called the ‘European Competition Network’ (ECN), which is based on close cooperation in the application and supervision of EU competition law. The network must ensure the effective and uniform application of competition law.

16.      Within the cooperation network, the application of competition law is based on a system of parallel powers between the Commission and the national competition authorities. (8) At the same time, the rule still applies that the competition authorities of the Member States are relieved of their competence if the Commission initiates its own proceedings. This is in order to ensure effective enforcement of competition law and optimal management of the network. (9) The Commission thus remains the guarantor of the uniform application of EU competition law.

17.      In that respect, the Cooperation Notice, an instrument of soft law, defines in detail how the system outlined by Regulation No 1/2003 functions.

18.      The Cooperation Notice therefore serves as a guide for the coordination of cooperation and the allocation of cases between the Commission and the competition authorities of the Member States.

19.      It is in that context that the main question in the present dispute arises, namely how cases are allocated between the Commission and the national competition authorities. More specifically, the resolution of the present appeal will require the Court to clarify the extent to which the Commission may initiate proceedings, at the request of the national competition authority, pursuant to the Cooperation Notice.

1.      The third part of the fourth ground of appeal

20.      Silgan challenges paragraph 105 of the judgment under appeal in which the General Court concluded that Silgan failed to demonstrate that the Commission departed from the Cooperation Notice. Silgan puts forward two complaints in that regard.

21.      By the first complaint, Silgan challenges paragraphs 59 and 60 of the judgment under appeal in which the General Court found that the conditions laid down in the second limb of paragraph 54(d) of the Cooperation Notice were satisfied.

22.      By the second complaint, Silgan alleges that the General Court did not take into account the two-month period referred to in the Cooperation Notice, and that it should have concluded that the Commission had exceeded that time limit.

(a)    Silgan’s arguments on the first complaint, alleging failure to satisfy the requirements necessary for re-allocation outside of the prescribed period

23.      As regards the first complaint, alleging failure to satisfy the requirements necessary for re-allocation outside of the prescribed period, Silgan argues that the material change in facts referred to in paragraph 19 of the Cooperation Notice presupposes that there is new information about the circumstances that led the Commission to conclude that the law had been infringed. According to Silgan, the corporate restructuring does not constitute a material change in facts, since the restructuring took place after the infringement ceased.

24.      It also challenges paragraph 72 of the judgment under appeal, in which the General Court merely stated that the national competition authority might not have been able to guarantee that full penalties were imposed in respect of any infringements, thus leaving the question open, according to Silgan, whether that was indeed the case.

25.      The General Court should thus have concluded that there was no evidence that the transfer of the investigation to the Commission was necessary to ensure the effective enforcement of EU competition law.

26.      Silgan further alleges that in paragraph 105 of the judgment under appeal, the General Court erred in its assessment of the allocation of the burden of proof. The Commission should have provided evidence of the basis for its competence and demonstrated that the conditions for re-allocation were satisfied.

(b)    Analysis

27.      I should begin by discussing paragraphs 18 and 19 of the Cooperation Notice. On the one hand, by referring to the end of a period of two months from the date of the first information sent to the network, paragraph 18 concerns the initial allocation period that takes place prior to the start of the proceedings. (10) In other words, the initial allocation period coincides with the period in which the authority that is well placed to deal with the case is identified. (11) On the other hand, paragraph 19 concerns the situation in which, after the two-month period, the competition authority should continue to deal with the case until the completion of the proceedings. Paragraph 19 governs the situation in which re-allocation is exceptionally permitted, after the initial allocation period of two months, only where the facts known about the case change materially during the course of the proceedings.

28.      In those circumstances, it should be noted that in paragraph 60 of the judgment under appeal, the General Court correctly held that the Commission was in a better position than the national competition authority to ensure the effective enforcement of competition law. In that regard, I consider the General Court’s reasoning in paragraphs 56 to 59 of the judgment under appeal to be free from errors of law.

29.      In particular, in paragraphs 56 to 58 of the judgment under appeal, the General Court emphasised the temporal difference between when the infringement was recorded and when the restructuring took place, (12) and pointed out that loopholes in the German law applicable at the time would have prevented effective penalties from being imposed on the relevant undertakings. (13) Given those circumstances and temporal differences, the General Court could hold that there was a potential risk that the infringement, under the German law applicable at the time, would remain unpunished, at least as far as concerns part of the infringement itself, as the effective enforcement of EU competition law could not be guaranteed.

30.      The General Court recalled, in paragraph 59 of the judgment under appeal, that the objective of Regulation No 1/2003 is to ensure that the EU competition rules are applied effectively by empowering the competition authorities of the Member States to apply that law in parallel with the Commission.

31.      However, the General Court merely pointed out that that objective is also mentioned in the second limb of paragraph 54(d) of the Cooperation Notice. On that basis, the General Court correctly held that the Commission was in a better position than the national competition authority to ensure the effective enforcement of competition law.

32.      Moreover, as stated in paragraph 2 of the Cooperation Notice, ‘Member States are under an obligation to set up a sanctioning system providing for sanctions which are effective, proportionate and dissuasive for infringements of EC law’. In other words, if the Member State cannot guarantee such a sanctioning system, the effective and uniform application of competition law cannot be guaranteed. (14) It would in fact be contrary to the spirit of cooperation that characterises the network, as well as the objective pursued by Regulation No 1/2003, to take the view that the national competition authority cannot ask the Commission to allocate the procedure to itself. (15)

33.      Furthermore, Article 11(6) of Regulation No 1/2003, which is based on close cooperation between the national competition authorities of the Member States and the Commission, (16) provides not only that the initiation by the Commission of proceedings relieves the national competition authorities of their competence, but also that, if a national competition authority is already acting on a case, the Commission is to initiate proceedings only after consulting with that national competition authority. (17) In that regard, and as the Court of Justice has also pointed out, Article 11(6) comes under Chapter IV of Regulation No 1/2003 concerning cooperation between the Commission and the competition authorities of the Member States. (18)

34.      Therefore, Silgan’s argument that the General Court found that the conditions set out in the second limb of paragraph 54(d) of the Cooperation Notice had been satisfied is unfounded. Paragraphs 59 and 60 of the judgment under appeal contain no indication to that effect.

35.      As regards Silgan’s complaint regarding the material change in the facts known about the case, referred to in paragraph 19 of the Cooperation Notice, it should be noted first of all that there is no discussion of that point in the contested paragraphs of the judgment under appeal. As mentioned above, the General Court’s conclusion that the Commission could exercise its competence is based solely on the need to ensure that the objective of Regulation No 1/2003, namely the effective enforcement of competition law, is pursued.

36.      Even if there were a connection between the present case and paragraph 19 of the Cooperation Notice, I doubt that corporate restructuring is not covered by the definition of a material change in the facts of the case. Although the restructuring may in itself be unrelated to the infringement, I take the view that, in general, restructuring, in its various forms, should be regarded as a possible means of improving a company’s commercial and strategic position in the market and that it entails substantial changes to the undertakings that committed the infringements, and as such is included in the definition of a material change in facts.

37.      As regards the allocation of the burden of proof, I question the admissibility of Silgan’s claim that it was for the Commission to prove its competence. On that point, it must be recalled that it is for the applicant in the context of a legal challenge to adduce evidence – direct or circumstantial – to demonstrate that his or her complaints are well founded. (19) In the present case, the General Court did not err in its assessment, but merely found that Silgan had failed to demonstrate that the Commission had departed from the Cooperation Notice. Moreover, it is apparent from paragraph 105 of the judgment under appeal that the General Court had doubts as to the admissibility of Silgan’s argument that the administration cannot depart from the internal measures it adopts, since it was only raised in the reply.

38.      It follows from the foregoing that the first complaint of the third part of the fourth ground of appeal must, in my opinion, be rejected.

(c)    Silgan’s arguments on the second complaint, alleging that the re-allocation a posteriori was effected outside of the prescribed period

39.      As regards the second complaint of the third part alleging that the re-allocation a posteriori was effected outside of the prescribed period, Silgan alleges that the General Court ignores the time requirements imposed by the Cooperation Notice in the event of re-allocation a posteriori, and that, in paragraph 105 of the judgment under appeal, the General Court should instead have concluded that there had been a deviation from those requirements.

40.      Silgan also argues that, contrary to the General Court’s finding in paragraph 88 of the judgment under appeal, the use of the word ‘normally’ in paragraph 18 of the Cooperation Notice does not mean that the period of two months from the date of the first information sent to the network is not binding. In paragraphs 88 and 89 of the judgment under appeal, the General Court erred in law by holding that paragraph 18 of the Cooperation Notice does not apply in the present case and that the Commission is not bound by any time limit.

41.      Silgan argues that the re-allocation a posteriori should instead take place without delay, as soon as the Commission becomes aware of the circumstances justifying it.

(d)    Analysis

42.      First, I note that in paragraph 88 of the judgment under appeal, according to the General Court, paragraph 18 of the Cooperation Notice is not relevant in the present case, since paragraph 18 applies to the situation in which the national competition authority and the Commission have to reach an agreement on a possible re-allocation.

43.      In that regard, it should be mentioned that, as stated above in point 27 of the present Opinion, paragraph 18 expressly refers to the situation in which there are re-allocation issues which may arise during the initial allocation period and which must be resolved swiftly, normally within a period of two months. However, it is clear from the case file that the Commission intervened at the request of the national competition authority, since the authority feared that the companies responsible for the infringement would go unpunished on account of loopholes in German law. Moreover, in the present case, it is common ground that the national competition authority requested the Commission to investigate the case after it had already initiated the proceedings. (20) It follows that the Commission intervened after the initial allocation period. The General Court thus correctly held that paragraph 18 of the Cooperation Notice is not relevant in the present case.

44.      As regards paragraph 89 of the judgment under appeal, in which the General Court concluded that it does not appear from paragraph 54 of the Cooperation Notice that the Commission is bound by any specific time limit, the scope of paragraph 54 of the Cooperation Notice should be clarified.

45.      Paragraph 54 covers two situations: the first relates to the initial allocation period, referring to the end of two months in accordance with paragraph 18. During that initial period, as provided for in paragraph 54, the Commission may initiate proceedings pursuant to Article 11(6) of Regulation No 1/2003, after consulting with the relevant competition authority. The second situation is where, once the allocation period is over, the Commission may in principle apply Article 11(6) of Regulation No 1/2003 only in certain situations listed in paragraph 54. For that second situation, that paragraph does not indicate any time limit. One of the situations listed in paragraph 54 refers to the circumstance where the adoption of a Commission decision is necessary to ensure the effective enforcement of EU competition law.

46.      It follows, in my opinion, that the General Court correctly held that, under paragraph 54, the Commission is not bound by any time limit.

47.      Furthermore, it should be noted that in its pleadings, the Commission explains that the proceedings could not be initiated before the date of the inspections that had to be carried out. It also explains that the reason why 10 months elapsed between the request from the national competition authority and the initiation of the proceedings by the Commission is that it took that amount of time to request and analyse the numerous files, to decide whether to proceed with the investigation and to organise the inspections.

48.      On that point, I note that in paragraphs 91 to 93 of the judgment under appeal, the General Court correctly referred to the case-law according to which EU law requires the institutions to deal with matters within a reasonable time in the administrative proceedings conducted by them, and that the reasonableness of the time limit is assessed in the light of the circumstances of each particular case, and in particular the complexity of the case in question. (21)

49.      Specifically, I note that the Court has already ruled that competition cases require, in principle, a complex factual and economic analysis and that, in a significant number of cases, any acts and investigation measures adopted by the competition authorities would necessarily prolong the duration of the infringement proceedings. (22)

50.      In the present case, it is my view that the General Court correctly held, on the basis of the information contained in paragraphs 94 to 100 of the judgment under appeal, that a period of 10 months did not seem unreasonable for the proceedings. Moreover, as the General Court was right to recall in paragraph 101 of the judgment under appeal, it must be mentioned by analogy that, according to the case-law of the Court of Justice, the breach of the principle of observance of a reasonable period is capable of justifying the annulment of a decision taken following an administrative procedure based on Article 101 or 102 TFEU only if it also constitutes an infringement of the rights of the defence of the undertaking concerned. (23) However, Silgan did not invoke a breach of its rights of defence either before the General Court (24) or before the Court of Justice.

51.      It follows from the foregoing that the second complaint in the third part of the fourth ground of appeal must, in my view, also be rejected.

2.      The first, second and fourth parts of the fourth ground of appeal

52.      In the fourth ground of appeal, Silgan raises three other complaints against paragraphs 105 and 106 of the judgment under appeal.

53.      In the first place, Silgan invokes the principle that the Commission is bound by its own acts, from which it may depart only by providing reasons compatible with the principle of equal treatment.

54.      In the second place, Silgan argues that that principle also applies to the Cooperation Notice. In that regard, Silgan refers to the judgment of 9 February 2022, Sped-Pro v Commission (T‑791/19, EU:T:2022:67), in which the General Court held that, as is the case with other soft law instruments, the Commission imposed a limit on the exercise of its discretion through the Cooperation Notice and cannot depart from it under pain of being found, where appropriate, to be in breach of the general principles of law, such as equal treatment or the protection of legitimate expectations. (25)

55.      In the third place, it criticised the General Court for failing to find that the Commission provided inadequate reasons for departing from the Cooperation Notice.

56.      With regard to the first two complaints mentioned above, Silgan merely refers to the principle that the administration is bound by its decisions, without remotely challenging the General Court’s reasoning. I doubt therefore whether those two complaints are admissible.

57.      As regards the merits (and as explained above in points 28 to 31 of the present Opinion), where the Commission, at the request of the national competition authority, decides to initiate the proceedings, since they are necessary to ensure the effective enforcement of EU competition law, that does not constitute a departure from the Cooperation Notice. For that reason, such findings are not contrary to the judgment in Sped-Pro v Commission, as referred to in point 54 of the present Opinion.

58.      As regards the third complaint explained in point 55 of the present Opinion, Silgan refers to the content of the fifth ground of appeal. Specifically, Silgan challenges paragraph 62 of the judgment under appeal in which the General Court held that the reasoning set out in the national competition authority’s press release of 27 April 2018 (26) and the Commission’s press release of 12 July 2022 (27) allowed Silgan to understand the context that had led that authority to submit the request and the Commission to initiate the proceedings. In that regard, Silgan argues that press releases cannot replace the statement of reasons for a Commission decision, especially where the press release was published after the decision was adopted.

59.      As regards the latter complaint, it is true that in the contested decision, the Commission merely states that it initiated the proceedings at the request of the national competition authority, whereas in the press release it clarifies that the national competition authority referred the case to the Commission because loopholes in the German law applicable at the time did not allow it to impose penalties on Silgan’s subsidiaries. (28) However, the case file shows that those difficulties due to the legislative loopholes had also been highlighted in the national competition authority’s press release of 27 April 2018, and therefore long before the Commission’s press release of 12 July 2022.

60.      In that regard, according to the Court’s settled case-law, it is not necessary for the statement of reasons to go into all the relevant facts and points of law, since the question whether the obligation to provide a statement of reasons has been satisfied must be assessed with regard not only to the wording of the act, but also to its context and to all the legal rules governing the matter in question. (29)

61.      Moreover, although that examination may be undertaken only on the basis of a decision that has been formally adopted, the Court has already ruled that elements such as the press release make known the essential elements that are relevant for the case in question. (30)

62.      In the present case, I take the view that the Commission’s press release, as well as that of the national competition authority – according to the judgment under appeal – did allow Silgan to understand the reasons why the national competition authority referred the case to the Commission and why the Commission initiated the proceedings.

63.      It follows from the foregoing that the first, second and fourth parts of the fourth ground of appeal must also be rejected.

64.      Consequently, I conclude that the fourth ground of appeal should be rejected in its entirety.

IV.    Conclusion

65.      In the light of the foregoing considerations, I propose that the Court should reject the fourth ground of appeal in its entirety.

1      Original language: Italian.

2      The contested decision, which relates to Case AT.40522, is available at https://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/cases1/202307/AT_40522_8986595_2868_7.pdf.

3      For a more detailed explanation of the background to the present case, see paragraphs 2 to 14 of the judgment under appeal.

4      In the same decision, the Commission found that the infringement was also committed by Crown Holdings, Inc. and Crown Cork & Seal Deutschland Holdings GmbH (together ‘Crown’) and imposed a fine on those companies as well. As is clear from the pleadings of the Federal Republic of Germany, the Crown companies had also undergone corporate restructuring. Crown brought an action for annulment of the Commission’s decision before the General Court, which was, however, rejected by judgment of 2 October 2024, Crown Holdings and Crown Cork & Seal Deutschland v Commission (T‑587/22, EU:T:2024:661). Crown’s appeal seeking annulment of the judgment of the General Court is currently before the Court of Justice (Case C‑855/24 P). In the present Opinion, I shall confine myself to the arguments put forward by Silgan.

5      Commission Notice on the conduct of settlement procedures in view of the adoption of Decisions pursuant to Article 7 and Article 23 of Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 in cartel cases (OJ 2008 C 167, p. 1).

6      Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty (OJ 2003 L 1, p. 1), and last amended by Council Regulation (EC) No 487/2009 of 25 May 2009 (OJ 2009 L 148, p. 1).

7      See paragraph 3 of the Commission Notice on cooperation within the Network of Competition Authorities (OJ 2004 C 101, p. 43).

8      Judgment of 23 November 2017, Gasorba and Others (C‑547/16, EU:C:2017:891, paragraph 23).

9      See recital 17 of Regulation No 1/2003.

10      To that effect, in its pleadings, the Commission specified that the initial allocation period takes place prior to the start of the proceedings.

11      See paragraphs 5 to 9 of the Cooperation Notice.

12      As noted by the Commission in its decision (see footnote 2 of the present Opinion), the infringement took place from 11 March 2011 to 18 September 2014. As explained in paragraph 56 of the judgment under appeal, several Silgan companies were subject to restructuring from December 2016.

13      The German legislature closed those loopholes with the introduction of Paragraph 81 in the ninth amendment of the Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen (Law against restrictions on competition), Bundesgesetzblatt Jahrgang 2017 Part No 33, issued at Bonn on 8 June 2017.

14      See, to that effect, judgment of 30 January 2025, Caronte & Tourist (C‑511/23, EU:C:2025:42), where the Court recalled that ‘in the exercise of its procedural autonomy, a Member State must ensure not only that EU competition law and the prosecution and punishment of infringements thereof are fully effective, but also that fundamental rights are observed, in particular the rights of the defence of the undertakings concerned by infringement proceedings’ (paragraph 62, emphasis added).

15      Including when the competition authority determines that it is no longer well placed to complete the proceedings and apply penalties, on the basis that the legislative system applicable at the time did not allow the prosecution of infringements of competition rules.

16      Judgment of 8 March 2007, France Télécom v Commission (T‑339/04, EU:T:2007:80, paragraph 79).

17      Judgment of 25 February 2021, Slovak Telekom (C‑857/19, EU:C:2021:139, paragraph 31).

18      Ibid.

19      Judgment of 26 January 2017, Duravit and Others v Commission (C‑609/13 P, EU:C:2017:46, paragraph 58).

20      As is clear from paragraphs 3 and 4 of the judgment under appeal, on 21 May 2015, the national competition authority carried out searches at the premises of various companies of the Silgan group, and on 14 June 2017, the authority itself requested the Commission to investigate the present case.

21      See judgment of 15 October 2002, Limburgse Vinyl Maatschappij and Others v Commission (C‑238/99 P, C‑244/99 P, C‑245/99 P, C‑247/99 P, C‑250/99 P – C‑252/99 P and C‑254/99 P, EU:C:2002:582, paragraph 187).

22      See, by analogy, judgment of 15 January 2026, Imballaggi Piemontesi (C‑588/24, EU:C:2026:14, paragraph 58 and the case-law cited).

23      See, by analogy, judgment of 4 October 2024, Ferriere Nord v Commission (C‑31/23 P, EU:C:2024:851, paragraph 150 and the case-law cited).

24      See paragraph 76 of the judgment under appeal.

25      Paragraph 40.

26      The national competition authority’s press release is not included with the parties’ pleadings. It was among the documents filed before the General Court and is publicly available.

27      The Commission’s press release can be viewed at: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_22_4483.

28      The Commission’s press release also refers to Crown’s subsidiaries.

29      See, inter alia, judgment of 14 December 2023, EDP España v Naturgy Energy Group and Commission (C‑693/21 P and C‑698/21 P, EU:C:2023:989, paragraph 61).

30      See, to that effect, judgment of 16 June 2015, Gauweiler and Others (C‑62/14, EU:C:2015:400, paragraph 71).