52023SC0696

Türkiye 1 remains a key partner for the European Union and a candidate country. Türkiye has been linked to the EU by an association agreement since 1964 and a Customs Union was established in 1995. The European Council granted Türkiye the status of candidate country in December 1999 and accession negotiations were opened in October 2005. Within the framework of accession negotiations, 16 chapters have been opened and one has been provisionally closed. Accession negotiations with Türkiye, however, remain at a standstill, in line with the Council Conclusions of June 2018 as reiterated by the Council Conclusions of December 2022. Türkiye continued to move away from the EU and did not reverse the negative trend in relation to reform, despite its repeated statements of commitment to EU accession. The EU’s serious concerns on the continued deterioration of democratic standards, the rule of law, the independence of the judiciary and respect for fundamental rights were not addressed.

Presidential and parliamentary elections were held in Türkiye in May 2023. The ruling coalition retained its majority in the parliament and the incumbent President was re-elected. The priorities of the new government include post-earthquake relief and reconstruction, financial stability and a constitutional overhaul.

In February 2023, two powerful earthquakes and multiple aftershocks struck south-eastern Türkiye. The devastating earthquakes caused the death of tens of thousands of people and resulted in widespread destruction of public and private infrastructure, including schools and healthcare facilities. The EU’s reaction was immediate and substantial emergency assistance was provided both through humanitarian funding and the EU Civil Protection Mechanism. In March 2023, the European Commission and the Swedish Presidency of the Council of the EU hosted, in coordination with the Turkish authorities, an international donors’ conference to mobilise funds from the international community to support the early recovery, relief and reconstruction of the affected areas. This conference raised more than EUR 6 billion. The implementation of the assistance pledged by the European Commission has begun.

The EU has a strategic interest in a stable and secure environment in the Eastern Mediterranean and in the development of a cooperative and mutually beneficial relationship with Türkiye. The European Council in June 2022 reconfirmed its expectation that Türkiye fully respects international law, contributes to the de-escalation of tensions in the interest of regional stability in the Eastern Mediterranean and promotes good-neighbourly relations in a sustainable way. The European Council in June 2023 invited the High Representative and the Commission to submit a report to the European Council on the state of play of EU-Türkiye relations, building on the instruments and options identified by the European Council and with a view to proceeding in a strategic and forward-looking manner. The Foreign Affairs Council discussed Türkiye in July 2023.

During the reporting period, Türkiye did not engage in any unauthorised drilling activities in the Eastern Mediterranean. It continued to refuse to recognise the Republic of Cyprus and repeatedly advocated a two-state solution in Cyprus, contrary to relevant UN Security Council Resolutions.

The 2016 EU-Turkey Statement continued to yield results and remained the key framework for cooperation on migration. Türkiye sustained its remarkable efforts to host 3.6 million refugees from Syria and other countries. The EU has mobilised close to EUR 10 billion to support refugees and host communities since 2012. The Commission continued to implement the additional package of EUR 3 billion covering 2021-2023, providing assistance in areas such as basic needs, border management, education, healthcare, protection and socio-economic support.

1.2. Summary of the report 2

There are serious deficiencies in the functioning of Türkiye’s democratic institutions. Democratic backsliding continued during the reporting period. Structural deficiencies in the presidential system remained in place.

Presidential and parliamentary elections took place on 14 May 2023. A second round of the presidential election was held on 28 May. The elections were held under the new electoral law adopted in March 2022. The elections offered voters a choice between genuine political alternatives and voter participation remained high, but biased media coverage and the lack of a level playing field gave an unjustified advantage to the incumbent.

The constitutional architecture kept powers centralised at the level of the Presidency and does not ensure a sound and effective separation of powers between the executive, the legislature and the judiciary. The ineffective checks-and-balances mechanism means that the executive branch is democratically accountable only through elections.

Political pluralism continued to be undermined by the targeting of opposition parties and individual members of parliament. The government’s pressure on mayors from opposition parties continued to weaken local democracy. Most regulatory authorities remain directly linked to the Presidency. The recommendations by the Council of Europe’s Venice Commission on the presidential system remain unaddressed.

The situation in the south-east region remained a cause for concern, particularly after the earthquakes in February 2023. The Turkish government conducted security and military operations in Iraq and Syria. Border areas faced a security risk with terrorist attacks by the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), which is listed as a terrorist group by the EU. The government has a legitimate right and a responsibility to fight terrorism, but it is essential that it does so in full compliance with the principles of the rule of law, human rights and fundamental freedoms. Anti-terror measures need to be proportionate. There was no progress in resuming a credible political peace process to resolve the Kurdish issue. Following the earthquakes, the Kurdistan Communities Union (KCK) declared a period of unilateral truce, during the run-up to the May elections, which was terminated in June. Turkish officials linked the PKK-affiliated People’s Protection Units (YPG) to an attack in Istanbul in November 2022, but the PKK denied involvement. The EU unambiguously condemned the PKK’s attacks and expressed solidarity with the families of the victims. Türkiye continued to carry out airstrikes against the PKK and affiliated groups in northern Syria and Iraq.

Serious backsliding regarding civil society issues continued. Civil society organisations faced increased pressure and shrinking space to operate , limiting their freedoms of expression, association and assembly. The implementation of the Law on preventing financing of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction placed further restrictions on civil society organisations. However, despite increasing pressure from the authorities, civil society continued to be vocal and to participate actively in civic life, including by providing support to the people affected by the February 2023 earthquakes.

Civilian oversight of the security forces was not consolidated. The executive branch maintained significant control over the security forces. The civilian component of the Supreme Military Council (YAŞ) remained unchanged. The military judicial system’s authority was curbed, with civilian higher courts reviewing appeals against military court decisions. However, effective civilian oversight of the security forces remained incomplete and lacking in effective accountability mechanisms. Strengthening parliamentary oversight of security institutions is necessary.

Türkiye is in between some and moderate level of preparation in the field of public administration reform. It made no progress in this area over the reporting period. There is still a lack of political will to reform the public administration and public financial management. The restructuring of the executive branch and the overhaul of the public administration in line with the presidential system introduced in 2018 resulted in highly centralised policymaking system. The level of accountability of the administration remains insufficient. Its human resources management system needs to be reformed. Politicisation of the public administration has continued. The share of women in managerial posts in the civil service is still low.

Türkiye remains at an early stage of preparation in the area of judiciary. Serious backsliding continued and, despite several judicial reform packages in recent years, the structural deficiencies in the judicial system remained unaddressed. The continued refusal to implement certain rulings of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) remains a matter of concern. There was no progress in eliminating undue influence and pressure by the executive on judges and prosecutors, which negatively affects the independence, impartiality and quality of the judiciary. Implementation of the 2021 Human Rights Action Plan (HRAP) and the 2019 Judicial Reform Strategy (JRS) continued, but the activities foreseen in these documents fell short of addressing the structural problems and issues identified in the previous reports of the European Commission. The lack of objective, merit-based, uniform and pre-established criteria for recruiting and promoting judges and prosecutors remains a source of concern.

Türkiye is at an early stage in the fight against corruption. There was no progress in the reporting period. Outstanding deficiencies in key areas of the fight against corruption over the last years remained unaddressed. A fully-fledged corruption prevention policy still remains to be developed, including the relevant institutions, contrary to the United Nations Convention against Corruption, to which Türkiye is party. Legislative gaps still remain in several fields of the fight against corruption. The limitations of the legal framework and the institutional architecture allowed undue influence on the investigation and prosecution phases of corruption cases. The accountability and transparency of public institutions need to be improved. The absence of an anti-corruption strategy and action plan indicates the lack of will to fight decisively against corruption. The Council of Europe’s Group of States against Corruption (GRECO) recommendations remained unimplemented. Overall, corruption remains a problem.

Türkiye has some level of preparation in the fight against organised crime and there was some progress at operational level through participation in an increasing number of joint operations with EU Member States and neighbouring countries. Nevertheless, it is important for Türkiye to further increase its operational willingness to cooperate and exchange information with EU law enforcement partners. The legal framework for the fight against organised crime and police cooperation is only partially aligned with the EU acquis. The completion of an international agreement between the EU and Türkiye on the exchange of personal data between Europol and the Turkish authorities responsible for fighting serious crime and terrorism is still pending, considering also that the Turkish data protection legislation is still not aligned with the EU acquis. The legal framework regulating the fight against money laundering and terrorist financing needs to be improved in line with the recommendations of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) and the Venice Commission on the Law on preventing financing of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

The deterioration of human and fundamental rights continued. The Turkish legal framework includes general guarantees of respect for human and fundamental rights, but the legislation and its implementation need to be brought into line with the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) case law. No legislative amendments were adopted to eliminate the remaining elements of the 2016 state of emergency laws.

Türkiye’s refusal to implement certain ECtHR rulings is a source of concern regarding the judiciary’s adherence to international and European standards. Türkiye has not implemented the July 2022 ruling of the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights, which was issued in the framework of the infringement procedure launched by the Committee of Ministers against Türkiye, that points to a drifting away from the standards of human rights and fundamental freedoms that it has subscribed to as a member of the Council of Europe.

The implementation of the human rights action plan adopted in 2021 continued. However, it did not address critical issues. The overall human rights situation did not improve.

On freedom of expression, the serious backsliding continued. Broad restrictions on the activities of journalists, writers, lawyers, academics, human rights defenders and critical voices continued to have a negative effect on the exercise of their freedoms. The implementation of the criminal laws relating to national security and anti-terrorism continued to contravene the ECHR and to diverge from ECtHR case law.

The May 2023 election campaign witnessed restrictions on freedom of expression, both private and public media did not ensure editorial independence and impartiality in their coverage of the campaign, detracting from the ability of voters to make an informed choice.

There was no progress in the area of freedom of assembly and association, where legislation and its implementation are not in line with the Turkish Constitution, European standards or the international conventions that Türkiye is party to. There were recurrent bans, disproportionate use of force and interventions around peaceful demonstrations. Demonstrators were subject to investigations, court cases and administrative fines on charges of terrorism-related activities or of violating the Law on demonstrations and marches.

The rights of the most disadvantaged groups and people belonging to minorities need better protection. Roma 3 people are still largely excluded from formal employment and their living conditions deteriorated severely. In January 2023, Türkiye adopted a new Roma strategy covering the period 2023-2030 and an action plan covering the period 2023-2025. The February 2023 earthquakes affected the Roma population disproportionately, and increased the difficulties they faced in the affected areas in terms of living conditions, livelihood and basic needs and health, especially for women and children. Gender-based violence, discrimination and hate speech against minorities and against lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, intersex and queer (LGBTIQ) persons are still a matter of serious concern.

On migration and asylum policy, Türkiye made some progress. The EU-Turkey Statement remained the main framework for cooperation between the EU and Türkiye. Some progress was made in further strengthening the capacity for surveillance and protection of the land borders with Iran and Iraq. The Commission expects Türkiye to uphold its commitments under the EU-Turkey statement, in line with the European Council conclusions of October 2021, including prevention of irregular migration from land and sea routes, and resuming returns. The return of irregular migrants from the Greek islands under the EU-Turkey Statement remained suspended. The full and effective implementation of the EU-Turkey readmission agreement towards all EU Member States is pending. Political and technical dialogue is ongoing on migration and security. The next EU-Türkiye high level dialogue on migration is scheduled to take place on 23 November 2023. Overall, the number of illegal border crossings between Türkiye and Greece remained significantly lower than it was prior to the adoption of the EU-Turkey Statement. In 2022, the number of irregular migrants arriving increased on most routes by comparison with 2021. In the first half of 2023, the number of irregular arrivals from Türkiye into the EU was lower than in the same period in 2022. Arrivals in Greece increased by 62%, while the sea route to Italy saw a substantial decrease (down by 52%) and the number of arrivals in Cyprus via the Green Line went down significantly by 42%. Türkiye has still not implemented the provisions relating to third-country nationals in the EU-Turkey readmission agreement, which entered into force in October 2017.

Türkiye continued to make significant efforts to host and meet the needs of one of the largest refugee communities in the world. Out of the almost EUR 10 billion in EU support to refugees allocated since 2011, some EUR 7 billion had been disbursed by September 2023. Efficient integration measures are needed to address the prolonged presence of refugees in the country. Access to public health for migrants and refugees should be improved. No outstanding benchmarks under the visa liberalisation roadmap were fulfilled. Türkiye still needs to further align its legislation with the EU acquis on visa policy.

Türkiye is an active and significant actor in the area of foreign policy, which constitutes an important element in the context of the EU-Türkiye relationship. Nevertheless, Türkiye’s unilateral foreign policy remained at odds with the EU’s priorities under the common foreign and security policy (CFSP). Türkiye maintained a very low alignment rate of 10% with the EU stance on foreign and security policy (as of August 2023), compared to 8% in 2022. Its rhetoric in support to terrorist group Hamas following its attacks against Israel on 7 October 2023 is in complete disagreement with the EU approach.

Following Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, Türkiye condemned the Russian military aggression, including at the UN General Assembly, and engaged politically and diplomatically, including by facilitating the export of Ukrainian grain and the exchange of prisoners. The UN- and Türkiye-brokered Black Sea Grain Initiative was terminated by Russia in July 2023. Türkiye also sought to facilitate talks between Ukraine and Russia and to work on de-escalation and bringing about a cease-fire. Nevertheless, Türkiye refrained from aligning itself with the EU’s restrictive measures against Russia. As of March 2023, Türkiye has implemented a ban on exporting to Russia sanctioned goods originating from the EU, the United States and the United Kingdom. This ban specifically targeted goods that were in transit, stored in warehouses or located within free zones in Türkiye. However, the potential transportation of dual-use and sensitive technology goods, as well as the unrestricted movement of sanctioned goods from Türkiye to Russia still need to be addressed. Overall, Türkiye significantly intensified its trade and economic ties with Russia, and the Turkish economy became more dependent on Russia in crucial sectors, particularly in energy.

Türkiye intensified its ‘regional normalisation’ policy with the Arab states, with Armenia and with Israel. Following the Hamas terrorist group’s attacks against Israel in October 2023, Türkiye refrained from condemning and qualifying them as terrorism and strongly criticised Israel’s response. Türkiye strongly condemned the loss of civilian lives on both sides and proposed to act as a mediator between Israel and Hamas. Türkiye is currently re-evaluating its ties with Israel. On the Middle East Peace Process (MEPP), Türkiye’s position aligns with the EU’s position supporting the two-state solution. Türkiye's rapprochement with the Syrian regime, brokered by Russia, occurred in spite of the lack of a political resolution to the Syrian conflict and is at odds with the EU’s policy. At the same time, Türkiye shared a common goal with the EU to achieve a stable and prosperous Syria, primarily by implementing UNSCR 2254. Türkiye has a growing presence and geopolitical ambition in the South Caucasus and Central Asia. It also continued its efforts to extend its relations with African, Latin American and Asian countries. Türkiye’s pragmatic engagement on Afghanistan and its vocal position on the developments in Sudan underscored its ambition to be a key player in the context of major international crises.

Türkiye continued to seek involvement in the common security and defence policy (CSDP) and EU defence initiatives while persisting in its exclusion of a Member State from all possible cooperation with NATO. Türkiye remained actively involved in EU crisis management missions and operations within the framework of the CSDP. In March 2023, the Turkish National Assembly approved Finland’s NATO accession and during the NATO summit in July 2023, the Turkish President pledged to promptly submit Sweden’s accession protocol to the Turkish parliament for ratification. The president submitted the bill for ratification to the Parliament on 23 October 2023.

Regarding good neighbourly relations and regional cooperation, Türkiye continued to refuse to recognise the Republic of Cyprus and repeatedly advocated a two-state solution in Cyprus, contrary to relevant UN Security Council Resolutions. The EU remains fully committed to a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem within the UN framework, in accordance with the relevant UNSC resolutions, in line with the principles on which the EU is founded and the acquis. The EU has called, most recently in the European Council conclusions of June 2023, for the speedy resumption of negotiations and expressed its readiness to play an active role in supporting all stages of the UN-led process with all appropriate means at its disposal. There were no unauthorised drilling activities by Türkiye in the Eastern Mediterranean during the reporting period.

Relations between Türkiye and Greece deteriorated until early 2023. However, following the devastating earthquakes in Türkiye in February 2023, there was a marked improvement in the relations. As of February 2023, violations of Greek airspace diminished drastically, and no flights over Greek inhabited areas were reported.

Pursuing dialogue in good faith and abstaining from unilateral actions which run counter to the EU interests and violate international law and the sovereign rights of EU Member States is an essential requirement to ensure stable and secure environment in the Eastern Mediterranean and the development of a cooperative and mutually beneficial relationship between the EU and Türkiye. Türkiye is expected to unequivocally commit itself to good neighbourly relations, international agreements and the peaceful settlement of disputes, in accordance with the United Nations Charter, having recourse, if necessary, to the International Court of Justice.

Regarding the economic criteria, the Turkish economy is well advanced but made no progress over the reporting period. Serious concerns persist over the proper functioning of Türkiye’s market economy. There was backsliding on important elements, such as the conduct of monetary policy and the institutional and regulatory environments over most of the reporting period. Since the May parliamentary and presidential elections, the authorities have taken some steps to revert to more stability oriented macroeconomic policies. Although economic growth remained robust in 2022, Türkiye moved further away from market-oriented policies, which weakened its economic fundamentals and increased vulnerabilities and risks. Inflation decreased somewhat but remained very high as monetary policy prioritised exceptionally low interest rates, which remain deeply negative in real terms and are sustained by a web of regulatory and prudential measures. After the presidential and parliamentary elections in spring 2023, monetary policy has started to tighten, also signalling a gradual simplification of the macroprudential framework. The current account deficit increased to 5.4% of GDP in 2022, driven by a negative terms-of-trade shock and large imports of non-monetary gold. The relatively good budget performance in recent years masks an underlying trend of growing fiscal risks. The authorities’ commitment to fiscal discipline wavered, as the fiscal stance turned pro-cyclical in 2023, with earthquake-related expenditure pressure adding to pre-electoral budgetary largesse. However, the fiscal stance was tightened after the elections and a revised budget, including sizeable tax increases, was adopted in July.

The institutional and regulatory environment lacks predictability and transparency, and complicates the post-electoral economic policy normalisation. Market exit remains costly and slow. However, Türkiye has made progress in digitalising government services to businesses. Although the size of the informal economy has fallen in recent years, it still accounts for a significant share of economic activity. State intervention in price-setting mechanisms persists. The provision of State aid lacks proper implementation rules, enforcement and transparency. The banking sector remained broadly stable but is facing financial stability challenges due to the numerous overly complex and far-reaching macroprudential and regulatory measures. The labour market strengthened further, although structural challenges remain significant, in particular for youth and female employment. Regional labour market disparities declined and reached one of the lowest levels in years. The recent net minimum wage increases were pro-cyclical.

Türkiye has a good level of preparation and made limited progress in achieving the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the EU. Despite improved vocational training, the mismatch between the education system and labour market needs remains a concern. Expenditure on research and development continued to increase, albeit at a very slow pace, and is still below the government’s target. Investment was relatively subdued in 2022. There was progress in the diversification of energy supplies and the share of energy generated from renewable sources increased significantly. However, the local content requirement in the renewable energy generation sector is a discriminatory practice and a cause for concern. Trade openness increased further, but integration with the EU continued falling, although remaining high. Deviations from Türkiye’s obligations under the EU-Turkey Customs Union continue to hinder bilateral trade.

Türkiye is moderately prepared in the area of public procurement, with significant gaps remaining to align with the EU acquis. There was backsliding in the reporting period as Türkiye increased the use of the negotiated procedure and of discriminatory domestic price advantage practices, and continued to allow offsets that favour local content. Türkiye is moderately prepared on statistics and made some progress, with work continuing to harmonise its statistical methodology with EU standards. The Turkish Statistical Institute (TurkStat) improved its compliance with the timeframes for publishing annual national accounts and excessive deficit procedure notifications. It took further steps to improve cooperation with other main data providers. However, Türkiye needs to increase the credibility of TurkStat and public trust in official statistics. Türkiye has a good level of preparation on financial control. It made no progress over the reporting period. The public internal financial control policy paper was not updated. The purpose, authority and responsibility of internal audit are undermined by the lack of a legal requirement to have internal audit units in ministries.

Regarding its ability to assume the obligations of membership, Türkiye has pursued alignment with the EU acquis on a rather ad hoc basis and to a limited degree.

The internal market cluster is key to the good functioning of the EU-Turkey Customs Union and to integrating Türkiye into the EU’s internal market. Türkiye has achieved a good level of preparation for the free movement of goods. However, technical barriers to trade and requirements discriminating against EU products remained in place. Preparations in the areas of freedom of movement for workers, the right of establishment and freedom to provide services are at an early stage, and substantial efforts are still required to align with the acquis. Türkiye is moderately prepared on free movement of capital, as limitations remain on foreign ownership and on capital movement. Türkiye needs to continue to address outstanding issues in its framework regulating the fight against money laundering and terrorist financing.

Türkiye is well advanced in the area of company law but needs to make further progress in aligning with the EU acquis. Türkiye has a good level of preparation in the area of intellectual property law, notably in terms of legislative alignment, but it needs to improve implementation and enforcement. Türkiye has some level of preparation in the area of competition policy. Backsliding was observed as serious concerns persist in relation to the legislative framework, enforcement capacity and transparency in the field of State aid. Türkiye has a good level of preparation in the area of financial services, however the banking sector faced a challenging operating environment in the reporting period. Türkiye has a good level of preparation on consumer and health protection, with limited progress made, notably on strengthening its surveillance system for health (security) services. The capacity of the healthcare system was seriously affected by the February 2023 earthquakes in south-east Türkiye.

Within the cluster on competitiveness and inclusive growth, Türkiye has some level of preparation in the area of digital transformation and media. Türkiye’s preparations in the area of science and research are well advanced and Türkiye made good progress during the reporting period, notably as a result of joining Horizon Europe and continued efforts to raise awareness of, and capacity for the programme. Türkiye is moderately prepared on education and culture, and continued to make some progress, notably through the continued implementation of the national qualifications system and the increased participation in some EU programmes. Access to education in south-east Türkiye was significantly impacted by the February 2023 earthquakes.

On the economy-related chapters, backsliding continued on economic and monetary policy, where Türkiye has some level of preparation. The Central Bank continued to loosen its unorthodox monetary policy stance, which triggered multi-year high inflation and unhinged inflation expectations. Until the parliamentary and presidential elections in May 2023, the Central Bank was subject to significant political pressure to keep real interest rates deeply negative. Far-reaching prudential and regulatory measures disrupted the functioning of financial markets and increased risks. After the elections, the Central Bank has started to tighten monetary policy and the new government took measures to limit the bulging fiscal deficit. Türkiye is moderately prepared and made limited progress on enterprise and industrial policy. Major challenges in relation to measures incompatible with EU industrial policy principles remain unaddressed. Türkiye has some level of preparation in the area of social policy and employment. The labour market situation improved but concerns remain over trade union rights and effective social dialogue, persistent levels of informal economic activity and the gender gap in employment. The February 2023 earthquakes had a major impact on the labour market in the affected regions.

Türkiye is moderately prepared on taxation. It made no progress during the reporting period and still needs to enable tax information exchange with all EU Member States. Türkiye maintains a good level of preparation for the customs union but made limited progress over the reporting period. However, Türkiye’s deviations from its obligations under the EU-Turkey Customs Union continued, contributing to a number of trade irritants.

Regarding the cluster on the Green Agenda and sustainable connectivity, Türkiye is moderately prepared in transport policy. It made limited progress during the reporting period, mainly linked to the update of the nationally determined contribution under the Paris Agreement with a specific chapter on transport mitigation policies. Türkiye is moderately prepared in the area of energy, and made limited progress overall. Efforts continued on renewable energy deployment, reforms in the natural gas sector and legislative alignment on nuclear safety. Türkiye continues to be an important transit country for the EU, but remains reliant on Russia for fossil fuel imports and nuclear energy. Türkiye is well advanced on trans-European networks and made no progress. The trans-Anatolian pipeline continues to operate smoothly and transmit gas to the European section of the Southern Gas Corridor. The construction of the flagship Halkali-Kapikule railway line connecting the EU border to Istanbul continued.

Türkiye has some level of preparation in the area of environment and climate change, and made limited progress over the reporting period. On climate change, Türkiye submitted its updated nationally determined contribution under the Paris Agreement. It faces critical environmental and climate challenges, and needs more ambitious and better coordinated environment and climate policies, strategic planning, substantial investment and stronger administrative capacity.

On the cluster covering resources, agriculture and cohesion, Türkiye reached some level of preparation in the area of agriculture and rural development. Backsliding continued during the reporting period, as its agricultural policy keeps moving away from the main principles of the EU common agricultural policy and as Türkiye continued to restrict imports of agricultural products from the EU. Türkiye is a major exporter of food products to the EU and made limited progress in the area of food safety, veterinary and phytosanitary policy, where it reached some level of preparation. Full implementation of the EU acquis in this area requires significant further work. Türkiye is moderately prepared in the area of fisheries and aquaculture, and made some progress on fisheries governance, inspection and control.

Türkiye is moderately prepared in the area of regional policy and the coordination of structural instruments, and continued to make some progress in accelerating the absorption of IPA II funds and setting up the structures for IPA III funds. Türkiye has some level of preparation in the area of financial and budgetary provisions but made no progress during the reporting period.

In the external relations cluster, Türkiye is moderately prepared in the area of external relations and made no progress over the reporting period. Türkiye has some level of preparation in the area of foreign, security and defence policy, and made no progress overall in the reporting period. Türkiye is a significant actor in the area of foreign policy, which constitutes an important element in the context of the EU-Türkiye relationship. Stepping up efforts to ensure alignment with the EU's common foreign and security policy would be a significant signal of Türkiye's commitment to the EU in the new geopolitical context.

2. Cluster 1: The fundamentals of the accession process

2.1. Functioning of democratic institutions and Public Administration Reform

Democracy

The functioning of Türkiye’s democratic institutions continued to be severely hampered. The structural shortcomings of the presidential system remained. Democratic backsliding and political polarisation increased in the run-up to the presidential and parliamentary elections. Following the earthquakes, which hit 11 provinces in February 2023, a state of emergency was introduced in the affected provinces and expired in May 2023. Furthermore, even though the nationwide state of emergency was lifted in July 2018, a number of legal provisions granting extraordinary powers to government officials and maintaining a number of the emergency’s restrictive elements remain in effect. Some of these provisions have been extended for another 2 years, but most of the provisions related to the 2018 state of emergency expired in July 2022.

The State of Emergency Inquiry Commission ruled on all the applications within the scope of the 2018 Law on the establishment of the Inquiry Commission on the State of Emergency Measures and completed its work in January 2023. Of the total number of applications submitted to the Inquiry Commission (127 292), the Inquiry Commission accepted 17 960 cases and rejected 109 332.

Elections

Presidential and parliamentary elections took place on 14 May 2023. A second round to determine the new President of the Republic was held on 28 May. According to the preliminary conclusions of the OSCE’s Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (the ODIHR), which deployed an election observation mission, voters had a choice between genuine political alternatives and voter participation was high. However, the incumbent-biased media coverage and the lack of a level playing field gave an unjustified advantage to the incumbent.

Parliamentary elections were held in Türkiye on 14 May 2023 to elect the 600 members of the Grand National Assembly. The governing Justice and Development Party (AKP) of the incumbent President, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, led the People’s Alliance, which also included the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), the Great Union Party (BBP) and the New Welfare Party (YRP). The People’s Alliance retained its majority in the parliament with 322 members of parliament. During the second round of the presidential elections on 28 May, President Erdoğan was re-elected with 52.18% of the vote (the Republic People’s Party CHP opposition candidate Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu received 47.82%). The elections took place in a deeply polarised environment. The elections offered voters a choice between genuine political alternatives and voter participation remained high, however, biased media coverage and the lack of a level playing field gave an unjustified advantage to the incumbent. In the subdued yet competitive campaign, candidates were able to campaign freely. However, harsher rhetoric, inflammatory and discriminatory language by both contestants, along with the continued intimidation and harassment of supporters of some opposition parties undermined the process. Election days were generally calm and well-administered. However, instances of deficient implementation of certain procedures, particularly during the vote count, were noted. The electoral campaign was held during the state of emergency in the 11 provinces affected by the earthquakes, where voting difficulties were widely reported. OSCE/ODIHR deployed an election observation mission (EOM) with 28 long-term and 350 short-term observers, with additional embedded observers from the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE). Local NGOs and the political parties also deployed thousands of volunteers to monitor the elections. The elections were held under the new electoral law adopted in March 2022. The new law introduced significant changes, such as a revised seat allocation system, changes to eligibility criteria for political parties and changes to the method of appointing mid-level electoral councils. It positively addressed an ODIHR recommendation to lower the parliamentary threshold from 10% to 7%. Most other ODIHR recommendations (including those related to seat distribution, voter and candidate rights, campaign financing and election dispute resolution) remain unaddressed. The Venice Commission criticised several aspects of the amended law, such as the new system for selecting the chairpersons and members of provincial and district election appeal boards with a lottery rather than taking experience into account.

Any further amendments that Türkiye makes to its electoral framework, including its legislation on political parties, need to be made in line with international standards, after thorough consultation.

The 48 mayors displaced by government-appointed trustees following the 2019 local elections in the south-east have not been reinstated and no action was taken to address the relevant Venice Commission’s June 2020 opinion. This remains a source of serious concern as it undermines local democracy and denies voters their preferred representation.

Parliament

The presidential system has largely weakened the national parliament’s legislative and oversight functions. The President’s extensive powers allow him to take decisions across a broad spectrum of policy areas, thereby limiting the parliament’s legislative function. The parliament lacks the tools needed to hold the government to account. Targeting of the political opposition continued. The closure case of the People’s Democratic Party (HDP) is still ongoing.

During the reporting period, the legislative function of the parliament was curtailed by the extensive use of presidential decrees and presidential decisions. From January to December 2022, the parliament adopted 80 of the 749 proposed laws. By contrast, during the same period, 273 presidential decrees issued under the state of emergency on a variety of policy issues (including socioeconomic issues) were brought before parliamentary committees.

The parliament’s legislative and agenda-setting duties remained mainly under the control of the ruling AKP-MHP alliance, which has a parliamentary majority. Opposition parties had a very limited ability to influence parliamentary debates.

The fourth GRECO evaluation report of 2022 highlighted the points that the asset declarations made by members of parliament are not verified for their accuracy, and that there are no effective sanctions for violations of rules in this area. Moreover, the content of these declarations is not made publicly available promptly after their submission to the parliament.

Parliamentary oversight of the executive remained very weak. The parliament lacks the necessary means to hold the government accountable. Members of parliament can submit written questions to the Vice-President and ministers, but it is not foreseen by the law that they can submit formal questions to the President. Ordinary presidential decrees are not subject to parliamentary review. However, presidential decrees issued under the state of emergency must be submitted to the parliament for approval. The supervision of public expenditure by the parliament must be substantially strengthened.

Political pluralism continued to be undermined by the judiciary’s targeting of opposition parties and of individual members of parliament (particularly from the People's Democratic Party (the HDP)) for alleged terrorism offenses. The system of parliamentary immunity did not provide sufficient legal protection for opposition parliamentarians to express their views within the limits of free speech. Approximately 5 000 HDP members and officials are currently imprisoned. One of the detained defendants in the Gezi trial was elected as a deputy from the Workers’ Party of Türkiye (the TIP) in the May 2023 elections but was not released from prison and was therefore not allowed to be sworn in as a member of parliament. By the end of the 27th legislative term (2018-2023), the total number of members of parliament subject to the legislative immunity resolution and a request for the lifting of their immunity was 206 (180 of them belonged to the parliamentary opposition). During the reporting period, no deputies had their immunity revoked or were detained on terrorism-related charges. Two former HDP co-chairs and several former HDP legislators are still in prison despite a European Court of Human Rights ruling in their favour.

The HDP’s closure case on terrorism charges, including the banning from political life of 451 HDP members, remain pending before the Constitutional Court. In April 2023, the HDP waived its right to oral defence, arguing that the case was politically motivated and that it should be postponed until after the May 2023 elections. The General Assembly of the Court recorded the party’s decision and sent the file to the Rapporteur. In January 2023, the Constitutional Court suspended State funding for the HDP but reinstated it in March following an appeal. In June 2023, the Constitutional Court ruled that the Treasury aid paid to the HDP could not be legally blocked.

Despite the March 2022 lowering of the electoral threshold from 10% to 7%, the legal framework for elections and political parties remains problematic. Türkiye has yet to implement the outstanding recommendations of the OSCE’s Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights and of the Council of Europe’s Venice Commission. The level of participation of women in decision-making, politics and employment remained low by international standards. Following the May 2023 elections, the percentage of women in the parliament increased from 17.1% during the previous term to 20.1% (from 104 to 121 out of 600). This is the highest ever ratio of women’s representation in the parliament but women are still under-represented.

Governance

The presidential system continues to be characterised by a lack of checks and balances, as well as the politicisation of the public administration. Most regulatory authorities remain directly linked to the Presidency. The recommendations by the Council of Europe’s Venice Commission on the presidential system still need to be addressed. The government’s pressure on mayors from opposition parties continued to weaken local democracy.

As highlighted by the Venice Commission's 2017 opinion and the European Commission's previous country reports, the presidential system still lacks the necessary checks and balances to prevent an undue concentration of power and to safeguard the independence of the judiciary. The highly centralised presidential system continues to impair the legislative branch of government, the judicial branch and the public administration.

The use of traditional instruments of oversight of the executive by the parliament, such as a vote of confidence and the ability to ask the executive oral questions, has not been allowed since the entry into force of the presidential system in 2018. The absence of effective checks and balances and the parliament’s inability to effectively supervise the office of the President mean that the latter’s political accountability is limited to election time. The public administration, courts and security forces are under the heavy influence of the executive. The Presidency exercises direct authority over all key institutions and regulatory bodies. The public sector remained politicised, especially at senior management level.

The legal framework allowed regulatory authorities to be subject to excessive political influence. The President has the authority to appoint the chiefs and board members of the vast majority of the regulatory agencies. These regulatory bodies, notably in the media sector, issued decisions that disproportionately target (including with heavy pecuniary fines) media that are critical of the government.

The Ombudsman’s caseload continued to increase during the reporting period and a high number of cases was adjudicated. However, the Ombudsman did not address politically sensitive issues concerning human rights and fundamental freedoms.

As regards local self-governance, the government maintained its pressure on opposition mayors, including through administrative and judicial investigations. In December 2022, the metropolitan mayor of Istanbul was sentenced to a suspended prison sentence on charges of insulting members of the Supreme Electoral Council. The mayor is also under administrative investigation by the Ministry of Interior for allegedly ‘employing terrorists’ in the municipality. In June 2023, a new case was opened against the mayor for alleged involvement in rigging a public works tender in 2015. In May, during a rally in Erzurum, the mayor was among those physically attacked, with the violence being condoned rather than condemned by senior AKP officials.

In the south-east, local democracy remained severely constrained. Since the 2019 municipal elections, 48 HDP mayors have been removed from office on terrorism-related accusations. Governors continued to serve as trustees in place of the deposed mayors. Hundreds of elected municipal officials have been detained on suspicion for ties to terrorism. These actions violate citizens’ right to be governed by their elected representatives.

The legal framework governing the tutelary powers of the Ministry of Interior over locally elected officials was not revised in accordance with Türkiye’s commitments under the European Charter of Local Self-Government.

The municipal law provides for the engagement of local administrations with the public and with civil society. Citizens’ assemblies, which seek to bring together professional and civil society organisations and other local stakeholders, remained inactive in most provinces.

Civil society

Serious backsliding regarding the civil society environment continued. Civil society faced continuous pressure from the authorities. Human rights organisations, which were closed under the state of emergency, were not offered any legal remedy in relation to confiscations. Human rights defender Osman Kavala and his co-defendants in the Gezi trial remained in prison without parole, despite a ruling by the ECtHR.

The implementation of the Law on preventing financing of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction added further restrictions and pressure on civil society.

Despite all these negative developments, civil society continued to be vocal and to participate actively in civic life, including by providing support to the people affected by the February 2023 earthquakes. Systematic and inclusive mechanisms for the effective consultation of independent civil society organisations on new legislation and policies need to be put in place.

A free, empowered and diverse civil society is a key component of any democratic system. Civil society organisations in Türkiye continued to make crucial contributions in areas, such as education, women’s rights, rights for LGBTIQ persons, rights of persons belonging to minorities, rights of persons with disabilities, freedom of religion and belief, the environment, anti-discrimination and support for refugees.

In the immediate aftermath of the February 2023 earthquakes, civil society faced pressure from the authorities when delivering aid on the ground and was prevented from reporting on the situation in the affected regions.

Human rights organisations and human rights defenders faced judicial and administrative pressure, partly due to Türkiye’s broad definition of terrorism. In some cases, however, the judiciary issued positive decisions, acquitting and releasing a number of human rights defenders from prison. As regards the infringement procedure launched by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe in February 2022, the ECtHR ruled in July 2022 that Türkiye had failed to fulfil its obligations under Article 46 (1) of the Convention. Türkiye’s refusal to implement the ECtHR’s ruling in the Kavala case contravenes its obligations as a long-standing member of the Council of Europe. The seven co-defendants of Osman Kavala in the Gezi case, who were each sentenced in April 2022 to 18 years of imprisonment, remained in prison. In the Büyükada case, the Court of Cassation annulled the terrorism-related convictions of all the defendants in October 2022, ruling that they had been made with ‘inadequate investigation’. The case was referred back to the local court, which acquitted the four human rights defenders in June 2023.

Some media outlets close to the government continued to portray human rights defenders as terrorists and criminals, notably for accepting funds from international donors, including the EU. The defamatory rhetoric used by high-level public officials to comment on court proceedings of human rights defenders is a matter of serious concern and casts doubt on the integrity of judicial proceedings and on the right to a fair trial.

Women’s organisations faced pressure in the form of defamation, detentions, investigations and arrests. Women activists also faced detentions and police violence while exercising their right to freedom of assembly. The closure case against the Tarlabaşı Community Centre in Istanbul continued. The court cases against the executives of the Rosa Women’s Association based in Diyarbakır continued. Concerning the closure case against ‘We Will Stop Femicides Platform’ on the grounds of ‘conducting activities contrary to law and morality’, in September 2023, the first instance court decided to reject it.

Stigmatisation, hate speech and discriminatory discourse targeting LGBTIQ civil society organisations and persons remained very strong. Anti-LGBTIQ discourse was instrumentalised by the governing coalition during the electoral campaign. Anti-LGBTIQ rallies took place in a number of cities during the autumn of 2022, whereas pride marches were banned and heavily repressed by the police.

The legal framework regulating the work of civil society organisations lacks clarity and carries the risk of arbitrariness during implementation. It remained compulsory for all associations to register their members in the Ministry of Interior’s information system. This legal obligation is not in line with the OSCE/Council of Europe guidelines on freedom of association.

The Law on preventing financing of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction continued to be used by the authorities to disproportionally target independent rights-based organisations, despite the Venice Commission’s and the UN Special Rapporteurs’ recommendations that the government should reconsider certain aspects of the legislation. The Law should not be used to hinder civil society’s freedom of association and assembly, including their fundraising activities.

The Law on collection of aid continued to impose burdensome requirements for permits that discourage fundraising activities by civil society organisations and de facto limit civil society activities. The distribution of public funds to civil society organisations remained untransparent. Heavy taxation hampered the functioning and development of foundations and associations. The status of ‘public benefit’ for associations and ‘tax exemption’ for foundations are vaguely defined and are arbitrarily granted by the President. Foreign donors providing financial support to civil society in Türkiye were often slandered and beneficiary NGOs ran the risk of having their activities criminalised because they had received foreign funds.

In August 2022, the Ministry of Interior’s Directorate General for Relations with Civil Society published the draft civil society strategy document and action plan (2023-2027) for consultation. Despite public consultations, strategy development lacked transparency and clarity.

Open and transparent participatory and consultation mechanisms are needed for cooperation between the authorities and civil society, for policymaking and for amending the legal framework. Overall, the legal, financial and administrative environment needs to be more conducive to developing civil society in Türkiye.

Civilian oversight of the security forces

In the reporting period, the executive branch continued to hold extensive authority over the security forces. The civilian component of the Supreme Military Council (YAŞ), which is responsible for setting the military agenda and making such decisions as appointments, promotions and dismissals of high-ranking military personnel, did not change. The scope of the military judicial system was curbed. Civilian higher courts continued to review appeals against the decisions of military courts. However, civilian oversight of the security forces remained incomplete due to the lack of effective accountability mechanisms. Parliamentary oversight of the security institutions needs to be strengthened. The legal framework for overseeing military expenditure was not improved.

The culture of impunity continued to prevail within the security sector, where security personnel benefited from de facto judicial and administrative protection in cases involving alleged human rights violations and the disproportionate use of force. Military personnel and high-ranking command officials still have special legal privileges when prosecuted. Moreover, the investigation of alleged offences committed by security personnel requires prior authorisation by either military or civilian superiors.

Situation in the east and south-east

The situation in the south-east remained worrying and was exacerbated by the earthquakes in February 2023, which also affected part of the region. The Turkish government continued its domestic and cross-border security and military operations in Iraq and Syria, including after the earthquakes. The security situation remained precarious in border areas with terrorist attacks led by the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), which remains on the EU list of persons, groups and entities involved in acts of terrorism. The government retains a legitimate right to fight terrorism, however, related activities should be in line with the rule of law, fundamental rights and freedoms. There was no progress towards the resumption of a credible political peace process to achieve a sustainable solution to the Kurdish issue. The Kurdistan Communities Union (KCK) declared a unilateral truce in Türkiye after the earthquakes in February and extended it until the Turkish presidential and parliamentary elections in May. The truce was terminated in June 2023.

In the aftermath of the November 2022 attack in Istanbul, which left 6 dead and 81 wounded, Turkish officials rapidly arrested a Syrian national, as the alleged main perpetrator of the attack, and attributed the attack to the PKK-linked People’s Protection Units (YPG), even though the PKK denied its involvement. Türkiye launched a series of airstrikes in northern Syria and Iraq against the PKK and affiliated groups.

In March 2023, the Council of Europe’s Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CPT) published a report on its visit to the high-security prison on the island of Imralı, where the PKK’s leader Öcalan and three other inmates are being held. The report stated that detention conditions had significantly improved for Mr Öcalan and remained satisfactory for the three other inmates. However, the CPT expressed serious concern that the prisoners’ contact with the outside world had been further limited. During the reporting period, Mr Öcalan was not allowed to receive visits from his family or his lawyers.

In Diyarbakir’s Sur municipality, after the state took possession of land from its owners for public use, several court cases were launched by owners challenging the assessed value of their expropriated property. The principle of participation by the local residents was ignored in the planning of the area’s reconstruction. Serious violations of human rights by security forces (including alleged instances of torture, ill-treatment, arbitrary arrests and procedural rights violations) continued to be reported. There have also been reports of severe acts of violence and other abuses committed by the security forces in the aftermath of the earthquakes and during the state of emergency.

Eastern and south-eastern provincial governors often imposed blanket bans on meetings, demonstrations and events in their provinces. The longest of these has been in force in Van since 2016. The broad interpretation of terrorism, judicial and administrative pressure imposed on journalists, political opponents, bar associations and human rights defenders working on the Kurdish issue raised repeated concerns. Many associations, Kurdish-language media outlets and cultural rights institutions remained closed.

The 15 Kurdish journalists and one media worker, who were detained in Diyarbakır in June 2022, were released in July 2023 under judicial control condition and the next trial session is due in November. Over 100 people (including several journalists, lawyers, members of political parties, artists and members of civil society) were detained in April 2023 in a coordinated operation across 21 Turkish provinces on the grounds of alleged ‘membership in a terrorist organisation’. Some lawyers and journalists were released, but a court case was launched against 11 Kurdish journalists. The 2021 Constitutional Court judgment annulling a provision of the emergency decree regarding the closure in 2016 of media outlets on the grounds of ‘posing a threat to national security’ and annulling a provision that allowed the seizure of properties of closed media outlets was not implemented. In January 2023, the Diyarbakir Regional Court of Appeals upheld the prison sentence against journalist Abdurrahman Gök for photographing the killing by the police of university student Kemal Kurkut during the 2017 Newroz celebrations in Diyarbakır. The local court had sentenced Gök in June 2022 to more than one year in prison on the grounds of propagandising for a terrorist organisation while acquitting him of ‘being a member of an illegal organisation’.

Hate crimes and hate speech against Kurds continued. The court case in relation to the hate killing of HDP staff member Deniz Poyraz in Izmir was concluded in December 2022 and the court sentenced the perpetrator to aggravated life imprisonment (i.e. the most severe penalty under Turkish law) on the charge of ‘intentional killing’ as well as other minor offences. Several attacks against HDP buildings and election offices have been reported, including during the electoral campaign period.

In January 2023, an investigation was launched against the presidents of 12 bar associations over their joint statement against Turkish military operations in northern Syria and Iraq and calling for peace, on the grounds of ‘insulting the Turkish Nation, the State of the Republic of Türkiye and its institutions’.

The March 2023 Kurdish Newroz celebrations took place amid a heavy police presence. The Diyarbakir Bar association reported that law enforcement forces used excessive and disproportionate force during the celebrations. The police detained 350 people, most of whom were shortly released.

The Kobane trial of 108 members and executives of the HDP continued. During the April 2023 session the prosecutor of the case issued his final opinion and demanded aggravated life sentences for 36 HDP executives (including the party’s former co-chair Selahattin Demirtaş) and the re-arrest of 12 released defendants. The trial was adjourned to July 2023 and is still ongoing. There were numerous new detentions and arrests of HDP members and mayors, municipal council members and municipal executives on terrorism-related charges in the east and south-east of Türkiye. Requests by the prosecution to the parliament to remove the immunity of almost all HDP lawmakers are pending. The closure case against the HDP continued in the Constitutional Court (see above under ‘the parliament’).

Former HDP co-chair Selahattin Demirtaş remained in prison despite two final ECtHR judgments ruling in favour of his immediate release. In March 2023, the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe urged Türkiye to release Mr Demirtaş, in line with the ECtHR judgments. The Constitutional Court’s ruling of June 2020 on the violation of Mr Demirtaş’ right to liberty and security was not implemented. Former HDP MP and co-chair Aysel Tuğluk, who was reportedly seriously ill, was released from prison in October 2022.

In October 2022, the ECtHR, in its ruling on the case of 13 imprisoned former HDP MPs, found that several articles of the ECHR had been violated and stated that the arrests were politically motivated. In July 2022, the Constitutional Court ruled that the Turkish State had violated the rights of former HDP co-chair Figen Yüksekdağ to freedom of thought and expression by stripping her of her parliamentary immunity in 2016, and ordered the State to pay Yüksekdağ TRY 30 000 for non-pecuniary losses.

In June 2023, out of the 65 municipalities won by the HDP in the 2019 local elections, 48 remained ruled by State-appointed trustees and another 6 by AK party mayors. Since the first trustee appointment in June 2019, 83 co-mayors have been detained, 39 mayors arrested and 6 HDP co-mayors remain in prison. The March 2022 Recommendations on Türkiye of the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of the Council of Europe need to be implemented.

Court cases continued regarding government-funded construction projects on cultural, historical and religious heritage sites, which were damaged in the 2015 and 2016 operations. There were renewed tensions around several new mining projects, including in the Tunceli Mountains, which is part of a national park and a sacred site for Alevis.

There was no comprehensive and consistent approach in place for missing persons, the exhumation of mass graves or the independent investigation of all alleged cases of extrajudicial killing by security and law enforcement officers. Most of the investigations of cases of enforced disappearance from the 1990s have passed the 20-year statute of limitations. Out of more than 1 400 cases of missing persons since then, only 16 court cases have been launched and 14 of these ended in the acquittal of the alleged perpetrators. Concerns remained about the continued justification of extraterritorial abductions and forced returns under the pretext of combating terrorism and protecting national security. The village guard system, a paramilitary force supporting the Turkish security forces, was maintained. Some village guards were linked to widespread human rights violations and excessive use of force, particularly against the Kurdish population. The village guard system is hindering the return of displaced villagers and continues to impede progress towards a political resolution of the Kurdish issue.

Refugees and internally displaced persons

Türkiye continues to host one of the largest refugee populations in the world. In August 2023, according to official data, Türkiye was hosting 3 298 817 Syrian refugees with temporary protection status, and some 91 711 Syrians with residence status. Around 1.7 million of these were being hosted in the 11 provinces affected by the earthquakes.

According to official sources, 223 881 Syrians had been granted Turkish citizenship in December 2022. 561 758 Syrian refugees had voluntarily returned to Syria from Türkiye according to government data. In May 2023, according to the Presidency for Migration Management, in addition to the Syrian refugees, Türkiye hosted 300 720 asylum-seekers from other countries. In December 2022, 1 345 488 foreign nationals holding residence permits were present in Türkiye, including humanitarian residence permit holders. The return of irregular migrants from the Greek islands, which Türkiye unilaterally suspended on public health grounds in March 2020, has not resumed. The EU has repeatedly called on Türkiye to resume return operations in line with the commitments made under the EU-Turkey Statement. Resettlement of Syrian refugees from Türkiye to EU Member States continued in the reporting period totalling 39 648 by September 2023. Recurrent allegations of human rights violations in the field of migration, particularly in removal centres, remain a concern. Over the last year, media and civil society continued to report on policies and practices in breach of human rights standards and Turkish legislation. Türkiye needs to further align its practice in removal centres with European standards, in particular with regard to protection of human rights (including access to legal counselling and interpreters) and protection of vulnerable groups (in particular, children staying with their families) (see Chapter 24).

Public discontent with the presence of Syrian refugees increased, and became an important electoral topic and a matter of constant debate. A large majority of refugees and asylum seekers do not have effective access to the labour market, in particular to formal employment, due to low employability (lower levels of education and skills), language barriers and limited access to information and services.

Türkiye made sustained significant efforts to support refugees and ensure wider access to healthcare and schooling, although restrictions to registration hampered access to these services. By February 2023, over 846 000 refugee children had been enrolled in formal education in Türkiye, which was about 104 000 more than the previous academic year. Over 720 000 of these were of Syrian origin. However, more than 400 000 school-aged refugee children were still out of school and did not have any access to education opportunities. Refugees (mainly Syrians under temporary protection) continued to benefit from free-of-charge healthcare services provided in 190 migrant health centres funded by the EU through its Facility for Refugees in Turkey and in Turkish hospitals. The EU supported the employment of almost 4 000 healthcare workers to ensure that refugees and people under subsidiary protection have access to healthcare services. Over 7 million primary health care consultations were conducted in EU-supported primary level healthcare facilities in 2022. The capacity of mental health and psychosocial support services, reproductive health services, mobile health services and health literacy for the refugees have also improved. Furthermore, the health infrastructure was also improved by the completion of the construction of two new state hospitals in Dörtyol Hatay and Kilis, which were fully financed by the EU and inaugurated during the reporting period.

There was no progress on the situation of internally displaced persons resulting from the violence in the south-east in the 1990s and in more recent years.

After the February 2023 earthquakes, which affected an estimated 15 million people in 11 provinces, there were massive population relocations, both within the provinces and away from them. An estimated 2.9 million people have moved away from the affected provinces.

Public administration reform

Türkiye is in between some and moderate level of preparation in the field of public administration reform. It made no progress over the reporting period. The country still lacks the political will to reform the public administration and public financial management. The restructuring of the executive branch and overhaul of the public administration in line with the presidential system introduced in 2017 resulted in very high levels of centralisation of the policymaking system. The level of accountability of the administration remains insufficient. Its human resources management system remains outdated and needs to be reformed. The politicisation of all branches of the administration has continued. The share of women in managerial posts in the civil service is still low. The public administration does not use evidence-based methods or participatory mechanisms in policymaking.

The Commission’s recommendations from last year were not met, and therefore remain valid. In the coming year, Türkiye should in particular:

®prepare and adopt an interinstitutional public administration reform document in line with EU principles and values, and with the necessary political ownership and support;

®introduce merit-based recruitments, appointments and promotions, notably to the senior positions;

®review the policymaking process to achieve inclusive and evidence-based methods of preparing policy planning documents and legislative proposals.

Strategic framework for public administration reform

Türkiye still lacks both a comprehensive strategy for public administration reform and the political will to reform. In 2022, the administration produced numerous policy planning and sectoral policy documents on multiple aspects of public administration. In the absence of a comprehensive strategy, these documents lack a sound budget forecast and a coherent approach. An administrative unit with the legal mandate to design, coordinate and monitor public administration reform and public policy documents has yet to be established. The unit would need to coordinate with the Ministry of Finance and Treasury to ensure strategic planning is consistent with fiscal planning and to efficiently tackle the issue of managerial accountability.

Policy development and coordination

Türkiye continued the strong trend to centralise policymaking under the presidential system, further preventing an inclusive, participatory and evidence-based policymaking process. Policy coordination, policy planning and inter-agency cooperation among government institutions needs to be improved. In the absence of well-functioning administrative controls and parliamentary scrutiny, policy planning, monitoring and reporting of government performance remains inadequate. The administration does not carry out regulatory impact assessments or public consultations systematically.

Public financial management

Türkiye still lacks an overarching public financial management reform programme. Parliamentary engagement and oversight over the budget remain weak. Numerous exceptions introduced in the public procurement Law limit the transparency of tenders and public expenditure. (see also Chapter 5 – Public procurement). Türkiye does not have in place an independent oversight body to ensuring fiscal discipline. Given the lack of adequate ex post monitoring and reporting, major public investment programmes lack transparency.

On external audit, the Turkish Court of Accounts (TCA) continued to carry out a range of ex post controls. The TCA’s audit reports continued to provide substantive information for parliamentary oversight and public scrutiny. However, shortcomings remain in the legal framework of the Law on the Court of Accounts and in the associated process of parliamentary scrutiny. There needs to be greater parliamentary and judicial follow-up to the TCA’s audit reports.

There is limited parliamentary oversight of the budget, which resulted in a low degree of budget transparency. The Turkish State Wealth Fund (TWF) lacks accountability and transparency. The 2022 audit report was not published on the TWF website, which contains limited information overall (see Chapter 32 - Financial control).

Following the February earthquakes, the parliament adopted a law creating a Disaster Reconstruction Fund, governing the allocation of resources to restore infrastructure in areas affected by various natural disasters such as earthquakes, floods, fires and landslides in regions classified as 'disaster zones'. However, the law lacked details on the decision-making process, and on the transparency rules for managing the Fund, apart from an obligation to report financial data to the public on a quarterly basis.

Public service and human resources management

The 1965 legal framework governing human resources management in the civil service is outdated. The civil service legal framework fails to ensure the political neutrality of the civil service. There is growing concern about the lack of merit-based recruitment and appointments in the civil service. The appointment procedure for senior civil service posts lacks competitive objective criteria, leaving appointments open to nepotism and political interference. There is a set of uniform criteria for demotion, dismissals and disciplinary measures, but there is a general lack of transparency in implementing the criteria. The civil service remuneration system is not standardised across the institutions. The ethics committees were ineffective against allegations of corruption and wrongdoings.

Accountability of the administration

Under the presidential system, accountability is centralised and held by the President. Given that internal control and audit do not function effectively, the level of accountability of agencies is weak and insufficient to protect citizens’ right to good administration.

Citizens’ right to access public information is regulated by the Law on the right to information, which does not require proactive disclosure and provides broad exemptions. A simplified online access system received millions of requests to access information. The Board of Review of Access to Information is responsible for assessing appeals filed against a refusal to provide access to public information. The backlog of cases continues to hamper citizens’ rights to administrative justice and their right to seek compensation.

Strong concerns remain on the quality of the work of the Inquiry Commission on the State of Emergency Measures, even though it has completed the examination of all cases. Strong concerns remain as to whether cases were examined individually, whether the rights of defence were upheld and whether the assessment procedure was in line with international standards.

Service delivery to citizens and businesses

A thorough process is needed to simplify administrative procedures. However, in the continuous absence of a law on general administrative procedures, which is necessary to give citizens and businesses greater legal certainty, simplifying administrative procedures remains problematic.

The government continued to develop user-focused administration at central and local government level and expanded access to e-government services. Several public services are accessible through e-government tools. A monitoring system needs to be set up to reduce the barriers to access services for persons with disabilities.

2.2. Rule of law and fundamental rights

2.2.1.Chapter 23: Judiciary and fundamental rights

The EU’s founding values include the rule of law and respect for human rights. An effective (independent, high-quality and efficient) judicial system and an effective fight against corruption are of paramount importance, as is respect for fundamental rights in law and in practice.

Türkiye remains at an early stage of applying the EU acquis and European standards in the area of rule of law and fundamental rights. There was backsliding during the reporting period.

Major issues identified in previous reports, such as the systemic lack of independence of the judiciary and the urgent need to improve the human rights situation, remain unaddressed. The 2019 judicial reform strategy (JRS) and the 2021 human rights action plan (HRAP) tackle some of the areas where reforms are needed but did not include concrete steps to remedy the most acute problems.

Functioning of the judiciary

Türkiye remains at an early stage in this area. Serious backsliding continued and despite the several judicial reform packages in recent years, the structural deficiencies in the judicial system remained unaddressed. The continued refusal to implement certain rulings of the ECtHR remains a matter of serious concern. Undue pressure by the authorities on judges and prosecutors continued to have a negative effect on the independence and quality of the judiciary. Implementation of the 2019 JRS and the 2021 HRAP continued, but the activities foreseen in these documents fell short of addressing the structural problems and the issues identified in the previous reports of the European Commission. The lack of objective, merit-based, uniform and pre-established criteria for recruiting and promoting judges and prosecutors remains a source of concern. Several politically motivated cases against opposition politicians were initiated during the reporting period.

The Commission’s recommendations from last year were not addressed. Türkiye needs to adopt and implement measures to significantly improve the overall functioning of the country’s judicial system.

In the coming year, Türkiye should in particular:

®create a political and legal environment in line with European standards that allows the judiciary to carry out its duties independently and impartially; strengthen judicial responsibilities, with the executive and legislature fully respecting the separation of powers; and ensure that lower courts respect judgments by the Constitutional Court, whose decisions should abide by ECtHR jurisprudence;

®amend the structure and process of selecting the members of the Council of Judges and Prosecutors (HSK) so that the role and influence of the executive is limited; and introduce safeguards against any interference by the HSK or high-level officials in judicial proceedings;

®provide effective guarantees against transfers of judges without their consent;

®in accordance with the guarantee of judicial independence under the Constitution, limit any suspension of judges from office to cases where there are well-founded suspicions of serious misbehaviour; and take measures to remedy the damage caused by dismissals that have taken place in breach of procedural rights;

®revise the system of disciplinary proceedings so that it is based on objective criteria and without any undue influence from the executive;

®in relation to the administrative and judicial measures taken against individuals, ensure that any allegation of wrongdoing or crime is subject to due process and based on concrete evidence, and follows fully transparent procedures under the authority of an independent judiciary;

®ensure that all judicial proceedings respect fundamental rights (including procedural rights), in particular the presumption of innocence, individual criminal responsibility, legal certainty, the right to defence, the right to a fair trial, equality of arms and the right to an effective appeal.

Strategic documents

Implementation of the 2021 HRAP and the 2019-2023 JRS continued. A new (seventh) judicial reform package was adopted in April 2023. The government’s implementation report for the JRS stated that, as of May 2023, 70% of the activities had been completed. However, the actions included in the HRAP do not address Türkiye’s fundamental human rights shortcomings. The 7th judicial reform package failed to address many structural issues of concern related to the judicial system indicated in the previous annual reports of the European Commission. However, it did provide some positive steps regarding the increased sentences for smuggling and the possibility of postponing the execution of a sentence for convicted women due to a child’s sickness.

Management bodies

Concerns remain around the structure of the Council of Judges and Prosecutors (HSK), its lack of independence from the executive and the appointment process for its members. In accordance with the Constitution, the President appoints 4 out of 13 members and the parliament elects 7 by qualified majority. The remaining 2 seats are allocated ex officio to the Minister of Justice and the Deputy Minister. None of the members are elected by their peers. Due to its lack of independence, the HSK has been suspended from participating in the European Network of Councils for the Judiciary since December 2016.

The budget allocated to the HSK increased to TRY 312 551 000 in 2023 (TRY 193 657 975 in 2022).

Independence and impartiality

Although the principle of separation of powers and judicial independence is enshrined in the Constitution and other legislative provisions, there are strong concerns regarding political influence on the judiciary. The HRAP included some actions to improve the independence of the judiciary, but these actions have not been implemented.

High-level officials and representatives of the executive (including the President) continued to comment publicly on ongoing judicial cases, thus undermining judicial independence. They also publicly criticised the ECtHR and Constitutional Court case law. Lower courts at times ignored or significantly delayed implementation of decisions reached by the Constitutional Court. The non-implementation of the administrative courts’ decisions by the administration also remains an issue of concern.

Individual applications to the Constitutional Court had limited effect, especially with regard to politically motivated trials.

Accountability

The obligation for judges and prosecutors to declare their assets every 5 years is still applicable. No information is available on the sanctions imposed if this procedure was not followed. A credible and functioning verification system needs to be developed, including appropriate follow-up for late or incorrect declarations of assets.

Professionalism and competence

The selection and recruitment of judges and prosecutors is conducted in a non-transparent manner. The Ministry of Justice supervised the selection boards for new judges and prosecutors, while the HSK had no role in the selection boards. The annual appraisal of judges and prosecutors was done by the HSK. There was limited progress in setting objective, merit-based, standardised and pre-established criteria for recruiting and promoting judges and prosecutors.

Quality of justice

As of September 2023, Türkiye had 16 225 full-time judges (19.13 per 100 000 inhabitants) and 7 601 full-time prosecutors (8.96 per 100 000 inhabitants). Out of 23 826 judges and prosecutors, 8 871 are women. The final budget for the entire justice system increased to TRY 51.2 billion in 2022 (while TRY 34.37 billion was initially approved) compared with almost TRY 24 billion in 2021.

Pre-service training for candidate judges and prosecutors and in-service training continued to be delivered by the Justice Academy. The Academy has scientific, administrative and financial autonomy by law, but there are still concerns related to its independence because its management is left to its president, who is appointed by the President of the Republic. The Academy’s lack of independence affects its capacity to provide training programmes that meet the requirements of openness, competence and impartiality. The European Judicial Training Network (EJTN) therefore maintained the suspension of the Academy’s observer status that was originally decided in 2017.

The quality of judicial decisions and indictments remains insufficient due to the lack of legal reasoning and sufficient factual evidence to lead to convictions that often relate to alleged offences supporting terrorism. The defence lawyers’ access to case files for a specific catalogue of crimes is sometimes restricted until the indictment is issued. In some politically sensitive cases, the indictments took months to be finalised.

Pre-trial detention continues to be frequently imposed, despite the fact that this is a measure of last resort by European standards. Defendants were increasingly held in prisons or detention centres far from the location of the alleged crime, appearing at their hearing via an audiovisual system rather than in person. Frequent transfers of judges and prosecutors continued to impair the quality of justice, as did the appointment of newly recruited and less experienced judges and prosecutors to criminal courts.

Trial-monitoring organisations and lawyers reported that in politically sensitive cases judges frequently barred journalists and observers and sometimes even the defendants’ lawyers from the courtroom. In terrorism-related cases, the practice of providing evidence extracted coercively from secret witnesses who cannot be cross-examined or from a single witness without supporting evidence remained a major concern. Frequent use of the confidentiality of decisions in political cases should be revised because it is often used to limit lawyers’ access to their clients’ files, thus violating the right of defence.

In October 2022, the Council of State ruled in favour of the reinstatement of 178 judges and prosecutors dismissed under the 2016 state of emergency decrees on the basis of alleged ties to the Gülen movement, arguing that the acts attributed to them were insufficient to prove their links to the movement. The Council of State also ordered the State to pay compensation and damages to the judges and prosecutors. As of March 2023, 3 683 of the dismissals had been finalised and 3 cases were ongoing. 845 dismissed/suspended judges and prosecutors had been reinstated. As of March 2023, 343 judges and prosecutors who had filed a complaint with the Council of State on the issue of their removal had been reinstated. This decision followed an ECtHR ruling that the government had violated the ECHR by detaining 167 judges and prosecutors after the attempted coup in 2016.

Efficiency

The backlog of cases remained a problem. Large parts of the judiciary continued to be under severe pressure to handle cases quickly. Delays in criminal cases, which are often postponed for months, and delays in cases where the defendants were arrested pending trial violate the defendants’ rights.

Regarding the backlog of cases in the high courts, at the end of 2022, 293 207 criminal and 64 126 administrative cases for the Court of Cassation were postponed to 2023, compared with 296 907 and 76 455 respectively in 2021. 120 773 cases for the Council of State were transferred from 2022 compared with 128 961 in 2021. As regards the regional courts of appeals, in 2022, a total of 809 989 cases were transferred from 2021; the courts received 1 258 366 new cases and settled 1 146 065 cases. Individual applications to the Constitutional Court continued to increase. In 2022, 109 779 applications were lodged and 73 036 were concluded.

Fight against corruption

Türkiye is at an early stage in the fight against corruption. There was no progress in the reporting period. Türkiye has not addressed outstanding deficiencies in key areas of the fight against corruption in recent years. It has not taken preventive action and has not set up anti-corruption bodies in line with the United Nations Convention against Corruption, to which Türkiye is party. The legal framework and institutional architecture need to be improved to limit undue political influence on the prosecution and adjudication of corruption cases. The accountability and transparency of public institutions need to be improved. The absence of an anti-corruption strategy and action plan indicated a lack of political will to fight decisively against corruption. The Council of Europe’s Group of States against Corruption (GRECO) recommendations remained unimplemented. Overall, corruption remains a major issue. In the coming year, Türkiye should in particular:

®implement its international obligations in relation to the fight against corruption, in particular the United Nations Convention against Corruption and the relevant Council of Europe Conventions;

®ensure effective follow-up of the recommendations issued by GRECO, including through adopting the necessary legislation;

®elaborate an anti-corruption strategy that reflects a clear political will and vision to effectively address corruption, underpinned by a credible and realistic action plan.

Track record

The track record of investigations, prosecutions and convictions in corruption cases remained poor, particularly in relation to high-level corruption cases involving politicians and public officials. Sentences are lenient and do not have a deterrent effect. Cooperation between audit and inspection units with prosecution offices needs to be improved. Political party and election campaign financing, local administrations, land administration and management, and the construction and transportation industries (especially when implementing projects via public-private partnerships) remained particularly prone to corruption. The increasing use and wide scope of exemptions in procurement procedures undermined the integrity of public procurement. Outstanding GRECO recommendations on political party financing have not been addressed.

Institutional framework

Prevention measures

Türkiye continued to lack a permanent, functionally independent anti-corruption prevention body. The level of coordination between various preventive bodies remains inadequate. The State Supervisory Council, which is responsible for coordinating preventive anti-corruption measures, is not independent. Financial control of political parties remained ineffective. There have been no regular awareness-raising campaigns on anti-corruption.

Law enforcement

There are no specialised law enforcement authorities, prosecution services and courts specifically dedicated to the fight against corruption. The executive retained undue political influence over the judicial police. Financial investigations are not systematically started in corruption and organised crime cases. The legal framework of anti-corruption remains weak, including for the private sector.

Legal framework

Türkiye is party to all international anti-corruption conventions, including the United Nations Convention Against Corruption. However, Türkiye needs to fully implement such provisions. The legislative amendments envisaged in previous anti-corruption strategies (i.e. the Law on general administrative procedure, the Law on public procurement, the Code of Ethics for Members of Parliament and the Law on whistle-blower protection) have not been adopted.

In November 2022, the OECD Working Group on Bribery also underlined Türkiye’s continued inaction with respect to long-standing recommendations on the liability of legal persons in particular in relation to foreign bribery, as well as issues concerning whistle-blower protection and prosecutorial independence, and the lack of enforcement of its foreign bribery laws.

Türkiye failed to comply with the GRECO recommendations on judicial independence, and on transparency of the legislative process and political party financing. Legal loopholes remain in the Criminal Code’s corruption-related provisions, which do not meet the standards put in place by the Criminal Law Convention on Corruption. Public procurement legislation is not in line with the EU’s acquis. The legal privileges of public officials continued to provide legal protection for public officials and hamper anti-corruption criminal and administrative investigations. The legal framework on conflicts of interest as well as public officials’ asset declarations remained inadequate. Türkiye has no legislation governing lobbying.

Strategic framework

Previous anti-corruption strategies and action plans failed to meet most of their key objectives. Outstanding anti-corruption measures for these action plans have not been followed up. There is no ongoing anti-corruption strategy and action plan, and no efforts were made to develop new ones with the involvement of relevant institutions and civil society.

Fundamental rights

Human rights continued to deteriorate and no progress was made on last year’s recommendations. The Turkish legal framework includes general guarantees of respect for human and fundamental rights, but the legislation and its implementation need to be brought into line with the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) case law. No legislative amendments were adopted to eliminate the remaining elements of the 2016 state of emergency laws. The Council of Europe’s Parliamentary Assembly continued to monitor Türkiye’s respect for human rights, democracy and the rule of law. Türkiye’s continued refusal to implement certain ECtHR rulings further increased concerns regarding the judiciary’s adherence to international and European standards. The 2021 HRAP continued to be implemented but did not address critical issues or improve the overall human rights situation. Trials and convictions of journalists, writers, lawyers, academics, human rights defenders and other critical voices for alleged support for terrorism have continued.

In addition to addressing the shortcomings set out in this section, which have still not been addressed, Türkiye should in particular in the coming year:

®align its criminal and anti-terror legislation, and its implementation of European standards, the ECHR, ECtHR case law and the Venice Commission recommendations;

®ensure that any allegations of offences are subject to due process, based on concrete evidence and fully transparent procedures carried out under the authority of an independent and impartial judiciary; and fully respect the right to a fair trial and relevant procedural rights, in particular the presumption of innocence, the principle of legal certainty, the right to defence, equality of arms and the right to an effective remedy;

®improve the legislative framework and its implementation, in order to effectively tackle all forms of violence against women, including domestic violence, psychological and physical abuse, sexual harassment, rape, so-called ‘honour’ crimes, stalking and forced marriage;

®improve the legislative framework and its implementation to effectively tackle all forms of racism and discrimination, including against LGBTIQ persons and ensure the protection of minorities.

®implement the ECtHR judgments as a matter of priority, including in the case of Kavala v Türkiye.

Türkiye is a party to most international human rights instruments, but serious human rights violations continued. The Council of State ruled in January 2023 that the President’s decision to withdraw from the Council of Europe Convention on preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence (the Istanbul Convention) was lawful. Türkiye has not yet signed the International Convention for the Protection of all Persons from Enforced Disappearance and the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe continued its full monitoring procedure.

In June 2023, there were 23 851 applications pending before the ECtHR. The ECtHR delivered judgments on 637 applications and found breaches of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) in 66 out of 69 cases (against 70 violations in 2022) that mainly concerned the right to respect for private and family life, the right to a fair trial, the right to liberty and security and freedom of assembly and association. During the reporting period, there were 13 232 new applications allocated to a decision body of the ECtHR. There are currently 184 cases against Türkiye under enhanced supervision by the Committee of Ministers.

There were no developments with regard to the implementation of the ECtHR’s July 2022 Grand Chamber judgment on the Kavala case as part of the ongoing infringement procedure launched by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe against Türkiye (see the ‘Judiciary’ section).

Regarding promotion and enforcement of human rights, the March 2021 human rights action plan (HRAP) continued to be implemented. The annual monitoring report, which was due in March 2023, has not been published and an evidence-based assessment of the implementation of the HRAP is missing. The HRAP does not include measures to address the main shortcomings in the human rights situation in Türkiye that were identified in previous years’ reports by the European Commission.

The Human Rights and Equality Institution of Türkiye (HREI) and the Ombudsman are the main human rights institutions. The Ombudsman processes complaints against the actions of the public administration while the HREI only accepts cases that fall outside the Ombudsman’s remit. The HREI lacks ex officio powers to initiate investigations and to intervene in cases with legal remedies. The number of cases treated by the two institutions increased, but concerns remain regarding the operational, structural and financial independence of both institutions and the appointment of their members. The effectiveness of both institutions remained limited. The HREI was accredited to the Global Alliance for National Human Rights Institutions with a B status in October 2022.

In 2022, the HREI received 2 020 applications (1 185 in 2021), visited 63 institutions (including prisons) and adopted 69 reports prepared within the scope of visits. The HREI makes prison visits in its role as the National Preventive Mechanism (NPM), but does not have set and independent criteria for announced visits. In some visits, it only interacted with the administration and did not speak to the detainees. It has not visited all the prisons with the highest number of allegations of human rights violations, or did so with a significant delay. The recommendations mainly deal with minor issues and do not make concrete statements on serious human rights abuses. The HREI needs to improve its reputation regarding effectively tackling human rights issues and engaging in constructive dialogue with civil society. The HREI remained largely ineffective due to legislative and structural restrictions, including by not accepting applications filed by civil society organisations and by being overly cautious in tackling cases of torture and ill treatment. 132 of the 3 638 applications filed with the parliament’s Human Rights Inquiry Committee in 2022 were not processed.

The term of office of the State of Emergency Commission expired in January 2023. The Commission found 17 960 of the 109 332 filed applications to be admissible but rejected 86% of them.

The space for civil society organisations and human rights defenders continued to be very limited due to continuous pressure through judicial and administrative investigations, threats, surveillance, arbitrary detentions and ill-treatment of human rights defenders. The chairperson of the Turkish Medical Association was arrested after calling for an investigation into allegations that the Turkish armed forces had used chemical weapons in Northern Iraq. She was later released and the case is ongoing. Similar cases, coupled with smear campaigns by some media outlets close to the government and aggressive language by high-level officials, had a chilling effect on civil society. Intimidation of, and court cases against, lawyers who provide legal assistance to members of the civil society and human rights defenders continued.

The three court cases lodged against the Human Rights Association’s chairperson ended in acquittal, but appeals were made against two of them and are pending before courts of appeal. The court case continued regarding the 2015 killing of Tahir Elçi, a lawyer and the chairperson of the Diyarbakir Bar Association. Several female human rights defenders and activists were detained and faced fines for participating in demonstrations for women’s rights. The GÖÇİZ-DER court case in which 23 human rights defenders are being tried for ‘using EU and UN funds to conduct research and develop projects on social migration movements in line with the aims and objectives of the PKK’ continued. There were concerns regarding the recurrent and disproportionate use of anti-terrorism legislation against NGOs and human rights defenders.

The retrial of the Büyükada case resulted in the acquittal of four human rights defenders, including Amnesty International Türkiye's honorary chair, who had been originally sentenced to over 6 years in prison on charges of ‘membership in a terrorist organisation’.

Concerning the right to life, urgent measures need to be taken by the authorities to align legislation with ECtHR case-law in order to ensure that credible and effective investigations are held into reported killings by the security services. The legislation adopted in June 2016, which grants judicial privileges to the security services and increases the risk of impunity, has remained in force. In many cases, the authorities did not grant permission to prosecute civil servants, thus seriously limiting accountability and fostering a climate of impunity for the security forces. No credible investigations were launched into some of the death cases reported in the media. No adequate investigations have been carried out regarding the alleged cases of abductions and enforced disappearances by the security services that have been reported since the 2016 attempted coup. Alleged killings by the security forces in the south-east, especially during the events in 2015, have not been investigated and prosecuted effectively. Military or police officers have been implicated in most of these cases (as also underlined by the ECtHR judgments and the reports of the UN Working Group on ‘Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances on Turkey’) and investigations have never been properly carried out. The statute of limitations remains a major concern as regards the impunity of the offenders. Most of the crimes dating from the 1990s in the south-east have ended in impunity through acquittal or due to the statute of limitations (for example, the murder of the writer Musa Anter in Diyarbakır in 1992).

According to various reports, torture and ill-treatment continued to occur in detention centres, prisons, informal places of detention and transportation vehicles, and on the street during demonstrations. Disproportionate use of force by security forces continued. Although tasked with the role of the National Preventive Mechanism (NPM), the HREI does not meet the key requirements under the Optional Protocol to the UN Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (OPCAT) and did not effectively process cases referred to it. The authorities have not authorised the publication of the 2016, 2018, 2021 and 2022 reports by the Council of Europe’s Committee for the Prevention of Torture (CPT). There have been reports documenting several cases of violence, torture and other abuses committed by the police and gendarmerie in the regions affected by the February 2023 earthquakes as well as threats against lawyers who documented a torture case. In some limited cases, administrative actions were taken against the accused officers.

The UN Subcommittee on Prevention of Torture (SPT) visited Türkiye in September 2022 to assess how the authorities and Türkiye’s national preventive mechanism had implemented the SPT’s previous recommendations. Effective investigations into allegations of torture and ill treatment remained limited.

While the number of prisons continued to increase, overcrowding remains a major problem. As of April 2023, the prison population exceeded 350 000 (with a capacity of 290 000) and continued to be the largest in Europe. Incidents broke out in Hatay's T-Type Closed Prison after the authorities denied the inmates’ requests to see their families affected by the earthquakes. Pilot projects are being implemented in several prisons to improve inmates’ contact with their families, notably via secure video teleconference systems. However, allegations of human rights violations (including arbitrary restrictions on the rights of detainees, denial of access to medical care, mistreatment, limitation of open visits and solitary confinement) continued to be reported. Education, rehabilitation and resocialisation programmes remained limited. The new S-type security prisons are assessed as increasing inmates’ isolation. Communal activities remained limited and arbitrary. Transfer to remote prisons continued, sometimes without early warning. Such transfers had a negative effect on family visits, especially for poor families and juvenile inmates.

There were allegations of discrimination by prison authorities, especially against LGBTIQ persons. There was no improvement regarding investigations into allegations of suicides, strip-searches and discriminatory behaviour by prison guards. Concerns related to the independence of the Forensic Medicine Institute persisted. Access to medical care for sick inmates continued to be uneven and at times delayed or denied, causing deaths in prison or soon after release. Following complaints about food quality and living conditions, the daily allowance for prison food was increased from TRY 20 to TRY 50 in March 2023.

The HREI, as the national preventive mechanism, is also tasked with monitoring the prison administration and observation boards, but this work has remained ineffective. The work of the boards is not transparent and not supervised by independent bodies.

On the protection of personal data, the 2016 Personal Data Protection Law is still not aligned with the EU acquis, notably with the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) and the Law Enforcement Directive (LED) that constitutes a potential obstacle in several policy areas, including with regard to enhanced operational cooperation with Eurojust and Europol. The scientific commission that was established in 2021 to advance acquis harmonisation continued its work, but progress has been slower than anticipated. The legislation needs to be improved, notably with regard to the exceptions for processing of personal data by judicial and law enforcement authorities and the independence of the Personal Data Protection Authority. The 2018 Protocol amending the Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data (Council of Europe, CETS No 223) has yet to be signed.

On freedom of thought, conscience and religion, freedom of worship continued to be generally respected. The lack of legal personality for the non-Muslim and Alevi communities remained a serious concern, notably in relation to the lack of legal status for the patriarchates, the chief rabbinate, synagogues, churches and Cem houses (Alevi places of worship). The Venice Commission’s recommendations on the legal status of non-Muslim religious communities and the right of the Greek Orthodox Ecumenical Patriarchate in Istanbul to use the title ‘Ecumenical’ have yet to be implemented and have continued to be challenged.

Following the publication in June 2022 of the long-awaited Community Foundations Election Regulation, the vast majority of minority foundations completed their elections, albeit under strict control and restricted by the state electoral process, and new boards of directors have taken office. However, rules for the election of the board members in the foundations controlling community hospitals have yet to be issued. Five articles of the Election Regulation were improved in September 2022. Decisions in cases related to the property of religious communities still need to be implemented. The lack of legal provisions on conscientious objection to army service remained an issue for Jehovah’s Witnesses and other citizens because refusal to serve in the military results in conviction for desertion. Several ECtHR judgments and a decision by the United Nations that found violations of the rights of Jehovah’s Witnesses remained unimplemented. School textbooks need to be revised in order to remove all discriminatory elements and hate rhetoric against all religious and faith groups.

Further damage to Hagia Sophia was reported, indicating a lack of proper care of this historical monument. No steps were taken to address the UNESCO World Heritage Committee’s grave concern about the potential impact of the monument’s status change into a mosque on the outstanding universal value of Hagia Sophia. No steps were taken to re-open the Halki (Heybeliada) Greek Orthodox Seminary, which has been closed since 1971.

Attacks continued against Cem houses and Alevi religious leaders during the reporting period. The court case concerning the July 2022 attacks in Ankara was concluded at the first instance court in July 2023, with the main perpetrator sentenced to 3 years in prison, for damaging places of worship and for deliberate injury. A presidential decree establishing the Alexi-Bektash Culture and Cemevi Presidency was adopted in November 2022. The Decree defines the duties and powers of this new state body attached to the Presidency of the Republic. However, it does not recognise Cem Houses as places of worship. Alevi organisations held demonstrations in several cities, demanding legal rights and official recognition of Cem houses.

In March 2023, Türkiye submitted an action plan to the Council of Europe regarding the implementation of four ECtHR judgments filed by the Alevi community on compulsory religion and ethics classes and the status of Cem houses. In June 2023, the Committee of Ministers reviewed the cases. On the positive side, this review led to developments allowing the partial elimination of the imbalance in religious public services provided to the Alevi community by the State. However, no measures were taken by the authorities to address the shortcomings identified by the Court as regards the compulsory religious culture and ethics classes.

Hate speech and hate crimes against Christians, Protestants, Jews and Alevis continued (see the section on minorities below). No official data exists, but the general trend is that those most targeted and subjected to hate speech and crimes are Syrians (often refugees), Greeks, Armenians, Jews and Alevis. The Jewish community and the Chief Rabbi hold annual holocaust remembrance ceremonies in İstanbul, which are occasionally attended by authorities at local level. Protestants continued to face problems in gaining official recognition for their places of worship. Hate speech and insults against atheists and deists continued. The court case on the killing/disappearance of the Chaldean Catholic couple in Şırnak in 2020 continued.

The Diyanet (Religious Affairs Presidency) Academy that was established with the amended March 2022 law started vocational training for imams and Diyanet staff. Reports of maltreatment and sexual abuse within some Sunni sects continued. The increased work, powers and influence of the Diyanet continued in all spheres of public life.

Acts of vandalism and destruction of minority worship places and cemeteries were reported during the period and need to be investigated and prosecuted effectively. In July 2022, the Jewish cemetery in Istanbul was vandalised and 81 gravestones were damaged. In January 2023, a fire broke out at the Surp Pırgiç Armenian Church lodgings and resulted in the death of two elderly residents. The authorities condemned the incidents and investigations were launched. Regarding the fight against antisemitism, Türkiye is an observer country to the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance and it has been taking actions to support and preserve Jewish cultural heritage.

Two non-Muslim persons were elected as members of parliament in May 2023, one Armenian and one Syriac. As the Venice Commission underlined in 2010, Türkiye should continue the reform process and introduce legislation to eliminate all obstacles preventing non-Muslim religious communities from exercising all their rights and acquiring legal personality, in accordance with European standards.

There are reports concerning the ill-treatment and detention of members of the Ahmadi Religion, currently kept in the detention centre of Edirne, for attempting to seek asylum at the border with Bulgaria. A request for interim measure with the European Court of Human Rights for their release was rejected on the grounds that national measures need to be exhausted first.

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Freedom of expression

Türkiye continues to be at an early stage in this area and the serious backsliding observed in recent years continued. The implementation of the criminal laws relating to national security and anti-terrorism continued to contravene the ECHR and to diverge from ECtHR case law. Cases and convictions of journalists, human rights defenders, lawyers, writers, opposition politicians, students, artists and social media users continued. The dissemination of opposition voices and freedom of expression were impaired by the increasing pressure and restrictive measures. Regarding the May 2023 elections, the ODIHR identified an environment with restrictions on freedom of expression, both private and public media did not ensure editorial independence and impartiality in their coverage of the campaign, thus reducing voters’ ability to make an informed choice.

The recommendations from the European Commission’s last five annual reports were not addressed. In the coming year, Türkiye should in particular:

→ release journalists, human rights defenders, lawyers, writers and academics being held in pre-trial detention and ensure that the criminal cases against them are concluded in accordance with the criteria set by the ECHR and the ECtHR;

→ ensure a safe and pluralist environment that enables the media to carry out their work independently and without fear of reprisals and dismissals. This includes ending the practice of both state and non-state agents of intimidating, interfering with, and putting pressure on the media;

→ revise criminal legislation, in particular the anti-terror law, the Criminal Code, the data protection law, the internet law, the new media law in relation to the definition of ‘fake news’, and the Radio and Television Supreme Council (RTÜK) law, to ensure that they comply with European standards and are implemented in a proportionate manner, which does not curtail freedom of expression;

→ ensure that criminal law provisions on defamation and other similar offences are not used as a means of putting pressure on critical voices.

Intimidation of journalists

Activities of journalists, writers, lawyers, academics, human rights defenders, opposition politicians and critical voices continued to be restricted through arrests, detentions, prosecutions and convictions. These practices continued to hinder the exercise of their freedoms and led to self-censorship. A few journalists covering the search and rescue efforts in the area of the earthquakes were reportedly blocked by the police on the basis of the three-month State of Emergency declared in the region. Some were taken into custody on the grounds that they had taken pictures without permission. Earthquake victims who spoke to journalists were also threatened.

Türkiye is ranked 165th out of 180 in the Reporters without Borders (RSF) 2023 annual World Press Freedom Index (down from 149th in 2022). As of June 2023, 59 journalists and media employees were in prison, either awaiting trial or serving a sentence. In 2022, at least 40 (41 in 2021) journalists were taken into custody and 28 (35 in 2021) journalists were sentenced to a total of 50.5 years in prison (92.5 in 2021). A large number of cases continued to be launched against writers and journalists. Threats and physical attacks on journalists and media organisations due to their work continued during the reporting period. At least 55 opposition journalists in Türkiye were physically assaulted by politically motivated groups. Prosecutions were initiated against over 700 people, with some 180 people being detained and more than 40 people arrested, for their social media posts on the February 2023 earthquakes.

Legislative environment

The current laws on anti-terrorism, the internet, intelligence services and the Criminal Code impede freedom of expression and run counter to European standards. Selective and arbitrary application of legislation continued to raise concerns as it infringes the basic principles of the rule of law and right to a fair trial. Despite legislative changes introducing the need for a strong evidence base in ‘catalogue crimes’, cases relating to freedom of expression remained in the category of crimes that automatically requires ‘arrest pending trial’.

No legislative changes to the Criminal Code and the anti-terrorism law to comply with ECtHR case law took place in relation to the Council of Europe Committee of Ministers 2021 resolution on a long-standing series of freedom of expression cases against Türkiye.

The case fi to enable the concentration of resources on rescue efforts, led with the Council of State by the Union of Turkish Bar Associations against the circular issued by the President in January 2022 addressed to all print, audio and visual media, including social media and digital platforms, is ongoing. The circular’s aims include to ‘protect youth, children and family institutions from bad habits and ignorance and to protect national and moral values from alienation and degeneration’.

A new Media Law was adopted by the parliament in October 2022. It raises concerns due to its vague and ambiguous language with regard to what constitutes ‘false or misleading information’, as it allows arbitrary use of the law to stifle criticism of the government. The Law leaves the final decision as to what is ‘fake news’ to the judiciary, which does not have the tools to examine complex situations and does not provide guarantees of independence from the executive power. Equally worrying is the provision of the Law that stipulates imprisonment for the crime of disinformation. The Law also increases the punitive powers of the Press Advertisement Agency (BIK) and increases the sanctions to be imposed on internet service providers that breach provisions related to information requests from the authorities. On the positive side, the Law allows internet news sites to benefit from public advertisements and allows journalists working for internet sites to receive press cards and enjoy certain social security benefits.

The new Media Law may have serious negative consequences for freedom of expression as it may foster self-censorship and stifle public debate. Several hundred cases were launched against social media users on the basis of the Law in relation to the government’s post-earthquake response. The opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP) leader was the first high-profile public figure to be charged with ‘disinformation’ for his criticism of the government response to the earthquakes. He was also charged with ‘insulting the Turkish nation, the State of the Republic of Türkiye, and the institutions and organs of the State’. An individual application was lodged with the Constitutional Court on behalf of the first journalist convicted on charges of ‘openly disseminating information misleading the public’ in December 2022.

The Venice Commission issued an urgent opinion in October 2022 on the draft amendments to the Turkish Penal Code introducing a provision on ‘false or misleading information’. This opinion criticised the new Media Law for its lack of proportionality and the risk of increased media self-censorship and violation of the right of anonymity over the internet.

Implementation/institutions

Selective and arbitrary application of the legislation continued to raise concerns. The quality of the indictments and accusations remains low as they fail to make a direct and credible link between the alleged offence and the act. The alleged offences are often acts which constitute constitutional guarantees, such as attending press conferences or trade union activities.

Despite the 2022 final ECtHR ruling on the Vedat Şorli case, which pronounced that the article of the Turkish Penal Code providing a maximum sentence of 4 years for insulting the President is not in line with ECHR principles. This article continued to be used extensively to prosecute persons who criticised the President.

Following the Constitutional Court judgment of July 2019 (finding that the conviction of the ‘Academics for Peace’, who had been dismissed from their positions after signing a declaration criticising the government over human rights violations in the 2015-2016 operation in the south-east, violated their freedom of expression), some courts have since ruled in their favour and opened the way for their reinstatement. As a result, a number of academics were reinstated in their university positions.

The 15 Kurdish journalists and one media worker, who were detained in Diyarbakır in June 2022, were released in July 2023 under judicial control condition. The next trial session is due in November.

11 journalists were detained in April 2023 and subsequently charged with ‘membership of a terrorist organisation’.

In January 2023, the Turkish Medical Association (TMA) Chair was sentenced to 2 years, 8 months and 15 days in prison for ‘terror propaganda’ because she had called for an investigation into the alleged use of chemical weapons by the Turkish armed forces. She was released from pre-trial detention and the case is being appealed.

The Press Advertising Agency (BIK), which is responsible for placing public advertisements in the media, replaced its General Board Decision on the Code of Press Ethics of 1994. The new Decision now includes vague wording on possible violations that may contribute to further media self-censorship. It also includes ambiguous and generic provisions such as ‘sharing information and visuals on terror organisations’ that are open to interpretation and can contribute to media censorship. The Constitutional Court ruled in August 2022 that the broad-ranging authority granted to the BIK concerning the imposition of sanctions (such as public advertisement bans and fines) and the way it was used violated the right to freedom of expression. BIK then issued a decision stating that it would not examine applications on Code of Press Ethics until the parliament amended the law. At the same time, the BIK continued to allocate public advertising in a discriminatory way that favoured pro-government media. The discriminatory application of its powers risks pushing independent media into self-censorship. Measures therefore need to be taken to ensure that the State advertising budget is fairly distributed in an impartial, accountable and transparent way.

Public Service Broadcasters

The public service broadcaster Turkish Radio and Television Corporation (TRT) is affiliated with the Presidential Communication Authority, and the Radio and Television Supreme Council (RTÜK) is affiliated with the Ministry of Culture and Tourism. No changes were made to TRT’s editorial policy, which reflects the government’s official lines. RTÜK has continued to impose fines on independent television and radio channels for their broadcasting content, on the vague grounds that the content is ‘contrary to the national and moral values of society, general morality and the principle of family protection’. Media outlets critical of the government were frequently fined by RTÜK on various grounds, ranging from displaying the imprisoned former HDP co-chair Demirtaş’ new book to ‘failing to be objective’ when reporting on the government’s response to the earthquakes. The Industry and Technology Ministry did not extend the operating license of Deutsche Welle’s (DW) Turkish office, which closed at the end of March 2023. This decision meant that DW was not able to insure its employees who can therefore only continue practising journalism as freelancers. In August 2023, upon the request of the RTÜK, a criminal judge of peace decided to block access to the Voice of America Turkish service, for providing broadcasting services over the internet without obtaining a broadcast license. The concerns relating to RTÜK’s independence and neutrality persisted as members continue to be elected by the parliament without any consultation of civil society or professional media organisations. Currently, six members are nominees of the ruling coalition, two from the CHP party and one from the HDP party.

Economic factors

The ownership of the Turkish media outlets, which is heavily concentrated in a few large companies close to the government, undermined the independence of editorial policies as it lacked transparency. In addition, the distribution channels of printed media, which are used to allocate public advertising revenues and deliver newspapers to retail outlets, are owned by a single company close to the government. The Broadcasting Law, which does not ensure fair competition because it does not prevent monopolisation, was not amended.

Internet

The current legislation and its implementation do not guarantee an open and free internet in Türkiye. There were frequent website and social media bans for those who expressed views critical of the government. Authors of such websites faced harassment and at times prosecution. There are no official statistics on banned websites or the blockage of content, in accordance with the rulings of the criminal judges of peace. In August 2023, upon the request of the RTÜK, a criminal judge of peace decided to block access to the Voice of America Turkish service, for providing broadcasting services over the internet without obtaining a broadcast license.

By March 2023, RTÜK had issued 25 penalties based on its authority to inspect online broadcasts. In February 2023, the Information and Communication Technologies Authority (BTK) blocked access to one of Türkiye’s most popular social networks, the online discussion forum Ekşi Sözlük, due to its coverage of the post-earthquake response. The authorities also reduced Twitter’s bandwidth on the second day of the earthquakes. Access was reinstated the next day after severe criticism that this had put search and rescue efforts at risk. Legal action was taken against 609 persons, 150 people were detained and 29 were arrested for ‘provoking the public into hatred and hostility’ on social media platforms in connection with the recent earthquakes.

Professional organisations and working conditions

Journalism in Türkiye remains a precarious and risky profession, with low wages, a high risk of judicial harassment and no job security. Trade union rights are limited and labour legislation is not properly applied. According to the Journalists Union of Türkiye, only 11% of journalists are unionised. The new Media Law made the issuing of press cards and accreditations highly arbitrary, due to the composition of the Press Card Commission, in which only 1 of the 19 members comes from the journalists’ union and the others have been appointed by the executive branch of the government. Investigative journalism on politically sensitive issues continued to be subject to editorial pressure, self-censorship and judicial harassment (see also Chapter 10 on digital transformation and media).

The existing legislation includes vague provisions that can be used to restrict freedom of artistic expression. A number of artistic events and performances were banned by the authorities, and artists critical of government policies were subject to intimidation and insulting remarks by pro-government figures and RTÜK officials.

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There was no progress in the area of freedom of assembly and association where legislation and its implementation are not in line with the Turkish Constitution, European standards or the international conventions that Türkiye is party to. Bans on peaceful gatherings were widely imposed and public events were often dispersed with a disproportionate use of force by the police. Demonstrators frequently faced investigations, court cases and administrative fines on charges of terrorism or of violating the Law on demonstrations and marches. Attacks on opposition gatherings and premises were often not investigated or prosecuted. Türkiye needs to urgently apply the ECtHR case law and to revise relevant national laws.

Protests and demonstrations for human rights, environmental rights, and political and socioeconomic rights were banned and dispersed by the police on several occasions (including demonstrations by dismissed civil servants, on the occasion of the International Women’s Day and by mothers of disappeared persons). Participants in public events were often detained (including with the use of force) and later released. The legislation on meetings and demonstrations allowed authorities to prohibit meetings and demonstrations on the basis of vague, discretionary and arbitrary criteria. All activities related to the “Armenian Genocide Commemoration Day” were banned in April 2023. All activities and gatherings to mark anti-homophobia and Pride Month in May and June 2023 were also banned. Some activists that participated in the June march were detained and later released.

In a positive development, the Constitutional Court ruled in September 2022 that the blanket ban on demonstrations issued by Ankara’s governor between 2016 and 2018 constituted a violation of the Constitution. The Constitutional Court ruled in February 2023 that the Beyoğlu District’s governor’s ban on the gathering of the Saturday Mothers violated their rights. Following the Court’s decision, the Saturday Mothers tried to meet in their original venue, but they were repeatedly detained and released on the same day. The court case against 46 human rights defenders and the relatives of Saturday Mothers continued.

Dozens of women and a journalist were detained for gathering to mark the International Day for the Elimination of Violence against Women in November 2022. There were reports of torture and ill-treatment by the police in Cizre. The ‘November 25 Platform’ lodged a criminal complaint about the police brutality on that day in İstanbul.

Regarding freedom of association, many human rights defenders were detained or arrested and NGOs, especially in the south-east, were subjected to police raids. The legal provision requiring information on the identity of members of associations by the authorities remained in place. Regarding political associations, the 8th Administrative Court of Ankara found unlawful the stance of the Ministry of Interior, which prevented the establishment of the Green Party by not providing a ‘received’ certificate for the application and decided to stay the execution of the process. The Court of Appeal has since removed the stay of execution decision regarding the Ministry of Interior’s act, the Green Party is again prevented from being established and the case is still pending. The file for the establishment of the Humanity and Freedom Party is pending before the Constitutional Court.

The Law on the prevention of financing of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction has continued to be implemented in a manner not compatible with international human rights standards and this is threatening freedom of association in Türkiye. The Council of Europe Venice Commission’s July 2021 opinion on the law was not taken into account. Türkiye used the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) recommendations to categorise NGOs as medium to high risk for terrorism financing abuse in an arbitrary way, and to subject rights-based NGOs to frequent and burdensome audits. Many associations and foundations, especially recipients of international funds, have been subjected to repeated audits. The case against the Ministry of Interior’s October 2021 circular, requiring NGOs to be audited based on a risk analysis, is ongoing. The recommendations made in the 2021 Venice Commission opinion should be implemented, including with regard to fundraising activities by NGOs.

Issues of labour and trade union rights are further covered in Chapter 19 on social policy and employment.

On property rights, the Inquiry Commission on the State of Emergency Measures, whose term ended in January 2023, did not provide an effective domestic remedy for confiscations. There are ongoing court cases against the decisions of the Inquiry Commission. The case of the Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality against the Directorate-General for Foundations (DGF) on the ownership of the Taksim Gezi Park is ongoing.

In March, the EctHR found Türkiye in violation of property rights in the case of the Chief Rabbinate of Türkiye – İzmir Jewish Synagogue Foundation and ordered a retrial of the case. In December 2022, the Constitutional Court found the transfer of the Armenian Sanasaryan Inn to the State unlawful. There will be a retrial of the case, which was launched by the Armenian Patriarchate. In January 2023, the Constitutional Court ruled that there had been a violation of the right to property regarding the Greek Bebek Aya Haralambos Church, Bebek Aya Yani Cemetery Dova Church and the Cemetery Foundation. In April 2023, the Mor Batlo Syriac Orthodox Church and the cemetery in Mardin/Turabdin were transferred to the Housing Development Administration (TOKI). Court cases regarding the 2016 expropriations in Diyarbakir Sur District are ongoing.

In the south-east, the restoration of cultural and religious heritage and urban housing construction continued. Several important cultural and religious heritage sites were damaged by the February 2023 earthquakes in the region, especially in Hatay/Antakya. Regarding the implementation of the Law on foundations for minority communities, many appeals on rejected claims for the restitution of property were ongoing either before a local court or at the EctHR. Litigation brought forward by state institutions or municipalities against returned immovable property resulted in lengthy legal proceedings and uncertain property rights. The case of the Mor Gabriel Monastery Syriac Orthodox Church Foundation’s land borders continued before the Constitutional Court. Other cases in relation to the ownership of the land of the Mor Gabriel Monastery continued. Other non-Muslim community foundations also have properties that have not yet been returned. Council of Europe Resolution 1625 of 2008 regarding property rights on the islands of Gökçeada (Imbros) and Bozcaada (Tenedos) still needs to be fully implemented. There is an urgent need to revise the relevant legislation on the issue of property rights for non-Muslim minorities and other legislation covering all issues of property rights to ensure a more comprehensive framework.

Legislation on non-discrimination is not in line with European standards and not duly enforced in practice. There were serious concerns regarding the implementation of the April 2021 Law on security investigations and archive checks for people who are to be appointed to public posts for the first time, as this takes into consideration not only final convictions but also other factors (e.g. ongoing investigations, pending cases and even intelligence against a person). The law decree issued under the State of Emergency to allow arbitrary dismissals expired in July 2022. However, dismissals with no objective criteria of civil servants continued on the basis of the Law on civil servants. Reports on profiling and discrimination against civil servants in employment on vague legal grounds continued. Cases of discrimination and hate crimes based on ethnic, religious grounds, sexual orientation and gender identity continued to be reported. Diyarbakır football team was subjected to racist attacks in two different provinces during matches. The HREI, which is in charge of applying non-discrimination legislation, finalised the examination of 166 applications in 2022 but received 355 new applications during the year falling under the scope of the task of ‘combating discrimination’. The finalised decisions are sent to the relevant public authorities, but there is no systematic follow-up of corrective actions that were taken. School textbooks still need to be revised, especially regarding some content on minorities, secularism, religion and gender equality. The HREI and the Ombudsman did not accept applications on sexual orientation and identity. Türkiye should urgently adopt a law on combating discrimination in line with the EU acquis as well as the ECHR, covering discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation. Protocol 12 of the ECHR, which provides for the general prohibition of discrimination, remained unratified and the recommendations of the Council of Europe Commission against racism and intolerance (ECRI) were not implemented. Legislation against hate crime, including hate speech, is still not in line with international standards and does not cover hate offences on the basis of sexual orientation, ethnicity, age or gender identity. No progress was made with the ratification of the Additional Protocol to the Convention on Cybercrime concerning the criminalisation of acts of a racist and xenophobic nature committed through computer systems.

In the area of gender equality, the backsliding on the rights of women and girls remained. Türkiye ranked 129th out of 146 countries, as measured by the World Economic Forum’s Global Gender Gap Report 2023 (compared to 124th place in the 2022 Report).

Widespread promotion of stereotyped gender roles and definitions continued, including in school textbooks and in the media. Statements by the authorities targeting independent women’s organisations and women activists threatened the freedom of operation of women’s rights associations. State authorities increasingly came under the influence of Sunni religious sects that promote illegal practices, such as early marriage. Efforts should be increased to prevent school drop-out due to early marriage (e.g. establishing early warning systems in schools, ensuring that domestic violence is properly investigated and prosecuted, and establishing a sufficient number of shelters for vulnerable individuals).

The Council of State concluded in its final ruling that the decision to withdraw from the Council of Europe Convention on Preventing and Combatting Violence against Women and Domestic Violence (also known as the Istanbul Convention) was in compliance with Turkish law. The Istanbul Convention is an important international standard, so this constitutes serious backsliding in Türkiye’s progress. According to reports, 334 women were killed in 2022 (339 in 2021) and 245 more women died in suspicious circumstances. There is no comprehensive data collection system in this area. Despite the continued implementation of the Fourth National Action Plan for Combating Violence against Women (2021-2025), there are no effective policies (including deterrent sentences), implementation of legislation is weak and the quality of available support services is low. The February 2023 earthquakes worsened the already difficult situation of women and children in the region, due to the collapse of women’s shelters, crowded temporary accommodation and a lack of proper preventive policies. In the earthquake areas, priority has been given to certain basic needs, but the provision of hygiene products for women, separate and protected toilets, and reproductive health facilities was neglected.

The protection of the rights of the child remained weak, including in the juvenile justice system and in relation to the consequences of the earthquakes. Urgent action is needed to ensure protection of children in the areas affected by the February 2023 earthquakes in order to avoid exploitation and abuse.

Several human rights violations were reported in the regions affected by the earthquakes, including against children and persons with disabilities. The Religious Affairs Presidency issued a ruling (fatwa) soon after the earthquakes, stating that there is no religious obstacle to a marriage between a person and their adopted child. This is cause for very serious concern. A coherent and effective monitoring mechanism by public institutions for children in earthquake regions, including for unaccompanied and missing children, is urgently needed.

In January 2023, a Parliamentary Commission for Investigation of Child Abuse was established at the National Grand Assembly. A national action plan needs to be put in place to combat and prevent child, early and forced marriages and to raise awareness of the harmful impacts of child marriage. Consistent efforts are needed to eradicate child labour, especially among refugees.

Türkiye is effectively pursuing a de-institutionalisation strategy. However, 60% of the children living in the childcare system are in institutional care. Adequate funding should be directed towards reinforcing community-based care and ensuring proper de-institutionalisation. Particular concern is caused by the construction of new institutions following the earthquakes and the wars in Syria and Ukraine.

Children can benefit from free legal aid for criminal disputes, but no such scheme is in place for civil cases and/or other complaint mechanisms. Concerns remained about juveniles facing arrest and detention on charges of membership of terrorist organisations. Non-custodial measures for children need to be improved. The capacity of NGOs and bar associations to intervene, monitor and lodge strategic litigation is limited, both in law and practice. There is an insufficient number and geographical coverage of specialised child courts, child assize courts and qualified staff including judges, prosecutors, lawyers and experts. Almost half of the children on trial are still being tried before non-specialised courts. There are currently 81 juvenile courts and 12 juvenile high criminal courts, in accordance with the law that requires that there is a juvenile court in every province. However, this is not enough for the needs of big cities. Child-specific services (such as child-friendly interview rooms and child monitoring centres) were reportedly interrupted in various cities. A comprehensive training programme for all professionals working with children in contact with the law, with a certification mechanism and incentives, needs to be developed.

Concerning the rights of persons with disabilities, a national action plan to implement the ‘2030 Barrier-Free Vision Document’ was adopted by the government in February 2023, covering actions until 2025. The action plan pursues a rights-based approach and largely reflects the EU strategy in this field. The Monitoring and Evaluation Board on Rights of Persons with Disabilities became operational in November 2022 and convenes twice a year under the coordination of the Ministry of Family and Social Services, of which it is structurally part. Türkiye has ratified the UN Convention for the Protection of the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and its Optional Protocol, but shortcomings persist in its transposition and implementation. There is insufficient data collection in the field of accessibility of services and public infrastructure. The consequences of the February 2023 earthquakes will need to be reflected in the national action plan, including to ensure that public institutions include persons with disabilities in their preparedness, evacuation and post-disaster recovery plans. This will require a number of actions, including a thorough assessment of the number of people who became disabled as a consequence of the earthquakes, along with proper rehabilitation and psychological support measures.

Türkiye continued to pursue a de-institutionalisation policy for persons with disabilities, coupled with a home-based care support programme. However, independent-living mechanisms and opportunities remained very limited. The human resources capacity of services for people with chronic mental disorders and intellectual disabilities was enhanced in 2022. Quality standards developed for community mental health centres are now in active use. However, Türkiye has no mental health legislation and no independent monitoring mechanism for mental health institutions. In school education, the proportion of students with disabilities attending inclusive classrooms reached 75%. The remaining 25% (more than 60 000 children) continued to attend special schools.

The lack of protection for the fundamental rights of lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, intersex and queer (LGBTIQ) persons continued to raise serious concerns. The lack of legal protection against hate speech and hate crimes based on sexual orientation or gender identity was further exacerbated by negative stereotyping in the media and discriminatory rhetoric from high-level officials, including the highest political level. Anti-LGBTIQ rallies were organised in various parts of the country during the reporting period and were allowed by the authorities. LGBTIQ associations were regularly targeted by pro-government media for being funded by foreign countries. Discrimination, intimidation and violence against the LGBTIQ community and especially transgender persons increased, in part due to the lack of effective criminal sanctions. Several court cases related to LGBTIQ persons who were murdered or seriously assaulted continued. Access to gender reassignment surgery and to health and social services remained cumbersome and problematic for trans persons. LGBTIQ prisoners suffered discrimination and solitary confinement. LGBTIQ activities, marches and pride parades were banned in several provinces and police intervened to disperse participants.

The appeal case against the Middle East Technical University (METU) students who took part in a pride gathering on the university campus in May 2019 continued. A new court case was launched against METU students for their participation in the pride march of 2022. The court case against the former executives of the Ankara Bar Association for criticising the Diyanet’s president’s homophobic speech continued. A court case against the Izmir Bar Association’s former president and ten board members started in April 2023 on charges of insulting religious values, due to the statement they issued on their official website against the discriminatory Friday sermon of the president of religious affairs against private life, different life preferences and LGBTIQ individuals. The Human Rights and Equality Institution (HREI) continued to not process applications by LGBTIQ persons on the grounds that it does not consider discrimination against LGBTIQ to be within its remit, because the law establishing the HREI does not consider ‘sexual orientation and gender identity-based discrimination’ to be a criterion for discrimination.

On procedural rights, legislation and its implementation are not in line with the EU acquis or European standards, since basic minimum procedural rights’ standards are missing. The 2023 earthquakes seriously hindered access to justice in the affected areas, especially for disadvantaged groups, women and children. In addition to the loss of life, many lawyers’ offices and some bar associations’ premises were destroyed by the earthquakes. The Union of Bar Associations provided support to lawyers in the affected regions but, overall, problems of access to justice remained extensive. Several complaints were launched by bar associations concerning human rights violations, property rights and other issues.

ECtHR judgments condemning Türkiye for violating the right to a fair trial and the presumption of innocence due to its failure to respect procedural rules continued to be handed down. The 2018 law issued under the state of emergency that restricted fundamental freedoms (including in the Code on Criminal Procedures and Anti-Terror Law) remained in force.

Access to legal assistance for convicted children remained limited. Lawyers (especially those providing legal assistance to human rights defenders and civil and political activists) continued to face difficulties in performing their duties. In some cases, lawyers were subjected to ill-treatment by law enforcement personnel.

Protection of victims’ rights is regulated under the penal legislation. The presidential decree on Supporting the Victims of Crime has been in force since June 2020. Accordingly, there is a specialised Department of Victims’ Rights under the Ministry of Justice. The ‘Judicial Support and Victim Services Directorates’ established in 167 courthouses provide information, orientation and psycho-social support services to the victims of crime during judicial proceedings. Currently, there are 166 forensic interview rooms in 159 courthouses in 81 provinces, where victims can give their statements outside the courtroom with the support of experts and without having to face the alleged perpetrator. Compensation and redress for victims remained limited. Steps need to be taken to align national legislation with the EU Victims’ Rights Directive and the directive relating to compensation for crime victims.

Hate speech and hate crime remained a serious issue for persons belonging to ethnic and national minorities. No steps were taken to revise school textbooks to remove discriminatory and derogatory references. Minorities continued to face difficulties, such as the lack of legal status for religious institutions, protection for languages, schooling support, clergy training, the economic non-viability of media in minority languages and complications in enjoying property rights for foundations. The lack of legal personality for minority communities’ churches, synagogues, patriarchates, monasteries and chief rabbinates continued to create difficulties in exercising their freedom of association and religion, and impacted their property rights. Minority schools received no public funds. Regular and substantive subsidies to the newspapers run by members of the Armenian, Greek, Jewish and Syriac communities were granted by the Press Advertising Authority, in order to ensure their viability, given their limited circulation. In the court case against public officials involved in the killing of Armenian journalist Hrant Dink in 2007, the Court of Cassation in June 2023 upheld some of the convictions given by the local court and some acquittals. In April 2023, as a result of an on-going investigation, a new case was launched against some of the perpetrators of Dink’s murder on charges of ‘being a member of an armed organisation’, ‘deliberate killing’ and ‘attempting to remove the constitutional order’. The first hearing was held in June 2023.

The ‘Armenian Genocide Commemoration Day’ was banned by the Istanbul governorate and other provinces. During the reporting period, a member of the Armenian community was appointed as a sub-province governor (kaymakam) for the first time. The restoration studies continued on the Büyükada (Prinkipo Island) Greek Orphanage, a cultural heritage monument. Mechanisms should be in place to support the participation of minorities in decision-making and to ensure that they are adequately represented in the public administration and in politics (see also Chapter 23 on cultural rights).

Concerning the Roma, Dom and Abdal communities, Türkiye adopted in January 2023 a new Roma strategy and a related action plan covering the period until 2030. The aim is to align with the EU Roma Strategic Framework, however, a horizontal objective of fighting antigypsyism and discrimination and quantitative national targets connected to indicators and baselines that would allow measuring progress towards the EU level headline targets remains to be defined. The implementation of the strategy needs to be monitored inclusively, including with the broad participation of civil society. Ten municipalities across Türkiye voluntarily took part in an EU programme to promote participation in local governance using social mediators. Specific policy measures are needed for the inter-sectional vulnerabilities of Roma women. No official data on the situation and living conditions of Roma exists in Türkiye.

The February 2023 earthquakes increased the difficulties of the Roma population in the affected areas in terms of living conditions, livelihood, basic needs and health, especially for women and children. Dramatic increases in housing prices particularly hit Roma families, who often live in poor conditions and have limited property ownership. Lack of emergency savings and high dependence on informal jobs made Roma in earthquake-affected regions more vulnerable. The Roma were among the vulnerable groups who had more difficulties in accessing relief aid. A holistic approach is needed to address drug use disorder among the Roma, taking particular account of social and economic factors. Roma children being more integrated into the education system would contribute to eliminate child labour and early marriage. Targeted support measures for Roma entrepreneurs and self-employed need to be introduced. The problem of incorrect diagnosis of Roma children with mental disabilities or learning difficulties should be effectively tackled. No EU-Türkiye Joint Roma Seminar was held. Concrete measures should be taken to prevent the increase of antigypsyism and to combat prejudice and discrimination against Roma. The capacity of the National Roma Contact Point to programme and mainstream funds targeting all aspects of Roma inclusion remained limited. No members of parliament in the new parliamentary term have an overt Roma identity.

On cultural rights, there were no legislative developments to allow public services to be provided in languages other than Turkish. Legal restrictions on mother-tongue education in primary and secondary schools remained in place. Optional courses in Kurdish and Circassian are provided in public state schools, but the requirement of a minimum of 10 students for these courses continued to be an impediment. The small number or complete lack of teachers for these courses remained another limiting factor. University programmes are available in Kurdish, Arabic, Syriac, Zaza and Circassian. Only a few political parties explicitly included mother-tongue education in their election platforms. The state-appointed trustee mayors in the south-east continued changing the original names of streets. The increased powers of the governors and arbitrary censorship continued to have a negative impact on arts and culture and a number of art and culture groups in Kurdish language were dismissed by the trustees. A dozen concerts, festivals and cultural events were banned by governorates and municipalities on the grounds of ‘security and public order’. Kurdish cultural and language institutions, media outlets and numerous art spaces remained mostly closed, as they have been since the 2016 coup attempt, which contributed to a further shrinking of their cultural rights (see also Chapter 26 – Education and culture).

2.2.2.Chapter 24: justice, freedom and security

The EU has common rules for border control, visas, residence and work permits, external migration and asylum. Schengen cooperation entails the lifting of border controls within the EU. The Member States also cooperate with Türkiye in the fight against organised crime and terrorism, and on judicial, police and customs matters, all with the support of the EU justice and home affairs agencies.

Türkiye is moderately prepared in the area of justice, freedom and security. Some progress was made in relation to the further strengthening of the surveillance and protection capacity of the land border with Iran. Türkiye has still not implemented the provisions pertaining to third-country nationals in the EU-Turkey readmission agreement, which entered into force in October 2017. Türkiye continued to make significant efforts to host and meet the needs of 3.6 million refugees. Türkiye still needs to align its legislation on data protection with European standards.

Most of last year’s recommendations still need to be addressed and remain valid. In the coming year, Türkiye should in particular:

®fully implement the EU-Turkey Statement of March 2016 (notably the returns from the Greek islands and the prevention of irregular routes to all Member States) and implement all the provisions of the EU-Turkey readmission agreement towards all EU Member States;

®align legislation on personal data protection with European standards, which could have a positive effect for the possible conclusion of an international agreement between the EU and Türkiye on the exchange of personal data between Europol and Türkiye;

®revise legislation and practices on terrorism in line with the European Convention on Human Rights, European Court of Human Rights case law and the EU acquis and practices. The proportionality principle should be observed in practice;

®adopt and implement a strategy and action plan on border management with the aim of enhancing coordination between border services at national and international levels.

Fight against organised crime

Türkiye has some level of preparation to implement the EU acquis in this area. Some progress was made at operational level through participation in an increasing number of joint operations with EU Member States and neighbouring countries. A new strategy and new action plan against organised crime were adopted. However, Türkiye needs to improve the effectiveness of law enforcement in fighting certain forms of crime, such as money laundering and financial crimes. Coordination remains crucial for all stakeholders involved in fighting organised crime.

In the coming year, Türkiye should in particular:

®improve the legal framework and practices on counterterrorism in line with the EU acquis; and continue addressing the remaining recommendations in order to be delisted from the Financial Action Task Force’s (FATF) ‘grey list’;

®conclude an international agreement with the European Union on cooperation with Eurojust;

®enhance efforts in the fight against the smuggling of migrants, including final convictions and asset confiscation;

®revise Law No 7262 in line with the recommendations of the Venice Commission;

®increase its operational willingness to cooperate and exchange information with EU law enforcement partners.

Institutional set-up and legal alignment

There are a number of specialised departments dealing with various forms of organised crime, under two main law enforcement agencies; namely the gendarmerie and the police under the Ministry of Interior (MoI). The Coast Guard Command also plays an important role in preventing migrant smuggling and trafficking in human beings. The Financial Crimes Investigation Board (MASAK) is the Turkish financial intelligence unit attached to the Ministry of Treasury and Finance. Cybercrime is addressed by a specialised department for combating cybercrime affiliated to the Turkish national police (the TNP) as well as the public order division of the gendarmerie at central level and the 31 provincial gendarmerie branches.

The TNP comprised a total of 339 563 officers (equivalent to 399.48 officers per 100 000 inhabitants). By comparison, the EU average is 335.3 officers per 100 000 inhabitants (Eurostat, 2019-2021). The total number of gendarmerie staff (excluding conscripts) was 196 285 (equivalent to 230.34 gendarmerie personnel per 100 000 inhabitants). The Coast Guard Command comprised of 8 343 personnel (equivalent to 9.81 personnel per 100 000 inhabitants). Between April 2022 and April 2023, 1 054 personnel were dismissed from the gendarmerie. These figures include the personnel dismissed due to their affiliation to the Gülen movement and the Parallel State Structure (PDY).

The legal framework for the fight against organised crime and police cooperation is partially
aligned with the EU acquis.

Türkiye adopted a new national strategy (2022-2027) and an action plan (2022-2024) against organised crime in December 2022. The Ministry of Interior’s Department of Smuggling Intelligence, Operations and Data Collection is responsible for coordinating the implementation.

The legal framework pertaining to trafficking in human beings is largely in accordance with international conventions and the EU acquis. A new action plan on trafficking in human beings requested by the Council of Europe’s Group of Experts on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings (GRETA) has not been adopted. Türkiye needs to fully align its definition of trafficking in human beings with the Council of Europe Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings.

The completion of an international agreement between the EU and Türkiye on the exchange of personal data between Europol and the Turkish authorities with responsibility for fighting serious crime and terrorism is still pending considering also that the Turkish data protection legislation is still not aligned with the EU’s acquis.

Türkiye is party to the Council of Europe’s ‘Budapest’ Convention on cybercrime, but it has yet to sign its Second Additional Protocol on enhanced cooperation and disclosure of electronic evidence, which was opened for signature in May 2022.

Türkiye’s Information and Communication Technologies Authority has been a member of INHOPE (International Association of Internet Hotlines) since 2011 and cooperates with other hotlines to fight against child sexual abuse. Article 21 (entitled ‘Protection of Children’) of the By-law on the provision of radio, television and on-demand media services via the internet environment requires media service providers that have been granted an online broadcasting license and online media platform operators that have been granted an authorisation certificate for the online transmission of media services to take measures to ensure parental control. It also makes these institutions responsible for taking the necessary technical measures to protect children and young audiences. In this context, examples such as PIN systems, and child profile and protective symbol systems are used by media service providers operating in Türkiye to protect children in online audiovisual media services. In January 2023, the Turkish parliament set up a research commission with the objective of preventing child abuse. The establishment of this commission was prompted by a specific case involving the forced marriage of a six-year-old girl (see the section on fundamental rights of the child).

MASAK is a member of the Egmont Group of Financial Intelligence Units, which facilitates cooperation and intelligence sharing between national financial intelligence units to investigate and prevent money laundering and terrorist financing.

Türkiye is party to the UN Convention against Transnational Organised Crime and the Council of Europe Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of the Proceeds of Crime and on the Financing of Terrorism (CETS No 198).

Türkiye has a witness protection system to protect witnesses from intimidation and threats. However, the scope of the Law on witness protection needs to be expanded to include all types of serious crimes and procedural rules need improvement.

Implementation and enforcement capacity

In the reporting period, operational capacity continued to be strengthened through new recruitment and training programmes.

In total, 6 145 operations were carried out by the gendarmerie and the Turkish national police (the TNP) to tackle organised crime, cybercrime, smuggling of migrants and trafficking in human beings.

Concerning firearms trafficking, 2 388 small and light weapons (SALW) were seized by the gendarmerie and 4 138 by the TNP during the reporting period. In 2022, 877 cases of firearms trafficking (Article 12 of the Turkish Criminal Code) were brought before criminal courts, resulting in the conviction of 584 persons.

Since July 2004, cooperation between Europol and Türkiye has been based on the Strategic Agreement on Cooperation. This does not include the possibility of sharing personal data, but it does facilitate cooperation in a range of areas. A Turkish liaison officer has been seconded to Europol since 2016. Türkiye is connected to and configured for the full use of the Secure Information Exchange Network Application (SIENA) with third parties and EU Member States. The EU (through Europol) and Türkiye have a joint interest in stepping up law enforcement cooperation to effectively address common challenges.

16 EU Member States have 30 liaison officers in Türkiye and Türkiye has 10 liaison officers in 7 EU Member States. A cooperation agreement with the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Training (CEPOL) has been in place since 2010. Its revision has been pending since the end of 2022. Exchange and training programmes were carried out involving the gendarmerie and the TNP. As well as participating in the courses held by EU Member States, TNP also organises joint workshops with CEPOL.

The track record on combating money laundering and terrorist financing showed a gradual improvement. Turkish judicial statistics showed a consistent upward trend. There were 19 files, 49 separate offences and 47 convictions in 2020, while there were 26 files, 61 separate offences and 61 convictions in 2021. In 2022, 39 criminal files and 118 offences resulted in 116 convictions.

The domestic terrorist asset freeze mechanism continued to be implemented through the joint decisions issued by the Ministry of Treasury and Finance and the Ministry of Interior. In 2021, the assets of 1 145 real persons and 16 corporate identities were frozen through three interministerial decisions. In 2022, 4 interministerial decisions resulted in the assets of 64 real persons and 14 corporate identities being frozen.

The country’s geographic location makes it an important player in the fight against organised crime groups, in particular drug trafficking, migrant smuggling, arms trafficking, intellectual property crime and money laundering. Türkiye is used as a financial hub between south-east Asian countries, the Gulf region and Europe for facilitating illicit money flows in exchange for irregular migrants and illicit commodities. As far as participation in the European Multi-disciplinary Platform against Criminal Threats (EMPACT) is concerned, Türkiye was in 2022 a participant in one operational action (in the operational action plan on intellectual property crime, counterfeit goods and currencies). In 2023, Türkiye is participating in 16 operational actions. Regarding cross-border cooperation, Türkiye has not participated in any EU joint investigation teams (JITs) to date.

Türkiye continues to be an important transit and destination country for trafficking in human beings. By the end of 2022, the number of victims identified by the Turkish authorities stood at 345 (compared to 2021 when 403 victims were identified). Sexual and labour exploitation constitute the highest number among the purposes of trafficking. Most victims are of Syrian origin. In 2022, 115 cases of trafficking in human beings (Article 80 of the Turkish Criminal Code) were brought before Türkiye’s criminal courts. 23 cases ended with convictions. 65 people accused of trafficking were convicted by the criminal courts of first instance.

There are two shelters in Ankara and Kirikkale provinces run by the Presidency for Migration Management (PMM). Their total capacity to host victims of trafficking in human beings is 42 persons. There is an urgent need to increase the capacity to host and provide services to victims of human trafficking. Additional shelters are planned for the provinces of Aydin and Kutahya. Türkiye should bolster its collaboration with civil society organisations to enhance its capacity in identifying victims and delivering essential victim support services. Specialised services should be strengthened for all victims of trafficking.

The many Syrian and other refugees, including children, are vulnerable to being exploited through forced labour. Reports of early marriages increased in the wake of the pandemic as a negative economic coping mechanism.

There are insufficient training programmes for law enforcement agencies, prosecutors and judges that focus on a victim-centred approach. Partnership with civil society should be sought in order to encourage the identification of victims of trafficking and to provide them with shelter and services. The reasons why the crime of trafficking in human beings is not prosecuted should be identified and measures should be taken to ensure that victims are allowed to appear in court via video link when the circumstances of the case and the vulnerability of the persons concerned require this.

Gun violence in Türkiye has surged in recent years, while the overwhelming majority of firearms owned by individuals are unregistered due to lax enforcement of the Law on unregistered weapons.

In 2022, 47 079 suspects were detected in 8 252 cases of cybercrime (Articles 243/1, 244, 103 and 226 of the Turkish Criminal Code), resulting in the conviction of 123 persons. In the reporting period, there was no national strategy and action plan in place against cybercrime.

The National Cyber Security Strategy and Action Plan 2020-2023 covers public administration systems, information systems belonging to critical infrastructures operated by the public and private sectors, small and medium-sized industry, and all the components of cyber space at the national level (including all private and legal persons).

Cooperation in the field of drugs

Institutional set-up and legal alignment

The High Council for the Fight against Drugs consists of 12 ministers and is responsible for coordination and monitoring at national level. The national strategy and the action plan aimed at combating illegal drugs, which have been in effect for the period of 2018-2023, are coming to an end. The secretariat for coordinating their implementation is within the Ministry of Health’s Directorate-General for Public Health. All ministers involved in the implementation of the strategy and action plan are also members of the High Council. A research committee conducts research into drug addiction and a scientific committee provides recommendations for studies, training and awareness-raising activities on drug abuse. An Action Plan on the Fight Against Methamphetamine 2022-2024 has been in force since August 2022 under the coordination of the Ministry of Interior. The Ministries of Justice, Family and Social Services, Interior, Defence, Health and Trade take part in the implementation.

Türkiye is a member of the European Information Network on Drugs and Drug Addiction (Reitox).

The Turkish Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction (TUBİM) continues to act as the national focal point of the European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction (EMCDDA) and is the national drug observatory. Türkiye has had a participation agreement in place with the EMCDDA since 2007 and is a member of the Management Board of the European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction (EMCDDA). It has a monitoring role at national and international level and drafts the annual Turkish drug report. It collects data, makes risk assessments and provides recommendations with regard to the National Early Warning System on new psychoactive substances. A total of 1 006 new psychoactive substances have been included in the national legislation and 35 of these were put on the list in 2022. The instant data-flow system, which uses encryption and anonymisation of personal data for monitoring and reporting, is operational. The responsible body for controlling drug precursors is the Turkish Medicine and Medical Devices Agency of the Ministry of Health, which grants licences and permits for manufacture, possession, selling, purchase, transportation, consumption, distribution, importation, exportation and legal use including for pharmaceutical and industrial purposes.

Within the framework of the 7th Judicial Reform Package adopted in April 2023, some penalties have been increased under the Turkish Penal Code with regard to manufacturing and trading certain types of drug substances, which have a higher potential to cause addiction and serious health problems. The minimum imprisonment penalty was increased from 10 to 15 years. Some amendments were made in relation to treatment, rehabilitation and probation. Random tests may be conducted under probation, and compulsory treatment and rehabilitation can be exercised on the convict or prisoner.

Implementation and enforcement capacity

Türkiye remains a transit route for drugs between Asia and Europe, but information exchange and collaboration with EU law enforcement partners are to be enhanced, particularly for heroin. In 2022, Turkish law enforcement services conducted operations that resulted in the seizure of, inter alia, 71 967 kg of cannabis including skunk (2021: 64 125 kg), 2 276 kg of cocaine (2021: 2 841 kg), 7 957 kg of heroin (2021: 22 202 kg), 16 210 kg of methamphetamine (2021: 5 528 kg), 5 050 325 ecstasy tablets (2021: 7 618 013) and 23 945 026 captagon tablets (2021: 13 790 648).

In 2022, a total of 69 430 cases in relation to Article 188/3 of the Turkish Criminal Code involving 90 919 suspects were launched by the prosecution for illicit drug related offences. 28 181 suspects were convicted.

In the field of prevention, the Ministry of Health (MoH) operates 237 counselling centres in 81 provinces. In 2022, 30 new centres became operational. The anti-drug counselling hotline received 78 152 calls in 2022. There are 135 treatment centres for drug dependence in 81 provinces. 59 of the centres focus on inpatient treatment and 20 of those are specifically dedicated to treating children. The other 76 centres are outpatient centres and 20 of those are specifically dedicated to children. The waiting time for applicants to be admitted to the treatment centres is currently 1-3 days. Bed capacity is 1 372. Despite improvements, the rehabilitation and treatment capacity remains insufficient.

Fight against terrorism

Institutional set-up and legal alignment

Türkiye’s continuing efforts to tackle terrorism reduced terrorist activity and improved the security situation. The country continued to face threats from various terrorist groups. The EU has condemned all acts of terrorist violence perpetrated in Türkiye. Türkiye has prioritised the fight against the PKK and the dismantling of the Gülen movement. The PKK remains on the EU’s list of persons, groups and entities involved in acts of terrorism. Türkiye has a legitimate right to fight terrorism. However, bringing the Turkish anti-terrorism legislation in line with EU standards still remains an essential outstanding reform.

The legal framework regulating the fight against money laundering
and terrorist financing should be aligned with the recommendations provided by the FATF and those outlined by the Venice Commission on the Law on preventing financing of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

Türkiye has been on the list of jurisdictions under increased monitoring (the ‘grey list’) of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) since October 2021. Türkiye's EU candidate status and commitment to address shortcomings identified by the FATF and to align with the EU’s acquis have prevented it from being added to the EU’s high-risk third countries list. Türkiye’s response to the concerns of the EU and the FATF continues to be closely monitored in the framework of the Association Agreement. Türkiye must diligently adhere to the outstanding FATF Action Plan items to secure its removal from the grey list. With regard to the outcomes of the FATF’s Mutual Evaluation Report on Türkiye and the recommended actions by the FATF, Türkiye promulgated an overarching national AML/CFT strategy document in July 2021. The strategy document was revised in 2022 to comply with the outstanding recommended actions. Türkiye also updated its National Risk Assessment at the end of 2022. The country is also supported by the EU’s Global Facility on Anti-Money Laundering and Countering the Financing of Terrorism project.

In 2022, Türkiye adopted regulations regarding politically exposed persons and guidance to the private sector on detecting terrorist financing. It also increased its financial intelligence agency’s proactive dissemination of financial intelligence. In July 2023, the FATF concluded that Türkiye has taken positive steps towards improving its AML/CFT regime. Türkiye is now compliant with 14 recommendations, largely compliant with 25 recommendations, with only one recommendation (Recommendation 15 on new technologies) remaining as partially compliant.

The Law on the prevention of financing of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction has not been revised in line with the Venice Commission’s recommendations. The Ministry of Interior and the Financial Crimes Investigation Board (MASAK) developed a risk-based methodology for the audit of the non-profit organisations (NPOs). As a result of the risk-based methodology, the Ministry of Interior’s audits prioritised the humanitarian aid NPOs. More than 600 NPOs have been audited repeatedly in accordance with the provisions of law since 2021. None of the audited NPOs and their executives have been prosecuted as a result of these audits. Civil society remained concerned about potential disproportionate implementation of the law to further restrict the legitimate activities of NGOs and to put additional pressure on critical voices.

Türkiye is an active member of the Global Coalition against Daesh.

Implementation and enforcement capacity

Türkiye faces threats from various terrorist groups. Türkiye actively engaged in the regular biannual review of the EU terrorism list under Common Position 2001/931/CFSP (‘CP 931’). The PKK, IBDA-C, DHKP/C and TAK remain on the EU’s terrorism list. However, terrorism prosecutions often disproportionately targeted legitimate activities of political opposition. Counterterrorism efforts need to be pursued in accordance with the rule of law and fundamental rights and freedoms.

In the reporting period, MASAK continued to strengthen its institutional capacity as well as its cooperation with law enforcement agencies and judicial authorities. MASAK has consistently built a sound track-record. The number of suspicious transaction reports submitted decreased from 504 995 in 2021 to 425 322 in 2022. Systematic inter-agency cooperation between the law enforcement agencies, prosecution and MASAK has improved. As a result of its anti-money laundering / countering the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) analysis and inspections, MASAK forwarded criminal complaints to the prosecution for 496 persons.

Türkiye reaffirmed its commitment to freeze the assets of persons/entities designated by the United Nations Security Council Sanctions Committee. The government also continued to use the domestic assets freezing instrument as a deterrent.

Judicial cooperation in civil and criminal matters

Judicial cooperation in civil and commercial matters is regulated by the Law on international civil law and procedural law, circulars and international conventions. Türkiye is a party to most international conventions. However, it has not acceded to relevant international conventions in the area of civil justice, many of which were drawn up by the Hague Conference on Private International Law, including in particular the 1996 Convention on Jurisdiction, Applicable Law, Recognition, Enforcement and Co-operation in Respect of Parental Responsibility and Measures for the Protection of Children, the 2007 Convention on the International Recovery of Child Support and Other Forms of Family Maintenance and the 2005 Convention of Hague on Choice of Court Agreements. Türkiye has not yet ratified the European Convention on the Compensation of Victims. In 2022, within the scope of the Convention on Civil Procedure, 15 judicial legal assistance requests were made by EU Member States and 196 by Türkiye. Within the scope of the Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters, 77 judicial legal assistance requests were made by EU Member States and 1 937 by Türkiye.

The main legislation governing judicial cooperation in criminal matters has been in place since 2016 and Türkiye has acceded to most of the international conventions. 33 mutual legal assistance requests following the introduction of videoconferencing have been processed and 2 of these have been finalised. Under the new ‘consensual extradition’ procedure, extradition of an offender now takes 1-2 months on average, whereas the previous extradition procedure lasted around a year. As for the transfer of sentenced persons, introduction of the procedure of ‘exact execution’ paved the way for the removal of the obligation on local courts to comply with domestic legislation. In 2022, a total of seven convicts were transferred to Türkiye from EU Member States under the new procedure, while one convict was transferred from Türkiye to an EU Member State. The independence and accountability of the justice system has to be substantially strengthened for a smooth application of the principle of mutual recognition of judgments and court decisions in criminal matters.

In 2022, EU Member States accepted 18 extradition requests from Türkiye, while 29 were rejected, 19 requests became redundant and 151 are still pending. Of the 15 extradition requests from EU Member States, 3 were rejected and 12 are still pending. EU Member States did not agree to any transfer of convicts to Türkiye, but Türkiye agreed to 2 transfers to EU Member States. Five contact points have been designated by Türkiye to coordinate and follow up judicial cooperation on criminal matters with Eurojust. In 2022, Türkiye was involved in 13 Eurojust cases on terrorism, terrorism financing, cybercrime (fraud), migrant smuggling, attempted murder, money laundering, forgery and drug smuggling (compared with 15 cases in 2021). However, negotiations for an International Agreement with the EU on cooperation with Eurojust have not started yet.

Cooperation arrangements should also be established with the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO), which started operating in June 2021. In 2022, there were four EPPO cases involving Türkiye. Until August 2023, Türkiye had not formally communicated whether it would cooperate with the EPPO on the basis of the declarations made by Member States to the European Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, recognising the EPPO as a national competent authority for the purpose of the Convention.

Legal and irregular migration

Institutional set-up and legal alignment

The Presidency for Migration Management (PMM) is in charge of coordinating migration policy; ensuring coordination between relevant agencies and organisations; carrying out functions and actions related to foreigners’ entry into, stay in and exit from Türkiye as well as their removal, international and temporary protection; and the protection of victims of trafficking in human beings. The PMM currently has 13 267 personnel.

Following the December 2019 amendment of the Law on foreigners and international protection, which introduced alternatives to detention, the implementing regulation on alternative obligations to administrative detention was adopted on 14 September 2022. The regulation breaks down the procedures applicable for the implementation of each alternative to detention. In addition to alternatives to detention based on residence and notification duty that were already implemented (before the regulation entered into force), methods such as return counselling and family-based return have been rolled out. Alternatives to detention that require an electronic infrastructure (such as voice recognition software and electronic bracelets) have yet to be put into practice. Irregular migration bureaus are set up to monitor the implementation of alternatives to detention in all the Provincial Directorates of Migration Management (PDMMs). Monitoring working groups were established in the İstanbul, Ankara, İzmir and Antalya PDMMs.

Implementation and enforcement capacity

The EU-Turkey Statement remained the main framework for cooperation between the EU and Türkiye.

The PMM suffered loss of personnel and infrastructure due to the devastating February 2023 earthquakes, which affected 11 provinces of Türkiye. The buildings of the PDMMs in Malatya, Osmaniye, Hatay, Adıyaman and Gaziantep were damaged, while a large number of personnel from other provinces have been appointed to the affected areas to provide services to foreigners. In the reporting period, PMM continued to employ a limited number of psychologists, social workers, interpreters and lawyers, some of whom are financed by the EU.

According to the International Organization for Migration (IOM), 378 migrants lost their lives in the Eastern Mediterranean in 2022 (111 in 2021). Between January and September 2023, 22 421 irregular migrants arrived in the EU from Türkiye (including Greece, Italy and Bulgaria) compared to 22 821 arrivals during the same period in 2022. The sea route to Italy saw a substantial decrease (down by 55%), while arrivals in Greece increased considerably by 123%. However, the number of arrivals in Cyprus via the Green Line went down by 42% between January and September 2023, in comparison with the same period in 2022.

The average number of daily irregular arrivals in Greece from Türkiye was 42 in 2022 (up from 20 in 2021). In 2023, by September, the average number of daily irregular arrivals in Greece from Türkiye increased to 78. Turkish irregular migrants occupied the top spot among those who arrived in Greece, followed by Syrians and Afghans. In 2022, the number of irregular arrivals in Cyprus reached 17 365 (11 600 in 2021), most of whom crossed the Green Line after arriving from Türkiye via the non-government-controlled area of Cyprus. In 2023, by September, 6 969 irregular arrivals were recorded in the government-controlled area of Cyprus.

As regards the irregular sea route from Türkiye to Italy in 2023, 4 913 irregular arrivals were recorded until September, compared to 10 805 in the same period in 2022. The total number of irregular migrants who arrived in the EU from Türkiye in 2022 stood at 33 514 (including 15 582 in Greece, 15 805 in Italy, 1 884 in Bulgaria and 173 in Romania), a substantial increase compared to 21 295 irregular arrivals in 2021 (7 410 in Greece, 12 916 in Italy, 936 in Bulgaria and none in Romania). At the same time, in 2022, the number of irregular arrivals in Cyprus via the Green Line also increased substantially to 17 365, from 10 918 in 2021.

280 206 irregular migrants were apprehended in Türkiye in 2022 (162 996 in 2021). As in past years, irregular migrants from Afghanistan, Syria and Pakistan were the most frequently apprehended nationalities. The Turkish Coast Guard (TCG) rescued 49 518 irregular migrants at sea in 2022 (23 676 in 2021).

In 2023, by August, the Turkish authorities had apprehended 102 746 irregular migrants, around 24 405 of whom were intercepted by the TCG. Nationals of Afghanistan, Syria and Palestine topped the list of nationalities. According to the government, law enforcement forces apprehended 9 149 smugglers in 2022 (an increase on the 7 942 apprehensions in 2021). As regards 2023, as of August, 3 259 migrant smugglers had been apprehended. 1 720 people and organised crime groups were convicted for migrant smuggling in 2022.

No progress was made as regards the full implementation of the EU-Turkey Readmission Agreement. Türkiye maintained its position that it would not implement the provisions concerning third-country nationals until the visa requirement for its citizens travelling to the Schengen Area is lifted.

Türkiye has unilaterally suspended the return of irregular migrants from the Greek islands on public health grounds since March 2020. The European Commission and Greece have repeatedly called on Türkiye to resume return operations in line with the commitments made under the EU-Turkey Statement. The resumption of returns to Türkiye remains key to effectively fighting irregular migration and migrant smuggling networks in the region. Between 2016 and 2020, 2 140 persons (including 412 Syrian nationals) were readmitted to Türkiye from Greece under the ‘One-for-One’ scheme. The bilateral Readmission Protocol between Greece and Türkiye remained suspended. Türkiye did not readmit third-country nationals from Bulgaria under either the bilateral border agreement or the EU-Turkey Readmission Agreement.

As regards resettlement from Türkiye to the EU under the ‘One-for-One’ scheme, 5 046 Syrian refugees were resettled in eight EU Member States in 2022. Moreover, the Resettlement Support Facility run by the European Union Agency for Asylum in Istanbul facilitated the processing of 2 585 resettlement candidates. The total number of Syrian refugees resettled from Türkiye to the EU Member States under the ‘One-for-One’ scheme reached 39 648 as of September 2023. At the same time, 561 758 Syrian refugees were voluntarily repatriated from Türkiye to Syria between 2016 and 2023 according to government data. Out of the total number, 58 758 Syrians were repatriated in 2022.

Türkiye returned effectively 124 441 irregular migrants to their home countries in 2022, an increase of more than 160% on the 2021 figure of 46 653. The total number of irregular migrants returned since 2018 reached 372 790. The total number of Afghan nationals returned from Türkiye in 2022 was 66 534, while 12 385 Pakistani nationals and 40 898 other countries’ nationals had been returned to their countries as of 22 December 2022. None of these returns were carried out within the scope of the readmission agreements that are in force between Türkiye and third countries. Türkiye did not sign any new readmission agreements in the reporting period.

Türkiye continued voluntary returns of irregular migrants financed through national as well as EU funds. 737 irregular migrants were returned through the national voluntary return scheme while 2 259 were returned with the assistance of IOM and EU financing in 2022.

According to the government, 280 206 irregular migrants were prevented from entering Turkish territory in the eastern and southern provinces in 2022 by Turkish security forces.

Some of the 30 removal centres were heavily damaged by the February 2023 earthquakes and the capacity to host irregular migrants dropped from 18 000 to 15 710. The removal centre in Hatay was evacuated due to heavy damage and is no longer operational, whereas hosting of migrants in other removal centres was suspended pending reparations. The number of temporary accommodation centres managed by the PMM increased from 7 to 9, leading to an increase in capacity from around 66 000 to 77 000. Temporary accommodation centres also started hosting earthquake victims of Turkish origin along with Syrians.

Civil society, bar associations and various media reported incidents of alleged human rights violations as well as pervasive challenges relating to access to rights and services in removal centres, particularly with regard to access to information and legal aid. In 2022, more than 280 000 irregular migrants were apprehended, most of whom were subject to return procedures in removal centres. A limited number of irregular migrants (939) benefited from free legal aid in 2022 (1 059 in 2021). In addition to the free legal aid scheme, 37 876 migrants were able to have access to and meet their lawyers in removal centres.

Overall, irregular migration continued to be a polarising topic in society and was heavily used by political parties in their electoral campaigns.

1 345 488 foreigners were legal residents in Türkiye on 1 December 2022 (1 275 741 in 2021). Nationals of Iraq, Russia, and Turkmenistan were the most common holders of residence permits. The number of Russian nationals with residence permits increased from approximately 66 000 in 2021 to around 155 000 in 2023. Approximately 560 000 Ukrainians have arrived in Türkiye since the beginning of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine in February 2022. Many had already left for a third country or voluntarily returned to Ukraine by September 2022. Around 46 000 Ukrainians were residing in Türkiye in April 2023.

The legislation on the acquisition of nationality by foreign investors remained unchanged during the reporting period. Moreover, according to Articles 35 and 36 of the Land Registry Law, natural persons who are the nationals of countries designated by the President of the Republic can acquire real estate in Türkiye. As of October 2022, the list contained 185 countries. The list is not publicly available because it is not published on the website of the General Directorate of Land Registry. Such schemes pose risks in relation to security, money laundering, tax evasion, terrorist financing, corruption and infiltration by organised crime. As a candidate country, Türkiye should refrain from any measure that could jeopardise the attainment of the EU’s objectives when using its prerogatives to award nationality.

Asylum

Institutional set-up and legal alignment

The Presidency for Migration Management (PMM) is the main institution responsible for all asylum-related procedures. The status determination processes are carried out by the Provincial Directorates of Migration Management (PDMMs) as well as by the International Protection Bureaus (decision centres) in Ankara and Istanbul (established in 2018 and 2019 respectively), with a view of reducing case backlog. A new International Protection Bureau was established in Samsun in 2022. In addition to those bureaus, mobile teams were established in 2019. Decisions on refugee status determination are subject to administrative and judicial appeal procedures.

Legislation in this area is partially aligned with the EU acquis. The Law on foreigners and international protection maintains the reservation (geographical limitation) expressed in the New York Protocol to the 1951 Geneva Convention as a result of which the vast majority of persons seeking international protection in Türkiye cannot apply for fully-fledged refugee status but only for ‘conditional refugee’ status and subsidiary protection. Conditional refugee status limits the stay in the country ‘until the moment a recognised conditional refugee is resettled to a third country’. By law, Syrian refugees are granted a specific refugee status under the Temporary Protection Regulation. However, in February 2022, the Ministry of Interior announced that newly arriving Syrians who have not been registered will not automatically receive temporary protection status in 16 provinces. According to the announcement, residence permit applications by foreigners would not be accepted in any neighbourhood in which 25% or more of the population consisted of foreigners (this was reduced to 20% in June 2022).

Implementation and enforcement capacity

Türkiye continued to host one of the largest refugee populations in the world, with (as of 31 August 2023) 3 298 817 Syrians under temporary protection and slightly over 300 000 non-Syrians (including those who hold or who have applied for international protection status). The number of asylum seekers slightly increased over the reporting period. 33 246 international protection applications were received in 2022 (29 256 in 2021). 19 400 applications were made by Afghans, 7 131 by Ukrainians and 4 083 by Iraqis. This was a different pattern from 2021 due to the Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine. In 2022, Türkiye granted international protection (refugee status, conditional refugee status or subsidiary protection) to 12 857 applicants, a slight decrease compared with 13 227 in 2021. The authorities rejected 12 030 applications (11 908 in 2021). In 2022, the cumulative total of pending international protection applications stood at 272 336. Despite a slight decrease on last year, this remains a significant backlog that has not been reduced over the years. There is no publicly accessible data on international protection with a breakdown by category of decisions and of pending cases at the end of the year.

As of June 2022, Türkiye officially closed registration of temporary protection applications in 16 provinces in an attempt to avoid an increase in the number of foreigners where they already exceed 20% of the total population. When asylum seekers are denied registration in a ‘closed’ province, they are most often not officially referred to another province with supporting documentation. Outside the officially ‘closed’ provinces, NGOs and lawyers repeatedly referred to the de facto closure of international protection registration in other provinces, except for highly vulnerable cases. Such barriers to registration hinder access to all other essential services and put asylum seekers in an irregular situation if they are apprehended.

Almost half of all Syrians in Türkiye are registered in four provinces – Istanbul, Gaziantep, Hatay and Şanlıurfa. The rest reside in various other provinces across Türkiye. 67 548 Syrians are hosted in seven temporary accommodation centres (50 736 in 2021). 230 998 Syrians had been granted Turkish citizenship as of April 2023.

The destructive earthquakes of 6 February 2023 affected a total of 11 provinces (Kahramanmaraş, Hatay, Gaziantep, Malatya, Kilis, Osmaniye, Diyarbakir, Adana, Adıyaman, Sanliurfa) where most of the migrant and refugee population (in particular 1 738 035 Syrians under Temporary Protection) had been living. According to a statement by the Interior Minister, 6 969 foreigners (mostly Syrians) lost their lives because of the earthquakes. The earthquakes have led to great human mobility, including refugees and migrants, inside the country.

In ordinary circumstances, Türkiye imposes travel restrictions on refugees, prohibiting them from travelling out of the provinces in which they are registered with local authorities unless they have a permit. On 7 February 2023, the authorities lifted these restrictions for about 1.7 million refugees under temporary and international protection in the earthquake region for 90 days (with the exception that they could not travel to İstanbul). A second circular reduced this to 60 days and granted those travelling from the worst-affected five provinces (Hatay, Malatya, Kahramanmaraş, Adıyaman, and Gaziantep) unconditional access to other provinces, but made travel from the other five (Kilis, Diyarbakır, Şanlıurfa, Adana, and Osmaniye) dependent on the applicant’s home being seriously damaged and the existence of medical needs that could only be met in other provinces. This circular is still in place and is extended on a regular basis excluding Istanbul. Another administrative order gave Syrians under temporary protection, registered and residing in the 11 earthquake-affected provinces, the opportunity to return to Syria temporarily. Syrians returning temporarily can stay in Syria for up to 6 months. Temporary returns to Syria started in February 2023 and by June the total number of temporary returns was 70 086 individuals. By September 62 936 individuals had returned to Türkiye. The deadline for re-entry to Türkiye was 15 September 2023, after which the temporary protection status of Syrians who had not returned to Türkiye was cancelled.

The earthquakes and their consequences resulted in increasing discomfort for a large portion of the public. In the lead-up to the general elections in May 2023, opposition politicians made speeches that further fuelled anti-refugee sentiment and called for Syrians to return to Syria.

Throughout 2022, the PMM continued the verification of data of Syrians under temporary protection, updating and completing the information gathered during their original registration. 2 071 051 Syrians’ data was verified in 2022.

Additionally, in the context of the 20% rule, the PMM introduced an address-verification exercise for Syrians. As a result of this exercise, the temporary protection status of Syrians who were found to be residing in locations other than their officially registered addresses has reportedly been deactivated. The PMM invited these individuals to approach their provincial offices to declare their current residential addresses so that they could reactivate their protection status. In practice, deactivation of the status means discontinued access to services such as education and healthcare.

A key mechanism for identifying vulnerable asylum seekers is protection desks in PDMMs which interview and make referrals based on their specific needs assessment. There are protection desks in 50 provinces. In 2022, protection desks identified and processed referrals for 153 054 asylum seekers. In 2022, 181 unaccompanied children were referred to the Ministry of Family and Social Services (MoFSS) by various agencies. Unaccompanied children continue to face protection risks, particularly during initial identification and age assessment processes, which are undertaken by different agencies (including law enforcement services). Children are referred to hospitals for bone x-rays, which give a broad two-year age range. In the absence of holistic age-assessment processes, individuals whose results indicate that they are aged 16-18 might be registered as adults. A multi-disciplinary approach to age assessment procedures, which take psychosocial aspects into consideration, is necessary in order to increase compliance with European standards.

Applicants for international protection, conditional refugee status holders and people under temporary protection, i.e. Syrians, can apply for work permits. However, a large majority of refugees and asylum seekers do not have effective access to the labour market, in particular to formal employment, due to low employability (lower levels of education and skills), language barriers and limited access to information and services. Around 400 000 refugee children in Türkiye (especially in the 15-18 age group) do not regularly attend school. According to the Ministry of National Education, 822 524 refugee students were enrolled at schools in 29 provinces in January 2023.

The EU has mobilised close to EUR 10 billion in support for refugees in Türkiye since 2011. The full operational budget of EUR 6 billion of the EU Facility for Refugees in Turkey was committed, with over EUR 5.1 billion disbursed by June 2023. The Facility mobilises both humanitarian and development assistance for refugees and host communities in Türkiye to meet basic needs, increase access to education and healthcare (including for vulnerable groups, children and women) and strengthen border protection at the eastern borders with Iran and Iraq.

A first top-up of EUR 535 million was allocated in 2020 and an additional EUR 3 billion was mobilised by the EU in June 2021 to continue support for refugees and host communities in Türkiye in 2021-2023. This funding is committed to continuing the provision of basic needs, inclusive quality education for refugees, their socio-economic empowerment in Türkiye as well as border management. Part of it (EUR 350 million) is being mobilised to support refugees and host communities in the regions affected by the February 2023 earthquake.

The PMM and the European Union Agency for Asylum (EUAA) continued their cooperation with the implementation of the 2022-2023 Cooperation Roadmap, which offers capacity-building support and peer-to-peer exchanges on best practices in the fields of asylum, reception, resettlement and organisational change.

NGOs and lawyers report concerns about the quality of decisions on asylum, their reasoned notification and challenges with the awareness of and access to legal aid for appeals.

Visa policy

Türkiye made no progress in meeting the six unfulfilled benchmarks of the visa liberalisation roadmap (on the anti-terror law, personal data protection legislation, implementation of the EU-Turkey Readmission Agreement, conclusion of an international agreement with the EU on Europol, implementation of the Group of States against Corruption (GRECO) recommendations on anti-corruption and judicial cooperation with all EU Member States).

Türkiye needs to further harmonise its visa policy with the EU’s visa policy. This would include further aligning Turkish visa requirements with the EU lists of visa-free and visa-required countries; full phasing-out of the issuing of visas at borders (currently the citizens of 33 countries are eligible to obtain a visa on arrival, compared with 24 in 2021) and of electronic visas; and ensuring that the issuing of visas at its diplomatic missions is carried out in line with the conditions and procedures set out in the EU Visa Code. Türkiye continues to apply a discriminatory visa regime against nationals of Cyprus, but it has abolished the short-stay visa requirements for the other 26 Member States.

Türkiye has introduced the biometric collection of fingerprinting for sticker visas issued by its diplomatic missions in a number of countries (primarily in Africa) with a view to increasing the authorities’ capacity to tackle irregular migration. The authorities have relaxed the rules governing the entry and residence of Ukrainian nationals in Türkiye as a result of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine.

Schengen and external borders

Institutional set-up and legal alignment

No new legislation for the sector was adopted during the reporting period. The coordination of the work of the State bodies dealing with border management matters is the responsibility of the Directorate-General for Provincial Administration in the Ministry of the Interior (MoI). The Border Management Implementation Board did not meet in the reporting period, while preparations for its 6th meeting since its establishment in 2016 have been underway for some time. Its supervising body, the Integrated Border Management Coordination Board, has not yet met. In addition, relevant interinstitutional meetings were held at technical level on specific topics.

The Ministry of the Interior created a new department in autumn 2021 for the coordination of the future work of the National Coordination and Joint Risk Analysis Centre (NACORAC). Several border management services within the Turkish administration assigned staff to NACORAC, which is located in Ankara. Given its responsibilities at Türkiye’s green border, personnel from the Land Forces Command (in the Ministry of National Defence) should be assigned. The centre was formally established in 2016 and an inauguration ceremony was held in November 2022 to formalise the handover of EU-financed equipment, but it is not yet fully operational. Staff detachments from all other relevant institutions have been completed, but the staff assignment process from the Land Forces Command is still ongoing. NACORAC has started collecting data from central and local institutions, albeit at a basic level. The risk analysis process has also been initiated to a limited extent, while negotiations with all relevant institutions for enhanced data-sharing are ongoing.

Following the establishment in February 2021 of the Institute of Heads of Civil Border Administration, transfer of certain border management responsibilities from governors in 11 border regions (mostly in eastern Türkiye) to the Directorate-General for Provincial Administration has continued. Two heads were appointed at land borders during the reporting period, bringing the total number of heads appointed by the Directorate-General for Provincial Administration for border gates to eight (six at airports, including Istanbul, Ankara, Izmir and Antalya; and two at land borders). This reform seeks to streamline the coordination of border management at central level.

In terms of new coordination mechanisms at local level, ‘Security Commissions’ have been established (under the chairmanship of the Civil Border Administration with the participation of the representatives of the Ministry of Transport and Infrastructure, the Ministry of Trade, the Ministry of Health, the Turkish National Police and the gendarmerie) and will meet every month at civil airports, ports and border gates to develop, implement and evaluate measures with regard to security, training and inspection services.

Similar to last year’s recommendations, in order to bring the country’s border management system in line with the EU acquis, Türkiye should further improve inter-service and international cooperation, accelerate the adoption of an integrated border management (IBM) strategy and update its IBM national implementation action plan from 2006. It also needs to take steps to enact new legislation to set up a non-military border management body in charge of all aspects of border management, including border surveillance at the green border, which is currently under the responsibility of the Turkish land forces.

Implementation and enforcement capacity

Türkiye continued to invest significant effort and financial resources in modernising border security at the land border, especially in the south and south-east of the country. After the construction of a modular security wall and a panel/barbed-wire fence, patrol roads, lighting, sensors and thermal cameras along the Syrian border, the installation of modern electro-optical communication and surveillance masts continued at the Iranian border. Communication and surveillance masts were also being erected on the western land border. The EU provides substantial support to Türkiye to modernise its border surveillance infrastructure, including at its eastern borders with Iran and Iraq.

Relations with the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex) are based on the Memorandum of Understanding of 2012 and a three-year cooperation plan covering the period 2020-2022. The authorities continued to provide monthly reports on irregular migration flows at the country’s western land and sea borders. Türkiye did not engage in joint operations in the reporting period but did participate in training sessions and conferences.

Cooperation with neighbouring Greece and Bulgaria within the framework of a trilateral Police and Customs Co-operation Centre at the Bulgarian-Turkish border crossing point at Kapitan Andreevo/Kapıkule continued through data-sharing, and regular ad hoc meetings between the countries’ respective authorities within the scope of existing agreements.

Türkiye continued contributing to Interpol’s databases, albeit only on the basis of manual inquiries in case of need (using the ‘POLNET’ website of the TNP’s Interpol & Europol Department). Interpol’s ‘Stolen and Lost Travel Documents’ (SLTD) database is not integrated with Türkiye’s local database and there is no access to other international police databases. Local database connections are used by authorised officers of the Turkish National Police in all 81 provinces. Certain staff members in the following services have access to the databases: the Presidency of Migration Management (PMM), the Disaster and Emergency Presidency (AFAD), the Nuclear Regulatory Authority, the Turkish Atomic Energy Authority, the Ministry of Trade (DG Customs Enforcement), the Turkish Coast Guard Command and the General Gendarmerie Command.

Türkiye has committed itself to removing all anti-personnel landmines by 31 December 2025 in order to fulfil its obligations under the Ottawa Convention (or Anti-personnel Mine Ban Treaty). This deadline has been extended several times since 2014. So far, only a relatively small stretch of the total of 2 949 km of land border has been cleared entirely. Türkiye needs to substantially increase its national investment in removing mines not only along its borders with Syria, Iraq, Iran, and Armenia, but also inside Türkiye in order to fulfil its obligations under the Ottawa Convention. The EU is currently providing significant financial support for demining.

2.3. Economic criteria

In line with the conclusions of the European Council in Copenhagen in June 1993, EU accession requires the existence of a functioning market economy and the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union.

2.3.1. The existence of a functioning market economy

The Turkish economy is well advanced but made no progress over the reporting period. Serious concerns persist over the continued proper functioning of Türkiye’s market economy. There has been prolonged backsliding on important elements, such as the conduct of monetary policy and the institutional and regulatory environment over most of the reporting period. Since the May parliamentary and presidential elections, the authorities have taken some steps to revert to more stability‑oriented macroeconomic policies.

Although economic growth remained robust in 2022, Türkiye moved further away from market-oriented policies, which weakened its economic fundamentals and increased vulnerabilities and risks. Inflation decreased somewhat but remained very high as monetary policy prioritised exceptionally low interest rates, which remain deeply negative in real terms and are sustained by a web of regulatory and prudential measures. After the presidential and parliamentary elections in spring 2023, monetary policy has started to tighten, also signalling a gradual simplification of the macroprudential framework. The current account deficit increased to 5.4% of GDP in 2022, driven by a negative terms-of-trade shock and large imports of non-monetary gold. The relatively good budget performance in recent years masks an underlying trend of growing fiscal risks. The authorities’ commitment to fiscal discipline wavered, as the fiscal stance turned pro-cyclical in 2023, with earthquake-related expenditure pressure adding to pre-electoral budgetary largesse. However, the fiscal stance was tightened after the elections and a revised budget, including sizeable tax increases, was adopted in July.

The institutional and regulatory environment lacks predictability and transparency, and complicates the post-electoral economic policy normalisation. Market exit remains costly and slow. However, Türkiye made progress in digitalising government services to businesses. Although the size of the informal economy has fallen in recent years, it still accounts for a significant share of economic activity. State intervention in price-setting mechanisms persists. The provision of State aid lacks proper implementation rules, enforcement and transparency. The banking sector remained broadly stable but is facing financial stability challenges due to the numerous overly complex and far‑reaching macroprudential and regulatory measures. The labour market strengthened further, although structural challenges remain significant, in particular for youth and female employment. Regional labour market disparities declined and reached one of the lowest levels in years. The recent net minimum wage increases were pro‑cyclical.

The Commission’s recommendations from 2022 were not fully implemented and remain valid. In order to improve the functioning of the market economy, Türkiye should in particular:

®restore the independence of the central bank and tighten monetary policy in order to reduce inflation sustainably towards the target;

®develop a credible medium-term fiscal consolidation plan that underpins a gradual return to primary surpluses, while accommodating transparent reconstruction spending and addressing fiscal risks, including from contingent liabilities;

®further improve the business environment, including by reducing State interference in price-setting mechanisms, simplifying the macroprudential and regulatory framework, and enhancing the transparency and control of State aid.

Economic governance

Türkiye moved further away from market-oriented policies, weakening economic fundamentals and increasing risks, but has taken some steps to reverse this course since the May elections. Monetary policy prioritised maintaining deeply negative real interest rates, despite soaring inflation and tightening global financial conditions. This necessitated the adoption of far-reaching macroprudential and regulatory measures that have disrupted the functioning of the financial markets and increased vulnerabilities. However, the central bank has started to tighten monetary policy after the presidential and parliamentary elections in spring 2023, also signalling a gradual simplification of the macroprudential framework. Fiscal policy turned strongly expansionary in the first half of 2023, with earthquake-related expenditure pressure adding to pre-electoral budgetary largesse. Ad hoc policy measures have increasingly become the norm, undermining, in conjunction with high macroeconomic instability, the credibility of medium-term planning. A budget rebalancing and large tax hikes in July have sought to limit the bulging budget deficit. Subsidies and transfers to curb the effects of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine increased significantly in 2022 but are planned to decline in 2023. Türkiye has not joined the EU restrictive measures against Russia and continued to benefit from its extensive and growing trade relations with it, particularly in energy, tourism and agriculture. The implementation of the policy guidance set out in the conclusions from the Economic and Financial Dialogue of May 2022 has been limited.

Macroeconomic stability

Türkiye’s economic growth remained upbeat but unbalanced. Real GDP grew by 5.5% in 2022, which was above the five-year average (2018‑2022) of 4.5%, although, after a strong first half of the year, it decelerated in the second half. It expanded further in the first half of 2023 and growth even strengthened a bit, despite the devastating February earthquakes. Domestic demand, in particular very strong household consumption fuelled by pre‑election expenditure, remained the main driver of this. Net exports’ contribution to growth turned negative in the second half of 2022, following a loss in export momentum and a pick-up in imports, which worsened further in early 2023. Inventories continued to wind down and very weak construction investment pulled down total investment growth last year. A notable expansion of technology-intensive and export-oriented sectors lifted industrial production to record high levels in 2022. The 6 February earthquakes caused a tragic loss of life and significant destruction of capital assets. High frequency indicators captured the first negative economic effects of the earthquakes already in February, with steep monthly falls in industrial production and retails sales, and declining economic confidence. However, economic activity rebounded quickly in the following months and consumer confidence increased sharply to levels not seen in 5 years, before steeply falling back in the aftermath of the elections. Due to Türkiye’s relatively strong performance during the COVID-19 crisis, income convergence with the EU resumed, with per capita GDP in purchasing power standards rising to 69% of the EU average in 2022 from 59% in 2019, and above its 2015 high of 68%.

External imbalances increased and remained a major vulnerability. The current account deficit swelled to 5.4% of GDP in 2022 and increased further in the first half of 2023 to more than double its average in 2018-2022, as the negative terms-of-trade shock and large imports of non-monetary gold (a traditional safe asset in times of policy uncertainty in Türkiye) drove the trade deficit back into double digits for the first time in a decade. However, excluding gold and energy trade, the current account recorded a 5% surplus. The high external deficits remain a key macroeconomic vulnerability, aggravated by the strong reliance on short-term borrowing, a very high sovereign risk premium and the low level of foreign exchange reserves (with a large share in non-core foreign currencies). The central bank’s net foreign assets even turned negative in April as it used its reserves to defend the exchange rate before the elections. Reflecting deteriorating market perception of domestic economic policy, the five-year credit default swap

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