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Document 52014SC0355
COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT Progress report on the implementation of the Railway Safety Directive Accompanying the document Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on a progress report on the implementation of the Railway Safety Directive
COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT Progress report on the implementation of the Railway Safety Directive Accompanying the document Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on a progress report on the implementation of the Railway Safety Directive
COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT Progress report on the implementation of the Railway Safety Directive Accompanying the document Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on a progress report on the implementation of the Railway Safety Directive
/* SWD/2014/0355 final */
COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT Progress report on the implementation of the Railway Safety Directive Accompanying the document Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on a progress report on the implementation of the Railway Safety Directive /* SWD/2014/0355 final */
COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT Progress report on the implementation of
the Railway Safety Directive Accompanying the document Communication from the Commission
to the Council and the European Parliament on a progress report on the
implementation of the Railway Safety Directive Table of Contents 1. INTRODUCTION.. 3 1.1. Institutional set-up of the
railway safety. 3 2. DEVELOPMENT OF THE LEGAL
FRAMEWORK.. 5 2.1. EU policy developments in the
railway field and in rail safety in particular. 5 2.2. Last development of the legal
framework for rail safety. 7 2.2.1.
Common safety indicators (Article
5 of the Railway Safety Directive). 7 2.2.2.
Common safety methods (Article 6
of the Railway Safety Directive). 7 2.2.3.
Common safety targets (Article 7
of the Railway Safety Directive). 10 2.2.4.
Certification of the entities in
charge of maintenance for freight wagons (Article 14a of the Railway Safety
Directive). 12 2.3. National safety rules. 12 2.3.1.
The Task Force on national safety
rules and the rule management tool 12 2.3.2.
Notif-IT: database of national
safety and national technical rules. 13 2.3.3.
Follow-up of the recommendations
of the Task Force. 13 2.4. The 4th Railway
package and the recast of the Railway Safety Directive. 15 2.4.1.
Revision of the Safety
Certification and migration towards a single safety certificate 15 2.4.2.
A moving environment for safety. 17 2.4.3.
Recast of the Railway Safety
Directive: inter-institutional dialogue. 18 3.
MONITORING THE IMPLEMENTATION AND THE SAFETY PERFORMANCE.. 19 3.1. Measures notified by the Member
States for transposition of Directive 2004/49/EC.. 19 3.2. Managing and monitoring safety. 20 3.2.1. Managing safety. 20 3.2.2.
Safety certification and Safety
authorisation. 22 3.2.3.
Safety overview.. 23 3.2.4.
Occurrences investigated by NIBs. 26 3.2.5.
Monitoring activities supported
by ERA.. 27 3.3. Certification of the entities in
charge of maintenance: overview.. 28 3.3.1.
Status of different schemas (ART
10.1 of the Regulation (EU) 445/2011) in EU and non EU Contracting States. 28 3.3.2.
State of play of ECM
certification. 29 3.3.3.
ERA supporting activities. 30 3.4. Further developments. 30 3.4.1.
Monitoring safety performance
processes. 30 3.4.2.
A Platform for European Rail
Infrastructure Managers (PRIME). 33 CONCLUSIONS. 34 1. INTRODUCTION This
report is an update of the state of play of the implementation of the Railway
Safety Directive (Directive 2004/49/EC[1])
since the last report SEC (2009) 1157 issued on 8 September 2009. This update
is required every 5 years in accordance with Article 31 of the aforementioned
directive. After
a short introduction devoted to the authorities and institutional bodies
created for the implementation of the Railway Safety Directive, Chapter 2 will
present the developments of the legislation built on the Railway Safety
Directive during the last five years, while
Chapter 3 will focus on its implementation and enforcement. Most
of the legal documents referred in the progress report are published on the
Official Journal of the European Unions. All reports related to railway safety
are publicly available on the web site of the European Railway Agency: http://www.era.europa.eu/Pages/Home.aspx.
Internal notes related to the correspondence with the Member States in matter
of legislative procedures and transposition into the national legal framework
cannot be disclosed. The
European Railway Agency is credited for all figures in this report.
1.1. Institutional
set-up of the railway safety
In
2009 the authorities and institutional bodies most relevant to the
implementation of the Railway Safety Directive were already in place:
The
Railway Interoperability and Safety Committee (RISC) where Member States
are represented. It was established under Article 21 of Directive
96/48/EC. The competences of the Committee have been extended three times:
in 2001 with the conventional rail interoperability directive, in 2004
with the railway safety directive, and in 2007 with the train driver
certification directive (Directive 2007/59/EC[2]).
The Committee is
chaired by the Commission and has held its 70th meeting in June 2014.
The agenda is prepared by the Commission and includes, as standard parts: items
submitted for vote under comitology procedures, items for discussion and items
to agree on the Community position for meetings organised by international
organisations such as OTIF and OSJD. Since the Agency was established, it has
reported regularly on the state of play of its work leading to Commission
measures.
The
European Railway Agency (ERA) was established in 2005 to help the integration
of the railway area by reinforcing safety and interoperability. Its objective
is to contribute, on technical matters, to the implementation of Community
legislation aimed at improving the competitive position of the railway
sector. Its work involves producing recommendations intended to become
Commission decisions or regulations and issuing opinions on matters
relating to Interoperability and safety. All recommendations must be
accompanied by an economic analysis.
National
safety authorities (NSAs) assure safety performance whilst taking care
that safety regulation does not hinder market opening opportunities during
the development of interoperability. The NSAs are responsible for
inspecting and supervising the activities of the railway undertakings and
infrastructure managers during the period of validity of the safety certificate
or safety authorisation.
National
investigation bodies (NIBs) are charged with investigating serious
accidents and – at their discretion – other accidents and incidents on the
railway. Supported by ERA, they are obliged to exchange views and experiences
with each other in order to develop common investigation methods,
principles for following up safety recommendations in safety reports and
to adapt investigations to the latest technical and scientific progress.
To
complete this institutional framework, new institutional bodies have been
introduced for specific tasks during the last five years:
The
bodies issuing a certificate for the entities in charge of maintenance.
These may be bodies either accredited or recognised by the Member States.
Also the NSA can issue such certificate, in particular when maintenance is
performed by the railway undertakings themselves. Although these bodies
was required in Article 14a of the Railway Safety
Directive, they became operational after the Regulation (EU) No 445/2011 on
a system of certification of the entity in charge of maintenance for
freight wagons[3]
entered into force in 2011;
The
bodies able to carry out an independent assessment on the application of
the risk management process according to Commission Regulation (EC) No 352/2009
of 24 April 2009 on the common safety method for risk evaluation and
assessment[4].
Their competencies were further developed with the Commission Regulation
(EU) No 402/2013 of 30 April 2013 on the common safety method for risk
evaluation and assessment[5],
which will be applied from May 2015.
2. DEVELOPMENT OF THE LEGAL
FRAMEWORK
2.1. EU
policy developments in the railway field and in rail safety in particular
In
its White Paper ‘Roadmap to a Single European Transport Area - Towards a competitive
and resource efficient transport system’, adopted on 28 March 2011, the
Commission announced its vision to establish a Single European Railway Area and
clarified that this objective implies creating the internal railway market
where European railway undertakings can provide services without unnecessary
technical and administrative barriers. Additionally,
the European Council conclusions of January 2012 highlighted the importance of
releasing the growth-creating potential of a fully integrated Single Market,
including as regards network industries[6].
Furthermore, the Commission Communication on Action for Stability, Growth and
Jobs adopted on 30 May 2012[7]
stresses the importance of reducing further the regulatory burden and barriers
to entry in the rail sector making country specific recommendations in that
direction. In the same vein, the Commission adopted on 6 June 2012 the
Communication on strengthening the governance of the single market, which
likewise stresses the importance of the transport sector[8]. A
common regulatory framework for railway safety was a necessary cornerstone for a
single market for rail transport services. Member States have until now
developed their safety rules and standards mainly on national lines, based on
national technical and operational concepts. Simultaneously, differences in
principles, approach and culture have made it difficult to break through the
technical barriers and to establish international transport operations. The
'Railway Safety Directive' 2004/49/EC[9],
represented a great improvement towards the establishment of a common
regulatory framework for railway safety. The Directive established a framework
for harmonising the content of safety rules, safety certification of railway
undertakings, the tasks and roles of the safety authorities and the
investigation of accidents, to discourage Member States from continuing to
develop their safety rules and standards based on national technical and
operational concepts. Directive
2004/49/EC was amended by Directive 2008/57/EC of the European Parliament and
of the Council of 17 June 2008[10]
and Directive 2008/110/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16
December 2008[11].
The last one introduced the concept of 'entity in charge of maintenance' (ECM)
and the new article 14a set the obligation for each vehicle to have an ECM
assigned to it. The
legal framework created by the Railway Safety Directive is based on the
principle of role and responsibility sitting with the two major operational actors
of the railway chain: the railway undertakings and the infrastructure managers.
These
actors have the best opportunity to know and manage the risks related to their
operations. Therefore, they are responsible for assessing all the risks related
to the safe operation of the trains and establishing a safety management system
(SMS) according to Article 9 of the Directive. The SMS is the main tool for
managing safety. It demonstrates the maturity and competences of the railway
undertaking and infrastructure managers and actually their capability in
addressing risks. After
having evaluated the quality of the respective SMS, the NSAs issue safety
certificates to the railway undertakings and safety authorisation to the
infrastructure managers. Through the certification or authorisation systems
these two main players should demonstrate that they have in place an effective
system to manage safety and they are able to satisfy the requirements for the
safe operation on the railway network. The
picture provided by the safety certificates and authorisations may be good but
only partial: supervision, consisting of ongoing verification that SMSs are
correctly implemented, is also an essential part of the certification process.
NSAs have an essential role in issuing safety certificates and in performing supervision
activities. The
SMS should also include the process for improving and taking the appropriate
lessons after an occurrence (accident or incident). This consists of an
efficient system of internal reporting, investigation and analysis for taking
the necessary preventive measures. To achieve this goal, railway undertakings
and infrastructure managers should establish, within their safety culture, a
"just culture" to actively encourage personnel to report
safety-related accidents, incidents and near misses without being subject to
punishment or discrimination. A fair, not blaming culture enables the railway
industry to learn lessons from accidents and incidents and thereby improve
safety for workers and for passengers. The
recommendations provided by the NIBs are another tool to take lessons from the
accidents. The railway undertakings and the infrastructure managers should take
preventive measures the most appropriate to their particular risk profile. The
NSAs should abstain from setting new safety rules after an accident reducing
their margin of manoeuvre unnecessarily. They should show leadership in best
proactive benchmarking, assuring that the railway undertakings and the
infrastructure managers take their responsibilities, and supervise that
appropriate preventive measures are taken, according to the SMS provisions. To
conclude, safe and successful railway transport operations, is a common goal of
the railway undertakings, the infrastructure managers, the NSAs and the NIBs. Railway
undertakings are not rewarded by doing short-cuts in matter of safety:
persistent poor safety records may lead to poor competitiveness and to the
revocation of their safety certificate. On their side, the major obligations of
the NSAs are related to certification, authorisation and supervision, and they
should avoid taking the responsibilities that sit with the railway undertaking
and the infrastructure managers. 2.2. Last development of the legal framework
for rail safety Since
the adoption of the last progress report in 2009, the secondary legislation in
railway safety has been developed and the implementing acts required by the
Railway Safety Directive entered into force.
2.2.1. Common safety
indicators
(Article 5 of the Railway Safety Directive)
Information
on common safety indicators (CSIs) is necessary to assess the achievements of
the common safety targets (CSTs) and to provide for the monitoring of the
general development of railway safety in the EU. In accordance with Article
5(2) of Directive 2004/49/EC, Annex I to that Directive had to be revised to
include common definitions of the CSIs and methods to calculate accident costs.
The revision of Annex I was carried out according to the regulatory procedure
with scrutiny. The
amendment of Annex I was provided the first time in Commission Directive
149/2009/EC of 27 November 2009 amending Directive 2004/49/EC of the European
Parliament and of the Council as regards Common Safety Indicators and common
methods to calculate accident costs[12]. This
directive was based on Recommendation ERA/REC/SAF/02-2008 delivered by the
European Railway Agency on 29 September 2008, and on an in-depth analysis of
the current Annex I carried out by ERA. After
five years of practical experience with reporting and with the use of the
indicators, ERA suggested some further amendments to improve consistency in
reporting of common safety indicators across the Union. On 10 December 2013, ERA
delivered the new Recommendation ERA/REC/08/2013 on the amendment of Annex I of
Directive 2004/49/EC. The new Commission Directive 2014/88/EU amending
Directive 2004/49/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council as regards
common safety indicators and common methods of calculating accident costs[13]was
adopted on
9 July 2014.
2.2.2. Common safety
methods
(Article 6 of the Railway Safety Directive)
One
of the purposes of Directive 2004/49/EC is to improve access to the market for
rail transport services by defining common principles for the management,
regulation and supervision of railway safety. The Directive also provides a
framework for equal conditions for all infrastructure managers, as the same
safety authorisation requirements apply across the European Union. These
common principles are usually referred to as 'common safety methods' (CSM). The
CSMs shall describe how safety levels as well as the achievement of safety
targets and compliance with other safety requirements are assessed by
elaborating and defining: a) risk
evaluation and assessment methods, b) methods
for assessing conformity with requirements for the award of safety certificates
and safety authorisations issued in accordance with Articles 10 and 11
2004/49/EC, and c) methods
to check that the structural subsystems of the railway system are operated and
maintained in accordance with the relevant essential requirements, as far as
they are not yet covered by the technical specifications for interoperability. a)
Risk evaluation and assessment methods On
11 July 2012, ERA addressed the Recommendation ERA/REC/02-2012/SAF for the
revision of the Regulation (EC) No 352/2009 on the common safety method (CSM)
on risk evaluation and assessment[14].
Under Article 6(4) of the Directive, CSMs must be revised at regular intervals,
taking into account the experience gained from their application and the global
development of railway safety and the obligations on Member States. The
revision was based on an Agency report which analysed the experience gained
with the CSM and its overall effectiveness. In addition, it covered further
developments on the roles and the responsibilities of the assessment body
referred to in Article 6 of Regulation (EC) No 352/2009. On this basis the
Commission adopted the Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 402/2013
of 30 April 2013 on the common safety method for risk evaluation and assessment
and repealing Regulation (EC) No 352/2009[15]. The
risk acceptance criteria used to evaluate the acceptability of a risk during
explicit risk estimation and evaluation could not be included because of lack
of common agreement between the sector and the authorities. ERA has continued
developments in order to address a recommendation by 2015. b)
Methods for assessing conformity with requirements for the award of safety
certificates and safety authorisations In
accordance with Article 17(4) of the Railway Safety Directive, CSMs should provide
a framework for national safety authorities (NSAs) to harmonise their assessment
and decision-making criteria across the EU and the procedure to follow. More
specifically: 1) Commission
Regulation (EU) No 1158/2010 of 9 December 2010 on a common safety method for
assessing conformity with the requirements for obtaining railway safety
certificate[16]
provides to NSAs a methodology for assessing a railway undertaking’s ability to
comply with all the requirements necessary to operate in general and on the
specific network for which it is seeking a certificate by assessing its safety
management system. 2) Commission
Regulation (EU) No 1169/2010 of 10 December 2010 on a common safety method for
assessing conformity with the requirements for obtaining a railway safety
authorisation[17]
provides to NSAs a methodology for assessing an infrastructure manager’s
ability to comply with all the requirements required to operate the specific
network for which it is seeking authorisation by assessing its safety
management system. Both
Regulations were based on the Recommendation ERA/REC/SAF/09-2009 of the
European Railway Agency of 18 September 2009. c)
Methods to check operation and maintenance. The
purpose of certification and authorisation is not achieved by issuing the
certificate or the authorisation alone. NSA supervision activities are the
cornerstone of maintaining and improving safety performance across the EU. Each
NSA needs to put in place arrangements to examine whether the processes outlined
in the application for a safety certificate or a safety authorisation are being
delivered in operation after the award of the certificate or the authorisation.
This
post-award supervision regime should have a common methodology, as described in
the Commission Regulation (EU) No 1077/2012 of 16 November 2012 on a common
safety method for supervision by national safety authorities after issuing a
safety certificate or safety authorisation[18]. At
the same time and in line with a system-based management approach, it was
recognised that a proactive self-monitoring by railway undertakings,
infrastructure managers and by entities in charge of maintenance was essential
for effective safety risk management and continuous improvement. A common methodology
is provided by Commission Regulation (EU) No 1078/2012 of 16 November 2012
on a common safety method for monitoring to be applied by railway undertakings,
infrastructure managers after receiving a safety certificate or safety
authorisation and by entities in charge of maintenance[19]. These
two Regulations were based on Recommendation ERA/REC/SAF/01-2011 of the
European Railway Agency of 16 December 2011. d)
Revision of the common safety methods After a few years of application of the CSMs
for assessing conformity and for supervision, ERA has come to a conclusion that
further harmonisation can only be achieved through the revision of the
respective regulations. On
this basis, the European Commission addressed to ERA the Commission
Implementing Decision C(2014) 1649 of 14 March 2014 on a mandate to the
European Railway Agency for the revision of the common safety methods for
conformity assessment and the common safety methods for supervision. The
Decision aims at a recommendation on the revision of CSMs no later than
mid-July 2016 identifying the necessary changes for a more detailed description
of the standard processes to be applied for safety certification (both the
assessment before issuing the certification and the post award supervision) to
ensure the establishment of a well-controlled SMS-based certification regime
and a more consistent approach across NSAs. This
revision of the CSMs will be a major step in the achievement of a Single Safety
Certificate regime. It will be made consistent with the provisions of the
recast of the Railway Safety Directive as part of the 4th Railway Package (see
Section 2.4).
2.2.3. Common safety
targets
(Article 7 of the Railway Safety Directive)
Common
safety targets (CSTs) are quantitative measures of risk allowing assessment of
whether the current safety levels of the railways in the Member States are at
least maintained. In the long term, they could also help to reduce the current
differences in railway safety performance and the related barriers to market
opening. Railway transport is the only mode of transport for which safety
targets have been prescribed by European legislation. The CSTs are EU-wide
maximum risk values, the national reference values (NRVs) are the maximum risk
levels set for individual Member States. The risk level is measured in terms of
the number of weighted fatalities and serious injuries [20]
per train-km. There are risk categories for passengers, employees,
level-crossing users, unauthorised persons on railway premises, others and
those applied to society as a whole. The Directive prescribes a progressive
approach consisting of several steps: a)
First set of draft common safety targets Article 7
of the Railway Safety Directive requires, among others, (a) that draft common
safety targets should be drawn up by the European Railway Agency under
mandates, (b) that the first set of draft common safety targets should be based
on an examination of existing targets and safety performance in the Member
states and should ensure that the current safety performance of the rail system
is not reduced in any Member State. On
this basis, the Commission Decision 2010/409/EU of 19 July 2010 on common
safety targets as referred to in Article 7 of Directive 2004/49/EC ([21]) has
been adopted, following the Recommendation ERA/REC/03-2009/SAF of the European
Railway Agency of 18 September 2009 on Common Safety Targets. The
first set of common
safety targets
was
understood as a first step of a process which will ensure that existing safety
levels are maintained and, where reasonably practicable, continuously improved.
With this first step, a transparent framework was put in place for monitoring
the global safety performance of railways across the European Union. b)
Second set of draft common safety targets As
a second step, the Decision was updated by making use of 6-year instead of
4-year time series of statistical data on railway accidents and related
consequences. This was intended to enable the Commission to take further
decisions based on data of a better quality. The
second set of common safety targets, required by Article 7(3) of the Railway
Safety Directive, builds on the experience gained from the first set of common
safety targets
and their implementation. Although safety levels are already adequate all over
the European railway systems, this will allow steering the national railway
systems of the Member States with a lower safety performance closer to the best
"safety performers". The
Commission
Decision 2012/226/EU of 23 April 2012 on the second set of common safety
targets as regards the rail system[22] was
based on ERA’s recommendation ERA/REC/05-2011/SAF of 26 August 2011. The
decision was later amended by the Commission Implementing Decision
2013/753/EU of 11 December 2013 amending Commission Decision 2012/226/EU on the
second set of common safety targets for the rail system[23],
following the annual assessment of ERA. This last Decision was based on ERA’s
recommendation ERA/REC/06-2013/SAF of 16 July 2013. c)
Third set of common safety targets According
to Article 7 (5), the common safety targets will be revised at regular
intervals, taking into account the global development of railway safety. To
this aim, the Commission adopted a Commission Implementing Decision
C(2011)5158 on a mandate to the European Railway Agency for the revision of
common safety targets and the related common safety method for the period
2011-2015. According to this Mandate, ERA should deliver its
recommendation for the amendment of the common safety method and including the
third set of safety targets by June 2015.
2.2.4. Certification
of the entities in charge of maintenance for freight wagons
(Article 14a of the Railway Safety Directive)
After
the tragic rail accident occurred in Viareggio, Italy, on 29 June 2009, due to
the derailment of a freight wagon and the explosion of its content, leading to
more than 30 fatalities, the European Commission and ERA decided to accelerate
the establishment of a system of certification for the ECM as required by
article 14a of the Railway Safety Directive. The
Commission
Regulation (EU) No 445/2011 of 10 May 2011 on a system of certification of the
entity in charge of maintenance for freight wagons and amending Regulation (EC)
No 653/2007[24]
provided a framework for the harmonisation of requirements and methods to
assess the ability of entities in charge of maintenance to ensure the safe
state of running of any freight wagon for which it is in charge. The
purpose of the certification system is to provide evidence across the Union that an entity in charge of maintenance has established its maintenance system and
can meet the harmonised requirements laid down in this Regulation. Without
prejudice to the responsibility of railway undertakings and infrastructure
managers for the safe operation of the train, the ECM should ensure that the
freight wagons for which it is in charge of maintenance are in a safe state of
running by means of a system of maintenance. This
Decision was based on the Recommendation ERA/REC/06-2010/SAF of the European
Railway Agency of 8 July 2010 on a System of Certification for Entities in
Charge of Maintenance.
2.3. National
safety rules
Since
the European Union took efforts to revitalize the railway market, complex and
unnecessary national safety rules (NSR) were seen as one of the major obstacles
to achieve the goal of a single European rail area, as well as having the
potential to create unnecessary safety risks. The Railway Safety Directive
introduced measures in 2004 that gradually harmonised and reduced the need for NSR,
improving overall transparency. Therefore, Member States should keep their
system of national rules updated, deleting obsolete rules. After several years,
limited progress has been made in Member States in cleaning up NSR made redundant
by the present EU safety system. Therefore in December 2010, the RISC decided
to set up a Task Force on NSR in order to clarify some uncertainties about NSR
and foster best practices.
2.3.1. The Task Force
on national safety rules and the rule
management
tool
The
activity of the Task Force on NSR (2011-2012) covered four major topics: the definition
of NSR and overlaps with other rules, the procedures for improving transparency
of the rule systems, procedures to clean-up the rule systems and proposals for
the future legal framework. To identify the scope for NSR, the Task Force developed
a ‘rule management tool’ providing an overview of the existing European railway
legislation: where requirements are already covered by EU legislation, the
Member States may not impose any NSR, while, where there are exceptions, there
is room for NSR. The
European Railway Agency will continuously improve the rule management tool with
the aim to provide guidance for the Member States. An updated version of the
rule management tool is available on ERA website together with the Final Report
on the Task Force:
http://www.era.europa.eu/Document-Register/Pages/Report-NSR-TF.aspx ERA
is preparing a proposal to give a legal basis for the application of the rule
management tool.
2.3.2. Notif-IT: database
of national
safety
and national
technical
rules
Notif-IT
is the main informatics application for dealing with the notification of new
NSRs. ERA assists the Commission in the setting up, operation, administration
and management of the databases, in the maintenance and improvement of Notif-IT
and provides assistance to the users. Early
review of draft national rules is considered as a key development to improve
the transparency and to prevent the adoption of rules by the Member States that
are not in line with the EU legislative framework. To this end the Commission
supported by ERA developed a new module of Notif-IT allowing the notification
of draft rules, at an early stage. With this module stakeholders
will be given the opportunity to comment on draft rules and the comments will
be taken into account in the evaluation by the Commission, assisted by ERA. The
purpose is to prevent introduction of rules which may have a discriminatory
effect, or constitute a disguised restriction on rail transport operations
between the Member States and / or infringe EU law. The new module
is operational since April 2014.
2.3.3. Follow-up of
the recommendations of the Task Force
The
conclusions of the report on the activity of the Task Force included
recommendations for the dissemination of best practices and cleaning-up the
rule systems of the Member States, procedures for improving transparency of the
rule systems, and proposals for the future legal framework. These
recommendations have been followed by the Commission and by ERA according to
their respective competences: a)
Dissemination activities The
Task Force on NSRs entailed ERA launching a dissemination campaign. ERA enhanced
the bilateral and multilateral cooperation and coordination, especially through
the Network of contact persons for NSR notification and through the RISC. In
2013 ERA carried out dissemination workshops in Hungary, Austria, Portugal and Denmark. This included customized information and dialogues, evaluation of the
system of national safety rules and identification of specific priorities in
each visited Member State with a particular focus on the application and update
of the rule management tool, on the improvement of Notif-IT and on monitoring
of the progress in cleaning up the rule systems. b)
Procedures to clean up the national safety rule systems in Member States The
Task Force recommended using the rule management tool for cleaning up the
Member States rule systems. Member States should revise, clarify and/or reduce
these rules as appropriate. Notifications should be updated accordingly. Reducing
NSR and ensure that the key actors recognises and consistently fulfils their
safety responsibilities may be a deep cultural change in some Member States. Rule
cleaning means first of all the understanding of the purpose for each rule,
placing it at the right level and integrating them into the safety management
system. NSR should be strictly limited to a defined safety objective.
Unfortunately, the experience shows that some draft NSRs are too prescriptive,
providing for detailed obligations that instead should be adapted to the
specificity of each railway undertaking. In doing this, Member States may
introduce discriminations, giving an advantage to the domestic railway
undertakings in comparison to the others. The correct way to ensure the
fulfilment by railway undertakings and infrastructure managers is ensuring that
the objective of the rules is taken in consideration in their respective safety
management system. ERA
continued to support the Commission and the Member States in their efforts to
improve both transparency and gradual reduction of national safety rules. By
2016 ERA will have implemented the action plan identified in the final report
of the Task Force on NSRs. c)
Procedures for improving and promoting transparency Early
identification of draft rules is crucial for improving the transparency and to
prevent at an early stage the adoption of rules which were not in line with the
EU legislative framework. When there is a justified need for NSR, the Railway
Safety Directive imposes a number of principles, responsibilities and tasks of
the Member States and NSA that apply on different stages of NSR development. The
Task Force analysed legal requirements and discovered best practice for their
establishment and enforcement, including wide consultation in the Member State, and publication of adopted rules. Member States should verify their existing
practice accordingly and make relevant steps for improvement of NSR
transparency. The
Task Force clarified that it is not a good practice to introduce rules in an
urgent manner. Nevertheless for some “urgent” rules it was recognized, that
there might be safety reasons to adopt them, before the Commission has
completed their evaluation as a draft rule. The adoption of any rule will not
stop their evaluation. The Commission will also check if there were grounds for
urgency[25]. Moreover,
ERA defined a method to monitor progress with transparency and reduction of
national safety rules and to steer improvements in Member States. This method
is composed of the Transparency Barometer addressed to the railway sector and
Transparency Survey addressed to the national safety authorities and Member
States. d)
Proposals for the future legal framework Following
the analysis of existing practices, the Task Force suggested some changes to
the legal framework aimed to simplify the NSR system and to help its consistent
evolution pursuing the objectives of the Railway Safety Directive. Notably, the
Task Force proposed to merge the NSR and the national technical rules adopted
according to the Interoperability Directive[26]. In
the framework of the 4th Railway Package (Cf. Section 2.4) the
Commission proposed a review of both the Directives on railway safety and
interoperability. The legal base for the adoption of new rules still remains
separate, although the former NSR and national technical rules were both
designated as 'national rules' irrespective from the safety or technical
justification. The procedure is harmonised in both directives. Taking
into account the progress with the harmonized European legislation, room for 'national
rules' remains limited. The Task Force proposed to clarify the rationale for
remaining rules and to delete Annex II from the revised Railway Safety
Directive.
2.4. The
4th Railway Package and the recast of the Railway Safety Directive
In
the last decade, the EU railway market has seen massive changes, gradually
introduced by three legislative ‘railway packages’ (with some accompanying
acts) intended to open up the national markets and make railways more
competitive and interoperable at the EU level, while maintaining a high level
of safety. However, despite the considerable development of the ‘EU acquis’
establishing an internal market for rail transport services, the modal share of
rail in intra-EU transport has remained modest. Therefore the Commission has
planned to come forward with the 4th Railway Package in order to
enhance the quality and efficiency of rail services by removing the remaining
market obstacles. In
particular, the Railway Safety Directive has been reviewed focussing on the
removal of administrative and technical barriers, in particular by establishing
a common approach to safety and progressive technical harmonisation. This
proposal for a deep review ("recast") has been included in the 4th
Railway Package. The elimination of barriers may increase economies of scale
for railway undertakings active across the EU, decreasing administrative costs
and accelerating administrative procedures, as well as avoiding disguised
discrimination and thus contributing to the competitiveness of rail sector
versus other modes of transport. The "recast" of the Railway Safety
Directive is therefore fully consistent with the objectives of the 4th
Railway Package.
2.4.1.
Revision of the Safety Certification and migration towards a single safety
certificate
The
simplification of the process of granting safety certificates to the railway
undertakings (RU) was the main driver for the recast of the Railway Safety
Directive. The
current certification system requires several applications for the RU intending
to operate in more than one Member State: - Safety
certificate “Part A”, granted only once in the Member State where the RU is first
established. It is valid through the whole EU; - Safety
certificate “Part B”, granted in each Member State where the RU intends to
operate. The
purpose of the recast is migrating from the current two parts system towards a
single safety certificate valid across the EU. Therefore, it will no longer be necessary
for a RU to apply for a Part B certificate separately. The
migration towards a single certificate principle was already established in the
Railway Safety Directive in force: Article 10 (7) of Directive 2004/49/EC
prescribes that ‘Before 30 April 2009 ERA shall evaluate the development of
safety certification and submit a report to the Commission with recommendations
on a strategy for migration towards a single Community safety certificate’
replacing the current two part system (Part A/B). Single EU safety certificate
development and implementation has always been a long term objective. It was
never a question of 'if' but rather of 'when' it would be introduced. In
its interim report of 2009, the European Railway Agency explained that it was
too early to make a recommendation and that more information was needed in
order to ensure an informed debate. Three years later, on 7 March 2012, ERA
held a workshop with stakeholders. Finally, ERA submitted a report to the
European Commission in July 2012 with Recommendation ERA/REC/10/2011 on the
migration to a single EU safety certificate proposing a strategy for the
migration through the revision of the current regulatory framework. The
migration was an opportunity to revise the role of the national safety
authorities (NSAs) and to reallocate the responsibilities between them and ERA. To
prepare and monitor the way towards a single safety certificate regime, a task
force under the auspices of the Rail and Interoperability Committee has been
set up. When
the new Railway Safety Directive will be adopted by the Council and by the
European Parliament, the regulatory framework (in particular Regulations
653/2007, 1158/2010, and 1077/2012[27])
need to be adapted to make the Single Safety Certificate effective. The issues
that were identified as “preconditions” by ERA in its report on the development
of a migration strategy towards a single safety certificate will continue to be
considered as part of ERA Work Programme, while the programme plan for the
Single Safety Certificate Task Force is focused on the activities needed to
accelerate the achievement of a single safety certificate. The
introduction of new roles and responsibilities for ERA needs to be prepared as
well inside this framework: ERA Recommendation to the Commission on the
migration to a single EU safety certificate did not cover the scenario in which
the task of assessing an applicant’s safety management system and consequently
granting a single safety certificate is performed by ERA. Since
several workstreams of the Safety Unit of ERA are linked to the achievement of
the single safety certificate, a Programme Management approach is needed to
ensure the right momentum. A task force constituted of members of the Railway
Interoperability and Safety Committee (RISC) has been appointed to drive the
programme towards its successful delivery. The Taskforce will be provided with
the information collected from the various related projects of ERA and will
contribute to monitoring the efficiency of the overall programme. The reasons
for having a TF under the auspice of the RISC are:
To
ensure the right level of Commitment : the development and delivery of
harmonised approaches for assessment and supervision initiated at the
level of the National safety authorities (including the NSA Task Force on
Assessment & Supervision) is not delivering results according to a
time plan compatible with the expectations of the Commission's proposal
for the 4th Railway Package; it must be enlarged to the related
stakeholders including Member States representatives as well as Sector
representatives to get the right level of involvement and commitment;
To
provide the necessary Mandate: having a Task Force at RISC level for
driving this programme (which is also paving the way for the Commission’s
proposal of recast of Directive 2004/49/EC as part of the 4th Railway
Package) will provide the necessary basis for modifying the current
regulatory framework which is not (yet) part of the current mandate of ERA;
The
programme plan of the Task Force has been agreed at RISC in January 2014. The
kick-off meeting was held on 10 June 2014 and was mainly devoted to
organisational issues and to some constructive exchanges of views. 12 Member States, Switzerland, Norway and three sector associations (CER, EIM, and ERFA) were
represented.
2.4.2. A moving
environment for safety
The
revision of the Railway Safety Directive is also an opportunity to adapt the
text to the evolution of the railway market where new professional actors or
entities have been created. The lessons from severe railway accidents show that
these actors may assume important responsibilities with regards to safety. All
actors involved in the safety operations should implement the necessary risk
control measures (ECM, consignor, manufacturer …) and are responsible for the
transmission of relevant information about safety. However, the main principle
set up in the Commission proposal remained unchanged: the responsibility for
the safe operation of the rail system and the control of the associated risks
is laid upon the infrastructure managers and railway undertakings. These
actors, together with entities in charge of maintenance will ensure that their
contractors implement the appropriate risk control measures.
2.4.3. Recast of the
Railway Safety Directive: inter-institutional dialogue
-
Proposal
of the Commission: adopted on 30.1.2013 -
Opinion
of European Committee of Regions: provided on 8.10.2013 -
Opinion
of European Economic and Social Committee: provided on 22.8.2013 -
TTE
Council general approach: agreed on 10.10.2013 -
EP
position in first reading adopted on 26.2.2014 -
TTE
Council political agreement: agreed on 5.6.2014 Trialogues
started under Italian Presidency in October 2014.
3. MONITORING
THE IMPLEMENTATION AND THE SAFETY PERFORMANCE
3.1. Measures notified by the Member States for
transposition of Directive 2004/49/EC
The
Commission, assisted by the European Railway Agency (ERA), analysed the
legislative measures notified by the Member States for national transposition
of Directive 2004/49/EC (Railway Safety Directive) checking if the
transposition into the national legal framework had been made according to the
aim of its provisions. If
the Railway Safety Directive is transposed incorrectly, common safety measures
cannot be effectively applied within the European railway system and the rail
safety framework as a whole may not operate as intended. Deviations from the
system set up by the directive may have serious consequences, such as:
Incorrect
or unclear transposition of the scope of the Directive (Article 2) could
lead to a fragmented safety systems and to different levels of safety across
Europe;
Failing
to allocate the responsibility for safe operations, risk management and
risk control to railway undertakings and infrastructure managers (Article
4) may lead to unreliable railway sectors where safety responsibilities
are confused and risks left uncontrolled;
Failing
to ensure full independence to the NSAs (Article
16) may undermine the achievement of the transparent, and non-discriminatory
common railway safety system;
Failing
to ensure full independence and appropriate resources to the NIBs (Articles
20 and 21) may undermine the possibilities of the NIBs to carry out their
tasks and to ensure effective independent investigation.
On
the basis of questionnaires ('EU-Pilot') as an initial request of
information from the Member States regarding transposition of Railway Safety
Directive and in the cases where the Member States failed to explain the
missing or incorrect transposition, the Commission has launched the procedures
of infringement. Enforcement
of a Directive follows a 3-phase process: 1) A formal
notice is sent to the Member State informing of the short-comings of its
legislative measures. 2) If
the problem persists, the Commission would address a reasoned opinion to
the Member State warning of possible court action if it cannot amend or justify
the short-comings mentioned above. 3) Finally
the Member State may be referred to the Court of Justice. Only
a few procedures arrive at the last stage: it is preferable for all parties to
avoid this resource-consuming step and address the pending issues at the early
phases of the process through dialogue and clarification or corrective actions. Concerning
the measures notified by the Member States for transposition of Directive
2004/49/EC, 26 'EU-Pilot' cases have been handled, of which one case was closed
at pre-infringement stage. 19
infringement cases have been opened, of which 5 were closed following corrective
actions taken by the Member State. One Member State has been referred to the
Court. At present, there are still six procedures at EU-Pilot stage and 14
infringement cases ongoing (October 2014).
3.2. Managing
and monitoring safety
3.2.1. Managing
safety
Railway
safety in the European context is managed at three different levels; at the
level of operators, Member States and the EU. The
legal framework created by Directive 2004/49/EC is based on the principle of
responsibilities of the major actors of the railway chain: the railway
undertakings and the infrastructure managers. They are responsible for
assessing all risks relating to the safe operation of trains and establishing a
safety management system (SMS) in accordance with Article 9 of the Directive. They
are also responsible for self-monitoring their activities and for taking the
necessary corrective measures. At
the Member State level, the quality of the SMS is evaluated by the national
safety authorities (NSAs) when issuing to the railway undertakings and to the
infrastructure managers the safety certificate or safety authorisation required
for performing their activity. The NSAs are responsible for supervising the
activities of the railway undertakings and infrastructure managers during the
period of validity of the safety certificate or safety authorisation. Supervision
is assured at the national level with two main instruments defined in the
Railway Safety Directive as audits and inspections. While the safety audits are
typically the result of longer-term planning and follow a well-established
comprehensive procedure, inspections are carried out as irregular checks of the
specific procedures or operations of a railway undertaking. The NSAs should
take a leadership in benchmarking, assuring that the railway undertakings and
the infrastructure managers take their responsibilities, and supervise that
appropriate preventive measures are taken, according to the SMS provisions. At
the European level, ERA supports the Commission in monitoring safety. On an
annual basis ERA assess the achievement of the common safety targets (CSTs) and
national reference values (NRVs) in accordance with the common safety method
(CSM) defined in the Commission Decision 2009/460/EC[28], and
in particular in its Article 4. The assessment concerns 26 of 28 EU Member
States that have a railway system, plus Norway. For the first time, in 2014 the
assessment was carried out for Croatia, which joined the EU in 2013. In
accordance with the common safety method, a second set of CSTs/NRVs were
applied for the third assessment carried out in 2012. The second set of
CSTs/NRVs was adjusted in 2013 following the fourth annual assessment carried
out by ERA. In general, the second set contains reference values that are
slightly stricter compared to the values estimated in the first set (Figure 1). The
NRVs and the second set of CSTs were established using Eurostat data for the
years 2004-2009 and published as Commission Decision 2012/226/EU in 2012, which
was later amended by the Commission Implementing Decision 2013/753/EU. The
assessment carried out in 2014 used the risk values estimated for the period
between 2008-2012 and for the single year 2012 and compared them with the national
reference values of the second set (risk estimated for the period between
2004-2009). For
all railway user categories, the respective national reference value (NRV) was
lower than the corresponding CST; the NRVs represented the maximum tolerable level
of the risk to which it refers for this assessment. As with the assessments
carried out in the past, NRVs represented the safety targets that were subject
to the assessment of achievements as described in the CSM. In
general, the results of the annual assessment of achievements of the CSTs/NRVs
indicated that railway safety performance remains acceptable at the EU level
for all the categories of railway users. The past assessments of achievements
of the CSTs/NRVs rarely resulted in possible or probable deterioration of
safety performance for individual Member States (and never for the Union). In these instances, the Member States should provide a satisfactory explanation for
the result achieved. The
2014 Report on the Assessment of achievement of Safety Targets may be found at
the link: http://www.era.europa.eu/Document-Register/Pages/2014-Assessment-CSTs.aspx
Figure
1: Overview of the annual assessments of achievements of the CSTs/NRVs carried
out by ERA ([29]).
Source: Railway Safety Performance in the European Union 2014
http://www.era.europa.eu/Document-Register/Documents/SPR2014.pdf
3.2.2. Safety
certification and Safety authorisation
The
Railway Safety Directive requires the railway undertakings (RUs) to hold a
safety certificate issued by the national safety authority (NSA) to access the
railway infrastructure. Similarly, Infrastructure managers (IMs) must obtain a
safety authorisation from the NSA to manage and operate a rail infrastructure
in a Member State. The NSA assesses the Safety Management System (SMS) of RUs
and IMs applying for safety certificates or safety authorisations against the
requirements set out in the Directive and the common safety methods. For the
RUs, they are awarded a Part A safety certificate, which is valid throughout
the EU. RUs also need to obtain Part B certificates for each Member State in which they operate, relating to the specific requirements for safe operation on
the relevant network, including the authorisation of the vehicles used by the
RU. There
were a total of 1 088 valid safety certificates in EU-27 countries, Norway and Switzerland (548 part A and 540 part B certificates) issued in accordance with the Railway
Safety Directive and valid on 1 January 2014. Figure 2 shows the
repartition of the Safety Certificates among the Member States. Figure
3
provides more details on the number of safety certificates per type of service,
valid on 1st January 2014 and registered in the ERADIS database. It
shows that a relatively small number of RUs provide cross-border train
operations in Europe. The international part B safety certificates remain rather
rare for RUs operating passenger train services; they are more common for RUs
operating freight transport services. European
IMs are typically state-owned entities with national coverage; a small number
of IMs that are privately owned manage small infrastructure networks, typically
at ports. Detailed information about IMs with safety authorisation is currently
not available at EU level. Figure 2:
Number of valid Safety Certificates — Part A and B per Member State
(1
January 2014)
Source: Railway Safety Performance in the
European Union 2014
http://www.era.europa.eu/Document-Register/Documents/SPR2014.pdf Figure 3:
Number of valid Safety Certificates — Part A and B, international operations
only, per type of service
Source: Railway Safety Performance in the
European Union 2014
http://www.era.europa.eu/Document-Register/Documents/SPR2014.pdf
3.2.3. Safety
overview
Monitoring
safety performance is one of the key tasks of the European Railway Agency. ERA
collects, processes and analyses different sets of data in order to support
recommendations on actions to be taken. In this way, ERA facilitates
evidence-based policy-making at the EU level. By continuously monitoring and
analysing safety performance, ERA provides assurance that the objective of
maintaining and improving safety where reasonably practicable is achieved. In
accordance with Article 9(2) of ERA Regulation[30],
ERA publishes a report on a biennial basis since 2006. This report is one of
the visible results of ERA’s activities in monitoring safety performance. It is
also part of ERA’s effort to provide to its stakeholders a thorough overview of
the development of railway safety in the European Union. The
basis for this report is information provided by the national safety
authorities and national investigation bodies. According to Articles 18 and 23
of the Railway Safety Directive, these bodies have a legal obligation to report
to ERA a set of defined information that can be used to assess the development
of railway safety in the EU. Notably, the national safety authorities gather
common safety indicators, defined in legislation, from the railway undertakings
and infrastructure managers which provide a footprint for safety performance in
Member States and the Union. Although this report is largely based on this
data, it also includes additional information gathered from other sources
(notably other European Commission services), as well as its own data derived
from its oversight activities. In
2012, railway safety continued to improve across the EU, with 2 068 significant
accidents resulting in 1 133 fatalities and 1 016 seriously injured persons in
the 28 countries. Accident figures have been decreasing considerably over the
last six years; the casualty totals have seen slight, close to uniform,
reductions over the same period (Figures 4a and 4b). Figure 4a: Number of
fatalities per victim category (EU-28: 2006–2012) Figure 4b: Seriously injured
persons per victim category (EU-28: 2007-2012)
*
Data not available for Croatia in the period 2006-2009
Source:
Railway
Safety Performance in the European Union 2014
http://www.era.europa.eu/Document-Register/Documents/SPR2014.pdf Figure
5:
Railway accidents with five or more fatalities (EU-28, 1980‑2013) [31]
Source:
Railway
Safety Performance in the European Union 2014
http://www.era.europa.eu/Document-Register/Documents/SPR2014.pdf Figure
6:
Fatality risk: Railway fatalities and weighted serious injuries per million train-km
(2007-2012).
Source: Railway Safety Performance in the
European Union 2014
http://www.era.europa.eu/Document-Register/Documents/SPR2014.pdf According
to the figures published in the 2014 report, more than 2 000 significant
accidents occur each year on the Member States railways. Accidents to persons
caused by rolling stock in motion and level-crossing accidents constitute more
than three quarters of railway accidents, excluding suicides. In these
accidents, around 1 200 people are killed and a similar number seriously
injured each year. Available
historical data on fatal railway accidents shows a solid gradual improvement in
railway safety over the past three decades, which has however slowed down since
the mid-1990s and further since the mid-2000s. This ‘softening’ of the trend is
observable when analysing both absolute and relative figures for fatal train
collisions and derailments in Europe. The recording of significant accidents
has only been fully harmonised in the EU since 2010. Since then the trend in
significant accidents has been aligned with the trend in casualty numbers. Accident
risk, expressed in the number of outcomes per exposure, is probably the best measure
of a safety level. The framework for the evaluation of CSTs/NRVs also uses it
as a basis for the assessment of safety levels at the level of Member States and the Union. Considering all railway fatalities (excluding suicides), the
fatality risk (system risk) per million train-kilometres (train-km) in the
period 2010-2012 was 0.3 killed per million train-km in the EU. Similarly, one
can estimate the fatality risk of railway passengers (passenger risk). This was
0.15 passengers killed per billion train-km in the period 2010-2012 (Figure
5). Comparison of fatality risks for travelling passengers reveals that rail is
the safest mode of land transport in Europe. Estimating
risk levels for different Member States allows us to produce a benchmark
highlighting the best and worst performing countries. It appears that safety
levels vary greatly among Member States. One third of them have a significantly
higher risk than others; the variations in risk within that group of Member
States
are also significant (Figure 6). It is particularly remarkable that
nine Member
States
have significantly higher risk than the others. A systematic approach to the
safety performance improvements of these countries would mean a major step
towards genuine EU-wide safety targets in the future.
3.2.4. Occurrences
investigated by NIBs
According
to the provision of the Railway Safety Directive, the NIBs have to investigate
all serious accidents that occur in their territory and may in addition
investigate other accidents and incidents. The occurrences investigated by the
NIBs are subject to mandatory reporting to ERA. Each accident is reported to
ERA twice: as a notification of the opening of an investigation and when the
final report is sent to ERA. Both records are available in ERA’s database
ERAIL. Every
year, more than 200 accidents and incidents are investigated in the Member
States. This number has been slightly increasing over recent years, since more
and more NIBs have decided to open an investigation into accidents not
categorised as serious according to the Railway Safety
Directive.
The number of serious railway accidents investigated by NIBs has been stable
since 2007 at around 40 per year. While
the majority of serious accidents in the EU are investigated by the NIBs, the
share of other similar accidents and other accidents and incidents investigated
vary greatly among countries. NIBs carried out nine investigations per year on
average in the period 2010-2012. The
approach and methods to accident investigation vary between Member States. One
of the tasks of ERA is to facilitate a common understanding of the approach of
the Safety Directive within the European Union. Current projects include work
on accident causation, safety recommendations and investigator training. The
investigations should not be limited to the identification of the direct
causes. This may lead to the risk that systemic factors in the SMS of a RU or
IM or even in the regulatory framework remain undetected and safety
recommendations may just address the symptoms of a safety problem but not its
causes. ERA
works with the NIBs on accident investigation methods, reporting,
recommendations and exchange of good practice. With ERA support, the NSAs and
NIBs have developed joint guidance on safety recommendations[32].
3.2.5. Monitoring
activities supported by ERA
a)
NSA cross-audit programme Supported
by ERA, the NSAs agreed to a programme of audits, to share best practice as
well as evaluate the performance of their three main activities required by the
Safety and Interoperability Directives: safety certification and safety
authorisation, supervision and authorisation for placing in service of vehicles. From
2011 to 2013 the NSA Network carried out a series of Cross Audits of each other
through a pilot phase of 6 audits. A Programme Manual was adopted to ensure the
audits would be conducted using a consistent methodology, and Audit Protocols,
against which NSAs were audited. ERA trained around 30 NSA and ERA staff to be
auditors for the purposes of the Cross Audits. Following
a successful pilot phase, the NSA Cross-Audit Programme has launched its 1st full
Audit Cycle (2013-2018), in which all the NSAs will be audited once. During the
first year, the NSAs of Channel Tunnel, Sweden, Romania and Austria have been audited. The
programme was set up in order to:
Evaluate
performance of the NSA duties and responsibilities under the Safety
Directive;
support
harmonization of their processes and decision making principles; and
identify
any problems related to implementation of the EU legislation.
At
this stage, the audit programme focuses on the quality of NSA processes, and
does not look critically at the decision-making or risk assessment applied as
part of those processes. Early indications are that, while all NSAs appear
committed to continuous improvement, many of them are at an early stage in
terms of developing and implementing quality processes. Nevertheless, the
programme has proven successful at driving improvement within those NSAs
audited and those providing auditors. In addition, the audits provide a
structured and consistent way to understand how well these key elements of
national regulatory frameworks are functioning. Within the agreed boundaries
of the programme (the audit findings are not public), this information can also
help ERA by complementing the statistics and other information available to
develop a fuller picture. The
current cycle is scheduled to end in 2018, by which time the changes brought by
the 4th Railway Package are likely to shape the revision of the
programme. b)
NIB voluntary assessments The
first NIB assessment programme was launched by ERA in 2013. The objective of
these voluntary assessments is to support NIBs, who have a leading role in rail
accident investigation in their own Member States, to share good practices and
to identify practical improvements to their work, by assessing their current
performance. The assessments are made on request, reflecting the individual
commitments of NIBs to continuously improve their organisations in this structured
and systematic way. The
voluntary assessment relies on the method developed by the NIBs in cooperation
with ERA. After a successful pilot assessment of the Hungarian NIB in 2012, two
assessments started in 2013. At the same time, two audits were carried out at
the request of the European Commission and the National Parliamentary Committee
of one Member State in 2013. The assessments were conducted by ERA staff and
showed that the two NIBs manage their performance: they deliver good
investigation reports including recommendations with the intention to prevent
reoccurrence and at the same time seek to continuously improve the
investigation process by developing and applying defined processes. These
assessments also showed that while all assessed NIBs have effectively carried
out investigation into past accidents, the approaches vary greatly between
countries. In some instances, the transposition and the implementation of the
legal framework created difficulties for the NIB to work effectively and independently.
In some others, the amount of available resources had a great impact on the
extent and quality of the work of the organisation.
3.3. Certification
of the entities in charge of maintenance: overview
3.3.1.
Status of different schemas (ART 10.1 of the Regulation (EU) 445/2011) in EU
and non EU Contracting
States.
According
to the article 10.1 of the Commission Regulation (EU) n° 445/2011 of 10 May
2011, the Member States have to choose between accreditation or recognition of
the national certification bodies or shall nominate the NSA as certification
body. The situation in 2014 is the following: ·
“Accreditation”
means that the certification body is accredited by a national accreditation
body. Four Member States have chosen the accreditation scheme (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France) + Norway, Switzerland; ·
“Recognition”
means that the certification body is a body recognized by the Member State. Three Member States who has chosen recognition (Italy, Portugal, Slovak Republic); ·
“NSA
as certification body” means that the NSA was designated by the Member state as
certification body. 15 NSAs acting are acting as certification body (Bulgaria,
Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Latvia,
Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovenia, Spain, The Netherlands); ·
Four
Member states have chosen both accreditation and NSA: Finland, Sweden, Luxembourg (with the NSA for the RU and the IM when they act as ECM and
accreditation for all the others) and, temporarily, United Kingdom (to be
reviewed after two years). Within
this certification scheme, each MS put at disposal of the domestic ECM at less
one type of certification. However,
the ECMs are always free to choose between the bodies put at disposal at
national level and any accredited or recognized body in another European
country. 20 ECMs out of the 248 certified ones have preferred this option.
3.3.2. State of play
of ECM certification
Regulation
(EU) No 445/2011 of 10 May 2011 on a system of certification of the entity in
charge of maintenance for freight wagons entered into force on 31 May 2011.
Since then, the system delivered successful results. The number of ECMs certified
in accordance with the new system of certification increased from 10 to 248 from
May 2012 to March 2014 (Figures 7 and 8). Figure
7: evolution of the number of ECM Certificates issued in accordance with the
Regulation (EU) 445/2011 Figure
8: Distribution of the number of ECM certificates in accordance with the
regulation 445/2011
by Member States (248 certificates in March 2014). A
similar trend was observed for the number of maintenance workshops certified
according with the system of certification set in Regulation (EU) 445/2011.
Although the system set up in the regulation is voluntary, the number increased
from 1 to 169 during the same period (Figure 9). Figure
9: evolution of the number of the certificates for maintenance workshops issued
in accordance with the Regulation (EU) 445/2011 During
a transitory period the Regulation provides for the acceptance and recognition of
certificates issued according to certain systems used before its entry into
force: 1.
The
certificates issued by a certification body no later than 31 May 2012 on the
basis of principles and criteria equivalent to those of Memorandum of
Understanding signed by Member States on 14 May 2009, will be recognized as
being equivalent to ECM certificates for their original validity period until
at the latest 31 May 2015. At March 2014, there are 26 MoU certificates
dispatched in 6 countries (Figure 10). 2.
The
certificates for the workshops based on national laws (ES, NL, RO). Figure
10: statistics on the ECM certificates issued in accordance with Memorandum of
Understanding, recognized under Regulation (EU) 445/2011
3.3.3. ERA supporting
activities
a)
Cooperation activities of the certification bodies Accordingly
to the article 6(4) of the ECM regulation 445/2011, in order to harmonise their
assessment approach, the ECM certification bodies should cooperate with each
other both within the Member states and across the Union. To
this aim, ERA organises meetings that are the occasion for all certification
bodies to address their needs and feedback on the implementation of the
regulation 445/2011 and for developing common solutions to their needs. In
2013, 3 plenary meetings have been organized and two task forces (on the
analysis of gap and on drafting templates for the “release to service” and “return
to operation”). A seminar on “ECM an overview” was organized by ERA in November
2013 with more than 120 participants. (ECMs, keepers, maintenance workshops,
RUs, IMs, ECM certification bodies). b)
Guidance and dissemination A
new version of the Guide for the application of the Art 14 (a) of the Safety
Directive and Commission Regulation (EU) No 445/2011 on a system of
certification of entities in charge of maintenance for freight wagons was
published in September 2013. Form
April 2012 to December 2013, there were 16 dissemination workshops on ECM
organized, the attendance per workshop was approximately between 60 and 120
people.
3.4. Further
developments
3.4.1. Monitoring
safety performance processes
There
are certain limitations to the current EU railway safety monitoring approach.
It relies exclusively on outcome indicators, such as the number of accidents
and resulting casualties. There is a long-term downward trend for these
indicators, with zero values becoming more common in some categories at country
level. Relying on these very rare occurrences alone can lead to regulatory
planning that is too reactive and fails to capture the available and important
information about underlying safety issues. ERA has therefore started to
develop new methods for monitoring and evaluating the safety of the railway
system at EU level. The
aim of this approach is to create an overview of how the framework is
functioning on a Member State level in order to get a better understanding of
the mechanisms behind systemic problems but also of where there exists best
practice in the application of the regulatory framework to be shared between
Member States. For this purpose ERA developed a model, the 'regulatory monitoring
matrix', which can provide a systematic overview of the situation in the
different Member States concerning Ministry, NSA and NIB-level issues. The
matrix uses information that is already available to ERA within its different
work streams and presents it in a structured and accessible way. Further information
is gathered through interviews. The expected outcomes of the approach are more
focused support to the Member States, more informed advice to the European
Commission and better prioritization of ERA’s work. The approach was presented to
RISC in June 2013 and a pilot (from December 2013 until June 2014) was carried
out with six voluntary Member States to develop a methodology and evaluate the
model (BE, DK, IE, UK, NL, SE, June 2014). The
matrix consists of elements of the Railway Safety Directive and
brings an understanding on the capability of a Member State to deliver its main
requirements. Essentially, the matrix is a tool for a structured discussion with
Member States and their authorities, as well as for prioritising the
activities of ERA. The
'regulatory monitoring matrix' covers five areas of effective management
(steering, organising, staffing, performing and evaluating), which are further
articulated into 26 sub-elements. For each of the sub-elements, an evaluation
scheme was defined with five levels of performance. The results can be analysed
both on a Member State level (Figure 11) or aggregated (Figure 12). The
pilot results were reported to the RISC in June 2014. The European Commission
and ERA proposed to use this tool for a general assessment of the effectiveness
of safety management of the Member States, starting from a number of priority
countries having significantly higher risk above the EU average (at the right
in figure 6). The
experience from the pilot is currently being used by ERA to update the matrix. Evaluations
using the updated version are expected to start in September 2014. Figure
11: matrix assessment results for a hypothetic Member State in a spider-web
diagram, showing poor performance related to the item "Audit" and
sufficient or good performance for the other items (level 3 or above). Figure
12: preliminary results for the matrix pilot phase (6 Member States).
(3 = sufficient level of implementation)
3.4.2. A Platform for
European Rail Infrastructure Managers (PRIME)
A
High Level European Rail Infrastructure Managers’ Platform was launched in
January 2014 by the European Commission; it should help to enhance the
cooperation among the infrastructure managers and, among other objective, assure
better implementation of the common safety approach in the EU. The
first meeting on 28 January 2014 allowed a profitable exchange of
views on recent rail accidents and on which preventive measures should be
considered.
CONCLUSIONS
Over
the past 5 years, the essential legislative targets have been met. The
Railway Interoperability and Safety Committee (RISC) held approximately 20
meetings, advising on the measures proposed by the Commission. The overall
legislative framework is therefore operational despite some delays or some incorrect
transposition in most Member States. Common
safety indicators, methods and targets have been developed since the 2009
progress report. These facilitate collection of information, definition of risk
evaluation / assessment methods and instil common safety levels between Member
States, providing a framework aimed to harmonise the requirements across Europe for safety certification and authorisation. A harmonised system of certification of
entities in charge of maintenance for freight wagons has been also established. Member
States were required to transpose the Railway Safety Directive into their
national legal framework. Without doing so, safety measures cannot be consistently
applied,
developed or improved within the European railway system. However,
transposition provides only one part of the picture: most essential is how the
Railway Safety Directive is implemented, in particular with the appropriate
allocation of responsibilities to the main actors. Member States should
restrain from diluting the responsibility of the operators, e.g. adopting new
national safety rules instead of encouraging the railway undertakings to take
risk prevention measures adapted to their own specific situation. Finally,
Member States should ensure a system-based approach, which includes granting
NSAs and NIBs sufficient legal powers, duties and resources to correctly
supervise and enforce the roles and responsibilities set out in the Railway
Safety Directive. In
general, the results of the assessment indicate that the railway safety
performance remains acceptable at the EU level for all categories of railway
users under consideration, although it is important that some
Member States are watched more closely. Over the coming years, by dedicating
more attention to these members, more balanced and improved overall results can
be expected. Taken
benefit from its ten-year experience, ERA developed a complementary framework
for the collection, process, analysis and publication of data on safety
performance related to the process. The European Commission and ERA
proposed to use the tool developed by ERA for a general assessment of the
railway safety in the Member States, starting from a number of countries having
significantly higher risk above the EU average. Recent
initiatives from the Commission in the framework of the 4th Railway Package and
the development of a platform for Infrastructure managers in Europe (PRIME)
have real potential to bring further safety improvements. [1] Directive 2004/49/EC of
the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on safety on the Community’s
railways and amending Council Directive 95/18/EC on the licensing of railway
undertakings and Directive 2001/14/EC on the allocation of railway
infrastructure capacity and the levying of charges for the use of railway
infrastructure and safety certification (OJ L 164, 30.4.2004, p. 44 and Corrigendum, OJ L 220,
21.6.2004, p. 16. [2] Directive
2007/59/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October
2007 on the certification of train drivers operating locomotives and trains on
the railway system in the Community,
OJ L315 of 3 December 2007, p. 51. [3] OJ
L 122 of 11.5.11, p. 22 [4] OJ
L 108 of 29.4.09, p. 4 [5] OJ
L 121 of 3.5.13, p. 8 [6] http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/127599.pdf. [7] COM (2012)
299 final. [8] COM(2012)
259 final. [9] OJ
L 164, 30.4.2004, p. 44. [10] OJ L 191,
18.7.2008, p. 1 [11] OJ L 345,
23.12.2008, p. 62 [12] OJ L313
of 28.11.09, p. 65 [13] OJ L201
of 10.7.2014, p.9 [14] OJ L
108, 29.4.2009, p. 4 [15] OJ L 121
of 3.5.13, p. 8 [16] OJ L326 of
10.12.2010, p.11 [17] OJ L327 of
11.12.2010, p.13 [18] OJ L 320 of
17.11.2012, p.3 [19] OJ L 320 of
17.11.2012, p. 8 [20] Weighted
fatalities and serious injuries (FWSI) are the normalised measure of railway
safety outcome. One seriously injured person is considered as 0.1 fatalities
and added to the number of fatalities in the given year. [21] OJ L189 of 22.7.2010,
p. 19 [22] OJ L189 of 22.7.2010,
p. 19 [23] OJ L 334 of 13.12.13,
p. 37 [24] OJ L 122 of 11.5.11,
p. 22 [25] To the specific
purpose of addressing urgent matter (e.g.; after an accident) ERA is currently
working for establishing a Quick Response Procedure. [26] Directive
2008/57/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 June 2008 on the
interoperability of the rail system within the Community (OJ L 191,
18.7.2008, p. 1). [27] Commission
Regulation (EC) No 653/2007 on the use of a common European format for safety
certificates and application documents in accordance with Article 10 of
Directive 2004/49/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and on the
validity of safety certificates delivered under Directive 2001/14/EC (OJ L 153,
14.6.2007, p. 9)
Commission Regulation (EU) No 1158/2010 on a common safety method for assessing
conformity with the requirements for obtaining railway safety certificates (OJ
L 326, 10.12.2010, p. 11)
Commission Regulation (EU) No 1077/2012 on a common safety method for
supervision by national safety authorities after issuing a safety certificate
or safety authorisation (OJ L 320, 17.11.2012, p. 3) [28] Commission
Decision 2009/460/EC of 5 June 2009 on the adoption of a common safety method
for assessment of achievement of safety targets, as referred to in Article 6 of
Directive 2004/49/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council, OJ L 150,
13.6.2009, p. 11. ([29]) MWA=Moving
weighted average, OSP=Observed safety performance. [30] Regulation (EC)
No 881/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004
establishing a European railway agency (Agency Regulation, OJ L 164 of 30.4.2004,
p. 1) [31] All EU
countries, Norway and Switzerland, excluding Romania and Croatia for the period 1980–1989. Accidents on railway lines not covered by the Railway Safety
Directive are also included. [32] Guide available on
ERA web site: http://www.era.europa.eu/Document-Register/Pages/guidance-on-safety-recommendations-Safety-Directive-Art-25.aspx