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Document 52013SC0182
COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF THE IMPACT ASSESSMENT Accompanying the document Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a framework on the market access to port services and the financial transparency of ports
COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF THE IMPACT ASSESSMENT Accompanying the document Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a framework on the market access to port services and the financial transparency of ports
COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF THE IMPACT ASSESSMENT Accompanying the document Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a framework on the market access to port services and the financial transparency of ports
/* SWD/2013/0182 final */
COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF THE IMPACT ASSESSMENT Accompanying the document Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a framework on the market access to port services and the financial transparency of ports /* SWD/2013/0182 final */
COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF THE IMPACT ASSESSMENT Accompanying the document Proposal for a regulation of the
European Parliament and of the Council establishing a framework on the
market access to port services and the financial transparency of ports LEAD DG: DIRECTORATE-GENERAL FOR MOBILITY AND TRANSPORT 1. General context Europe is one of the
densest port regions worldwide. As the world’s principal
trading bloc, the EU is highly dependent on the maritime transport system. 37% of goods exchanged within its internal market transit through
ports. In terms of passenger transport, ports service regional and local
traffic to link peripheral and island areas. Ports are essential facilitators
for the economy as they have a crucial function in logistics and are a
significant generator of jobs. The 319 ports of the trans-European transport
network (TEN-T) which account for 96% of goods and 93% of passengers transiting
through EU ports play a key role in the European transport system. 2. Problem definition The main problem is
the structural performance gap in some TEN-T seaports. The problem is
exacerbated by the need to adapt ports to new transport and logistics
requirements at a moment of scarce public funding. This creates risks of congestion
and puts at risk an efficient, interconnected and sustainable TEN-T and hence
the smooth functioning of the internal market. In a business-as-usual scenario the expected
transport growth, changes in transport and logistics requirements and the structural
gaps in the current performance of ports will cause capacity problems and
aggravate the current un-balanced use of the network. This will lead to under-capacity
problems in certain ports and further congestion in their broad hinterland.
This will undermine the development of short sea shipping. The low performance
of some TEN-T ports is a missed opportunity for the economic development of the
areas they serve, hence the Union as a whole. Decaying and
non-adapted port infrastructure can affect the competitiveness of European
industries. Without tackling these problems, achieving
the goals of the TEN-T will be at risk. Finally, there is a major concern about
unfair competition between ports linked to public funding practices. Port
workers' trade unions oppose EU provisions touching on the existing port labour
regimes in the Member States. 3. root causes The Commission
identified three problem drivers. The first is the lack of adequate connections
between ports and the rail, inland waterways and road networks, is addressed by
the TEN-T policy and is therefore not further addressed in the impact
assessment. The other drivers are described below. 3.1. Problem driver 1:
Sub-optimal port services and operations in some TEN-T seaports Three root causes are linked to this issue:
(1)
many of the port services are subject to a weak
competitive pressure due to market access restrictions; (2)
the exclusive or special rights, although
justified in a number of situations, may lead to market abuses and (3)
in some ports users are faced with too much
administrative burden due to a lack of coordination within ports. 3.2. Problem driver 2: Port governance frameworks not
attractive enough for investments in all TEN-T
seaports Two root causes explain the overall
unattractive investment climate in several ports: (4)
unclear financial relations between public
authorities, port authorities and port services providers and (5)
weak autonomy of ports to define infrastructure
charges and non-transparent link with costs. 4. Analysis of subsidiarity Articles 58, 90 and 100 of the Treaty on the
Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) extend to ports the objectives of a
genuine internal market in the context of the Common Transport Policy. Despite the specific nature of the port
sector and its long-lasting local history and culture, the port sector has a
strong international and European dimension. Because of the latter and of internal
market reasons and cross-border network effects, the proposed initiative targeting
the TEN-T ports is in line with the subsidiarity principle. 5. Objectives 5.1. General objective The general objective is to improve the performance of the TEN-T
seaports in order to contribute to the goal of a more efficient, interconnected
and sustainable functioning of the TEN-T in line with the objectives of the
Transport White Paper and the EU 2020 strategy for a resource efficient growth.
5.2. Specific
objectives (SO) SO1. Modernise port services and operations in all TEN-T seaports
SO2. Optimise
port governance frameworks as to enable a more attractive investment climate 5.3. Operational objectives (OO) 5.3.1. Modernisation
of port services and operations (a)
OO1. Clarify and facilitate access to the port
services market. (b)
OO2. Prevent market abuse by designated port
service providers. (c)
OO3. To ensure the consultation of port users on
the main decisions which affect the functioning of the port in all (100%) TEN-T
ports by the implementation date of the initiative. 5.3.2. Creation
of framework conditions which attract investments in ports (d)
OO4. To ensure the transparency in the financial
relations between public authorities, port authorities and port service
providers in all (100%) TEN-T ports by the implementation date of the
initiative. (e)
OO5. To ensure that all (100%) TEN-T port authorities
are free to autonomously set their port infrastructure charges by the
implementation date of the initiative, with the possibility of environmental
modulation of the charges. 6. Policy options 6.1. Discarded
policy measures The Commission discarded the following
measures after the consultation of stakeholders: (1)
Reform of the port labour market is not
considered nor proposed in any of the policy packages (PPs) because of the
recent progress made in the set-up of the social dialogue between employers and
employees: the Social Dialogue Committee for Dockers should be up and running
in the course of 2013. (2)
From the consultation, it appears that the issue
of 'self-handling' is no longer an issue to be considered at EU level. (3)
As the TFEU foresees a wide discretion for
Member States to organise Services of General Economic Interest as they deem
appropriate, none of the PPs impinge upon this discretion margin. 6.2. Policy
Packages 6.2.1. PP1: “Horizontal Instruments and Transparency” PP1 combines the use of horizontal
instruments, a 'soft' measure on market access and legally binding provisions
on financial transparency, intra-port coordination and port infrastructure
access charges. The soft measure is a non-binding Commission's Communication
which explains the TFEU rules on non-discrimination and the future Directive on
concession. 6.2.2. PP2: “Regulated competition” PP2 introduces the
freedom to provide services to the provision of port services. This freedom can
be limited if necessary, based on objective and transparent reasons related to
the lack of space or reasons of public interest. When limiting the freedom, the
public or port authority would have to enter into a contractual arrangement
with a port service provider via an open tendering procedure, except in duly
justified cases. Transparency is enforced in those cases where
public funding is involved in order to be able to track possible distortive
state aids and cross-subsidies between port services. If the service is
provided by an in-house operator or another operator with an exclusive right, a
confinement obligation ensures reciprocity in the first case and price
regulatory oversight avoid abuses in both cases. The charging for using the port
infrastructure is done transparently and based on cost. A port users' committee helps to orient the
port activities more towards the users and clients of the port. 6.2.3. PP2a: “Regulated competition and port autonomy” PP2a consists of PP2 with the following variations:
·
The obligation to have recourse to open tendering
in the event of space restrictions or public service obligations applies not
only to new contracts but also to substantial changes to existing contracts. ·
The regulatory oversight of service providers with
exclusive rights applies only to the markets which have not been granted
through an open tendering (if no open procedure is used, the market can not be
contested). ·
Each port is given the right to set itself the
structure and level of port infrastructure charges provided that the charging
policy remains transparent. The initiative also encourages a differentiation
according to the environmental performance of ships or fuels. 6.2.4. PP3:
“Full competition and port autonomy” PP3 builds on PP2a by additionally requiring at
least two competing and independent operators for each port service where the
number of operators is limited as a result of space constraints. There is also
a functional/legal separation. To ensure that the port keeps functioning, the
central coordination role of the port authorities is strengthened. 7. Assessment of impacts 7.1. Economic
impacts The impacts of the PPs in terms of
transport costs have been estimated. The potential savings of total port
related costs are presented in Table 1 below. Table 1: Effects of policy packages on savings in
total port costs (PwC, 2013) || Change (%) in Total Port Costs || Annual Savings (€ million) PP1 || -2.0% || 318.15 PP2 || -3.0% || 481.47 PP2a || -6.8% || 1,071.37 PP3 || -7.9% || 1,245.21 To judge whether the policy packages attract
more investment, they have been assessed against four criteria. The results
are presented in Table 2. Financial transparency will
encourage public resources to be allocated more efficiently and will reduce the
risk of distortive State aids. Private investors will see fewer risks of unfair
competition resulting from potentially illicit State aids. Table 2: Impact of the policy packages on the
investment climate || PP1 || PP2 || PP2a || PP3 Efficient allocation of public funding || + || ++ || ++ || +++ Lower risks of distortive state aid to ports || + || ++ || ++ || +++ Better climate for private investment || + || ++ || +++ || ++ Economic rationality of port charges || + || +++ || ++ || + ("+"
refers to the intensity of a positive correlation: for instance in the case of
"lower risks of distortive state aid to ports", a "+" means
less risk on distortive state aids) The overall administrative costs of
the policy packages is calculated and presented in Table 3. Table 3: Additional administrative costs per policy
package against the baseline scenario (PwC, 2013) || Recurrent (€ million / year) || One off (€ million) || Public sector || Businesses || Public sector || Businesses PP1 || 9.0 || 16.2 || 9.9 || 15.7 PP2 || 7.7 || 14.0 || 32.4 || 15.7 PP2a || 2.3 || 2.2 || 24.4 || 0.8 PP3 || 33.0 || 3.9 || 121.8 || 0.8 For SMEs and microenterprises the
total effect is difficult to appreciate. In general, a better business
environment will help create new SMEs in the port sector, opening up investment
and job creation opportunities. The impacts on multimodality, short sea
shipping and traffic shifts from land to sea have also been estimated. There
are differential regional impacts due to the uneven (and variable) distribution
of cargo streams. This explains why specific regions will benefit more from
short sea shipping than the EU average (Table 4). From an international competitiveness
perspective, European ports (MED and Baltic) which are currently losing
transhipment business to non-EU ports, will be strengthened by having a sound
investment basis. While consideration should be given to possible dominant
positions resulting from vertical integration, open market access can
facilitate international investment and could be accompanied by reciprocal
access to the markets of third countries for European port and terminal
operators. Table 4: Potential increases (%) of short sea
shipping tonnage between regions (PwC, 2013) Potential changes of short sea shipping between different coastal regions || East Med || Cent Med || West Med / Atl || UK / IRL || North Range || Scand / Balt East Med || 1.51 || 6.50 || 1.98 || 0.68 || 0.64 || 0.24 Cent Med || 8.39 || 6.12 || 6.43 || 0.25 || 2.68 || 1.19 West Med / Atl || 1.25 || 4.79 || 6.56 || 2.67 || 2.35 || 0.83 UK / IRL || 0.16 || 0.07 || 3.90 || 3.23 || 1.10 || 1.36 North Range || 0.51 || 4.54 || 1.80 || 1.54 || 4.34 || 2.59 Scand / Balt || 0.37 || 0.84 || 3.09 || 5.04 || 5.35 || 2.49 Categories cover:
East Med (Greece, Black Sea EU, Slovenia); Cent Med (Italy, Malta, French Med); West Med/Atl (Spain, Portugal, French Atlantic); UK/IRL; North Range (Hamburg-Le Havre); Scand/Balt 7.2. Environmental impacts All the PPs help to mitigate the overall
environmental impact of transport. The overall result is presented in Table 5: Table 5: Effects of policy packages on annual savings
in external costs (PwC, 2013) || Savings in external costs (€ million/pa) PP1 || 23 PP2 || 34 PP2a || 69 PP3 || 76 7.3. Social impacts All PPs will create a better business
environment which will lead to more activity and create jobs. As measures
touching on labour regimes have been discarded, no particular impact in terms
of wages, labour relations and labour conditions is expected. Table 6: Summary of the aggregate economic,
environmental and social impacts Impact compared to the baseline || PP1 || PP2 || PP2a || PP3 Efficiency || + || ++ || +++ || +++ Investments || + || + || ++ || ++ Administrative burden || + || ++ || +++ || + SMEs || ++ || ++ || ++ || ++ Transport impact || + || + || ++ || ++ Environmental impact || + || + || ++ || ++ Social Impact || + || ++ || ++ || ++ + refers to a
positive correlation: e.g. in the case of administrative burden, more + means
less burden, in the case of environmental impacts, more + means better taking
environmental considerations into account 8. Comparison of options 8.1. Effectiveness All PPs would be effective, though each of
them would show results on a different time scale and not with the same
reliability. 8.2. Efficiency With regard to net annual efficiency
gains, PP3 scores the best, but is very closely followed by PP2a, for which the
administrative cost is much lower than PP3 and is close to zero for business. PP1
and PP2 score much worse than both PP2a and PP3. 8.3. Coherence All PPs are in line with the completion
of the internal transport market and are coherent with the EU policy objectives
reflected in the Single Market Act, the White Paper on Transport and Europe's 2020 growth strategy. PP2, PP2a, and to a
greater extent PP3, show important trade-off between economic and social
impacts. 8.4. Summary of the comparison of policy packages Table 7: effectiveness, efficiency and coherence of
the policy packages || PP1 || PP2 || PP2a || PP3 Effectiveness || + || ++ || +++ || +++ 001 Clarify and facilitate access to the port services market || + || ++ || +++ || +++ 002 Prevent market abuse by port service providers with exclusive or special rights || + || ++ || ++ || ++ 003 Improve coordination mechanisms within ports || ++ || + || + || ++ 004 Ensure a more transparent framework for financial relations between public authorities, port authorities and providers of port services || + || ++ || ++ || +++ 005 Ensure port infrastructure charges are autonomously set, allowing for the internalisation of external costs || + || ++ || +++ || ++ Efficiency || + || + || +++ || +++ Coherence || Minor trade-off || Limited trade-off except for cargo handling (important trade-off) || Limited trade-off except for cargo handling (important trade-off) || Important trade-off "+"
refers to the intensity of a positive correlation, no negative or neutral
correlations have been identified 9. Preferred
option Based on the analysis set out in the
impact assessment, PP2a is the preferred policy option. According to estimates, PP2a will generate savings in port costs
of the order of € 1 billion per year. It will induce additional short sea
shipping traffic of around 13.3 billion tonne-kilometres (an increase of up to
6.5% on a number of routes). This will lead to increased port activities, which
will create direct and indirect port-related jobs. However, this impact assessment advocates
caution as far as market access of cargo handling is concerned, because of
three aspects: –
There is an important trade-off with social
issues. –
Cargo handling services are already exposed to
competitive pressure in some ports. –
Most of cargo handling services are concession
covered by the future Directive on concession. So, as regards the clarification and
facilitation of market access to cargo handling services, the PP1 approach
might be just as appropriate. If this variant
of PP2a[1]
were to be chosen, the impacts initially estimated for PP2a would decrease
slightly in intensity but would remain overall similar in tendency; the savings
in port costs would still represent up to 10 billion until 2030. The details of
the quantified impacts are presented in table 8. Table 8: Comparison PP2a and 'PP2a variant' (excluding
market access measures for cargo handling) (PwC, 2013) || PP2a || PP2a variant Change (%) in total port costs || -6.8 || -4 Annual savings in total port costs (€ million) || 1071.37 || 635 Increase in Short Sea Shipping (%) || 1.63 || 0.97 Induced tonnes Km (billion) in EU ports || 13.311 || 7.205 Administrative costs (recurrent – public) (€ million) || 2.3 || 2.1 Administrative costs (recurrent - business) (€ million) || 2.2 || 1.7 Annual external cost savings (€ million) || 69 || 46 The same reasoning may hold good for
passenger services, and a similar approach might therefore be envisaged.
However due to unavailability of data it was not possible to make a separate
impact calculation. 10. Monitoring and evaluation The Commission will monitor the
implementation and effectiveness of this initiative through a set of core
indicators. The data will be gathered using a method developed by the PPRISM[2] project and FP7 RTD project that
the Commission is launching to provide data on a continuous basis. Regarding evaluation, the idea is that,
three years after the entry into force of the proposed legislation, the
Commission will evaluate whether the objectives of the initiative have been attained.
This evaluation will be based in part on the core progress indicators mentioned
above. [1] ‘PP2a variant’ = PP2a with one difference: an
explanatory Commission communication on how existing rules apply to cargo
handling services, instead of proposing new legal provisions on the matter. [2] http://pprism.espo.be .