(1)

On 9 December 2024, the European Commission (‘the Commission’) initiated an anti-dumping investigation with regard to imports of sweetcorn originating in the People’s Republic of China (‘the country concerned’ or ‘the PRC’ or China) on the basis of Article 5 of the basic Regulation. It published a Notice of Initiation in the Official Journal of the European Union (2) (‘the Notice of Initiation’).

(2)

The Commission initiated the investigation following a complaint lodged on 25 October 2024 by the Association Européenne des Transformateurs de Maïs Doux (AETMD) (‘the complainant’). The complaint was made on behalf of the Union industry of certain prepared or preserved sweetcorn in kernels in the sense of Article 5(4) of the basic Regulation. The complaint contained evidence of dumping and of resulting material injury that was sufficient to justify the initiation of the investigation.

(3)

The Commission made imports of the product concerned subject to registration by Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/309 (3) (‘the registration Regulation’).

(4)

In accordance with Article 19a of the basic Regulation, on 10 July 2025, the Commission provided parties with a summary of the proposed duties and details about the calculation of the dumping margins and the margins adequate to remove the injury to the Union industry. Interested parties were invited to comment on the accuracy of the calculations within three working days. Both sampled exporting producers, the Sunflower group and Tongfa group, filed written submissions making their views known on alleged clerical errors in the calculation of their dumping margins. The Commission found some of the claims justified and adjusted the dumping margins accordingly.

(5)

On 8 August 2025, the Commission imposed provisional anti-dumping duties on imports of certain prepared or preserved sweetcorn in kernels, originating in the People’s Republic of China by Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/1723 (4) (‘the provisional Regulation’).

(6)

Following the disclosure of the essential facts and considerations on the basis of which a provisional anti-dumping duty was imposed (‘provisional disclosure’), the complainant, the Sunflower group, the Tongfa group, the China Chamber of Commerce of Import & Export of Foodstuffs, Native Produce & Animal By-Products (‘CFNA’), representing exporting producers (5), and Frucom, an association of Union importers and traders of food products which includes sweetcorn filed written submissions making their views known on the provisional findings within the deadline provided by Article 2(1) of the provisional Regulation.

(7)

The parties who so requested were granted an opportunity to be heard. A hearing took place with Frucom.

(8)

The Commission continued to seek and verify all the information it deemed necessary for its final findings. When reaching its definitive findings, the Commission considered the comments submitted by interested parties and revised its provisional conclusions when appropriate.

(9)

The Commission informed all interested parties of the essential facts and considerations on the basis of which it intended to impose a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of certain prepared or preserved sweetcorn in kernels, originating in the People’s Republic of China (‘final disclosure’). All parties were granted a period within which they could make comments on the final disclosure. CFNA and Tongfa group made comments on the final disclosure.

(10)

In the absence of comments concerning the initiation of the proceeding, the Commission confirmed the conclusions set out in recitals 6 to 28 of the provisional Regulation

(11)

In the absence of comments concerning the sampling of exporting producers in China, Union producers and unrelated importers, the Commission confirmed the conclusions set out in recitals 29 to 34 of the provisional Regulation.

(12)

In the absence of comments, the Commission confirmed the conclusions set out in recitals 35 to 39 of the provisional Regulation.

(13)

In the absence of comments concerning the application of Article 18 of the basic Regulation relating to the existence of significant distortions in China, the Commission confirmed the conclusions set out in recital 40 of the provisional Regulation.

(14)

Further comments were received from Sunflower Group and Tongfa Group in relation to recitals 41 and 42 of the provisional Regulation. These comments have been considered under sections 3.2, 3.3 and 3.4 below.

(15)

In the absence of comments, the Commission confirmed the conclusions set out in recital 43 of the provisional Regulation

(16)

The product under investigation is sweetcorn (Zea mays var. saccharata) in kernels, prepared or preserved by vinegar or acetic acid, not frozen and sweetcorn (Zea mays var. saccharata) in kernels prepared or preserved otherwise than by vinegar or acetic acid, not frozen, other than products of heading 2006, currently falling under CN codes ex 2001 90 30 (TARIC code 2001 90 30 10) and ex 2005 80 00 (TARIC code 2005 80 00 10 (‘the product under investigation’).

(17)

Sweetcorn is used for human consumption. The product is usually presented in a canned format, but also in glasses, tetra packs or pouches.

(18)

In the absence of comments, the Commission confirmed the conclusions set out in recitals 44 to 48 of the provisional Regulation

(19)

In the absence of further comments concerning this procedure, the Commission confirmed the conclusions set out in recitals 49 to 58 of the provisional Regulation.

(20)

In the absence of further comments concerning the existence of significant distortions, the Commission confirmed the conclusions set out in recitals 62 to 152 of the provisional Regulation.

(21)

The use of Malaysia as a representative country was discussed at recitals 153 to 187 of the provisional Regulation. Following provisional disclosure, Tongfa Group and Frucom claimed that Thai company Sunsweet should be used to calculate selling, general and administrative (‘SG&A’) costs and profit data as it produced the product concerned and was therefore more appropriate than the Malaysian company Fraser and Neave Holdings BHD (F&N), that only produced products in the same general category. However, as explained in recitals 172 and 175 of the provisional Regulation, Thailand was excluded as a representative country due to the large quantities of imports of fresh sweetcorn and cans from China. The claim was therefore rejected.

(22)

Frucom further commented that Mexico had been rejected as an appropriate representative country due to the lack of available SG&A costs and profit data from companies producing the product under investigation, and this should apply as well to Malaysia. However, as explained in recitals 176 and 181 of the provisional Regulation, the reasons for excluding Mexico were the lack of imports of fresh sweetcorn and that the available data relating to cans was not representative of cans used in food production. The claim was therefore rejected.

(23)

Frucom also commented that Malaysia was not appropriate as a representative country because its prices of imports of cans may be distorted due to the influence of large quantities of Chinese imports. However, as stated in recital 177 of the provisional Regulation, there was no evidence that the prices of imports into Malaysia of cans from China had affected the prices of other imports. Indeed, the prices of cans imported into Malaysia from China (around 14 CNY per kg) were much lower than those of imports from other countries (around 28 CNY per kg). Frucom did not provide any evidence to support its claim. The claim was therefore rejected.

(24)

In the absence of further comments concerning the representative country, the Commission confirmed the conclusions set out in recitals 153 to 187 of the provisional Regulation.

(25)

Tongfa group claimed that the Malaysian customs nomenclature code used for cans, namely 7310 21 91 , is inappropriate to set the benchmark for the group because it excludes cans of less than 1 litre capacity, and almost all cans used by Tongfa are under 1 litre. Tongfa group requested that the Commission identify a code explicitly covering the type of cans used by Tongfa or, if this is not possible, use the import data under the 6-digit HS subheading 7310 21 which definitely covers the cans used by Tongfa.

(26)

It is correct that code 7310 21 91 of the Malaysian customs nomenclature (6) covers cans of tinplate with a capacity of less than 50 litres, other than those with a capacity of less than 1 litre. The latter would fall under code 7310 21 11 . However, there were no imports at all under code 7310 21 11 into Malaysia in the investigation period. The rest of imports into Malaysia under HS subheading 7310 21 relate to products other than cans such as tanks or casks of steel with a capacity of more than 50 litres. Furthermore, the Commission observed that Tongfa group did not use only cans under 1 litre but also other types of cans. Therefore, 7310 21 91 , that covers only cans, is the most appropriate code for the cans used in sweetcorn production, while using the import price under HS subheading 7310 21 would only render the benchmark inappropriate as it would no longer relate to the products used in production of sweet corn. The claim was therefore rejected.

(27)

Following final disclosure, Tongfa group claimed that the Commission should use the average import price into Thailand under Thai customs code 7310 21 11 , that exclusively covers cans under 1 litre (7). To support their claim, they referred to recent Commission practice (8) where the Commission had used a different country than the representative country to establish the benchmark for some factors of production, and to the fact that the majority of imports of cans into Thailand under that code are from countries other than China.

(28)

Article 2(6a)(a), first indent, of the basic Regulation states that the sources the Commission may use for constructing normal value include corresponding costs of production and sale in an appropriate representative country with a similar level of economic development as the exporting country, provided the relevant data are readily available. As explained in recital 175 of the provisional Regulation, Thailand was rejected as a potential appropriate representative country due to the large quantities of imports from China of fresh sweetcorn and cans which make up around 75 % of the cost of manufacturing. Consequently, the Commission considered that it could not use imports into Thailand to establish the benchmarks for the normal value. Moreover, imports under Malaysian customs code 7310 21 91 corresponded to the cost of production in the country concerned because that code exclusively covered cans of tinplate, which was the input used by both exporting producers sampled in this investigation and, since the Commission used the average price per kilogram imported into Malaysia, the benchmark was appropriate for the corresponding costs of production for all cans regardless of their capacity. Tongfa group did not provide any evidence to the contrary. For all the reasons above, the Commission rejected the claim.

(29)

Following provisional disclosure, Tongfa Group claimed that its methodology to calculate labour hours was explained at the verification using worksheets and company files and was more precise than the method imposed by the Commission i.e. an allocation based on canned weights.

(30)

As explained at recitals 207 to 209 of the provisional Regulation, the calculation of labour hours made by the Tongfa Group could not be accepted because it was only supported by data in spreadsheets which did not constitute a verifiable system. The actual system presented at the verification attempted to directly allocate labour to the product under investigation, but it could not be linked to the company’s accounting system. The labour hours reported under this system were very low compared to the number of hours recorded for similar canned products. No explanation was provided by Tongfa Group for this anomaly. Consequently, on the basis of facts available under Article 18 of the basic Regulation, the Commission used an apportionment based on the quantity produced of the product under investigation as compared to all canned products, as Tongfa group itself used for other factors of production (e.g. energy). The Tongfa group provided no new evidence that would support its claim. Therefore, the claim was rejected.

(31)

Following provisional disclosure, the Sunflower group claimed that the inclusion of electricity into consumables for Sunflower was unreasonable, because electricity is not a raw material, the Commission had established a benchmark for electricity and, moreover, for Sunny the Commission did not treat electricity as a consumable and used the benchmark.

(32)

As explained in recitals 190 and 194 of the provisional Regulation, the Commission included some factors of production into consumables because they represented a negligible share of total raw material costs in the investigation period. This approach is justified based on the share of each factor of production, of which electricity is one, in the total manufacturing cost of a company, regardless of whether the Commission had established a benchmark. This was the case for electricity for Sunflower. For Sunny the situation was different as electricity represented a bigger share of their total costs. The claim was therefore rejected.

(33)

Following provisional disclosure, the Sunflower Group claimed that the adjustment the Commission applied to calculate their manufacturing overheads was erroneous and lacked legal basis. Concretely, it claimed that the Commission did not apply the actual ratio of manufacturing overheads to direct manufacturing costs incurred by Sunflower and Sunny during the investigation period, that originate from their financial records and had been verified by the Commission, but instead adjusted this ratio by referencing data only for Sunny and outside the investigation period. They further claimed that applying the companies’ actual overhead ratios to the undistorted benchmark prices would inherently reflect undistorted overhead costs.

(34)

The Commission found the claim justified and revised the dumping calculation for Sunflower accordingly. Consequently, the revised calculation of overheads reflects the actual percentage for Sunflower in the investigation period.

(35)

As explained at recital 21, following provisional disclosure Tongfa Group challenged the use of F&N in Malaysia as a source for to calculate SG&A costs and profit data. The above recital confirmed the rejection of Thailand as a representative country. In addition, Tongfa Group claimed that F&N is not an appropriate source of SG&A costs and profit data as it did not produce the product concerned. However, as explained at recital 169 of the provisional Regulation F&N manufactures products in the same general category as the product under investigation, i.e. food and drink products including canned products and as such these products are not vastly different from the product under investigation. In any event, Tongfa Group provided no evidence that would render the amounts based on the SG&A costs and profit rates established for F&N unreasonable. This claim was therefore rejected.

(36)

In the absence of further comments concerning the sources used to establish undistorted costs, the Commission confirmed the conclusions set out in recitals 188 to 213 of the provisional Regulation.

(37)

In the absence of comments concerning the export price, the Commission confirmed the conclusions set out in recitals 214 to 216 of the provisional Regulation.

(38)

In the absence of further comments concerning adjustments made to the normal value, the Commission confirmed the conclusions set out in recital 218 of the provisional Regulation.

(39)

Following provisional disclosure, the Tongfa group claimed that the Commission should use Fujian Tongfa Foods Group Co., Ltd. (‘FT’) actual profit/loss, as it did with SG&A costs instead of the profit of an unrelated trader for the adjustment under article 2(10)(i) of the basic Regulation. Concretely, the company claimed that FT only serves as an intermediate invoicing party between Zhangzhou Tongfa Foods Industry Co., Ltd. (‘ZT’), the producer, and unrelated EU customers and the net invoice value of FT to ZT is the same as ZT and therefore, FT must be considered at the scale of the integrated Tongfa Group, not as an independent, profit-driven and typical trader.

(40)

According to the framework contract between both parties provided by the Tongfa group in the course of the investigation, FT is responsible for signing customer contracts, customer negotiations, collecting payment from customers, or dealing with export tax refund procedures and tax refund collection. Such functions are similar to those performed by an agent working on a commission basis. Furthermore, the individual invoices for each sales transaction were subject to an arbitration clause between ZT and FT, demonstrating lack of economic solidarity and which would not be appropriate if FT was simply operating as a fully integrated sales department.

(41)

The investigation also established that FT cannot be considered as a fully integrated sales department within the group as ZT exported the product concerned directly to the Union and other countries in 2021, 2022 and 2023, and to countries other than the Union during the IP. It follows that ZT has its own operational sales department. On this basis, the Commission carried out the adjustment for commissions under Article 2(10)(i) of the basic Regulation. Regarding the profit used in the construction of the amount for commissions, the invoices between ZT and FT reflected intra-group transfers that did not reflect arm's length pricing. Consequently, the adjustment could not be based on those transfers. The claim was therefore rejected.

(42)

Following provisional disclosure, Tongfa Group reiterated their claim that the application of Article 18 regarding the CIF value was not warranted as they allege that there was no false or misleading information. Tongfa also claimed that an arithmetic error had been made in the methodology applied by the Commission.

(43)

As explained in recital 229 of the provisional Regulation, and as acknowledged by Tongfa in its comments on provisional disclosure, Tongfa supplied actual data for around 70 % of its sales. Tongfa did provide an estimation for the remaining 30 % of sales but, as pointed out in recital 229 of the provisional Regulation, such calculation was inaccurate as it did not take into account the date of shipment. Therefore, the Commission used, as facts available under Article 18 of the basic Regulation, the basic freight rates provided by Tongfa for the 70 % of transactions but applied them on a monthly basis. Tongfa did not provide any evidence or explanation why the approach taken by the Commission, based on their own data, was inaccurate. The claim was therefore dismissed.

(44)

Regarding the alleged arithmetical error, the Commission could not find any in its calculation. It therefore provided further details of the calculation of the CIF prices in the final disclosure.

(45)

In the absence of further comments concerning adjustments made to the export price, the Commission confirmed the conclusions set out in recitals 219 to 232 of the provisional Regulation.

(46)

As described in recitals 33 and 34, following a claim from interested parties, the Commission revised the dumping margins.

(47)

The definitive dumping margins expressed as a percentage of the cost, insurance and freight (CIF) Union frontier price, duty unpaid, are as follows:

(48)

In the absence of further comments concerning dumping margins, the Commission confirmed the conclusions set out in recitals 233 to 238 of the provisional Regulation.

(49)

In the absence of any comments, the unit of measurement as set out in recital 239 of the provisional regulation is hereby confirmed.

(50)

In accordance with Article 4(1) of the ‘basic Regulation, the Union industry is defined as the Union producers of the like product taken as a whole, or those of them whose collective output constitutes a major proportion of the total Union production of that product.

(51)

As set out in recitals 240 and 241 of the provisional Regulation, the Commission provisionally defined the Union industry as comprising the cooperating Union producers of the like product, representing around [29-38 %] of the total Union production.

(52)

Following disclosure of the provisional findings, interested parties were invited to comment on the definition of the Union industry. No comments were received from interested parties in this respect.

(53)

In the absence of any comments, and as no new information was submitted that would alter the Commission’s assessment, the definition of the Union industry as set out in recitals 240 and 241 of the provisional Regulation is hereby confirmed.

(54)

As set out in recitals 242 to 246 of the provisional Regulation, the Commission provisionally established the development of Union consumption.

(55)

No comments were received from interested parties in this respect.

(56)

In the absence of any comments, the Commission confirms the conclusions set out in recitals 242 to 246 of the provisional Regulation.

(57)

Following disclosure, CFNA submitted that the Commission failed to analyse the reasons behind the sudden increase in Chinese imports in 2022, which according to CFNA was caused by exceptional market conditions, namely a poor harvest in Europe, the need of retailers to secure supply chains under tender procedures, and a large order by a retailer (Lidl). CFNA submitted a purchase order in this regard. FRUCOM also, echoed these arguments in its submission.

(58)

The Commission recalled that in accordance with Article 3(5) of the basic Regulation, the impact of dumped imports on the Union industry must be assessed in relation to the actual volume and market share of such imports and their price behaviour. The Commission considered that, although the poor EU harvest in 2022 contributed to the surge of imports, this effect was temporary. Imports from China remained high during 2023 and the investigation period, when harvest conditions had already improved. Moreover, the evidence on the alleged Lidl order did not demonstrate that the continued high level of imports was explained by such a one-off transaction.

(59)

Accordingly, the Commission confirms the findings set out in recitals 247 to 248 of the provisional Regulation.

(60)

As set out in recitals 249 to 255 of the provisional Regulation, Chinese imports were consistently made at dumped prices which significantly undercut those of the Union producers.

(61)

No new comments were submitted by interested parties in this regard.

(62)

The Commission therefore confirms the conclusions set out in recitals 249 to 252 of the provisional Regulation.

(63)

The Commission clarified that the price comparison was made on a type-by-type basis for transactions at the appropriate level at which they compete in the Union (i.e. ex-works for the Union industry sales and landed CIF value for prices of the sampled exporting producers). Following provisional disclosure, the Commission reviewed the undercutting calculations. As a result, the revised average undercutting margin of the imports from the country concerned on the Union market was established at 15,9 %.

(64)

In the absence of any further comments the Commission therefore confirms the conclusions set out in recitals 254 and 255 of the provisional Regulation.

(65)

In the absence of any comments, the Commission confirmed its conclusions set out in recitals 256 to 261 of the provisional Regulation.

(66)

In the absence of any comments, the Commission confirmed its conclusions set out in recitals 262 to 265 of the provisional Regulation.

(67)

In the absence of any comments, the Commission confirmed its conclusions set out in recitals 266 to 270 of the provisional Regulation.

(68)

In the absence of any comments, the Commission confirmed its conclusions set out in recitals 271 and 272 of the provisional Regulation.

(69)

In the absence of any comments, the Commission confirmed its conclusions set out in recitals 273 and 274 of the provisional Regulation.

(70)

In the absence of any comments, the Commission confirmed its conclusions set out in recitals 275 and 276 of the provisional Regulation.

(71)

In the absence of any comments, the Commission confirmed its conclusions set out in recitals 277 to 280 of the provisional Regulation.

(72)

In the absence of any comments, the Commission confirmed its conclusions set out in recitals 281 and 282 of the provisional Regulation.

(73)

In the absence of any comments, the Commission confirmed its conclusions set out in recitals 283 to 285 of the provisional Regulation.

(74)

In the absence of any comments, the Commission confirmed its conclusions set out in recitals 286 to 292 of the provisional Regulation.

(75)

Following disclosure, CFNA claimed that the Commission failed to properly analyse the different sales channels of the Union industry (related/unrelated) and tenders.

(76)

This claim was found to be unsubstantiated. In the investigation, the Commission duly analysed the sales channels in order to establish the quantities and values of sales to the first independent customer. The methodology took into account both direct sales to unrelated customers as well as intermediate sales between related parties. The Commission therefore rejects this claim.

(77)

CFNA also contended that the increase of net investment by the Union industry during the period considered pointed to self-inflicted injury.

(78)

The Commission recalled that the Union industry is highly capital-intensive and requires continuous and large-scale investments into production facilities. Despite being constantly below the target profit level, the Union industry remained profitable during the period considered and was therefore able to raise the necessary capital to maintain its operations. However, as established in the investigation, the return on investment decreased by 24 % over the period considered, clearly reflecting the negative impact of price pressure exerted by dumped imports from the People’s Republic of China. This argument was therefore dismissed.

(79)

Following disclosure, CFNA reiterated its claim that the sudden increase in imports from the People’s Republic of China was partly due to a one-off, exceptional purchase order placed by the retailer Lidl. CFNA argued that the Commission should have investigated tenders in detail to establish whether certain EU retailers had switched sources of supply from Union producers to Chinese exporters. In support of this argument, CFNA submitted, as Annex I to its comments, copies of what it described as purchase orders issued by Lidl to Chinese exporters.

(80)

This claim was found to be unsubstantiated. First, the documents provided by CFNA were not purchase orders but invoices, relating to transactions in both 2022 and 2024. This undermines CFNA’s allegation that the import surge resulted from a single, exceptional order in 2022. Second, as established in Table 4 of the provisional Regulation, imports from the People’s Republic of China increased significantly and consistently throughout the period considered, irrespective of any individual orders. Finally, the Commission recalls that the injury analysis is based not on isolated transactions but on the overall volume and price effects of dumped imports. The evidence confirmed that the sustained level of dumped imports from the People’s Republic of China exerted significant price pressure on the Union industry and caused material injury.

(81)

On this basis, the Commission rejected CFNA’s claim.

(82)

On the basis of the analysis of the economic indicators set out in Sections 4.6.1 and 4.6.2 above, the Commission confirmed that the Union industry suffered material injury within the meaning of Article 3(5) of the basic Regulation during the period considered.

(83)

The injury indicators showed that, while Union consumption remained broadly stable, the Union industry lost sales volumes and market share to dumped imports from the People’s Republic of China, which entered the Union market in steadily increasing quantities and at significantly undercutting prices. This led to negative developments in the financial situation of the Union industry, in particular declining profitability and return on investments, despite the fact that the industry remained overall profitable.

(84)

The arguments presented by CFNA were duly considered but found to be unsubstantiated. In particular, the Commission confirmed that:

(85)

The Commission therefore concluded that the material injury suffered by the Union industry was caused by the continuous inflow of dumped imports from the People’s Republic of China. Other factors, such as raw material costs, export performance, or temporary supply shocks, did not break the causal link.

(86)

Accordingly, the findings on injury as set out in recitals 240 to 302 of the provisional Regulation are confirmed.

(87)

CFNA and FRUCOM argued that the Commission had underestimated the role of imports from other third countries, in particular Thailand, suggesting that they might have contributed to the injury suffered by the Union industry.

(88)

As already explained in recitals 310 to 313 of the provisional regulation, imports from third countries remained at a relatively low and stable level throughout the period considered. Imports from Thailand, the main third-country supplier apart from China, maintained an overall stable market share. The volume and prices of these imports were insufficient to explain the deterioration in the situation of the Union industry.

(89)

CFNA and FRUCOM did not submit new evidence demonstrating that imports from other third countries materially contributed to the injury. The Commission therefore confirms its provisional conclusion that imports from third countries did not break the causal link between the dumped imports from the People’s Republic of China and the injury suffered by the Union industry.

(90)

CFNA and FRUCOM reiterated that the poor harvest year in 2022, rather than dumped imports, was the key cause of the injury.

(91)

Following the final disclosure, CFNA claimed that the Union industry’s recovery in 2023 proved that: (1) imports from the PRC merely filled a market gap caused by the poor harvest in 2022; and (2) Chinese imports were not a direct cause of injury to the Union industry. CFNA further contended that for agricultural processing industries subject to natural conditions, poor harvests largely explain poor business performance, and that import surges following such events would ‘normally have a time to slow down in tandem with the market development’. CFNA therefore concluded that imports remaining high in 2023 cannot be a factor to establish the existence of causation.

(92)

The Commission rejected these arguments. As established in the provisional Regulation, production in the year 2023 and in the investigation period is higher than in the year 2022, whereas sales and market share continued to decline and stocks to increase. This demonstrates the inability of the Union producers to sell their product despite the production increase after 2022.

(93)

CFNA's characterisation of Chinese imports as ‘filling a market gap’ is contradicted by two key findings. First, if imports were responding to temporary supply shortages, they would be expected to decline once Union production recovered. Instead, as established in Table 3 of the provisional Regulation, Chinese imports and the Chinese market share increased in 2023 compared to 2022 and the overall Chinese market share went from 6 % in 2022 to 15 % in the investigation period. Second, as established in recitals 249 to 255 of the provisional Regulation, these imports undercut Union industry prices, on average by between 7,2 % and 28,6 % during the investigation period.

(94)

Moreover, the Commission found that the imports from China suppressed the prices of the Union industry, especially via the tender mechanism, and caused a significant drop of sales volume and market share of Union producers.

(95)

Dumped imports can have a significant impact on a market where price sensitivity is important. As indicated in recital 293 of the provisional regulation, the Union market for prepared or preserved sweetcorn in kernels is characterised by tender processes where all retailer brand sweetcorn is sold through competitive bidding. In such a market structure, price differences can have a major impact, as retailers negotiate simultaneously with multiple producers and allocate volumes based primarily on price competitiveness.

(96)

As noted on recital 279 of the provisional regulation, during the period considered, although average Union sales prices increased, they did not keep pace with the rise in unit production costs, which grew more rapidly due to higher raw material, can and energy prices. As shown in Table 3 of the provisional Regulation, imports from China increased by 518 %, while their prices remained consistently below the Union industry’s average unit cost of goods sold. This prevented the Union industry from adjusting its prices upwards in line with cost increases and forced it to maintain offers at suppressed levels to remain competitive in tenders. The Commission therefore concluded that imports from China exercised significant price suppression. It was therefore significant price pressure by the imports rather than legitimate market-gap filling.

(97)

As acknowledged in recital 317 of the provisional Regulation, the Commission concluded that while it could not be excluded that the low sweetcorn yield of 2022 contributed to the injury of the Union industry, as it was limited to only one year of the period considered, it was considered that it did not attenuate the causal link. However, Article 3(7) of the basic Regulation requires the Commission to distinguish injury caused by known factors other than dumped imports from injury caused by the dumped imports themselves. The investigation established that temporary harvest difficulties in 2022 did not cause: (a) the fact that Chinese imports continued to enter the Union market in significant volume after 2022; (b) the price undercutting of between 7,2 % and 28,6 % established in the investigation period; (c) the Union industry's loss of market share specifically to Chinese imports over the period considered; (d) the significant price suppression exerted by the Chinese import prices, which remained overall below the Union unit cost throughout the whole period considered, as explained in recitals 255 and 280 of the provisional Regulation, and (e) the deterioration of financial indicators over the entire period considered, as explained in recital 83 above.

(98)

CFNA’s conclusion that sustained high volumes of imports in 2023 ‘cannot be a factor to establish the existence of causation’ fundamentally misunderstands the causation analysis. The fact that imports remained high well after harvest conditions improved is precisely relevant to causation, as it demonstrates that the injurious effects of Chinese imports were not temporary but continued even after the Union industry's production recovered in 2023.

(99)

In light of the above, the Commission concluded that the arguments linking the injury to the poor harvest in 2022 were unfounded. The persistence of high import volumes, price undercutting during the investigation period and further deterioration of the Union industry’s key performance indicators confirmed that there was a genuine and substantial causal link between the material injury and the dumped imports from China. The latter was not attenuated by the impact of temporary natural factors.

(100)

No new information was provided after disclosure to demonstrate that the poor harvest year had a lasting impact or that it explained the continuous presence of large volumes of dumped imports. The Commission therefore confirms its provisional finding that the injury suffered by the Union industry cannot be attributed to temporary fluctuations in harvests.

(101)

Both CFNA and FRUCOM argued that unforeseen events, such as floods in Thailand and associated disruptions, had caused a sudden change in global supply chains and pushed EU buyers to source from China.

(102)

This issue was already addressed in recital 318 of the provisional regulation. The Commission found that imports of sweetcorn from Thailand were not significantly affected by such events, as their market share remained broadly stable over the period considered. No verifiable evidence was provided to show that temporary weather events or external shocks caused a structural shift in trade patterns towards China.

(103)

The Commission therefore confirms its provisional conclusion that the increase in imports from China cannot be explained by exceptional or short-term market disruptions such as floods in Thailand.

(104)

CFNA claimed that any decline in the Union industry’s sales and performance might have resulted from a reduction in Union consumption rather than the impact of dumped imports.

(105)

The Commission recalls that, as established in recitals 319 to 323 of the provisional regulation, Union consumption decreased moderately over the period considered. However, the fall in the Union industry’s sales volume and market share was proportionally much greater than the contraction in consumption.

(106)

Therefore, while the decrease in consumption may have had some limited influence on sales, it cannot explain the significant loss of market share and price suppression suffered by the Union industry. The Commission confirms its provisional finding that this factor does not break the causal link between the dumped imports and the injury.

(107)

CFNA argued that rising costs of raw materials, energy and cans were the principal causes of the deterioration in profitability, and that the Commission had not sufficiently analysed these developments.

(108)

The Commission recalls that this issue was thoroughly examined in recitals 324 to (325) of the provisional regulation. While costs indeed increased during the period considered, these increases affected all Union producers alike and cannot explain the scale of the decline in profitability and market share of the Union industry. The inability of Union producers to raise their prices accordingly was primarily due to the price-suppressing effect of dumped imports.

(109)

Following the final disclosure, CFNA reiterated that the Union sweetcorn industry is not genuinely capital-intensive and that its low return on investment results primarily from increased costs of raw materials, energy and cans rather than from dumped imports.

(110)

The Commission noted, however, that CFNA provided no evidence to substantiate its assertion that the industry is not capital-intensive. As regards the alleged impact of energy and raw material costs on the deterioration of the Union industry’s situation, no new factual or analytical elements were submitted beyond what was already addressed in the provisional regulation. The claim was therefore rejected.

(111)

The Commission therefore confirms its provisional finding that rising costs of raw materials, energy and cans do not break the causal link between dumped imports and the injury suffered by the Union industry.

(112)

The Commission considered the arguments concerning procurement strategies and the alleged one-off large order by Lidl put forward by CFNA and FRUCOM after the provisional disclosure. Following the final disclosure, CFNA argued that the invoices it submitted prove that Lidl placed a large-volume order. However, CFNA did not provide any new element to demonstrate that these invoices related to a single order, and the evidence on file does not substantiate these claims. The documents provided referred to invoices covering 2022 and 2024, confirming a sustained trade relationship rather than an isolated purchase. Furthermore, imports from China continued to grow beyond 2022, which could not be explained by a single order or temporary supply adjustments.

(113)

Therefore, in the absence of any further comment the Commission confirmed its conclusions set out in recitals 330 to 333 of the provisional Regulation.

(114)

In the absence of any comments, the Commission confirmed its conclusions set out in recitals 336 to 341 of the provisional Regulation.

(115)

Following the adjustment explained above in recital 63 the Commission revised the underselling margin. The definitive dumping and underselling margins are as follows.

(116)

On the basis of the dumping and underselling margins as set above, the Commission concluded that it was necessary to assess whether there are distortions with regard to the product under investigation within the meaning of Article 7(2a) of the basic Regulation, which would render a duty lower than the margin of dumping insufficient to remove the injury caused by dumped imports of the product under investigation.

(117)

As explained in the Notice of Initiation, the complainant has provided sufficient evidence in the complaint that there are raw material distortions within the meaning of Article 7(2a) of the basic Regulation in the country concerned with regard to the product concerned.

(118)

At provisional stage, the Commission stated that it would continue to investigate the alleged distortions to conduct the assessment on the appropriate level of measures in accordance with Article 7(2a) of the basic Regulation at the definitive stage of the investigation.

(119)

According to the evidence in the complaint (9), steel cans, accounting for at least 17 % of the cost of production of the product concerned, are subject to a value added tax (VAT) refund reduction in the PRC. The complainant provided the same evidence as in the complaint following provisional disclosure, namely extracts from the Transcustoms website that showed that cans, under customs codes 7310 21 10 00 and 7310 21 90 00, are subject to VAT of 13 % and export VAT rebate of 10 %. Although it also mentioned the Customs Import and Export Tariff published by the Chinese Customs Authorities, it provided no evidence of such document.

(120)

At initiation, the Commission sent a questionnaire regarding the allegations of raw material distortions to the Government of China. Also, the questionnaire for exporting producers included questions on those allegations. The Government of China did not reply to the questionnaire, and none of the two sampled exporting producers provided any evidence that such measures are not in place.

(121)

The Commission examined whether cans are subject to any of the measures listed in Article 7(2a) of the basic Regulation. For this purpose, the Commission cross-checked the evidence provided by the complainant against other sources such as legislation from the People’s Republic of China, other websites and the Customs Import and Export Tariff published by the Chinese Authorities for years 2023 and 2024. By Announcement No 15 [2020] of the Ministry of Finance and the State Taxation Administration (10), the export tax refund rates for cans under customs codes 7310 21 10 00 and 7310 21 90 00 were increased to 13 %. This is confirmed by the State Taxation Administration (11) and other websites, that also show the evolution of the refund rate across time (12), and by the Customs Import and Export Tariff published by the Chinese Authorities for years 2023 and 2024 according to which cans under those customs codes are subject to VAT of 13 % and export VAT refund of 13 %.

(122)

Consequently, the Commission concluded that there is no value added tax (VAT) refund reduction in the PRC regarding the cans used in the production of the product concerned. The investigation did not reveal any other distortion within the meaning of Article 7(2a) of the basic Regulation.

(123)

Following the above assessment, definitive anti-dumping duties should be set as below in accordance with Article 7(2) or of the basic Regulation:

(124)

Following disclosure, FRUCOM, representing European traders of preserved fruit and vegetables, submitted comments opposing the imposition of definitive measures. FRUCOM argued that anti-dumping duties on imports of sweetcorn from the People’s Republic of China would have a negative impact on EU traders and consumers by increasing costs, reducing supply security, and distorting competition in the Single Market.

(125)

With respect to the concern that measures would undermine consumer welfare and security of supply, the Commission recalls that the purpose of anti-dumping measures is to restore fair competition by removing the injury caused by unfairly traded imports. The Union market remains supplied by both Union producers and imports from various third countries. Nothing in the file suggests that the imposition of anti-dumping duties would threaten the availability of sweetcorn in the Union or significantly distort consumer prices. On the contrary, restoring fair competition will ensure the long-term viability of the Union industry and safeguard supply diversity.

(126)

In light of the above, the Commission concluded that the imposition of measures would not be disproportionate or contrary to the overall Union interest.

(127)

In view of the conclusions reached with regard to dumping, injury, causation, level of measures and Union interest, and in accordance with Article 9(4) of the basic Regulation, definitive anti-dumping measures should be imposed in order to prevent further injury being caused to the Union industry by the dumped imports of the product concerned.

(128)

On the basis of the above, the definitive anti-dumping duty rates, expressed on the CIF Union border price, customs duty unpaid, should be as follows:

(129)

The individual company anti-dumping duty rates specified in this Regulation were established on the basis of the findings of this investigation. Therefore, they reflect the situation found during this investigation in respect to these companies. These duty rates are thus exclusively applicable to imports of the product under investigation originating in the country concerned and produced by the named legal entities. Imports of the product concerned manufactured by any other company not specifically mentioned in the operative part of this Regulation, including entities related to those specifically mentioned, cannot benefit from these rates and should be subject to the duty rate applicable to ‘all other imports originating in the People’s Republic of China’.

(130)

A company may request the application of these individual anti-dumping duty rates if it changes subsequently the name of its entity. The request must be addressed to the Commission (13). The request must contain all the relevant information enabling to demonstrate that the change does not affect the right of the company to benefit from the duty rate which applies to it. If the change of name of the company does not affect its right to benefit from the duty rate which applies to it, a regulation about the change of name will be published in the Official Journal of the European Union.

(131)

To minimise the risks of circumvention due to the difference in duty rates, special measures are needed to ensure the proper application of the individual anti-dumping duties. The application of individual anti-dumping duties is only applicable upon presentation of a valid commercial invoice to the customs authorities of the Member States. The invoice must conform to the requirements set out in Article 1(3) of this Regulation. Until such invoice is presented, imports should be subject to the anti-dumping duty applicable to ‘all other imports originating in the People’s Republic of China’.

(132)

While presentation of this invoice is necessary for the customs authorities of the Member States to apply the individual rates of anti-dumping duty to imports, it is not the only element to be taken into account by the customs authorities. Indeed, even if presented with an invoice meeting all the requirements set out in Article 1(3) of this Regulation, the customs authorities of Member States should carry out their usual checks and may, like in all other cases, require additional documents (shipping documents, etc.) for the purpose of verifying the accuracy of the particulars contained in the declaration and ensure that the subsequent application of the rate of duty is justified, in compliance with customs law.

(133)

Should the exports by one of the companies benefiting from lower individual duty rates increase significantly in volume, in particular after the imposition of the measures concerned, such an increase in volume could be considered as constituting in itself a change in the pattern of trade due to the imposition of measures within the meaning of Article 13(1) of the basic Regulation. In such circumstances, an anti-circumvention investigation may be initiated, provided that the conditions for doing so are met. This investigation may, inter alia, examine the need for the removal of individual duty rate(s) and the consequent imposition of a country-wide duty.

(134)

To ensure a proper enforcement of the anti-dumping duties, the anti-dumping duty for all other imports originating in the People’s Republic of China should apply not only to the non-cooperating exporting producers in this investigation, but also to the producers which did not have exports to the Union during the investigation period.

(135)

Exporting producers that did not export the product concerned to the Union during the investigation period should be able to request the Commission to be made subject to the anti-dumping duty rate for cooperating companies not included in the sample. The Commission should grant such request provided that three conditions are met. The new exporting producer would have to demonstrate that: (i) it did not export the product concerned to the Union during the IP; (ii) it is not related to an exporting producer that did so; and (iii) has exported the product concerned thereafter or has entered into an irrevocable contractual obligation to do so in substantial quantities.

(136)

In view of the dumping margins found and given the level of the injury caused to the Union industry, the amounts secured by way of provisional anti-dumping duties imposed by the provisional Regulation, should be definitively collected up to the levels established under the present Regulation.

(137)

As mentioned in section 1.2, the Commission made imports of the product under investigation subject to registration.

(138)

During the definitive stage of the investigation, the data collected in the context of the registration was assessed. The Commission analysed whether the criteria under Article 10(4) of the basic Regulation were met for the retroactive collection of definitive duties.

(139)

The Commission’s analysis showed no further substantial rise in imports in addition to the level of imports which caused injury during the investigation period, as prescribed by Article 10(4)(d) of the basic Regulation. For this analysis, the Commission compared the monthly average import volumes of the product concerned during the investigation period, 3 700 tonnes, with the monthly average import volumes during the period from the month following the initiation of this investigation until the last full month preceding the imposition of provisional measures, (January 2025–July 2025) which was 2 503 tonnes that is 32 % lower than the average during the investigation period. Also, when comparing the monthly average import volumes of the product concerned during the investigation period with the monthly average import volumes during the period from the month following the initiation of this investigation up to and including the month in which provisional measures were imposed (January 2025–August 2025) the volume, 2 223 tonnes, was 40 % lower than the average during the investigation period. Therefore, the Commission concluded that the conditions for the retroactive collection of definitive duties were not met.

(140)

In view of Article 109 of Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509 of the European Parliament and of the Council (14), when an amount is to be reimbursed following a judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union, the interest to be paid should be the rate applied by the European Central Bank to its principal refinancing operations, as published in the C series of the Official Journal of the European Union on the first calendar day of each month.

(141)

The measures provided for in this regulation are in accordance with the opinion of the Committee established by Article 15(1) of Regulation (EU) 2016/1036,