(1)

A number of amendments are to be made to Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2018/1046 of the European Parliament and of the Council (3). In the interests of clarity and legal certainty, that Regulation should be recast.

(2)

This Regulation lays down the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union (the ‘budget’) within the meaning of Article 322 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) and does not regulate or affect the implementation of restrictive measures adopted on the basis of the TFEU and the Treaty on European Union (TEU), including in the framework of implementation of the budget.

(3)

Taking into account the experience gained with the implementation of the financial rules applicable to the budget and following the adoption of Council Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2093 (4), certain targeted amendments should be made in order to align those financial rules to the new legal framework, adapt them to the needs of efficient crisis management and enhance the protection of the financial interests of the Union. Furthermore, targeted simplifications, technical updates and corrections should be made.

(4)

Following the adoption of Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2093, the references to basic acts should be replaced and the references to Council Decision (EU, Euratom) 2020/2053 (5), to Council Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2021/768 (6) and to the Interinstitutional Agreement of 16 December 2020 on budgetary discipline, on cooperation in budgetary matters and on sound financial management, as well as on new own resources, including a roadmap towards the introduction of new own resources (7) should be added to the references used throughout this Regulation.

(5)

In the interest of clarity, all references to repealed Regulation (EC) No 45/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council (8) should be replaced by references to Regulation (EU) 2018/1725 of the European Parliament and of the Council (9).

(6)

In the interest of legal certainty, a number of cross-references should be corrected.

(7)

It is necessary to better reflect the specific nature and functioning of the provisioning of financial liabilities and of the budgetary guarantees. Certain definitions and rules on budgetary guarantees, budgetary commitments, legal commitments, payment appropriations, recipients and publication of information on recipients should therefore be adjusted. A definition of the constitution phase of the provisioning of financial liabilities should be added. Additionally, definitions should be updated to reflect in particular amendments to procurement rules and the introduction of rules on non-financial donations.

(8)

In order to enhance transparency on recipients of Union funds which are non-governmental organisations, a definition of non-governmental organisations should be introduced, providing for criteria to identify them. In addition, grant applicants should declare their legal status, including whether they are non-governmental organisations.

(9)

A reference to the general regime of conditionality for the protection of the budget laid down in Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2092 of the European Parliament and of the Council (10) should be inserted in this Regulation. Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2092 is a cornerstone of the legal framework for the implementation of the budget.

(10)

It is essential that in the implementation of the budget, Member States and the Commission ensure compliance with the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, and respect the Union values enshrined in Article 2 TEU.

(11)

This Regulation should enable authorising officers, where relevant in accordance with sector-specific rules, to adopt appropriate measures and take action to protect the budget, for example through suspension of payments, in cases where the implementation by a Member State of an action financed from Union funds is affected by that Member State’s non-respect of relevant Union values and fundamental rights.

(12)

The fundamental budgetary principles should be maintained. Existing derogations from those principles for specific areas such as research, external actions and structural funds should be reviewed and simplified as far as possible, taking into account their continuing relevance, their added value for the budget, and the burden they impose on stakeholders.

(13)

Rules on the carry-over of appropriations should be presented more clearly and a distinction should be made between automatic and non-automatic carry-overs. The Union institutions concerned should provide information to the European Parliament and to the Council on both automatic and non-automatic carry-overs.

(14)

The carrying-over and use of external assigned revenue for the succeeding programme or action should be allowed with a view to using such funds efficiently. It should be possible to carry over internal assigned revenue only to the following financial year, except where this Regulation provides otherwise.

(15)

Following the adoption of Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2093 and the basic acts related thereto, certain rules related to budgetary principles, in particular as regards cancellation and carry-over, decommitments and making appropriations corresponding to decommitments available again, laid down in Regulations (EU) 2021/1060 (11) and (EU) 2021/2116 (12) of the European Parliament and of the Council, should be incorporated into this Regulation.

(16)

With regard to internal assigned revenue, the financing of new building projects with the revenue from lettings and the sale of buildings should be allowed. To that end, such revenue should be considered as internal assigned revenue which can be carried over until it is fully used.

(17)

In the interest of simplification and in order to align better the timing of contributions from Member States with the corresponding payment needs, all additional financial contributions from Member States to Union’s actions and programmes, including voluntary contributions, should be subject to the same treatment and be considered as external assigned revenue.

(18)

In order to increase transparency and visibility in the presentation of assigned revenue while maintaining the substance of the information previously provided, detailed information on the estimated amount of the internal and external assigned revenue to be received, and the foreseen allocation to the relevant budget lines, should be provided in an annex, which forms an integral part of the budget. In addition, it is appropriate to clarify the reporting requirements regarding the implementation of the internal and external assigned revenue in the preceding year. This will ensure that all information on the implementation of assigned revenue and forecast of assigned revenue to be received is presented in a clear and accessible manner.

(19)

The rules on transfers that are subject to special provisions should be updated to take into account the Solidarity and Emergency Aid Reserve established pursuant to Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2093. In addition, adjustments should be made in order to reflect that draft amending budgets are no longer required for the mobilisation of the Solidarity and Emergency Aid Reserve.

(20)

Union institutions should be able to accept any donation made to the Union.

(21)

In order to allow a rapid reaction in exceptional circumstances, the Commission should be able to accept in-kind donations, irrespective of their value, where such donations are made for the purposes of humanitarian aid, emergency support, civil protection or crisis management aid. In order to ensure appropriate safeguards, the Commission should only accept such donations where acceptance is in accordance with the principles of sound financial management and transparency, does not give rise to conflicts of interest, does not harm the image of the Union and does not harm or risk harming the security or public order of the Union or Member States. The donor should not be, at the moment of acceptance, in one of the exclusion situations under the early detection and exclusion system and should not be registered as excluded in the corresponding database. Where the Commission accepts a donation, the authorising officer responsible should provide information thereon in his or her annual activity report.

(22)

A provision should be introduced to allow for in-kind sponsorship by a legal person of an event or activity for promotional or corporate social responsibility purposes.

(23)

The concept of performance as regards the budget should be clarified. Performance should be linked to the direct application of the principle of sound financial management. The principle of sound financial management should also be defined, and a link should be established between objectives set and performance indicators, results and economy, efficiency and effectiveness in the use of appropriations. For reasons of legal certainty, while avoiding conflicts with existing performance frameworks of the different programmes, performance terminology, in particular output and results, should be defined.

(24)

In light of the horizontal gender mainstreaming goal, targets for monitoring climate spending and performance and expenditure contributing to halting and reversing the decline of biodiversity, specific performance indicators for the budget should be introduced to track the spending on gender equality, as well as on climate change mitigation and adaptation and the protection of biodiversity. Such indicators should be concise and proportionate, avoid overlapping, be limited in number and not result in excessive administrative burden. They should be based on an effective, transparent and comprehensive methodology and, where appropriate, widely recognised scientific evidence. Where appropriate, the data collected in relation to such indicators should be broken down by gender and should be collected in a way that allows for the aggregation of such data across all relevant programmes.

(25)

Considering the importance of addressing climate and environmental challenges and in order to ensure that budget implementation contributes to the achievement of the European Green Deal as referred to in the communication of the Commission of 11 December 2019 on the European Green Deal, of the Union’s climate and energy targets and of climate neutrality by 2050, the concept of performance as regards the budget should be extended to include the implementation of programmes and activities in a sustainable way, which would not hinder the achievement of the environmental objectives of climate change mitigation, climate change adaptation, the sustainable use and protection of water and marine resources, the transition to a circular economy, pollution prevention and control and the protection and restoration of biodiversity and ecosystems.

(26)

It is important to promote social rights and fair working and labour conditions, in line with the European Pillar of Social Rights and Article 9 TFEU. Where feasible and appropriate, the Commission and Member States should respect relevant applicable national law, Union law, conventions of the International Labour Organization (ILO) and collective agreements when implementing programmes and activities funded by the budget.

(27)

In accordance with the Interinstitutional Agreement of 13 April 2016 on Better Law-Making (13), Union legislation should be of high quality and should focus on areas where it has the greatest added value for citizens and is as efficient and effective as possible in delivering the common policy objectives of the Union. Making existing and new spending programmes and activities entailing significant spending subject to evaluation can help achieve those objectives.

(28)

In order to implement the Commission’s commitment to be digital by default and to foster more efficient and qualitative controls and audits by increasing the level of assurance while decreasing the cost, it is appropriate to introduce an explicit reference to the use of digital tools and emerging technologies such as machine learning, robotic process automation, data-mining and artificial intelligence.

(29)

In order to enhance the protection of the budget against irregularities including fraud, corruption, conflicts of interest and double funding, standardised measures to collect, compare and aggregate information on recipients of Union funds should be introduced. In particular, in order to effectively prevent, detect, investigate and correct frauds or remedy irregularities, it is necessary to be able to identify the natural persons that ultimately benefit, directly or indirectly, from Union funding or the misuse of that funding. The electronic recording and storage of data on recipients of Union funds, including their beneficial owners as defined in Article 3, point (6), of Directive (EU) 2015/849 of the European Parliament and of the Council (14), and the regular making of those data available in a single integrated and interoperable information and monitoring system, including a single data-mining and risk-scoring tool (single integrated IT system) provided by the Commission should facilitate risk assessment for the purposes of selection, award, financial management, monitoring, investigation, control and audit and contribute to effective prevention, detection, correction and follow-up of irregularities including fraud, corruption, conflicts of interest and double funding. The rules related to the recording, storage, transfer and processing of data should comply with applicable data protection rules. The single integrated IT system should be developed with a view to avoiding double reporting and reducing administrative burden for Member States and other implementing entities. The Commission should act as the controller and be responsible for the development, management and supervision of the single integrated IT system. Member States, Union investigative, control and audit bodies including the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF), the Court of Auditors and the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (the ‘EPPO’) should have access to those data within the exercise of their respective competences. Such access should respect the principles of necessity and proportionality. Data available through the single integrated IT system should be made available to the European Parliament and the Council on a case-by-case basis to the extent necessary and proportionate to the exercise of their respective competences, in the context of the discharge procedure for the Commission.

(30)

The single integrated IT system should be based on interoperability, whereby up-to-date information and data on recipients of Union funds should be retrieved from and transferred into that system, in an automatic way, in real time where feasible, using inter alia relevant national databases, internal systems of relevant national bodies and authorities, management and paying authorities, national public procurement and tender databases, publicly available data, and data from other Commission databases, thereby ensuring the comprehensiveness and completeness of the information and data.

(31)

The single integrated IT system should be designed and put in place in a way that would allow the aggregation of relevant information in connection with the same recipients across different Union funding programmes. It should only use risk indicators that are objective, proportionate, necessary for risk assessment, as well as based on reliable sources of up-to-date information and data, in real time where feasible. The single integrated IT system should be designed for its use in line with general data protection principles, including data minimisation and storage limitation, applicable to the processing of personal data.

(32)

For the purpose of ensuring that the functions of the single integrated IT system remain of a high standard, certain actions and measures should be implemented where feasible, including alignment of data fields with the relevant national and Commission IT systems and databases, with necessary additions for the purpose of the data-mining and risk-scoring tool, including reference to the unique identifier of the operations; integration of the relevant national IT systems and databases with the single integrated IT system for an automatic exchange of information; providing users with the possibility to tailor and group risk indicators and their weights to the needs and specificities of a Union fund, programme or country; use of artificial intelligence for analysing and interpreting data; providing users with multiple possibilities for using search options and filtering capabilities; providing users with guidance on the interpretation and use of data and results; and training on how to navigate the single integrated IT system, assess risks and take them into account in verifications and audits.

(33)

In accordance with the principle of transparency enshrined in Article 15 TFEU, Union institutions are to conduct their work as openly as possible. With regard to budget implementation, the application of that principle implies that citizens should know where, and for what purpose, funds are spent by the Union. Such information fosters democratic debate, contributes to the participation of citizens in the Union’s decision-making process, reinforces institutional control and scrutiny over Union expenditure, and contributes to boosting its credibility. Communication should be more targeted and should aim to increase the visibility of the Union contribution for citizens. Such objectives should be achieved by the publication, preferably using modern communication tools, of relevant information concerning all recipients of funds financed from the budget which takes into account those recipients’ legitimate interests of confidentiality and security and, as far as natural persons are concerned, their right to privacy and the protection of their personal data. Union institutions should therefore adopt a selective approach in the publication of information, in accordance with the principle of proportionality. Decisions to publish should be based on relevant criteria in order to provide meaningful information.

(34)

Without prejudice to the rules on the protection of personal data, the utmost transparency regarding information on recipients should be sought. The information on recipients of Union funds should be published on a centralised and dedicated website of Union institutions, such as the Financial Transparency System, and should be easily available via suitable and secure technical solutions. Publication requirements should cover all methods of budget implementation, including by other Union institutions and bodies.

(35)

It should be possible for the Commission to implement the budget indirectly through Member State organisations. For reasons of legal certainty, it is therefore appropriate to define a Member State organisation as an entity established in a Member State as a public-law body, or as a body governed by private law entrusted with a public-service mission and provided with adequate financial guarantees by that Member State. Financial backing provided to such private-law bodies by a Member State in accordance with existing requirements set out in Union law, in a form decided by that Member State and not necessarily requiring a bank guarantee, should be considered as adequate financial guarantees.

(36)

Personal data referring to natural persons should not be publicly available for longer than the period during which the funds are being used by the recipient and should therefore be removed after two years.

(37)

In most of the cases covered by this Regulation, the publication concerns legal persons. Where natural persons are concerned, the publication of personal data should respect the principle of proportionality between the importance of the amount granted and the need to control the best use of the funds. In such cases, the publication of the region on level 2 of the common classification of territorial units for statistics (NUTS) is consistent with the objective of publication of information on recipients and ensures equal treatment between Member States of different sizes while respecting the recipients’ right to private life and, in particular, the protection of their personal data.

(38)

For reasons of legal certainty and in accordance with the principle of proportionality, the situations in which publication should not take place should be specified. For example, information should not be published with regard to scholarships or other forms of direct support paid to natural persons most in need, to certain contracts with a very low value or to financial support below a certain threshold provided through financial instruments or budgetary guarantees, or in cases where disclosure risks threatening the rights and freedoms of the individuals concerned as protected by the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union or causing harm to the commercial interests of the recipients. For grants, however, there should be no special exemption from the obligation to publish information on the basis of a specific threshold, in order to maintain the current practice and to allow for transparency.

(39)

Where personal data of recipients is published for the purposes of transparency in relation to the use of Union funds and the control of award procedures, those recipients should be informed of such publication, as well as of their rights and the procedures applicable for exercising those rights, in accordance with Regulations (EU) 2018/1725 and (EU) 2016/679 (15) of the European Parliament and of the Council.

(40)

In order to ensure that the principle of equal treatment is respected for all recipients, the information related to natural persons should also be published, in line with the obligation for Member States to establish a large degree of transparency for contracts above the thresholds laid down in Directive 2014/24/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council (16).

(41)

In the case of indirect and shared management, the persons, entities or designated bodies implementing Union funds should make available information on recipients and final recipients. In the case of shared management, the information should be published in accordance with sector-specific rules. Member States that receive and implement Union funds under direct management should make available information on their recipients in accordance with this Regulation. The Commission should make available information about a single website, including a reference to its address, where the information on recipients and final recipients can be found.

(42)

In the interest of increased readability and transparency of data on financial instruments implemented under direct and indirect management, it is appropriate to merge all reporting requirements into one single working document to be attached to the draft budget.

(43)

In order to ensure transparency, avoid certain duplications and align the timing of reporting with the availability of the relevant data, while ensuring no information is lost, the information on budgetary guarantees, the common provisioning fund and contingent liabilities covered under the own resources ceiling should be regrouped under those three categories and presented in a comprehensive way in the respective reports.

(44)

In order to increase transparency and accuracy in reporting, the information on financial instruments presented in the working document attached to the draft budget should include information on realised losses from assets.

(45)

In order to ensure synchronisation with the timeline for the adoption of the statement of estimates, the working document on the building policy of the Commission should be attached to the draft budget.

(46)

In order to promote best practices in the implementation of the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF), the European Social Fund (ESF), the Cohesion Fund, the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD), and the European Maritime, Fisheries and Aquaculture Fund (EMFAF), as well as the European Agricultural Guarantee Fund (EAGF), the Commission should, for information purposes, be able to make available to bodies responsible for management and control activities a non-binding methodological guide setting out its own control strategy and approach, including checklists, and examples of best practice. That guide should be updated whenever necessary.

(47)

Case law (17) obliging the Commission to pay interest or other charge due on the amounts of fines cancelled or reduced by the Court of Justice of the European Union generated a new, unforeseeable situation. It is therefore necessary to allow the deduction from the revenue of the budget of any interest or other charge due on the amounts of cancelled or reduced fines, other penalties or sanctions, including any negative return related to those amounts. This exception to the prohibition on negative revenue should be limited to that specific situation. In order to comply with the general principle of restoration to the prior state (restitutio in integrum) applicable to fines, other penalties or sanctions imposed by Union institutions that are later cancelled or reduced by the Court of Justice of the European Union, it is necessary to provide that any negative return on the provisionally collected amount of such fines, other penalties or sanctions imposed by Union institutions not be deducted from the amount to be repaid. To compensate for the loss of enjoyment of monies from the date the concerned third parties provisionally paid the fine to the Commission until the date of repayment, the amount to be repaid should be increased by interest at the rate applied by the European Central Bank to its principal refinancing operations increased by one and a half percentage points as an adequate compensation for such third parties in such situations, which excludes the need to apply any other interest rate on that amount. Furthermore, that rate corresponds to the interest rate applicable in relation to the debtor when the debtor chooses to defer the payment of a fine, other penalty or sanction, and provides a financial guarantee instead of payment. Such interest and charges should only be deducted as negative revenue until 31 December 2027, pending a definitive solution for the multiannual financial framework after 2027 relative to the rate of interest and other charges that should be paid as adequate compensation for the reimbursement of cancelled or reduced fines, other penalties or sanctions. This definitive solution should take stock of past experience and expected future developments and should be in line with the application of the budgetary principles laid down in this Regulation. In order to secure sufficient cash flow to compensate the concerned third parties for the loss of enjoyment of monies where a fine, other penalty or sanction has been cancelled or their amount has been reduced, it could be necessary to allow for the amounts received by way of fines, other penalties or sanctions and any accrued interest or other income generated by them to be entered in the budget by the end of the following financial year. In order to ensure full transparency of this mechanism, the Commission should provide all information available in the framework of the annual budgetary procedure to the European Parliament and to the Council.

(48)

In view of the increased volume of borrowing and lending operations carried out by the Commission on behalf of the Union to finance the recovery from the COVID-19 pandemic, transparency regarding those operations should be further enhanced. To address the increased complexity of those operations and in order to ensure better visibility of their content, a comprehensive overview of borrowing and lending operations carried out by the Commission should be added to the document annexed to the section of the budget relating to the Commission. That overview should include inter alia, detailed information on maturities, schedule of payments, interest due on aggregate level, the investor base on the primary market, and, where applicable the dimension and costs of the common liquidity pool underpinning the diversified funding strategy, as well as the borrowing plan. In addition, that overview should lay out the underlying data and the methodology used by the Commission to calculate the interest incurred and estimate the interest due, without including any market-sensitive information.

(49)

It is appropriate to provide for the possibility for Union institutions to conclude service-level agreements with each other in order to facilitate the implementation of their appropriations and also for the possibility to conclude such agreements between departments of Union institutions, Union bodies, European offices, bodies or persons entrusted with implementation of specific actions in the common foreign and security policy (CFSP) pursuant to Title V of the TEU and the Office of the Secretary-General of the Board of Governors of the European schools for the provision of services, supply of products or execution of works or of building contracts.

(50)

For reasons of legal certainty, it is necessary to clarify that the applicable law, under which any appropriate actions are to be taken with regard to conflicts of interest, includes Union and national law relating to conflicts of interest.

(51)

In order to increase inclusiveness, private or Union law bodies established in a Member State and eligible to be entrusted, in accordance with sector-specific rules, with the implementation of Union funds or budgetary guarantees, should be added to the list of entities to which budget implementation tasks can be entrusted insofar as they are controlled by public law bodies or private law bodies with public service mission eligible under indirect management, and are provided with adequate financial guarantees. Where such private or Union law bodies do not benefit from financial backing provided by a Member State, adequate financial guarantees should take the form of joint and several liability by the controlling bodies or equivalent financial guarantees.

(52)

It is appropriate to lay down the procedure for setting up new European offices and to distinguish between obligatory and non-obligatory tasks of such offices. A possibility for Union institutions, Union bodies and other European offices to delegate the powers of the authorising officer to the director of a European office should be introduced. European offices should also have the possibility to conclude service-level agreements for the provision of services, supply of products or execution of works or of building contracts. It is appropriate to set out specific rules for the drawing-up of accounting records, provisions authorising the accounting officer of the Commission to delegate some of his or her tasks to staff in those offices and operating procedures for bank accounts which the Commission should be able to open in the name of a European office.

(53)

In order to improve the cost-effectiveness of executive agencies and in light of the practical experience gained with other Union bodies, it should be possible to entrust the accounting officer of the Commission with all or part of the tasks of the accounting officer of the executive agency concerned.

(54)

For reasons of legal certainty, it is necessary to clarify that directors of executive agencies act as authorising officers by delegation when managing operational appropriations of programmes delegated to their agencies. To achieve the full effect of efficiency gains resulting from a global centralisation of certain support services, the possibility for executive agencies to implement administrative expenditure should be explicitly provided for.

(55)

It is necessary to establish rules on the powers and responsibilities of financial actors, in particular authorising officers and accounting officers.

(56)

The European Parliament, the Council, the Court of Auditors and the accounting officer of the Commission should be informed of the appointment or termination of the duties of an authorising officer by delegation, internal auditor and accounting officer within two weeks of such appointment or termination.

(57)

Authorising officers should be fully responsible for all revenue and expenditure operations executed under their authority, and for internal control systems, and should be held accountable for their actions, including, where necessary, through disciplinary proceedings.

(58)

The tasks, responsibilities and principles of the procedures to be observed by the authorising officers should also be laid down. Authorising officers by delegation should ensure that the authorising officers by subdelegation and their staff receive information and training concerning the control standards and the respective methods and techniques and that measures are taken in order to ensure the functioning of the control system. The authorising officer by delegation should report to his or her Union institution on the performance of the duties in the form of an annual report. That report should include the required financial and management information to support that officer’s declaration of assurance on the performance of his or her duties, including the information on the overall performance of the operations carried out. The supporting documents relating to the operations carried out should be kept for at least five years. The various forms of negotiated procedure for the award of public contracts should be the subject of a special report from the authorising officer by delegation to the Union institution concerned and of a report from that Union institution to the European Parliament and to the Council, since those procedures represent derogations from the usual award procedures.

(59)

The double role of Heads of Union delegations, and of their deputies in their absence, as authorising officers by subdelegation for the European External Action Service (EEAS) and, as regards operational appropriations, for the Commission should be taken into account.

(60)

The delegation of powers of budget implementation by the Commission concerning the operational appropriations of its own section of the budget to the deputy Heads of Union delegations should be restricted to situations where the performance of those tasks by the deputy Heads of Union delegations is strictly necessary in order to ensure business continuity during the absence of Heads of Union delegations. The deputy Heads of Union delegations should not be allowed to exercise those powers on a systematic basis or for reasons of internal work division.

(61)

The accounting officer should be responsible for the proper implementation of payments, the collection of revenue and the recovery of amounts receivable. The accounting officer should manage the treasury, bank accounts and third-party files, keep the accounts and be responsible for drawing up the financial statements of Union institutions. The accounting officer of the Commission should be the only person who is entitled to lay down the accounting rules and the harmonised charts of accounts, while the accounting officers of all other Union institutions should lay down accounting procedures applicable in their institutions.

(62)

The arrangements for the appointment and termination of the duties of the accounting officer should also be established.

(63)

The accounting officer should set up procedures to ensure that the accounts opened for the requirements of treasury management and imprest accounts are not in debit.

(64)

It is appropriate to align the means of payment authorised for treasury management with modern payment methods, including credit cards and electronic wallets.

(65)

Considering that payments by Union delegations through the standard rules for budgetary, treasury and accounting operations (budgetary procedures) are increasingly executed through the central treasury and, as a consequence, the number of transactions and the amounts paid through imprest accounts decrease, it is appropriate to simplify the rules on the creation, administration and control of imprest accounts.

(66)

The conditions for the use of imprest accounts, a system of management which constitutes an exception to normal budgetary procedures and only concerns limited amounts, should be laid down, and the tasks and responsibilities of the imprest administrators, as well as those of the authorising officer and the accounting officer in connection with the control of imprest accounts, should be set out. For reasons of efficiency, imprest accounts should be set up in Union delegations for appropriations from both the sections of the budget relating to the Commission and to the EEAS. It is also appropriate to allow, under specific conditions, for the use of imprest accounts in the Union delegation for payments of limited amounts by budgetary procedures. As regards the appointment of imprest administrators, it should be possible to select them also from personnel employed by the Commission in the field of crisis-management aid and humanitarian aid operations whenever there is no available Commission staff covered by the Staff Regulations of Officials of the European Union and the Conditions of Employment of Other Servants of the Union, laid down in Council Regulation (EEC, Euratom, ECSC) No 259/68 (18) (Staff Regulations).

(67)

In order to take into account the situation in the field of crisis-management aid and humanitarian aid operations whenever there are no Commission staff covered by the Staff Regulations available and the technical difficulties to have all legal commitments signed by the authorising officer responsible, it should be allowed for the personnel employed by the Commission in that field to enter into legal commitments of a very low value up to EUR 2 500 which are linked to the payments executed from imprest accounts, and for Heads of Union delegations or their deputies to enter into legal commitments on the instruction of the authorising officer responsible of the Commission.

(68)

Once the tasks and responsibilities of financial actors have been defined, it is only possible to hold them liable under the conditions laid down in the Staff Regulations. Specialised financial irregularities panels have been set up in Union institutions pursuant to Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 966/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council (19). However, due to the limited number of cases submitted to them and for reasons of efficiency, it is appropriate to transfer their functions to an interinstitutional panel established pursuant to this Regulation (the ‘panel’). The panel should be set up to assess requests and issue recommendations on the need to take decisions on exclusion and imposition of financial penalties referred to it by the Commission or other Union institutions and bodies, without prejudice to their administrative autonomy in respect of members of their staff. That transfer also aims to avoid duplication and to mitigate the risks of contradictory recommendations or opinions, in cases where both an economic operator and a member of staff of a Union institution or body are involved. It is necessary to maintain the procedure by which it is possible for an authorising officer to seek confirmation of an instruction which that officer considers to be irregular or contrary to the principle of sound financial management, and thus be released from any liability. The composition of the panel should be modified when it fulfils this role. The panel should have no investigative powers.

(69)

As regards revenue, it is necessary to address negative adjustments of own resources covered by Council Regulations (EU, Euratom) No 609/2014 (20) and (EU, Euratom) 2021/770 (21). Except in the case of own resources, it is necessary to maintain the existing tasks and controls falling within the responsibility of the authorising officers at the different stages of the procedure: establishment of the estimate of amounts receivable, issuing of recovery orders, dispatch of the debit note informing the debtor that the amount receivable has been established and the decision, where necessary, to waive an entitlement subject to criteria guaranteeing compliance with sound financial management in order to ensure an efficient collection of revenue.

(70)

The authorising officer should be able to waive totally or partially the recovery of an established amount receivable when the debtor has entered into any of the insolvency proceedings as defined in Regulation (EU) 2015/848 of the European Parliament and of the Council (22), in particular in cases of judicial arrangements, compositions and analogous proceedings.

(71)

Specific provisions on procedures for the adjustment or the reduction to zero of an estimate of the amount receivable should be laid down.

(72)

It is necessary to clarify the timing of the entry in the budget of amounts received by way of fines, other penalties and sanctions, and of any accrued interest or other income generated by them.

(73)

Due to the recent developments on the financial markets and the interest rate applied by the European Central Bank to its principal refinancing operations, it is necessary to review the provisions concerning the interest rate for fines or other penalties.

(74)

To reflect the specific nature of amounts receivable consisting in fines or other penalties imposed by Union institutions under the TFEU or the Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom Treaty), it is necessary to introduce specific provisions on the interest rates applicable to amounts due but not yet paid, in the event that such amounts are increased by the Court of Justice of the European Union.

(75)

The rules on recovery should be both clarified and strengthened. In particular, it should be specified that the accounting officer is to recover amounts by offsetting them also against amounts owed to the debtor by an executive agency when it implements the budget.

(76)

In order to guarantee legal certainty and transparency, rules regarding the deadlines within which a debit note is to be sent should be laid down.

(77)

In order to secure the management of assets whilst prioritising the aim of security and liquidity of the monies, the amounts relating to fines, other penalties or sanctions imposed under the TFEU or the Euratom Treaty, such as competition fines which are being contested, should be collected on a provisional basis. It should also be possible for the Commission to invest those amounts in financial assets, and to determine the assignment of the return on them. Since the Commission is not the only Union institution which is entitled to impose fines, other penalties or sanctions, it is necessary to lay down provisions concerning such fines, other penalties or sanctions imposed by other Union institutions and to lay down rules for their recovery which should be equivalent to those applicable to the Commission.

(78)

In order to ensure that the Commission has all the necessary information for the adoption of financing decisions, it is necessary to lay down the minimum requirements for the contents of financing decisions on grants, procurement, Union trust funds for external actions (Union trust funds), prizes, financial instruments, blending facilities or platforms and budgetary guarantees. At the same time, in order to give a longer-term perspective to the potential recipients, it is necessary to allow for financing decisions to be adopted for more than one financial year while specifying that the implementation is subject to the availability of budget appropriations for the respective financial years. Furthermore, it is necessary to reduce the number of the elements required for the financing decision. In line with the aim of simplification, the financing decision should at the same time constitute an annual or multiannual work programme. Since contributions to the Union bodies referred to in Articles 70 and 71 are already established in the budget, there should be no requirement to adopt a specific financing decision in that respect.

(79)

As regards expenditure, the relationship between financing decisions, global budgetary commitments and individual budgetary commitments as well as the concepts of budgetary and legal commitment should be clarified in order to establish a clear framework for the different stages of budget implementation.

(80)

In order to take into account in particular the number of legal commitments entered into by Union delegations and Union representations and the exchange-rate fluctuations experienced by them, provisional budgetary commitments should be possible also in cases where the final payee and the amount are known.

(81)

In order to align the EAGF with the general accounting and budgetary procedures as soon as it is technically possible, it should be allowed to proceed with individual budgetary commitments to make the payments, without the need to first make a global provisional commitment to make the payments followed by individual commitments within a period of up to two months, or, under certain conditions, a longer period. Furthermore, to be able to proceed with individual budgetary commitments and payments for the first month of the financial year in December, routine management expenditure for the EAGF should be added to the types of expenditure for which payments made in advance are authorised.

(82)

As regards the typology of payments which it is possible for authorising officers to make, clarification of the various types of payments should be provided, in accordance with the principle of sound financial management. The rules for clearing of pre-financing payments should further be clarified, in particular for situations where no interim clearing is possible. To that effect, appropriate provisions should be included in legal commitments entered into.

(83)

This Regulation should stipulate that payments are to be made within specified time limits and that, in the event of failure to respect such time limits, creditors will be entitled to default interests to be charged to the budget, except in the case of Member States, the European Investment Bank (EIB) and the European Investment Fund (EIF).

(84)

The core elements of electronic invoices in public procurement should be based on the rules set out in Directive 2014/55/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council (23).

(85)

For the sake of clarity, the definition of unsuitable tenders in public procurement should be revised to include tenders where the economic operator does not have access to procurement.

(86)

It is necessary to clarify that specific contracts under framework contracts concluded with a single economic operator can be awarded and modified within the limits of the terms foreseen in the framework contract.

(87)

Considering that the ex ante publicity measures are the same for open, restricted and competitive procedures with negotiation, the use of a negotiated procedure without prior publication of a contract notice following an unsuccessful competitive procedure with negotiation should be allowed under certain conditions.

(88)

It is necessary to exclude from the scope of the procurement rules of this Regulation the document certification and authentication services provided by notaries, in cases where the procedures governing such services in the Member State concerned are not open to competition.

(89)

It is appropriate to provide for the possibility of having negotiated procedures without prior publication for services provided by Member State organisations which cannot participate in competitive procedures.

(90)

In order to ensure compliance with the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (24), the authorising officer should request the evidence for exclusion and selection criteria to be submitted before the award decision.

(91)

It is appropriate to integrate the provisions concerning validation and authorisation of expenditure in one article and to introduce a definition of ‘decommitments’. Since the transactions are carried out in computerised systems, the signing of a ‘passed for payment’ voucher in order to express the validation decision should be replaced by an electronically secured signature, except in a limited number of cases. It is also necessary to clarify that the validation of expenditure applies to all eligible costs, including, as is the case for the clearing of pre-financing, costs which are not associated with a payment request.

(92)

In order to reduce complexity, streamline existing rules and improve the readability of this Regulation, rules common to more than one budget implementation instrument should be established. For those reasons, certain provisions should be regrouped, the wording and scope of other provisions should be aligned and unnecessary repetitions and cross-referencing should be removed.

(93)

Each Union institution should establish an internal audit progress committee tasked with ensuring the independence of the internal auditor, monitoring the quality of the internal audit work and ensuring that internal and external audit recommendations are properly taken into account and followed up by its services. The composition of that internal audit progress committee should be decided by each Union institution, taking into account its organisational autonomy and the importance of independent expert advice.

(94)

More emphasis should be put on performance and results of projects financed from the budget. It is thus appropriate to define an additional form of financing not linked to costs of the relevant operations in addition to the forms of Union contribution already well established (reimbursement of the eligible costs actually incurred, unit cost, lump sums and flat-rate financing). The additional form of financing should be based on the fulfilment of certain conditions ex ante or on the achievement of results measured by reference to previously set milestones or through performance indicators.

(95)

When the Union contribution takes the form of financing not linked to costs and where reimbursement is based on results, the achievement of those results should be measured by either pre-defined milestones or targets, and the achievement of such milestones or targets should be verified before the contribution is paid. Records and supporting documents linked to the achievement of the targets or milestones should be retained for the purposes of ex post checks or audits, including by the Court of Auditors.

(96)

Where the Commission carries out assessments of the operational and financial capacity of recipients of Union funds or of their systems and procedures, it should be able to rely on the assessments already conducted by itself, other entities or donors such as national agencies and international organisations, in order to avoid duplicating assessments of the same recipients. The possibility for cross-reliance on assessments conducted by other entities should be used where such assessments were made in compliance with conditions equivalent to those set out in this Regulation for the applicable method of implementation. Therefore, in order to foster cross-reliance on assessments among donors, the Commission should promote the recognition of internationally accepted standards or international best practices.

(97)

It is also important to avoid situations in which recipients of Union funds are audited several times by different entities on the use of those funds. It should therefore be possible to rely on audits already carried out by independent auditors provided that there is sufficient evidence of their competence and independence and provided that the audit work is based on internationally accepted audit standards providing reasonable assurance, and that they have been conducted on the financial statements and reports setting out the use of the Union contribution. Such audits should then form the basis of the overall assurance on the use of Union funds. To that end, it is important to ensure that the report of the independent auditor and the related audit documentation is made available on request to the European Parliament, the Commission, the Court of Auditors and the audit authorities of Member States.

(98)

For the purpose of relying on assessments and audits and in order to reduce the administrative burden on persons and entities receiving Union funds, it is important to ensure that any information already available at Union institutions, managing authorities or other bodies and entities implementing Union funds, is reused to avoid multiple requests to recipients or beneficiaries.

(99)

In order to provide for a long-term cooperation mechanism with recipients, the possibility of signing financial framework partnership agreements should be provided for. Financial framework partnerships should be implemented through grants or through contribution agreements with persons and entities implementing Union funds. For that purpose, the minimum content of such contribution agreements should be specified. Financial framework partnerships should not unduly restrict access to Union funding.

(100)

The conditions and procedures for suspending, terminating or reducing a Union contribution should be harmonised across the different budget implementation instruments such as grants, procurement, indirect management, prizes, etc. The grounds for such suspension, termination or reduction should be defined. Where irregularities or fraud are subsequently discovered to have taken place during an award procedure, the authorising officer responsible should take certain corrective measures unless it is justified not to do so, for example where implementation of the legal commitment is in the interests of the institution or body concerned, or where there is a need to guarantee continuity of service.

(101)

This Regulation should establish standard periods for which documents relating to Union contributions should be kept by recipients so as to avoid divergent or disproportionate contractual requirements while still providing the Commission, the Court of Auditors and OLAF with sufficient time to obtain access to such data and documents and perform the ex post checks and audits. In addition, any person or entity receiving Union funds should be obliged to cooperate in the protection of the financial interests of the Union.

(102)

In order to provide adequate information to participants and recipients and to ensure that they have the possibility to exercise their right of defence, participants and recipients should be allowed to submit their observations before adoption of any measure adversely affecting their rights and they should be informed of the means of redress available to them for challenging such a measure.

(103)

In the context of an award procedure, it is not necessary for the authorising officer responsible to provide an opportunity to a participant to submit observations where that participant has been rejected from an award procedure. In order to ensure legal certainty, this should also be specified in the provision on adversarial procedures and means of redress.

(104)

Considering the increasingly challenging geopolitical environment with rapidly evolving hybrid and cyber threats, as well as the need for a digital transformation with its inherent exposure to technical vulnerabilities, the Union needs to ensure the protection of the security and the public order of the Union or its Member States, as reflected in public policy and law. This concerns the preservation of fundamental interests of society such as ensuring the security of energy supply, combating organised crime and fraud. Whilst respecting any international agreements of the Union, the award of Union funds in relation to strategic assets and interests, such as digital or space infrastructure, communication and information systems and services, can require the application of specific conditions to ensure such protection including for the integrity of communication and information systems, and of related supply chains. The types of conditions and requirements for applying them should be clarified. Nonetheless, specific conditions laid down in this Regulation are not exhaustive, and it is possible for a basic act to include specific conditions provided that it does not modify or derogate from requirements and procedures laid down in this Regulation in respect of the protection of security and public order.

(105)

In order to protect the financial interests of the Union, a single early detection and exclusion system should be set up by the Commission.

(106)

The early detection and exclusion system should apply to participants, recipients, entities on whose capacity the candidate or tenderer intends to rely, subcontractors of a contractor, beneficial owners and affiliated entities of an excluded entity, natural persons, guarantors, as well as any person or entity receiving Union funds where the budget is implemented under indirect management, any person or entity receiving Union funds under financial instruments implemented under direct management, participants or recipients on which entities implementing the budget under shared management have provided information, and sponsors.

(107)

In order to enhance the protection of Union financial interests, the early detection and exclusion system should be reinforced. It is important to avoid that a person or entity in an exclusion situation is able to apply for or to be selected for implementing Union funds, or to receive such funds under a programme in shared management. Where there is a final judgment or a final administrative decision, the authorising officer responsible should be able to exclude a person or entity, provided that the latter is in an exclusion situation and deemed not reliable due to having engaged in certain types of serious misconduct. Without prejudice to information obligations set out in other basic acts, persons and entities implementing the budget under shared management should convey to the Commission, through any official channel, such as the automated information system established by the Commission currently in use for reporting of fraud and irregularities (the ‘Irregularity Management System’), information pertaining to established facts and findings, in the context of such final judgments or final administrative decisions only with reference to the grounds set out under Article 138(1), points (c)(iv) and (d), when they become aware of such information. In the absence of a final judgment or a final administrative decision, the authorising officer responsible should be able to exclude, on the basis of a preliminary classification in law made by the panel, having regard to facts and findings established in the context of audits or investigations carried out by OLAF, the EPPO or the Court of Auditors or any other check, audit or control performed under the responsibility of the authorising officer. Such exclusion should be registered in the early detection and exclusion system database. Persons and entities implementing the budget under shared management should consult the early detection and exclusion system database prior to awarding Union funds or selecting participants and beneficiaries. This consultation should concern the person or entity applying for or selected to implement Union funds. To ensure the effective implementation of the early detection and exclusion system, the competent authorities of the Member States should enforce the exclusions recorded in the database with regard to such persons or entities applying for or selected to implement Union funds for the entire duration of the exclusion. That exclusion should uphold the integrity of the procurement or selection process and safeguard it against the participation of individuals or entities involved in a serious misconduct. Payment applications from Member States under shared management, including expenditure related to a person or entity that has been excluded, should not be reimbursed. Where funds are disbursed to Member States under performance-based frameworks, specific rules should apply, as set out in sector-specific rules.

(108)

It is important to underline that early detection and exclusion system should only apply in respect of Union funds disbursed to the Member States under direct management, where Member States have the responsibility to take all the appropriate measures to protect the financial interests of the Union, to the extent that the Commission has relevant responsibilities under the respective legal framework. Therefore, the responsibilities of the Commission should be limited to the obligation to refer a case to the panel for the purpose of excluding a person or entity if the authorising officer becomes aware of serious misconduct following final judgments, final administrative decisions, or facts and findings established in the context of audits or investigations carried out concerning those funds by OLAF, the EPPO or the Court of Auditors or any other check, audit, or control performed under the responsibility of the authorising officer. Without prejudice to these responsibilities of the Commission, the Member States remain responsible to verify the information on decisions of exclusion registered in the early detection and exclusion system database, to enforce such decisions and to ensure that no payment application is submitted in respect of a person or entity that is in such an exclusion situation. Without prejudice to sector-specific rules and voluntary application, the early detection and exclusion system should not apply to Regulation (EU) 2021/241 of the European Parliament and of the Council (25).

(109)

It should be clarified that, where a decision to register a person or entity in the early detection and exclusion system database is taken on the basis of an exclusion situation relating to a natural or legal person that is a member of the administrative, management or supervisory body of that person or entity, or that has powers of representation, decision or control with regard to that person or entity, or to a natural or legal person that assumes unlimited liability for the debts of that person or entity or to a natural person who is essential for the award or for the implementation of the legal commitment, the information registered in the database is to include the information concerning those persons.

(110)

The decision on the exclusion of a person or entity from participation in award procedures or the imposition of a financial penalty on a person or entity and the decision on the publication of the related information should be taken by the authorising officers responsible, in light of their autonomy in administrative matters. In the absence of a final judgment or final administrative decision and in cases related to a serious breach of contract, the authorising officers responsible should take their decision on the basis of a preliminary classification in law, having regard to the recommendation of the panel. The panel should also assess the duration of an exclusion in cases where the duration has not been set by the final judgment or the final administrative decision.

(111)

The role of the panel should be to ensure the coherent operation of the early detection and exclusion system. The panel should be composed of a standing chair, a standing vice-chair who should deputise for the chair, two representatives of the Commission and a representative of the requesting authorising officer.

(112)

In order to align the early detection and exclusion system to public procurement rules and to enhance its effectiveness, attempting to influence the award of Union funds or unduly obtaining Union funds including in relation to conflicts of interest should be explicitly included as a specific situation of exclusion under the ground of grave professional misconduct.

(113)

Having due regard to the principle of proportionality, the authorising officer responsible should exclude a person or entity when it has shown lack of integrity by having engaged in any wrongful conduct that is incompatible with the values enshrined in Article 2 TEU and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, such as incitement to discrimination, hatred or violence against a group of persons or a member of a group, where the conduct may negatively affect the performance of the contract.

(114)

An autonomous ground for exclusion should be added in the case of intentional and unjustified lack of cooperation in the context of investigations, checks or audits carried out by an authorising officer, OLAF, the EPPO or the Court of Auditors as this can have severe implications on the protection of the financial interests of the Union.

(115)

The preliminary classification in law does not prejudge the final assessment of the conduct of the person or entity concerned by the competent authorities of Member States under national law. The recommendation of the panel, as well as the decision of the authorising officer responsible, should therefore be reviewed following the notification of such a final assessment.

(116)

A person or entity should be excluded by the authorising officer responsible where it has been established by a final judgment or a final administrative decision that the person or entity is guilty of grave professional misconduct, of non-compliance, whether intentional or not, with the obligations relating to the payment of social security contributions or taxes, of the creation of an entity in a different jurisdiction with the intent to circumvent fiscal, social or any other legal obligations, of fraud affecting the budget, of corruption, of conduct related to a criminal organisation, of money laundering or terrorist financing, of terrorist offences or offences related to terrorist activities, of child labour or other offences concerning trafficking in human beings or of the commitment of an irregularity. A person or entity should also be excluded in the event of a serious breach of a legal commitment, including breach of the requirement to perform any contract to the highest professional standard, or of bankruptcy or in cases of refusal to co-operate in investigations, checks or audits. In assessing these grounds for exclusion, unreasonably injurious acts condemned in international trade law could be considered a relevant factor, where they involve grave professional misconduct.

(117)

In accordance with the judgment of the General Court of 15 February 2023 (26), when taking a decision on the exclusion of a person or entity on the ground of grave professional misconduct, the authorising officer should rely on evidence that is sufficiently specific, convincing and concrete and is, therefore, capable of establishing clearly and unequivocally that the applicant engaged in wrongful conduct having an impact on its professional credibility which, moreover, would denote wrongful intent or gross negligence within the meaning of this Regulation.

(118)

When taking a decision on the exclusion of a person or entity, or the imposition of a financial penalty on a person or entity, and on the publication of the related information, the authorising officer responsible should ensure compliance with the principle of proportionality, in particular by taking into account the seriousness of the situation, its budgetary impact, the time which has elapsed since the relevant conduct, the duration of the conduct and its recurrence, whether the conduct was intentional or the degree of negligence shown and the degree of collaboration of the person or entity with the relevant competent authority and the contribution of that person or entity to the investigation.

(119)

The authorising officer responsible should also be able to exclude a person or entity where a natural or legal person assuming unlimited liability for the debts of the economic operator is bankrupt or in a similar situation of insolvency or where that natural or legal person fails to comply with its obligations to pay social security contributions or taxes, where such situations have an impact on the financial situation of that economic operator.

(120)

In order to further enhance the protection of the financial interests of the Union, it should be possible for the authorising officer to exclude or impose a financial penalty on beneficial owners and affiliated entities of the excluded entity that were involved in the misconduct of the excluded entity. The possibility to exclude beneficial owners and affiliated entities is intended to prevent that a person or entity that has been excluded from being selected to implement Union funds could continue to participate in procurement and award procedures, through a new company or existing affiliated entities.

(121)

In order to increase its effectiveness, the early detection and exclusion system should also apply to natural persons who are deemed responsible for the misconduct of an entity, so that they are unable to participate in award procedures or be selected to implement Union funds either in a personal capacity or through a new corporate identity, without prejudice to the right to be heard.

(122)

At the request of the authorising officer, the panel of the early detection and exclusion system should have the ability to issue its recommendations by means of an expedited procedure, without prejudice to the right to be heard. Such procedure should be used when the circumstances or the nature of the case requires so, for instance where a final judgment or a final administrative decision has been issued by a Member State’s authority but the duration of the exclusion is not set; or a final judgment or a final administrative decision has been issued by a third country; or a sanction equivalent to an exclusion has been already imposed on the person or entity by virtue of a decision of international organisations.

(123)

A person or entity should not be subject to a decision on exclusion when it has taken remedial measures, thus demonstrating its reliability. That possibility should not apply in cases of the most severe criminal activities.

(124)

In light of the principle of proportionality, a distinction should be made between cases where it is possible to impose a financial penalty as an alternative to exclusion, on the one hand, and cases where the gravity of the conduct of the recipient concerned in respect of attempting to unduly obtain Union funds justifies the imposition of a financial penalty in addition to the exclusion so as to ensure a deterrent effect, on the other. The maximum amount of the financial penalty which can be imposed by the contracting authority should also be defined.

(125)

A financial penalty should only be imposed on a recipient and not on a participant given that the amount of the financial penalty to be imposed is calculated on the basis of the value of the legal commitment at stake.

(126)

The possibility to take decisions on exclusion or to impose financial penalties is independent from the possibility to apply contractual penalties, such as liquidated damages.

(127)

The duration of an exclusion should be limited in time, as is the case under Directive 2014/24/EU, and should be in accordance with the principle of proportionality.

(128)

It is necessary to determine the commencement date and the duration of the limitation period for taking decisions on exclusion or imposing financial penalties.

(129)

It is important to be able to reinforce the deterrent effect achieved by the exclusion and the financial penalty. In that regard, the deterrent effect should be reinforced by the possibility to publish the information related to the exclusion and/or to the financial penalty in a manner that satisfies the data-protection requirements set out in Regulations (EU) 2018/1725 and (EU) 2016/679. Such publication should contribute to ensuring that the same conduct is not repeated. For reasons of legal certainty and in accordance with the principle of proportionality it should be specified in which situations a publication should not take place. In its assessment, the authorising officer responsible should have regard to any recommendation of the panel. As far as natural persons are concerned, personal data should only be published in exceptional circumstances justified by the seriousness of the conduct or its impact on the financial interests of the Union.

(130)

Information related to an exclusion or to a financial penalty should only be published in certain cases such as grave professional misconduct, fraud, a significant deficiency in complying with the main obligations of a legal commitment financed by the budget, or an irregularity, or where an entity is created in a different jurisdiction with the intent to circumvent fiscal, social or any other legal obligations.

(131)

The criteria for exclusion should be clearly separated from the criteria leading to a possible rejection from an award procedure.

(132)

The information on the early detection of risks and on decisions on exclusion and the imposition of financial penalties on a person or entity should be centralised. For that purpose, related information should be stored in a database set up and operated by the Commission as the owner of the centralised system. That system should operate in compliance with the right to privacy and the protection of personal data.

(133)

While the setting-up and the operation of the early detection and exclusion system should be the responsibility of the Commission, other Union institutions and bodies, as well as all persons and entities implementing Union funds under direct, shared and indirect management, should participate in that system by transmitting relevant information to the Commission. The authorising officer responsible and the panel should guarantee the right of defence of the person or entity. The same right should be given to a person or entity, in the context of an early detection, where an act envisaged by an authorising officer could adversely affect the rights of the person or entity concerned. In cases of fraud, corruption or any other illegal activity affecting the financial interests of the Union which are not yet subject to a final judgment, it should be possible for the authorising officer responsible to defer the notification of the person or entity and for the panel to defer the right of the person or entity to submit its observations. Such deferral should only be justified where there are compelling legitimate grounds to preserve the confidentiality of the investigation or of national judicial proceedings.

(134)

The Court of Justice of the European Union should be given unlimited jurisdiction with regard to decisions on exclusion and financial penalties imposed pursuant to this Regulation, in accordance with Article 261 TFEU.

(135)

In order to address attempts by entities to avoid possible adverse consequences of their misconduct, rules of notification should be established under precise conditions in the context of early detection and exclusion procedures. Furthermore, the use of electronic exchange system should apply to such procedures.

(136)

In order to facilitate the protection of the financial interests of the Union across all methods of budget implementation, it should be possible for the persons and entities involved in budget implementation to get access to the early detection and exclusion database and verify the exclusions decided upon by the authorising officers at Union level. The early detection and exclusion database should be consulted prior to awarding or selecting a person or entity for implementing and receiving Union funds. This is without prejudice to the possibility of consulting the database at other stages of the implementation of the legal commitment.

(137)

This Regulation should foster the objective of e-government, in particular the use of electronic data in the exchange of information between Union institutions and third parties.

(138)

Progress towards the electronic exchange of information and the electronic submission of documents, including e-procurement, where appropriate, which constitute a major simplification measure, should be accompanied by clear conditions for the acceptance of the systems to be used, so as to establish a legally sound environment while preserving flexibility in the management of Union funds for the participants, recipients and the authorising officers as provided for in this Regulation.

(139)

In order to improve governance and quality of interoperable digital public services, Member States, Union institutions, executive agencies and Union bodies should apply to the greatest possible extent the European Interoperability Framework.

(140)

Rules on the composition and tasks of the committee in charge of evaluating application documents in procurement procedures, grant award procedures and in contests for prizes should be laid down. It should be possible for the committee to include external experts where that possibility is provided for in the basic act.

(141)

In line with the principle of good administration, the authorising officer should request clarifications or missing documents while respecting the principle of equality of treatment and without substantially changing the application documents. The authorising officer should have the possibility to decide not to do so only in duly justified cases. In addition, the authorising officer should be able to correct an obvious clerical error or request the participant to correct it.

(142)

Sound financial management should require that the Commission protects itself by requesting guarantees at the time of paying pre-financing. The requirement for contractors and beneficiaries to lodge guarantees should not be automatic, but should be based on a risk analysis. Where, in the course of implementation, the authorising officer discovers that a guarantor is not or is no longer authorised to issue guarantees in accordance with the applicable national law, the authorising officer should be able to require replacement of the guarantee.

(143)

The different sets of rules for direct and indirect management, in particular as regards the concept of ‘budget implementation tasks’, have created confusion and entailed risks of errors of qualification both for the Commission and for its partners and should thus be simplified and harmonised.

(144)

The provisions on the ex ante pillar assessment of persons and entities implementing Union funds under indirect management should be revised to enable the Commission to rely as much as possible on the systems, rules and procedures, including due diligence, of those persons and entities which have been deemed equivalent to the ones used by the Commission. In addition, it is important to clarify that, where the assessment reveals areas in which the procedures in place are not sufficient to protect the financial interests of the Union, the Commission should be able to sign contribution agreements while taking appropriate supervisory measures. It is also important to clarify in which cases it is possible for the Commission to decide not to require an ex ante pillar assessment in order to sign contribution agreements.

(145)

In order to ensure efficient implementation of the budget, it is appropriate to further clarify the application of the principle of proportionality to indirect management. While the principle of proportionality cannot affect the nature of the obligations imposed by the relevant applicable legal framework, it should be systematically used in the cooperation with Union implementing partners, in order to strike the right balance between protection of the financial interests of the Union and preserving the Union’s ability to implement its policies. Certain adjustments and restructuring of the relevant provisions should be made. This should not be interpreted as limiting in practice the necessary rights and access required for the authorising officer responsible, for the EPPO in respect of those Member States participating in enhanced cooperation pursuant to Council Regulation (EU) 2017/1939 (27), for OLAF, for the Court of Auditors, and, where appropriate, for the relevant national authorities, to comprehensively exert their respective competences.

(146)

In line with the principle of proportionality, it is necessary to provide for an application of the obligations provided for by this Regulation to the final recipients receiving support from the budget under financial instruments or budgetary guarantees. This application should take into due consideration and be commensurate to the nature of the final recipients and of the action, and the financial risks involved. Unnecessary administrative burden should be avoided in particular where final recipients are micro enterprises and small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and comparable economic operators with equivalent turnover or balance sheet total.

(147)

The financial rules laid down in this Regulation should be kept simple and clear in order to avoid gold-plating and additional administrative burdens for the recipients of Union funds, Member States, Union institutions or other persons and entities implementing the budget.

(148)

The proportionality principle also needs to be applied to the assessment of rules, systems and procedures of entities that have already been successfully assessed, such as entities using rules established by the Commission, which should be exempted from ex ante assessment. It should also be possible to exempt from ex ante assessment Member States’ organisations entrusted with the implementation of Union funds under shared management.

(149)

It is necessary to clarify that when entities are selected to work under indirect management as a result of a call for expression of interest, the principles of equal treatment and non-discrimination apply.

(150)

Remuneration of persons and entities implementing the budget should, where relevant and possible, be performance-based.

(151)

To ensure the integrity of the budget when implemented under indirect management, it is appropriate to request from implementing partners that they inform the Commission of suspected cases of fraud, corruption or any other illegal activity and to include such obligation in agreements that they conclude with third parties under indirect management.

(152)

The Commission enters into partnerships with third countries by means of financing agreements. It is important to clarify the content of such financing agreements, in particular for those parts of an action that are implemented by the third country under indirect management.

(153)

It is important to recognise the specific nature of blending facilities or platforms where the Commission blends its contribution with that of finance institutions and to clarify the application of the provisions on financial instruments and budgetary guarantees.

(154)

Procurement rules and principles applicable to public contracts awarded by Union institutions on their own account should be based on the rules set out in Directive 2014/23/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council (28) and Directive 2014/24/EU.

(155)

Experience has shown that the application of the rules on procurement under this Regulation is not appropriate for the award of public contracts for financial services in connection with the issue, sale, purchase or transfer of securities or other financial instruments within the meaning of Directive 2014/65/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council (29), used by the Commission in the context of its borrowing and lending, asset management and treasury operations. This includes services provided by central banks, the European Stability Mechanism, EIB and other international financial institutions, and national entities entrusted with the issuance and management of sovereign debt. For that reason and in accordance with Article 10 of Directive 2014/24/EU the rules on procurement laid down in this Regulation should not apply to those services.

(156)

In light of the COVID-19 pandemic, it is appropriate to modify the definition of crisis, which applies in particular to the common provisions and to procurement in the field of external actions and should cover public and animal health, food security and food safety emergencies and global health threats. In order to allow the flexibility needed to ensure a rapid response to unforeseen circumstances of extreme urgency resulting from a crisis, the contracting authority should be allowed to apply simplified procurement rules, such as use of negotiated procedure without prior publication of a contract notice applicable to crisis situations and acceptance of evidence on exclusion and selection criteria from the presumed successful tenderer after the award decision but in any case before the signature of the contract. The contracting authority should also have flexibility to exceptionally modify a contract or a framework contract, beyond the applicable thresholds, without a procurement procedure in order to respond to a crisis. Moreover, in a situation of crisis it should be possible, exceptionally, to add new contracting authorities after the launch of a procurement procedure and before the contract signature or following a modification of a contract without restricting competition. A declaration of crisis should be required in line with the relevant internal rules prior to having recourse to such simplified rules, except for procurement in the field of external action where such declaration is not required. In addition, the authorising officers responsible should justify case-by-case the extreme urgency resulting from the declared crisis.

(157)

In the case of mixed contracts, the methodology of the contracting authorities for determining the applicable rules should be clarified.

(158)

The ex ante and ex post publicity measures necessary to launch a procurement procedure should be clarified for contracts equal to or greater than the thresholds set out in Directive 2014/24/EU, for contracts below those thresholds and for contracts falling outside the scope of that Directive.

(159)

This Regulation should include an exhaustive list of all the procurement procedures available to Union institutions regardless of the thresholds.

(160)

In the interests of administrative simplification and in order to encourage the participation of SMEs, negotiated procedures for middle-value contracts should be provided for.

(161)

Where necessary, it should be possible to carry out a joint procurement between, on the one hand, one or more contracting authorities from Member States and, on the other hand, Union institutions, Union bodies or executive agencies, without those institutions, bodies or agencies being bound to acquire works, supplies or services. In order to allow contracting authorities to fully benefit from the potential of the internal market in terms of economies of scale and risk-benefit sharing, the possibilities for Union institutions, Union bodies or executive agencies to purchase supplies or services on behalf of two or more Member States should be extended. A Union institution, Union body or an executive agency should be able to conduct the relevant procurement procedure on behalf or in the name of Member States based on an agreement between the parties, or act as a wholesaler, by buying, stocking and reselling or donating supplies and services, including rentals, to Member States or partner organisations it has selected. In accordance with rules on compliance of the secondary legislation with this Regulation, other Union legislative acts can contain more specific rules on joint procurement or procurement on behalf or in the name of Member States. When doing so, such acts should clearly indicate such derogations and state the specific reasons justifying them.

(162)

As is the case in Directive 2014/24/EU, this Regulation should allow for market consultation prior to the launch of a procurement procedure. In order to ensure that an innovation partnership is used only when the desired works, supplies and services do not exist on the market or as a near-to-market development activity, an obligation to carry out such preliminary market consultation before using an innovation partnership should be laid down in this Regulation.

(163)

The contribution of contracting authorities to the protection of the environment and the promotion of sustainable development, while ensuring that they obtain the best value for money for their contracts, in particular through requiring specific labels or through the use of appropriate award methods, should be clarified.

(164)

In line with the objectives of the European Green Deal, progress towards implementation of greening aspects should be ensured by including, when relevant, for the calls for tenders, green selection or award criteria, which will incentivise the economic operators to offer more sustainable options.

(165)

In order to ensure that, when executing contracts, economic operators comply with the applicable environmental, social and labour law obligations established by Union law, national law, collective agreements or the international social and environmental conventions listed in Annex X to Directive 2014/24/EU, such obligations should be part of the minimum requirements defined by the contracting authority and should be integrated in the contracts signed by the contracting authority.

(166)

It is appropriate that different cases usually referred to as situations of a conflict of interests be identified and treated distinctly. The notion of a ‘conflict of interests’ should be solely used for cases where a person or entity with responsibilities for budget programming, implementation, audit or control, or an official or an agent of a Union institution or national authorities at any level, is in such a situation. Attempts to unduly influence an award procedure or obtain confidential information should be treated as grave professional misconduct which can lead to the rejection from the award procedure and/or exclusion from Union funds. In addition, economic operators might be in a situation where they should not be selected to implement a contract because of a professional conflicting interest. For instance, a company should not evaluate a project in which it has participated or an auditor should not be in a position to audit accounts it has previously certified. The assessment of conflicts of interest, and the obligation to set up systems to detect and prevent such conflicts, should respect the principle of proportionality. Appropriate guidance on the assessment of conflicts of interest should provide additional clarification to those assessing such situations at Union and national level, with a view to contributing to legal certainty.

(167)

In order to ensure the absence of professional conflicting interests that can affect or risk affecting the capacity to perform the contract in an independent, impartial and objective manner, it is necessary to clarify the obligations of the contracting authority and of the candidates or tenderers. On the one hand, the candidates, tenderers, and, where appropriate, entities on whose capacity they rely as well as envisaged subcontractors should declare the absence of such conflicting interests, and provide related information where requested. On the other hand, the contracting authority should assess the existence of such professional conflicting interests when declared or on the basis of additional information. Where such professional conflicting interests are established, this should lead to rejection from the award.

(168)

A competitive and open internal market should ensure a level playing field and enable both European and foreign economic operators to compete on the merits. Foreign subsidies can distort the internal market and undermine the level playing field in procurement procedures where, for instance, the awarded economic operators have benefitted from foreign subsidies. To remedy this risk, Regulation (EU) 2022/2560 of the European Parliament and of the Council (30) established rules and procedures to investigate foreign subsidies that actually or potentially distort the internal market and, where relevant, to ensure that those distortions be redressed. In order to ensure consistency between the rules applicable to Member States and the procurement procedures under this Regulation, Union institutions, Union bodies and executive agencies should apply mutatis mutandis the same rules and procedures on foreign subsidies laid down in Regulation (EU) 2022/2560.

(169)

In order to ensure uniform conditions for the implementation of this Regulation, implementing powers should be conferred on the Commission relating to the procedural details and related items regarding the preliminary review and the in-depth investigation of any foreign financial contributions obtained in a procurement procedure. Those implementing powers should be exercised in accordance with Regulation (EU) No 182/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council (31).

(170)

In accordance with Directive 2014/24/EU, it should be possible to verify whether an economic operator is excluded, to apply selection and award criteria, as well as to verify compliance with the procurement documents in any order. As a result, it should be possible to reject tenders on the basis of award criteria without a prior check of the corresponding tenderer with regard to exclusion or selection criteria.

(171)

Contracts should be awarded on the basis of the most economically advantageous tender in line with Article 67 of Directive 2014/24/EU.

(172)

In the interests of legal certainty, it is necessary to clarify that the selection criteria are strictly linked to the evaluation of candidates or tenderers and that the award criteria are strictly linked to the evaluation of the tenders. In order to align Union procurement rules with Directive 2014/24/EU, contracting authorities should also be allowed to use as an award criterion the organisation, qualification and experience of the staff assigned to perform the contract, where they can significantly affect the quality of contract performance and, as a result, the economic value of the tender. Contracting authorities which make use of any of those award criteria should ensure, by appropriate contractual means, that the staff assigned to contract performance effectively fulfil the specified quality standards. The contracting authorities should give their consent to any replacement of such staff and should verify whether replacing staff affords an equivalent level of quality as the replaced staff. Furthermore, it should be ensured that there is no overlap and double evaluation of the same element under the selection and award criteria.

(173)

In order to reduce time-consuming procedures and to enable contracting authorities to take full advantage of the possibilities afforded by dynamic purchasing systems, it is necessary to simplify the rules governing those systems. In particular, those systems should be operated in the form of a restricted procedure, thus allowing for any economic operator that submits a request to participate and meets the exclusion and selection criteria to take part in procurement procedures carried out through the dynamic purchasing system over its period of validity, which should not be limited to four years. Tenders can also be presented in the form of an electronic catalogue particularly for off-the-shelf products or services generally available on the market. Moreover, in order to reduce the administrative burden, the requirement to appoint an opening and evaluation committee should be waived for specific procurements under a dynamic purchasing system.

(174)

Considering the progress in digitalisation of procurement procedures, it should be clarified that public openings for open procedures can be organised remotely via video conferences.

(175)

In order to simplify and align with the rules applicable to procurement by Union institutions on their own account, the obligation to publish the list of selected candidates to be invited to submit a tender on the Commission’s website should be removed in the field of external actions.

(176)

Union procurement should ensure that Union funds are used in an effective, transparent and appropriate way, while reducing administrative burden on recipients of Union funds. In that regard, e-procurement should contribute to the better use of Union funds and enhance access to contracts for all economic operators. All Union institutions conducting procurement should publish clear rules on their websites regarding acquisition, expenditure and monitoring, as well as all contracts awarded, including the value thereof.

(177)

In e-procurement, the electronic exchange of information with participants should rely to the largest extent possible on existing standards, such as the European Single Procurement Document and e-Invoicing standards mandated respectively by Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2016/7 (32) and by Directive 2014/55/EU.

(178)

The existence of an opening phase and an evaluation for any procedure should be clarified. An award decision should always be the outcome of an evaluation.

(179)

When notified of the outcome of a procedure, candidates and tenderers should be informed of the grounds on which the decision was taken and should receive a detailed statement of reasons based on the content of the evaluation report.

(180)

It is appropriate to specify that, upon request, unsuccessful tenderers which submitted compliant tenders should receive information on the characteristics and the relative advantages of the successful tender. Unsuccessful tenderers should, upon request, receive additional information even where the compliance of their tender has not been checked due to the selected order of criteria. It should also be clarified that rejected tenderers should not have access to such information.

(181)

For framework contracts with reopening of competition, there should be no obligation to provide information on the characteristics and the relative advantages of the successful tender to an unsuccessful contractor, on the basis that the receipt of such information by parties to the same framework contract each time a competition is reopened might prejudice fair competition between them.

(182)

A contracting authority should be able to cancel a procurement procedure, or partially cancel in the case of procedures awarded in lots or through multiple sourcing, before the contract is signed, without the candidates or tenderers being entitled to claim compensation. This should be without prejudice to situations where the contracting authority has acted in such a way that it is possible to hold it liable for damages in accordance with the general principles of Union law.

(183)

The award of contracts following multiple sourcing procurement should be allowed in duly justified cases, in particular in order to avoid the over-reliance on a single provider for critical equipment and services, taking into account the objectives of technological independence and continuity of services.

(184)

As is the case in Directive 2014/24/EU, it is necessary to clarify the conditions under which it is possible to modify a contract during its performance without a new procurement procedure. In particular, a new procurement procedure should not be required in the event of administrative changes, universal succession and application of clear and unequivocal revision clauses or options that do not alter the minimum requirements of the initial procedure. A new procurement procedure should be required in the case of material modifications to the initial contract, in particular to the scope and content of the mutual rights and obligations of the parties, including as regards the distribution of intellectual property rights. Such modifications demonstrate the parties’ intention to renegotiate the essential terms or conditions of that contract, in particular if the modifications would have had an influence on the outcome of the procedure had the modified terms or conditions been part of the initial procedure.

(185)

Experience gained has shown that it is necessary to clarify in which cases a modification is considered altering the subject matter of the contract.

(186)

It is necessary to provide for the option of requiring a performance guarantee in relation to works, supplies and complex services in order to guarantee compliance with substantial contractual obligations and to ensure proper performance throughout the duration of the contract. It is also necessary to provide for the option of requiring a retention money guarantee to cover the contract liability period, in line with customary practice in the sectors concerned.

(187)

In order to determine the applicable thresholds and procedures, it is necessary to clarify whether Union institutions, executive agencies and Union bodies are deemed to be contracting authorities. They should not be deemed to be contracting authorities in cases where they purchase from a central purchasing body. In addition, Union institutions form a single legal entity and their departments cannot conclude contracts, but only service-level agreements, between themselves.

(188)

It is appropriate to include a reference in this Regulation to the thresholds set out in Directive 2014/24/EU applicable to works and to supplies and services and in Directive 2014/23/EU for concessions. The revision of those thresholds as provided for in Directives 2014/24/EU and 2014/23/EU should therefore be directly applicable to procurement and concessions under this Regulation respectively.

(189)

The award of concession contracts should be simplified by applying the thresholds laid down in Directive 2014/23/EU to concessions.

(190)

For harmonisation and simplification purposes, the standard procedures applicable to procurement should also be applied to purchases provided for under the light regime for contracts for social and other specific services referred to in Article 74 of Directive 2014/24/EU. Therefore, the threshold for light regime purchases should be aligned with the threshold for service contracts.

(191)

In order to better adapt procurement procedures to market conditions outside the Union, this Regulation should include specific provisions under which Union delegations award contracts on their own account in third countries. Therefore, it is appropriate to revise the thresholds for awarding contracts applied by the Union delegations in third countries and align them to those applied for awarding contracts in the field of external actions.

(192)

It is necessary to clarify the conditions of application of the standstill period to be observed before signing a contract or framework contract.

(193)

The rules applicable to procurement in the field of external actions should be consistent with the principles laid down in Directives 2014/23/EU and 2014/24/EU.

(194)

The rules on access to procurement, applicable both at the time of tender submission and during contract implementation, should include the conditions laid down in implementing acts (International Procurement Instrument measures) adopted under Regulation (EU) 2022/1031 of the European Parliament and of the Council (33) as well as the respective obligations of the successful tenderers set out in that Regulation.

(195)

In order to reduce complexity, streamline existing rules and improve the readability of the procurement rules, it is necessary to regroup the general provisions on procurement and the specific provisions applicable to procurement in the field of external actions and to remove unnecessary repetitions and cross-referencing.

(196)

It is necessary to clarify which economic operators have access to procurement under this Regulation depending on their place of establishment and to provide explicitly for the possibility of such access also for international organisations.

(197)

In duly justified cases, where the contract is to be awarded by a Union delegation in a third country or exclusively in the interest of a Union delegation in a third country, the authorising officer responsible should be allowed to open access to the procurement procedure to natural or legal persons established in a third country that does not have a special agreement with the Union in the field of procurement. That flexibility should be provided in particular where there are no natural or legal persons established in countries that have access to the procurement under a special agreement with the Union in the field of procurement who can provide the required work, supplies or services.

(198)

In order to achieve a balance between the need for transparency and greater coherence of procurement rules on the one hand, and the need to provide flexibility on certain technical aspects of those rules on the other, the technical rules on procurement should be set out in an annex to this Regulation and the power to adopt acts in accordance with Article 290 TFEU should be delegated to the Commission in respect of amendments to that Annex.

(199)

It is necessary to clarify the scope of the Title on grants, particularly with regard to the type of action or body eligible for a grant, as well as with regard to legal commitments that can be used to cover grants. In particular, grant decisions should be phased out due to their limited use and the progressive introduction of e-grants. The structure should be simplified by moving the provisions on instruments which are not grants to other parts of this Regulation. The nature of bodies which can receive operating grants should be clarified by no longer referring to bodies pursuing an aim of general Union interest since those bodies are covered by the notion of bodies having an objective forming part of and supporting a Union policy.

(200)

In order to simplify procedures and improve the readability of this Regulation, provisions related to the content of the grant application, of the call for proposals and of the grant agreement should be simplified and streamlined.

(201)

In order to facilitate the implementation of actions financed by multiple donors where the overall financing of the action is not known at the time of commitment of the Union contribution, it is necessary to clarify the way the Union contribution is defined and the method of verifying its use.

(202)

A new category of a very low value grant of an amount of up to EUR 15 000 should be introduced with a view to simplifying administrative requirements for applicants for Union funding. Given the very low value of such grants, the requirements for presenting a declaration on honour and for assessing the financial capacity should be waived.

(203)

In order to further simplify grant applications in line with sound financial management, it should be possible for the authorising officer to decide, based on a risk assessment, that financial capacity checks are focused only on the lead applicant.

(204)

Experience gained in the use of lump sums, unit costs or flat-rate financing has shown that such forms of financing significantly simplify administrative procedures and substantially reduce the risk of error. Regardless of the field of Union intervention, lump sums, unit costs and flat rates are suitable forms of financing, in particular for standardised and recurrent actions, such as mobility or training activities. Moreover, as institutional cooperation between public administrations of Member States and of beneficiary or partner countries (institutional twinning) is implemented by Member State institutions, the use of simplified cost options is justified and should foster their engagement. In the interest of increased efficiency, Member States and other recipients of Union funds should be able to make more frequent use of simplified cost options. In this context, the conditions for using lump sums, unit costs and flat rates should be made more flexible. It is necessary to provide explicitly for the establishment of single lump sums covering the entire eligible costs of the action or the work programme. In addition, in order to foster focus on results, priority should be given to output-based funding. Input-based lump sums, unit costs and flat rates should remain an option where output-based ones are not possible or appropriate.

(205)

In order to ensure legal certainty, it is necessary to clarify that, where a grant takes the form of financing not linked to costs, the provisions on an estimated budget, co-financing and no double funding do not apply since they cannot be applied in a case where the amount to be reimbursed is linked to defined conditions or results and is decoupled from the underlying costs.

(206)

The administrative procedures for authorising lump sums, unit costs and flat rates should be simplified by vesting the power for such authorisation in the authorising officers responsible. Where appropriate, such authorisation can be given by the Commission in light of the nature of the activities or of the expenditure or in light of the number of authorising officers concerned.

(207)

In order to bridge the gap in the availability of data used to establish lump sums, unit costs and flat rates, the use of an expert judgement should be allowed.

(208)

While the potential of more frequent use of simplified forms of financing should be realised, compliance with the principle of sound financial management, and in particular the principles of economy, efficiency and no double funding, should be ensured. For that purpose, simplified forms of financing should ensure that the resources employed are adequate to the objectives to be achieved, that the same costs are not financed more than once from the budget, that the co-financing principle is respected and that overall overcompensation of recipients is avoided. Therefore, simplified forms of financing should be based on statistical or accounting data, similar objective means or expert judgement. In addition, suitable checks, controls and periodic assessments should continue to apply.

(209)

The scope of checks and controls as opposed to the periodic assessments of lump sums, unit costs or flat rates should be clarified. Those checks and controls should focus on the fulfilment of the conditions triggering the payment of lump sums, unit costs or flat-rates, including, where required, the achievement of outputs and/or results. Those conditions should not require reporting on the costs actually incurred by the beneficiary. Where the amounts of lump sums, unit costs or flat-rate financing have been determined ex ante by the authorising officer responsible or by the Commission they should not be challenged by ex post controls. This should not prevent the reduction of a grant in the event of poor, partial or late implementation or of irregularity, fraud or a breach of other obligations. In particular, a grant should be reduced where the conditions triggering the payment of lump sums, unit costs or flat rates have not been fulfilled. The frequency and scope of the periodic assessment should depend on the evolution and the nature of the costs, in particular taking into account substantial changes in market prices and other relevant circumstances. The periodic assessment could lead to adjustments of the lump sums, unit costs or flat rates applicable to future agreements, but should not be used for questioning the value of the lump sums, unit costs or flat rates already agreed upon. The periodic assessment of lump sums, unit costs or flat rates might require access to the accounts of the beneficiary for statistical and methodological purposes and such access is also necessary for fraud-prevention and detection purposes.

(210)

Where a grant takes the form of flat-rates, unit costs or lump sums and there is thus no ex post verification of the underlying costs, it is not possible to check that the eligible costs were incurred during the lifetime of the action. In order to ensure legal certainty, it should be clarified that ex post checks and controls on beneficiaries will verify that the fulfilment of the conditions triggering the payment of flat rates, unit costs or lump sums was achieved during the implementation period.

(211)

In order to facilitate the participation of small organisations in the implementation of the Union policies in an environment of limited availability of resources, it is necessary to recognise the value of the work provided by volunteers as eligible costs. As a result, such organisations should be able to rely to a greater extent on volunteers’ work for the sake of providing co-financing to the action or the work programme. Without prejudice to the maximum co-financing rate specified in the basic act, in such cases, the Union grant should be limited to the estimated eligible costs other than those covering volunteers’ work. As volunteers’ work is a work provided by third parties without a remuneration being paid to them by the beneficiary, the limitation avoids reimbursing costs which the beneficiary did not incur. In addition, the value of the volunteers’ work should not exceed 50 % of the in-kind contributions and any other co-financing.

(212)

To ensure legal certainty, it should be clarified that, where in-kind contributions from third parties in the form of volunteers’ work are presented as eligible costs in the estimated budget, the co-financing to which the 50 % limit is applied should include all the sources of financing, that is the Union grant, in-kind contributions and other sources of financing.

(213)

In order to protect one of the fundamental principles of public finances, the no-profit principle should be retained in this Regulation.

(214)

To ensure legal certainty when calculating the Union contribution in the case of a profit in a grant funded by the budget, it should be clarified that the recovery of the percentage of the profit corresponding to the Union contribution to the eligible costs should not differentiate between actually incurred costs and simplified costs.

(215)

In principle, grants should be awarded following a call for proposals. Where exceptions are allowed, they should be interpreted and applied restrictively in terms of scope and duration. The exceptional possibility to award grants without a call for proposals to bodies with a de facto or de jure monopoly should only be used where the bodies concerned are the only ones capable of implementing the relevant types of activities or have been vested with such a monopoly by law or by a public authority.

(216)

In the framework of moving towards e-grants and e-procurement, applicants and tenderers should be asked to provide a proof of their legal status and financial viability only once within a specific period and should not be required to resubmit supporting documents in each award procedure. It is therefore necessary to align the requirements for the number of years for which documents will be requested under grant award procedures and procurement procedures.

(217)

A beneficiary of a grant can provide financial support to a third party based on the fulfilment of certain conditions, and the amount paid to any third party should not exceed EUR 60 000. It should be possible to exceed that amount where achieving the objectives of the action would otherwise be impossible or overly difficult. In order to allow more flexibility for implementing the budget in crisis and emergency situations, it should also be possible to exceed that amount without case-by-case justification in the cases of humanitarian aid, emergency support operations, civil protection operations or crisis management aid. The authorising officer should report on such cases.

(218)

Where the implementation of an action or a work programme requires a beneficiary to carry out procurement, it should be clarified that any beneficiary can use its own purchasing practices provided they ensure best value for money, or as appropriate, lowest price, irrespective of whether the beneficiary awards a public contract and is a contracting authority within the meaning of this Regulation. The definition of contract should be amended accordingly.

(219)

As a valuable type of financial support not related to predictable costs, the use of prizes should be facilitated and the applicable rules should be clarified. Prizes should be seen as complementing, not substituting, other funding instruments such as grants.

(220)

In order to allow for the more flexible implementation of prizes, the obligation under Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 966/2012 to publish contests for prizes with a unit value of EUR 1 000 000 or more in the statements accompanying the draft budget should be replaced by an obligation to submit prior information to the European Parliament and to the Council and to explicitly mention such prizes in the financing decision.

(221)

Prizes should be awarded in accordance with the principles of transparency and equal treatment. In that context, the minimum characteristics of contests should be laid down, in particular the arrangements for paying the prize to the winners after its award, and the appropriate means of publication It is also necessary to establish a clearly defined award procedure, from submission of the applications to the provision of information to applicants and notification of the winning applicant, which mirrors the grant award procedure.

(222)

This Regulation should lay down the principles and conditions applicable to financial instruments, budgetary guarantees and financial assistance and the rules on the limitation of the financial liability of the Union, the fight against fraud and money laundering, the winding down of financial instruments and reporting.

(223)

In recent years the Union has increasingly used financial instruments that allow a higher leverage of the budget to be achieved but, at the same time, they generate a financial risk for the budget. Those financial instruments include not only the financial instruments covered by Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 966/2012, but also other instruments, such as budgetary guarantees and financial assistance, that previously have been governed only by the rules established in their respective basic acts. It is important to establish a common framework to ensure the homogeneity of the principles applicable to that set of instruments and to regroup them under a new Title in this Regulation, comprising sections on budgetary guarantees and on financial assistance to Member States or third countries in addition to the existing rules applicable to financial instruments.

(224)

Financial instruments and budgetary guarantees can be valuable in multiplying the effect of Union funds when those funds are pooled with other funds and include a leverage effect. Financial instruments and budgetary guarantees should only be implemented if there is no risk of distortion of competition in the internal market or inconsistency with State aid rules.

(225)

Within the framework of the annual appropriations authorised by the European Parliament and by the Council for a given programme, financial instruments and budgetary guarantees should be used on the basis of an ex ante evaluation demonstrating that they are effective for the achievement of the policy objectives of the Union.

(226)

Financial instruments, budgetary guarantees and financial assistance should be authorised by means of a basic act. Where in duly justified cases financial instruments are established without a basic act, they should be authorised by the European Parliament and by the Council in the budget.

(227)

The instruments that potentially fall under Title X, such as loans, guarantees, equity investments, quasi-equity investment and risk-sharing instruments, should be defined. The definition of ‘risk-sharing instruments’ should allow for the inclusion of credit enhancements for project bonds, covering the debt service risk of a project and mitigating the credit risk of bond holders through credit enhancements in the form of a loan or a guarantee.

(228)

Any repayment from a financial instrument or budgetary guarantee should be used for the instrument or guarantee which produced the repayment with a view to enhancing the efficiency of that instrument or guarantee, unless otherwise specified in the basic act, and should be taken into account when proposing future appropriations to that instrument or guarantee.

(229)

This Regulation provides that the Commission is empowered, in the relevant basic act, to borrow on behalf of the Union or Euratom for the purpose of on-lending the corresponding amounts to beneficiary Member States or third countries under the conditions applicable to the borrowings. In that regard, the cash flows between the borrowed funds and the loans are matched one-to-one. This means that the Union should carry out market operations based on disbursement needs for each specific case of lending, which limits the possibility to coherently plan various borrowing operations and to structure maturities to achieve the best costs.

(230)

Financing individual programmes of financial assistance through separate funding methods creates cost and complexity as different programmes of financial assistance compete for a limited number of funding opportunities. It fragments the supply of Union debt securities and reduces liquidity and investor interest in the separate programmes, even though all Union debt securities have the same high credit quality. Financial assistance should therefore be organised under a single funding method that enhances the liquidity of Union bonds and the attractiveness and cost-effectiveness of Union issuance.

(231)

Recent experience with the funding needs for Ukraine has highlighted the disadvantages of a fragmented approach to the organisation of Union debt. In order to strengthen the Union’s position as an issuer of euro-denominated debt, it is essential that all new issuances be organised through a single funding method, except in duly justified cases, such as Euratom issuance, small issuance and the funding of programmes of financial assistance for which the basic acts entered into force before 9 November 2022.

(232)

The model for a single funding method, and most elements of the infrastructure needed for its implementation, have already been established in the form of a diversified funding strategy under Decision (EU, Euratom) 2020/2053. That strategy has allowed the successful mobilisation of funds for grants and loans under Regulation (EU) 2021/241 and for a range of other Union programmes referred to in Council Regulation (EU) 2020/2094 (34). In view of the expected complexity of operations needed to satisfy the urgent financing needs of Ukraine, and to anticipate possible future borrowing and lending operations, it is appropriate to establish a diversified funding strategy as the single funding method for implementation of borrowing operations.

(233)

The use of a diversified funding strategy should allow the flexible implementation of the funding programme, while fully respecting the principles of budgetary neutrality and budgetary balance as set out in Article 310(1) TFEU. The costs of the funding programme should be fully borne by the beneficiaries based on a single cost allocation methodology that ensures the transparent and proportional allocation of costs. Repayment obligations should remain with the beneficiaries of the financial assistance, in compliance with this Regulation.

(234)

The implementation of a diversified funding strategy would require a single set of rules to be followed in respect of all borrowing and lending programmes relying on it.

(235)

A diversified funding strategy should provide the Commission with more flexibility concerning the timing and the maturity of single funding transactions and allow regular and steady disbursements to different beneficiary countries. Such a strategy should be based on the pooling of funding instruments. This would give the Commission flexibility to organise payments to the beneficiaries independently of market conditions at the time of disbursement, while also reducing the risk that the Commission would have to raise fixed amounts in volatile or adverse conditions.

(236)

Giving the Commission that flexibility would require putting into place a common liquidity pool. Such a centralised liquidity function would render the Union’s funding capacity more resilient and able to withstand temporary mismatches between all inflows and outflows, based on a robust liquidity forecasting capacity.

(237)

The Commission should implement all necessary transactions aiming at a regular capital market presence, at achieving the best possible funding costs and at facilitating transactions in debt securities of the Union and Euratom.

(238)

In extending the diversified funding strategy to a wider range of programmes, it is therefore appropriate for the Commission to establish the necessary arrangements for its implementation. Those arrangements should comprise a governance framework, risk management procedures, and a cost allocation methodology, which should respect Article 223(4), point (e), of this Regulation. To ensure transparency, the Commission should regularly and comprehensively inform the European Parliament and the Council about all aspects of its borrowing and debt management strategy.

(239)

In the interest of legal certainty and clarity in respect of already granted financial assistance and in respect of macro-financial assistance under Regulation (EU) 2022/2463 of the European Parliament and of the Council (35), the rules in this Regulation concerning diversified funding strategy should only apply to programmes of financial assistance for which the basic acts enter into force on or after 9 November 2022.

(240)

It is important that the audited financial statements for financial instruments and budgetary guarantees implemented under indirect management be provided in time for the Court of Auditors to take them into account when making its observations on the provisional accounts.

(241)

It is appropriate to recognise the alignment of interests in pursuing policy objectives of the Union and, in particular, that the EIB and the EIF have the specific expertise to implement financial instruments and budgetary guarantees.

(242)

The EIB and the EIF, acting as a group, should have the possibility to transfer part of the implementation to each other, where such transfer might benefit the implementation of a given action and as further defined in the relevant agreement with the Commission.

(243)

For consistency and in order to take into account the Multiannual Financial Framework for 2021 to 2027, for financial instruments and budgetary guarantees, it is necessary to clarify certain provisions on reporting by persons or entities implementing Union funds under indirect management, on the application of Title X in case of combination thereof with ancillary support from the budget, including grants, and in combination with Union funds implemented under shared management.

(244)

It should be clarified that, where financial instruments or budgetary guarantees are combined with ancillary forms of support from the budget, the rules on financial instruments and budgetary guarantees should apply to the whole measure. Such rules should be complemented, where applicable, by specific requirements set out in sector-specific rules.

(245)

The implementation of financial instruments and budgetary guarantees financed by the budget should adhere to the Union policy on non-cooperative jurisdictions for tax purposes, and updates thereto, as laid down in relevant legal acts of the Union and in Council conclusions, in particular the Council conclusions of 8 November 2016 on the criteria for and process leading to the establishment of the EU list of non-cooperative jurisdictions for tax purposes (36) and the Annex thereto, as well as the Council conclusions of 5 December 2017 on the EU list of non-cooperative jurisdictions for tax purposes (37) and the Annexes thereto.

(246)

Budgetary guarantees and financial assistance to Member States or third countries are generally off-budget operations that have a significant impact on the balance sheet of the Union. While remaining generally off-budget operations, their inclusion in this Regulation provides a stronger protection of the financial interests of the Union and a clearer framework for their authorisation, management and accounting.

(247)

The Union launched important initiatives based on budgetary guarantees such as the European Fund for Strategic Investments (EFSI) or the European Fund for Sustainable Development (EFSD). The characteristics of those instruments are that they generate a contingent liability for the Union and imply the provisioning of funds to make available a liquidity cushion that allows the budget to respond in an orderly manner to the payment obligations that might arise from those contingent liabilities. In order to guarantee the credit rating of the Union and, hence, its capacity to deliver effective financing, it is essential that the authorisation, provisioning and monitoring of contingent liabilities follow a robust set of rules that should be applied to all budgetary guarantees.

(248)

The contingent liabilities arising from budgetary guarantees can cover a wide range of financing and investment operations. The possibility of a budgetary guarantee being called cannot be scheduled with full certainty on a yearly basis as in the case of loans that have a defined schedule for repayment. It is, therefore, indispensable to set up a framework for the authorisation and monitoring of contingent liabilities ensuring full respect, at any moment, for the ceiling for annual payment appropriations set out in Decision (EU, Euratom) 2020/2053.

(249)

That framework should also provide for management and control, including regular reporting on the financial exposure of the Union. The rate of provisioning of financial liabilities should be set on the basis of a proper risk assessment of the financial risks arising from the related instrument. The sustainability of the contingent liabilities should be assessed annually in the context of the budgetary procedure. An early warning mechanism should be established to avoid a shortage of provisions to cover financial liabilities.

(250)

The increasing use of financial instruments, budgetary guarantees and financial assistance requires a significant volume of payment appropriations to be mobilised and provisioned. In order to deliver leverage while ensuring an adequate level of protection against financial liabilities, it is important to optimise the amount of provisioning required and to achieve efficiency gains by pooling those provisions into a common provisioning fund. In addition, the more flexible use of those pooled provisions permits an effective global provisioning rate that delivers the protection requested with an optimised amount of resources.

(251)

The rules applicable to provisioning and to the common provisioning fund should provide a solid internal control framework. The guidelines applicable to the management of the resources in the common provisioning fund should be established by the Commission after having consulted the accounting officer of the Commission. The authorising officers of the financial instruments, budgetary guarantees or financial assistance should actively monitor the financial liabilities under their responsibility and the financial manager of the resources of the common provisioning fund should manage the cash and the assets in the fund following the rules and procedures set out by the accounting officer of the Commission.

(252)

Budgetary guarantees and financial assistance should follow the same set of principles established for financial instruments. Budgetary guarantees, in particular, should be irrevocable, unconditional and on demand. They should be implemented under indirect management or, only in exceptional cases, under direct management. They should only cover financing and investment operations and their counterparts should contribute their own resources to the operations covered.

(253)

Financial assistance to Member States or third countries should take the form of a loan, of a credit line or any other instrument deemed appropriate to ensure the effectiveness of the support. To that end, the Commission should be empowered in the relevant basic act to borrow the necessary funds on the capital markets or from financial institutions, avoiding the involvement of the Union in any transformation of maturities that would expose it to an interest risk or to any other commercial risk.

(254)

The provisions related to financial instruments should apply as soon as possible in order to achieve the simplification and effectiveness sought. The provisions related to the budgetary guarantees and to financial assistance, as well as to the common provisioning fund, should apply as from the post-2020 multiannual financial framework. That calendar will allow a thorough preparation of the new tools for managing contingent liabilities. It will also permit an alignment between the principles set out in Title X and, on the one hand, the proposal for the post-2020 multiannual financial framework and, on the other hand, the specific programmes related to that framework.

(255)

Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 1141/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council (38) lays down rules for, inter alia, the funding of political parties and political foundations at European level, in particular with regard to funding conditions, the award and distribution of funding, donations and contributions, financing of campaigns for elections to the European Parliament, reimbursable expenditure, the prohibition of certain funding, accounts, reporting and audit, implementation and control, penalties, cooperation between the Authority for European political parties and foundations, the Authorising Officer of the European Parliament and Member States, and transparency.

(256)

Rules should be included in this Regulation on contributions from the budget to European political parties as envisaged by Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 1141/2014.

(257)

The financial support given to European political parties should take the form of a specific contribution, to match the specific needs of those parties.

(258)

Although financial support is awarded without an annual work programme being required, European political parties should justify ex post the sound use of Union funding. In particular, the authorising officer responsible should verify if the funding has been used to pay reimbursable expenditure as established in the call for contributions within the time limits laid down in this Regulation. Contributions to European political parties should be spent by the end of the financial year following that of their award, after which, any unspent funding should be recovered by the authorising officer responsible.

(259)

Union funding awarded to finance the operating costs of European political parties should not be used for other purposes than those established in Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 1141/2014, in particular to directly or indirectly finance third parties such as national political parties. European political parties should use the contributions to pay a percentage of current and future expenditure and not expenditure or debts incurred before the submission of their applications for contributions.

(260)

The award of contributions should also be simplified and adapted to the specificities of European political parties, in particular by the absence of selection criteria, the establishment of a single full pre-financing payment as a general rule, and by the possibility to use lump sums, flat-rate financing and unit costs.

(261)

The contributions from the budget should be suspended, reduced or terminated if European political parties infringe Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 1141/2014.

(262)

Penalties that are based both on this Regulation and on Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 1141/2014 should be imposed in a coherent way and should respect the principle of ne bis in idem. In accordance with Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 1141/2014, administrative and/or financial penalties provided for by this Regulation are not to be imposed in one of the cases for which penalties have already been imposed on the basis of Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 1141/2014.

(263)

This Regulation should establish a general framework under which budget support can be used as an instrument in the field of external actions including the obligation for the third country to provide the Commission with adequate and timely information to evaluate the fulfilment of the agreed conditions and provisions ensuring the protection of the financial interests of the Union.

(264)

In order to reinforce the role of the European Parliament and of the Council, the procedure for establishing Union trust funds should be clarified. It is also necessary to specify the principles applicable to the contributions to Union trust funds, in particular the importance of securing contributions from other donors which justify their establishment with regard to added value. It is also necessary to clarify the responsibilities of the financial actors and of the board of the Union trust fund and to define rules ensuring a fair representation of the participating donors on the board of the Union trust fund and a mandatory vote in favour by the Commission for the use of the funds. It is also important to set out in more detail the reporting requirements applicable to Union trust funds.

(265)

The Union should be able to participate in global initiatives, when such participation contributes to the achievement of Union policy objectives. In order to provide a suitable legal framework for Union participation in global initiatives, Union contribution to such initiatives should be included as a new budget implementation instrument. The use of this new financial vehicle would be subject to conditions, the fulfilment of which would ensure a level of protection comparable to other budget implementation instruments. Such conditions should include the existence of appropriate internal and external systems to combat fraud and irregularities, whereby the systems operated by implementing entities of the global initiative should be considered as external systems. The use of the provisions related to global initiatives should be limited to cases where other budget implementation instruments do not enable the achievement of the respective Union policy objectives with the same scale and impact. Where possible and appropriate, the Commission should join any governance board or equivalent steering committee of a global initiative in order to ensure effective representation of the Union interest. In the interests of transparency and effective decision-making, the Commission should, as early as possible, provide detailed information to the European Parliament and the Council on any intended contribution to a global initiative, so as to enable them to give that information due consideration.

(266)

In order to adapt to the progress on digitalisation, the lists of external experts drawn up following a call for expression of interest should be valid longer than the duration of the multiannual programme provided a rotation of the experts is ensured and new experts are able to express their interest. In addition, it is necessary to allow Union institutions to attract highly skilled external experts in order to ensure the evaluation process and the specific opinions and advice provided by the experts is of high quality. In order to successfully compete with other actors on the market, the Union institutions should be allowed to offer more competitive remuneration in exceptional and duly justified cases. Finally, in the interest of legal certainty, the rules applicable to remunerated external experts should be clarified to mirror the different steps of the award procedure.

(267)

In order to provide a clear legal framework for Union institutions to donate services, supplies or works, non-financial donations should be included as a new budget implementation instrument. This instrument should not be confused with the general framework of support provided by the Union to third countries which is of a broader nature but can include non-financial donations. In light of the COVID-19 pandemic and the impact of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, such an instrument should provide a stable legal basis in particular for future crisis and emergency situations and ensure that the Union institutions have the appropriate budget support tools to help Member States, other persons and entities when support is most needed. That instrument should be implemented under direct management or under indirect management by a Union body. Related provisions, such as definitions, suspension, termination and reduction, and evaluation committee should be adjusted accordingly. In the interest of sound financial management, non-perishable supplies financed from administrative appropriations should not be donated before they have partially depreciated in value.

(268)

Similar to the introduction of non-financial donations, Union institutions should be able to award prizes which are not financial. This is also important in order to allow contests among young people who do not have a bank account in their Member State, but who can easily receive their reward in a practical form. For this purpose, the definition of and the provisions on ‘prizes’ should be adjusted accordingly.

(269)

In line with the streamlining of the existing rules and in order to avoid undue repetition, the special provisions set out in Part Two of Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 966/2012, applicable to the EAGF, to research, to external actions and to specific Union funds, should only be introduced in the relevant parts of this Regulation, provided that the provisions are still used and relevant.

(270)

The provisions on the presentation of accounts and accounting should be simplified and clarified. It is therefore appropriate to group together all provisions on annual accounts and other financial reporting.

(271)

The deadlines for the observations by the Court of Auditors on the provisional accounts and for the submission of the final accounts should be adjusted to take into account the timetable of the discharge procedure.

(272)

The accounts of all the Union’s revenue and expenditure, including assigned revenue and the related specific items of expenditure, the resulting balance and the assets and liabilities of the Union shown in the balance sheet, including those arising from borrowing and lending operations, should be covered in the discharge decision. Likewise, the examination by the Court of Auditors of all revenue should include assigned revenue and the related items of expenditure.

(273)

The manner in which Union institutions currently report on building projects to the European Parliament and to the Council should be improved. Union institutions should be allowed to finance new building projects with the revenue received for buildings already sold. Consequently, a reference to the provisions on internal assigned revenue should be introduced in the provisions on building projects. This would allow meeting the changing needs in the building policy of Union institutions, while saving costs and introducing more flexibility.

(274)

In its Communication on the European Green Deal, the Commission encourages the renovation of buildings in order to reduce their emissions and make them more energy efficient. Taking into account the rapid evolution of the market for energy efficient buildings, there is an acute need for Union institutions to incorporate the European Green Deal commitments in their own building policy and to renovate their buildings, prioritising the most energy-efficient investments. In addition, the recent development of working methods accelerated by the COVID-19 pandemic requires adapting the Union institutions’ office stock in order to develop a dynamic office policy. As a consequence, financing of structural renovations by loans should be allowed, provided that it leads to savings, in accordance with the principle of sound financial management. The European Parliament and the Council should receive sufficient information for the purposes of their prior approval, including on the added value of the envisaged structural renovation and its contribution to the green transition. The interpretation of the concept of new building projects should be broadened and, in particular, include projects concerning structural renovation.

(275)

In order to adapt the rules applicable to certain Union bodies, the detailed rules on procurement and the detailed conditions and the minimum ratio for the effective provisioning rate, the power to adopt acts in accordance with Article 290 TFEU should be delegated to the Commission in respect of the framework financial regulation for bodies set up under the TFEU and the Euratom Treaty, the model financial regulation for public-private partnership bodies, amendments to Annex I to this Regulation, the detailed conditions and methodology for the calculation of the effective provisioning rate and the amendment of the defined minimum ratio of the effective provisioning rate, which should not be set at a level lower than 85 %. It is of particular importance that the Commission carry out appropriate consultations during its preparatory work, including at expert level, and that those consultations be conducted in accordance with the principles laid down in the Interinstitutional Agreement of 13 April 2016 on Better Law-Making. In particular, to ensure equal participation in the preparation of delegated acts, the European Parliament and the Council receive all documents at the same time as Member States’ experts, and their experts systematically have access to meetings of Commission expert groups dealing with the preparation of delegated acts.

(276)

Some modifications regarding the provision of access by the Commission to data on recipients for the purposes of publication, and regarding the electronic recording and storage of data on recipients and their beneficial owners and access by the single integrated IT system for data-mining and risk-scoring to analyse those data should apply only to programmes adopted under and financed as from the post-2027 multiannual financial framework in order to ensure a smooth transition by allowing sufficient time for the necessary adaptation of electronic data systems and of relevant agreements, as well as the provision of guidance and training.

(277)

The Commission should present by the end of 2027 an assessment of the readiness of the single integrated IT system. That assessment should evaluate whether interoperability is ensured with relevant IT systems and databases, including those of Member States, allowing for an automatic transfer of the relevant information in real time where feasible, and avoiding duplication of reporting; whether the risk indicators used by the single integrated IT system are sufficiently uniform, objective, proportionate, and necessary for risk assessment, and are based on reliable sources of information; whether the single integrated IT system permits using artificial intelligence for analysing and interpreting data; and whether the single integrated IT complies with general data protection principles.

(278)

The European Data Protection Supervisor was consulted in accordance with Article 42(1) of Regulation (EU) 2018/1725 and delivered an opinion on 7 July 2022.

(279)

This Regulation should enter into force on the third day following that of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union,