(1)

Avian influenza is an infectious viral disease in birds, including poultry. Infections with avian influenza viruses in domestic poultry cause two main forms of that disease that are distinguished by the virulence of the virus. The low pathogenic form generally only causes mild symptoms, while the highly pathogenic form results in very high mortality rates in most poultry species. That disease may have a severe impact on the health of domestic and wild birds and the profitability of poultry farming.

(2)

Directive 2005/94/EC sets out the minimum control measures to be applied in the event of an outbreak of that disease in poultry or other captive birds and also provides for certain preventive measures relating to the surveillance and the early detection of avian influenza.

(3)

Wild birds, in particular migratory water birds, are known to be the natural host for avian influenza viruses of low pathogenicity which they carry, usually without showing signs of that disease, during their seasonal migratory movements. However, since 2005, highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) viruses of the H5 subtype have shown to be able to infect migratory birds which can then spread these viruses over long distances between continents.

(4)

The presence of avian influenza viruses and in particular HPAI viruses in wild birds poses a continual threat for the direct and indirect introduction of these viruses into holdings where poultry or other captive birds are kept, in particular during the seasonal movements of migratory birds, with the risk of subsequent virus spread from an infected holding to other holdings liable to cause significant economic losses.

(5)

The European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) adopted on 14 September 2017 a comprehensive scientific opinion on avian influenza (2), confirming that the strict implementation of biosecurity measures plays a key role in preventing the spread of HPAI viruses from wild birds to poultry and other captive birds (the 2017 EFSA opinion).

(6)

The 2017 EFSA opinion lists the most relevant biosecurity measures to be applied continuously in different poultry husbandry systems including small size farms. It also states that certain general biosecurity principles universally apply to poultry holdings, while unique features for each holding need to be considered for optimised protection based on expert advice.

(7)

The 2017 EFSA opinion assessed and identified risks for HPAI virus introduction into poultry holdings, such as the keeping together of domestic ducks and geese with other poultry species, and the risks related to certain activities, such as the release of poultry for restocking supplies of game birds, and it proposed measures to mitigate these risks.

(8)

The 2017 EFSA opinion concluded that the passive surveillance of wild birds is the most effective means for the early detection of the presence of HPAI viruses in wild birds, where the HPAI virus infections are associated with mortality and it recommended the sampling and laboratory testing of wild bird target species. Subsequently, EFSA published a list of wild bird target species in its scientific report on avian influenza approved on 18 December 2017 (3).

(9)

In a scientific report on avian influenza approved on 22 March 2018 (4), EFSA stated that there have not been any reported cases of human infection due to A(H5N8) or the newly emerged A(H5N5) and A(H5N6) viruses representing a reassortment of A(H5) clade 2.3.4.4 viruses with local European viruses donating the N5 or N6 gene. The A(H5N8), A(H5N5) and A(H5N6) viruses are considered to be predominantly adapted to avian species.

(10)

The 2017 EFSA opinion also concluded that in certain epidemiological situations, it may be appropriate that Member States temporarily intensify certain preventive measures around the place where the HPAI virus infection was confirmed in a wild bird or in its faeces, in particular in order to assess, if transmission to poultry holdings has occurred and if biosecurity measures are effectively applied to prevent virus introduction.

(11)

In order to target the bird populations that are most at risk of avian influenza infection and to ensure the effectiveness of the measures laid down in this Decision, certain preventive measures should therefore be targeted at holdings keeping poultry.

(12)

Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2017/263 (5) provided for risk mitigating and reinforced biosecurity measures to reduce the risk of the transmission of HPAI viruses from wild birds to poultry by preventing direct and indirect contacts between these populations, and it required the Member States to identify the areas of their territory that are at particular risk for the introduction of HPAI viruses into holdings where poultry or other captive birds are kept (‘high risk areas’), taking into account, amongst other things, the epidemiological situation and specific risk factors. That Implementing Decision applied until 30 June 2018.

(13)

The measures laid down in Implementing Decision (EU) 2017/263 should therefore be reviewed taking into account the current epidemiological situation in poultry, other captive birds and in wild birds in the Union and in risk-relevant third countries, the 2017 EFSA opinion and subsequent scientific reports on avian influenza and the Member States' experience gained in the implementation of the measures laid down in that Implementing Decision.

(14)

Accordingly, in view of the ongoing threat of HPAI virus transmission by infected wild birds, and the risk of outbreaks in holdings where poultry or other captive birds are kept, updated measures, taking into account the results of the review of Implementing Decision (EU) 2017/263, should therefore be laid down in this Decision.

(15)

The experience gained in the implementation of the measures laid down in Implementing Decision (EU) 2017/263 shows that certain derogations from risk mitigation and reinforced biosecurity measures are necessary in order for individual Member States to be able to adapt these measures to the changing epidemiological situation.

(16)

The measures provided for in this Decision are in accordance with the opinion of the Standing Committee on Plants, Animals, Food and Feed,