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Document 02020R1998-20230307

Consolidated text: Council Regulation (EU) 2020/1998 of 7 December 2020 concerning restrictive measures against serious human rights violations and abuses

ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2020/1998/2023-03-07

02020R1998 — EN — 07.03.2023 — 008.001


This text is meant purely as a documentation tool and has no legal effect. The Union's institutions do not assume any liability for its contents. The authentic versions of the relevant acts, including their preambles, are those published in the Official Journal of the European Union and available in EUR-Lex. Those official texts are directly accessible through the links embedded in this document

►B

COUNCIL REGULATION (EU) 2020/1998

of 7 December 2020

concerning restrictive measures against serious human rights violations and abuses

(OJ L 410I 7.12.2020, p. 1)

Amended by:

 

 

Official Journal

  No

page

date

►M1

COUNCIL IMPLEMENTING REGULATION (EU) 2021/371 of 2 March 2021

  L 71I

1

2.3.2021

►M2

COUNCIL IMPLEMENTING REGULATION (EU) 2021/478 of 22 March 2021

  L 99I

1

22.3.2021

►M3

COUNCIL IMPLEMENTING REGULATION (EU) 2021/2151 of 6 December 2021

  L 436

1

7.12.2021

►M4

COUNCIL IMPLEMENTING REGULATION (EU) 2021/2195 of 13 December 2021

  L 445I

10

13.12.2021

►M5

COMMISSION IMPLEMENTING REGULATION (EU) 2022/595 of 11 April 2022

  L 114

60

12.4.2022

►M6

COUNCIL IMPLEMENTING REGULATION (EU) 2022/2374 of 5 December 2022

  L 314

81

6.12.2022

►M7

COUNCIL IMPLEMENTING REGULATION (EU) 2023/430 of 25 February 2023

  L 59I

423

25.2.2023

►M8

COUNCIL IMPLEMENTING REGULATION (EU) 2023/500 of 7 March 2023

  L 69I

1

7.3.2023


Corrected by:

 C1

Corrigendum, OJ L 035, 17.2.2022, p.  22 (2021/2151)




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COUNCIL REGULATION (EU) 2020/1998

of 7 December 2020

concerning restrictive measures against serious human rights violations and abuses



Article 1

For the purposes of this Regulation, the following definitions apply:

(a) 

‘claim’ means any claim, whether asserted by legal proceedings or not, made before or after the date of entry into force of this Regulation, under or in connection with a contract or transaction, and in particular:

(i) 

a claim for performance of any obligation arising under or in connection with a contract or transaction;

(ii) 

a claim for extension or payment of a bond, financial guarantee or indemnity of whatever form;

(iii) 

a claim for compensation in respect of a contract or transaction;

(iv) 

a counterclaim;

(v) 

a claim for the recognition or enforcement, including by the procedure of exequatur, of a judgment, an arbitration award or an equivalent decision, wherever made or given;

(b) 

‘contract or transaction’ means any transaction of whatever form and whatever the applicable law, whether comprising one or more contracts or similar obligations made between the same or different parties; for that purpose ‘contract’ includes a bond, guarantee or indemnity, particularly a financial guarantee or financial indemnity, and credit, whether legally independent or not, as well as any related provision arising under, or in connection with, the transaction;

(c) 

‘competent authorities’ refers to the competent authorities of the Member States as identified on the websites listed in Annex II;

(d) 

‘economic resources’ means assets of every kind, whether tangible or intangible, movable or immovable, which are not funds, but may be used to obtain funds, goods or services;

(e) 

‘freezing of economic resources’ means preventing the use of economic resources to obtain funds, goods or services in any way, including, but not limited to, by selling, hiring or mortgaging them;

(f) 

‘freezing of funds’ means preventing any move, transfer, alteration, use of, access to, or dealing with funds in any way that would result in any change in their volume, amount, location, ownership, possession, character, destination or other change that would enable the funds to be used, including portfolio management;

(g) 

‘funds’ means financial assets and benefits of every kind, including, but not limited to:

(i) 

cash, cheques, claims on money, drafts, money orders and other payment instruments;

(ii) 

deposits with financial institutions or other entities, balances on accounts, debts and debt obligations;

(iii) 

publicly- and privately-traded securities and debt instruments, including stocks and shares, certificates representing securities, bonds, notes, warrants, debentures and derivatives contracts;

(iv) 

interest, dividends or other income on or value accruing from or generated by assets;

(v) 

credit, right of set-off, guarantees, performance bonds or other financial commitments;

(vi) 

letters of credit, bills of lading, bills of sale;

(vii) 

documents showing evidence of an interest in funds or financial resources;

(h) 

‘territory of the Union’ means the territories of the Member States to which the Treaty on European Union (TEU) is applicable, under the conditions laid down in the TEU, including their airspace.

Article 2

1.  

This Regulation applies to:

(a) 

genocide;

(b) 

crimes against humanity;

(c) 

the following serious human rights violations or abuses:

(i) 

torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment;

(ii) 

slavery;

(iii) 

extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions and killings;

(iv) 

enforced disappearance of persons;

(v) 

arbitrary arrests or detentions;

(d) 

other human rights violations or abuses, including but not limited to the following, in so far as those violations or abuses are widespread, systematic or are otherwise of serious concern as regards the objectives of the common foreign and security policy set out in Article 21 TEU:

(i) 

trafficking in human beings, as well as abuses of human rights by migrant smugglers as referred to in this Article;

(ii) 

sexual and gender-based violence;

(iii) 

violations or abuses of freedom of peaceful assembly and of association;

(iv) 

violations or abuses of freedom of opinion and expression;

(v) 

violations or abuses of freedom of religion or belief.

2.  

For the purpose of applying paragraph 1, regard should be had to customary international law and widely accepted instruments of international law, such as:

(a) 

the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights;

(b) 

the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights;

(c) 

the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,

(d) 

the Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment;

(e) 

the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination;

(f) 

the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women;

(g) 

the Convention on the Rights of the Child;

(h) 

the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance;

(i) 

the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities;

(j) 

the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime;

(k) 

the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court.

(l) 

the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.

3.  

For the purposes of applying this Regulation, natural or legal persons, entities or bodies may include:

(a) 

State actors;

(b) 

other actors exercising effective control or authority over a territory;

(c) 

other non-State actors, subject to Article 1(4) of Decision (CFSP) 2020/1999.

Article 3

1.  
All funds and economic resources belonging to, owned, held or controlled by any natural or legal person, entity or body as listed in Annex I shall be frozen.
2.  
No funds or economic resources shall be made available, directly or indirectly, to or for the benefit of natural or legal persons, entities or bodies listed in Annex I.
3.  

Annex I shall include, as identified by the Council in accordance with Article 3 of Decision (CFSP) 2020/1999:

(a) 

natural or legal persons, entities or bodies, who are responsible for acts set out in Article 2(1);

(b) 

natural or legal persons, entities or bodies, who provide financial, technical, or material support for or are otherwise involved in acts set out in Article 2(1), including by planning, directing, ordering, assisting, preparing, facilitating, or encouraging such acts;

(c) 

natural or legal persons, entities or bodies, who are associated with the natural or legal persons, entities or bodies covered by points (a) and (b).

Article 4

1.  

By way of derogation from Article 3, the competent authorities of the Member States may authorise the release of certain frozen funds or economic resources, or the making available of certain funds or economic resources, under such conditions as they deem appropriate, after having determined that the funds or economic resources concerned are:

(a) 

necessary to satisfy the basic needs of natural or legal persons, entities or bodies listed in Annex I, and dependent family members of such natural persons, including payments for food, rent or mortgage, medicines and medical treatment, taxes, insurance premiums, and public utility charges;

(b) 

intended exclusively for the payment of reasonable professional fees or the reimbursement of incurred expenses associated with the provision of legal services;

(c) 

intended exclusively for the payment of fees or service charges for the routine holding or maintenance of frozen funds or economic resources;

(d) 

necessary for extraordinary expenses, provided that the relevant competent authority has notified the competent authorities of the other Member States and the Commission of the grounds on which it considers that a specific authorisation should be granted, at least two weeks prior to the authorisation; or

(e) 

to be paid into or from an account of a diplomatic or consular mission or an international organisation enjoying immunities in accordance with international law, insofar as such payments are intended to be used for official purposes of the diplomatic or consular mission or international organisation.

2.  
The Member State concerned shall inform the other Member States and the Commission of any authorisation granted under paragraph 1 within two weeks of the authorisation.

Article 5

1.  
By way of derogation from Article 3, the competent authorities of the Member States may authorise the release of certain frozen funds or economic resources, or the making available of certain funds or economic resources, under such conditions as they deem appropriate, after having determined that the provision of such funds or economic resources is necessary for humanitarian purposes, such as delivering or facilitating the delivery of assistance, including medical supplies, food, or the transfer of humanitarian workers and related assistance or for evacuations.
2.  
The Member State concerned shall inform the other Member States and the Commission of any authorisation granted under paragraph 1 within four weeks of the authorisation.

Article 6

1.  

By way of derogation from Article 3(1), the competent authorities of the Member States may authorise the release of certain frozen funds or economic resources, if the following conditions are met:

(a) 

the funds or economic resources are the subject of an arbitral decision rendered prior to the date on which the natural or legal person, entity or body referred to in Article 3 was listed in Annex I, or of a judicial or administrative decision rendered in the Union, or a judicial decision enforceable in the Member State concerned, prior to or after that date;

(b) 

the funds or economic resources will be used exclusively to satisfy claims secured by such a decision or recognised as valid in such a decision, within the limits set by applicable laws and regulations governing the rights of persons having such claims;

(c) 

the decision is not for the benefit of a natural or legal person, entity or body listed in Annex I; and

(d) 

recognition of the decision is not contrary to public policy in the Member State concerned.

2.  
The Member State concerned shall inform the other Member States and the Commission of any authorisation granted under paragraph 1 within two weeks of the authorisation.

Article 7

1.  

By way of derogation from Article 3(1) and provided that a payment by a natural or legal person, entity or body listed in Annex I is due under a contract or agreement that was concluded by, or an obligation that arose for, the natural or legal person, entity or body concerned, before the date on which that natural or legal person, entity or body was included in Annex I, the competent authorities of the Member States may authorise, under such conditions as they deem appropriate, the release of certain frozen funds or economic resources, provided that the competent authority concerned has determined that:

(a) 

the funds or economic resources will be used for a payment by a natural or legal person, entity or body listed in Annex I; and

(b) 

the payment is not in breach of Article 3(2).

2.  
The Member State concerned shall inform the other Member States and the Commission of any authorisation granted under paragraph 1 within two weeks of the authorisation.

Article 8

1.  
Article 3(2) shall not prevent the crediting of frozen accounts by financial or credit institutions that receive funds transferred by third parties onto the account of a listed natural or legal person, entity or body, provided that any additions to such accounts will also be frozen. The financial or credit institution shall inform the relevant competent authority about any such transaction without delay.
2.  

Article 3(2) shall not apply to the addition to frozen accounts of:

(a) 

interest or other earnings on those accounts;

(b) 

payments due under contracts, agreements or obligations that were concluded or arose before the date on which the natural or legal person, entity or body referred to in Article 3 was included in Annex I; or

(c) 

payments due under judicial, administrative or arbitral decisions rendered in a Member State or enforceable in the Member State concerned,

provided that any such interest, other earnings and payments remain subject to the measures provided for in Article 3(1).

Article 9

1.  

Without prejudice to the applicable rules concerning reporting, confidentiality and professional secrecy, natural and legal persons, entities and bodies shall:

(a) 

supply immediately any information which would facilitate compliance with this Regulation, such as information on accounts and amounts frozen in accordance with Article 3(1), to the competent authority of the Member State where they are resident or located, and transmit such information, directly or through the Member State, to the Commission; and

(b) 

cooperate with the competent authority in any verification of the information referred to in point (a).

2.  
Any additional information received directly by the Commission shall be made available to the Member States.
3.  
Any information provided or received in accordance with this Article shall be used only for the purposes for which it was provided or received.

Article 10

It shall be prohibited to participate, knowingly and intentionally, in activities the object or effect of which is to circumvent the measures referred to in Article 3.

Article 11

1.  
The freezing of funds and economic resources or the refusal to make funds or economic resources available, carried out in good faith on the basis that such action is in accordance with this Regulation, shall not give rise to liability of any kind on the part of the natural or legal person or entity or body implementing it, or its directors or employees, unless it is proved that the funds and economic resources were frozen or withheld as a result of negligence.
2.  
Actions by natural or legal persons, entities or bodies shall not give rise to any liability of any kind on their part if they did not know, and had no reasonable cause to suspect, that their actions would infringe the measures set out in this Regulation.

Article 12

1.  

No claims in connection with any contract or transaction the performance of which has been affected, directly or indirectly, in whole or in part, by the measures imposed under this Regulation, including claims for indemnity or any other claim of this type, such as a claim for compensation or a claim under a guarantee, in particular a claim for extension or payment of a bond or of a guarantee or indemnity, in particular a financial guarantee or financial indemnity, of whatever form, shall be satisfied, if they are made by:

(a) 

natural or legal persons, entities or bodies listed in Annex I;

(b) 

any natural or legal person, entity or body acting through or on behalf of one of the natural or legal persons, entities or bodies referred to in point (a).

2.  
In any proceedings for the enforcement of a claim, the onus of proving that satisfying the claim is not prohibited by paragraph 1 shall be on the natural or legal person, entity or body seeking the enforcement of that claim.
3.  
This Article is without prejudice to the right of the natural or legal persons, entities and bodies referred to in paragraph 1 to judicial review of the legality of the non-performance of contractual obligations in accordance with this Regulation.

Article 13

1.  

The Commission and Member States shall inform each other of the measures taken under this Regulation and share any other relevant information at their disposal in connection with this Regulation, in particular information in respect of:

(a) 

funds frozen under Article 3 and authorisations granted under Articles 4, 5, 6 and 7;

(b) 

violation and enforcement problems and judgments handed down by national courts.

2.  
The Member States shall immediately inform each other and the Commission of any other relevant information at their disposal which might affect the effective implementation of this Regulation.

Article 14

1.  
Where the Council decides to subject a natural or legal person, entity or body to the measures referred to in Article 3, it shall amend Annex I accordingly.
2.  
The Council shall communicate the decision referred to in paragraph 1, including the grounds for listing, to the natural or legal person, entity or body concerned, either directly, if the address is known, or through the publication of a notice, providing that natural or legal person, entity or body with an opportunity to present observations.
3.  
Where observations are submitted, or where substantial new evidence is presented, the Council shall review the decisions referred to in paragraph 1 and inform the natural or legal person, entity or body concerned accordingly.
4.  
The list in Annex I shall be reviewed at regular intervals and at least every 12 months.
5.  
The Commission shall be empowered to amend Annex II on the basis of information supplied by Member States.

Article 15

1.  
Annex I shall include the grounds for the listing of natural or legal persons, entities or bodies concerned.
2.  
Annex I shall contain, where available, the information necessary to identify the natural or legal persons, entities or bodies concerned. With regard to natural persons, such information may include: names and aliases; date and place of birth; nationality; passport and identity card numbers; gender; address, if known; and function or profession. With regard to legal persons, entities or bodies, such information may include: names; place and date of registration; registration number; and place of business.

Article 16

1.  
Member States shall lay down the rules on penalties applicable to infringements of the provisions of this Regulation and shall take all measures necessary to ensure that they are implemented. The penalties provided for must be effective, proportionate and dissuasive.
2.  
Member States shall notify the Commission of the rules referred to in paragraph 1 without delay after the entry into force of this Regulation and shall notify it of any subsequent amendment.

Article 17

1.  

The Council, the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (the ‘High Representative’) shall process personal data in order to carry out their tasks under this Regulation. These tasks include:

(a) 

as regards the Council, preparing and making amendments to Annex I;

(b) 

as regards the High Representative, preparing amendments to Annex I;

(c) 

as regards the Commission:

(i) 

adding the contents of Annex I to the electronic, consolidated list of persons, groups and entities subject to Union financial sanctions and to the interactive sanctions map, both publicly available;

(ii) 

processing information on the impact of the measures provided for in this Regulation such as the value of frozen funds and information on authorisations granted by the competent authorities.

2.  
The Council, the Commission and the High Representative may process, where applicable, relevant data relating to criminal offences committed by listed natural persons, to criminal convictions of such persons or to security measures concerning such persons, only to the extent that such processing is necessary for the preparation of Annex I.
3.  
For the purposes of this Regulation, the Council, the Commission service listed in Annex II to this Regulation and the High Representative are designated as ‘controller’ within the meaning of point (8) of Article 3 of Regulation (EU) 2018/1725, in order to ensure that the natural persons concerned can exercise their rights under Regulation (EU) 2018/1725.

Article 18

1.  
Member States shall designate the competent authorities referred to in this Regulation and identify them on the websites listed in Annex II. Member States shall notify the Commission of any changes in the addresses of their websites listed in Annex II.
2.  
Member States shall notify the Commission of their competent authorities, including the contact details of those competent authorities, without delay after the entry into force of this Regulation, and shall notify it of any subsequent amendment.
3.  
Where this Regulation sets out a requirement to notify, inform or otherwise communicate with the Commission, the address and other contact details to be used for such communication shall be those indicated in Annex II.

Article 19

This Regulation shall apply:

(a) 

within the territory of the Union, including its airspace;

(b) 

on board any aircraft or vessel under the jurisdiction of a Member State;

(c) 

to any natural person inside or outside the territory of the Union who is a national of a Member State;

(d) 

to any legal person, entity or body, inside or outside the territory of the Union, which is incorporated or constituted under the law of a Member State;

(e) 

to any legal person, entity or body in respect of any business done in whole or in part within the Union.

Article 20

This Regulation shall enter into force on the day following that of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union.

This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States.




ANNEX I

List of natural or legal persons, entities or bodies referred to in Article 3

A. 

Natural persons

▼M1



 

►M2  Names (Transliteration into Latin script) ◄

►M2  Names ◄

Identifying information

Reasons for listing

Date of listing

▼M6

1.

Alexander (Alexandr) Petrovich KALASHNIKOV

Aлександр Петрович КАЛАШНИКОВ (Russian spelling)

Position(s): Former director of the Russian Federal Penitentiary Service (FSIN)

DOB: 27.1.1964

POB: Tatarsk, Novosibirsk Region/Oblast, Russian SFSR (now Russian Federation)

Alexander Kalashnikov was the director of the Russian Federal Penitentiary Service (FSIN) from 8 October 2019 until 25 November 2021. In that position, he oversaw all activities of the FSIN. In his capacity as director of the FSIN, he was responsible for serious human rights violations in Russia, including arbitrary arrests and detentions.

2.3.2021

 

 

 

Nationality: Russian

Gender: male

In the case of Alexei Navalny, while Mr Navalny was recovering in Germany (September 2020-January 2021) after having been poisoned with a toxic nerve agent of the Novichok group, on 28 December 2020 FSIN demanded that he immediately present himself to a probation officer or face a prison sentence for violating a suspended sentence for fraud conviction. That fraud conviction had been found arbitrary and unfair by the European Court of Human Rights in 2018. On 17 January 2021, acting on the orders of Alexander Kalashnikov, FSIN officers detained Alexei Navalny upon his arrival at Moscow airport.

 

 

 

 

 

Alexei Navalny’s arrest is based on a decision by the Khimki city court, which in turn was issued at the request of FSIN. In late December 2020, FSIN had already requested that a court replace Alexei Nalvany’s suspended sentence with a prison term. On 17 February 2021, the European Court of Human Rights ordered the Government of Russia to release Alexei Navalny.

 

▼M1

2.

Alexander (Alexandr) Ivanovich BASTRYKIN

Алексaндр Ивaнович БАСТРЫКИН

Position(s): Chairman of the Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation

DOB: 27.8.1953

POB: Pskov, Russian SFSR (now Russian Federation)

Nationality: Russian

Gender: male

Alexander Bastrykin has served as chairman of the Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation (the ‘Committee’) since January 2011 (and as acting chairman from October to December 2010). In that position, he oversees all activities of the Committee. Officially, the Committee is presided over by the Russian President. In Alexander Bastrykin’s capacity as chairman of the Committee, he is responsible for serious human rights violations in Russia, including arbitrary arrests and detentions.

Alexander Bastrykin is responsible for the Committee’s widespread and systematic repressive campaigns against the Russian opposition, targeting and investigating their members. On 29 December 2020, the Committee launched an investigation into the opposition leader Alexei Navalny, charging him with large-scale fraud. Alexei Navalny and others published articles on Alexander Bastrykin’s ownership of Czech real estate firm LAW Bohemia in the 2000s.

2 March 2021

3.

Igor Viktorovich KRASNOV

Игорь Викторович КРАСНОВ

Position(s): Prosecutor General of the Russian Federation

DOB: 24.12.1975

POB: Arkhangelsk, Russian SFSR (now Russian Federation)

Nationality: Russian

Gender: male

Igor Krasnov has been Prosecutor General of the Russian Federation since 22 January 2020, and is the former Deputy Chairman of the Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation. In his position as Prosecutor General, he supervises the Prosecutor’s Offices in the Russian Federation, the Special Prosecutor’s Offices and the Military Prosecutor’s Office. In his capacity as Prosecutor General, he is responsible for serious human rights violations, including the arbitrary detentions of protesters, and for widespread and systematic repression of freedom of peaceful assembly and of association, and freedom of opinion and expression.

Ahead of the 23 January 2021 protests, the Prosecutor General’s Office warned that participants would be held responsible. Moreover, the Prosecutor General’s Office demanded that the Federal Service for Supervision in the Sphere of Communications, Information Technology and Mass Communications (Roskomnadzor) restrict access to opposition websites and social network accounts that contained information on planned gatherings of Alexei Navalny’s supporters. On 29 January 2021, the Prosecutor General’s Office once again demanded that Roskomnadzor restrict access to opposition websites and social network accounts, this time ahead of the pro-Navalny protests on 30 and 31 January 2021. Warnings were sent to internet companies (Facebook, TikTok, Twitter, Google, Mail.ru Group). The Prosecutor General’s Office also announced that those taking part in the demonstrations would be prosecuted.

The Prosecutor General’s Office supported the request by the Russian Federal Penitentiary Service (FSIN) to convert the suspended sentence imposed on Alexei Navalny in a case of alleged fraud to a prison sentence. Despite the fact that his conviction in that case had been found arbitrary and unfair by the European Court of Human Rights in 2018, Alexei Navalny was arrested upon his arrival at Moscow airport on 17 January 2021.

2 March 2021

▼M3

4.

Viktor Vasilievich (Vasilyevich) ZOLOTOV

Виктор Васильевич ЗОЛОТОВ

Position(s): Director of the Federal Service of National Guard Troops of the Russian Federation (Rosgvardia)

DOB: 27.1.1954

POB: Sasovo, Russian SFSR (now Russian Federation)

Nationality: Russian

Gender: male

Viktor Zolotov has been the Director of the Federal Service of National Guard Troops of the Russian Federation (Rosgvardia) since 5 April 2016 and therefore Commander-in-Chief of the National Guard Troops of the Russian Federation, as well as Commander of OMON – the Special Purpose Mobile Unit integrated in Rosgvardia. In that position, he oversees all activities of Rosgvardia and OMON troops. In his capacity as Director of Rosgvardia, he is responsible for serious human rights violations in Russia, including arbitrary arrests and detentions and systematic and widespread violations of freedom of peaceful assembly and of association, in particular by violently repressing protests and demonstrations.

2.3.2021

 

 

 

 

Rosgvardia was employed to quell the pro-Navalny protests of 23 January and 21 April 2021, and many OMON and National Guard officers were reported to have used brutality and violence against protesters. Dozens of journalists were targeted with aggression by the security forces, including Meduza’s correspondent Kristina Safronova, who was hit by an OMON officer, and Novaya Gazeta’s journalist Yelizaveta Kirpanova, who was hit on the head with a truncheon leaving her bleeding. During the 23 January 2021 protests, security forces arbitrarily detained more than 300 minors.

 

5.

ZHU Hailun

朱海仑 (Chinese spelling)

Position(s): Member of the 13th National People’s Congress of the People’s Republic of China (in session from 2018 to 2023) representing the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR); Member of the National People’s Congress Supervisory and Judicial Affairs Committee (since 19 March 2018)

Former Secretary of the Political and Legal Affairs Committee of the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) and former Deputy Secretary of the Party Committee of the XUAR (2016 to 2019). Former Deputy Head of the Standing Committee of the 13th People’s Congress of the XUAR, a regional legislative body (2019 to 5 February 2021 but still active until at least March 2021). Member of the 13th National People’s Congress of the People’s Republic of China (in session from 2018 to 2023) representing the XUAR. Member of the National People’s Congress Supervisory and Judicial Affairs Committee since 19 March 2018.

22.3.2021

 

 

 

DOB: January 1958

POB: Lianshui, Jiangsu (China)

Nationality: Chinese

Gender: male

As Secretary of the Political and Legal Affairs Committee of the XUAR (2016 to 2019), Zhu Hailun was responsible for maintaining internal security and law enforcement in the XUAR. As such, he held a key political position in charge of overseeing and implementing a large-scale surveillance, detention and indoctrination programme targeting Uyghurs and people from other Muslim ethnic minorities. Zhu Hailun has been described as the ‘architect’ of this programme. He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in China, in particular large-scale arbitrary detentions inflicted upon Uyghurs and people from other Muslim ethnic minorities.

As Deputy Head of the Standing Committee of the 13th People’s Congress of the XUAR (2019 to 5 February 2021), Zhu Hailun continued to exercise a decisive influence in the XUAR where the large-scale surveillance, detention and indoctrination programme targeting Uyghurs and people from other Muslim ethnic minorities continues.

 

▼M6

6.

WANG Junzheng

王君正 (Chinese spelling)

Position(s): Party Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR); former Party Secretary of the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps (XPCC) and Deputy Secretary of the Party Committee of China’s Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region; Political commissar of the XPCC and CEO of the China Xinjian Group

DOB: May 1963

POB: Linyi, Shandong (China)

Nationality: Chinese

Gender: male

Party Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) since October 2021. Former Party Secretary of the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps (XPCC) and Deputy Secretary of the Party Committee of China’s Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) from April 2020 to October 2021, as well as Political commissar of the XPCC from May 2020 to October 2021. Former Secretary of the Political and Legal Affairs Committee of the XUAR, from February 2019 to September 2020. Wang Junzheng also held other senior posts in the XPCC.

22.3.2021

 

 

 

 

The XPCC is a state-owned economic and paramilitary organisation in the XUAR, which exercises administrative authority and controls economic activities in Xinjiang.

As Party Secretary and Political commissar of the XPCC, Wang Junzheng was involved in overseeing all policies implemented by the XPCC. In that position, he was responsible for serious human rights violations in China, in particular large-scale arbitrary detentions and degrading treatment inflicted upon Uyghurs and people from other Muslim ethnic minorities, as well as systematic violations of their freedom of religion or belief, linked, inter alia, to the XPCC’s implementation of a large-scale surveillance, detention and indoctrination programme targeting Uyghurs and people from other Muslim ethnic minorities.

 

 

 

 

 

He was also responsible for the XPCC’s systematic use of Uyghurs and people from other Muslim ethnic minorities as a forced workforce, in particular in cotton fields.

As Deputy Secretary of the Party Committee of the XUAR, Wang Junzheng was involved in overseeing all the security policies implemented in Xinjiang, including the aforementioned programme targeting Uyghurs and people from other Muslim ethnic minorities. As Secretary of the Political and Legal Affairs Committee of the XUAR from February 2019 to September 2020, Wang Junzheng was responsible for maintaining internal security and law enforcement in the XUAR. As such, he held a key political position in charge of overseeing and implementing the aforementioned programme.

 

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7.

WANG Mingshan

王明山 (Chinese spelling)

Position(s): Member of the Standing Committee of the Party Committee of the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) and Secretary of the Political and Legal Affairs Committee of the XUAR

DOB: January 1964

POB: Wuwei, Gansu (China)

Nationality: Chinese

Gender: male

Member of the Standing Committee of the Party Committee of the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) and Secretary of the Political and Legal Affairs Committee of the XUAR since September 2020. Former Director and Deputy Party Secretary of the Xinjiang Public Security Bureau (XPSB) between 2017 and January 2021.

22.3.2021

 

 

 

 

As Secretary of the Political and Legal Affairs Committee of the XUAR since September 2020, Wang Mingshan is responsible for maintaining internal security and law enforcement in the XUAR. As such, he holds a key political position in charge of overseeing a large-scale surveillance, detention and indoctrination programme targeting Uyghurs and people from other Muslim ethnic minorities.

 

 

 

 

 

As Former Director and Deputy Party Secretary of the XPSB (2017 to January 2021), he held a key position in Xinjiang’s security apparatus and was directly responsible for implementing the aforementioned programme. In particular, the XPSB has deployed the ‘Integrated Joint Operations Platform’ (IJOP), a big data programme used to track millions of Uyghurs in the Xinjiang region and flag those deemed ‘potentially threatening’ to be sent to detention camps.

In his current position and due to his former functions, Wang Mingshan is responsible for serious human rights violations in China, in particular large-scale arbitrary detentions and degrading treatment inflicted upon Uyghurs and people from other Muslim ethnic minorities, as well as systematic violations of their freedom of religion or belief.

 

8.

CHEN Mingguo

陈明国

(Chinese spelling)

Position(s): Director of the Xinjiang Public Security Bureau (XPSB) and Vice-Chairman of the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region (XUAR) People’s Government

DOB: October 1966

POB: Yilong, Sichuan (China)

Nationality: Chinese

Gender: male

Director of the Xinjiang Public Security Bureau (XPSB) since January 2021 and Vice-Chairman of the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region (XUAR) People’s Government.

22.3.2021

 

 

 

 

As Director of the XPSB, Chen Mingguo holds a key position in Xinjiang’s security apparatus and is directly involved in implementing a large-scale surveillance, detention and indoctrination programme targeting Uyghurs and people from other Muslim ethnic minorities. In particular, the XPSB has deployed the ‘Integrated Joint Operations Platform’ (IJOP), a big data programme used to track millions of Uyghurs in the Xinjiang region and flag those deemed ‘potentially threatening’ to be sent to detention camps. Chen Mingguo is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in China, in particular arbitrary detentions and degrading treatment inflicted upon Uyghurs and people from other Muslim ethnic minorities, as well as systematic violations of their freedom of religion or belief.

 

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9.

JONG Kyong-thaek (a.k.a. CHO’NG Kyo’ng-t’aek)

정경택 (Korean spelling)

Position(s): Director of the General Political Bureau of the Korean People’s Army; former Minister of State Security of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK)

DOB: between 1.1.1961 and 31.12.1963

Nationality: Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK)

Gender: male

Jong Kyong-thaek is the Director of the General Political Bureau of the Korean People’s Army. He was the Minister of State Security of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) from 2017 until 2022. The Ministry of State Security of the DPRK is one of the leading institutions in charge of implementing the repressive security policies of the DPRK, with a focus on identifying and suppressing political dissent, the inflow of ‘subversive’ information from abroad, and any other conduct considered a serious political threat to the political system and its leadership.

22.3.2021

 

 

 

 

As former Head of the Ministry of State Security, Jong Kyong-thaek is responsible for serious human rights violations in the DPRK, in particular torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions and killings, enforced disappearance of persons, and arbitrary arrests or detentions, as well as widespread forced labour and sexual violence against women.

 

10.

RI Yong Gil (a.k.a. RI Yong Gi, RI Yo’ng-kil, YI Yo’ng-kil)

리영길 (Korean spelling)

Position(s): Minister of National Defence of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK)

Rank: Vice Marshal

DOB: 1955

Nationality: Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK)

Gender: male

Ri Yong Gil is the Minister of National Defence of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK). He was the Minister of Social Security from January 2021 until June or July 2021. He was Chief of the General Staff of the Korean People’s Army (KPA) between 2018 and January 2021. He was promoted to Vice Marshal of the KPA on 14 April 2022.

As Minister of National Defence, Ri Yong Gil is responsible for serious human rights violations, including by members of the Military Security Command and other KPA units.

22.3.2021

 

 

 

 

The Ministry of Social Security of the DPRK (formerly known as the Ministry of People’s Security or Ministry of Public Security) and the Military Security Command are leading institutions in charge of implementing the repressive security policies of the DPRK, including interrogation and punishment of people ‘illegally’ fleeing the DPRK. In particular, the Ministry of Social Security is in charge of running prison camps and short-term labour detention centres through its Correctional Bureau, where prisoners/detainees are subject to deliberate starvation and other inhuman treatment.

 

 

 

 

 

As former Head of the Ministry of Social Security, Ri Yong Gil is responsible for serious human rights violations in the DPRK, in particular torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions and killings, enforced disappearance of persons, and arbitrary arrests or detentions, as well as widespread forced labour and sexual violence against women.

As former Chief of the General Staff of the KPA, Ri Yong Gil is also responsible for the widespread serious human rights violations committed by the KPA.

 

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12.

Abderrahim AL-KANI (a.k.a. Abdul-Rahim AL-KANI, Abd-al-Rahim AL-KANI, Abdel Rahim KHALIFA, Abdel Rahim AL-SHAQAQI)

عبد الرحيم الكاني (Arabic spelling)

Position(s): member of the Kaniyat Militia

DOB: 7.9.1997

Nationality: Libyan

Passport number: PH3854LY

ID number: 119970331820

Gender: male

Abderrahim Al-Kani is a key member of the Kaniyat Militia and brother of the Head of the Kaniyat Militia, Mohammed Khalifa Al-Khani (deceased in July 2021). The Kaniyat Militia exercised control of the Libyan town of Tarhuna between 2015 and June 2020.

Abderrahim Al-Kani is in charge of internal security for the Kaniyat Militia. In that capacity, he is responsible for serious human rights abuses in Libya, in particular extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances of persons between 2015 and June 2020 in Tarhuna.

22.3.2021

 

 

 

 

Abderrahim Al-Kani and the Kaniyat Militia fled Tarhuna in early June 2020 to eastern Libya. Since then, several mass graves attributed to the Kaniyat Militia have been discovered in Tarhuna.

 

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13.

Aiub Vakhaevich KATAEV (a.k.a. Ayubkhan Vakhaevich KATAEV)

Аюб Вахаевич КАТАЕВ (a.k.a. Аюбхан Вахаевич КАТАЕВ) (Russian spelling)

Position(s): Former Head of Department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation in the city of Argun in the Chechen Republic

DOB: 1.12.1980 or 1.12.1984

Nationality: Russian

Gender: male

Head of Department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation in the city of Argun in the Chechen Republic until 2018.

In his capacity as Head of Department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation in Argun, Aiub Kataev oversaw the activities of local state security and police agencies. In this position, he personally oversaw widespread and systematic persecutions in Chechnya, which began in 2017. The repressions are directed against lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex (LGBTI) persons, those presumed to belong to LGBTI groups, and other individuals suspected of being opponents of the Head of the Chechen Republic Ramzan Kadyrov. Aiub Kataev and forces formerly under his command are responsible for serious human rights violations in Russia, in particular torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment, as well as arbitrary arrests and detentions and extrajudicial or arbitrary executions and killings.

According to numerous witnesses, Aiub Kataev personally supervised and took part in torturing detainees.

22.3.2021

14.

Abuzaid (Abuzayed) Dzhandarovich VISMURADOV

Абузайд Джандарович ВИСМУРАДОВ (Russian spelling)

Position(s): Former Commander of the Special Rapid-Response Unit (SOBR) Team ‘Terek’, Deputy Prime Minister of the Chechen Republic, unofficial bodyguard of the Head of the Chechen Republic Ramzan Kadyrov

DOB: 24.12.1975

Former Commander of the Special Rapid-Response Unit (SOBR) Team ‘Terek’. Since 23 March 2020, Deputy Prime Minister of the Chechen Republic. Unofficial bodyguard of the Head of the Chechen Republic Ramzan Kadyrov.

Abuzaid Vismuradov was the Commander of the SOBR detachment ‘Terek’ from March 2012 until March 2020. In this position, he personally oversaw widespread and systematic persecutions in Chechnya, which began in 2017. The repressions are directed against lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex (LGBTI) persons, those presumed to belong to LGBTI groups and other individuals suspected of being opponents of the Head of the Chechen Republic Ramzan Kadyrov.

22.3.2021

 

 

 

POB: Akhmat-Yurt/Khosi-Yurt, former Checheno-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (ASSR), now Chechen Republic (Russian Federation)

Nationality: Russian

Gender: male

Abuzaid Vismuradov and the ‘Terek’ unit previously under his command are responsible for serious human rights violations in Russia, in particular torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment, as well as arbitrary arrests and detentions and extrajudicial and arbitrary killings and executions.

According to numerous witnesses, Abuzaid Vismuradov personally supervised and took part in torturing detainees. He is a close associate of Ramzan Kadyrov, the Head of the Chechen Republic, who has been conducting a campaign of repression against his political opponents for many years.

 

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15.

Gabriel Moses LOKUJO

-

Position(s): Major General of the South Sudan People’s Defense Forces (SSPDF)

Nationality: South Sudanese

Gender: male

Major General of the South Sudan People’s Defense Forces (SSPDF).

Gabriel Moses Lokujo is responsible for serious human rights violation in South Sudan, in particular extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions and killings.

In May 2020, three officers of the Sudan People’s Liberation Army in Opposition (SPLA-IO) were abducted and executed on the orders of Major General Lokujo.

22.3.2021

 

 

 

 

Major General Lokujo defected in September 2020 from the SPLA-IO to the SSPDF and is responsible for the ensuing clashes in and around the Moroto Training Center in southern Central Equatoria. As a consequence, several deaths and injuries were reported on both sides during the last quarter of 2020, and civilians were also displaced, especially in the Kajo-Keji area of Central Equatoria State. Major General Lokujo’s forces remained in the area where several further clashes have been reported and the safety and security of the civilian communities continue to be in jeopardy.

 

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16.

Dimitriy (Dimitry, Dmitri, Dmitry) Valerievich UTKIN

Дмитрий Валерьевич Уткин

(Russian spelling)

Position(s): Founder and commander of the Wagner Group

Rank: Lieutenant colonel (reserve)

Callsign: Vagner, Wagner, The Nineth

Wagner Group ID: M-0209

DOB: 1.6.1970 or 11.6.1970

POB: Asbest, Sverdlovsk Oblast, Russian SFSR (now Russian Federation)

Nationality: Russian

Address: Pskov, Russian Federation

Gender: male

Dimitriy Utkin, a former Russian military intelligence (GRU) officer, is the founder of the Wagner Group and responsible for coordinating and planning operations for the deployment of Wagner Group mercenaries across various countries.

In his commanding position within the Wagner Group, he is responsible for serious human rights abuses committed by the group, which include torture and extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions and killings.

This includes the torturing to death of a Syrian deserter by four members of the Wagner Group in June 2017 in the governorate of Homs, Syria. According to a former member of the Wagner Group, Dimitriy Utkin personally ordered the torturing to death of the deserter as well as the filming of the act.

13.12.2021

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17.

Stanislav Evgenievitch DYCHKO

Станислав Евгеньевич Дычко

(Russian spelling)

Position(s): Mercenary of the Wagner Group

DOB: 1990

Nationality: Russian

Gender: male

Stanislav Dychko, a former employee of the Stavropol police, is a mercenary of the Wagner Group.

Alongside three other mercenaries of the Wagner Group, he took part in the torturing to death of a Syrian deserter in June 2017 in the governorate of Homs, Syria.

He is therefore responsible for serious human rights abuses in Syria.

13.12.2021

18.

Valery (Valeriy) Nikolaevich ZAKHAROV

Валерий Николаевич Захаров

(Russian spelling)

Position(s): Security counsellor to the President of the Central African Republic (CAR)

Wagner Group ID: M-5658

DOB: 12.1.1970

POB: Leningrad, Russian SFSR (now Russian Federation)

Nationality: Russian

Gender: male

Valery Zakharov, a former member of the Russian state security (FSB), is the security counsellor to the President of the Central African Republic (CAR). He is a key figure in the Wagner Group’s command structure and keeps close links with the Russian authorities.

Given his influential position in CAR and his leading role in the Wagner group, he is responsible for serious human rights abuses committed by the Wagner Group in CAR, which include extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions and killings.

This includes the murder of three Russian journalists in 2018, the security of whom was under the responsibility of Valery Zakharov.

13.12.2021

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19.

Maxim SHUGALEY

a.k.a.

Maksim SHUGALEI

Максим ШУГАЛЕЙ

(Russian spelling)

Position(s): President of the Foundation for the Defence of National Values (FDNV)

DOB: 24.2.1966

POB: Leningrad, former USSR (now St Petersburg, Russian Federation)

Nationality: Russian

Gender: male

Passport or ID number:

710508436 (Russian passport)

Maxim Shugaley is head of Foundation for the Defence of National Values (FDNV) and works directly under the supervision of Yevgeny Prigozhin, who is the head of the Wagner Group. The FDNV operates as the public relations arm of the Wagner Group and Shugaley’s role in FDNV involves steering pro-Wagner Group propaganda and disinformation campaigns, including to enhance the reputation of the Wagner Group and support its deployment, as well as covertly interfering on behalf of the Wagner Group in the various countries that he is active in.

The Wagner Group is listed for serious human rights abuses, which include torture and extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions and killings, in several countries including Libya, Mali and the Central African Republic.

Shugaley is associated with the Wagner Group and is responsible for supporting and encouraging the acts of the Wagner Group through pro-Wagner Group propaganda and disinformation.

25.2.2023

20.

Aleksandr Grigorievitch MALOLETKO

Александр Григорьевич МАЛОЛЕТКО

(Russian spelling)

 

Aleksandr Grigorievitch Maloletko is a close collaborator of Yevgeny Prigozhin. His action as a ‘defender of the Motherland’ and as the Head of the ‘Veteran’s Interests Defenders League’ has been publicly hailed by Yevgeny Prigozhin. He has been working as an instructor for the Wagner Group in the Central African Republic (CAR). He is associated with the Wagner Group, listed for serious human rights abuses in several countries, including in CAR, and is responsible for supporting the acts of the Wagner Group.

25.2.2023

21.

Konstantin Alexandrovich PIKALOV

Константин Александрович ПИКАЛОВ

(Russian spelling)

Position(s): One of the PMC Wagner Group Commanders in Africa

DOB: 23.7.1968

Nationality: Russian

Gender: male

Konstantin Alexandrovich Pikalov, code name ‘Mazaï’ (Mazay), is one of the leaders of the Wagner Group and is responsible for the operational activities of the Wagner Group in Africa, notably in the Central African Republic (CAR). He is accused of being the instigator of the murder of three Russian journalists in July 2018.

The Wagner Group is listed for serious human rights abuses, which include torture and extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions and killings, in several countries, including CAR.

In his leadership position within the Wagner Group, Pikalov is responsible for the serious human rights abuses committed by the Wagner Group in CAR.

25.2.2023

22.

Dimitri SYTII

a.k.a.

Dimitri SYTYI

Дмитрий СЫТИЙ

(Russian spelling)

Position(s): Director of the Russian house of Bangui

DOB: 23.3.1989

POB: Minsk (Belarus)

Nationality: Russian

Gender: male

Address: NA-SYTAIA/A1-TANKISTAZ KHRUSTITSKOGO 62 APT25/ZP-198217/CI St Petersburg, Russian Federation

Dimitri Sytii has a leading role within the Wagner Group in the Central African Republic (CAR), with close links to Yevgeny Prigozhin. He is in charge of conducting the Wagner Group’s influence policy in CAR. He is the head of the local branch of the Russian House, the cultural arm of the Russian foreign ministry.

The Wagner Group is listed for serious human rights abuses, which include torture and extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions and killings, in several countries, including CAR.

Given his influential position in CAR and his leading role in the Wagner Group, he is responsible for serious human rights abuses committed by the Wagner Group in CAR.

25.2.2023

23.

Mikhail Sergeyevich POTEPKIN

Михаил Сергеевич ПОТЕПКИН

(Russian spelling)

Position(s): Director Meroe Gold

DOB: 19.9.1981 or 29.9.1981

Nationality: Russian

Gender: male

Passport number: 651697952 (Russian passport)

Address: Sudan

Associated companies:

Megaline; Concord; IT-Debugger

Mikhail Potepkin is director of Meroe Gold, a cover entity for the Wagner Group’s operations in Sudan, as well as being involved in M-Invest, Meroe’s parent company. He has a leading role within the Wagner Group in Sudan, with close links to Yevgeny Prigozhin. By being affiliated with the Sudanese military, the Wagner Group secured the exploiting and exporting of Sudanese gold to Russia. Potepkin is associated with the Wagner Group, listed for serious human rights abuses, which include torture and extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions and killings, in several countries, including Sudan. Through his activities, he also provides support for such abuses committed in Sudan.

25.2.2023

24.

Alexander Alexandrovich IVANOV

Александр Александрович ИВАНОВ

(Russian spelling)

Position(s): Representative of the Wagner Group instructors in the Central African Republic

DOB: 14.6.1960

Nationality: Russian

Gender: male

Address: Bangui, Central African Republic

Alexander Ivanov is the spokesperson of the Wagner Group in the Central African Republic (CAR). He is also the head of the Russian ‘Officers Union for International Security’, which sent the Russian military instructors to CAR. Those instructors are Wagner Group mercenaries.

The Wagner Group is listed for serious human rights abuses, which include torture and extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions and killings, in several countries including CAR.

In his position as official representative of Russian military instructors, he is involved in the serious human rights abuses committed by the Wagner Group in CAR.

25.2.2023

25.

Vitalii Viktorovitch PERFILEV

Виталий Викторович ПЕРФИЛЬЕВ

(Russian spelling)

DOB: 11.9.1983

POB: Novossibirsk USSR (now Russian Federation)

Nationality: Russian

Address: Bangui (Central African Republic)

Gender: male

Passport number: NR 75 2987491

Date of delivery: 30.3.2016

Expiration date: 30.3.2026

Perfilev is the security advisor to the President of the Central African Republic (CAR). He is a key figure within the Wagner Group in CAR.

The Wagner Group is listed for serious human rights abuses, which include torture and extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions and killings, in several countries, including CAR.

Given his influential position in CAR and his leading role in the Wagner Group, he is responsible for serious human rights abuses committed by the Wagner Group in CAR.

25.2.2023

26.

Andrei Sergeevich MANDEL

Андрей Сергеевич МАНДЕЛЬ

(Russian spelling)

DOB: 2.3.1990

POB: Germany

Gender: male

Passport number: 753615660

Andrei Mandel is head of M-Invest, a cover entity for the Wagner Group’s operations in Sudan, as well as being involved in its subsidiary Meroe Gold. He has a leading role within the Wagner Group in Sudan, with close links to Yevgeny Prigozhin. By being closely affiliated with the Sudanese military, the Wagner Group secured the exploiting and exporting of Sudanese gold to Russia. Mandel is associated with the Wagner Group, listed for serious human rights abuses, which include torture and extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions and killings, in several countries, including Sudan. Through his activities, he also provides support for such abuses committed in Sudan.

25.2.2023

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27.

Neda Mohammad NADEEM

نداء محمد ندیم

(Pashto spelling)

Position(s): Acting Taliban Minister for Higher Education

Nationality: Afghan

Gender: male

Neda Mohammed Nadeem has been the acting Taliban Minister for Higher Education since 22 October 2022.

Since he took up his position, the Taliban have published decrees banning women from higher education throughout the country. These decrees deprive women of their right to education as well as their equal access to education, violating the principle of equal treatment between men and women.

In his capacity as acting Taliban Minister for Higher Education, Neda Mohammed Nadeem is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Afghanistan, in particular the widespread violation of women’s right to education and the right to equal treatment between men and women in the field of education.

7.3.2023

28.

Sheikh Muhammad Khalid HANAFI

شیخ محمد خالد

(Pashto spelling)

Position(s): Acting Taliban Minister for the propagation of virtue and the prevention of vice

DOB: around 1970

POB: Kolam Shaheed village, Doabi district, Nurestan province, Afghanistan

Nationality: Afghan

Gender: male

Sheikh Muhammad Khalid Hanafi is the acting Taliban Minister for the propagation of virtue and the prevention of vice, replacing the Minister for women’s affairs.

Since he took up his position, the Taliban have published decrees restricting women’s and girl’s freedom and dignity throughout the country, curbing their freedom of speech and expression, and inflicting harsh punishments and violence on those who do not respect the Taliban’s edicts.

In particular, during his time in office, hijab decrees were published as well as gender-segregated timetables for the use of public spaces.

In his capacity as acting Taliban Minister for the propagation of virtue and the prevention of vice, Sheikh Muhammad Khalid Hanafi is responsible for serious human rights violations in Afghanistan, in particular the widespread violation of women’s rights, such as their freedom of expression, as well as the right to equal treatment between men and women.

7.3.2023

29.

Alexander Georgievich FEDORINOV

Александр Георгиевич ФЕДОРИНОВ

(Russian spelling)

Position(s): commanding officer of Moscow Police Station

Rank: Lieutenant Colonel

Nationality: Russian

Gender: male

Lieutenant Colonel Alexander Georgievich Fedorinov is a commanding officer of Moscow Police Station.

In his capacity as acting head of the police station in March 2022, he authorised the arbitrary arrest and detention, as well as the subsequent torture, of female anti-war protestors.

Alexander Georgievich Fedorinov is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Russia, in particular torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, arbitrary arrests or detentions as well as systematic sexual and gender-based violence.

7.3.2023

30.

Ivan RYABOV

Иван РЯБОВ

(Russian spelling)

Position(s): police officer of Moscow Police Station

Nationality: Russian

Gender: male

Ivan Ryabov is a police officer of Moscow Police Station.

On the orders of Lieutenant Colonel Alexander Georgievich Fedorinov, he arbitrarily detained and tortured female anti-war protestors in March 2022. Victims report that he beat them, suffocated them with plastic bags and abused them physically and verbally for six hours.

Ivan Ryabov is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Russia, in particular torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, and arbitrary arrests or detentions.

7.3.2023

31.

Nikolay Anatolevich KUZNETSOV

a.k.a. Nikolaj Anatolevich Kuznetsov, Nikolaj Kuznetsov, Nikolay Kuznetsov

Николай Анатольевич Кузнецов

(Russian spelling)

Position(s): Member of the armed forces of the Russian Federation, commander of the Dzerzhinsky division special forces unit of Rosgvardia (Federal Service of National Guard Troops of the Russian Federation)

Rank: Major-General

DOB: 13.4.1978

Nationality: Russian

Gender: male

Tax identification number: 645407737871

Major-General Nikolay Anatolevich Kuznetsov is a member of the armed forces of the Russian Federation and commander of the Dzerzhinsky division special forces unit of Rosgvardia (Federal Service of National Guard Troops of the Russian Federation).

Kuznetsov’s unit was part of Russia’s illegal invasion of Ukraine and members of his unit systematically participated in acts of sexual violence and rape in Ukraine in March/April 2022.

The scale and severity of acts of sexual and gender-based violence taking place in Russian-occupied areas of Ukraine speak to ‘planning on a more systematic level’ and Russian commanders being aware of sexual violence by military personnel in Ukraine and, in some cases, having ‘encouraged or even ordered it’.

In his capacity as commander of the unit, Kuznetsov is responsible for serious human rights violations in Ukraine, including systematic sexual and gender-based violence.

7.3.2023

32.

Ramil Rakhmatulovich IBATULLIN

Рамиль Рахматуллович Ибатуллин

(Russian spelling)

Position(s): Member of the armed forces of the Russian Federation, former commander of the 90th guards tank division

Rank: Colonel

DOB: 22.10.1976

Nationality: Russian

Gender: male

Tax identification number: 631409144707

Russian armed forces personnel number: U-927425

Colonel Ramil Rakhmatulovich Ibatullin served in the Russian occupation troops in the Donbas region (2014-2017) and took part in Russia’s illegal invasion of Ukraine as commander of the 90th guards tank division.

In March 2022, the division under his command took part in the offensive towards Chernihiv and Kyiv. During the offensive, members of his division committed acts of sexual and gender-based violence against the Ukrainian civilian population.

After these facts became public, the Russian Ministry of Defense promoted Ibatullin to the rank of colonel.

The Ukrainian authorities have charged several members of the 90th guards tank division with allegations of sexual and gender-based violence, including the rape of a pregnant woman near Kyiv, the murder of a civilian after repeatedly raping his wife in the presence of a young child, as well as the participation of members of this division in gang rapes.

The scale and severity of acts of sexual and gender-based violence taking place in Russian-occupied areas of Ukraine speak to ‘planning on a more systematic level’ and Russian commanders being aware of sexual violence by military personnel in Ukraine and, in some cases, having ‘encouraged or even ordered it’.

Ibatullin is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Ukraine, including systematic sexual and gender-based violence.

7.3.2023

33.

Gatluak Nyang HOTH

 

Position(s): County commissioner for Mayiandit county

Nationality: South Sudanese

Gender: male

Gatluak Nyang Hoth has been the county commissioner for Mayiandit county (Unity State, South Sudan) since February 2021.

In this position, he commanded government-aligned militias to carry out attacks in southern Unity State, between February and May 2022. During this period, troops under his command made widespread and systematic use of sexual violence as a war tactic and instrumentalised it as a reward and entitlement for men participating in the conflict.

In his capacity as county commissioner, Hoth is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in South Sudan, including systematic and widespread sexual and gender-based violence.

7.3.2023

34.

Gordon Koang BIEL

a.k.a. Gordon Koang Char BIEL, Koang Biel CHAR, Koang NYALUALGO

 

Position(s): County commissioner for Koch county

POB: South Sudan

Nationality: South Sudanese

Gender: male

Gordon Koang Biel has been the county commissioner for Koch county (Unity State, South Sudan) since February 2021.

In this position, he commanded government-aligned militias to carry out attacks in southern Unity State, between February and May 2022. During this period, troops under his command made widespread and systematic use of sexual violence as a war tactic and instrumentalised it as a reward and entitlement for men participating in the conflict.

In his capacity as county commissioner, Biel is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in South Sudan, including systematic and widespread sexual and gender-based violence.

7.3.2023

35.

Toe UI

 

Position(s): Deputy Minister of Home Affairs

Rank: Major-General

Nationality: Myanmar/Burma

Gender: male

Major-General Toe Ui was appointed Deputy Minister of Home Affairs on 3 February 2023. He is the former second in command of the Office of the Chief of Military Security Affairs (OCMSA). The OCMSA is responsible for the management of detention and interrogation centres in Myanmar/Burma and tasked with intelligence gathering.

OCMSA staff under Ui’s authority use forced nudity, rape, electro-shocks, burning of genitalia and excessive violence during the arbitrary detention and interrogation of men, women and members of the LGBTIQ community.

In his capacity as the second in command, Major-General Toe Ui is responsible for serious human rights violations in Myanmar/Burma, including arbitrary detentions and torture, as well as for systematic and widespread sexual and gender-based violence.

7.3.2023

▼B

B. 

Legal persons, entities and bodies

▼M2



 

Name (Transliteration into Latin script)

Name

Identifying information

Reasons for listing

Date of listing

1.

Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps Public Security Bureau

新疆生产建设兵团公安局

(Chinese spelling)

Address: 106 Guangming Road, Urumqi, Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR), China

Telephone: +86 991 598 8114

The Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps (XPCC) Public Security Bureau is in charge of implementing all policies of the XPCC relating to security matters, including the management of detention centres. The XPCC is a state-owned economic and paramilitary organisation in China’s Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, which exercises administrative authority and controls economic activities in Xinjiang.

22.3.2021

 

 

 

 

As the organisation in charge of security policies within the XPCC, the XPCC Public Security Bureau is responsible for serious human rights violations in China, in particular large-scale arbitrary detentions and degrading treatment inflicted upon Uyghurs and people from other Muslim ethnic minorities, as well as systematic violations of their freedom of religion or belief, linked, inter alia, to the XPCC’s implementation of a large-scale surveillance, detention and indoctrination programme targeting Muslim ethnic minorities.

As part of the aforementioned programme, the XPCC uses Uyghurs and people from other Muslim ethnic minorities as a forced workforce, in particular in cotton fields. As the organisation in charge of security policies within the XPCC, the XPCC Public Security Bureau is responsible for the systematic use of forced labour.

 

2.

Central Public Prosecutor’s Office (a.k.a. Office of the Prosecutor of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK))

조선민주주의인민공화국 중앙검찰소 (Korean spelling)

 

The Central Public Prosecutor’s Office is an institution which oversees all criminal proceedings in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), including investigation, interrogation, pre-trial detention and trial.

22.3.2021

 

 

 

 

The Central Public Prosecutor’s Office is used to prosecute and punish persons for political wrongdoing in fundamentally unfair trials. It also carries institutional responsibility for serious human rights violations in ordinary prisons and interrogation detention centres by failing to enforce the rights of pre-trial detainees and convicted prisoners. In close cooperation with the Ministries of State Security and of Social Security, it bears responsibility for and provides legitimacy to serious human rights violations committed by the DPRK security apparatus, in particular torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions and killings, enforced disappearances of persons, and arbitrary arrests or detentions.

 

▼M6

3.

Kaniyat Militia (f.k.a. 7th Brigade, Tarhuna 7th Brigade, Tarhuna Brigade) (a.k.a. 9th Brigade, Al-Kani Militia, Al-Kaniyat, Kani Brigade, Kaniat, Kaniyat, Kanyat)

مليشيا كانيات (Arabic spelling)

 

The Kaniyat Militia is a Libyan armed militia, which exercised control in the Libyan town of Tarhuna between 2015 and June 2020. Mass graves attributed to the Kaniyat Militia have been discovered in Tarhuna since June 2020, after the militia fled to eastern Libya. The Kaniyat Militia is responsible for serious human rights abuses, in particular extrajudicial killings, and enforced disappearances of persons.

22.3.2021

▼M2

4.

National Security Office (a.k.a. National Security Agency) of the Government of Eritrea

-

Headed by Major General Abraha Kassa

The National Security Office (a.k.a. National Security Agency) of the Government of Eritrea is headed by Major General Abraha Kassa and is under the supervision of the Office of the President. The National Security Office is organised into six offices, each of which is divided into three sections responsible for intelligence, arrests and interrogations, respectively. The National Security Office is responsible for serious human rights violations in Eritrea, in particular arbitrary arrests, extrajudicial killings, enforced disappearances of persons and torture committed by its agents.

22.3.2021

▼M6

5.

Wagner Group (a.k.a. Vagner Group, PMC Wagner, Liga, League)

Группа Вагнера (Russian spelling)

 

The Wagner Group is a Russia-based unincorporated private military entity, which was established in 2014 as a successor organisation of the Slavonic Corps. It is led by Dimitriy Utkin and financed by Yevgeny Prigozhin. Through the setting-up of local entities, and with the support of local governments, the Wagner Group finances and conducts its operations.

The Wagner Group is responsible for serious human rights abuses in Ukraine, Syria, Libya, the Central African Republic (CAR), Sudan, Mali and Mozambique, which include torture and extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions and killings.

13.12.2021

▼M7

6.

Lobaye Invest SARLU

 

Place of registration: Bangui (Central African Republic)

Date of registration: 24.10.2017

Registration number: M 354838 D 0001 (‘NIF’ number, Tax identification number)

Principal place of business: Central African Republic

Other information: Branch of M-Finans

Lobaye Invest SARLU is a private company registered in the Central African Republic (CAR), subsidiary of the Russian company M-Finans, controlled by Yevgeny Prigozhin. It is managed by Dimitri Sytii, a senior Wagner Group executive and by Yevgeny Khodotov, who is associated with Yevgeny Prigozhin. Lobaye Invest operates gold and diamond mines in CAR. It has been linked to the Wagner Group’s operations in CAR. It also finances several media outlets, such as the radio station Lengo Sengo, a Central African radio station conducting disinformation campaigns and promoting the Wagner Group’s presence in CAR.

Lobaye Invest is associated with the Wagner Group, listed for serious human rights abuses, which include torture and extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions and killings, in several countries, including the CAR. Through its activities, Lobaye Invest also provides support for such abuses committed in CAR.

25.2.2023

7.

DIAMVILLE

 

Date of registration: 28.3.2019

Registration number: CA/BG2019B519

Principal place of business: Central African Republic

Other information: associated individuals and entites: Yevgeny Prigozhin, Wagner Group, Dimitri Sytii, Valery Zakharov, Perfilev, Svetlana Troitskaya, Lobaye Invest

Diamville is a screen company used by the Wagner Group present in the Central African Republic (CAR) to illegally trade diamonds. It is closely linked to all major actors of the Wagner Group in CAR, such as Yevgeny Prigozhin and Dimitri Sytii. Diamville is associated with the Wagner Group, listed for serious human rights abuses, which include torture and extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions and killings, in several countries, including the CAR. Through its activities, it provides support for such abuses committed in CAR.

25.2.2023

8.

Foundation for the Defence of National Values (FDNV)

Fund for the Defence of National Values (FDNV)

Foundation/organization for the Protection of National Values (FPNV)/(FZNC)

Foundation for National Values Protection

 

Place of registration: Moscow (64 Zemlyanoy Val str., building 2, office 201, Moscow, Russian Federation)

Website: https://en.fznc.ru/

The Foundation for the Defence of National Values (FDNV) is linked with the head of the Wagner Group, Yevgeny Prigozhin. The FDNV operates as the public relations arm of the Wagner Group. It steers pro-Wagner Group propaganda and disinformation campaigns, including to enhance the reputation of the Wagner Group and support its deployment, and engages in covert interference on behalf of the Wagner Group in the various countries that it is active in.

The Wagner Group is listed for serious human rights abuses, which include torture and extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions and killings, in several countries including Libya, Mali and the Central African Republic.

FDNV is associated with the Wagner Group and is responsible for supporting and encouraging the acts of the Wagner Group through pro-Wagner Group propaganda, political interference and disinformation.

25.2.2023

9.

Radio Centrafricaine Lengo Sengo

 

Place of registration: Bangui, Central African Republic

Date of registration: November 2018

Principal place of business: Galabadja

Bangui, Commune de Bangui

Galabadja, 8eme Arr.

[GPS]-> 4.4070, 18.5465

Radio Lengo Sengo is a Central African radio station engaged in online influence operations on behalf of the Wagner Group. Its ultimate objective is to manipulate public opinion. The company conducts disinformation campaigns and promotes the Wagner Group’s presence in the Central African Republic (CAR). Radio Lengo Sengo is financed by Lobaye Invest, a private company linked to Yevgeny Prigozhin and connected to the Wagner Group that serves as a cover for its activities in CAR.

The Wagner Group is listed for serious human rights abuses, which include torture and extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions and killings in several countries including CAR.

Radio Lengo Sengo is responsible for supporting and encouraging the acts of the Wagner Group in CAR.

25.2.2023

10.

Meroe Gold Co. Ltd.

 

Place of registration: Al-jref Gharb Plot 134 Blok 1h, Khartoum, Sudan

Other information: Mining of other non-ferrous metal ores

Associated with:

Al Sawlaj for Mining Ltd

الصولج

Aswar Multi Activities Co., Ltd

Meroe Gold is a cover entity for the Wagner Group’s operations in Sudan. It is closely linked to Yevgeny Prigozhin. By being affiliated with the Sudanese military, the Wagner Group secured the exploiting and exporting of Sudanese gold to Russia.

Meroe Gold is associated with the (Wagner Group, listed for serious human rights abuses, which include torture and extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions and killings, in several countries, including Sudan. Through its activities, Meroe Gold also provides support for such abuses committed in Sudan.

25.2.2023

11.

M-Invest

 

Place of registration: d. 76 korp. 4 litera A ofis N620, prospekt Obukhovskoi Oborony St. Petersburg, Russian Federation

Registration number: 1177847044066

Principal place of business: Khartoum, Sudan

Other information: Tax ID number: 7811636632; Government gazette number: 06513574

M-Invest is a cover entity for the Wagner Group’s operations in Sudan. It is closely linked to Yevgeny Prigozhin. By being affiliated with the Sudanese military, the Wagner Group secured the exploiting and exporting of Sudanese gold to Russia. M-Invest is associated with the Wagner Group, listed for serious human rights abuses, which include torture and extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions and killings, in several countries, including Sudan. Through its activities, M-Invest also provides support for such abuses committed in Sudan.

25.2.2023

12.

Sewa Security Services

 

Place of registration: Bangui (Central African Republic)

Principal place of business: Central African Republic

Other information: subsidiary of Lobaye Invest

Sewa Security Services is a Central African Republic (CAR)-based private company that provides protection for senior CAR government officials. It serves as a cover for the Wagner Group’s activities in CAR. It is a subsidiary of Lobaye Invest, managed by Dimitri Sytii, a senior Wagner Group executive and by Yevgeny Khodotov, who is associated with Yevgeny Prigozhin. Sewa Security has been involved alongside the Wagner Group in a series of violent attacks that have occurred in CAR since the presidential elections of December 2020. Sewa Security is associated with the Wagner Group, listed for serious human rights abuses, which include torture and extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions and killings, in several countries, including CAR. Through its activities, Sewa Security Services also provides support for such abuses committed in CAR.

25.2.2023

▼M8

13.

Qarchak Prison

a.k.a. Gharchak Prison, Zendân-e-Qarchak, Qarchak Women’s Prison, Shahr-e Rey Prison

زندان قرچک

(Farsi spelling)

Place of registration: Varamin County, Tehran province, Iran

Date of registration: 2010

Qarchak Prison is one of the Iranian regime’s detention facilities for women in Varamin County (Teheran province).

Detainees include political prisoners and participants in peaceful pro-democracy protests as well as pregnant women and mothers with children. Living conditions in Qarchak Prison are deplorable and inhumane.

Female detainees in Qarchak prison are subject to torture, rape and other forms of sexual violence. They are held in overcrowded cells, without access to clean drinking water, food and medical assistance, amounting to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment. Released prisoners report instances of sexual abuse by prison guards and security personnel. Female protesters sent to Qarchak prison are often threatened with rape to extract confessions.

Qarchak Prison is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran, including torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment as well as systematic sexual and gender-based violence.

7.3.2023

14.

Syrian Republican Guard

 

Place of registration: Syria

Associated individuals: Major General Shoaeb Suleiman (commander),

Brigadier General Mohamed Qasem (deputy commander),

General Malik Aliaa (supreme commander),

Major General Issam Zahreddine, Mohammad Nayouf, Rukin Mohamed Kaddor (commanders),

President Bashar Al-Assad

The Syrian Republican Guard is an entity responsible for the security of officials and part of the Syrian security forces.

In its ranks, sexual and gender-based violence against women is widespread, particularly during the ongoing Syrian conflict. Victims have reported violent rapes and torture after arbitrary arrests and during arbitrary detention.

The Syrian Republican Guard is part of a systematic approach by the Syrian regime to use sexual and gender-based violence to repress and intimidate the Syrian people, particularly women and girls.

The Syrian Republican Guard is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Syria, including torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, arbitrary arrests or detentions, as well as widespread sexual and gender-based violence.

7.3.2023

15.

Office of the Chief of Military Security Affairs (OCMSA)

 

Place of registration: Naypyitaw, Myanmar/Burma

The Office of the Chief of Military Security Affairs (OCMSA) is responsible for the management of detention and interrogation centres in Myanmar/Burma and tasked with intelligence gathering.

OCMSA staff uses forced nudity, rape, electro-shocks, burning of genitalia and excessive violence during the arbitrary detention and interrogation of men, women and members of the LGBTIQ community.

Therefore, the OCMSA is responsible for serious human rights violations in Myanmar/Burma, including arbitrary detentions and torture, as well as for systematic and widespread sexual and gender-based violence.

7.3.2023

▼B




ANNEX II

Websites for information on the competent authorities and address for notifications to the Commission

▼M5

BELGIUM

https://diplomatie.belgium.be/en/policy/policy_areas/peace_and_security/sanctions

BULGARIA

https://www.mfa.bg/en/EU-sanctions

CZECHIA

www.financnianalytickyurad.cz/mezinarodni-sankce.html

DENMARK

http://um.dk/da/Udenrigspolitik/folkeretten/sanktioner/

GERMANY

https://www.bmwi.de/Redaktion/DE/Artikel/Aussenwirtschaft/embargos-aussenwirtschaftsrecht.html

ESTONIA

https://vm.ee/et/rahvusvahelised-sanktsioonid

IRELAND

https://www.dfa.ie/our-role-policies/ireland-in-the-eu/eu-restrictive-measures/

GREECE

http://www.mfa.gr/en/foreign-policy/global-issues/international-sanctions.html

SPAIN

https://www.exteriores.gob.es/es/PoliticaExterior/Paginas/SancionesInternacionales.aspx

FRANCE

http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/fr/autorites-sanctions/

CROATIA

https://mvep.gov.hr/vanjska-politika/medjunarodne-mjere-ogranicavanja/22955

ITALY

https://www.esteri.it/it/politica-estera-e-cooperazione-allo-sviluppo/politica_europea/misure_deroghe/

CYPRUS

https://mfa.gov.cy/themes/

LATVIA

http://www.mfa.gov.lv/en/security/4539

LITHUANIA

http://www.urm.lt/sanctions

LUXEMBOURG

https://maee.gouvernement.lu/fr/directions-du-ministere/affaires-europeennes/organisations-economiques-int/mesures-restrictives.html

HUNGARY

https://kormany.hu/kulgazdasagi-es-kulugyminiszterium/ensz-eu-szankcios-tajekoztato

MALTA

https://foreignandeu.gov.mt/en/Government/SMB/Pages/SMB-Home.aspx

NETHERLANDS

https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/onderwerpen/internationale-sancties

AUSTRIA

https://www.bmeia.gv.at/themen/aussenpolitik/europa/eu-sanktionen-nationale-behoerden/

POLAND

https://www.gov.pl/web/dyplomacja/sankcje-miedzynarodowe

https://www.gov.pl/web/diplomacy/international-sanctions

PORTUGAL

https://www.portaldiplomatico.mne.gov.pt/politica-externa/medidas-restritivas

ROMANIA

http://www.mae.ro/node/1548

SLOVENIA

http://www.mzz.gov.si/si/omejevalni_ukrepi

SLOVAKIA

https://www.mzv.sk/europske_zalezitosti/europske_politiky-sankcie_eu

FINLAND

https://um.fi/pakotteet

SWEDEN

https://www.regeringen.se/sanktioner

Address for notifications to the European Commission:

European Commission

Directorate-General for Financial Stability, Financial Services and Capital Markets Union (DG FISMA)

Rue de Spa 2

B-1049 Brussels, Belgium

E-mail: relex-sanctions@ec.europa.eu

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