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Document 02006R0765-20230228

    Consolidated text: Council Regulation (EC) No 765/2006 of 18 May 2006 concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Belarus and the involvement of Belarus in the Russian aggression against Ukraine

    ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2006/765/2023-02-28

    02006R0765 — EN — 28.02.2023 — 038.003


    This text is meant purely as a documentation tool and has no legal effect. The Union's institutions do not assume any liability for its contents. The authentic versions of the relevant acts, including their preambles, are those published in the Official Journal of the European Union and available in EUR-Lex. Those official texts are directly accessible through the links embedded in this document

    ►B

    ▼M46

    COUNCIL REGULATION (EC) No 765/2006

    of 18 May 2006

    concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Belarus and the involvement of Belarus in the Russian aggression against Ukraine

    ▼B

    (OJ L 134 20.5.2006, p. 1)

    Amended by:

     

     

    Official Journal

      No

    page

    date

     M1

    COMMISSION REGULATION (EC) No 1587/2006 of 23 October 2006

      L 294

    25

    25.10.2006

     M2

    COUNCIL REGULATION (EC) No 1791/2006 of 20 November 2006

      L 363

    1

    20.12.2006

    ►M3

    COUNCIL REGULATION (EC) No 646/2008 of 8 July 2008

      L 180

    5

    9.7.2008

    ►M4

    COUNCIL REGULATION (EU) No 84/2011 of 31 January 2011

      L 28

    17

    2.2.2011

     M5

    COUNCIL IMPLEMENTING REGULATION (EU) No 271/2011 of 21 March 2011

      L 76

    13

    22.3.2011

     M6

    COUNCIL IMPLEMENTING REGULATION (EU) No 505/2011 of 23 May 2011

      L 136

    48

    24.5.2011

    ►M7

    COUNCIL REGULATION (EU) No 588/2011 of 20 June 2011

      L 161

    1

    21.6.2011

    ►M8

    COUNCIL REGULATION (EU) No 999/2011 of 10 October 2011

      L 265

    6

    11.10.2011

     M9

    COUNCIL IMPLEMENTING REGULATION (EU) No 1000/2011 of 10 October 2011

      L 265

    8

    11.10.2011

     M10

    COUNCIL IMPLEMENTING REGULATION (EU) No 1320/2011 of 16 December 2011

      L 335

    15

    17.12.2011

     M11

    COUNCIL REGULATION (EU) No 114/2012 of 10 February 2012

      L 38

    3

    11.2.2012

     M12

    COUNCIL IMPLEMENTING REGULATION (EU) No 170/2012 of 28 February 2012

      L 55

    1

    29.2.2012

     M13

    COUNCIL IMPLEMENTING REGULATION (EU) No 265/2012 of 23 March 2012

      L 87

    37

    24.3.2012

    ►M14

    COUNCIL REGULATION (EU) No 354/2012 of 23 April 2012

      L 113

    1

    25.4.2012

    ►M15

    COUNCIL REGULATION (EU) No 1014/2012 of 6 November 2012

      L 307

    1

    7.11.2012

     M16

    COUNCIL IMPLEMENTING REGULATION (EU) No 1017/2012 of 6 November 2012

      L 307

    7

    7.11.2012

     M17

    COUNCIL IMPLEMENTING REGULATION (EU) No 494/2013 of 29 May 2013

      L 143

    1

    30.5.2013

     M18

    COUNCIL REGULATION (EU) No 517/2013 of 13 May 2013

      L 158

    1

    10.6.2013

     M19

    COUNCIL IMPLEMENTING REGULATION (EU) No 1054/2013 of 29 October 2013

      L 288

    1

    30.10.2013

     M20

    COUNCIL IMPLEMENTING REGULATION (EU) No 46/2014 of 20 January 2014

      L 16

    3

    21.1.2014

     M21

    COUNCIL IMPLEMENTING REGULATION (EU) No 740/2014 of 8 July 2014

      L 200

    1

    9.7.2014

     M22

    COUNCIL IMPLEMENTING REGULATION (EU) No 1159/2014 of 30 October 2014

      L 311

    2

    31.10.2014

     M23

    COUNCIL IMPLEMENTING REGULATION (EU) 2015/1133 of 13 July 2015

      L 185

    1

    14.7.2015

     M24

    COUNCIL IMPLEMENTING REGULATION (EU) 2015/1326 of 31 July 2015

      L 206

    16

    1.8.2015

     M25

    COUNCIL REGULATION (EU) 2015/1948 of 29 October 2015

      L 284

    62

    30.10.2015

     M26

    COUNCIL IMPLEMENTING REGULATION (EU) 2015/1949 of 29 October 2015

      L 284

    71

    30.10.2015

     M27

    COUNCIL IMPLEMENTING REGULATION (EU) 2016/276 of 25 February 2016

      L 52

    19

    27.2.2016

    ►M28

    COUNCIL REGULATION (EU) 2016/277 of 25 February 2016

      L 52

    22

    27.2.2016

     M29

    COUNCIL REGULATION (EU) 2017/331 of 27 February 2017

      L 50

    9

    28.2.2017

     M30

    COUNCIL REGULATION (EU) 2018/275 of 23 February 2018

      L 54

    1

    24.2.2018

     M31

    COMMISSION IMPLEMENTING REGULATION (EU) 2019/1163 of 5 July 2019

      L 182

    33

    8.7.2019

     M32

    COUNCIL IMPLEMENTING REGULATION (EU) 2020/1387 of 2 October 2020

      L 319I

    1

    2.10.2020

     M33

    COUNCIL IMPLEMENTING REGULATION (EU) 2020/1648 of 6 November 2020

      L 370I

    1

    6.11.2020

     M34

    COUNCIL IMPLEMENTING REGULATION (EU) 2020/2129 of 17 December 2020

      L 426I

    1

    17.12.2020

    ►M35

    COUNCIL IMPLEMENTING REGULATION (EU) 2021/339 of 25 February 2021

      L 68

    29

    26.2.2021

    ►M36

    COUNCIL REGULATION (EU) 2021/907 of 4 June 2021

      L 197I

    1

    4.6.2021

    ►M37

    COUNCIL REGULATION (EU) 2021/996 of 21 June 2021

      L 219I

    1

    21.6.2021

    ►M38

    COUNCIL IMPLEMENTING REGULATION (EU) 2021/997 of 21 June 2021

      L 219I

    3

    21.6.2021

     M39

    COUNCIL IMPLEMENTING REGULATION (EU) 2021/999 of 21 June 2021

      L 219I

    55

    21.6.2021

    ►M40

    COUNCIL REGULATION (EU) 2021/1030 of 24 June 2021

      L 224I

    1

    24.6.2021

    ►M41

    COUNCIL REGULATION (EU) 2021/1985 of 15 November 2021

      L 405

    1

    16.11.2021

    ►M42

    COUNCIL REGULATION (EU) 2021/1986 of 15 November 2021

      L 405

    3

    16.11.2021

    ►M43

    COUNCIL IMPLEMENTING REGULATION (EU) 2021/2124 of 2 December 2021

      L 430I

    1

    2.12.2021

    ►M44

    COUNCIL REGULATION (EU) 2022/212 of 17 February 2022

      L 37

    4

    18.2.2022

    ►M45

    COUNCIL IMPLEMENTING REGULATION (EU) 2022/300 of 24 February 2022

      L 46

    3

    25.2.2022

    ►M46

    COUNCIL REGULATION (EU) 2022/355 of 2 March 2022

      L 67

    1

    2.3.2022

    ►M47

    COUNCIL REGULATION (EU) 2022/398 of 9 March 2022

      L 82

    1

    9.3.2022

    ►M48

    COUNCIL REGULATION (EU) 2022/577 of 8 April 2022

      L 111

    67

    8.4.2022

    ►M49

    COMMISSION IMPLEMENTING REGULATION (EU) 2022/595 of 11 April 2022

      L 114

    60

    12.4.2022

    ►M50

    COUNCIL IMPLEMENTING REGULATION (EU) 2022/876 of 3 June 2022

      L 153

    1

    3.6.2022

    ►M51

    COUNCIL REGULATION (EU) 2022/877 of 3 June 2022

      L 153

    11

    3.6.2022

    ►M52

    COUNCIL IMPLEMENTING REGULATION (EU) 2022/1231 of 18 July 2022

      L 190

    5

    19.7.2022

    ►M53

    COUNCIL IMPLEMENTING REGULATION (EU) 2023/419 of 24 February 2023

      L 61

    20

    27.2.2023


    Corrected by:

     C1

    Corrigendum, OJ L 299, 17.10.2014, p.  32 (46/2014)

     C2

    Corrigendum, OJ L 328, 13.11.2014, p.  60 (740/2014)

     C3

    Corrigendum, OJ L 176, 7.7.2015, p.  40 (740/2014)

     C4

    Corrigendum, OJ L 057, 18.2.2021, p.  94 (2020/1648)

    ►C5

    Corrigendum, OJ L 002, 6.1.2022, p.  9 (2021/2124)

    ►C6

    Corrigendum, OJ L 079, 9.3.2022, p.  38 (2021/1030)

    ►C7

    Corrigendum, OJ L 083I, 10.3.2022, p.  2 (2022/398)

    ►C8

    Corrigendum, OJ L 189, 18.7.2022, p.  24 (2022/355)

     C9

    Corrigendum, OJ L 323, 19.12.2022, p.  107 (2021/997)

     C10

    Corrigendum, OJ L 071, 9.3.2023, p.  42 ((EU) 2023/419)

    ►C11

    Corrigendum, OJ L 090, 28.3.2023, p.  65 ((EU) 2023/419)




    ▼B

    ▼M46

    COUNCIL REGULATION (EC) No 765/2006

    of 18 May 2006

    concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Belarus and the involvement of Belarus in the Russian aggression against Ukraine

    ▼B



    Article 1

    For the purpose of this Regulation, the following definitions shall apply:

    1. 

    ‘funds’ means financial assets and benefits of every kind, including but not limited to:

    (a) 

    cash, cheques, claims on money, drafts, money orders and other payment instruments;

    (b) 

    deposits with financial institutions or other entities, balances on accounts, debts and debt obligations;

    (c) 

    publicly- and privately-traded securities and debt instruments, including stocks and shares, certificates representing securities, bonds, notes, warrants, debentures and derivatives contracts;

    (d) 

    interest, dividends or other income on or value accruing from or generated by assets;

    (e) 

    credit, right of set-off, guarantees, performance bonds or other financial commitments;

    (f) 

    letters of credit, bills of lading, bills of sale;

    (g) 

    documents evidencing an interest in funds or financial resources.

    2. 

    ‘freezing of funds’ means preventing any move, transfer, alteration, use of, access to, or dealing with funds in any way that would result in any change in their volume, amount, location, ownership, possession, character, destination or other change that would enable the use of the funds, including portfolio management.

    3. 

    ‘economic resources’ means assets of every kind, whether tangible or intangible, movable or immovable, which are not funds but can be used to obtain funds, goods or services.

    4. 

    ‘freezing of economic resources’ means preventing the use of economic resources to obtain funds, goods or services in any way, including, but not limited to, by selling, hiring or mortgaging them.

    ▼M7

    5. 

    ‘territory of the Community’ means the territories of the Member States, including their airspace, to which the Treaty is applicable, under the conditions laid down in the Treaty.

    ▼M7

    6. 

    ‘technical assistance’ means any technical support related to repairs, development, manufacture, assembly, testing, maintenance, or any other technical service, and may take forms such as instruction, advice, training, transmission of working knowledge or skills or consulting services; including verbal forms of assistance.

    ▼C6

    7. 

    ‘belarusian air carrier’ means an air transport undertaking holding a valid operating licence or equivalent issued by the competent authorities of Belarus;

    ▼M46

    8. 

    ‘dual-use goods and technology’ means the items listed in Annex I to Regulation (EU) 2021/821 of the European Parliament and of the Council ( 1 );

    ▼C6

    9. 

    ‘investment services’ means the following services and activities:

    (i) 

    reception and transmission of orders in relation to one or more financial instruments;

    (ii) 

    execution of orders on behalf of clients;

    (iii) 

    dealing on own account;

    (iv) 

    portfolio management;

    (v) 

    investment advice;

    (vi) 

    underwriting of financial instruments and/or placing of financial instruments on a firm commitment basis;

    (vii) 

    placing of financial instruments without a firm commitment basis;

    (viii) 

    any service in relation to the admission to trading on a regulated market or trading on a multilateral trading facility.

    ▼C7

    10. 

    ‘transferable securities’ means the following classes of securities, including in the form of crypto-assets, which are negotiable on the capital market, with the exception of instruments of payment:

    (i) 

    shares in companies and other securities equivalent to shares in companies, partnerships or other entities, and depositary receipts in respect of shares;

    (ii) 

    bonds or other forms of securitised debt, including depositary receipts in respect of such securities;

    (iii) 

    any other securities giving the right to acquire or sell any such transferable securities or giving rise to a cash settlement determined by reference to transferable securities.

    ▼C6

    11. 

    ‘money-market instruments’ means those classes of instruments which are normally dealt in on the money market, such as treasury bills, certificates of deposit and commercial papers and excluding instruments of payment;

    12. 

    ‘credit institution’ means an undertaking the business of which is to take deposits or other repayable funds from the public and to grant credit for its own account;

    ▼M44

    13. 

    ‘brokering services’ means:

    (i) 

    the negotiation or arrangement of transactions for the purchase, sale or supply of goods and technology or of financial and technical services, including from a third country to any other third country; or

    (ii) 

    the selling or buying of goods and technology or of financial and technical services, including where they are located in third countries for their transfer to another third country;

    14. 

    ‘public corporation’ means an undertaking, other than a credit institution, established in Belarus with over 50 % public ownership, or under public control, as of 1 June 2021;

    15. 

    ‘claim’ means any claim, whether asserted by legal proceedings or not, made before, on or after the date of entry into force of this Regulation, under or in connection with a contract or transaction, and includes in particular:

    (i) 

    a claim for performance of any obligation arising under or in connection with a contract or transaction;

    (ii) 

    a claim for extension or payment of a bond, financial guarantee or indemnity of whatever form;

    (iii) 

    a claim for compensation in respect of a contract or transaction;

    (iv) 

    a counterclaim;

    (v) 

    a claim for the recognition or enforcement, including by the procedure of exequatur, of a judgment, an arbitration award or an equivalent decision, wherever made or given;

    16. 

    ‘contract or transaction’ means any transaction of whatever form and whatever the applicable law, whether comprising one or more contracts or similar obligations made between the same or different parties; for this purpose, ‘contract’ includes a bond, guarantee or indemnity, in particular a financial guarantee or financial indemnity, and credit, whether legally independent or not, as well as any related provision arising under, or in connection with, the transaction;

    ▼M46

    17. 

    ‘financing or financial assistance’ means any action, irrespective of the particular means chosen, whereby the person, entity or body concerned, conditionally or unconditionally, disburses or commits to disburse its own funds or economic resources, including but not limited to grants, loans, guarantees, suretyships, bonds, letters of credit, supplier credits, buyer credits, import or export advances and all types of insurance and reinsurance, including export credit insurance; payment, as well as terms and conditions of payment, of the agreed price for a good or a service, made in line with normal business practice, does not constitute financing or financial assistance;

    18. 

    ‘partner country’ means a country applying a set of export control measures substantially equivalent to those set out in this Regulation, as listed in Annex Vb;

    19. 

    ‘consumer communication devices’ means devices used by private individuals such as personal computers and peripherals (including hard drives and printers), mobile telephones, smart televisions, memory devices (USB drives), and consumer software for those devices;

    ▼M47

    20. 

    ‘central securities depository’ means a legal person as defined in point 1 of Article 2(1) of Regulation (EU) No 909/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council ( 2 );

    21. 

    ‘deposit’ means a credit balance which results from funds left in an account or from temporary situations deriving from normal banking transactions and which a credit institution is required to repay under the legal and contractual conditions applicable, including a fixed-term deposit and a savings deposit, but excluding a credit balance where:

    (i) 

    its existence can only be proven by a financial instrument as defined in Article 4(1)(15) of Directive 2014/65/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council ( 3 ), unless it is a savings product which is evidenced by a certificate of deposit made out to a named person and which exists in a Member State on 2 July 2014;

    (ii) 

    its principal is not repayable at par;

    (iii) 

    its principal is only repayable at par under a particular guarantee or agreement provided by the credit institution or a third party;

    22. 

    ‘investor citizenship schemes’ (or "golden passports") means the procedures put in place by a Member State, which allow third-country nationals to acquire its nationality in exchange for pre-determined payments and investments;

    23. 

    ‘investor residence schemes’ (or "golden visas") means the procedures put in place by a Member State, which allow third-country nationals to obtain a residence permit in a Member State in exchange for pre-determined payments and investments;

    24. 

    ‘trading venue’, as defined in Article 4(1)(24) of Directive 2014/65/EU, means a regulated market, a multilateral trading facility or an organised trading facility;

    ▼M48

    25. 

    ‘road transport undertaking’ means any natural or legal person, entity or body engaged with a commercial purpose, in the transport of freight by means of motor vehicles or combinations of vehicles.

    ▼M7

    Article 1a

    1.  

    It shall be prohibited:

    (a) 

    to sell, supply, transfer or export, directly or indirectly, equipment which might be used for internal repression as listed in Annex III, whether or not originating in the Union, to any person, entity or body in Belarus or for use in Belarus;

    (b) 

    to participate, knowingly and intentionally, in activities the object or effect of which is to circumvent the prohibitions referred to in point (a).

    2.  
    Paragraph 1 shall not apply to protective clothing, including flak jackets and helmets, temporarily exported to Belarus by United Nations (UN) personnel, personnel of the Union or its Member States, representatives of the media or humanitarian and development workers and associated persons exclusively for their personal use.
    3.  
    By way of derogation from paragraph 1, the competent authorities in the Member States as listed in Annex II may authorise the sale, supply, transfer or export of equipment which might be used for internal repression, under such conditions as they deem appropriate, if they determine that such equipment is intended solely for humanitarian or protective use.

    ▼M40 —————

    ▼M7

    Article 1b

    1.  

    It shall be prohibited:

    (a) 

    to provide, directly or indirectly, technical assistance related to the goods and technology listed in the Common Military List of the European Union ( 4 ) (‘Common Military List’), or related to the provision, manufacture, maintenance and use of goods included in that list, to any person, entity or body in Belarus or for use in Belarus;

    (b) 

    to provide, directly or indirectly, technical assistance or brokering services related to equipment which might be used for internal repression as listed in Annex III, to any person, entity or body in Belarus or for use in Belarus;

    (c) 

    to provide, directly or indirectly, financing or financial assistance related to the goods and technology listed in the Common Military List or in Annex III, including in particular grants, loans and export credit insurance, for any sale, supply, transfer or export of such items, or for any provision of related technical assistance to any person, entity or body in Belarus or for use in Belarus;

    (d) 

    to participate, knowingly and intentionally, in activities the object or effect of which is to circumvent the prohibitions referred to in points (a) to (c).

    2.  

    By way of derogation from paragraph 1, the prohibitions referred to therein shall not apply to:

    (a) 

    non-lethal military equipment, or equipment which might be used for internal repression, intended solely for humanitarian purposes or protective use or for institution building programmes of the UN and the Union, or for EU or UN crisis management operations; or

    (b) 

    non-combat vehicles fitted with materials to provide ballistic protection, intended solely for the protective use of personnel of the Union and its Member States in Belarus,

    provided that the provision thereof has first been approved by the competent authority of a Member State, as identified on the websites listed in Annex II.

    3.  
    Paragraph 1 shall not apply to protective clothing, including flak jackets and military helmets, temporarily exported to Belarus by UN personnel, personnel of the Union or its Member States, representatives of the media or humanitarian and development workers and associated persons exclusively for their personal use.

    ▼M40 —————

    ▼M40

    Article 1c

    1.  
    It shall be prohibited to sell, supply, transfer or export, directly or indirectly, equipment, technology or software identified in Annex IV, whether or not originating in the Union, to any natural or legal person, entity or body in Belarus or for use in Belarus, unless the competent authority of the relevant Member State, as identified on the websites listed in Annex II, has given prior authorisation.
    2.  
    The competent authorities of the Member States, as identified on the websites listed in Annex II, shall not grant any authorisation under paragraph 1 if they have reasonable grounds to determine that the equipment, technology or software in question would be used for repression by the Belarusian Government, public bodies, corporations or agencies, or any natural or legal person or entity acting on their behalf or at their direction.
    3.  
    Annex IV shall include equipment, technology or software intended primarily for use in the monitoring or interception of internet or telephone communications.
    4.  
    The Member State concerned shall inform the other Member States and the Commission of any authorisation granted under this Article within two weeks of the authorisation.

    Article 1d

    1.  

    Unless the competent authority of the relevant Member State, as identified on the websites listed in Annex II, has given prior authorisation in accordance with Article 1c(2), it shall be prohibited to:

    (a) 

    provide, directly or indirectly, technical assistance or brokering services related to the equipment, technology and software identified in Annex IV, or related to the installation, provision, manufacture, maintenance and use of the equipment and technology identified in Annex IV or to the provision, installation, operation or updating of any software identified in Annex IV, to any natural or legal person, entity or body in Belarus or for use in Belarus;

    (b) 

    provide, directly or indirectly, financing or financial assistance related to the equipment, technology and software identified in Annex IV to any natural or legal person, entity or body in Belarus or for use in Belarus;

    (c) 

    provide any telecommunication or internet monitoring or interception services of any kind to, or for the direct or indirect benefit of, the Belarusian Government, public bodies, corporations and agencies or any natural or legal person or entity acting on their behalf or at their direction.

    2.  
    For the purposes of point (c) of paragraph 1, "telecommunication or internet monitoring or interception services" means those services that provide, in particular using equipment, technology or software as identified in Annex IV, access to and delivery of a subject's incoming and outgoing telecommunications and call-associated data for the purpose of its extraction, decoding, recording, processing, analysis or storing, or any other related activity.

    ▼M46

    Article 1e

    1.  
    Without prejudice to Articles 1a, 1c and 1s, it shall be prohibited to sell, supply, transfer or export, directly or indirectly, dual-use goods and technology, whether or not originating in the Union, to any natural or legal person, entity or body in Belarus or for use in Belarus.
    2.  

    It shall be prohibited:

    (a) 

    to provide technical assistance, brokering services or other services related to the goods and technology referred to in paragraph 1, or to the provision, manufacture, maintenance and use of those goods and technology, directly or indirectly to any natural or legal person, entity or body in Belarus or for use in Belarus;

    (b) 

    to provide financing or financial assistance related to the goods and technology referred to in paragraph 1 for any sale, supply, transfer or export of those goods and technology, or for the provision of related technical assistance, brokering services or other services, directly or indirectly to any natural or legal person, entity or body in Belarus, or for use in Belarus.

    3.  

    Without prejudice to the authorisation requirements pursuant to Regulation (EU) 2021/821, the prohibitions in paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article shall not apply to the sale, supply, transfer or export of dual-use goods and technology or to the related provision of technical and financial assistance, for non-military use and for a non-military end-user, intended for:

    (a) 

    humanitarian purposes, health emergencies, the urgent prevention or mitigation of an event likely to have a serious and significant impact on human health and safety or on the environment or as a response to natural disasters;

    (b) 

    medical or pharmaceutical purposes;

    (c) 

    temporary use by news media;

    (d) 

    software updates;

    (e) 

    use as consumer communication devices;

    (f) 

    ensuring cyber-security and information security for natural or legal persons, entities or bodies in Belarus except for its government and undertakings directly or indirectly controlled by that government; or

    (g) 

    personal use of natural persons travelling to Belarus, and limited to personal effects, household effects, vehicles or tools of trade owned by those individuals and not intended for sale.

    With the exception of points (f) and (g), the exporter shall declare in the customs declaration that the items are being exported under the relevant exception set out in this paragraph and shall notify the competent authority of the Member State in which it is resident or established of the first use of the relevant exception within 30 days from that first export.

    4.  

    By way of derogation from paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article, and without prejudice to the authorisation requirements pursuant to Regulation (EU) 2021/821, the competent authority may authorise the sale, supply, transfer or export of dual-use goods and technology or the provision of related technical or financial assistance, for non-military use and for a non-military end user, after having determined that such goods or technology or the related technical or financial assistance are intended for:

    (a) 

    cooperation between the Union, the governments of Member States and the government of Belarus in purely civilian matters;

    (b) 

    intergovernmental cooperation in space programmes;

    (c) 

    the operation, maintenance, fuel retreatment and safety of civil nuclear capabilities, as well as civil nuclear cooperation, in particular in the field of research and development;

    (d) 

    maritime safety;

    (e) 

    civilian telecommunications networks, including the provision of internet services;

    (f) 

    the exclusive use of entities owned, or solely or jointly controlled, by a legal person, entity or body which is incorporated or constituted under the law of a Member State or of a partner country;

    (g) 

    the diplomatic representations of the Union, Member States and partner countries, including delegations, embassies and missions.

    5.  
    By way of derogation from paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article, and without prejudice to the authorisation requirements pursuant to Regulation (EU) 2021/821, the competent authority may authorise the sale, supply, transfer or export of dual-use goods and technology or the provision of related technical or financial assistance, for non-military use and for a non-military end-user, after having determined that such goods or technology or such related technical or financial assistance are due under contracts concluded before 3 March 2022, or ancillary contracts necessary for the execution of such a contract, provided that such authorisation is requested before 1 May 2022.
    6.  
    Authorisations required under this Article shall be granted by the relevant competent authority in accordance with the rules and procedures laid down in Regulation (EU) 2021/821, which shall apply mutatis mutandis. Such authorisation shall be valid throughout the Union.
    7.  

    When deciding on a request for authorisation pursuant to paragraphs 4 and 5, the competent authority shall not grant an authorisation if it has reasonable grounds to believe that:

    (i) 

    the end-user might be a military end-user or a natural or legal person, entity or body listed in Annex V, or that the goods might have a military end-use; or

    (ii) 

    the sale, supply, transfer or export of goods and technology referred to in paragraph 1, or the provision of related technical or financial assistance, is intended for aviation or the space industry.

    8.  
    The competent authority may annul, suspend, modify or revoke an authorisation which it has granted pursuant to paragraphs 4 and 5 if it deems that such annulment, suspension, modification or revocation is necessary for the effective implementation of this Regulation.

    Article 1f

    1.  
    Without prejudice to Articles 1a, 1c and 1s, it shall be prohibited to sell, supply, transfer or export, directly or indirectly, goods and technology which might contribute to Belarus’s military and technological enhancement, or to the development of its defence and security sector, as listed in Annex Va, whether or not originating in the Union, to any natural or legal person, entity or body in Belarus or for use in Belarus.
    2.  

    It shall be prohibited:

    (a) 

    to provide technical assistance, brokering services or other services related to the goods and technology referred to in paragraph 1, or to the provision, manufacture, maintenance and use of those goods and technology, directly or indirectly to any natural or legal person, entity or body in Belarus or for use in Belarus;

    (b) 

    to provide financing or financial assistance related to the goods and technology referred to in paragraph 1 for any sale, supply, transfer or export of those goods and technology, or for the provision of related technical assistance, brokering services or other services, directly or indirectly to any natural or legal person, entity or body in Belarus or for use in Belarus.

    3.  

    The prohibitions in paragraphs 1 and 2 shall not apply to the sale, supply, transfer or export of the goods and technology referred to in paragraph 1 or to the related provision of technical and financial assistance, for non-military use and for a non-military end-user, intended for:

    (a) 

    humanitarian purposes, health emergencies, the urgent prevention or mitigation of an event likely to have a serious and significant impact on human health and safety or on the environment, or as a response to natural disasters;

    (b) 

    medical or pharmaceutical purposes;

    (c) 

    temporary use by news media;

    (d) 

    software updates;

    (e) 

    use as consumer communication devices;

    (f) 

    ensuring cyber-security and information security for natural or legal persons, entities or bodies in Belarus except for its government and undertakings directly or indirectly controlled by that government; or

    (g) 

    personal use of natural persons travelling to Belarus, and limited to personal effects, household effects, vehicles or tools of trade owned by those individuals and not intended for sale.

    With the exception of points (f) and (g), the exporter shall declare in its customs declaration that the items are being exported under the relevant exception set out in this paragraph and shall notify the competent authority of the Member State in which it is resident or established of the first use of the relevant exception within 30 days from that first export.

    4.  

    By way of derogation from paragraphs 1 and 2, the competent authority may authorise the sale, supply, transfer or export of the goods and technology referred to in paragraph 1 or the provision of related technical or financial assistance, for non-military use and for a non-military end-user, after having determined that such goods or technology or the related technical or financial assistance are intended for:

    (a) 

    cooperation between the Union, the governments of Member States and the government of Belarus in purely civilian matters;

    (b) 

    intergovernmental cooperation in space programmes;

    (c) 

    the operation, maintenance, fuel retreatment and safety of civil nuclear capabilities, as well as civil nuclear cooperation, in particular in the field of research and development;

    (d) 

    maritime safety;

    (e) 

    civilian telecommunications networks, including the provision of internet services;

    (f) 

    the exclusive use of entities owned, or solely or jointly controlled by a legal person, entity or body which is incorporated or constituted under the law of a Member State or of a partner country; or

    (g) 

    the diplomatic representations of the Union, Member States and partner countries, including delegations, embassies and missions.

    5.  
    By way of derogation from paragraphs 1 and 2, the competent authority of a Member State may authorise the sale, supply, transfer or export of the goods and technology referred to in paragraph 1 or the provision of related technical or financial assistance, for non-military use and for a non-military end-user, after having determined that such goods or technology or the related technical or financial assistance are due under contracts concluded before 3 March 2022, or ancillary contracts necessary for the execution of such a contract, provided that such authorisation is requested before 1 May 2022.
    6.  
    Authorisations required under this Article shall be granted by the relevant competent authority in accordance with the rules and procedures laid down in Regulation (EU) 2021/821, which shall apply mutatis mutandis. Such authorisations shall be valid throughout the Union.
    7.  

    When deciding on a request for authorisation pursuant to paragraphs 4 and 5, the competent authority shall not grant an authorisation if it has reasonable grounds to believe that:

    (i) 

    the end-user might be a military end-user or a natural or legal person, entity or body listed in Annex V, or that the goods might have a military end-use; or

    (ii) 

    the sale, supply, transfer or export of goods and technology referred to in paragraph 1, or the provision of related technical or financial assistance, is intended for aviation or the space industry.

    8.  
    The competent authority may annul, suspend, modify or revoke an authorisation which it has granted pursuant to paragraphs 4 and 5 if it deems that such annulment, suspension, modification or revocation is necessary for the effective implementation of this Regulation.

    ▼M46

    Article 1fa

    1.  

    With regard to the entities listed in Annex V, by way of derogation from Article 1e(1) and (2) and Article 1f(1) and (2), and without prejudice to the authorisation requirements pursuant to Regulation (EU) 2021/821, the competent authority may only authorise the sale, supply, transfer or export of dual-use goods and technology and goods and technology listed in Annex Va, or the provision of related technical or financial assistance, after having determined that such goods or technology or the related technical or financial assistance are:

    (a) 

    necessary for the urgent prevention or mitigation of an event likely to have a serious and significant impact on human health and safety or the environment; or

    (b) 

    due under contracts concluded before 3 March 2022, or ancillary contracts necessary for the execution of such a contract, provided that such authorisation is requested before 1 May 2022.

    2.  
    Authorisations required under this Article shall be granted by the competent authorities of the Member State in accordance with the rules and procedures laid down in Regulation (EU) 2021/821, which shall apply mutatis mutandis. Such authorisation shall be valid throughout the Union.
    3.  
    The competent authorities may annul, suspend, modify or revoke an authorisation which they have granted pursuant to paragraph 1 if they deem that such annulment, suspension, modification or revocation is necessary for the effective implementation of this Regulation.

    ▼C8

    Article 1fb

    1.  
    The notification to the competent authority referred to in Articles 1e(3) and 1f(3) shall be submitted by electronic means, whenever possible, on forms containing at least all the elements of, and in the order provided for in, the models set out in Annex Vc.
    2.  
    All authorisations referred to in Articles 1e and 1f shall be issued by electronic means, whenever possible, on forms containing at least all the elements of, and in the order provided for in, the models set out in Annex Vc.

    ▼M46

    Article 1fc

    1.  
    The competent authorities shall exchange information on authorisations granted and denials issued pursuant to Articles 1e, 1f and 1fa with the other Member States and the Commission. Such exchange of information shall be carried out using the electronic system provided pursuant to Article 23(6) of Regulation (EU) 2021/821.
    2.  
    Information received as a result of the application of this Article shall be used only for the purpose for which it was requested, including the exchanges mentioned in paragraph 4. Member States and the Commission shall ensure the protection of confidential information acquired in the application of this Article in accordance with Union law and the respective national law. Member States and the Commission shall ensure that classified information provided or exchanged under this Article is not downgraded or declassified without the prior written consent of the originator.
    3.  
    Before a Member State grants an authorisation in accordance with Article 1e, 1f or 1fa for a transaction which is essentially identical to a transaction which is the subject of a still valid denial issued by another Member State or by other Member States, it shall first consult the Member State or Member States which issued the denial. If, following such consultations, the Member State concerned decides to grant an authorisation, it shall inform the other Member States and the Commission thereof, providing all relevant information to explain the decision.
    4.  
    The Commission, in consultation with the Member States, shall, where appropriate and on the basis of reciprocity, exchange information with partner countries, with a view to supporting the effectiveness of export control measures under this Regulation and the consistent application of export control measures applied by partner countries.

    ▼M40

    Article 1g

    1.  
    It shall be prohibited to sell, supply, transfer, or export the goods listed in Annex VI, whether such goods originate or not in the Union, to any natural or legal person, entity or body in Belarus or for use in Belarus.

    ▼M46

    1a.  
    It shall be prohibited to provide, directly or indirectly, technical assistance, brokering services, financing or financial assistance, including financial derivatives, as well as insurance and re-insurance, related to the prohibitions in paragraph 1

    ▼M44

    2.  
    Annex VI shall include goods used for the production or manufacturing of tobacco products.

    ▼M46 —————

    ▼M40

    Article 1h

    ▼M44

    1.  

    It shall be prohibited:

    (a) 

    to import, directly or indirectly, ►M46  mineral products ◄ as listed in Annex VII into the Union if they:

    (i) 

    originate in Belarus; or

    (ii) 

    have been exported from Belarus;

    (b) 

    to purchase, directly or indirectly, ►M46  mineral products ◄ as listed in Annex VII which are located in or which originated in Belarus;

    (c) 

    to transport ►M46  mineral products ◄ as listed in Annex VII if they originated in Belarus or are being exported from Belarus to any other country.

    (d) 

    to provide, directly or indirectly, technical assistance, brokering services, financing or financial assistance, including financial derivatives, as well as insurance and re-insurance, related to the prohibitions in points (a), (b) and (c).

    2.  
    The prohibitions in paragraph 1 shall not apply to purchases in Belarus of ►M46  mineral products ◄ as listed in Annex VII which are required in order to meet the essential needs of the purchaser in Belarus or of humanitarian projects in Belarus.

    ▼M46 —————

    ▼M44

    4.  
    Paragraph 1 shall be without prejudice to the freedom of transit through Belarus of ►M46  mineral products ◄ as listed in Annex VII which originate in a third country.

    ▼M40

    Article 1i

    1.  
    It shall be prohibited to import, purchase or transfer, directly or indirectly, potassium chloride ("potash") products as listed in Annex VIII from Belarus, whether or not originating in Belarus.

    ▼M46

    1a.  
    It shall be prohibited to provide, directly or indirectly, technical assistance, brokering services, financing or financial assistance, including financial derivatives, as well as insurance and re-insurance, related to the prohibitions in paragraph 1.

    ▼M46 —————

    ▼M40

    Article 1j

    It shall be prohibited to directly or indirectly purchase, sell, provide investment services for or assistance in the issuance of, or otherwise deal with transferable securities and money-market instruments with a maturity exceeding 90 days, issued after 29 June 2021 by:

    ▼M44

    (a) 

    the Republic of Belarus, its Government, its public bodies, corporations or agencies;

    (b) 

    a major credit institution established in Belarus with over 50 % public ownership, or under public control, as of 1 June 2021, as listed in Annex IX;

    (c) 

    a legal person, entity or body established outside the Union whose proprietary rights are directly or indirectly owned for more than 50 % by an entity referred to in point (a) or (b) of this Article; or

    (d) 

    a natural or legal person, entity or body acting on behalf or at the direction of an entity referred to in point (a), (b) or (c) of this Article.

    ▼M47

    Article 1ja

    1.  
    Transactions related to the management of reserves as well as of assets of the Central Bank of Belarus, including transactions with any legal person, entity or body acting on behalf of, or at the direction of, the Central Bank of Belarus, are prohibited.
    2.  
    By way of derogation from paragraph 1, the competent authorities may authorise a transaction provided that it is strictly necessary to ensure the financial stability of the Union as a whole or of the Member State concerned.
    3.  
    The Member State concerned shall immediately inform the other Member States and the Commission of its intention to grant an authorisation under paragraph 2.

    Article 1jb

    It shall be prohibited to list and provide services as of 12 April 2022 on trading venues registered or recognised in the Union for the transferable securities of any legal person, entity or body established in Belarus and with over 50 % public ownership.

    ▼M40

    Article 1k

    1.  

    It shall be prohibited to directly or indirectly make or be part of any arrangement to make new loans or credit with a maturity exceeding 90 days, after 29 June 2021, to:

    ▼M44

    (a) 

    the Republic of Belarus, its Government, its public bodies, corporations or agencies;

    (b) 

    a major credit institution established in Belarus with over 50 % public ownership, or under public control, as of 1 June 2021, as listed in Annex IX;

    (c) 

    a legal person, entity or body established outside the Union whose proprietary rights are directly or indirectly owned for more than 50 % by an entity referred to in point (a) or (b) of this paragraph; or

    (d) 

    a natural or legal person, entity or body acting on behalf or at the direction of an entity referred to in point (a), (b) or (c) of this paragraph.

    ▼M40

    2.  
    The prohibition shall not apply to loans or credits that have a specific and documented objective to provide financing for non-prohibited imports or exports of goods and non-financial services between the Union and any third State, including the expenditure for goods and services from another third State that is necessary for executing the export or import contracts.
    3.  

    The competent authority of a Member State may also grant, under such terms as it deems appropriate, an authorisation to make or be part of the loans or credits referred to in paragraph 1 if it has determined that:

    (i) 

    the activities concerned are for the purpose of providing support for the Belarusian civilian population, such as humanitarian assistance, environmental projects, and nuclear safety or the loan or credit is necessary to comply with legal or regulatory minimum reserve or similar requirements to meet solvency and liquidity criteria for financial entities in Belarus which are majority-owned by financial institutions of the Union; and

    (ii) 

    the activities concerned do not entail funds or economic resources being made available, directly or indirectly, to or for the benefit of a person, entity or body referred to in Article 2.

    When applying the conditions under points (i) and (ii), the competent authority shall require adequate information as regards the use of the authorisation granted, including information concerning the purpose of, and the counterparts to, the activities concerned.

    The Member State concerned shall inform the other Member States and the Commission of any authorisation granted under this Article within two weeks of the authorisation.

    ▼M46 —————

    ▼M42

    Article 1l

    1.  

    It shall be prohibited to provide insurance or re-insurance to:

    ▼M44

    (i) 

    the Republic of Belarus, its Government, its public bodies, corporations or agencies; or

    ▼M42

    (ii) 

    any natural or legal person, entity or body acting on behalf or at the direction of a legal person, entity or body referred to in point (i).

    2.  
    The prohibitions in paragraph 1 shall not apply to the provision of compulsory or third party liability insurance to Belarusian persons, entities or bodies where the risk insured is situated in the Union or to the provision of insurance for Belarusian diplomatic or consular missions in the Union.

    ▼M46 —————

    ▼M40

    Article 1m

    ▼M47

    It shall be prohibited to participate, knowingly and intentionally, in activities whose object or effect is, directly or indirectly, to circumvent the prohibitions set out in this Regulation.

    ▼M40

    Article 1n

    In addition to the prohibitions set out in Article 1k, the European Investment Bank (EIB) shall:

    (a) 

    be prohibited from making any disbursement or payment under or in connection with any existing agreements entered into between the Republic of Belarus or any public authority thereof and the EIB; and

    (b) 

    suspend all existing Technical Assistance Service Contracts relating to projects financed under the agreements referred to in point (a), and which are intended for the direct or indirect benefit of the Republic of Belarus or any public authority thereof to be performed in Belarus.

    ▼M46

    Article 1o

    1.  

    It shall be prohibited:

    (a) 

    to import, directly or indirectly, wood products as listed in Annex X into the Union if they:

    (i) 

    originate in Belarus; or

    (ii) 

    have been exported from Belarus;

    (b) 

    to purchase, directly or indirectly, wood products as listed in Annex X which are located in or which originated in Belarus;

    (c) 

    to transport wood products as listed in Annex X if they originated in Belarus or are being exported from Belarus to any other country;

    (d) 

    to provide, directly or indirectly, technical assistance, brokering services, financing or financial assistance, including financial derivatives, as well as insurance and re-insurance, related to the prohibitions in points (a), (b) and (c).

    2.  
    The prohibitions in paragraph 1 shall be without prejudice to the execution until 4 June 2022 of contracts concluded before 2 March 2022, or ancillary contracts necessary for the execution of such contracts.

    Article 1p

    1.  

    It shall be prohibited:

    (a) 

    to import, directly or indirectly, cement products as listed in Annex XI into the Union if they:

    (i) 

    originate in Belarus; or

    (ii) 

    have been exported from Belarus;

    (b) 

    to purchase, directly or indirectly, cement products as listed in Annex XI which are located in or which originated in Belarus;

    (c) 

    to transport cement products as listed in Annex XI if they originated in Belarus or are being exported from Belarus to any other country;

    (d) 

    to provide, directly or indirectly, technical assistance, brokering services, financing or financial assistance, including financial derivatives, as well as insurance and re-insurance, related to the prohibitions in points (a), (b) and (c).

    2.  
    The prohibitions in paragraph 1 shall be without prejudice to the execution until 4 June 2022 of contracts concluded before 2 March 2022, or ancillary contracts necessary for the execution of such contracts.

    Article 1q

    1.  

    It shall be prohibited:

    (a) 

    to import, directly or indirectly, iron and steel products as listed in Annex XII into the Union if they:

    (i) 

    originate in Belarus; or

    (ii) 

    have been exported from Belarus;

    (b) 

    to purchase, directly or indirectly, iron and steel products as listed in Annex XII which are located in or which originated in Belarus;

    (c) 

    to transport iron and steel products as listed in Annex XII if they originated in Belarus or are being exported from Belarus to any other country;

    (d) 

    to provide, directly or indirectly, technical assistance, brokering services, financing or financial assistance, including financial derivatives, as well as insurance and re-insurance, related to the prohibitions in points (a), (b) and (c).

    2.  
    The prohibitions in paragraph 1 shall be without prejudice to the execution until 4 June 2022 of contracts concluded before 2 March 2022, or ancillary contracts necessary for the execution of such contracts.

    Article 1r

    1.  

    It shall be prohibited:

    (a) 

    to import, directly or indirectly, rubber products as listed in Annex XIII into the Union if they:

    (i) 

    originate in Belarus; or

    (ii) 

    have been exported from Belarus;

    (b) 

    to purchase, directly or indirectly, rubber products as listed in Annex XIII which are located in or which originated in Belarus;

    (c) 

    to transport rubber products as listed in Annex XIII if they originated in Belarus or are being exported from Belarus to any other country;

    (d) 

    to provide, directly or indirectly, technical assistance, brokering services, financing or financial assistance, including financial derivatives, as well as insurance and re-insurance, related to the prohibitions in points (a), (b) and (c).

    2.  
    The prohibitions in paragraph 1 shall be without prejudice to the execution until 4 June 2022 of contracts concluded before 2 March 2022, or ancillary contracts necessary for the execution of such contracts.

    Article 1s

    1.  

    It shall be prohibited:

    (a) 

    to sell, supply, transfer or export, directly or indirectly, machinery as listed in Annex XIV, whether or not originating in the Union, to any person, entity or body in Belarus or for use in Belarus;

    (b) 

    to provide, directly or indirectly, technical assistance, brokering services, financing or financial assistance, including financial derivatives, as well as insurance and re-insurance, related to the prohibitions in point (a).

    2.  

    The prohibitions in paragraph 1 shall not apply to the sale, supply, transfer or export of the machinery referred to in paragraph 1 or to the related provision of technical and financial assistance, for non-military use and for a non-military end-user, intended for:

    (a) 

    humanitarian purposes, health emergencies, the urgent prevention or mitigation of an event likely to have a serious and significant impact on human health and safety or on the environment, or as a response to natural disasters;

    (b) 

    medical or pharmaceutical purposes;

    (c) 

    temporary use by news media;

    (d) 

    software updates;

    (e) 

    use as consumer communication devices;

    (f) 

    ensuring cyber-security and information security for natural or legal persons, entities or bodies in Belarus except for its government and undertakings directly or indirectly controlled by that government; or

    (g) 

    personal use of natural persons travelling to Belarus, and limited to personal effects, household effects, vehicles or tools of trade owned by those individuals and not intended for sale.

    With the exception of points (f) and (g), the exporter shall declare in its customs declaration that the items are being exported under the relevant exception set out in this paragraph and shall notify the competent authority of the Member State where the exporter is resident or established of the first use of the relevant exception within 30 days from that first export.

    3.  
    The prohibitions in paragraph 1 shall be without prejudice to the execution until 4 June 2022 of contracts concluded before 2 March 2022, or ancillary contracts necessary for the execution of such contracts.

    ▼M47

    Article 1t

    1.  
    It shall be prohibited to provide public financing or financial assistance for trade with, or investment in, Belarus.
    2.  

    The prohibition in paragraph 1 shall not apply to:

    (a) 

    binding financing or financial assistance commitments established prior to 10 March 2022;

    (b) 

    the provision of public financing or financial assistance up to the total value of EUR 10 000 000 per project benefiting small and medium-sized enterprises established in the Union; or

    (c) 

    the provision of public financing or financial assistance for trade in food, and for agricultural, medical or humanitarian purposes.

    Article 1u

    1.  
    It shall be prohibited to accept any deposits from Belarusian nationals or natural persons residing in Belarus, or legal persons, entities or bodies established in Belarus, if the total value of deposits of the natural or legal person, entity or body per credit institution exceeds EUR 100 000 .
    2.  
    Paragraph 1 shall not apply to nationals of a Member State, of a country member of the European Economic Area or of Switzerland, or to natural persons having a temporary or permanent residence permit in a Member State, in a country member of the European Economic Area or in Switzerland.
    3.  
    Paragraph 1 shall not apply to deposits which are necessary for non-prohibited cross-border trade in goods and services between the Union and Belarus.

    Article 1v

    1.  

    By way of derogation from Article 1u(1), the competent authorities may authorise the acceptance of such a deposit, under such conditions as they deem appropriate, after having determined that the acceptance of such a deposit is:

    (a) 

    necessary to satisfy the basic needs of natural or legal persons, entities or bodies referred to in Article 1u(1) and their dependent family members, including payments for food, rent or mortgage, medicines and medical treatment, taxes, insurance premiums, and public utility charges;

    (b) 

    intended exclusively for the payment of reasonable professional fees or the reimbursement of incurred expenses associated with the provision of legal services;

    (c) 

    necessary for extraordinary expenses, provided that the relevant competent authority has notified the competent authorities of the other Member States and the Commission of the grounds on which it considers that a specific authorisation should be granted, at least two weeks prior to the authorisation; or

    (d) 

    necessary for official purposes of a diplomatic mission or consular post or international organisation.

    2.  
    The Member State concerned shall inform the other Member States and the Commission of any authorisation granted under points (a), (b) and (d) of paragraph 1 within two weeks of the authorisation.

    Article 1w

    1.  

    By way of derogation from Article 1u(1), the competent authorities may authorise the acceptance of such a deposit, under such conditions as they deem appropriate, after having determined that the acceptance of such a deposit is:

    (a) 

    necessary for humanitarian purposes, such as delivering or facilitating the delivery of assistance, including medical supplies, food, or the transfer of humanitarian workers and related assistance or for evacuations; or

    (b) 

    necessary for civil society activities that directly promote democracy, human rights or the rule of law in Belarus.

    2.  
    The Member State concerned shall inform the other Member States and the Commission of any authorisation granted under paragraph 1 within two weeks of the authorisation.

    Article 1x

    1.  
    It shall be prohibited for Union central securities depositories to provide any services as defined in the Annex to Regulation (EU) No 909/2014 for transferable securities issued after 12 April 2022 to any Belarusian national or natural person residing in Belarus or any legal person, entity or body established in Belarus.
    2.  
    Paragraph 1 shall not apply to nationals of a Member State or natural persons having a temporary or permanent residence permit in a Member State.

    Article 1y

    ▼M48

    1.  
    It shall be prohibited to sell transferable securities denominated in any official currency of a Member State issued after 12 April 2022 or units in collective investment undertakings providing exposure to such securities, to any Belarusian national or natural person residing in Belarus or any legal person, entity or body established in Belarus.

    ▼M47

    2.  
    Paragraph 1 shall not apply to nationals of a Member State or natural persons having a temporary or permanent residence permit in a Member State.

    Article 1z

    Without prejudice to the applicable rules concerning reporting, confidentiality and professional secrecy, credit institutions shall:

    (a) 

    supply to the national competent authority of the Member State where they are located or to the Commission by no later than 27 May 2022, a list of deposits exceeding EUR 100 000 held by Belarusian nationals or natural persons residing in Belarus, or by legal persons, entities or bodies established in Belarus. They shall provide updates regarding the amounts of such deposits every 12 months.

    (b) 

    supply to the national competent authority of the Member State where they are located information on deposits exceeding EUR 100 000 held by Belarusian nationals or natural persons residing in Belarus who have acquired the citizenship of a Member State or residence rights in a Member State through an investor citizenship scheme or an investor residence scheme.

    ▼M48

    Article 1za

    1.  
    It shall be prohibited to sell, supply, transfer or export banknotes denominated in any official currency of a Member State to Belarus or to any natural or legal person, entity or body in Belarus, including the government and the Central Bank of Belarus, or for use in Belarus.
    2.  

    The prohibition in paragraph 1 shall not apply to the sale, supply, transfer or export of banknotes denominated in any official currency of a Member State provided that such sale, supply, transfer or export is necessary for:

    (a) 

    the personal use of natural persons travelling to Belarus or members of their immediate families travelling with them; or

    (b) 

    the official purposes of diplomatic missions, consular posts or international organisations in Belarus enjoying immunities in accordance with international law.

    ▼M51

    Article 1zb

    1.  
    It shall be prohibited to provide specialised financial messaging services, which are used to exchange financial data, to the legal persons, entities or bodies listed in Annex XV or to any legal person, entity or body established in Belarus whose proprietary rights are directly or indirectly owned for more than 50 % by an entity listed in Annex XV.
    2.  
    For each legal person, entity or body referred to in Annex XV, the prohibition set out in paragraph 1 shall apply as of the date mentioned for it in that Annex. The prohibition shall apply as of that same date to any legal person, entity or body established in Belarus whose proprietary rights are directly or indirectly owned for more than 50 % by an entity listed in Annex XV.

    ▼M48

    Article 1zc

    1.  
    It shall be prohibited for any road transport undertaking established in Belarus to transport goods by road within the territory of the Union, including in transit.
    2.  
    The prohibition in paragraph 1 shall not apply to road transport undertakings transporting mail as a universal service.
    3.  

    The prohibition in paragraph 1 shall not apply until 16 April 2022 to the transport of goods that started before 9 April 2022, provided that the vehicle of the road transport undertaking:

    (a) 

    was already in the territory of the Union on 9 April 2022, or

    (b) 

    needs to transit through the Union in order to return to Belarus.

    4.  

    By way of derogation from paragraph 1, the competent authorities of a Member State may authorise the transport of goods by a road transport undertaking established in Belarus if the competent authorities have determined that such transport is necessary for:

    (a) 

    the purchase, import or transport into the Union of natural gas and oil, including refined petroleum products, as well as titanium, aluminium, copper, nickel, palladium and iron ore;

    (b) 

    the purchase, import or transport of pharmaceutical, medical, agricultural and food products, including wheat and fertilisers whose import, purchase and transport is allowed under this Regulation;

    (c) 

    humanitarian purposes; or,

    (d) 

    the functioning of diplomatic and consular representations of the Union and of the Member States in Belarus, including delegations, embassies and missions, or international organisations in Belarus enjoying immunities in accordance with international law.

    5.  
    The Member State concerned shall inform the other Member States and the Commission of any authorisation granted under paragraph 4 within two weeks of the authorisation.

    ▼M15

    Article 2

    1.  
    All funds and economic resources belonging to, or owned, held or controlled by the natural or legal persons, entities and bodies listed in Annex I shall be frozen.
    2.  
    No funds or economic resources shall be made available, directly or indirectly, to or for the benefit of the natural or legal persons, entities and bodies listed in Annex I.
    3.  
    The participation, knowingly and intentionally, in activities the object or effect of which is, directly or indirectly, to circumvent the measures referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2 shall be prohibited.
    4.  
    Annex I shall consist of a list of the natural or legal persons, entities and bodies who, in accordance with point (a) of Article 4(1) of Council Decision 2012/642/CFSP of 15 October 2012 concerning restrictive measures against Belarus ( 5 ), have been identified by the Council as being responsible for serious violations of human rights or the repression of civil society and democratic opposition, or whose activities otherwise seriously undermine democracy or the rule of law in Belarus, or any natural or legal persons, entities and bodies associated with them, as well as legal persons, entities or bodies owned or controlled by them.
    5.  
    Annex I shall also consist of a list of the natural or legal persons, entities and bodies who, in accordance with point (b) of Article 4(1) of Decision 2012/642/CFSP, have been identified by the Council as benefiting from or supporting the Lukashenka regime, as well as legal persons, entities and bodies owned or controlled by them.

    ▼M28 —————

    ▼M41

    6.  

    Annex I shall also consist of a list of:

    (a) 

    the natural or legal persons, entities or bodies who, in accordance with Article 4(1), point (c), of Decision 2012/642/CFSP, have been identified by the Council as organising or contributing to activities by the Lukashenka regime that facilitate:

    (i) 

    the illegal crossing of the external borders of the Union; or

    (ii) 

    the transfer of prohibited goods and the illegal transfer of restricted goods, including hazardous goods, into the territory of the Union; and

    (b) 

    the legal persons, entities or bodies who, in accordance with Article 4(1), point (d), of Decision 2012/642/CFSP, have been identified by the Council as legal persons, entities or bodies owned or controlled by persons, entities or bodies referred to in point (a).

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    Article 2a

    Actions by natural or legal persons, entities or bodies shall not give rise to liability of any kind on their part, if they did not know, and had no reasonable cause to suspect, that their actions would infringe the measures set out in this Regulation.

    ▼M4

    Article 2b

    1.  
    ►M15  Annex I ◄ shall include the grounds for the listing of listed persons, entities and bodies.
    2.  
    ►M15  Annex I ◄ shall also include, where available, information necessary to identify the natural or legal persons, entities and bodies concerned. With regard to natural persons, such information may include names including aliases, date and place of birth, nationality, passport and ID card numbers, gender, address, if known, and function or profession. With regard to legal persons, entities and bodies, such information may include names, place and date of registration, registration number and place of business.

    ▼M4

    Article 3

    ▼M37

    1.  

    By way of derogation from Article 2, the competent authorities in the Member States, as indicated in the websites listed in Annex II, may authorise the release of certain frozen funds or economic resources, or the making available of certain funds or economic resources, under such conditions as they deem appropriate, after having determined that the funds or economic resources are:

    (a) 

    necessary to satisfy the basic needs of persons listed in Annex I and their dependent family members, including payments for foodstuffs, rent or mortgage, medicines and medical treatment, taxes, insurance premiums, and public utility charges;

    (b) 

    intended exclusively for payment of reasonable professional fees and reimbursement of incurred expenses associated with the provision of legal services;

    (c) 

    intended exclusively for payment of fees or service charges for routine holding or maintenance of frozen funds or economic resources;

    ▼M44

    (d) 

    intended exclusively for:

    (i) 

    humanitarian purposes, including the operation of flights for the evacuation or repatriation of persons, or for initiatives providing support to victims of natural, nuclear or chemical disasters;

    (ii) 

    the operation of flights in the framework of international adoption procedures;

    (iii) 

    the operation of flights required for attending meetings with the objective of seeking a solution to the crisis in Belarus or promoting the policy objectives of the restrictive measures; or

    (iv) 

    an emergency landing, take-off or overflight by an EU air carrier;

    ▼M37

    (e) 

    necessary to deal with critical and clearly identified air safety matters and after prior consultation of the European Union Aviation Safety Agency.

    ▼M4

    2.  
    By way of derogation from Article 2, the competent authorities in the Member States, as indicated in the websites listed in Annex II, may authorise the release of certain frozen funds or economic resources, or the making available of certain funds or economic resources, under such conditions as they deem appropriate, after having determined that the funds or economic resources are necessary for extraordinary expenses, provided that the Member State concerned has notified the other Member States and the Commission of the grounds on which it considers that a specific authorisation should be granted, at least 2 weeks before the authorisation.
    3.  
    Member States shall inform the other Member States and the Commission of any authorisation granted under paragraph 1 or 2.

    ▼M44

    Article 3a

    1.  

    By way of derogation from Article 2(1), the competent authorities may authorise the release of certain frozen funds or economic resources, if the following conditions are met:

    (a) 

    the funds or economic resources are the subject of an arbitral decision rendered prior to the date on which the natural or legal person, entity or body referred to in Article 2 was listed in Annex I, or of a judicial or administrative decision rendered in the Union, or a judicial decision enforceable in the Member State concerned, prior to or after that date;

    (b) 

    the funds or economic resources will be used exclusively to satisfy claims secured by such a decision or recognised as valid in such a decision, within the limits set by applicable laws and regulations governing the rights of persons having such claims;

    (c) 

    the decision is not for the benefit of a natural or legal person, entity or body listed in Annex I; and

    (d) 

    recognition of the decision is not contrary to public policy in the Member State concerned.

    2.  
    The Member State concerned shall inform the other Member States and the Commission of any authorisation granted under paragraph 1 within two weeks of the authorisation.

    ▼B

    Article 4

    1.  

    Article 2(2) shall not apply to the addition to frozen accounts of

    (a) 

    interest or other earnings on those accounts; or

    (b) 

    payments due under contracts, agreements or obligations that were concluded or arose prior to the date on which those accounts became subject to the provisions of this Regulation,

    provided that any such interest, other earnings and payments continue to be subject to Article 2(1).

    2.  
    Article 2(2) shall not prevent financial or credit institutions in the EU from crediting the frozen accounts, if they receive funds transferred by third parties to the account of the listed person, entity or body, provided that any additions to such accounts will also be frozen. The financial or credit institution shall inform the competent authorities about such transactions without delay.

    ▼M8

    Article 4a

    By way of derogation from Article 2(1), where a payment by a natural or legal person, entity or body listed in ►M15  Annex I ◄ is due under a contract or agreement that was concluded by, or an obligation that arose for the natural or legal person, entity or body concerned before the date on which that person, entity or body had been listed, the competent authorities of the Member States, as indicated on the websites listed in Annex II, may authorise, under such conditions as they deem appropriate, the release of certain frozen funds or economic resources, provided that:

    (i) 

    the competent authority concerned has determined that the payment is not, directly or indirectly, to or for the benefit of a person, entity or body listed in ►M15  Annex I ◄ ; and

    (ii) 

    the Member State concerned has, at least 2 weeks prior to the grant of the authorisation, notified the other Member States and the Commission of that determination and its intention to grant the authorisation.

    ▼M14

    Article 4b

    By way of derogation from Article 2, the competent authorities in the Member States, as indicated in the websites listed in Annex II, may authorise, under such conditions as they deem appropriate, the release of certain frozen funds or economic resources or the making available of certain funds or economic resources, after having determined that the funds or economic resources are necessary for official purposes of diplomatic missions or consular posts or international organisations enjoying immunities in accordance with international law.

    ▼M3

    Article 5

    1.  

    Without prejudice to the applicable rules concerning reporting, confidentiality and professional secrecy, natural and legal persons, entities and bodies shall:

    (a) 

    immediately supply the competent authorities indicated in the websites listed in Annex II, in the country where they are resident or located, with any information which would facilitate compliance with this Regulation, such as accounts and amounts frozen in accordance with Article 2, and directly or indirectly supply such information to the Commission; and

    (b) 

    cooperate with the competent authorities indicated in the websites listed in Annex II in any verification of this information.

    2.  
    Any information provided or received in accordance with this Article shall be used only for the purposes for which it was provided or received.

    ▼B

    Article 6

    The freezing of funds and economic resources or the refusal to make funds or economic resources available, carried out in good faith on the basis that such action is in accordance with this Regulation, shall not give rise to liability of any kind on the part of the natural or legal person or entity or body implementing it, or its directors or employees, unless it is proved that the funds and economic resources were frozen as a result of negligence.

    ▼M47

    Article 7

    1.  

    The Member States and the Commission shall inform each other of the measures taken under this Regulation and share any other relevant information at their disposal in connection with this Regulation, in particular information in respect of:

    (a) 

    authorisations granted under this Regulation;

    (b) 

    information received under Article 1z;

    (c) 

    violation and enforcement problems and judgments handed down by national courts.

    2.  
    The Member States shall immediately inform each other and the Commission of any other relevant information at their disposal which might affect the effective implementation of this Regulation.
    3.  
    Any information provided or received in accordance with this Article shall be used for the purposes for which it was provided or received, including ensuring the effectiveness of the measures set out in this Regulation.

    ▼M46

    Article 8

    The Commission shall be empowered to amend Annexes II and Vc on the basis of information supplied by Member States.

    ▼M4

    Article 8a

    1.  
    Where the Council decides to subject a natural or legal person, entity or body to the measures referred to in Article 2(1), it shall amend ►M15  Annex I ◄ accordingly.
    2.  
    The Council shall communicate its decision, including the grounds for the listing, to the natural or legal person, entity or body referred to in paragraph 1, either directly, if the address is known, or through the publication of a notice, providing such natural or legal person, entity or body with an opportunity to present observations.
    3.  
    Where observations are submitted, or where substantial new evidence is presented, the Council shall review its decision and inform the natural or legal person, entity or body accordingly.
    4.  
    The lists in ►M15  Annex I ◄ shall be reviewed in regular intervals and at least every 12 months.

    ▼M28 —————

    ▼M36

    Article 8b

    1.  
    It shall be prohibited for any aircraft operated by Belarusian air carriers, including as a marketing carrier in code-sharing or blocked-space arrangements, to land in, take off from or overfly the territory of the Union.
    2.  
    Paragraph 1 shall not apply in the case of an emergency landing or an emergency overflight.

    Article 8c

    1.  
    By way of derogation from Article 8b, the competent authorities in the Member States as listed in Annex II may authorise an aircraft to land in, take off from or overfly the territory of the Union if those competent authorities have determined that such landing, take-off or overflight is required for humanitarian purposes or any other purpose consistent with the objectives of this Regulation.
    2.  
    The Member State or Member States concerned shall inform the other Member States and the Commission of any authorisation granted under paragraph 1.

    ▼M47

    Article 8ca

    1.  
    The Network Manager for air traffic management network functions of the single European sky shall support the Commission and the Member States in ensuring the implementation of, and compliance with, Articles 2(2) and 8b of this Regulation. The Network Manager shall, in particular, reject all flight plans filed by aircraft operators indicating an intent to carry out activities over the territory of the Union or of Belarus that constitute a violation of this Regulation, such that the pilot is not permitted to fly.
    2.  
    The Network Manager shall regularly supply to the Commission and the Member States, based on the analysis of flight plans, reports on the implementation of Article 8b.

    ▼M44

    Article 8d

    1.  

    No claims in connection with any contract or transaction the performance of which has been affected, directly or indirectly, in whole or in part, by the measures imposed under this Regulation, including claims for indemnity or any other claim of this type, such as a claim for compensation or a claim under a guarantee, notably a claim for extension or payment of a bond, guarantee or indemnity, particularly a financial guarantee or financial indemnity, of whatever form, shall be satisfied, if they are made by:

    (a) 

    designated natural or legal persons, entities or bodies listed in Annex I;

    ▼M47

    (b) 

    entities referred to in Articles 1j, 1k, 1l and 1zb or listed in Annexes V, IX and XV;

    ▼M44

    (c) 

    any other Belarussian person, entity or body, including the Belarusian government;

    (d) 

    any person, entity or body acting through or on behalf of one of the persons, entities or bodies referred to in point (a), (b) or (c) of this paragraph.

    2.  
    In any proceedings for the enforcement of a claim, the onus of proving that satisfying the claim is not prohibited by paragraph 1 shall be on the person seeking the enforcement of that claim.
    3.  
    This Article is without prejudice to the right of the persons, entities and bodies referred to in paragraph 1 to judicial review of the legality of the non-performance of contractual obligations in accordance with this Regulation.

    Article 8e

    1.  

    The Council, the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (the ‘High Representative’) shall process personal data that are necessary to carry out their tasks under this Regulation. Those tasks include:

    (a) 

    as regards the Council, preparing and making amendments to Annex I;

    (b) 

    as regards the High Representative, preparing amendments to Annex I;

    (c) 

    as regards the Commission:

    (i) 

    adding the contents of Annex I to the electronic, consolidated list of persons, groups and entities subject to Union financial sanctions and to the interactive sanctions map, both publicly available;

    ▼M47

    (ii) 

    processing information on the impact of the measures provided for in this Regulation such as the value of frozen funds, information on deposits and information on authorisations granted by the competent authorities.

    ▼M44

    2.  
    The Council, the Commission and the High Representative may process, where applicable, relevant data relating to criminal offences committed by listed natural persons, to criminal convictions of such persons or to security measures concerning such persons, only to the extent that such processing is necessary for the preparation of Annex I.
    3.  
    For the purposes of this Regulation, the Council, the Commission and the High Representative are designated as ‘controller’ within the meaning of point (8) of Article 3 of Regulation (EU) 2018/1725 of the European Parliament and of the Council ( 6 ), in order to ensure that the natural persons concerned can exercise their rights under Regulation (EU) 2018/1725.

    ▼B

    Article 9

    ▼M51

    1.  
    Member States shall lay down the rules on penalties, including as appropriate criminal penalties, applicable to infringements of the provisions of this Regulation and shall take all measures necessary to ensure that they are implemented. The penalties provided for must be effective, proportionate and dissuasive. Member States shall also provide for appropriate measures of confiscation of the proceeds of such infringements.

    ▼B

    2.  
    Member States shall notify these rules to the Commission without delay after entry into force of the Regulation and shall notify it of any subsequent amendment.

    ▼M3

    Article 9a

    1.  
    Member States shall designate the competent authorities referred to in Articles 3, 4(2) and 5 and identify them in the websites listed in Annex II.
    2.  
    Member States shall notify the Commission of their competent authorities and the contact details thereof by 31 July 2008 and shall notify it of any subsequent amendment without delay.

    ▼M4

    Article 9b

    Where there is, in this Regulation, a requirement to notify, inform or otherwise communicate with the Commission, the address and other contact details to be used for such communication shall be those indicated in Annex II.

    ▼B

    Article 10

    This Regulation shall apply:

    — 
    within the territory of the Community, including its airspace,
    — 
    on board any aircraft or any vessel under the jurisdiction of a Member State,
    — 
    to any natural person inside or outside the territory of the Community who is a national of a Member State,
    — 
    to any legal person, entity or body which is incorporated or constituted under the law of a Member State,
    — 
    to any legal person, entity or body in respect of any business done in whole or in part within the Community.

    Article 11

    This Regulation shall enter into force on the day of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union.

    This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States.

    ▼M35




    ANNEX I

    List of natural and legal persons, entities and bodies referred to in Article 2(1)

    A.   Natural persons referred to in Article 2(1)



     

    Names (Transliteration of Belarusian spelling)

    (Transliteration of Russian spelling)

    Names

    (Belarusian spelling)

    (Russian spelling)

    Identifying information

    Reasons for listing

    Date of listing

    1.

    Uladzimir Uladzimiravich NAVUMAU

    Vladimir Vladimirovich NAUMOV

    Уладзімір Уладзіміравіч НАВУМАЎ

    Владимир Владимирович НАУМОВ

    Position(s): former Minister of Internal Affairs; former Head of the President’s Security Service

    DOB: 7.2.1956

    POB: Smolensk, former USSR (now Russian Federation)

    Gender: male

    Failed to take action to investigate the case of the unresolved disappearances of Yuri Zakharenko, Viktor Gonchar, Anatoly Krasovski and Dmitri Zavadski in Belarus in 1999-2000. Former Minister of Internal Affairs and also former Head of the President's Security Service. As a Minister of Internal Affairs he was responsible for the repression of peaceful demonstrations until his retirement on 6 April 2009 for health reasons. Received a residence in the Drozdy nomenklatura district in Minsk from the Presidential Administration. In October 2014, was awarded the Order ‘For Merit’ III degree by President Lukashenka.

    24.9.2004

    ▼M45

    2.

    Dzmitry Valerievich PAULICHENKA

    Dmitri Valerievich PAVLICHENKO (Dmitriy Valeriyevich PAVLICHENKO)

    Дзмiтрый Валер'евiч ПАЎЛIЧЭНКА

    Дмитрий Валериевич ПАВЛИЧЕНКО

    Position(s): Former Commander of the Special Rapid Response Unit (SOBR)

    Commander of an OMON unit

    DOB: 1966

    POB: Vitebsk/Viciebsk, former USSR (now Belarus)

    Address: Belarusian Association of Veterans of Special Forces of the Ministry of Internal Affairs ‘Honour’, 111 Mayakovskogo St., 220028 Minsk, Belarus

    Gender: male

    Key person in the unresolved disappearances of Yuri Zakharenko, Viktor Gonchar, Anatoly Krasovski and Dmitri Zavadski in Belarus in 1999-2000. Former Commander of the Special Rapid Response Unit (SOBR) at the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MoIA).

    Businessman, Head of ‘Honour’, the MoIA's Association of Veterans of Special Forces of the MoIA.

    He was identified as commanding an OMON unit during the brutal crackdown on protesters that took place in Belarus in the wake of the 2020 presidential election.

    24.9.2004

    3.

    Viktar Uladzimiravich SHEIMAN (Viktar Uladzimiravich SHEYMAN)

    Viktor Vladimirovich SHEIMAN (Viktor Vladimirovich SHEYMAN)

    Вiктар Уладзiмiравiч ШЭЙМАН

    Виктор Владимирович ШЕЙМАН

    Position(s): Former Head of the Belarus President Property Management Directorate

    DOB: 26.5.1958

    POB: Soltanishki, Grodno/Hrodna Region/Oblast, former USSR (now Belarus)

    Address: Belarus President Property Management Directorate, 38 Karl Marx St., 220016 Minsk, Belarus

    Gender: male

    Former Head of the Belarus President Property Management Directorate. Responsible for the unresolved disappearances of Yuri Zakharenko, Viktor Gonchar, Anatoly Krasovski and Dmitri Zavadski in Belarus in 1999-2000. Former Secretary of the Security Council. Sheiman remains a Special Assistant/Aid to the President.

    He remains an influential and active member of the Lukashenka regime.

    24.9.2004

    ▼M35

    4.

    Iury Leanidavich SIVAKAU (Yuri Leanidavich SIVAKAU, SIVAKOU)

    Iury (Yuri) Leonidovich SIVAKOV

    Юрый Леанідавіч СІВАКАЎ, СІВАКОЎ

    Юрий Леонидович СИВАКОВ

    Position(s): former Minister of Internal Affairs; former Deputy Head of the Presidential Administration

    DOB: 5.8.1946

    POB: Onor, Sakhalin Region/Oblast, former USSR (now Russian Federation)

    Address: Belarusian Association of Veterans of Special Forces of the Ministry of Internal Affairs ‘Honour’, 111 Mayakovskogo St., Minsk 220028, Belarus

    Gender: male

    Orchestrated the unresolved disappearances of Yuri Zakharenko, Viktor Gonchar, Anatoly Krasovski and Dmitri Zavadski in Belarus in 1999-2000. Former Minister of Tourism and Sports, former Minister of Internal Affairs and former Deputy Head of the Presidential Administration.

    24.9.2004

    5.

    Yuri Khadzimuratavich KARAEU

    Yuri Khadzimuratovich KARAEV

    Юрый Хаджымуратавіч КАРАЕЎ

    Юрий Хаджимуратович КАРАЕВ

    Position(s): Former Minister of Internal Affairs; Lieutenant General of Militia (police force); Aide to the President of the Republic of Belarus - Inspector for the Grodno/Hrodna Region/Oblast

    DOB: 21.6.1966

    POB: Ordzhonikidze, former USSR (now Vladikavkaz, Russian Federation)

    Gender: male

    In his former leadership position as Minister of Internal Affairs (MoIA), he is responsible for the repression and intimidation campaign led by MoIA forces in the wake of the 2020 presidential election, in particular arbitrary arrests and ill treatment, including torture, of peaceful demonstrators as well as intimidation and violence against journalists.

    Remains active in the Lukashenka regime as an aide to the President of Belarus – Inspector for the Grodno/Hrodna Region/Oblast.

    2.10.2020

    6.

    Genadz Arkadzievich KAZAKEVICH

    Gennadi Arkadievich KAZAKEVICH

    Генадзь Аркадзьевіч КАЗАКЕВІЧ

    Геннадий Аркадьевич КАЗАКЕВИЧ

    Position(s): Former First Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs;

    Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs – Chief of the Criminal Militia, Colonel of Militia (police force)

    DOB: 14.2.1975

    POB: Minsk, former USSR (now Belarus)

    Gender: male

    In his former leadership position as First Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs (MoIA), he is responsible for the repression and intimidation campaign led by MoIA forces in the wake of the 2020 presidential election, in particular arbitrary arrests and ill-treatment, including torture, of peaceful demonstrators as well as intimidation and violence against journalists.

    He remains active in the Lukashenka regime as the Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs. He retains his post of Chief of the Criminal Militia.

    2.10.2020

    7.

    Aliaksandr Piatrovich BARSUKOU

    Alexander (Alexandr) Petrovich BARSUKOV

    Аляксандр Пятровіч БАРСУКОЎ

    Александр Петрович БАРСУКОВ

    Position(s): Former Deputy Minister Internal Affairs; Lieutenant-General of Militia (police force);

    Aide to the President of the Republic of Belarus - Inspector for the Minsk Region/Oblast

    DOB: 29.4.1965

    POB: Vetkovski (Vetka) District, former USSR (now Belarus)

    Gender: male

    In his former leadership position as Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs (MoIA), he is responsible for the repression and intimidation campaign led by MoIA forces in the wake of the 2020 presidential election, in particular arbitrary arrests and ill-treatment, including torture, of peaceful demonstrators as well as intimidation and violence against journalists.

    He remains active in the Lukashenka regime as Aide to the President of Belarus – Inspector for the Minsk Region/Oblast.

    2.10.2020

    ▼M45

    8.

    Siarhei Mikalaevich KHAMENKA

    Sergei Nikolaevich KHOMENKO

    Сяргей Мiкалаевiч ХАМЕНКА

    Сергей Николаевич ХОМЕНКО

    Position(s): Former Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs, Major-General of Militia (police force)

    Minister of Justice

    DOB: 21.9.1966

    POB: Yasinovataya, former USSR (now Ukraine)

    Gender: male

    In his former leadership position as Deputy Minister of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MoIA), he was responsible for the repression and intimidation campaign led by MoIA forces in the wake of the 2020 presidential election, in particular arbitrary arrests and ill-treatment, including torture, of peaceful demonstrators as well as intimidation and violence against journalists.

    He remains active in the Lukashenka regime as Minister of Justice.

    2.10.2020

    ▼M35

    9.

    Yuri Genadzevich NAZARANKA

    Yuri Gennadievich NAZARENKO

    Юрый Генадзевіч НАЗАРАНКА

    Юрий Геннадьевич НАЗАРЕНКО

    Position(s): Former Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs, Former Commander of the Internal Troops;

    First Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs, Head of the Public Security Police, Major General of Militia (police force)

    DOB: 17.4.1976

    POB: Slonim, former USSR (now Belarus)

    Gender: male

    In his former leadership position as Deputy Minister of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MoIA) and Commander of the MoIA Internal Troops, he is responsible for the repression and intimidation campaign led by MoIA forces, in particular the Internal Troops under his command, in the wake of the 2020 presidential election, in particular arbitrary arrests and ill-treatment, including torture, of peaceful demonstrators as well as intimidation and violence against journalists.

    He remains active in the Lukashenka regime as first Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs and Head of the Public Security Police.

    2.10.2020

    ▼M53

    10.

    Khazalbek Baktibekavich ATABEKAU

    Khazalbek Bakhtibekovich ATABEKOV

    Хазалбек Бактiбекавiч АТАБЕКАЎ

    Хазалбек Бахтибекович АТАБЕКОВ

    Position(s): Former Deputy Commander of the Internal Troops

    DOB: 18.3.1967

    Gender: male

    In his former position as Deputy Commander of the Internal Troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MoIA), he was responsible for the repression and intimidation campaign led by MoIA forces, in particular the Internal Troops under his command, in the wake of the 2020 presidential election, in particular arbitrary arrests and ill-treatment, including torture, of peaceful demonstrators, as well as intimidation and violence against journalists.

    He was passed to the military reserve in March 2022 by the decree of Aliaksandr Lukashenka. He has the right to wear military uniform and insignia.

    2.10.2020

    ▼M35

    11.

    Aliaksandr Valerievich BYKAU

    Alexander (Alexandr) Valerievich BYKOV

    Аляксандр Валер’евіч БЫКАЎ

    Александр Валерьевич БЫКОВ

    Position(s): Commander of the Special Rapid Response Unit (SOBR), Lieutenant Colonel

    Gender: male

    In his position as Commander of the Special Rapid Response Unit (SOBR) of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, he is responsible for the repression and intimidation campaign led by SOBR forces in the wake of the 2020 presidential election, in particular arbitrary arrests and ill-treatment, including torture, of peaceful demonstrators.

    2.10.2020

    12.

    Aliaksandr Sviataslavavich SHEPELEU

    Alexander (Alexandr) Svyatoslavovich SHEPELEV

    Аляксандр Святаслававіч ШЭПЕЛЕЎ

    Александр Святославович ШЕПЕЛЕВ

    Position(s): Head of the Department for Safety and Security, Ministry of Internal Affairs

    DOB: 14.10.1975

    POB: village of Rublevsk, Kruglyanskiy district, Mogilev/Mahiliou Region/Oblast, former USSR (now Belarus)

    Gender: male

    In his senior position as Head of the Department for Safety and Security in the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MoIA), he is involved in the repression and intimidation campaign led by MoIA forces in the wake of the 2020 presidential election, in particular arbitrary arrests and ill-treatment, including torture, of peaceful demonstrators as well as intimidation and violence against journalists.

    2.10.2020

    13.

    Dzmitry Uladzimiravich BALABA

    Dmitry Vladimirovich BALABA

    Дзмітрый Уладзіміравіч БАЛАБА

    Дмитрий Владимирович БАЛАБА

    Position(s): Head of OMON (‘Special Purpose Police Detachment’) for the Minsk City Executive Committee

    DOB: 1.6.1972

    POB: village of Gorodilovo, Minsk Region/Oblast, former USSR (now Belarus)

    Gender: male

    In his command position over OMON forces in Minsk, he is responsible for the repression and intimidation campaign led by OMON forces in Minsk in the wake of the 2020 presidential election, in particular arbitrary arrests and ill-treatment, including torture, of peaceful demonstrators as well as intimidation and violence against journalists.

    2.10.2020

    14.

    Ivan Uladzimiravich KUBRAKOU

    Ivan Vladimirovich KUBRAKOV

    Іван Уладзіміравіч КУБРАКОЎ

    Иван Владимирович КУБРАКОВ

    Position(s): Former Head of the Main Internal Affairs Directorate of the Minsk City Executive Committee;

    Minister of Internal Affairs, Major General of Militia (police force)

    DOB: 5.5.1975

    POB: village of Malinovka, Mogilev/Mahiliou Region/Oblast, former USSR (now Belarus)

    Gender: male

    In his former position as Head of the Main Internal Affairs Directorate of the Minsk City Executive Committee, he is responsible for the repression and intimidation campaign led by police forces in the wake of the 2020 presidential election, in particular arbitrary arrests and ill-treatment of peaceful demonstrators as well as intimidation and violence against journalists.

    He remains active in the Lukashenka regime as the Minister of Internal Affairs.

    2.10.2020

    15.

    Maxim Aliaksandravich GAMOLA (HAMOLA)

    Maxim Alexandrovich GAMOLA

    Максім Аляксандравіч ГАМОЛА

    Максим Александрович ГАМОЛА

    Position(s): Former Head of the Police Department in Moskovski District, Minsk;

    Deputy head of the Minsk City Police Department, Head of Criminal Police

    Gender: male

    In his former position as Head of the Police Department in Moskovski District, Minsk, he is responsible for the repression and intimidation campaign in that district against peaceful protesters in the wake of the 2020 presidential election, in particular arbitrary arrests, excessive use of force and ill-treatment, including torture.

    He remains active in the Lukashenka regime as Deputy Head of the Minsk City Police Department and Head of Criminal Police.

    2.10.2020

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    16.

    Aliaksandr Mikhailavich ALIASHKEVICH

    Alexander Mikhailovich ALESHKEVICH

    Аляксандр Мiхайлавiч АЛЯШКЕВIЧ

    Александр Михайлович АЛЕШКЕВИЧ

    Position(s): Former First Deputy Head of the District Department of Internal Affairs in Moskovsky District, Minsk, Head of Criminal Police

    Head of the District Department of Internal Affairs in Leninsky District, Minsk

    Gender: male

    In his former position as First Deputy Head of the District Department of Internal Affairs in Moskovsky District, Minsk, and Head of Criminal Police, he was responsible for the repression and intimidation campaign in that district against peaceful protesters in the wake of the 2020 presidential election, in particular arbitrary arrests, excessive use of force and ill-treatment, including torture.

    He remains active in the Lukashenka regime as Head of the District Department of Internal Affairs in Leninsky District, Minsk.

    2.10.2020

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    17.

    Andrei Vasilievich GALENKA

    Andrey Vasilievich GALENKA

    Андрэй Васiльевiч ГАЛЕНКА

    Андрей Васильевич ГАЛЕНКА

    Position(s): First Deputy Head of the District Department of Internal Affairs in Moskovski District, Minsk, Head of Public Safety Police

    Gender: male

    In his former position as Deputy Head of the District Department of Internal Affairs in Moskovski District, Minsk and Head of Public Safety Police, he was responsible for the repression and intimidation campaign in that district against peaceful protesters in the wake of the 2020 presidential election, in particular arbitrary arrests, excessive use of force and ill-treatment, including torture.

    He remains active in the Lukashenka regime and is serving as the First Deputy Head of the District Department of Internal Affairs in Moskovski District, Minsk, Head of Public Safety Police.

    2.10.2020

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    18.

    Aliaksandr Paulavich VASILIEU

    Alexander Pavlovich VASILIEV

    Аляксандр Паўлавiч ВАСIЛЬЕЎ

    Александр Павлович ВАСИЛЬЕВ

    Position(s): Former Head of the Department of Internal Affairs of Gomel/Homyel Region/Oblast Executive Committee

    Head of the Academy of the Ministry of Internal Affairs

    DOB: 24.3.1975

    POB: Mahiliou/Mogilev, former USSR (now Belarus)

    Gender: male

    In his former position as Head of the Department of Internal Affairs of Gomel/Homyel Region/Oblast Executive Committee, he was responsible for the repression and intimidation campaign in that region/oblast against peaceful protesters in the wake of the 2020 presidential election, in particular arbitrary arrests, excessive use of force and ill-treatment, including torture.

    He remains active in the Lukashenka regime as Head of the Academy of the Ministry of Internal Affairs.

    2.10.2020

    19.

    Aleh Mikalaevich SHULIAKOUSKI

    Oleg Nikolaevich SHULIAKOVSKI

    Алег Мiкалаевiч ШУЛЯКОЎСКI

    Олег Николаевич ШУЛЯКОВСКИЙ

    Position(s): Former First Deputy Head of the Department of Internal Affairs of Gomel/Homyel Region/Oblast Executive Committee, Head of Criminal Police

    Head of the Department of Internal Affairs of the Brest Region/Oblast Executive Committee

    DOB: 26.7.1977

    Gender: male

    In his former position as First Deputy Head of the Department of Internal Affairs of Gomel/Homyel Region/Oblast Executive Committee and Head of Criminal Police, he was responsible for the repression and intimidation campaign in that region/oblast against peaceful protesters in the wake of the 2020 presidential election, in particular arbitrary arrests, excessive use of force and ill-treatment, including torture.

    He remains active in the Lukashenka regime as Head of the Department of Internal Affairs of the Brest Region/Oblast Executive Committee.

    2.10.2020

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    20.

    Anatol Anatolievich VASILIEU

    Anatoli Anatolievich VASILIEV

    Анатоль Анатольевiч ВАСIЛЬЕЎ

    Анатолий Анатольевич ВАСИЛЬЕВ

    Position(s): First Deputy Head of the Department of Internal Affairs of Gomel/Homyel Region/Oblast Executive Committee, Head of Public Safety Police

    Former Deputy Head of the Department of Internal Affairs of Gomel/Homyel Region/Oblast Executive Committee, Head of Public Safety Police, Former Deputy Chairman of the Investigative Committee

    DOB: 26.1.1972

    POB: Gomel/Homyel, Gomel/Homyel Region/Oblast, former USSR (now Belarus)

    Gender: male

    In his former position as Deputy Head of the Department of Internal Affairs of Gomel/Homyel Region/Oblast Executive Committee and Head of Public Safety Police, he was responsible for the repression and intimidation campaign in that region/oblast against peaceful protesters in the wake of the 2020 presidential election, in particular arbitrary arrests, excessive use of force and ill-treatment, including torture.

    He remains active in the Lukashenka regime as First Deputy Head of the Department of Internal Affairs of Gomel/Homyel Region/Oblast Executive Committee, Head of Public Safety Police.

    2.10.2020

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    21.

    Aliaksandr Viachaslavavich ASTREIKA

    Alexander Viacheslavovich ASTREIKO

    Аляксандр Вячаслававiч АСТРЭЙКА

    Александр Вячеславович АСТРЕЙКО

    Position(s): Former Head of the Department of Internal Affairs of Brest Region/Oblast Executive Committee, Major-General of Militia (police force)

    Head of the Department of Internal Affairs of the Minsk Region/Oblast Executive Committee

    DOB: 22.12.1971

    POB: Kapyl, former USSR (now Belarus)

    Gender: male

    In his former position as Head of the Department of Internal Affairs of Brest Region/Oblast Executive Committee and Major-General of Militia, he was responsible for the repression and intimidation campaign in that region/oblast against peaceful protesters in the wake of the 2020 presidential election, in particular arbitrary arrests, excessive use of force and ill-treatment, including torture.

    He remains active in the Lukashenka regime as Head of the Department of Internal Affairs of the Minsk Region/Oblast Executive Committee.

    2.10.2020

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    22.

    Leanid ZHURAUSKI

    Leonid ZHURAVSKI

    Леанiд ЖУРАЎСКI

    Леонид ЖУРАВСКИЙ

    Position(s): Former Head of OMON (‘Special Purpose Police Detachment’) in Vitebsk/Viciebsk

    DOB: 20.9.1975

    Gender: male

    In his former command position over OMON forces in Vitebsk/Viciebsk, he was responsible for the repression and intimidation campaign led by OMON forces in Vitebsk/Viciebsk in the wake of the 2020 presidential election, in particular arbitrary arrests and ill-treatment of peaceful demonstrators.

    2.10.2020

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    23.

    Mikhail DAMARNACKI

    Mikhail DOMARNATSKY

    Міхаіл ДАМАРНАЦКІ

    Михаил ДОМАРНАЦКИЙ

    Position(s): Head of OMON (‘Special Purpose Police Detachment’) in Gomel/Homyel

    Gender: male

    In his command position over OMON forces in Gomel/Homyel, he is responsible for the repression and intimidation campaign led by OMON forces in Gomel/Homyel in the wake of the 2020 presidential election, in particular arbitrary arrests and ill-treatment of peaceful demonstrators.

    2.10.2020

    24.

    Maxim MIKHOVICH

    Maxim MIKHOVICH

    Максім МІХОВІЧ

    Максим МИХОВИЧ

    Position(s): Head of OMON (‘Special Purpose Police Detachment’) in Brest, Lieutenant Colonel

    Gender: male

    In his command position over OMON forces in Brest, he is responsible for the repression and intimidation campaign led by OMON forces in Brest in the wake of the 2020 presidential election, in particular arbitrary arrests and ill-treatment of peaceful demonstrators.

    2.10.2020

    25.

    Aleh Uladzimiravich MATKIN

    Oleg Vladimirovitch MATKIN

    Алег Уладзіміравіч МАТКІН

    Олег Владимирович МАТКИН

    Position(s): Head of the Penal Correction Department in the Ministry of Internal Affairs, Major-General of Militia (police force)

    Gender: male

    In his position as Head of the Penal Correction Department that has authority over the detention facilities of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, he is responsible for the inhumane and degrading treatment, including torture, inflicted on citizens detained in those detention facilities in the wake of the 2020 presidential election and for the general brutal crackdown on peaceful protesters.

    2.10.2020

    26.

    Ivan Yurievich SAKALOUSKI

    Ivan Yurievich SOKOLOVSKI

    Іван Юр’евіч САКАЛОЎСКІ

    Иван Юрьевич СОКОЛОВСКИЙ

    Position(s): Director of the Akrestina detention centre, Minsk

    Gender: male

    In his capacity as Director of the Akrestina detention centre in Minsk, he is responsible for the inhumane and degrading treatment, including torture, inflicted on citizens detained in that detention centre in the wake of the 2020 presidential election.

    2.10.2020

    27.

    Valeri Paulavich VAKULCHYK

    Valery Pavlovich VAKULCHIK

    Валерый Паўлавіч

    ВАКУЛЬЧЫК

    Валерий Павлович ВАКУЛЬЧИК

    Position(s): Former Chairman of the State Security Committee (KGB);

    Former State Secretary of the Security Council;

    Aide to the President of the Republic of Belarus – Inspector for the Brest Region/Oblast

    DOB: 19.6.1964

    POB: Radostovo, former USSR (now Belarus)

    Gender: male

    In his former leadership position as Chairman of the State Security Committee (KGB), he was responsible for the participation of the KGB in the repression and intimidation campaign in the wake of the 2020 presidential election, in particular arbitrary arrests and ill-treatment, including torture, of peaceful demonstrators and opposition members.

    He remains active in the Lukashenka regime as Aide to the President of Belarus – Inspector for the Brest Region/Oblast.

    2.10.2020

    28.

    Siarhei Yaugenavich TSERABAU

    Sergey Evgenievich TEREBOV

    Сяргей Яўгенавіч ЦЕРАБАЎ

    Сергей Евгеньевич ТЕРЕБОВ

    Position(s): First Deputy Chairman of the State Security Committee (KGB)

    DOB: 1972

    POB: Borisov/Barisaw, former USSR (now Belarus)

    Gender: male

    In his leadership position as First Deputy Chairman of the State Security Committee (KGB), he is responsible for the participation of the KGB in the repression and intimidation campaign in the wake of the 2020 presidential election, in particular arbitrary arrests and ill-treatment, including torture, of peaceful demonstrators and opposition members.

    2.10.2020

    29.

    Dzmitry Vasilievich RAVUTSKI

    Dmitry Vasilievich REUTSKY

    Дзмітрый Васільевіч РАВУЦКІ

    Дмитрий Васильевич РЕУЦКИЙ

    Position(s): Deputy Chairman of the State Security Committee (KGB)

    Gender: male

    In his leadership position as Deputy Chairman of the State Security Committee (KGB), he is responsible for the participation of the KGB in the repression and intimidation campaign in the wake of the 2020 presidential election, in particular arbitrary arrests and ill-treatment, including torture, of peaceful demonstrators and opposition members.

    2.10.2020

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    30.

    Uladzimir Viktaravich KALACH

    Vladimir Viktorovich KALACH

    Уладзiмiр Вiктаравiч КАЛАЧ

    Владимир Викторович КАЛАЧ

    Position(s): Former Deputy Chairman of the State Security Committee (KGB)

    Aide to the President of the Republic of Belarus - Inspector for Minsk Region/Oblast

    Gender: male

    Rank: Major-General

    In his former leadership position as Deputy Chairman of the State Security Committee (KGB), he was responsible for the participation of the KGB in the repression and intimidation campaign in the wake of the 2020 presidential election, in particular arbitrary arrests and ill-treatment, including torture, of peaceful demonstrators and opposition members.

    He remains active in the Lukashenka regime as Aide to the President of the Republic of Belarus - Inspector for Minsk Region/Oblast.

    2.10.2020

    31.

    Alieg Anatolevich CHARNYSHOU

    Oleg Anatolievich CHERNYSHEV

    Алег Анатольевiч ЧАРНЫШОЎ

    Олег Анатольевич ЧЕРНЫШЁВ

    Position(s): Former Deputy Chairman of the State Security Committee (KGB)

    Deputy Chairman of the Presidium of the National Academy of Sciences

    Gender: male

    Rank: Major-General

    In his former leadership position as Deputy Chairman of the State Security Committee (KGB), he was responsible for the participation of the KGB in the repression and intimidation campaign in the wake of the 2020 presidential election, in particular arbitrary arrests and ill-treatment, including torture, of peaceful demonstrators and opposition members.

    He remains active in the Lukashenka regime as Deputy Chairman of the Presidium of the National Academy of Sciences.

    2.10.2020

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    32.

    Aliaksandr Uladzimiravich KANYUK

    Alexander (Alexandr) Vladimirovich KONYUK

    Аляксандр Уладзіміравіч КАНЮК

    Александр Владимирович КОНЮК

    Position(s): Former Prosecutor General of the Republic of Belarus;

    Ambassador of the Republic of Belarus to Armenia

    DOB: 11.7.1960

    POB: Grodno/Hrodna, former USSR (now Belarus)

    Gender: male

    In his former position as Prosecutor General, he was responsible for the widespread use of criminal proceedings to disqualify opposition candidates ahead of the 2020 presidential election and to prevent persons from joining the Coordination Council launched by the opposition to challenge the outcome of that election.

    He remains active in the Lukashenka regime as the ambassador of Belarus to Armenia.

    2.10.2020

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    33.

    Lidzia Mihailauna YARMOSHINA

    Lidia Mikhailovna YERMOSHINA

    Лiдзiя Мiхайлаўна ЯРМОШЫНА

    Лидия Михайловна ЕРМОШИНА

    Position(s): Former Chairwoman of the Central Electoral Commission (CEC)

    DOB: 29.1.1953

    POB: Slutsk, former USSR (now Belarus)

    Gender: female

    In her former position as Chairwoman of the Central Electoral Commission (CEC), she was responsible for its misconduct of the 2020 presidential electoral process, its non-compliance with basic international standards of fairness and transparency, and its falsification of election results.

    The CEC and its leadership have, in particular, organised the dismissal of certain opposition candidates on spurious grounds and placed disproportionate restrictions on observers in polling stations. The CEC has also ensured that the election commissions under its supervision are composed in a biased manner.

    2.10.2020

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    34.

    Vadzim Dzmitryevich IPATAU

    Vadim Dmitrievich IPATOV

    Вадзім Дзмітрыевіч ІПАТАЎ

    Вадим Дмитриевич ИПАТОВ

    Position(s): Deputy Chairman of the Central Electoral Commission (CEC)

    DOB: 30.10.1964

    POB: Kolomyia, Ivano-Frankivsk Region/Oblast, former USSR (now Ukraine)

    Gender: male

    As Deputy Chairman of the CEC, he is responsible for its misconduct of the 2020 presidential electoral process, its non-compliance with basic international standards of fairness and transparency and its falsification of election results.

    The CEC and its leadership have, in particular, organised the dismissal of certain opposition candidates on spurious grounds and placed disproportionate restrictions on observers in polling stations. The CEC has also ensured that the election commissions under its supervision are composed in a biased manner.

    2.10.2020

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    35.

    Alena Mikalaeuna DMUHAILA

    Elena Nikolaevna DMUHAILO

    Алена Мiкалаеўна ДМУХАЙЛА

    Елена Николаевна ДМУХАЙЛО

    Position(s): Former Secretary of the Central Electoral Commission (CEC)

    DOB: 1.7.1971

    Gender: female

    In her former position as Secretary of the CEC, she was responsible for its misconduct of the 2020 presidential electoral process, its non-compliance with basic international standards of fairness and transparency and its falsification of election results.

    The CEC and its leadership have, in particular, organised the dismissal of certain opposition candidates on spurious grounds and placed disproportionate restrictions on observers in polling stations. The CEC has also ensured that the election commissions under its supervision are composed in a biased manner.

    2.10.2020

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    36.

    Andrei Anatolievich GURZHY

    Andrey Anatolievich GURZHIY

    Андрэй Анатольевіч ГУРЖЫ

    Андрей Анатольевич ГУРЖИЙ

    Position(s): Member of the Central Electoral Commission (CEC)

    DOB: 10.10.1975

    Gender: male

    As a member of the CEC college, he is responsible for its misconduct of the 2020 presidential electoral process, its non-compliance with basic international standards of fairness and transparency and its falsification of election results.

    The CEC and its college have, in particular, organised the dismissal of certain opposition candidates on spurious grounds and placed disproportionate restrictions on observers in polling stations. The CEC has also ensured that the election commissions under its supervision are composed in a biased manner.

    2.10.2020

    37.

    Volga Leanidauna DARASHENKA

    Olga Leonidovna DOROSHENKO

    Вольга Леанідаўна ДАРАШЭНКА

    Ольга Леонидовна ДОРОШЕНКО

    Position(s): Member of the Central Electoral Commission (CEC)

    DOB: 1976

    Gender: female

    As a member of the CEC college, she is responsible for its misconduct of the 2020 presidential electoral process, its non-compliance with basic international standards of fairness and transparency and its falsification of election results.

    The CEC and its college have, in particular, organised the dismissal of certain opposition candidates on spurious grounds and placed disproportionate restrictions on observers in polling stations. The CEC has also ensured that the election commissions under its supervision are composed in a biased manner.

    2.10.2020

    38.

    Siarhei Aliakseevich KALINOUSKI

    Sergey Alexeyevich KALINOVSKIY

    Сяргей Аляксеевіч КАЛІНОЎСКІ

    Сергей Алексеевич КАЛИНОВСКИЙ

    Position(s): Member of the Central Electoral Commission (CEC)

    DOB: 3.1.1969

    Gender: male

    As a member of the CEC college, he is responsible for its misconduct of the 2020 presidential electoral, its non-compliance with basic international standards of fairness and transparency and its falsification of election results.

    The CEC and its college have, in particular, organised the dismissal of certain opposition candidates on spurious grounds and placed disproportionate restrictions on observers in polling stations. The CEC has also ensured that the election commissions under its supervision are composed in a biased manner.

    2.10.2020

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    39.

    Sviatlana Piatrouna KATSUBA

    Svetlana Petrovna KATSUBO

    Святлана Пятроўна КАЦУБА

    Светлана Петровна КАЦУБО

    Position(s): Former Member of the Central Electoral Commission (CEC)

    DOB: 6.8.1959

    POB: Podilsk, Odessa Region/Oblast, former USSR (now Ukraine)

    Gender: female

    In her former position as a member of the CEC college, she was responsible for its misconduct of the 2020 presidential electoral process, its non-compliance with basic international standards of fairness and transparency and its falsification of election results.

    The CEC and its college have, in particular, organised the dismissal of certain opposition candidates on spurious grounds and placed disproportionate restrictions on observers in polling stations. The CEC has also ensured that the election commissions under its supervision are composed in a biased manner.

    2.10.2020

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    40.

    Aliaksandr Mikhailavich LASYAKIN

    Alexander (Alexandr) Mikhailovich LOSYAKIN

    Аляксандр Міхайлавіч ЛАСЯКІН

    Александр Михайлович ЛОСЯКИН

    Position(s): Member of the Central Electoral Commission (CEC)

    DOB: 21.7.1957

    Gender: male

    As a member of the CEC college, he is responsible for its misconduct of the 2020 presidential electoral process, its non-compliance with basic international standards of fairness and transparency and its falsification of election results.

    The CEC and its college have, in particular, organised the dismissal of certain opposition candidates on spurious grounds and placed disproportionate restrictions on observers in polling stations. The CEC has also ensured that the election commissions under its supervision are composed in a biased manner.

    2.10.2020

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    41.

    Igar Anatolievich PLYSHEUSKI

    Ihor Anatolievich PLYSHEVSKIY

    Iгар Анатольевiч ПЛЫШЭЎСКI

    Игорь Анатольевич ПЛЫШЕВСКИЙ

    Position(s): Former Member of the Central Electoral Commission (CEC)

    DOB: 19.2.1979

    POB: Lyuban, former USSR (now Belarus)

    Gender: male

    In his former position as a member of the CEC college, he was responsible for its misconduct of the 2020 presidential electoral process, its non-compliance with basic international standards of fairness and transparency and its falsification of election results.

    The CEC and its college have, in particular, organised the dismissal of certain opposition candidates on spurious grounds and placed disproportionate restrictions on observers in polling stations. The CEC has also ensured that the election commissions under its supervision are composed in a biased manner.

    2.10.2020

    42.

    Marina Yureuna RAKHMANAVA

    Marina Yurievna RAKHMANOVA

    Марына Юр’еўна РАХМАНАВА

    Марина Юрьевна РАХМАНОВА

    Position(s): Former Member of the Central Electoral Commission (CEC)

    DOB: 26.9.1970

    Gender: female

    In her former position as a member of the CEC college, she was responsible for its misconduct of the 2020 presidential electoral process, its non-compliance with basic international standards of fairness and transparency and its falsification of election results.

    The CEC and its college have, in particular, organised the dismissal of certain opposition candidates on spurious grounds and placed disproportionate restrictions on observers in polling stations. The CEC has also ensured that the election commissions under its supervision are composed in a biased manner.

    2.10.2020

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    43.

    Aleh Leanidavich SLIZHEUSKI

    Oleg Leonidovich SLIZHEVSKI

    Алег Леанідавіч СЛIЖЭЎСКІ

    Олег Леонидович СЛИЖЕВСКИЙ

    Position(s): Member of the Central Electoral Commission (CEC)

    DOB: 16.8.1972

    POB: Grodno/Hrodna, former USSR (now Belarus)

    Gender: male

    As a member of the CEC college, he is responsible for the misconduct of the 2020 presidential electoral process, its non-compliance with basic international standards of fairness and transparency and its falsification of election results.

    The CEC and its college have, in particular, organised the dismissal of certain opposition candidates on spurious grounds and placed disproportionate restrictions on observers in polling stations. The CEC has also ensured that the election commissions under its supervision are composed in a biased manner.

    2.10.2020

    44.

    Irina Aliaksandrauna TSELIKAVETS

    Irina Alexandrovna TSELIKOVEC

    Ірына Аляксандраўна ЦЭЛІКАВЕЦ

    Ирина Александровна ЦЕЛИКОВЕЦ

    Position(s): Member of the Central Electoral Commission (CEC)

    DOB: 2.11.1976

    POB: Zhlobin, former USSR (now Belarus)

    Gender: female

    As a member of the CEC college, she is responsible for the misconduct of the 2020 presidential electoral process, its non-compliance with basic international standards of fairness and transparency and its falsification of election results.

    The CEC and its college have, in particular, organised the dismissal of certain opposition candidates on spurious grounds and placed disproportionate restrictions on observers in polling stations. The CEC has also ensured that the election commissions under its supervision are composed in a biased manner.

    2.10.2020

    45.

    Aliaksandr Ryhoravich LUKASHENKA

    Alexander (Alexandr) Grigorievich LUKASHENKO

    Аляксандр Рыгоравіч ЛУКАШЭНКА

    Александр Григорьевич ЛУКАШЕНКО

    Position(s): President of the Republic of Belarus

    DOB: 30.8.1954

    POB: Kopys settlement, Vitebsk/Viciebsk Region/Oblast, former USSR (now Belarus)

    Gender: male

    As President of Belarus with authority over State bodies, he is responsible for the violent repression by the State apparatus carried out before and after the 2020 presidential election, in particular the dismissal of key opposition candidates, arbitrary arrests and ill-treatment of peaceful demonstrators as well as intimidation and violence against journalists.

    6.11.2020

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    46.

    Viktar Aliaksandravich LUKASHENKA

    Viktor Aleksandrovich LUKASHENKO

    Вiктар Аляксандравiч ЛУКАШЭНКА

    Виктор Александрович ЛУКАШЕНКО

    Position(s): Former National Security Advisor to the President, Member of the Security Council

    President of the National Olympic Committee of Belarus

    DOB: 28.11.1975

    POB: Mahiliou/Mogilev, former USSR (now Belarus)

    Gender: male

    Personal ID: 3281175A014PB8

    In his former position as National Security Advisor to the President and a Member of the Security Council, as well as his informal supervisory position over Belarus security forces, he has been responsible for the repression and intimidation campaign led by the State apparatus in the wake of the 2020 presidential election, in particular arbitrary arrests and ill-treatment, including torture, of peaceful demonstrators as well as intimidation and violence against journalists.

    He remains active in the Lukashenka regime as the President of the National Olympic Committee. In this position, to which he was appointed on 26 February 2021, he bears responsibility for the mistreatment by the NOC officials of athlete Krystsina Tsimanouskaya during the 2020 Summer Olympics in Tokyo.

    6.11.2020

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    47.

    Ihar Piatrovich SERGYAENKA

    Igor Petrovich SERGEENKO

    Ігар Пятровіч СЕРГЯЕНКА

    Игорь Петрович СЕРГЕЕНКО

    Position(s): Chief of Staff of the Presidential Administration

    DOB: 14.1.1963

    POB: Stolitsa village in Vitebsk/Viciebsk Region/Oblast, former USSR (now Belarus)

    Gender: male

    In his position as the Chief of Staff of the Presidential Administration, he is closely associated with the President and responsible for ensuring the implementation of presidential powers in the field of domestic and foreign policy. He is therefore supporting the Lukashenka regime, including in the repression and intimidation campaign led by the State apparatus in the wake of the 2020 presidential election.

    6.11.2020

    48.

    Ivan Stanislavavich TERTEL

    Ivan Stanislavovich TERTEL

    Іван Станіслававіч ТЭРТЭЛЬ

    Иван Станиславович ТЕРТЕЛЬ

    Position(s): Chairman of the State Security Committee (KGB), former Chairman of the State Control Committee

    DOB: 8.9.1966

    POB: village Privalka/Privalki in Grodno/Hrodna Region/Oblast, former USSR (now Belarus)

    Gender: male

    In his leadership position as the Chairman of the State Security Committee (KGB) and in his former position as the Chairman of the State Control Committee, he is responsible for the repression and intimidation campaign led by the State apparatus in the wake of the 2020 presidential election, in particular arbitrary arrests and ill-treatment, including torture, of peaceful demonstrators as well as intimidation and violence against journalists.

    6.11.2020

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    49.

    Raman Ivanavich MELNIK

    Roman Ivanovich MELNIK

    Раман Iванавiч МЕЛЬНIК

    Роман Иванович МЕЛЬНИК

    Position(s): Former Head of the Main Directorate of Law and Order Protection and Prevention at the Ministry of Internal Affairs

    Head of the Administration of the Leninsky District of Minsk

    DOB: 29.5.1964

    Gender: male

    In his former leadership position as the Head of the Main Directorate of Law and Order Protection and Prevention at the Ministry of Internal Affairs, he was responsible for the repression and intimidation campaign led by the State apparatus in the wake of the 2020 presidential election, in particular arbitrary arrests and ill-treatment, including torture, of peaceful demonstrators as well as intimidation and violence against journalists.

    He remains active in the Lukashenka regime as Head of the Administration of the Leninsky District of Minsk.

    6.11.2020

    50.

    Ivan Danilavich NASKEVICH

    Ivan Danilovich NOSKEVICH

    Iван Данiлавiч НАСКЕВIЧ

    Иван Данилович НОСКЕВИЧ

    Position(s): Former Chairman of the Investigative Committee

    Member of the reserve of the Investigative Committee

    DOB: 25.3.1970

    POB: village of Cierabličy in Brest Region/Oblast, former USSR (now Belarus)

    Gender: male

    In his former leadership position as the Chairman of the Investigative Committee, he was responsible for the repression and intimidation campaign led by that Committee in the wake of the 2020 presidential election, in particular investigations launched against the Coordination Council and peaceful demonstrators.

    He remains active in the Lukashenka regime as a member of the reserve of the Investigative Committee.

    6.11.2020

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    51.

    Aliaksey Aliaksandravich VOLKAU

    Alexei Alexandrovich VOLKOV

    Аляксей Аляксандравіч ВОЛКАЎ

    Алексей Александрович ВОЛКОВ

    Position(s): Former First Deputy Chairman of the Investigative Committee; currently Chairman of the State Committee for Forensic Expertise

    DOB: 7.9.1973

    POB: Minsk, former USSR (now Belarus)

    Gender: male

    In his former leadership position as the First Deputy Chairman of the Investigative Committee, he is responsible for the repression and intimidation campaign led by the Committee in the wake of the 2020 presidential election, in particular investigations launched against the Coordination Council and peaceful demonstrators.

    6.11.2020

    52.

    Siarhei Yakaulevich AZEMSHA

    Sergei Yakovlevich AZEMSHA

    Сяргей Якаўлевіч АЗЕМША

    Сергей Яковлевич АЗЕМША

    Position(s): Deputy Chairman of the Investigative Committee

    DOB: 17.7.1974

    POB: Rechitsa, Gomel/Homyel Region/Oblast, former USSR (now Belarus)

    Gender: male

    In his leadership position as the Deputy Chairman of the Investigative Committee, he is responsible for the repression and intimidation campaign led by the Committee in the wake of the 2020 presidential election, in particular investigations launched against the Coordination Council and peaceful demonstrators.

    6.11.2020

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    53.

    Andrei Fiodaravich SMAL

    Andrei Fyodorovich SMAL

    Андрэй Фёдаравiч СМАЛЬ

    Андрей Федорович СМАЛЬ

    Position(s): Former Deputy Chairman of the Investigative Committee

    DOB: 1.8.1973

    POB: Brest, former USSR (now Belarus)

    Gender: male

    In his former leadership position as the Deputy Chairman of the Investigative Committee, he was responsible for the repression and intimidation campaign led by the Committee in the wake of the 2020 presidential election, in particular investigations launched against the Coordination Council and peaceful demonstrators.

    6.11.2020

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    54.

    Andrei Yurevich PAULIUCHENKA

    Andrei Yurevich PAVLYUCHENKO

    Андрэй Юр’евіч ПАЎЛЮЧЕНКА

    Андрей Юрьевич ПАВЛЮЧЕНКО

    Position(s): Head of Operational-Analytical Center

    DOB: 1.8.1971

    Gender: male

    In his leadership position as the Head of Operational-Analytical Center, he is closely associated with the President and responsible for the repression of civil society, in particular interrupting connection to telecommunication networks as a tool of repression of civil society, peaceful demonstrators and journalists.

    6.11.2020

    55.

    Ihar Ivanavich BUZOUSKI

    Igor Ivanovich BUZOVSKI

    Ігар Іванавіч БУЗОЎСКІ

    Игорь Иванович БУЗОВСКИЙ

    Position(s): Deputy Minister of Information

    DOB: 10.7.1972

    POB: village of Koshelevo, Grodno/Hrodna Region/Oblast, former USSR (now Belarus)

    Gender: male

    In his leadership position as Deputy Minister of Information, he is responsible for the repression of civil society, in particular the Ministry of Information decision to cut off access to independent websites and limit internet access in Belarus in the wake of the 2020 presidential election, as a tool of repression of civil society, peaceful demonstrators and journalists.

    6.11.2020

    56.

    Natallia Mikalaeuna EISMANT

    Natalia Nikolayevna EISMONT

    Наталля Мікалаеўна ЭЙСМАНТ

    Наталья Николаевна ЭЙСМОНТ

    Position(s): Press Secretary of the President of Belarus

    DOB: 16.2.1984

    POB: Minsk, former USSR (now Belarus)

    Maiden name: Kirsanova (Russian spelling: Кирсанова) or Selyun (Russian spelling: Селюн)

    Gender: female

    In her position as Press Secretary of the President of Belarus, she is closely associated with the President and responsible for coordinating media activities of the President, including drafting statements and organising public appearances. She is therefores supporting the Lukashenka regime, including in the repression and intimidation campaign led by the State apparatus in the wake of the 2020 presidential election. In particular, with her public statements defending the President and criticising opposition activists as well as the peaceful protesters, made in the wake of the 2020 presidential election, she contributed to seriously undermining democracy and the rule of law in Belarus.

    6.11.2020

    57.

    Siarhei Yaugenavich ZUBKOU

    Sergei Yevgenevich ZUBKOV

    Сяргей Яўгенавіч ЗУБКОЎ

    Сергей Евгеньевич ЗУБКОВ

    Position(s): ALFA Unit Commander

    DOB: 21.8.1975

    Gender: male

    In his commanding position over ALFA Unit forces, he is responsible for the repression and intimidation campaign carried out by those forces in the wake of the 2020 presidential election, in particular arbitrary arrests and ill-treatment, including torture, of peaceful demonstrators as well as intimidation and violence against journalists.

    6.11.2020

    58.

    Andrei Aliakseevich RAUKOU

    Andrei Alexeyevich RAVKOV

    Андрэй Аляксеевіч РАЎКОЎ

    Андрей Алексеевич РАВКОВ

    Position(s): Former State Secretary of the Security Council

    Ambassador of the Republic of Belarus to Azerbaijan

    DOB: 25.6.1967

    POB: village of Revyaki, Vitebsk/Viciebsk Region/Oblast, former USSR (now Belarus)

    Gender: male

    In his former position as State Secretary of the Security Council, he has been closely associated with the President and responsible for the repression and intimidation campaign carried out by the State apparatus in the wake of the 2020 presidential election, in particular arbitrary arrests and ill-treatment, including torture, of peaceful demonstrators as well as intimidation and violence against journalists.

    He remains active in the Lukashenka regime as the ambassador of Belarus to Azerbaijan.

    6.11.2020

    59.

    Pyotr Piatrovich MIKLASHEVICH

    Petr Petrovich MIKLASHEVICH

    Пётр Пятровіч МІКЛАШЭВІЧ

    Петр Петрович МИКЛАШЕВИЧ

    Position(s): Chairman of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Belarus

    DOB: 18.10.1954

    POB: Minsk Region/Oblast, former USSR (now Belarus)

    Gender: male

    As the chairman of the Constitutional Court, he is responsible for the Constitutional Court’s decision adopted on 25 August 2020, by which the results of the fraudulent elections were legitimised. He has therefore supported and facilitated actions of repression and intimidation campaign by the State apparatus against peaceful protestors and journalists and is therefore responsible for seriously undermining democracy and the rule of law in Belarus.

    6.11.2020

    60.

    Anatol Aliaksandravich SIVAK

    Anatoli Alexandrovich SIVAK

    Анатоль Аляксандравіч СІВАК

    Анатолий Александрович СИВАК

    Position(s): Deputy Prime Minister; former Chairman of the Minsk City Executive Committee

    DOB: 19.7.1962

    POB: Zavoit, Narovlya District, Gomel/Homyel Region/Oblast, former USSR (now Belarus)

    Gender: male

    In his former leadership capacity as Chairman of the Minsk City Executive Committee, he was responsible for the repression and intimidation campaign run by the local apparatus in Minsk under his oversight in the wake of the 2020 presidential election, in particular arbitrary arrests and ill-treatment, including torture, of peaceful demonstrators as well as intimidation and violence against journalists. He made numerous public statements criticising peaceful protests taking place in Belarus.

    In his current leadership position as Deputy Prime Minister he continues to support the Lukashenka regime.

    17.12.2020

    61.

    Ivan Mikhailavich EISMANT

    Ivan Mikhailovich EISMONT

    Іван Міхайлавіч ЭЙСМАНТ

    Иван Михайлович ЭЙСМОНТ

    Position(s): Chairman of the Belarusian State Television and Radio Company, Head of Belteleradio Company

    DOB: 20.1.1977

    POB: Grodno/Hrodna, former USSR (now Belarus)

    Gender: male

    In his current position as Head of the Belarusian State Television and Radio Company, he is responsible for the dissemination of state propaganda in public media and continues to support the Lukashenka regime. This includes using media channels to support the President’s continuation of his term in office, despite the fraudulent presidential elections that took place on 9 August 2020, and the subsequent and repeated violent crackdown on peaceful and legitimate protests.

    Eismont made public statements criticising the peaceful protesters and refused to provide media coverage of the protests. He also fired striking employees of Belteleradio Company under his management, thereby making him responsible for human rights violations.

    17.12.2020

    62.

    Uladzimir Stsiapanavich KARANIK

    Vladimir Stepanovich KARANIK

    Уладзімір Сцяпанавіч КАРАНІК

    Владимир Степанович КАРАНИК

    Position(s): Governor of the Grodno/Hrodna Region/Oblast; former Minister of Healthcare

    DOB: 30.11.1973

    POB: Grodno/Hrodna, former USSR (now Belarus)

    Gender: male

    In his former leadership capacity as the Minister of Healthcare, he was responsible for the use of healthcare services to repress peaceful protesters, including using ambulances to transport protesters in need of medical assistance to isolation wards rather than to hospitals. He made numerous public statements criticising the peaceful protests taking place in Belarus, on one occasion accusing a protester of being intoxicated.

    In his current leadership position as the Governor of the Grodno/Hrodna Region/Oblast he continues to support the Lukashenka regime.

    17.12.2020

    63.

    Natallia Ivanauna KACHANAVA

    Natalia Ivanovna KOCHANOVA

    Наталля Іванаўна КАЧАНАВА

    Наталья Ивановна КОЧАНОВА

    Position(s): Chair of the Council of the Republic of the National Assembly of Belarus

    DOB: 25.9.1960

    POB: Polotsk, Vitebsk/Viciebsk Region/Oblast, former USSR (now Belarus)

    Gender: female

    In her current leadership position as Chair of the Council of the Republic of the National Assembly of Belarus, she is responsible for supporting the decisions of the President in the field of domestic policy. She is also responsible for organising the fraudulent elections that took place on 9 August 2020. She made public statements defending the brutal crackdown of the security apparatus on peaceful demonstrators.

    17.12.2020

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    64.

    Pavel Mikalaevich LIOHKI

    Pavel Nikolaevich LIOHKI

    Павел Мiкалаевiч ЛЁГКI

    Павел Николаевич ЛЁГКИЙ

    Position(s): minister counsellor at the Belarusian embassy in Moscow, Russia, Former First Deputy Minister of Information

    DOB: 30.5.1972

    POB: Baranavichy, former USSR (now Belarus)

    Gender: male

    In his former leadership position as First Deputy Minister of Information, he is responsible for the repression of civil society, and in particular the Ministry of Information decision to cut off access to independent websites and limit internet access in Belarus in the wake of the 2020 presidential election, as a tool of repression of civil society, peaceful demonstrators and journalists.

    He remains active in the Lukashenka regime as a minister counsellor at the Belarusian embassy in Moscow, Russia.

    17.12.2020

    65.

    Ihar Uladzimiravich LUTSKY

    Igor Vladimirovich LUTSKY

    Iгар Уладзiмiравiч ЛУЦКI

    Игорь Владимирович ЛУЦКИЙ

    Position(s): Deputy Head of the Presidential Administration, former Minister of Information

    DOB: 31.10.1972

    POB: Stolin, Brest Region/Oblast, former USSR (now Belarus)

    Gender: male

    In his former leadership position as Minister of Information, he was responsible for the repression of civil society, and in particular the Ministry of Information decision to cut off access to independent websites and limit internet access in Belarus in the wake of the 2020 presidential election, as a tool of repression of civil society, peaceful demonstrators and journalists.

    He remains active in the Lukashenka regime as Deputy Head of the Presidential Administration.

    17.12.2020

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    66.

    Andrei Ivanavich SHVED

    Andrei Ivanovich SHVED

    Андрэй Іванавіч ШВЕД

    Андрей Иванович ШВЕД

    Position(s): Prosecutor General of the Republic of Belarus

    DOB: 21.4.1973

    POB: Glushkovichi, Gomel/Homyel Region/Oblast, former USSR (now Belarus)

    Gender: male

    In his position as Prosecutor General, he is responsible for the ongoing repression of civil society and democratic opposition, and in particular the launching of numerous criminal proceedings against peaceful demonstrators, opposition leaders and journalists in the wake of the 2020 presidential elections. He also made public statements threatening participants in ‘unauthorised rallies’ with punishment.

    17.12.2020

    67.

    Genadz Andreevich BOGDAN

    Gennady Andreievich BOGDAN

    Генадзь Андрэевіч БОГДАН

    Геннадий Андреевич БОГДАН

    Position(s): Deputy Head of the Belarus President Property Management Directorate

    DOB: 8.1.1977

    Gender: male

    In his position of Deputy Head of the Belarus President Property Management Directorate, he oversees the functioning of numerous enterprises. The body under his leadership provides financial, material and technical, social, household and medical support to the State apparatus and republican authorities. He is closely associated with the President and continues to support the Lukashenka regime.

    17.12.2020

    68.

    Ihar Paulavich BURMISTRAU

    Igor Pavlovich BURMISTROV

    Ігар Паўлавіч БУРМІСТРАЎ

    Игорь Павлович БУРМИСТРОВ

    Position(s): Chief of Staff and First Deputy Commander of the Internal Troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs

    DOB: 30.9.1968

    Gender: male

    In his leadership position as First Deputy Commander of the Internal Troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, he is responsible for the repression and intimidation campaign led by the Internal Troops under his command in the wake of the 2020 presidential election, in particular arbitrary arrests and ill-treatment, including torture, of peaceful demonstrators as well as intimidation and violence against journalists.

    17.12.2020

    69.

    Arciom Kanstantinavich DUNKA

    Artem Konstantinovich DUNKO

    Арцём Канстанцінавіч ДУНЬКА

    Артем Константинович ДУНЬКО

    Position(s): Senior Inspector for Special Matters of the Department of Financial Investigations of the State Control Committee

    DOB: 8.6.1990

    Gender: male

    In his leadership position as Senior Inspector for Special Matters of the Department of Financial Investigations of the State Control Committee, he is responsible for the repression and intimidation campaign led by the State apparatus in the wake of the 2020 presidential election, in particular investigations launched into opposition leaders and activists.

    17.12.2020

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    70.

    Aleh Heorhievich KARAZIEI

    Oleg Georgievich KARAZEI

    Алег Георгiевiч КАРАЗЕЙ

    Олег Георгиевич КАРАЗЕЙ

    Position(s): Former Head of the Prevention Department of the Main Department of Law Enforcement and Prevention of the Public Security Police of the Ministry of Internal Affairs

    Associate professor at the Academy of the Ministry of Internal Affairs

    DOB: 1.1.1979

    POB: Minsk Region/Oblast, former USSR (now Belarus)

    Gender: male

    In his former leadership position as Head of the Prevention Department of the Main Department of Law Enforcement and Prevention of the Public Security Police of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, he was responsible for the repression and intimidation campaign led by the police forces in the wake of the 2020 presidential election, in particular arbitrary arrests and ill-treatment, including torture, of peaceful demonstrators as well as intimidation and violence against journalists.

    He remains active in the Lukashenka regime as associate professor at the Academy of the Ministry of Internal Affairs.

    17.12.2020

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    71.

    Dzmitry Aliaksandravich KURYAN

    Dmitry Alexandrovich KURYAN

    Дзмiтрый Аляксандравiч КУРЬЯН

    Дмитрий Александрович КУРЬЯН

    Position(s): Deputy Head of the public militia of the Academy of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, Police Colonel, former Deputy Head of the Main Department and Head of the Department of Law Enforcement in the Ministry of Internal Affairs

    DOB: 3.10.1974

    Gender: male

    In his former leadership position as Deputy Head of the Main Department and Head of the Department of Law Enforcement in the Ministry of Internal Affairs, he was responsible for the repression and intimidation campaign led by the police forces in the wake of the 2020 presidential election, in particular arbitrary arrests and ill-treatment, including torture, of peaceful demonstrators as well as intimidation and violence against journalists.

    He remains active in the Lukashenka regime as the Deputy Head of the public militia of the Academy of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and retains the rank of Police Colonel.

    17.12.2020

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    72.

    Aliaksandr Henrykavich TURCHIN

    Alexander (Alexandr) Henrihovich TURCHIN

    Аляксандр Генрыхавіч ТУРЧЫН

    Александр Генрихович ТУРЧИН

    Position(s): Chairman of Minsk Regional Executive Committee

    DOB: 2.7.1975

    POB: Novogrudok, Grodno/Hrodna Region/Oblast, former USSR (now Belarus)

    Gender: male

    In his position as the Chairman of Minsk Regional Executive Committee, he is responsible for overseeing local administration, including a number of committees. He is therefore supporting the Lukashenka regime.

    17.12.2020

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    73.

    Dzmitry Mikalaevich SHUMILIN

    Dmitry Nikolayevich SHUMILIN

    Дзмiтрый Мiкалаевiч ШУМIЛIН

    Дмитрий Николаевич ШУМИЛИН

    Position(s): Deputy Head of the Directorate for the Protection of Law and Order and Prevention, former Deputy Head of the department for mass events of the GUVD (Main Department of Internal Affairs) of the Minsk City Executive Committee

    DOB: 26.7.1977

    Gender: male

    In his former position as Deputy Head of the department for mass events of the GUVD of the Minsk City Executive Committee, he was responsible for the repression and intimidation campaign led by the local apparatus in the wake of the 2020 presidential election, in particular arbitrary arrests and ill-treatment, including torture, of peaceful demonstrators as well as intimidation and violence against journalists.

    He was documented as personally taking part in the unlawful detention of peaceful protesters.

    He remains active in the Lukashenka regime as Deputy Head of the Directorate for the Protection of Law and Order and Prevention of the GUVD (Main Department of Internal Affairs) of the Minsk City Executive Committee.

    17.12.2020

    ▼M35

    74.

    Vital Ivanavich STASIUKEVICH

    Vitalyi Ivanovich STASIUKEVICH

    Віталь Іванавіч СТАСЮКЕВІЧ

    Виталий Иванович СТАСЮКЕВИЧ

    Position(s): Deputy Chief of the Public Security Police in Grodno/Hrodna

    DOB: 5.3.1976

    POB: Grodno/Hrodna, former USSR (now Belarus)

    Gender: male

    In his position as Deputy Chief of the Public Security Police in Grodno/Hrodna, he is responsible for the repression and intimidation campaign led by the local police force under his command in the wake of the 2020 presidential election, in particular arbitrary arrests and ill-treatment, including torture, of peaceful demonstrators as well as intimidation and violence against journalists.

    According to witnesses, he personally supervised the unlawful detention of peaceful protesters.

    17.12.2020

    ▼M53

    75.

    Siarhei Leanidavich KALINNIK

    Sergei Leonidovich KALINNIK

    Сяргей Леанiдавiч КАЛИННИК

    Сергей Леонидович КАЛИННИК

    Position(s): Former Police Colonel, Chief of the Sovetsky District Police Department of Minsk

    DOB: 23.7.1979

    Gender: male

    In his former position as Chief of the Sovetsky District Police Department of Minsk, he was responsible for the repression and intimidation campaign led by the local police force under his command in the wake of the 2020 presidential election, in particular arbitrary arrests and ill-treatment, including torture, of peaceful demonstrators as well as intimidation and violence against journalists.

    According to witnesses, he personally supervised and took part in torturing unlawfully detained protesters.

    17.12.2020

    ▼M35

    76.

    Vadzim Siarhaevich PRYGARA

    Vadim Sergeyevich PRIGARA

    Вадзім Сяргеевіч ПРЫГАРА

    Вадим Сергеевич ПРИГАРА

    Position(s): Police Lieutenant Colonel, Head of the District Police Department in Molodechno

    DOB: 31.10.1980

    Gender: male

    In his position as Head of the District Police Department in Molodechno, he is responsible for the repression and intimidation campaign led by the local police force under his command in the wake of the 2020 presidential election, in particular arbitrary arrests and ill-treatment, including torture, of peaceful demonstrators as well as intimidation and violence against journalists.

    According to witnesses, he personally supervised beatings of unlawfully detained protesters. He also made numerous derogatory statements about the protesters to the media.

    17.12.2020

    ▼M45

    77.

    Viktar Ivanavich STANISLAUCHYK

    Viktor Ivanovich STANISLAVCHIK

    Вiктар Iванавiч СТАНIСЛАЎЧЫК

    Виктор Иванович СТАНИСЛАВЧИК

    Position(s): Former Deputy Head of the Police Department of the Sovetsky District of Minsk, Head of the Public Security Police

    First Deputy Head of the Centre of Advanced Studies and Specialists of the Ministry of Internal Affairs

    DOB: 27.1.1971

    Gender: male

    In his former position as Deputy Head of the Police Department of the Sovetsky District of Minsk and Head of the Public Security Police, he was responsible for the repression and intimidation campaign led by the local police force under his command in the wake of the 2020 presidential election, in particular arbitrary arrests and ill-treatment, including torture, of peaceful demonstrators as well as intimidation and violence against journalists.

    According to witnesses, he personally supervised the detention of peaceful protesters and beatings of those unlawfully detained.

    He remains active in the Lukashenka regime as the First Deputy Head of the Centre of Advanced Studies and Specialists of the Ministry of Internal Affairs.

    17.12.2020

    ▼M53

    78.

    Aliaksandr Aliaksandravich PIETRASH

    Alexander (Alexandr) Alexandrovich PETRASH

    Аляксандр Аляксандравiч ПЕТРАШ

    Александр Александрович ПЕТРАШ

    Position(s): Chairman of the Tsentralny District Court in Minsk, former Chairman of the Moskovski district court in Minsk

    DOB: 16.5.1988

    Gender: male

    In his former position as chairman of the Moskovski district court in Minsk, he was responsible for numerous politically motivated rulings against journalists, opposition leaders, activists and protesters. Violations of rights of defence and reliance on statements from false witnesses were reported during trials conducted under his supervision.

    He was instrumental in fining and detaining protesters, journalists and opposition leaders in the wake of the 2020 presidential election.

    He is therefore responsible for human rights violations and undermining the rule of law, as well as for contributing to the repression of civil society and democratic opposition.

    He remains active in the Lukashenka regime as chairman of the Tsentralny District Court in Minsk.

    17.12.2020

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    79.

    Andrei Aliaksandravich LAHUNOVICH

    Andrei Alexandrovich LAHUNOVICH

    Андрэй Аляксандравіч ЛАГУНОВІЧ

    Андрей Александрович ЛАГУНОВИЧ

    Position(s): Judge of the Sovetsky district court in Gomel/Homyel

    Gender: male

    In his position as judge of the Sovetsky district court in Gomel/Homyel, he is responsible for numerous politically motivated rulings against journalists, activists and protesters. Violations of rights of defence were reported during trials conducted under his supervision.

    He is therefore responsible for human rights violations and undermining the rule of law, as well as for contributing to the repression of civil society and democratic opposition.

    17.12.2020

    80.

    Alena Vasileuna LITVINA

    Elena Vasilevna LITVINA

    Алена Васільеўна ЛІТВІНА

    Елена Васильевна ЛИТВИНА

    Position(s): Judge of the Leninsky district court in Mogilev/Mahiliou

    Gender: female

    In her position as judge of the Leninsky district court in Mogilev/Mahiliou, she is responsible for numerous politically motivated rulings against journalists, opposition leaders, activists and protesters, in particular the sentencing of Siarhei Tsikhanousky – opposition activist and husband of presidential candidate Svetlana Tsikhanouskaya. Violations of rights of defence were reported during trials conducted under her supervision.

    She is therefore responsible for human rights violations and undermining the rule of law, as well as for contributing to the repression of civil society and democratic opposition.

    17.12.2020

    81.

    Victoria Valeryeuna SHABUNYA

    Victoria Valerevna SHABUNYA

    Вікторыя Валер’еўна ШАБУНЯ

    Виктория Валерьевна ШАБУНЯ

    Position(s): Judge of the Central district court in Minsk

    DOB: 27.2.1974

    Gender: female

    In her position as judge of the Central district court in Minsk, she is responsible for numerous politically motivated rulings against journalists, opposition leaders, activists and protesters, in particular the sentencing of Sergei Dylevsky – Coordination Council member and leader of a strike committee. Violations of rights of defence were reported during trials conducted under her supervision.

    She is therefore responsible for human rights violations and undermining the rule of law, as well as for contributing to the repression of civil society and democratic opposition.

    17.12.2020

    82.

    Alena Aliaksandravna ZHYVITSA

    Elena Alexandrovna ZHYVITSA

    Алена Аляксандравна ЖЫВІЦА

    Елена Александровна ЖИВИЦА

    Position(s): Judge of the Oktyabrsky district court in Minsk

    DOB: 9.4.1990

    Gender: female

    In her position as judge of the Oktyabrsky district court in Minsk, she is responsible for numerous politically motivated rulings against journalists, opposition leaders, activists and protesters. Violations of rights of defence were reported during trials conducted under her supervision.

    She is therefore responsible for human rights violations and undermining the rule of law, as well as for contributing to the repression of civil society and democratic opposition.

    17.12.2020

    83.

    Natallia Anatolievna DZIADKOVA

    Natalia Anatolievna DEDKOVA

    Наталля Анатольеўна ДЗЯДКОВА

    Наталья Анатольевна ДЕДКОВА

    Position(s): Judge of the Partizanski district court in Minsk

    DOB: 2.12.1979

    Gender: female

    In her position as judge of the Partizanski district court in Minsk, she is responsible for numerous politically motivated rulings against journalists, opposition leaders, activists and protesters, in particular the sentencing of Coordination Council leader Mariya Kalesnikava. Violations of rights of defence were reported during trials conducted under her supervision.

    She is therefore responsible for human rights violations and undermining the rule of law, as well as for contributing to the repression of civil society and democratic opposition.

    17.12.2020

    84.

    Maryna Arkadzeuna FIODARAVA

    Marina Arkadievna FEDOROVA

    Марына Аркадзьеўна ФЁДАРАВА

    Марина Аркадьевна ФЕДОРОВА

    Position(s): Judge of the Sovetsky district court in Minsk

    DOB: 11.9.1965

    Gender: female

    In her position as judge of the Sovetsky district court in Minsk, she is responsible for numerous politically motivated rulings against journalists, opposition leaders, activists and protesters. Violations of rights of defence were reported during trials conducted under her supervision.

    She is therefore responsible for human rights violations and undermining the rule of law, as well as for contributing to the repression of civil society and democratic opposition.

    17.12.2020

    ▼M53

    85.

    Yulia Chaslavauna HUSTYR

    Yulia Cheslavovna HUSTYR

    Юлiя Чаславаўна ГУСТЫР

    Юлия Чеславовна ГУСТЫР

    Position(s): lawyer at the legal aid office of the Kastrychnitski district in Minsk, former Judge of the Central district court in Minsk

    DOB: 14.1.1984

    Gender: female

    In her former position as judge of the Central district court in Minsk, she was responsible for numerous politically motivated rulings against journalists, opposition leaders, activists and protesters, in particular the sentencing of opposition presidential candidate Viktar Babarika. Violations of rights of defence were reported during trials conducted under her supervision.

    She is therefore responsible for human rights violations and undermining the rule of law, as well as for contributing to the repression of civil society and democratic opposition.

    She remains active in the Lukashenka regime as lawyer at the legal aid office of the Kastrychnitski district in Minsk.

    17.12.2020

    ▼M35

    86.

    Alena Tsimafeeuna NYAKRASAVA

    Elena Timofeyevna NEKRASOVA

    Алена Цімафееўна НЯКРАСАВА

    Елена Тимофеевна НЕКРАСОВА

    Position(s): Judge of the Zavodsky district court in Minsk

    DOB: 26.11.1974

    Gender: female

    In her position as judge of the Zavodsky district court in Minsk, she is responsible for numerous politically motivated rulings against journalists, opposition leaders, activists and protesters. Violations of rights of defence were reported during trials conducted under her supervision.

    She is therefore responsible for human rights violations and undermining the rule of law, as well as for contributing to the repression of civil society and democratic opposition.

    17.12.2020

    ▼M53

    87.

    Aliaksandr Vasilevich SHAKUTSIN

    Aleksandr Vasilevich SHAKUTIN

    Аляксандр Васiльевiч ШАКУЦIН

    Александр Васильевич ШАКУТИН

    Position(s): Businessman, chairman of the board of directors of Amkodor holding, shareholder of SV Maschinen GmbH, UAB EM System, Anulatrans SIA, Amkodor-Tsentr, OOO Iskamed, OOO PMI Inzhiniring,

    DOB: 12.1.1959

    POB: Bolshoe Babino, Orsha Rayon, Vitebsk/Viciebsk Region/Oblast, former USSR (now Belarus)

    Gender: male

    He is one of the leading businessmen operating in Belarus, with business interests in construction, machine building, agriculture and other sectors.

    He is reported to be one of the persons who benefitted most from the privatisation during Lukashenka’s tenure as President. He is also a former member of the presidium of the pro-Lukashenka public association ‘Belaya Rus’ and a former member of the Council for the Development of Entrepreneurship in the Republic of Belarus.

    In July 2020 he made public comments condemning the opposition protests in Belarus, thus supporting the Lukashenka regime’s policy of repression towards peaceful protesters, democratic opposition and civil society.

    He is therefore benefitting from and supporting the Lukashenka regime.

    He maintains business interests in Belarus.

    17.12.2020

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    88.

    Mikalai Mikalaevich VARABEI/VERABEI

    Nikolay Nikolaevich VOROBEY

    Мiкалай Мiкалаевiч ВАРАБЕЙ/ВЕРАБЕЙ

    Николай Николаевич ВОРОБЕЙ

    Position(s): Businessman, co-owner of Bremino Group

    DOB: 4.5.1963

    POB: Ukrainian SSR (now Ukraine)

    Gender: male

    He is one of the leading businessmen operating in Belarus, and has had business interests in petroleum, coal transit, banking and other sectors.

    He is the co-owner of Bremino Group – a company that has enjoyed tax breaks and other forms of support from the Belarusian administration. His company BelKazTrans was granted an exclusive right to transfer coal through Belarus. In December 2020 he transferred some of his assets to his close business associates. According to media reports he still controls companies Interservice and Oil Bitumen Plant. He maintains business activities and close relations with authorities in Belarus and gave two luxury cars to Lukashenka. He also has business interests in Ukraine and Russia.

    He is therefore benefitting from and supporting the Lukashenka regime.

    17.12.2020

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    89.

    Natallia Mikhailauna BUHUK

    Natalia Mikhailovna BUGUK

    Наталля Мiхайлаўна БУГУК

    Наталья Михайловна БУГУК

    Position: judge of the Minsk City Court, former judge at the Fruzensky district court in Minsk

    DOB: 19.12.1989

    POB: Minsk, former USSR (now Belarus)

    Gender: female

    Nationality: Belarusian

    In her former position as judge at the Fruzensky district court in Minsk, Natallia Buhuk was responsible for numerous politically motivated rulings against journalists and protesters, in particular the sentencing of Katsiaryna Bakhvalava (Andreyeva) and Darya Chultsova. Violations of rights of defence and of right to a fair trial were reported during trials conducted under her supervision.

    She is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations and for seriously undermining the rule of law, as well as for the repression of civil society and democratic opposition.

    She remains active in the Lukashenka regime as a judge of the Minsk City Court.

    21.6.2021

    90.

    Alina Siarhieeuna KASIANCHYK

    Alina Sergeevna KASYANCHYK

    Алiна Сяргееўна КАСЬЯНЧЫК

    Алина Сергеевна КАСЬЯНЧИК

    Position: prosecutor at the Minsk City Prosecutor’s Office, former Assistant Prosecutor at the Frunzensky District Court in Minsk

    DOB: 12.3.1998

    POB:

    Gender: female

    Nationality: Belarusian

    In her former position as assistant prosecutor at the Fruzensky District Court in Minsk, Alina Kasianchyk has represented the Lukashenka regime in politically motivated cases against journalists, activists and protesters. In particular, she has prosecuted journalists Katsiaryna Bakhvalava (Andreyeva) and Darya Chultsova for recording peaceful protests, based on the groundless charges of ‘conspiracy’ and ‘violating public order’. She has also prosecuted members of Belarusian civil society e.g. for taking part in peaceful protests, and paying tribute to murdered protester Aliaksandr Taraikousky. She has continuously asked the judge for long-term prison sentences.

    She is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations and for seriously undermining the rule of law, as well as for the repression of civil society and democratic opposition.

    She remains active in the Lukashenka regime as a prosecutor at the Minsk City Prosecutor’s Office.

    21.6.2021

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    91.

    Ihar Viktaravich KURYLOVICH

    Igor Viktorovich KURILOVICH

    Iгар Вiĸтаравiч КУРЫЛОВIЧ,

    Игорь Викторович КУРИЛОВИЧ

    Senior Investigator of the Frunzensky District Department of the Investigative Committee

    DOB: 26.09.1990

    POB:

    Gender: male

    Nationality: Belarusian

    In his position as Senior Investigator at the Fruzensky District Court in Minsk, Ihar Kurylovich was involved in preparing a politically motivated criminal case against journalists Katsiaryna Bakhvalava (Andreyeva) and Darya Chultsova. The journalists, who recorded peaceful protests, were accused of violations of public order and sentenced to two years of prison.

    He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations and for seriously undermining the rule of law, as well as for the repression of civil society and democratic opposition.

    21.6.2021

    92.

    Siarhei Viktaravich SHATSILA

    Sergei Viktorovich SHATILO

    Сяргей Віĸтаравіч ШАЦІЛА

    Сергей Виĸторович ШАТИЛО

    Judge at Sovetsky District Court in Minsk

    DOB: 13.08.1989

    POB: Minsk, former USSR (now Belarus)

    Gender: male

    Nationality: Belarusian

    In his position as judge of the Sovetsky District Court in Minsk, Siarhei Shatsila is responsible for numerous politically motivated rulings against protesters, in particular the sentencing of Natallia Hersche, Dzmitry Halko and Dzmitry Karatkevich, considered as political prisoners by Viasna, a Belarusian human rights organisation.

    He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations and for seriously undermining the rule of law, as well as for the repression of civil society and democratic opposition.

    21.6.2021

    93.

    Anastasia Vasileuna ACHALAVA

    Anastasia Vasilievna ACHALOVA

    Анастасія Васільеўна АЧАЛАВА

    Анастасия Васильевна АЧАЛОВА

    Judge at the Leninsky District Court in Minsk

    DOB: 15.10.1992

    POB: Minsk, Belarus

    Gender: female

    Nationality: Belarusian

    In her position as judge of the Leninsky District Court in Minsk, Anastasia Achalava is responsible for numerous politically motivated rulings against journalists, activists and protesters, in particular the sentencing of Coordination Council member Dzmitry Kruk, as well as against medical personnel and senior citizens. Reliance on statements of anonymous witnesses was reported during trials conducted under her supervision.

    21.6.2021

     

     

     

     

    She is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations and for seriously undermining the rule of law, as well as for the repression of civil society and democratic opposition.

     

    94.

    Mariya Viachaslavauna YAROKHINA

    Maria Viacheslavovna YEROKHINA

    Марыя Вячаславаўна ЯРОХІНА

    Мария Вячеславовна ЕРОХИНА

    Judge at the Frunzensky District Court in Minsk

    DOB: 04.07.1987

    POB: Minsk, former USSR (now Belarus)

    Gender: female

    Nationality: Belarusian

    In her position as judge of the Frunzensky District Court in Minsk, Mariya Yerokhina is responsible for numerous politically motivated rulings against journalists, opposition leaders, trade union activists, sportsmen and protesters, in particular the sentencing of journalist Uladzimir Hrydzin.

    She is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations and for seriously undermining the rule of law, as well as for the repression of civil society and democratic opposition.

    21.6.2021

    95.

    Yuliya Aliaksandrauna BLIZNIUK

    Yuliya Aleksandrovna BLIZNIUK

    Юлія Аляĸсандраўна БЛІЗНЮК

    Юлия Алеĸсандровна БЛИЗНЮК

    Deputy Chairwoman/judge at the Frunzensky District Court in Minsk

    DOB: 23.09.1971

    POB: Minsk, former USSR (now Belarus)

    Gender: female

    Nationality: Belarusian

    In her position as Deputy Chairwoman and judge at the Frunzensky District Court in Minsk, Yuliya Blizniuk is responsible for numerous politically motivated rulings against journalists, activists and protesters, in particular sentencing activists Artsiom Khvashcheuski, Artsiom Sauchuk, Maksim Pauliushchyk. These persons are considered as political prisoners by Viasna, a Belarusian human rights organization.

    She is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations and for seriously undermining the rule of law, as well as for the repression of civil society and democratic opposition.

    21.6.2021

    96.

    Anastasia Dzmitreuna KULIK

    Anastasia Dmitrievna KULIK

    Анастасія Дзмітрыеўна КУЛІК

    Анастасия Дмитриевна КУЛИК

    Judge of the Pervomaisky District Court of Minsk

    DOB: 28.07.1989

    POB: Minsk, former USSR (now Belarus)

    Gender: female

    Nationality: Belarusian

    In her position as judge of the Pervomaisky District Court of Minsk, Anastasia Kulik is responsible for numerous politically motivated rulings against peaceful protesters, in particular the sentencing of Aliaksandr Zakharevich, who is considered as a political prisoner by Viasna, a Belarusian human rights organization.

    She is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations and for seriously undermining the rule of law, as well as for the repression of civil society and democratic opposition.

    21.6.2021

    97.

    Maksim Leanidavich TRUSEVICH

    Maksim Leonidovich TRUSEVICH

    Маĸсім Леанідавіч ТРУСЕВІЧ

    Маĸсим Леонидович ТРУСЕВИЧ

    Judge of the Pervomaisky District Court of Minsk

    DOB: 12.08.1989

    POB:

    Gender: male

    Nationality: Belarusian

    In his position as judge at the Pervomaisky District Court in Minsk, Maksim Trusevich is responsible for numerous politically motivated rulings against journalists, opposition leaders, activists and protesters. Violations of rights of defence and right to a fair trial were reported during trials conducted under his supervision.

    He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations and for seriously undermining the rule of law, as well as for the repression of civil society and democratic opposition.

    21.6.2021

    98.

    Tatsiana Yaraslavauna MATYL

    Tatiana Yaroslavovna MOTYL

    Тацяна Яраславаўна МАТЫЛЬ

    Татьяна Ярославовна МОТЫЛЬ

    Judge of the Moskovsky District Court of Minsk

    DOB: 20.01.1968

    POB: Minsk, former USSR (now Belarus)

    Gender: female

    Nationality: Belarusian

    In her position as judge at the Moskovsky District Court in Minsk, Tatsiana Matyl is responsible for numerous politically motivated rulings against journalists, opposition leaders, activists and protesters, in particular the sentencing of opposition politician Mikalai Statkevich and journalist Alexander Borozenko. Violations of rights of defence and right to a fair trial were reported during trials conducted under her supervision.

    She is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations and for seriously undermining the rule of law, as well as for the repression of civil society and democratic opposition.

    21.6.2021

    99.

    Aliaksandr Anatolevich RUDZENKA

    Aleksandr Anatolevich RUDENKO

    Аляĸсандр Анатольевіч РУДЗЕНКА

    Алеĸсандр Анатольевич РУДЕНКО

    Deputy Chairman of the of the Oktyabrsky District Court of Minsk

    DOB: 01.12.1981

    POB:

    Gender: male

    Nationality: Belarusian

    In his position as Deputy Chairman and judge of the Oktyabrsky District Court in Minsk, Aliaksandr Rudzenka is responsible for numerous politically motivated rulings against journalists, activists and protesters, in particular fining an elderly and disabled protester, as well as the sentencing of Lyudmila Kazak – the lawyer of Mariya Kalesnikava, Belarussian opposition leader. Violations of rights of defence and right to a fair trial were reported during trials conducted under his supervision.

    21.6.2021

     

     

     

     

    He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations and for seriously undermining the rule of law, as well as for the repression of civil society and democratic opposition.

     

    100.

    Aliaksandr Aliaksandravich VOUK

    Aleksandr Aleksandrovich VOLK

    Аляĸсандр Аляĸсандравіч ВОЎК

    Алеĸсандр Алеĸсандрович ВОЛК

    Judge of the Sovetsky District Court of Minsk

    DOB: 01.08.1979

    POB:

    Gender: male

    Nationality: Belarusian

    In his position as judge of the Sovetsky District Court of Minsk, Aliaksandr Vouk is responsible for numerous politically motivated rulings against peaceful protesters, in particular the sentencing of sisters Anastasia and Victoria Mirontsev, considered as political prisoners by Viasna, a Belarussian human rights organisation. Violations of rights of defence and right to a fair trial were reported during trials conducted under his supervision.

    21.6.2021

     

     

     

     

    He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations and for seriously undermining the rule of law, as well as for the repression of civil society and democratic opposition.

     

    101.

    Volha Siarheeuna NIABORSKAIA

    Olga Sergeevna NEBORSKAIA

    Вольга Сяргееўна НЯБОРСКАЯ

    Ольга Сергеевна НЕБОРСКАЯ

    Judge of the Oktyabrsky District Court of Minsk

    DOB: 14.02.1991

    POB:

    Gender: female

    Nationality: Belarusian

    In her position as judge of the Oktyabrsky district court in Minsk, Volha Niaborskaya is responsible for numerous politically motivated rulings against peaceful protesters and journalists, in particular the sentencing of Sofia Malashevich and Tikhon Kliukach, considered as political prisoners by Viasna, a Belarussian human rights organisation. Violations of rights of defence were reported during trials conducted under her supervision.

    She is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations and seriously undermining the rule of law, as well as for the repression of civil society and democratic opposition.

    21.6.2021

    102.

    Marina Sviataslavauna ZAPASNIK

    Marina Sviatoslavovna ZAPASNIK

    Марына Святаславаўна ЗАПАСНІК

    Марина Святославовна ЗАПАСНИК

    Deputy Chairman of the Court of the Leninsky District of Minsk

    DOB: 28.03.1982

    POB: Minsk, former USSR (now Belarus)

    Gender: female

    Nationality: Belarusian

    In her position as Deputy Chairman and judge of the Court of the Leninsky District of Minsk, Marina Zapasnik is responsible for numerous politically motivated rulings against peaceful protesters, in particular the sentencing of activists Vladislav Zenevich, Olga Pavlova, Olga Klaskovskaya, Viktar Barushka, Sergey Ratkevich, Aleksey Charvinskiy, Andrey Khrenkov, student Viktor Aktistov, and minor Maksim Babich. All are recognized as political prisoners by Viasna, a Belarussian human rights organisation.

    21.6.2021

     

     

     

     

    She is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations and seriously undermining the rule of law, as well as for the repression of civil society and democratic opposition.

     

    103.

    Maksim Yurevich FILATAU

    Maksim Yurevich FILATOV

    Максім Юр'евіч Філатаў

    Максим Юрьевич ФИЛАТОВ

    Judge of the Lida City Court

    DOB:

    POB:

    Gender: male

    Nationality: Belarusian

    In his position as the judge of Lida City Court, Maksim Filatau is responsible for numerous politically motivated rulings against peaceful protesters, in particular the sentencing of activist Vitold Ashurok, who is recognized as political prisoner by Viasna, a Belarussian human rights organisation.

    He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations and seriously undermining the rule of law, as well as the repression of civil society and democratic opposition.

    21.6.2021

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    104.

    Andrei Vaclavavich HRUSHKO

    Andrei Vatslavovich GRUSHKO

    Андрэй Вацлававiч ГРУШКО

    Андрей Вацлавович ГРУШКО

    Position: Deputy Chairman of the Leninsky District Court of Brest, former Judge of the Leninsky District Court of Brest

    DOB: 24.1.1979

    POB:

    Gender: male

    Nationality: Belarusian

    In his position as judge of the Leninsky District Court of Brest, Andrei Hrushko is responsible for numerous politically motivated rulings against peaceful protesters, in particular by sentencing activists, recognized as political prisoners, and minors.

    He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations and seriously undermining the rule of law, as well as the repression of civil society and democratic opposition.

    He currently serves as the Deputy Chairman of the Leninsky District Court of Brest.

    21.6.2021

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    105.

    Dzmitry Iurevich HARA

    Dmitry Iurevich GORA

    Дзмітрый Юр'евіч ГАРА

    Дмитрий Юрьевич ГОРА

    Chairman of the Investigative Committee of Belarus (appointed on 11 March 2021)

    Former Deputy Prosecutor General of the Republic of Belarus (until 11 March 2021)

    DOB: 04.05.1970

    In his position of Deputy Prosecutor General until March 2021, Dzmitry Hara bears responsibility for politically motivated criminal cases against peaceful protestors, members of the opposition, journalists, civil society and regular citizens. Mr Hara was also involved in initiating of politically motivated criminal proceedings against Siarhei Tsikhanousky – opposition activist and husband of presidential candidate Svetlana Tsikhanouskaya.

    21.6.2021

     

     

     

    POB: Tbilisi, former Georgian SSR (now Georgia)

    Gender: male

    Nationality: Belarusian

    As the Head of the Intergovernmental Commission created by the Office of the General Prosecutor to investigate citizens' complaints about abuse of powers by law enforcement officers, Dzmitry Hara is responsible for inaction of this institution, since no case of such an investigation is known, despite applications for the initiation of criminal cases complaining about the use of violence, ill-treatment and torture.

    As of March 2021, he is the Chairman of the Investigative Committee of Belarus. In this position he is responsible for prosecuting human rights defenders and participants in peaceful protests.

     

     

     

     

     

    He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations and for seriously undermining the rule of law, as well as for the repression of civil society and democratic opposition

     

    106.

    Aliaksei Kanstantsinavich STUK

    Alexey Konstantinovich STUK

    Аляĸсей Канстанцінавіч СТУК

    Алеĸсей Константинович СТУК

    Deputy Prosecutor General of the Republic of Belarus

    DOB: 1959

    POB: Minsk, former USSR (now Belarus)

    Gender: male

    Nationality: Belarusian

    In his position of Deputy Prosecutor General, Aliaksei Stuk bears responsibility for politically motivated criminal cases against opposition, journalists, civil society and regular citizens. He is responsible for tightening the Prosecutor's Office's control of citizens' activities in localities and work places and is responsible for applying excessive legal responsibilities on participants in peaceful protests. He publicly stated that the Office of Prosecutor General would work to identify "illegal" citizen associations and suppress their activities.

    21.6.2021

     

     

     

     

    He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations and seriously undermining the rule of law, as well as for the repression of civil society and democratic opposition.

     

    107.

    Genadz Iosifavich DYSKO

    Gennadi Iosifovich DYSKO

    Генадзь Іосіфавіч ДЫСКО

    Геннадий Иосифович ДЫСКО

    Deputy Prosecutor General of the Republic of Belarus, State Counselor of Justice of the 3rd class DOB: 22.03.1964

    POB: Oshmyany, Hrodna region, (former USSR) now Belarus

    Gender: male

    Nationality: Belarusian

    In his position of Deputy Prosecutor General, Genadz Dysko bears responsibility for politically motivated criminal cases against opposition, journalists, civil society and regular citizens. He was also involved in initiating of politically motivated criminal proceedings against Siarhei Tsikhanousky - opposition activist and husband of presidential candidate Svetlana Tsikhanouskaya.

    He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations and seriously undermining the rule of law, as well as the repression of civil society and democratic opposition.

    21.6.2021

    108.

    Sviatlana, Anatoleuna LYUBETSKAYA

    Svetlana Anatolevna LYUBETSKAYA

    Святлана Анатольеўна ЛЮБЕЦКАЯ

    Светлана Анатольевна ЛЮБЕЦКАЯ

    Member of the House of Representatives of the National Assembly of the Republic of Belarus, Chairperson of the Standing Commission on Law

    DOB: 03.06.1971

    POB: former USSR (now Ukraine)

    Gender: female

    Nationality: Belarusian

    In her position as Chairperson of the Parliamentary Commission on Law, Sviatlana Lyubetskaya is responsible for the adoption of the new Code of Administrative Infringements (entered into force on 1 March 2021) that authorises arbitrary arrests and imposed increased liability for participation in mass events, including for display of political symbols. Through these legislative activities, she is responsible for serious violations of human rights, including the right of peaceful assembly, and the repression of civil society and democratic opposition. These legislative activities also seriously undermine democracy and the rule of law in Belarus.

    21.6.2021

    109.

    Aliaksei Uladzimiravich IAHORAU

    Alexei Vladimirovich YEGOROV

    Аляксей Уладзіміравіч ЯГОРАЎ

    Алексей Владимирович ЕГОРОВ

    Member of the House of Representatives of the National Assembly of the Republic of Belarus, Deputy Chairperson of the Standing Commission on Law

    DOB: 16.12.1969

    In his position as Deputy Chairperson of the Parliamentary Commission on Law, Aliaksei Iahorau is responsible for the adoption of the new Code of Administrative Infringements (entered into force on 1 March 2021) that authorises arbitrary arrests and imposed increased liability for participation in mass events, including for display of political symbols. Through these legislative activities, he is responsible for serious violations of human rights, including the right of peaceful assembly, and the repression of civil society and democratic opposition. These legislative activities also seriously undermine democracy and the rule of law in Belarus.

    21.6.2021

     

     

     

    POB: Novosokolniki, Pskov region, former USSR (now Russian Federation)

    Gender: male

    Nationality: Belarusian

     

     

    110.

    Aliaksandr Paulavich AMELIANIUK

    Aleksandr Pavlovich OMELYANYUK

    Аляксандр Паўлавіч АМЕЛЬЯНЮК

    Александр Павлович ОМЕЛЬЯНЮК

    Member of the House of Representatives of the National Assembly of the Republic of Belarus, Deputy Chairperson of the Standing Commission on Law

    DOB: 06.03.1964

    In his position as Deputy Chairperson of the Parliamentary Commission on Law, Aliaksandr Amelianiuk is responsible for the adoption of the new Code of Administrative Infringements (entered into force on 1 March 2021) that authorises arbitrary arrests and imposed increased liability for participation in mass events, including display of political symbols. Through these legislative activities, he is responsible for serious violations of human rights, including the right to peaceful assembly, and the repression of civil society and democratic opposition. These legislative activities also seriously undermine democracy and the rule of law in Belarus.

    21.6.2021

     

     

     

    POB: Kobrin, Brest Region/ Oblast, former USSR (now Belarus)

    Gender: male

    Nationality: Belarusian

     

     

    111.

    Andrei Mikalaevich MUKAVOZCHYK

    Andrei Nikolaevich MUKOVOZCHYK

    Андрэй Міĸалаевіч МУКАВОЗЧЫК

    Андрей Ниĸолаевич МУКОВОЗЧИК

    Political observer of "Belarus Today" ("Sovietskaia Belarus - Belarus Segodnya")

    DOB: 13.06.1963

    POB: Novosibirsk, former USSR (now Russian Federation)

    Andrei Mukavozchyk is one of the main propagandists of the Lukashenka regime publishing in "Belarus Today", the official newspaper of the Presidential Administration. In his articles, democratic opposition and civil society are systematically highlighted in a negative and derogatory way, using falsified information. He is one of the main sources of state propaganda, which supports and justifies the repression of the democratic opposition and of civil society.

    21.6.2021

     

     

     

    Gender: male

    Nationality: Belarusian

    Passport number: MP 3413113 and MP 2387911

    In May 2020, Mukavozchyk became a recipient of the "Golden Pen" award from a pro-governmental organization Belarusian Union of Journalists. In December 2020, he received the prize "Golden Letter", handed over by representatives of the Belarussian Ministry of Information. In January 2021, Lukashenka signed a decree awarding Mukavozchyk a medal "For labour merits".

    He is therefore benefitting from and supporting the Lukashenka regime.

     

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    112.

    Siarhei Aliaksandravich GUSACHENKA

    Sergey Alexandrovich GUSACHENKO

    Сяргей Аляксандравiч ГУСАЧЭНКА

    Сергей Александрович ГУСАЧЕНКО

    Position(s): Deputy Chair of the National State Television and Radio Company (Belteleradio Company)

    DOB: 5.11.1983

    POB: Minsk, former USSR (now Belarus)

    Gender: male

    Nationality: Belarusian

    Tel. (office): +375 (17) 369-90-15

    In his position as the Deputy Chair of Belteleradio Company (the National State Television and Radio Company), author and host of weekly propaganda television show Glavnyy efir, Siarhei Gusachenka has been willingly providing the Belarusian public with false information about the outcome of elections, protests, repressions perpetrated by the state authorities and activities of the Lukashenka regime that facilitate illegal crossing of the external borders of the Union. He is directly responsible for the way in which the state television presents information about the situation in the country, thus lending support to the authorities including Lukashenka.

    He is therefore supporting the Lukashenka regime.

    21.6.2021

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    113.

    Genadz Branislavavich DAVYDZKA

    Gennadi Bronislavovich DAVYDKO

    Генадзь Браніслававіч ДАВЫДЗЬКА

    Геннадий Брониславович ДАВЫДЬКO

    Member of the Chamber of Representatives, Chair of the Committee on Human Rights and Media

    Chair of the Belarusian political organisation Belaya Rus

    DOB: 29.09.1955

    As the Chairman of Belaya Rus, a major pro-Lukashenka organization, Genadz Davydzka is one of the main propagandists of the regime. In his support for Lukashenka, he frequently used inflammatory language, and encouraged the violence of the state apparatus against peaceful protesters.

    He is therefore supporting the Lukashenka regime.

    21.6.2021

     

     

     

    POB: Popovka village, Senno/Sjanno, Vitebsk Region, former USSR (now Belarus)

    Gender: male

    Nationality: Belarusian

    Passport MP2156098

     

     

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    114.

    Volha Mikalaeuna CHAMADANAVA

    Olga Nikolaevna CHEMODANOVA

    Вольга Мiĸалаеўна ЧАМАДАНАВА

    Ольга Ниĸолаевна ЧЕМОДАНОВА

    Position(s): Former Press Secretary of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Belarus

    Head of the Main Directorate for Ideology and Youth of the Minsk City Executive Committee

    DOB: 13.10.1977

    POB: Minsk Region/Oblast, former USSR (now Belarus)

    Gender: female

    Nationality: Belarusian

    Rank: Colonel

    Passport: MC1405076

    In her former position as the main media person of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Belarus, Volha Chamadanava played a key role in distorting and deflecting the facts regarding violence against protesters, as well as in spreading false information about them. She threatened peaceful protesters and continuously justified violence against them.

    Since she has been a part of the security apparatus and has spoken on its behalf, she is therefore supporting the Lukashenka regime.

    She remains active in the Lukashenka regime as the Head of the Main Directorate for Ideology and Youth of the Minsk City Executive Committee.

    21.6.2021

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    115.

    Siarhei Ivanavich SKRYBA

    Sergei Ivanovich SKRIBA

    Сяргей Іванавіч СКРЫБА

    Сергей Иванович СКРИБА

    Vice Chancellor of the Belarusian State Economic University for Educational Work

    DOB: 21.11.1964 / 1965

    POB: Kletsk, Minsk Region, former USSR (now Belarus)

    Gender: male

    Nationality: Belarusian

    e-mail: skriba_s@bseu.by

    In his position as Vice Chancellor of the Belarusian State Economic University (BSEU) for educational work, Siarhei Skryba is responsible for sanctions taken against students for their participation in peaceful protests, including their expulsion from university.

    Some of these sanctions were taken following Lukashenka's call on 27 October 2020 for expelling from universities students taking part in protests and strikes.

    He is therefore responsible for the repression of civil society and is supporting the Lukashenka regime.

    21.6.2021

    116.

    Siarhei Piatrovich, RUBNIKOVICH

    Sergei Petrovich RUBNIKOVICH

    Сяргей Пятровіч РУБНІКОВІЧ Сергей Петрович РУБНИКОВИЧ

    Rector of the Belarusian State Medical University DOB: 1974

    POB: Sharkauschyna, Vitebsk/ Viciebsk Region/ Oblast, former USSR (now Belarus)

    Gender: male

    Nationality: Belarusian

    In his position as the Rector of the Belarusian State Medical University, whose appointment was approved by Alexander Lukashenka, Siarhei Rubnikovich is responsible for the decision of University administration to expel students for taking part in peaceful protests. The expulsion orders were taken following Lukashenka's call on 27 October 2020 for expelling from universities students taking part in protests and strikes.

    He is therefore responsible for the repression of civil society and is supporting the Lukashenka regime.

    21.6.2021

    117.

    Aliaksandr Henadzevich BAKHANOVICH

    Aleksandr Gennadevich BAKHANOVICH

    Аляĸсандр Генадзевіч БАХАНОВІЧ

    Алеĸсандр Геннадьевич БАХАНОВИЧ

    Rector of the Brest State Technical University

    DOB: 1972

    POB:

    Gender: male

    Nationality: Belarusian

    In his position as the Rector of the Brest State Technical University, whose appointment was approved by Alexander Lukashenka, Aliaksandr Bakhanovich is responsible for the decision of University administration to expel students for taking part in peaceful protests. The expulsion orders were taken following Lukashenka's call on 27 October 2020 for expelling from universities students taking part in protests and strikes.

    Bakhanovich is therefore responsible for the repression of civil society and is supporting the Lukashenka regime.

    21.6.2021

    118.

    Mikhail Ryhoravich BARAZNA

    Mikhail Grigorevich BOROZNA

    Міхаіл Рыгоравіч БАРАЗНА

    Михаил Григорьевич БОРОЗНА

    Rector of the Belarusian State Academy of Arts (BSAA)

    DOB: 20.11.1962

    POB: Rakusheva, Mahileu/ Mogiliev Region/ Oblast, former USSR (now Belarus)

    Gender: male

    Nationality: Belarusian

    In his position as the Rector of the Belarusian State Academy of Arts (BSAA), Mikhail Barazna is responsible for the decision of University administration to expel students for taking part in peaceful protests.

    The expulsion orders were taken following Lukashenka's call on 27 October 2020 for expelling from universities students taking part in protests and strikes.

    Mikhail Barazna is therefore responsible for the repression of civil society and is supporting the Lukashenka regime.

    21.6.2021

    119.

    Maksim Uladzimiravich RYZHANKOU

    Maksim Vladimirovich RYZHENKOV

    Максім Уладзіміравіч РЫЖАНКОЎ

    Максим Владимирович РЫЖЕНКОВ

    First Deputy Head of the Presidential Administration

    DOB: 19.06.1972

    POB: Minsk, former USSR (now Belarus)

    Gender: male

    Nationality: Belarusian

    In his position as the First Deputy Head of the Presidential Administration, Maksim Ryzhankou is closely associated with the President and responsible for ensuring the implementation of presidential powers in the field of domestic and foreign policy. For over 20 years of his career in the civil service of Belarus he has held a number of posts, including in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and various embassies. He is therefore supporting the Lukashenka regime.

    21.6.2021

    120.

    Dzmitry Aliaksandravich LUKASHENKA

    Dmitry Aleksandrovich LUKASHENKO

    Дзмітрый Аляксандравіч ЛУКАШЭНКА

    Дмитрий Александрович ЛУКАШЕНКО

    Businessman, chairman of President’s Sport Club

    DOB: 23.03.1980

    POB: Mogilev/ Mahiliou, former USSR (now Belarus)

    Gender: male

    Nationality: Belarusian

    Dzmitry Lukashenka is Aliaksandr Lukashenka’s son and a businessman. He has been the chairman of the State-Public Association ‘Presidential Sport’s Club’ since 2005 and in 2020 he has been re-elected to this post. Through this entity, he conducts business and controls a number of enterprises. He was present on Aliaksandr Lukashenka’s secret inauguration in September 2020. He is therefore benefiting from and supporting the Lukashenka regime.

    21.6.2021

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    121.

    Liliya Valereuna LUKASHENKA (SIAMASHKA)

    Liliya Valerevna LUKASHENKO (SEMASHKO)

    Лiлiя Валер'еўна ЛУКАШЭНКА (СЯМАШКА)

    Лилия Валерьевна ЛУКАШЕНКО (СЕМАШКО)

    Position(s): Businesswoman, director of an art gallery

    DOB: 29.10.1979

    Gender: female

    Nationality: Belarusian

    Personal ID: 4291079A047PB1

    Liliya Lukashenka is the wife of Viktar Lukashenka and daughter-in-law of Aliaksandr Lukashenka. She has been closely connected with a number of high-profile companies which have benefitted from the Lukashenka regime, including Dana Holdings / Dana Astra and Belkhudozhpromysly concern. She was present, alongside her husband Viktar Lukashenka, on Aliaksandr Lukashenka's secret inauguration in September 2020.

    She is currently the director of the art gallery Art Chaos. Her business activities are promoted by regime-affiliated media.

    She is therefore benefitting from and supporting the Lukashenka regime.

    21.6.2021

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    122.

    Valeri Valerevich IVANKOVICH

    Valery Valerevich IVANKOVICH

    Валерый Валер'евіч ІВАНКОВІЧ

    Валерий Валерьевич ИВАНКОВИЧ

    General Director of OJSC "MAZ".

    DOB: 1971

    POB: Novopolotsk, Belarusian SSR (Now Belarus)

    Gender: male

    Nationality: Belarusian

    In his position as the General Director of OJSC ‘MAZ’, Valeri Ivankavich bears responsibility for the detention of MAZ workers within MAZ premises by security forces, and for firing MAZ employees who were participating in peaceful protests against the regime. He is therefore responsible for the repression of civil society.

    He was appointed by Lukashenka as a member of the commission tasked to draft amendments to the Belarus constitution. He therefore supports the Lukashenka regime.

    21.6.2021

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    123.

    Aliaksandr Yauhenavich SHATROU

    Alexander (Alexandr) Evgenevich SHATROV

    Аляксандр Яўгенавiч ШАТРОЎ

    Александр Евгеньевич ШАТРОВ

    Position(s): Businessman, shareholder and former head of Synesis LLC

    DOB: 9.11.1978

    POB: former USSR (now Russian Federation)

    Gender: male

    Nationality: Russian, Belarusian

    Personal ID: 3091178A002VF5

    In his position as the former head and former majority shareholder of Synesis LLC, Alexander Shatrov was responsible for that company’s decision to provide Belarusian authorities with a surveillance platform, Kipod, which can search through and analyse video footage and employ facial recognition software. He is therefore contributing to the repression of civil society and democratic opposition by the state apparatus. Synesis claims to have stopped providing the Belarusian authorities with the Kipod platform, but according to ByPOL reports Kipod is still used by the state securities agencies.

    Synesis is one of the residents of the Hi-Tech Park, created by a decree of Aliaksandr Lukashenka, and as such enjoys numerous benefits, including exemptions from income tax, VAT, offshore duty, customs duties and others.

    Synesis LLC and its subsidiary Panoptes have benefitted from their participation in the Republican Safety Monitoring System. Other companies which have been owned or co-owned by Shatrov, such as BelBet and Synesis Sport, also benefit from government contracts.

    He made public statements in which he criticised those protesting against the Lukashenka regime and put into perspective the lack of democracy in Belarus. He therefore benefits from and supports the Lukashenka regime.

    He remains a shareholder of Synesis LLC.

    21.6.2021

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    124.

    Siarhei Siamionavich TSIATSERYN

    Sergei Semionovich TETERIN

    Сяргей Сямёнавiч ЦЯЦЕРЫН

    Сергей Семёнович ТЕТЕРИН

    Position(s): Businessman, owner of BelGlobalStart, co-owner of VIBEL, former Chairman of the Belarusian Tennis Federation

    DOB: 7.1.1961

    POB: Minsk, former USSR (now Belarus)

    Gender: male

    Nationality: Belarusian

    Siarhei Tsiatseryn is one of the leading businessmen operating in Belarus, with business interests in the distribution of alcohol drinks (through his company BelGlobalStart), food products and furniture. He belongs to Lukashenka's inner circle.

    In 2019, BelGlobalStart was granted an opportunity to start the construction of a multi-functional business centre in front of the presidential palace in Minsk. He co-owns the company VIBEL, which sells commercials on a number of Belarusian national TV channels. He was the chairman of the Belarusian Tennis Federation and Lukashenka's former aide for sports matters.

    21.6.2021

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    125.

    Mikhail Safarbekovich GUTSERIEV

    Микаил (Михаил) Сафарбекович ГУЦЕРИЕВ

    Position(s): Businessman, shareholder and chairman of the board of executives of Slavkali, chairman of the board of directors and shareholder of: JSC Mospromstroi, Industrial Financial Group Safmar JSC, LLC Proekt Grad.

    Member of the board of directors and shareholder of JSC NKNeftisa

    ►C11  DOB: 9.3.1958 ◄

    POB: Akmolinsk, former USSR (now Kazakhstan)

    Gender: male

    Nationality: Russian

    Mikhail Gutseriev is a prominent Russian businessman, with business interests in Belarus in the sectors of energy, potash, hospitality and others. He is a long-time acquaintance of Aliaksandr Lukashenka and thanks to that association has accumulated significant wealth and influence among the political elite in Belarus. Safmar, a company which has been controlled by Gutseriev, was the only Russian oil firm that carried on supplying oil to Belarusian refineries during the energy crisis between Belarus and Russia in early 2020.

    Gutseriev also supported Lukashenka in disputes with Russia over oil deliveries. Gutseriev has been the chairman of the board of directors of, and a shareholder in, the Slavkali company, which is building the Nezhinsky potassium chloride mining and processing plant based on the Starobinsky potash salt deposit near Lyuban. It is the largest investment in Belarus, worth USD 2 billion. Lukashenka promised to rename the town of Lyuban ‘Gutserievsk’ in his honour.

    His other businesses in Belarus have included fuelling stations and oil depots, a hotel, a business centre and an airport terminal in Minsk. Lukashenka came to Gutseriev’s defence after a criminal investigation was initiated against him in Russia. Lukashenka also thanked Gutseriev for his financial contributions to charity and investments worth billions of dollars in Belarus. Gutseriev is reported to have gifted Lukashenka luxurious presents.

    Gutseriev also declared himself to be the owner of a residency which de facto belongs to Lukashenka, thus covering him up when journalists started to investigate Lukashenka’s assets. Gutseriev attended Lukashenka’s secret inauguration on 23 September 2020. In October 2020 Lukashenka and Gutseriev both appeared at the opening of an orthodox church, which the latter sponsored.

    According to media reports, when the striking employees of Belarusian state-owned media were fired in August 2020, Russian media workers were flown to Belarus on board aircraft belonging to Gutseriev in order to replace the fired workers, and lodged in the Minsk Renaissance Hotel belonging to Gutseriev. Gutseriev assisted with the acquisition of CT scanners for Belarus during the COVID-19 crisis. Mikhail Gutseriev is therefore benefitting from and supporting the Lukashenka regime.

    21.6.2021

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    126.

    Aliaksey Ivanavich ALEKSIN

    Alexei Ivanovich OLEKSIN

    Аляксей Іванавіч АЛЕКСІН

    Алексей Иванович ОЛЕКСИН

    Businessman, Co-owner of Bremino Group,

    DOB:

    POB:

    Gender: male

    Nationality: Belarusian

    Aliaksei Aleksin is one of the leading businessmen in Belarus, with business interests in the sectors of oil and energy, real estate, development, logistics, tobacco, retail, finance and others. He enjoys a close relationship with Aliaksandr Lukashenka and his son and former National Security Advisor Viktar Lukashenka. He is active in the biker movement in Belarus, a hobby he shares with Viktar Lukashenka. His company owns property in ‘Alexandria 2’ (Mogilev region), commonly called ‘presidential residence’, where Aliaksandr Lukashenka is a frequent visitor.

    21.6.2021

     

     

     

     

    He is the co-owner of ‘Bremino Group’ – the initiator and co-administrator of the Bremino-Orsha special economic zone project, created by a presidential decree signed by Aliaksandr Lukashenka. The company has received state support for developing the Bremino-Orsha zone, as well as a number of financial and tax advantages and other benefits. Aleksin and other owners of Bremino Group received support from Viktar Lukashenka.

     

     

     

     

     

    Companies ‘Inter Tobacco’ and ‘Energo-Oil’, which belong to Aleksin and members of his close family, were given exclusive privileges to import tobacco products to Belarus, based on a decree signed by Aliaksandr Lukashenka, and received state support for the creation of Tabakierka kiosks. He was allegedly involved in the establishment of the first government-approved private military company in Belarus ‘GardServis’, with reported links to the Belarussian security apparatus. He is therefore benefitting from the Lukashenka regime.

     

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    127.

    Aliaksandr Mikalaevich ZAITSAU

    Alexander (Alexandr) Nikolaevich ZAITSEV

    Аляксандр Мiкалаевiч ЗАЙЦАЎ

    Александр Николаевич ЗАЙЦЕВ

    Position(s): Businessman, co-owner of Bremino Group and Sohra Group

    DOB: 22.11.1976

    POB: Ruzhany, Brest Region/Oblast, former USSR (now Belarus)

    Gender: male

    Nationality: Belarusian

    Aliaksandr Zaitsau is the former assistant of Viktar Lukashenka, son of and former Adviser on National Security to Aliaksandr Lukashenka. Through access to the Lukashenka family, Zaitsau obtains lucrative contracts for his businesses. He has had close ties with the Sohra Group that is granted the right to export state-owned enterprises' production (tractors and trucks) to the Gulf and African countries. He is also the co-owner and chairman of the Council of participants of Bremino Group. The company has received state support for developing the Bremino-Orsha zone, as well as a number of financial and tax advantages and other benefits. Zaitsau and other owners of Bremino Group received support from Viktar Lukashenka.

    He therefore benefits from and supports the Lukashenka regime.

    21.6.2021

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    128.

    Ivan Branislavavich MYSLITSKI

    Ivan Bronislavovich MYSLITSKIY

    Іван Браніслававіч МЫСЛІЦКІ

    Иван Брониславович МЫСЛИЦКИЙ

    First Deputy Head of the Penal Correction Department Of the Ministry of Internal Affairs

    DOB: 23.10.1976

    POB:

    Gender: male

    Nationality: Belarusian

    In his position as First Deputy Head of the Penal Correction Department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs that has authority over detention facilities, Ivan Myslitski is responsible for the inhumane and degrading treatment, including torture, inflicted on citizens who participated in peaceful protests and were detained in those detention facilities in the wake of the 2020 presidential election, in line with the address of Lukashenka to officers of the Interior Ministry.

    21.6.2021

     

     

     

     

    In his position, he bears responsibility for detention conditions in Belarusian prisons, including the categorisation of prisoners corresponding to different kinds of ill-treatment and torture the detainees are subject to, such as verbal abuse, punitive isolation, deprivation of calls and visits, mutilation, beatings and brutal torture.

    He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations and for the repression of civil society and democratic opposition.

     

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    129.

    Aleh Mikalaevich, BELIAKOU

    Oleg Nikolaevich BELIAKOV

    Алег Мiĸалаевiч БЕЛЯКОЎ

    Олег Ниĸолаевич БЕЛЯКОВ

    Position: Head of the Department of ideological work and personnel support at the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Belarus, former Deputy Head of the Penal Correction Department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs

    DOB:

    POB:

    Gender: male

    Nationality: Belarusian

    In his former position as Deputy Head of the Penal Correction Department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs that has authority over detention facilities, Aleh Beliakou was responsible for the inhumane and degrading treatment, including torture, inflicted on citizens who participated in peaceful protests and were detained in those detention facilities in the wake of the 2020 presidential election, in line with the address of Lukashenka to officers of the Interior Ministry.

    In his position, he bears responsibility for detention conditions in Belarusian prisons, including the categorisation of prisoners corresponding to different kinds of ill-treatment and torture the detainees are subject to, such as verbal abuse, punitive isolation, deprivation of calls and visits, mutilation, beatings and brutal torture.

    He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations and for the repression of civil society and democratic opposition.

    He remains active in the Lukashenka regime as Head of the Department of ideological work and personnel support at the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Belarus.

    21.6.2021

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    130.

    Uladzislau Aliakseevich MANDRYK

    Vladislav Alekseevich MANDRIK

    Уладзіслаў Аляксеевіч МАНДРЫК

    Владислав Алексеевич МАНДРИК

    Deputy Head of the Penal Correction Department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs

    DOB: 04.07.1971

    POB:

    National ID: 3040771A125PB2; Passport: MP3810311.

    Gender: male

    Nationality: Belarusian

    In his position as Deputy Head of the Penal Correction Department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs that has authority over detention facilities, Uladzislau Mandryk is responsible for the inhumane and degrading treatment, including torture, inflicted on citizens who participated in peaceful protests and were detained in those detention facilities in the wake of the 2020 presidential election, in line with the address of Lukashenka to officers of the Interior Ministry.

    21.6.2021

     

     

     

     

    In his position, he bears responsibility for detention conditions in Belarusian prisons, including the categorization of prisoners, corresponding to different kinds of ill-treatment and torture the detainees are subject to, such as verbal abuse, punitive isolation, deprivation of calls and visits, mutilation, beatings and brutal torture.

    He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations and for the repression of civil society and democratic opposition.

     

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    131.

    Andrei Mikalaevich DAILIDA

    Andrei Nikolaevich DAILIDA

    Андрэй Мiкалаевiч ДАЙЛIДА

    Андрей Ниĸолаевич ДАЙЛИДА

    Position: Head of the Rear Support Department at the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Belarus, former Deputy Head of the Penal Correction Department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs

    DOB: 1.7.1974

    POB:

    Passport: KH2133825

    Gender: male

    Nationality: Belarusian

    In his former position as Deputy Head of the Penal Correction Department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs that has authority over detention facilities, Andrei Dailida was responsible for the inhumane and degrading treatment, including torture, inflicted on citizens who participated in peaceful protests and were detained in those detention facilities in the wake of the 2020 presidential election, in line with the address of Lukashenka to officers of the Interior Ministry.

    In his position, he bears responsibility for detention conditions in Belarusian prisons, including the categorization of prisoners, corresponding to different kinds of ill-treatment and torture the detainees are subject to, such as verbal abuse, punitive isolation, deprivation of calls and visits, mutilation, beatings and brutal torture. For his work as Deputy head of the Penal Correction Department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, he received, in December 2020, the Presidential Order for service to the Motherland and has therefore benefitted from the Lukashenka regime.

    He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations and for the repression of civil society and democratic opposition.

    He remains active in the Lukashenka regime as Head of the Rear Support Department at the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Belarus.

    21.6.2021

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    132.

    Aleh Mikalaevich LASHCHYNOUSKI

    Oleg Nikolaevich LASHCHINOVSKII

    Алег Мікалаевіч ЛАШЧЫНОЎСКІ

    Олег Николаевич ЛАЩИНОВСКИЙ

    Former Deputy Head of the Penal Correction Department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs

    DOB: 12.05.1963

    POB:

    Gender: male

    Nationality: Belarusian

    In his former position as Deputy Head of the Penal Correction Department that has authority over detention facilities of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, Aleh Lashchynouski is responsible for the inhumane and degrading treatment, including torture, inflicted on citizens who participated in peaceful protests and were detained in those detention facilities in the wake of the 2020 presidential election, in line with the address of Lukashenka to officers of the Interior Ministry.

    21.6.2021

     

     

     

     

    In his former position, he bears responsibility for conditions in Belarusian prisons and the repressive measures taken there, including the categorisation of prisoners corresponding to different kinds of ill-treatment and torture the detainees are subject to, such as verbal abuse, punitive isolation, deprivation of calls and visits, mutilation, beatings and brutal torture.

    He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations and for the repression of civil society and democratic opposition.

     

    133.

    Zhana Uladzimirauna BATURYTSKAIA

    Zhanna Vladimirovna BATURITSKAYA

    Жана Уладзіміраўна БАТУРЫЦКАЯ

    Жанна Владимировна БАТУРИЦКАЯ

    Head of the Directorate of Sentence Enforcement of the Penal Correction Department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs

    DOB: 20.04.1972

    POB:

    Gender: female

    Nationality: Belarusian

    In her position as Head of the Directorate of Sentence Enforcement of the Penal Correction Department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs that has authority over detention facilities, Zhana Baturitskaia is responsible for the inhumane and degrading treatment, including torture, inflicted on citizens who participated in peaceful protests and were detained in those detention facilities in the wake of the 2020 presidential election, in line with the address of Lukashenka to officers of the Interior Ministry.

    21.6.2021

     

     

     

     

    In her position, she bears responsibility for detention conditions in Belarusian prisons, including the categorisation of prisoners corresponding to different kind of ill-treatment and torture the detainees are subject to, such as verbal abuse, punitive isolation, deprivation of calls and visits, mutilation, beatings, brutal torture.

    She is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations and for the repression of civil society and democratic opposition.

     

    134.

    Dzmitry Mikalaevich STREBKOU

    Dmitry Nikolaevich STREBKOV

    Дзмітрый Мікалаевіч СТРЭБКОЎ

    Дмитрий Николаевич СТРЕБКОВ

    Head of the Prison No. 8 in Zhodino

    DOB: 19.03.1977

    POB:

    Gender: male

    Nationality: Belarusian

    In his position as Head of the Prison No. 8 in Zhodino, Dzmitry Strebkou is responsible for the appalling conditions in the detention centre and for the inhumane and degrading treatment, including torture, inflicted on citizens who participated in peaceful protests and were detained in this detention facility, including in its temporary detention centre, in the wake of the 2020 presidential election.

    He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations and for the repression of civil society and democratic opposition.

    21.6.2021

    135.

    Yauhen Andreevich SHAPETSKA

    Evgeniy Andreevich SHAPETKO

    Яўген Андрэевіч ШАПЕЦЬКА

    Евгений Андреевич ШАПЕТЬКО

    Head of Akrestina isolation centre for offenders

    DOB: 30.03.1989

    POB: Minsk, former USSR (now Belarus)

    Gender: male

    Nationality: Belarusian

    In his position as the Head of the Akrestina Isolation Centre for Offenders, Yauhen Shapetska is responsible for appalling conditions in the isolation centre and for the inhumane and degrading treatment, including torture, inflicted on citizens who participated in peaceful protests and were detained in this detention facility in the wake of the 2020 presidential election.

    He is therefore responsible for serious violations of human rights and for the repression of civil society and democratic opposition.

    21.6.2021

    136.

    Ihar Ryhoravich KENIUKH

    Igor Grigorevich KENIUKH

    Ігар Рыгоравіч КЕНЮХ

    Игорь Григорьевич КЕНЮХ

    Head of Akrestina Temporary Detention Centre

    DOB: 21.01.1980

    POB: Gomel Region/ Oblast, former USSR (now Belarus)

    Gender: male

    Nationality: Belarusian

    In his position as the Head of the Akrestina Temporary Detention Centre, Ihar Keniukh is responsible for appalling conditions and for the inhumane and degrading treatment, including beatings and torture, inflicted on citizens detained in this detention facility in the wake of the 2020 presidential election.

    21.6.2021

     

     

     

     

    He exerted pressure on medical staff to remove doctors who sympathize with protesters. According to the testimony of multiple women included in the report of the Centre for Promotion of Women’s Rights, "Her Rights," the most inhumane treatment took place in the detention centre at Akrestina in Minsk, where the OMON policemen were especially cruel and used torture.

    He is therefore responsible for serious violations of human rights and for the repression of civil society and democratic opposition.

     

    137.

    Hleb Uladzimiravich DRYL

    Gleb Vladimirovich DRIL

    Глеб Уладзіміравіч ДРЫЛЬ

    Глеб Владимирович ДРИЛЬ

    Deputy Head of the Akrestina Temporary Detention Centre

    DOB: 12.05.1980

    POB:

    Gender: male

    Nationality: Belarusian

    In his position as Deputy Head of the Temporary Detention Centre, Hleb Dryl is responsible for the appalling conditions and for the inhumane and degrading treatment, including beatings and torture, inflicted on citizens detained in this detention facility in the wake of the 2020 presidential election.

    21.6.2021

     

     

     

     

    According to witness testimonies, some of the women detained on 9-12 August 2020 were heavily beaten in the detention centres. According to the testimony of multiple women, included in the report of the Centre for Promotion of Women’s Rights ‘Her Rights’, the most inhumane treatment took place in the detention centre at Akrestina in Minsk, where the OMON policemen were especially cruel and used torture.

    He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations and for the repression of civil society and democratic opposition.

     

    138.

    Uladzimir Iosifavich LAPYR

    Vladimir Yosifovich LAPYR

    Уладзімір Іосіфавіч ЛАПЫР

    Владимир Иосифович ЛАПЫРЬ

    Deputy Head of the Akrestina Temporary Detention Centre

    DOB: 21.08.1977

    POB:

    Gender: male

    Nationality: Belarusian

    In his position as Deputy Head of the Akrestina Temporary Detention Centre, Uladzimir Lapyr is responsible for appalling conditions and for the inhumane and degrading treatment, including beatings and torture, inflicted on citizens detained in this detention facility in the wake of the 2020 presidential election. According to the testimony of multiple women included in the report of the Centre for Promotion of Women’s Rights, "Her Rights," the most inhumane treatment took place in the detention centre at Akrestina in Minsk, where the OMON policemen were especially cruel and used torture.

    21.6.2021

     

     

     

     

    He is therefore responsible for serious violations of human rights and for the repression of civil society and democratic opposition.

     

    139.

    Aliaksandr Uladzimiravich VASILIUK

    Alexander (Alexandr) Vladimirovich VASILIUK

    Аляксандр Уладзіміравіч ВАСІЛЮК

    Александр Владимирович ВАСИЛЮК

    Head of the Investigation team of the Investigative Committee

    DOB: 08.05.1975

    POB:

    Gender: male

    Nationality: Belarusian

    In his position as Head of the Investigation team of the Investigative Committee of Belarus, Aliaksandr Vasiliuk is responsible for politically-motivated prosecutions and detention, in particular of the opposition Coordination Council members, including Belarusian opposition leader Mariya Kalesnikava who is considered a political prisoner by human rights organisations. He is also responsible for the detention of several opposition media representatives.

    He is therefore responsible for the repression of civil society and democratic opposition.

    21.6.2021

    140.

    Yauhen Anatolevich ARKHIREEU

    Evgeniy Anatolevich ARKHIREEV

    Яўген Анатольевіч АРХІРЭЕЎ

    Евгений Анатольевич АРХИРЕЕВ

    Head of the Main Investigation Department, Central Office of Investigative Committee

    DOB: 1.07.1977

    POB:

    Gender: male

    Nationality: Belarusian

    In his position as the Head of the Main Investigation Department of the Investigative Committee of Belarus, Yauhen Arkhireeu is responsible for initiating and investigating politically-motivated criminal proceedings, in particular of the opposition Coordination Council members and other protesters. Such investigations are aimed at intimidating protesters, as well as criminalizing the participation in peaceful protests.

    He is therefore responsible for the repression of civil society and democratic opposition.

    21.6.2021

    141.

    Aliaksei Iharavich KAURYZHKIN

    Alexey Igorovich KOVRYZHKIN

    Аляĸсей Ігаравіч КАЎРЫЖКІН

    Алеĸсей Игоревич КОВРИЖКИН

    Head of Investigation Team, Main Investigation Department, Investigative Committee

    DOB: 03.11.1981

    POB: Bobruisk, former USSR (now Belarus)

    Gender: male

    Nationality: Belarusian

    In his position as the Head of the Investigation Team of the Investigative Committee of Belarus, Aliaksei Kauryzhkin is responsible for politically motivated prosecutions and detention, in particular of members of Viktar Babarika's presidential campaign team and of Coordination Council members, including lawyer Maksim Znak who is considered a political prisoner by human rights organisations.

    He is therefore responsible for the repression of civil society and democratic opposition.

    21.6.2021

    142.

    Aliaksandr Dzmitryevich AHAFONAU

    Alexander (Alexandr) Dmitrievich AGAFONOV

    Аляксандр Дзмітрыевіч АГАФОНАЎ

    Александр Дмитриевич АГАФОНОВ

    First Deputy Head of the Main Investigation Department, Investigative Committee

    DOB: 13.03.1982

    POB:

    Gender: male

    Nationality: Belarusian

    In his position as the First Deputy Head of the Main Investigation Department of the Investigative Committee of Belarus, Aliaksandr Ahafonau is responsible for politically-motivated prosecutions and arrests of the presidential candidate Siarhei Tsikhanousky – opposition activist and husband of presidential candidate Svetlana Tsikhanouskaya. and other political activists, including Mikalai Statkevich and Dzmitry Kazlou. Siarhei Tsikhanousky, Dzmitry Kazlou, and Mikalai Statkevich are recognised as political prisoners by Viasna, a Belarussian human rights organisation.

    21.6.2021

     

     

     

     

    He is therefore responsible for the repression of civil society and democratic opposition.

     

    143.

    Kanstantsin Fiodaravich BYCHAK

    Konstantin Fedorovich BYCHEK

    Канстанцін Фёдаравіч БЫЧАК

    Константин Фёдорович БЫЧЕК

    Head of Division of the KGB Investigation Department

    DOB: 20.09.1985

    POB:

    Gender: male

    Nationality: Belarusian

    In his position as Head of Division of the KGB Investigation Department, Kanstantin Bychak has supervised politically motivated investigation of presidential candidate Viktar Babarika. Babarika’s candidacy was rejected by the Central Election Commission. This decision was based on a report from the KGB and official TV statements of Bychak declaring Babarika guilty of money laundering while investigations were still ongoing.

    21.6.2021

     

     

     

     

    On October 26, 2020, Bychak threatened peaceful protestors on the governmental TV by stating that their actions would be classified as acts of terrorism.

    He is therefore responsible for the repression of the democratic opposition and civil society.

     

    ▼M45

    144.

    Andrei Siarheevich BAKACH

    Andrei Sergeevich BAKACH

    Андрэй Сяргеевiч БАКАЧ

    Андрей Сергеевич БАКАЧ

    Position(s): Former Head of the Pervomaysky District Police Department of Minsk

    First Deputy Head of the Internal Affairs Directorate of the Grodno/Hrodna Regional Executive Committee

    DOB: 19.11.1983

    POB: Minsk, former USSR (now Belarus)

    Gender: male

    Nationality: Belarusian

    In his former position as Head of the Department of Internal Affairs of the Pervomaysky District Administration in Minsk, Andrei Bakach was responsible for the actions of police forces belonging to that police precinct and for the actions occurring in the police station. During his time as Head, peaceful protesters in Minsk were subjected to cruel, inhumane and degrading treatment inside the police station under his control.

    He is therefore responsible for serious violations of human rights and the repression of civil society and democratic opposition.

    He remains active in the Lukashenka regime as the First Deputy Head of the Internal Affairs Directorate of the Grodno/Hrodna Regional Executive Committee.

    21.6.2021

    ▼M38

    145.

    Aliaksandr Uladzimiravich, PALULEKH

    Aleksandr Vladimirovich POLULEKH

    Аляксандр Уладзіміравіч ПАЛУЛЕХ

    Александр Владимирович ПОЛУЛЕХ

    Head of the Frunzensky District Police Department of Minsk

    DOB: 25.06.1979

    POB: Minsk, former USSR (now Belarus)

    Gender: male

    Nationality: Belarusian

    In his position as the Head of the Internal Affairs Directorate of the Frunzensky District Administration of Minsk, Aliaksandr Palulekh is responsible for the repression led by the police forces in this district against peaceful protesters in the wake of the 2020 presidential elections, in particular with ill-treatment, including torture, of peaceful protesters who were detained inside the police station under his control.

    He is therefore responsible for serious violations of human rights and the repression of civil society and democratic opposition.

    21.6.2021

    146.

    Aliaksandr Aliaksandravich ZAKHVITSEVICH

    Aleksandr Aleksandrovich ZAKHVITSEVICH

    Аляксандр Аляксандравіч ЗАХВІЦЭВІЧ

    Александр Александрович ЗАХВИЦЕВИЧ

    Deputy Head of the Frunzensky District Police Department of Minsk

    DOB: 01.01.1977

    POB:

    Gender: male

    Nationality: Belarusian

    In his position as the Deputy Head of the Frunzensky District Police Department of Minsk Aliaksandr Zakhvitsevich supervises public security police and is responsible for the inhumane and degrading treatment, including torture, inflicted on citizens detained in the Frunzenskiy District in the wake of the 2020 presidential election and for the general brutal crackdown on peaceful protesters in this district. Officers under Zakhvitsevich's supervision used torture against detainees.

    He is therefore responsible for serious violations of human rights and the repression of civil society and democratic opposition.

    21.6.2021

    147.

    Siarhei Uladzimiravich USHAKOU

    Sergei Vladimirovich USHAKOV

    Сяргей Уладзіміравіч УШАКОЎ

    Сергей Владимирович УШАКОВ

    Deputy Head of the Frunzensky District Police Department of Minsk

    DOB: 22.08.1980

    POB: Minsk, former USSR (now Belarus)

    Gender: male

    Nationality: Belarusian

    In his position as the Deputy Head of the Frunzensky District Police Department of Minsk supervising criminal police, Siarhei Ushakou is responsible for actions of his subordinates, especially inhumane and degrading treatment, including torture, inflicted on citizens detained in the Frunzensky District in the wake of the 2020 presidential election and for the general brutal crackdown on peaceful protesters. Officers under Ushakou’s direct supervision used torture against detainees.

    He is therefore responsible for serious violations of human rights and the repression of civil society and democratic opposition.

    21.6.2021

    148.

    Siarhei Piatrovich ARTSIOMENKA

    Sergei Petrovich ARTEMENKO / ARTIOMENKO

    Сяргей Пятровіч АРЦЁМЕНКА

    Сергей Петрович АРТЁМЕНКО

    Deputy Head of the Pervomaisky Police District in Minsk

    DOB: 26.03.1973

    POB:

    Gender: male

    Nationality: Belarusian

    In his position as the Deputy Head of the Pervomaisky Police District in Minsk, supervising public security police, Siarhei Artemenko is responsible for the inhumane and degrading treatment, including torture, inflicted, by his subordinates on citizens detained at the Pervomaiskiy District Police Department of Minsk that occurred in the wake of the 2020 presidential election and for the general brutal crackdown on peaceful protesters. One example is the mistreatment of Maksim Haroshin, a floral shop owner, who was arrested after he gave flowers to the participants of the Women's March on 13 October 2020. Artemenko exerted pressure on citizens not to participate in peaceful demonstrations.

    21.6.2021

     

     

     

     

    He is therefore responsible for serious violations of human rights and the repression of civil society and democratic opposition.

     

    149.

    Aliaksandr Mikhailavich RYDZETSKI

    Aleksandr Mikhailovich RIDETSKIY

    Аляксандр Міхайлавіч РЫДЗЕЦКІ

    Александр Михайлович РИДЕЦКИЙ

    Former Head of the Oktyabrskiy District Police Department of Minsk, Head of the Directorate of internal security of the State Forensic Examination Committee

    DOB: 14.08.1978

    POB:

    Gender: male

    Nationality: Belarusian

    In his former position as the Head of the Oktyabrsky District Police Department of Minsk, Aliandsandr Rydzetski was responsible for the inhuman and degrading treatment, including torture, inflicted by his subordinates on citizens detained in that district in the wake of the 2020 presidential election.

    He is therefore responsible for serious violations of human rights and the repression of civil society and democratic opposition.

    21.6.2021

    150.

    Dzmitry Iauhenevich BURDZIUK

    Dmitry Evgenevich BURDIUK

    Дзмітрый Яўгеньевіч БУРДЗЮК

    Дмитрий

    Евгеньевич БУРДЮК

    Head of the Oktyabrsky District Police Department, Former Head of the Partizanski District Police Department of Minsk

    DOB: 31.01.1980

    POB: Brest region, former USSR (now Belarus)

    Gender: male

    In his former position as Head of the Partizanski District Police Department of Minsk, Dzmitry Burdziuk was responsible for overseeing the severe beatings and torture of peaceful protesters and bystanders in that district in the wake of the 2020 presidential election.

    In December 2020 he was appointed Head of the Oktyabrsky District Police Department.

    He is therefore responsible for serious violations of human rights and the repression of civil society and democratic opposition.

    21.6.2021

     

     

     

    Nationality: Belarusian

    Personal identification: 3310180C009PB7

    Passport number: MP3567896

     

     

    151.

    Vital Vitalevich KAPILEVICH

    Vitaliy Vitalevich KAPILEVICH

    Віталь Вітальевіч КАПІЛЕВІЧ

    Виталий Витальевич КАПИЛЕВИЧ

    Head of the Leninsky District Police Department of Minsk

    DOB: 26.11.1988

    POB:

    Gender: male

    Nationality: Belarusian

    In his position as the Head of the Leninsky District Police Department of Minsk, Vital Kapilevich is responsible for the inhumane and degrading treatment, including torture, inflicted on citizens detained at the Leninsky District Police Department. The detainees were denied medical help; paramedics who arrived at the Department were intimidated to prevent the provision of medical assistance to the detainees.

    He is therefore responsible for serious violations of human rights and the repression of civil society.

    21.6.2021

    152.

    Kiryl Stanislavavich KISLOU

    Kirill Stanislavovich KISLOV

    Кірыл Станіслававіч КІСЛОЎ

    Кирилл Станиславович КИСЛОВ

    Head of the Zavodsky District Police Department of Minsk

    DOB: 02.01.1979

    POB: Minsk, former USSR (now Belarus)

    Gender: male

    Nationality: Belarusian

    In his position as Head of the Zavodsky District Police Department of Minsk, Kiryl Kislou is responsible for inhumane and degrading treatment, including torture, inflicted on citizens detained at the premises of this police station. He is also responsible for mass repressions against peaceful protesters, journalists, human rights activists, workers, representatives of the academic community and bystanders, inflicted by his subordinates.

    He is therefore responsible for serious violations of human rights and the repression of civil society.

    21.6.2021

    153.

    Siarhei Aliaksandravich VAREIKA

    Sergey Aleksandrovich VAREIKO

    Сяргей Аляĸсандравіч ВАРЭЙКА

    Сергей Алеĸсандрович ВАРЕЙКО

    Head of Moskovski District Police Department of Minsk, former Deputy Head of the Zavodsky District Police Department of Minsk

    DOB: 01.02.1980

    POB:

    In his former position as Deputy Head of the Zavodsky District Police Siarhei Vareika is responsible for the inhumane and degrading treatment, including torture, inflicted on citizens detained on the premises of the Zavodsky District Police Department in the wake of the 2020 presidential election. He is also responsible for the actions of his subordinates, who took part in mass repressions against peaceful protesters, journalists, human rights activists, workers, representatives of the academic community and bystanders.

    21.6.2021

     

     

     

    Gender: male

    Nationality: Belarusian

    On 21 December 2020 he was appointed Head of Moskovsky District Police Department of Minsk.

    He is therefore responsible for serious violations of human rights and the repression of civil society.

     

    154.

    Siarhei Feliksavich DUBAVIK

    Sergey Feliksovich DUBOVIK

    Сяргей Феліĸсавіч ДУБАВІК

    Сергей Фелиĸсович ДУБОВИК

    Deputy Head of the Leninsky District Police Department

    DOB: 01.02.1974

    POB:

    Gender: male

    Nationality: Belarusian

    In his position as Deputy Head of the Leninsky District Police Department, Siarhei Dubavik is responsible for the inhumane and degrading treatment, including torture, inflicted on citizens detained on the premises of the Leninsky District Police Department in the wake of the 2020 presidential election. The detainees were denied medical help; paramedics who arrived at the Department were intimidated to prevent the provision of medical assistance to the detainees.

    21.6.2021

     

     

     

     

    He is also responsible for the actions of his subordinates, who took part in mass repressions against peaceful protesters, journalists, human rights activists, workers, representatives of the academic community and bystanders.

    He is therefore responsible for serious violations of human rights and the repression of civil society and democratic opposition.

     

    155.

    Aliaksandr Mechyslavavich ANDRYEUSKI

    Alexander (Alexandr) Mechislavovich ANDRIEVSKII

    Аляĸсандр Мечыслававіч АНДРЫЕЎСКІ

    Алеĸсандр Мечиславович АНДРИЕВСКИЙ

    Deputy Head of the Frunzensky District Police Department of Minsk

    DOB: 29.04.1982

    POB:

    Gender: male

    Nationality: Belarusian

    In his position as Deputy Head of the Frunzensky District Police Department in Minsk, Aliaksandr Andryeuski is responsible for inhumane and degrading treatment, including torture, inflicted on citizens detained on the premises of the Fruzensky District Police Department in the wake of the 2020 presidential election. Detaineees were standing on their knees with heads down for hours, violently beaten, hit with a taser.

    He is therefore responsible for serious violations of human rights and the repression of civil society and democratic opposition.

    21.6.2021

    156.

    Vital Mikhailavich MAKRYTSKI

    Vitalii Mikhailavich MAKRITSKII

    Віталь Міхайлавіч МАКРЫЦКІ

    Виталий

    Михайлович МАКРИЦКИЙ

    Deputy Head of the Oktyabrsky District Police Department of Minsk (Until December 17 2020). From December 17 2020 - the Head of the Partizanski District Police Department of Minsk

    DOB: 17.02.1975

    POB:

    Gender: male

    Nationality: Belarusian

    In his former position as Deputy Head of the Oktyabrsky District Police Department of Minsk, Vital Makrytski was responsible for overseeing the severe beatings and torture of peaceful protesters and bystanders detained on the premises of this police department, in the wake of the 2020 presidential election.

    In December 2020 he was promoted to the position of the Head of the Partizanski District Police Department of Minsk.

    He is therefore responsible for serious violations of human rights and the repression of civil society and democratic opposition.

    21.6.2021

    157.

    Yauhen Aliakseevich URUBLEUSKI

    Evgenii Alekseevich VRUBLEVSKII

    Яўген Аляĸсеевіч УРУБЛЕЎСКІ

    ЕвгенийАлеĸсеевич ВРУБЛЕВСКИЙ

    Senior Police Sergeant of the Akrestina Offenders' Isolation Centre

    DOB: 28.01 1966

    POB:

    Gender: male

    Nationality: Belarusian

    In his position as a senior police sergeant of the Akrestina Offenders Isolation Centre. Yauhen Urubleuski is responsible for the inhumane and degrading treatment, including torture, inflicted on citizens detained in the Offenders’ Detention Centre. According to witnesses and media reports, he personally took part in brutal beatings of civilians detained in August 2020.

    He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations.

    21.6.2021

    158.

    Mikalai Mikalaevich KARPIANKAU

    Nikolai Nikolaevich KARPENKOV

    Міĸалай Міĸалаевіч КАРПЯНКОЎ

    Ниĸолай Ниĸолаевич КАРПЕНКОВ

    Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs, Former Head of the Main Department for Combating Organized Crime and Corruption of the Ministry of Internal Affairs

    DOB: 06.09.1968

    POB: Minsk, former USSR (now Belarus)

    Gender: male

    Nationality: Belarusian

    In his position as the Head of the Main Department for Combating Organized Crime and Corruption of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, Mikalai Karpiankau is responsible for the inhumane and degrading treatment inflicted on citizens who participated in peaceful protests and for their arbitrary arrest and detention. Numerous testimonies, photo and video evidence indicate that the group under his command beat and arrested peaceful protestors, threatened them with firearms.

    21.6.2021

     

     

     

     

    On 6 September 2020, Karpiankou was filmed as he was smashing a glass door with a baton to the café where peaceful protestors were hiding and brutally detaining them. A recording has been published where he claimed his department would use firearms against the protestors.

    He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations and for repression of civil society and democratic opposition.

     

    159.

    Mikhail Viachaslavavich HRYB

    Mikhail Viacheslavovich GRIB

    Міхаіл Вячаслававіч ГРЫБ

    Михаил Вячеславович ГРИБ

    Head of the Main Department of Internal Affairs of the Minsk City Executive Committee

    DOB: 29.07.1980

    POB: Minsk, former USSR (now Belarus)

    Gender: male

    Nationality: Belarusian

    Mikhail Hryb was Head of the Department of Internal Affairs in the Vitebsk Regional Executive Committee from March 2019 to October 2020, afterwards being appointed Head of the Main Department of Internal Affairs of the Minsk city Executive Committee and assigned the title of major general of militia (police forces).

    21.6.2021

     

     

     

     

    In this capacity, he is responsible for the actions of police forces, respectively in the Vitebsk region until October 2020 and in Minsk since after October 2020, including violent repression of peaceful protesters and breaches of right to peaceful assembly and free speech, committed by police forces in Vitebsk and Minsk, in the aftermath of the 2020 Belarussian presidential elections.

    He is therefore responsible for serious violations of human rights and the repression of civil society and democratic opposition.

     

    160.

    Viktar Genadzevich KHRENIN

    Viktor Gennadievich KHRENIN

    Віктар Генадзевіч ХРЭНІН

    Виктор Геннадиевич ХРЕНИН

    Minister of Defense

    DOB: 01.08.1971

    POB: Navahrudak/ Novogrudek, former USSR (now Belarus)

    Gender: Male

    Nationality: Belarusian

    Rank: Lieutanant General

    BY passport number: KH2594621

    In his position as Minister of Defense of Belarus since 20 January 2020, Viktar Khrenin is responsible for the decision taken by the Command of the Air Forces and Air Defence Forces, on Lukashenka's instructions, to dispatch military aircraft to escort the forced landing of passenger flight FR4978 in Minsk airport without proper justification on 23 May 2021. This politically motivated decision was aimed at arresting and detaining opposition journalist Raman Pratasevich and Sofia Sapega and is a form of repression against civil society and democratic opposition in Belarus.

    21.6.2021

     

     

     

    Personal identification: 3010871K003PB1

    He has made several public statements, declaring readiness to use the army against peaceful protesters in August 2020 and likening protesters' use of the historical white-red-white flag to Nazi collaborators.

    He is therefore responsible for the repression of civil society and democratic opposition in Belarus, and is supporting the Lukashenka regime.

     

    161.

    Ihar Uladzimiravich HOLUB

    Igor Vladimirovich GOLUB

    Ігар Уладзіміравіч ГОЛУБ

    Игорь Владимирович ГОЛУБ

    Commander of the Air Force and Air Defence of the Armed Forces

    DOB: 19.11.1967

    POB: Chernigov, Chernigovskaya oblast, former USSR (now Ukraine)

    Gender: Male

    Nationality: Belarusian

    Rank: Major General

    In his position as Commander of the Air Force and Air Defence Forces of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Belarus, Ihar Holub is responsible for the decision taken by the Command of the Air Forces and Air Defence Forces, on Lukashenka's instructions to dispatch military aircraft to escort the forced landing of passenger flight FR4978 in Minsk airport without proper justification on 23 May 2021.

    This politically motivated decision was aimed at arresting and detaining opposition journalist Raman Pratasevich and Sofia Sapega and is a form of repression against civil society and democratic opposition in Belarus.

    21.6.2021

     

     

     

    BY passport number: KH2187962

    Personal identification: 3191167E003PB1

    Following the incident, Ihar Holub gave press statements together with Belarusian Ministry of Transport Aviation Department Director Artem Sikorsky justifying the actions of the Belarusian aviation authorities.

    He is therefore responsible for the repression of civil society and democratic opposition in Belarus, and is supporting the Lukashenka regime.

     

    162.

    Andrei Mikalaevich GURTSEVICH

    Andrei Nikolaevich GURTSEVICH

    Андрэй Мікалаевіч ГУРЦЕВИЧ

    Андрей Николаевич ГУРЦЕВИЧ

    Chief of the Main Staff, First Deputy Commander of the Air Force

    DOB: 27.07.1971

    POB: Baranovich, Brest Region/ Oblast, former USSR (now Belarus)

    Gender: Male

    Nationality: Belarusian

    Rank: Major General

    In his position as Chief of the Main Staff and First Deputy Commander of the Air Force and Air Defence Forces of the Armed Forces, Andrei Gurtsevich is responsible for the decision taken by the Command of the Air Forces and Air Defence Forces, on Lukashenka's instructions, to dispatch military aircraft to escort the forced landing of passenger flight FR4978 in Minsk airport without proper justification on 23 May 2021.

    21.6.2021

     

     

     

    BY passport number: MP3849920

    Personal identification: 3270771C016PB2

    This politically motivated decision was aimed at arresting and detaining opposition journalist Raman Pratasevich and Sofia Sapega and is a form of repression against civil society and democratic opposition in Belarus. Following the incident, he gave press statements justifying the actions of the Belarusian authorities.

    He is therefore responsible for the repression of civil society and democratic opposition in Belarus, and is supporting the Lukashenka regime.

     

    163.

    Leanid Mikalaevich CHURO

    Leonid Nikolaevich CHURO

    Леанід Мікалаевіч ЧУРО

    Леонид Николаевич ЧУРО

    Director General of BELAERONAVIGATSIA State-Owned Enterprise

    DOB: 08.07.1956

    POB:

    Gender: Male

    Nationality: Belarusian

    BY passport number: P4289481

    Personal identification: 3080756A068PB5

    In his position as Director General of the BELAERONAVIGATSIA State-Owned Enterprise, Leanid Churo is responsible for Belarusian air traffic control. He therefore bears responsibility for diverting passenger flight FR4978 to Minsk airport without proper justification on 23 May 2021. This politically motivated decision was aimed at arresting and detaining opposition journalist Raman Pratasevich and Sofia Sapega and is a form of repression against civil society and democratic opposition in Belarus.

    He is therefore responsible for the repression of civil society and democratic opposition.

    21.6.2021

    164.

    Aliaksei Mikalaevich AURAMENKA

    Alexey Nikolaevich AVRAMENKO

    Аляксей Мікалаевіч АЎРАМЕНКА

    Алексей Николаевич АВРАМЕНКО

    Minister of Transport and Communications

    DOB: 11.05.1977

    POB: Minsk, former USSR (now Belarus)

    Gender: Male

    Nationality: Belarusian

    BY passport number: MP3102183

    Personal identification: 3110577A020PB2

    In his position as Minister of Transport and Communications of Belarus, Aliaksei Auramenka is responsible for the state management in the sphere of civil aviation and supervision of air traffic control. He therefore bears responsibility for diverting passenger flight FR4978 to Minsk airport without proper justification on 23 May 2021. This politically motivated decision was aimed at arresting and detaining opposition journalist Raman Pratasevich and Sofia Sapega and is a form of repression against civil society and democratic opposition in Belarus. He is therefore responsible for repression of civil society and democratic opposition.

    21.6.2021

    165.

    Artsiom Igaravich SIKORSKI

    Artem Igorevich SIKORSKIY

    Арцём Ігаравіч СІКОРСКІ

    Артем Игоревич СИКОРСКИЙ

    Director of the Aviation Department of the Ministry of Transport and Communications

    DOB: 1983

    POB: Soligorsk, Minsk Region/ Oblast, former USSR (now Belarus)

    In his capacity as the Director of the Aviation Department of the Ministry of Transport and Communications of Belarus, Artsiom Sikorski is responsible for the state management in the sphere of civil aviation and supervision of air traffic control. He therefore bears responsibility for diverting passenger flight FR4978 to Minsk on 23 May 2021 without a proper justification. This politically motivated decision was aimed at arresting and detaining the opposition journalist Raman Pratasevich and Sofia Sapega and is a form of repression against civil society and democratic opposition of Belarus.

    21.6.2021

     

     

     

    Gender: Male

    Nationality: Belarusian

    BY passport number: MP3785448

    Personal identification: 3240483A023PB7

    Following the incident, he gave press statements together with Commander of the Air Force and Air Defence Forces of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Belarus, Ihar Holub, justifying the actions of the Belarusian aviation authorities.

    He is therefore responsible for repression of civil society and democratic opposition and is supporting the Lukashenka regime.

     

    166.

    Aleh Siarheevich HAIDUKEVICH

    Oleg Sergeevich GAIDUKEVICH

    Алег Сяргеевіч ГАЙДУКЕВІЧ

    Олег Сергеевич ГАЙДУКЕВИЧ

    Deputy Chairman of the Standing Committee on International Affairs in the House of Representatives of the National Assembly, member of the delegation of the National Assembly for contacts with the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe

    DOB: 26.03.1977

    POB: Minsk, former USSR (now Belarus)

    Aleh Haidukevich is the Deputy Chairman of the Standing Committee on International Affairs in the House of Representatives of the National Assembly, member of the delegation of the National Assembly for contacts with the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe. He made public statements, applauding diverting passenger flight FR4978 to Minsk on 23 May 2021. This politically motivated decision was done without proper justification and was aimed at arresting and detaining opposition journalist Raman Pratasevich and Sofia Sapega and is a form of repression against civil society and democratic opposition in Belarus.

    21.6.2021

     

     

     

    Gender: Male

    Nationality: Belarusian

    Personal identification: 3260377A081PB9

    Passport number: MP2663333

    Additionally, Aleh Haidukevich made public statements suggesting that Belarusian opposition leaders may be detained abroad and transported to Belarus ‘in a car trunk’, thus supporting the ongoing crackdown of security forces on Belarusian democratic opposition and journalists.

    He is therefore supporting the Lukashenka regime.

     

    ▼M43

    167.

    Ihar Anatolevich KRUCHKOU

    Igor Anatolevich KRIUCHKOV

    Ігар Анатольевіч КРУЧКОЎ

    Игорь Анатольевич КРЮЧКОВ

    Head of Separate Service for Active Measures (ASAM) of the Special Forces of the State Border Committee

    DOB: 13.4.1976

    Gender: male

    Nationality: Belarusian

    Personal ID: 3130476M077PB6

    In his position as Head of Separate Service for Active Measures (ASAM) of the Special Forces of the State Border Committee, Ihar Kruchkou is responsible for actions of forces under his command, who are involved in the physical transportation of migrants inside Belarus to the border between Belarus and Union Member States. ASAM charges the transported migrants for the border crossing. Those actions are implemented as part of operation ‘Gate’.

    He is therefore contributing to activities by the Lukashenka regime that facilitate the illegal crossing of the external borders of the Union.

    2.12.2021

    168.

    Anatol Piatrovich LAPO

    Anatoliy Petrovich LAPPO

    Анатоль Пятровіч ЛАПО/ ЛАППО

    Анатолии Петрович ЛАППО

    Lieutenant General, Chairman of the State Border Committee of the Republic of Belarus (appointed on 29 December 2016), Chief State Border Delegate

    DOB: 24.5.1963

    POB: Kulakovka, Mogilev Region/ Oblast, former USSR (now Belarus)

    Gender: male

    Nationality: Belarusian

    Passport number: MP4098888

    Personal ID: 3240563K033PB5

    In his position as Chairman of the State Border Committee, Anatol Lapo is responsible for actions of border control bodies under his command, whose border guards were documented as directing, guiding or forcing migrants to illegally cross the border between Belarus and Union Member States, and whose deliberate failure to carry out their duties properly facilitates attempts by migrants to cross that border.

    He is therefore responsible for organising activities by the Lukashenka regime that facilitate the illegal crossing of the external borders of the Union.

    2.12.2021

    169.

    Kanstantsin Henadzevich MOLASTAU

    Konstantin Gennadevich MOLOSTOV

    Канстанцін Генадзьевіч МОЛАСТАЎ

    Константин Геннадьевич МОЛОСТОВ

    Colonel, Head of the Grodno Border Group (appointed on 1 October 2014), Military Unit 2141, State Border Delegate

    DOB: 30.5.1970

    POB: Krasnoarmeysk, Saratov Region, Russian Federation

    Gender: male

    Nationality: Belarusian

    Passport number: KH2479999

    Personal ID: 3300570K025PB3

    In his position as Head of the Grodno Border Group, Kanstantsin Molastau is responsible for actions of border guards under his command. The deliberate failure of the Grodno Border Group to carry out its duties properly facilitates attempts by migrants to cross the border with Union Member States.

    He is therefore contributing to activities by the Lukashenka regime that facilitate the illegal crossing of the external borders of the Union.

    2.12.2021

    170.

    Pavel Mikalaevich KHARCHANKA

    Pavel Nikolaevich KHARCHENKO

    Павел Мікалаевіч ХАРЧАНКА

    Павел Николаевич ХАРЧЕНКО

    Head of the Polotsk Border Detachment

    DOB: 29.3.1981

    POB: Chita, former USSR (now Russian Federation)

    Gender: male

    Nationality: Belarusian

    In his position as Head of the Polotsk Border Detachment, Pavel Kharchanka is responsible for actions of border guards under his command. The deliberate failure of the Polotsk Border Detachment to carry out its duties properly facilitates attempts by migrants to cross the border with Union Member States.

    He is therefore contributing to activities by the Lukashenka regime that facilitate the illegal crossing of the external borders of the Union.

    2.12.2021

    171.

    Ihar Mikalaevich GUTNIK

    Igor Nikolaevich GUTNIK

    Ігар Мікалаевіч ГУТНІК

    Игорь Николаевич ГУТНИК

    Head of the Brest Border Group, colonel

    DOB: 17.12.1974

    POB: Village of Zabolotye, Smolevichi District, Minsk Region/ Oblast, former USSR (now Belarus)

    Address: 90 Heroes of Defense of the Brest Fortress St., 224018, Brest, Belarus

    Gender: male

    Nationality: Belarusian

    Passport number: BM1962867

    In his position as Head of the Brest Border Group, Ihar Gutnik, who in 2018 became a deputy of the Brest Regional Council as one of the candidates loyal to Lukashenka, is responsible for actions of border guards under his command. The deliberate failure of the Brest Border Group to carry out its duties properly facilitates attempts by migrants to cross the border with Union Member States.

    He is therefore contributing to activities by the Lukashenka regime that facilitate the illegal crossing of the external borders of the Union.

    2.12.2021

    172.

    Aliaksandr Barysavich DAVIDZIUK

    Aleksandr Borisovich DAVIDIUK

    Аляксандр Барысавіч ДАВІДЗЮК

    Александр Борисович ДАВИДЮК

    Colonel, Head of the Lida Border Detachment, Military Unit 1234 (appointed on 27 September 2016), State Border Delegate

    Member of Lida District Council of Deputies of the 28th convocation (took office on 2 February 2018)

    DOB: 4.5.1973

    POB: Novograd-Volynsky, Zhytomyr region, former USSR (now Ukraine)

    Gender: male

    Nationality: Belarusian

    Passport number: KH2613034

    Personal ID : 3040573E050PB7

    In his position as Head of the Lida Border Detachment, Aliaksandr Davidziuk is responsible for actions of border guards under his command. The deliberate failure of the Lida Border Detachment to carry out its duties properly facilitates attempts by migrants to cross the border with Union Member States. He is therefore contributing to activities by the Lukashenka regime that facilitate the illegal crossing of the external borders of the Union.

    2.12.2021

    173.

    Maksim Viktaravich BUTRANETS

    Maxim Viktorovich BUTRANETS

    Максім Віктаравіч БУТРАНЕЦ

    Максим Викторович БУТРАНЕЦ

    Head of the Smorgon Border Group, Military Unit 2044 (appointed in March 2018), State Border Delegate

    DOB: 12.12.1978

    POB: Sverdlovsk, former USSR (now Russian Federation)

    Gender: male

    Nationality: Belarusian

    In his position as Head of the Smorgon Border Group, Maksim Butranets is responsible for actions of border guards under his command. The deliberate failure of the Smorgon Border Group to carry out its duties properly facilitates attempts by migrants to cross the border with Union Member States. Maksim Butranets also stated that the number of migrants at the Belarusian-Lithuanian border remained at the usual level, despite the substantial increase observed on the Lithuanian side. He is therefore contributing to activities by the Lukashenka regime that facilitate the illegal crossing of the external borders of the Union.

    2.12.2021

    174.

    Anatol Anatolyevich GLAZ

    Anatoliy Anatolyevich GLAZ

    Анатоль Анатольевіч ГЛАЗ

    Анатолий Анатольевич ГЛАЗ

    Head of the Department of Information and Digital Diplomacy (spokesperson) of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Belarus

    DOB: 31.7.1982

    Gender: male

    Nationality: Belarusian

    Anatol Glaz has been Head of the Department of Information and Digital Diplomacy and Spokesperson of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Belarus since 11 June 2018. In this capacity, he made a number of public statements, supporting the policy of the Lukashenka regime in its latest attempts to facilitate the illegal crossings of the external borders of Union Member States. He also publicly defended the forced landing of passenger flight FR4978 in Minsk airport without proper justification on 23 May 2021. This politically motivated decision had the aim of the arrest and detention of opposition journalist Raman Pratasevich and Sofia Sapega and is a form of repression against civil society and democratic opposition in Belarus.

    He is therefore supporting the Lukashenka regime.

    2.12.2021

    175.

    Siarhei Aliaksandravich EPIKHAU

    Sergei Aleksandrovich EPIKHOV

    Сяргей Аляксандравіч ЕПІХАЎ

    Сергей Александрович ЕПИХОВ

    Judge at the Minsk Regional Court

    DOB: 16.5.1966

    Address: 38 Timoshenko St., apt. 198, Minsk, Belarus;

    59 L.Tolstoy St., apt. 80, Vileika, Belarus;

    14 Kedyshko St., apt. 11, Minsk, Belarus

    Gender: male

    Nationality: Belarusian

    Personal ID : 3160566B046PB4

    In his position as judge at the Minsk Regional Court, Siarhei Epikhau is responsible for politically motivated rulings against opposition leaders and activists, in particular the sentencing of Maria Kolesnikova and Maksim Znak, who are considered as political prisoners by human rights organisations. Violations of rights of defence and of the right to a fair trial were reported during trials conducted under his supervision.

    He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations and for seriously undermining the rule of law, as well as for the repression of civil society and democratic opposition.

    2.12.2021

    176.

    Ihar Viachaslavavich LIUBAVITSKI

    Igor Viacheslavovich LIUBOVITSKI

    Ігар Вячаслававіч ЛЮБАВІЦКІ

    Игорь Вячеславович ЛЮБОВИЦКИЙ

    Judge at the Supreme Court of the Republic of Belarus

    DOB: 21.7.1983

    Address: Vogel 1K St., apt. 17, Minsk, Belarus

    Gender: male

    Nationality: Belarusian

    Personal ID: 3210783C002PB2

    In his position as judge at the Supreme Court of the Republic of Belarus, Ihar Liubavitski is responsible for politically motivated rulings against opposition leaders, activists and journalists, in particular the sentencing of opposition presidential candidate Viktar Babarika, who is considered a political prisoner by human rights organisations.

    He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations and for seriously undermining the rule of law, as well as for the repression of civil society and democratic opposition.

    2.12.2021

    177.

    Siarhei Siarheevich GIRGEL

    Sergei Sergeevich GIRGEL

    Сяргей Сяргеевіч ГIРГЕЛЬ

    Сергей Сергеевич ГИРГЕЛЬ

    Senior Prosecutor of the Department of Public Prosecution of the General Prosecutor’s Office

    DOB: 16.6.1978

    Address: 16 Lidskaya St., apt. 165, Minsk, Belarus

    Gender: male

    Nationality: Belarusian

    Personal ID: 3160678H018PB5

    In his position as the Senior Prosecutor of the Department of Public Prosecution of the General Prosecutor’s Office, Siarhei Girgel has represented the Lukashenka regime in politically motivated cases against opposition leaders and civil society members. In particular he has prosecuted the opposition presidential candidate Viktar Babarika, who is recognised as a political prisoner by human rights organisations. Siarhei Girgel has continuously asked the judge for long-term prison sentences.

    He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations and for seriously undermining the rule of law, as well as for the repression of civil society and democratic opposition.

    2.12.2021

    178.

    Valiantsina Genadzeuna KULIK

    Valentina Gennadevna KULIK

    Валянціна Генадзьеўна КУЛІК

    Валентина Геннадьевна КУЛИК

    Judge at the Supreme Court of the Republic of Belarus

    DOB: 15.1.1960

    Address: 54 Angarskaya St., apt. 48, Minsk, Belarus

    ►C5  Gender: female ◄

    Nationality: Belarusian

    Personal ID: 4150160A119PB2

    In her position as judge at the Supreme Court of the Republic of Belarus, Valiantsina Kulik is responsible for politically motivated decisions against activists and opposition leaders. In particular she denied Viktar Babarika’s complaint to initiate a civil case based on his complaints against the Central Electoral Commission’s decision to refuse registration as a presidential candidate.

    She is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations and for seriously undermining the rule of law, as well as for the repression of civil society and democratic opposition.

    2.12.2021

    ▼M53

    179.

    Andrei Andreevich PRAKAPUK

    Andrey Andreevich PROKOPUK

    Андрэй Андрэевiч ПРАКАПУК

    Андрей Андреевич ПРОКОПУК

    Position: Director of the Republican Unitary Enterprise ‘Brest Center for Standardization, Metrology and Certification’, former Deputy Director of the Financial Investigations Department of the State Control Committee of the Republic of Belarus

    Colonel of the Financial Police

    DOB: 22.7.1973

    POB: Kobrin, Brest region, Belarus

    Address: 22 Mira St., apt. 88, Priluki, Minsk Region, Belarus

    Gender: male

    Nationality: Belarusian

    Personal ID: 3220773C061PB1

    In his former position as the Deputy Director of the Financial Investigations Department of the State Control Committee of the Republic of Belarus, Andrei Prakapuk was responsible for politically motivated campaigns of that department against journalists and independent Belarusian media outlets. He personally approved a decision to search the premises of independent media outlet TUT.by and initiated a court case into TUT.by and the journalists employed by TUT.by, as well as blocking access to the TUT.by website.

    He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations and the repression of civil society and democratic opposition as well as for seriously undermining the rule of law.

    He remains active in the Lukashenka regime as Director of the Republican Unitary Enterprise ‘Brest Center for Standardization, Metrology and Certification’.

    2.12.2021

    ▼M43

    180.

    Ihar Anatolevich MARSHALAU

    Igor Anatolevich MARSHALOV

    Ігар Анатольевіч МАРШАЛАЎ

    Игорь Анатольевич МАРШАЛОВ

    Deputy Chairman of the State Control Committee, Director of the Financial Investigations Department of the State Control Committee

    Major General of Financial Police

    DOB: 12.1.1972

    POB: Shkolv, Mogilev Region/ Oblast, former USSR (now Belarus)

    Address: 15 Shchukina St., Minsk, Belarus;

    43A Franciska St., apt. 41, Minsk, Belarus

    Gender: male

    Nationality: Belarusian

    Personal ID : 3120172H018PB4

    Ihar Marshalau is the Deputy Chairman of the State Control Committee of Belarus and Director of the Financial Investigations Department of the State Control Committee. In that position, he is responsible for initiating the politically motivated tax evasion case against the media outlet TUT.by, allegedly based on Article 243 of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Belarus, which threatens the freedom of media in Belarus. He is also responsible for the searches conducted in May 2021 at the office of TUT.by in Minsk, at regional offices and at the homes of several TUT.by staff.

    He is also responsible for the detention of members of the Belarus Press Club in December 2020, a search and confiscation of items at the office of Rights of People with Disabilities including the violent interrogation of Aleh Hrableuski and Syarhei Drazdouski in January 2021, the detention of and tax evasion charges on member of the Coordination Council Liliya Ulasava, as well as the searches and detentions affecting employees of PandaDoc software company, who was running the initiative ‘Protect Belarus’, in September 2021.

    He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations and the repression of civil society and democratic opposition as well as for seriously undermining the rule of law.

    2.12.2021

    181.

    Hanna Mikhailauna SAKALOUSKAYA

    Anna Mikhaylovna SOKOLOVSKAYA

    Ганна Міхайлаўна САКАЛОЎСКАЯ

    Анна Михайловна СОКОЛОВСКАЯ

    Judge of the Judicial Collegium for Civil Cases at the Supreme Court

    DOB: 18.9.1955

    Address: 22 Surhanava St., apt. 1, Minsk, Belarus

    ►C5  Gender: female ◄

    Nationality: Belarusian

    Personal ID: 4180955A015P80

    In her position as judge at the Supreme Court of the Republic of Belarus, Hanna Sakalouskaya is responsible for the politically motivated decision to liquidate the Belarus PEN Center – a Belarusian civil society organisation. She is also responsible for a politically motivated decision leading up to the liquidation of the Belarus Helsinki Committee (BHC), as on 2 September 2021 she dismissed the complaint from BHC concerning the warning directed towards BHC by the Belarusian Ministry of Justice.

    She is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations and for seriously undermining the rule of law, as well as for the repression of civil society and democratic opposition.

    2.12.2021

    182.

    Marat Siarheevich MARKAU

    Marat Sergeevich MARKOV

    Марат Сяргеевіч МАРКАЎ

    Марат Сергеевич МАРКОВ

    Chairman of the Management Board of State-controlled TV channel ONT, host of the ‘Markov: Nothing Personal’ programme

    DOB: 1.5.1969

    POB: Luninets, former USSR (now Belarus)

    Gender: male

    Nationality: Belarusian

    Marat Markau is the Chairman of the Management Board of State-controlled TV channel ONT and the host of the ‘Markov: Nothing Personal’ programme. In this position he has been willingly providing the Belarusian public with false information about the outcome of elections, protests and the repression perpetrated by the State authorities, and the circumstances of the forced landing of passenger flight FR4978 in Minsk airport without proper justification on 23 May 2021. He is directly responsible for the way in which the ONT channel presents information about the situation in the country, thus lending support to the authorities, including Lukashenka. He is therefore supporting the Lukashenka regime.

    Markov conducted the first forced interview with Raman Pratasevich, after Pratasevich was detained and according to numerous reports tortured by the Belarusian authorities. Markov also threatened and intimidated ONT workers who were striking in the wake of fraudulent 2020 presidential elections and authorities’ crackdown. He is therefore responsible for the repression of civil society and democratic opposition.

    2.12.2021

    183.

    Dzmitry Siarheevich KARSIUK

    Dmitriy Sergeevich KARSIUK

    Дзмітрый Сяргеевіч КАРСЮК

    Дмитрий Сергеевич КАРСЮК

    Judge at the Central District of the City of Minsk Court

    DOB: 7.7.1995

    Gender: male

    Nationality: Belarusian

    In his position as judge at the Central District of the City of Minsk Court, Dzmitriy Karsiuk is responsible for numerous politically motivated rulings against peaceful protesters, in particular the sentencing of Yahor Viarshynin, Pavel Lukoyanov, Artsiom Sakovich and Mikalai Shemetau, who are recognised as political prisoners by Belarusian Human rights organisation Viasna. He has sentenced people to penal colony, prison and house arrest for taking part in peaceful protests, posts on social media, use of the white-red-white flag of Belarus and other exercises of civil freedoms.

    He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations and for seriously undermining the rule of law, as well as for the repression of civil society and democratic opposition.

    2.12.2021

    ▼M50

    184.

    Ihar Vasilievich KARPENKA

    Igor Vasilievich KARPENKO

    Iгар Васiльевiч КАРПЕНКА

    Игорь Васильевич КАРПЕНКО

    Position(s): Chairperson of the Central Commission of the Republic of Belarus on Elections and Holding Republican Referenda

    DOB: 28.4.1964

    Gender: male

    Nationality: Belarusian

    In his position as Chairperson of the Central Commission of the Republic of Belarus on Elections and Holding Republican Referenda since 13 December 2021, Ihar Karpenka is responsible for the organisation and holding of the constitutional referendum of 27 February 2022, which does not meet the international standards of rule of law, democracy and human rights and does not meet the criteria set by the Venice Commission. In particular, the drafting process was not transparent and did not involve civil society or the democratic opposition in exile.

    He is therefore responsible for seriously undermining democracy and the rule of law in Belarus.

    3.6.2022

    185.

    Dzmitry Aliakseevich ALEKSIN

    Dmitry Alexeevich OLEKSIN

    Дзмiтрый Аляксеевiч АЛЕКСIН

    Дмитрий Алексеевич ОЛЕКСИН

    Position(s): Son of Aliaksei Aleksin, shareholder of Belneftgaz, Energo-Oil and Grantlo (formerly Energo-Oil-Invest)

    DOB: 25.4.1987

    Gender: male

    Nationality: Belarusian

    Dzmitry Aleksin is the son of Aliaksei Aleksin, a prominent Belarusian businessman. In 2021 he became the co-owner of companies owned by or associated with his father, including Energo-Oil, Belneftgaz and Grantlo (formerly Energo-Oil-Invest). Those companies were given preferential treatment based on presidential decrees signed by Aliaksandr Lukashenka: Inter Tobacco was given exclusive privileges to import tobacco products to Belarus, while Belneftgaz was appointed national transit monitoring operator.

    He is therefore benefitting from the Lukashenka regime.

    3.6.2022

    186.

    Vital Aliakseevich ALEKSIN

    Vitaliy Alexeevich OLEKSIN

    Вiталь Аляксеевiч АЛЯКСIН

    Виталий Алексеевич ОЛЕКСИН

    Position(s): Son of Aliaksei Aleksin, shareholder of Belneftgaz, Energo-Oil and Grantlo (formerly Energo-Oil-Invest)

    DOB: 29.8.1997

    Gender: male

    Nationality: Belarusian

    Vital Aleksin is the son of Aliaksei Aleksin, a prominent Belarusian businessman. In 2021 he became the co-owner of companies owned by or associated with his father, including Energo-Oil, Belneftgaz and Grantlo (formerly Energo-Oil-Invest). Those companies were given preferential treatment based on presidential decrees signed by Aliaksandr Lukashenka: Inter Tobacco was given exclusive privileges to import tobacco products to Belarus, while Belneftgaz was appointed national transit monitoring operator.

    He is therefore benefitting from the Lukashenka regime.

    3.6.2022

    187.

    Bogoljub KARIĆ

    Богољуб КАРИЋ

    Боголюб КАРИЧ

    Position(s): Serbian businessman and politician, associated with the company Dana Holdings

    DOB: 17.1.1954

    POB: Peja/Pec, Kosovo

    Gender: male

    Nationality: Serbian

    Passport number: 012830978 (valid until 27.12.2026)

    Bogoljub Karić is a Serbian businessman and politician. Together with his family members, he developed a network of real estate companies in Belarus and has cultivated a network of contacts with the family of Aliaksandr Lukashenka. In particular, he has been closely associated with Dana Holdings and its former subsidiary Dana Astra, and he reportedly represented those entities during meetings with Lukashenka. The Minsk World project, which was developed by a company associated with Karić, was described by Lukashenka as ‘an example of cooperation of the Slavonic world’. Thanks to those close relationships with Lukashenka and his entourage, companies associated with Karić received preferential treatment from the Lukashenka regime, including tax breaks and plots of land for real estate development.

    He is therefore benefitting from and supporting the Lukashenka regime.

    3.6.2022

    188.

    Andrii SICH

    Andrey SYCH

    Андрiй СИЧ

    Андрей СЫЧ

    Position(s): Co-host of programme ‘Platform’ on state-owned television channel ‘Belarus 1’

    Member of organisation ‘Rusj molodaja’

    DOB: 20.9.1990

    POB: Belarus

    Gender: male

    Nationality: Belarusian

    Andrii Sich is a co-host of the programme ‘Platform’ on state-owned television channel ‘Belarus 1’. In that position, he has supported regime narratives that aim to discredit independent media, undermine democracy and justify repression. He has supported the Lukashenka regime’s narrative about Western states’ intentions to organise a coup d’état in Belarus and called for harsh punishments for those allegedly involved, supported disinformation campaigns about mistreatment of migrants arriving in the Union from Belarus, and promoted the image of independent media as agents of foreign influence whose activity should be restricted.

    He is therefore supporting the Lukashenka regime.

    3.6.2022

    189.

    Dzianis Aliaksandravich MIKUSHEU

    Denis Alexandrovich MIKUSHEV

    Дзянiс Аляксандравiч МIКУШЭЎ

    Денис Александрович МИКУШЕВ

    Position(s): Head of the Department for Supervision of Compliance with the Law of Court Decisions in Criminal Cases of the Prosecutor’s Office of the Gomel Region/Oblast; senior legal adviser

    DOB: 21.3.1980

    Gender: male

    Nationality: Belarusian

    Dzianis Mikusheu is the Head of the Department for Supervision of Compliance with the Law of Court Decisions in Criminal Cases of the Prosecutor’s Office of the Gomel Region/Oblast and senior legal adviser. In that position, he is responsible for initiating the prosecutions of Siarhei Tsikhanouski, Artsiom Sakau, Dzmitry Papou, lhar Losik, Uladzimir Tsyhanovich and Mikalai Statkevich. He contributed to the arbitrary detention of Siarhei Tsikhanouski, as presented in the report by the Human Rights Council’s Working Group on Arbitrary Detention.

    He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations and for undermining the rule of law, as well as for the repression of civil society and democratic opposition.

    3.6.2022

    190.

    Mikalai Ivanavich DOLIA

    Nikolai Ivanovich DOLYA

    Мiĸалай Iванавiч ДОЛЯ

    Ниĸолай Иванович ДОЛЯ

    Position(s): Judge at the Gomel Regional Court

    DOB: 3.7.1979

    Gender: male

    Nationality: Belarusian

    Personal ID: 3070379H041PBI

    Mikalai Dolia is a judge at the Gomel Regional Court. ln that position, he is responsible for sentencing Siarhei Tsikhanouski, Artsiom Sakau, Dzmitry Papou, lhar Losik, Uladzimir Tsyhanovich and Mikalai Statkevich to disproportionally lengthy prison terms. He contributed to the arbitrary detention of Siarhei Tsikhanouski, as presented in the report by the Human Rights Council’s Working Group on Arbitrary Detention.

    He is therefore responsible for serious violations of human rights and for undermining the rule of law, as well as for the repression of civil society and democratic opposition.

    3.6.2022

    191.

    Andrei Yauhenavich PARSHYN

    Andrei Yevgenevich PARSHIN

    Андрэй Яўгенавiч ПАРШЫН

    Андрей Евгеньевич ПАРШИН

    Position(s): Head of the Main Department for Combating Organised Crime and Corruption in Belarus (GUBOPiK)

    DOB: 19.2.1974

    Address: 4A Skryganova St., Apt. 211, Minsk, Belarus

    Gender: male

    Nationality: Belarusian

    Andrei Parshyn is the Head of the Main Department for Combating Organised Crime and Corruption (GUBOPiK) in the Ministry of Internal Affairs since 2021. GUBOPiK is one of the main bodies responsible for political persecution in Belarus, including arbitrary and unlawful arrests and ill-treatment, including torture, of activists and members of civil society.

    GUBOPiK has published on its Telegram profile videos of forced confessions by Belarusian activists and ordinary citizens, exposing them to the Belarusian general public and using them as a tool for political pressure. GUBOPiK also detained Mark Bernstein, one of the top Russian-language Wikipedia editors, for publishing information on the Russian aggression against Ukraine, considered as anti-Russian ‘fake news’.

    Andrei Parshyn is therefore responsible for serious violations of human rights and for the repression of civil society in Belarus.

    3.6.2022

    192.

    Ihar Piatrovich TUR

    Igor Petrovich TUR

    Iгар Пятровiч ТУР

    Игорь Петрович ТУР

    Position(s): Employee of state-owned television channel ‘ONT’, author and anchor of several programmes (‘Propaganda’, ‘To be completed’)

    DOB: 26.3.1989

    POB: Grodno/Hrodna, Belarus

    Gender: male

    Nationality: Belarusian

    Ihar Tur is an employee of the state-owned television channel ‘ONT’ and one of the main propagandists of the Lukashenka regime. He is the host of the ‘Propaganda’ programme, in which he calls for violence, discredits opposition activists and promotes videos with forced confessions from political prisoners. He is the author of a number of false reports on protests by the Belarusian opposition, and of disinformation regarding events in the Union and regarding attacks on civil society. He is also responsible for spreading disinformation and violence-inciting messages online. He was awarded a medal by Aliaksandr Lukashenka for his work in the media.

    He is therefore benefitting from and supporting the Lukashenka regime.

    3.6.2022

    193.

    Lyudmila Leanidauna HLADKAYA

    Lyudmila Leonidovna GLADKAYA

    Людмiла Леанiдаўна ГЛАДКАЯ

    Людмила Леонидовна ГЛАДКАЯ

    Position(s): Special correspondent of ‘SB Belarus Segodnya’ newspaper, presenter on state-owned television channel ‘Belarus 1’

    DOB: 30.6.1983

    Address: 8A Vodolazhsky St., apt. 45, Minsk, Belarus

    Gender: female

    Nationality: Belarusian

    Lyudmila Hladkaya is one of the most prominent propagandists of the Lukashenka regime. She is an employee of the newspaper ‘SB Belarus Segodnya’ and an associate of other pro-regime media, including state-owned television channel ‘Belarus 1’. She frequently uses hate speech and derogatory language while speaking of democratic opposition. She has also conducted numerous ‘interviews’ with unjustly detained Belarusian citizens, often students, showing them in humiliating situations and mocking them. She has promoted repression by the Belarusian security apparatus and taken part in disinformation and information manipulation campaigns. She is publicly voicing support for Aliaksandr Lukashenka and expressing pride in serving his regime. For her work, she has been publicly praised by and received awards from Lukashenka.

    She is therefore benefitting from and supporting the Lukashenka regime.

    3.6.2022

    194.

    Ryhor Yuryevich AZARONAK

    Grigoriy Yurevich AZARYONOK

    Рыгор Юр’евiч АЗАРОНАК

    Григорий Юрьевич АЗАРЁНОК

    Position(s): Employee of state-owned television channel ‘CTV’, author and host of several programmes (‘Secret Springs of Politics’, ‘Order of Judas’, ‘Panopticon’)

    Rank: Lieutenant in reserve

    DOB: 18.10.1995

    POB: Minsk, Belarus

    Gender: male

    Nationality: Belarusian

    Ryhor Azaronak is one of the chief propagandists of the Lukashenka regime. He is a political columnist, author and the host of weekly propaganda shows on the state-owned television channel ‘CTV’. In his broadcasts he endorsed violence against dissenters of the Lukashenka regime, and systematically used derogatory language about activists, journalists and other opponents of the Lukashenka regime. He received an award with the medal ‘For Courage’ from Aliaksandr Lukashenka.

    He is therefore benefitting from and supporting the Lukashenka regime.

    3.6.2022

    ▼M53

    195.

    Ivan Ivanavich GALAVATYI

    Ivan Ivanovich GOLOVATY

    Iван Iванавiч ГАЛАВАТЫ

    Иван Иванович ГОЛОВАТЫЙ

    Position(s): Director-General of the Open Joint Stock Company ‘Belaruskali’, Chairman of the supervisory board of JSC Belarussian Potash Company.

    Member of the Standing Committee of the Council of the Republic of the National Assembly of the Republic of Belarus for Foreign Affairs and National Security

    DOB: 15.6.1976

    POB: Pogost Settlement, Soligorsk District, Minsk Province, Belarus

    Gender: male

    Nationality: Belarusian

    Ivan Galavatyi is the Director-General of the state-owned enterprise Belaruskali, which is a major source of revenue and foreign currency for the Lukashenka regime. He is a member of the Council of the Republic of the National Assembly and holds multiple other high positions in Belarus. Furthermore, he is the Chairman of the supervisory board of JSC Belarussian Potash Company. He has received multiple state awards, including directly from Aliaksandr Lukashenka, during his career. He has been closely associated with Lukashenka and members of his family. He is therefore benefitting from and supporting the Lukashenka regime.

    The employees of Belaruskali who took part in strikes and peaceful protests in the aftermath of the fraudulent August 2020 presidential elections in Belarus were deprived of premiums and dismissed. Lukashenka himself personally threatened to replace the strikers with miners from Ukraine. Ivan Galavatyi is therefore responsible for the repression of civil society.

    3.6.2022

    ▼M35

    B.   Legal persons, entities and bodies referred to in Article 2(1)

    ▼M45



     

    Names

    (Transliteration of Belarusian spelling)

    (Transliteration of Russian spelling)

    Names

    (Belarusian spelling)

    (Russian spelling)

    Identifying information

    Reasons for listing

    Date of listing

    1.

    Beltechexport

    Белтехэкспорт

    Address: Nezavisimosti Ave. 86-B, Minsk, Belarus

    Website: https://bte.by/

    E-mail address: mail@bte.by

    Beltechexport is a private entity which exports weapons and military equipment produced by Belarusian state-owned companies to countries in Africa, South America, Asia and the Middle East. Beltechexport is closely associated with the Ministry of Defence of Belarus.

    Beltechexport is therefore benefitting from its association with and supporting the Lukashenka regime, by bringing benefits to the presidential administration.

    17.12.2020

    2.

    Dana Holdings

    ТАА ‘Дана Холдынгз’

    ООО ‘Дана Холдингз’

    Address: Peter Mstislavets St. 9, pom. 3 (office 4), 220076 Minsk, Belarus

    Registration number: 690611860

    Websites: https://bir.by/; https://en.dana-holdings.com; https://dana-holdings.com/

    E-mail address: info@bir.by

    Tel.: +375 (29) 636-23-91

    Dana Holdings is one of the main real estate developers and constructors in Belarus. The company and its subsidiaries received development rights for plots of land and developed several large residential complexes and business centres.

    Individuals reportedly representing Dana Holdings maintain close relations with President Lukashenka. Liliya Lukashenka, daughter-in-law of the President, had a high-ranking position in Dana Astra.

    Dana Holdings is still active economically in Belarus.

    Dana Holdings is therefore benefitting from and supporting the Lukashenka regime.

    17.12.2020

    3.

    Dana Astra

    ЗТАА ‘Дана Астра’

    ИООО ‘Дана Астра’

    Address: Peter Mstislavets St. 9, pom. 9-13, 220076 Minsk, Belarus

    Registration number: 191295361

    Websites: https://bir.by/; https://en.dana-holdings.com; https://dana-holdings.com/

    E-mail address: PR@bir.by

    Tel.: +375 (17) 269-32-60; +375 17 269-32-51

    Dana Astra, previously a subsidiary of Dana Holdings, is one of the main real estate developers and constructors in Belarus. The company received development rights for plots of land and is developing the multifunctional centre ‘Minsk World’, which is advertised by the company as the biggest investment of its kind in Europe.

    Individuals reportedly representing Dana Astra maintain close relations with President Lukashenka. Liliya Lukashenka, daughter-in-law of the President, had a high-ranking position in the company.

    Dana Astra is therefore benefitting from and supporting the Lukashenka regime.

    17.12.2020

    4.

    GHU – Main Economic Department of the Presidential Administration

    Главное хозяйственное управление

    Address: Miasnikova St. 37, Minsk, Belarus

    Website: http://ghu.by

    E-mail address: ghu@ghu.by

    Main Economic Department (GHU) of the Presidential Administration is the largest operator on the non-residential real estate market in the Republic of Belarus and a supervisor of numerous companies.

    Victor Sheiman, who as the former head of the Belarus President Property Management Directorate exercised direct control over GHU, was asked by President Aliaksandr Lukashenka to supervise the safety of the 2020 presidential elections.

    GHU is therefore benefitting from its association with and supporting the Lukashenka regime.

    17.12.2020

    ▼M53

    5.

    SYNESIS LLC

    ООО ‘Синезис’

    Address: 220005, Minsk, Platonova 20B Belarus; Mantulinskaya 24, Moscow 123100, Russia.

    Registration number (УНН/ИНН): 190950894 (Belarus); 7704734000/

    770301001 (Russia).

    Website: https://synesis.partners; https://synesis-group.com/

    Tel. +375 (17) 240-36-50

    Email address: yuriy.serbenkov@synesis.by

    Synesis LLC has provided the Belarusian authorities with a Kipod surveillance platform, which can search through and analyse video footage and employ facial recognition software, making the company responsible for the repression of civil society and democratic opposition by the state apparatus in Belarus. The Belarusian State Security Committee (KGB) and Ministry of Internal Affairs have been listed as users of a system created by Synesis.

    Synesis claims to have stopped providing the Belarusian authorities with the Kipod platform, but according to ByPOL reports Kipod is still used by the state securities agencies.

    Synesis is one of the residents of the Hi-Tech Park, created by a decree of Aliaksandr Lukashenka, and as such enjoys numerous benefits, including exemptions from income tax, VAT, offshore duty, customs duties and others.

    The company is therefore benefitting from its association with and supporting the Lukashenka regime.

    17.12.2020

    ▼M45

    6.

    AGAT electromechanical Plant OJSC

    Агат-электромеханический завод

    Address: Nezavisimosti Ave. 115, 220114 Minsk, Belarus

    Website: https://agat-emz.by/

    E-mail address: marketing@agat-emz.by

    Tel.:

    +375 (17) 272-01-32;

    +375 (17) 570-41-45

    AGAT electromechanical Plant OJSC is part of the Belarusian State Authority for Military Industry of the Republic of Belarus (a.k.a. SAMI or State Military Industrial Committee), which is responsible for implementing the military-technical policy of the State and a subordinate to the Council of Ministers and President of Belarus.

    AGAT electromechanical Plant OJSC is therefore benefitting from its association with and supporting the Lukashenka regime.

    The company manufactures ‘Rubezh’ – a barrier system designed for riot control that has been deployed against peaceful demonstrations that took place in the wake of the presidential elections held on 9 August 2020, thus making the company responsible for the repression of civil society and democratic opposition.

    17.12.2020

    7.

    140 Repair Plant

    140 ремонтный завод

    Website: 140zavod.org

    140 Repair Plant is part of the Belarussian State Authority for Military Industry of the Republic of Belarus (a.k.a. SAMI or State Military Industrial Committee), which is responsible for implementing the military-technical policy of the State and a subordinate to the Council of Ministers and President of Belarus. 140 Repair Plant is therefore benefitting from its association with and supporting the Lukashenka regime.

    The company manufactures transport vehicles and armoured vehicles, which have been deployed against peaceful demonstrations that took place in the wake of the presidential elections held on 9 August 2020, thus making the company responsible for the repression of civil society and democratic opposition.

    17.12.2020

    8.

    MZKT (a.k.a. VOLAT)

    МЗКТ - Минский завод колёсных тягачей

    Website: www.mzkt.by

    MZKT (a.k.a. VOLAT) is part of the Belarusian State Authority for Military Industry of the Republic of Belarus (a.k.a. SAMI or State Military Industrial Committee), which is responsible for implementing the military-technical policy of the State and a subordinate to the Council of Ministers and the President of Belarus. MZKT (a.k.a. VOLAT) is therefore benefitting from its association with and supporting the Lukashenka regime.

    Employees of MZKT who protested during the visit of Aliaksandr Lukashenka to the factory and went on strike in the wake of the 2020 presidential elections in Belarus were fired, which makes the company responsible for violation of human rights.

    17.12.2020

    9.

    Sohra Group / Sohra LLC

    ООО Сохра

    Address: Revolucyonnaya 17/19, office no. 22, 220030 Minsk, Belarus

    Registration number: 192363182

    Website: http://sohra.by/

    E-mail address: info@sohra.by

    Sohra company was owned by Aliaksandr Zaitsau, one of the most influential businessmen in Belarus, a person with close connections to the Belarusian political establishment and a close aide to Lukashenka's eldest son Viktor. Sohra promotes Belarusian industrial products in countries in Africa and the Middle East. It co-founded the defence company BSVT-New Technologies, engaged in weapons production and missile modernisation. Sohra, using its privileged position, serves as a proxy between the Belarusian political establishment and state-owned companies and foreign partners in Africa and the Middle East. It also engaged in gold mining in African countries on the basis of concessions obtained by the Lukashenka regime.

    Sohra Group is therefore benefitting from the Lukashenka regime.

    21.6.2021

    10.

    Bremino Group LLC

    ООО ‘Бремино групп’

    Address: Niamiha 40, 220004 Minsk, Belarus; Bolbasovo village, Zavodskaya 1k, Orsha Region/Oblast, Belarus

    Registration number: 691598938

    Website: http://www.bremino.by

    E-mail address: office@bremino.by; marketing@bremino.by

    Bremino Group is the initiator and co-administrator of the Bremino-Orsha special economic zone project, created by a presidential decree signed by Aliaksandr Lukashenka. The company has received state support for developing the Bremino-Orsha zone, as well as a number of financial and tax advantages and other benefits. The owners of Bremino Group - Aliaksandr Zaitsau, Mikalai Varabei and Aliaksei Aleksin - belong to the inner circle of Lukashenka-related businessmen and maintain close relations with Lukashenka and his family.

    Bremino Group is therefore benefitting from the Lukashenka regime.

    Bremino Group is the owner of Transport and Logistics Center (TLC) on the Belarusian-Polish border - Bremino-Bruzgi, which was used by the Lukashenka regime as a shelter for migrants who have been transported to the Belarusian-Union border with the aim of illegally crossing it. Bremino-Bruzgi TLC was also a site of Lukashenka's propaganda visit to the migrants.

    Bremino Group is therefore contributing to the activities by the Lukashenka regime that facilitate the illegal crossing of the external borders of the Union.

    21.6.2021

    11.

    Globalcustom Management LLC

    ООО ‘Глобалкастом-менеджмент’

    Address: Nemiga 40/301, Minsk, Belarus

    Registration number: 193299162

    Website: https://globalcustom.by/

    E-mail address: info@globalcustom.by

    Globalcustom Management is associated with the Belarus President Property Management Directorate, formerly headed by Victor Sheiman, who has been designated by the Union since 2004. The company is involved in the smuggling of goods to Russia, which would not be possible without the consent of the Lukashenka regime, which controls the border guards and customs. The privileged position in the flower export sector to Russia, from which the company benefits, is also conditioned on the support of the regime. Globalcustom Management was the first owner of the GardService, the only private company to whom Lukashenka granted the use of weapons. Globalcustom Management is therefore benefitting from the Lukashenka regime.

    21.6.2021

    12.

    Belarusski Avtomobilnyi Zavod (BelAZ) / OJSC ‘BELAZ’

    Open Joint Stock Company ‘BELAZ’ - Management Company of Holding ‘BELAZ-HOLDING’

    ААТ ‘БЕЛАЗ’

    ОАО ‘БЕЛАЗ’

    Address: 40 let Octyabrya St. 4, 222161, Zhodino, Minsk Region/Oblast, Belarus

    Website: https://belaz.by

    OJSC BelAZ is one of the leading state-owned companies in Belarus and one of the largest manufacturers of large trucks and large dump trucks in the world. It is a source of significant revenue for the Lukashenka regime. Lukashenka stated that the government will always support the company, and described it as a ‘Belarusian brand’ and ‘part of the national legacy’. OJSC BelAZ has offered its premises and equipment to stage a political rally in support of the Lukashenka regime. Therefore OJSC BelAZ benefits from and supports the Lukashenka regime.

    The employees of OJSC BelAZ who took part in strikes and peaceful protests in the aftermath of the fraudulent August 2020 elections in Belarus were threatened with layoffs and intimidated by the company management. A group of employees was locked indoors by OJSC BelAZ to prevent them from joining the other protesters. The company management presented a strike to the media as a staff meeting. Therefore OJSC BelAZ is responsible for the repression of civil society and supports the Lukashenka regime.

    21.6.2021

    13.

    Minskii Avtomobilnyi Zavod (MAZ) / OJSC ‘MAZ’

    Open Joint Stock Company ‘Minsk Automobile Works’ - Management Company of ‘BELAVTOMAZ’ Holding

    ААТ ‘Мiнскi аўтамабiльны завод’

    ОАО ‘Минский автомобильный завод’

    Address: Socialisticheskaya 2, 220021 Minsk, Belarus

    Website: http://maz.by/

    Date of registration: 16.7.1944

    Tel.: +375 (17) 217-22-22; +8000 217-22-22

    OJSC Minsk Automobile Plant (MAZ) is one of the biggest state-owned automotive manufacturers in Belarus. Lukashenka described it as ‘one of the most important industrial enterprises of the country’. It is a source of revenue for the Lukashenka regime. OJSC MAZ has offered its premises and equipment to stage a political rally in support of the regime. Therefore, OJSC MAZ benefits from and supports the Lukashenka regime.

    Employees of OJSC MAZ who took part in strikes and peaceful protests in the aftermath of fraudulent August 2020 elections in Belarus were intimidated and later laid off by the company's management. A group of employees was locked indoors by OJSC MAZ to prevent them from joining the other protesters. Therefore, OJSC MAZ is responsible for the repression of civil society and supports the Lukashenka regime.

    21.6.2021

    14.

    Logex

    ТАА ‘Лагекс’

    ООО ‘Логекс’

    Address: 24 Kommunisticheskaya St., office 2, Minsk, Belarus

    Registration number: 192695465

    Website: http://logex.by/

    E-mail address: info@logex.by

    Logex is associated with Aliaksandr Shakutsin, a businessman close to the Lukashenka regime, who has been designated by the Union.

    The company is involved in the export of flowers to the Russian Federation at dumped prices, which would not be possible without the consent of the regime, which controls the border guards and customs. The privileged position in the flower export sector to Russia, from which the company benefits, is conditioned on the support of the regime. The main Belarusian suppliers of cut flowers are the companies that are closely connected with the leadership of the republic.

    Logex is therefore benefitting from the Lukashenka regime.

    21.6.2021

    15.

    JSC ‘NNK’ (Novaia naftavaia kampania) / New Oil Company

    ЗАТ ‘ННК’ (Новая нафтавая кампанiя)

    ЗАО ‘ННК’ (Новая нефтяная компания)

    Address: Rakovska St. 14W room 7, 5th floor, Minsk, Belarus

    Registration number: 193402282

    Novaya Neftnaya Kompaniya (NNK), New Oil company, is an entity founded in March 2020. It is the only private company entitled to export oil products from Belarus - an indication of close links to the authorities and the highest level of state privileges. NNK is owned by Interservice, a company belonging to Mikalai Varabei who is one of the leading businessmen benefitting from and supporting the Lukashenka regime. NNK is also reported to be connected to Aliaksei Aleksin, another prominent Belarusian businessman who benefits from the Lukashenka regime. According to media reports, Aleskin was the founder of NNK alongside Varabei. NNK was also used by the Belarusian authorities to adapt the Belarusian economy to restrictive measures introduced by the Union.

    NNK is therefore benefitting from the Lukashenka regime.

    21.6.2021

    16.

    Belaeronavigatsia

    State-owned enterprise

    Белаэранавiгацыя

    Дзяржаўнае прадпрыемства

    Белаэронавигация

    Государственное предприятие

    Address: 19 Korotkevich St., 220039 Minsk, Belarus

    Date of registration: 1996

    Website: http://www.ban.by/

    E-mail address: office@ban.by

    Tel.: +375 (17) 215-40-51

    Fax: +375 (17) 213-41-63

    The state-owned enterprise Belaeronavigatsia is responsible for Belarusian air traffic control. It therefore bears responsibility for diverting passenger flight FR4978 to Minsk airport without proper justification on 23 May 2021. This politically motivated decision was taken with the aim of arresting and detaining opposition journalist Raman Pratasevich and Sofia Sapega and is a form of repression against civil society and democratic opposition in Belarus.

    The state-owned enterprise Belaeronavigatsia is therefore responsible for the repression of civil society and democratic opposition.

    21.6.2021

    17.

    Open Joint Stock Company ‘Belavia Belarusian Airlines’

    ААТ ‘Авiякампанiя Белавiя’

    ОАО ‘Авиакомпания Белавиа’

    Address: 14A Nemiga St., 220004 Minsk, Belarus

    Date of registration: 4.1.1996

    Registration number: 600390798

    OJSC Belavia Belarusian Airlines is the state-owned national flag carrier airline. Aliaksandr Lukashenka promised that his administration would provide all possible support to Belavia after the Union decided to introduce a prohibition on the overflight of Union airspace and on access to Union airports by all Belarusian air carriers. To that end, he agreed with the Russian President Vladimir Putin on planning the opening of new airline routes for Belavia.

    Belavia's management also told its employees not to protest against the election irregularities and mass detentions in Belarus, in view of the fact that Belavia is a state-owned enterprise.

    Belavia is therefore benefitting from and supporting the Lukashenka regime.

    Belavia has been involved in bringing migrants from the Middle East to Belarus. Migrants wishing to cross the Union's external border have been flying to Minsk on board flights operated by Belavia from a number of Middle Eastern countries, in particular Lebanon, UAE and Turkey. In order to facilitate this, Belavia opened new air routes and expanded the number of flights on existing routes. Local tour operators have acted as intermediaries in selling Belavia tickets to prospective migrants, thereby helping Belavia to keep a low profile.

    Belavia is therefore contributing to activities by the Lukashenka regime that facilitate the illegal crossing of the external borders of the Union.

    2.12.2021

    18.

    Republican unitary enterprise ‘TSENTRKURORT’

    Рэспублiканскае унiтарнае прадпрыемства ‘ЦЭНТРКУРОРТ’

    Республиканское унитарное предприятие ‘ЦЕНТРКУРОРТ’

    Address: 39 Myasnikova St., 220030 Minsk, Belarus

    Date of registration: 12.8.2003

    Registration number: 100726604

    State-owned tourism company Tsentrkurort is part of the Belarus President Property Management Directorate. Tsentrkurort is reported to be one of the companies coordinating the flow of migrants that intend to cross the border between Belarus and the Union. Tsentrkurort helped at least 51 Iraqi citizens acquire visas for their visit to Belarus, and signed a contract for transportation services with Belarusian company Stroitur, which offers bus rentals with drivers. Buses booked by Tsentrkurort transported migrants, including children, from Minsk airport to hotels.

    Tsentrkurort is therefore contributing to activities by the Lukashenka regime that facilitate the illegal crossing of the external borders of the Union.

    2.12.2021

    19.

    Oskartour LLC

    ООО Оскартур

    Address: 25 Karl Marx St., room 1n, Minsk, Belarus

    Date of registration: 18.10.2016

    Registration number: 192721937

    Oskartour is a tour operator, which facilitated the obtainment of visas for migrants coming from Iraq and organised their subsequent travel to Belarus by flights from Bagdad to Minsk. Those Iraqi migrants were later transported to the Belarusian-Union border with the aim of illegally crossing it. Thanks to Oskartour and its contacts with Iraqi airlines, Belarusian authorities and the state-owned Tsentrkurort company, regular flights from Baghdad to Minsk were launched by the Iraqi air carrier, in order to bring more persons to Belarus to illegally cross the external borders of the Union. Oskartour took part in this illegal border-crossing scheme carried out by Belarusian security services and state-owned companies.

    It is therefore contributing to activities by the Lukashenka regime that facilitate the illegal crossing of the external borders of the Union.

    2.12.2021

    20.

    Republican subsidiary unitary enterprise ‘Hotel Minsk’

    Гатэль ‘Мiнск’

    Республиканское дочернее унитарное предприятие “Отель ‘Минск’

    Address: 11 Nezavisimosti Ave., Minsk, Belarus

    Date of registration: 26.12.2016/3.4.2017

    Registration number: 192750964

    Website: http://hotelminsk.by/

    E-mail address: hotelminsk@udp.gov.by; marketing@hotelminsk.by

    Tel.: +375 (17) 209-90-61

    Fax: +375 (17) 200-00-72

    Hotel Minsk is a subsidiary company of the Belarus President Property Management Directorate – a government agency that directly reports to the President. Hotel Minsk took part in the illegal border-crossing scheme carried out by Belarusian security services and state-owned companies. Migrants were accommodated in the hotel before being transported to the border between Belarus and the Union in order to illegally cross it. Iraqi migrants had listed Hotel Minsk as a temporary residence in their Belarusian visa applications, which were lodged immediately before their arrival in Belarus.

    Hotel Minsk is therefore contributing to activities by the Lukashenka regime that facilitate the illegal crossing of the external borders of the Union.

    2.12.2021

    21.

    Open Joint Stock Company ‘Hotel Planeta’

    ААТ ‘Гасцiнiца Планета’

    OAO ‘Гостиница Планета’

    Address: 31 Pobediteley Ave., Minsk, Belarus

    Date of registration: 1.2.1994/6.3.2000

    Registration number: 100135173

    Website: https://hotelplaneta.by/

    E-mail address: planeta@udp.gov.by

    Tel.: +375 (17) 226-78-53

    Fax: +375 (17) 226-78-55

    OJSC Hotel Planeta is a subsidiary company of the Belarus President Property Management Directorate – a government agency that directly reports to the President. Hotel Planeta took part in the illegal border-crossing scheme carried out by Belarusian security services and state-owned companies. Migrants were accommodated in the hotel before being transported to the border between Belarus and the Union in order to illegally cross it. They paid USD 1 000 to a travel agent in Baghdad for the flight, a tourist visa and a stay in the hotel.

    Hotel Planeta is therefore contributing to activities by the Lukashenka regime that facilitate the illegal crossing of the external borders of the Union.

    2.12.2021

    22.

    ASAM (Asobnaia sluzhba aktyunykh merapryemstvau)

    OSAM (Otdiel'naya sluzhba aktivnykh mieropriyatiy)

    Асобная служба актыўных мерапрыемстваў (АСАМ)

    Отдельная служба активных мероприятий (ОСАМ)

    Address: State Border Committee of the Republic of Belarus, 24 Volodarsky St., 220050 Minsk, Belarus

    ASAM (Separate Service for Active Measures) is a Belarusian special border guard unit controlled by Viktar Lukashenka and headed by Ihar Kruchkou. ASAM forces under special operation ‘Gate’ organise illegal border crossings through Belarus to Union Member States and are directly involved in the physical transportation of migrants to the other side of the border. ASAM additionally charges the transported migrants for the border crossing.

    ASAM is therefore contributing to activities by the Lukashenka regime that facilitate the illegal crossing of the external borders of the Union.

    2.12.2021

    ▼M52 —————

    ▼M45

    24.

    VIP Grub

     

    Address: Büyükdere Cad., No:201, Istanbul, Turkey

    VIP Grub is a passport and visa service based in Istanbul, Turkey, which organises trips to Belarus with the explicit intention of facilitating migration to the Union. VIP Grub actively advertises migration to the Union. VIP Grub therefore contributes to activities by the Lukashenka regime that facilitate the illegal crossing of the external borders of the Union.

    2.12.2021

    25.

    Open Joint Stock Company ‘Grodno Azot’

    Including Branch ‘Khimvolokno Plant’ JSC ‘Grodno Azot’

    ААТ ‘Гродна Азот’

    ОАО ‘Гродно Азот’

    Фiлiял ‘Завод Хiмвалакно’ ААТ ‘Гродна Азот’

    Филиал ‘Завод Химволокно’ ОАО ‘Гродно Азот’

    Address: 100 Kosmonavtov Ave., Grodno/Hrodna, Belarus

    Date of registration: 1965

    Registration number: 500036524

    Website: https://azot.by/en/

    Address: 4 Slavinskogo St., 230026 Grodno/Hrodna, Belarus

    Date of registration: 12.5.2000

    Registration number: 590046884

    Website: www.grodno-khim.by

    E-mail address: office@grodno-khim.by; market@grodno-khim.by; ppm@grodno-khim.by; tnp@grodno-khim.by

    Tel./Fax: +375 (152) 39-19-00; +375 (152) 39-19-44

    OJSC Grodno Azot is a large state-owned producer of nitrogen compounds, based in Grodno/Hrodna. Lukashenka described it as ‘a very important enterprise, a strategic one’. Grodno Azot also owns Khimvolokno Plant, which is a large manufacturer of polyamide and polyester and composite materials. Grodno Azot and its Khimvolokno Plant are a source of substantial revenue for the Lukashenka regime. Grodno Azot is therefore supporting the Lukashenka regime.

    Lukashenka visited the company and met with its representatives, discussing the plant's modernisation and various forms of State support. Lukashenka also promised that a loan would be used for the construction of a new nitrogen plant in Grodno/Hrodna. Grodno Azot is therefore benefitting from the Lukashenka regime.

    The workers of Grodno Azot, including its employees at the Khimvolokno Plant, who participated in peaceful protests against the regime and went on strike, were dismissed, intimidated and threatened both by the Grodno Azot management and regime representatives. Grodno Azot is therefore responsible for the repression of civil society.

    2.12.2021

    26.

    State Production Association ‘Belorusneft’

    Дзяржаўнае вытворчае аб'яднанне ‘Беларуснафта’

    Государственное производственное объединение ‘Белоруснефть’

    Address: 9 Rogachevskaya St., 246003 Gomel/Homyel, Belarus

    Date of registration: 25.2.1966

    Registration number: 400051902

    Belorusneft is a state-owned company, operating in the petrochemical sector. The company's management dismissed workers who went on strike, took part in anti-regime protests or publicly supported those protests. Belorusneft is therefore responsible for the repression of civil society.

    2.12.2021

    27.

    Open Joint Stock Company ‘Belshina’

    AAT ‘Белшина’

    ОАО ‘Белшина’

    Address: 4 Minskoe Shosse St., 213824 Bobruisk, Belarus

    Date of registration: 10.1.1994

    Registration number: 700016217

    Website: http://www.belshinajsc.by/

    OJSC Belshina is one of the leading state-owned companies in Belarus and a large manufacturer of vehicle tyres. As such, it is a substantial source of revenue for the Lukashenka regime. The Belarusian State is directly profiting from the earnings made by Belshina. Therefore, Belshina supports the Lukashenka regime.

    Employees of Belshina who protested and went on strike in the wake of the 2020 presidential elections in Belarus were dismissed. Belshina is therefore responsible for the repression of civil society.

    2.12.2021

    ▼M50

    28.

    Open Joint Stock Company ‘Belaruskali’

    Адкрытае акцыянернае таварыства ‘Беларуськалiй’

    Открытое акционерное общество ‘Беларуськалий’

    Address: 5 Korzha St., Soligorsk, 223710 Minsk Region/Oblast, Belarus

    Date of registration: 23.12.1996

    Registration number: 600122610

    OJSC Belaruskali is a state-owned enterprise and one of the biggest potash producers in the world, providing 20 % of global potash exports. As such, it is a major source of revenue and foreign currency for the Lukashenka regime. Aliaksandr Lukashenka described it as ‘a national treasure, pride, one of the pillars of Belarusian exports’. Therefore, Belaruskali benefits from and supports the Lukashenka regime.

    Employees of Belaruskali who took part in strikes and peaceful protests in the aftermath of the fraudulent August 2020 presidential elections in Belarus were intimidated and dismissed by the company’s management. Lukashenka himself personally threatened to replace the strikers with miners from Ukraine. Therefore, Belaruskali is responsible for the repression of civil society in Belarus and supports the Lukashenka regime.

    3.6.2022

    ▼M53

    29.

    Joint Stock Company ‘Belarusian Potash Company’

    ААТ ‘Беларуская калiйная кампанiя’

    ОАО ‘Белорусская калийная компания’

    Address: 35 Masherova Ave., 220002 Minsk, Belarus

    Date of registration: 13.9.2013

    Registration number: 192050251

    Tel. +375 (17) 309-30-10; +375 (17) 309-30-30

    Email address: info@belpc.by

    JSC Belarusian Potash Company is the exporting arm of Belarusian state potash producer Belaruskali. Belaruskali is one of the largest sources of revenue for the Lukashenka regime. Supplies from the Belarusian Potash Company account for 20 % of global potash exports.

    The state guaranteed the Belarusian Potash Company monopoly rights to export potassium fertilizers. Thanks to preferential treatment from the Belarusian authorities, the company earns a substantial revenue. Therefore, the Belarusian Potash Company benefits from and supports the Lukashenka regime.

    3.6.2022.

    ▼M50

    30.

    ‘Inter Tobacco’ LLC

    Таварыства з абмежаванай адказнасцю ‘Iнтэр Табак’

    Общество с ограниченной ответственностью ‘Интер Тобако’

    Address: 131 Novodvorskiy village, Novodvorskiy village council, Minsk District, 223016 Minsk Region/Oblast, Belarus (Minsk Free Economic Zone)

    Date of registration: 10.10.2002

    Registration number: 808000714

    Inter Tobacco LLC is part of the tobacco manufacturing industry in Belarus. It has a significant share of the profitable domestic cigarette market in Belarus. The company was given exclusive privileges to import tobacco products to Belarus, based on a decree signed by Aliaksandr Lukashenka. Additionally, Lukashenka issued a Presidential decree to re-draw the boundaries of Belarus’s capital, Minsk, to carve out land for Inter Tobacco’s factory, probably for reasons related to tax evasion. Inter Tobacco belongs to Alexei Oleksin and members of his close family (it is owned by Oleksin’s company Energo-Oil).

    Therefore, Inter Tobacco is benefitting from the Lukashenka regime.

    3.6.2022

    31.

    Open Joint Stock Company ‘Naftan’

    Адкрытае акцыянернае таварыства ‘Нафтан’

    Открытое акционерное общество ‘Нафтан’

    Address: Novopolotsk 1, 211440 Vitebsk Region/Oblast, Belarus

    Date of registration: 1992

    Registration number: 300042199

    As a state-owned enterprise, OJSC Naftan is a major source of revenue and foreign currency for the Lukashenka regime. Therefore, Naftan benefits from and supports the Lukashenka regime.

    Employees of Naftan who took part in strikes and peaceful protests in the aftermath of the fraudulent August 2020 presidential elections in Belarus were intimidated and dismissed by the company’s management. Therefore, Naftan is responsible for the repression of civil society in Belarus and supports the Lukashenka regime.

    3.6.2022

    32.

    Open Joint Stock Company ‘Grodno Tobacco Factory Neman’

    Адкрытае акцыянернае таварыства ‘Гродзенская тытунёвая фабрыка Нёман’

    Oткрытое акционерное общество ‘Гродненская табачная фабрика Неман’

    Address: 18 Ordzhonikidze St., 230771 Grodno/Hrodna, Belarus

    Date of registration: 30.12.1996

    Registration number: 500047627

    OJSC Grodno Tobacco Factory Neman is a Belarusian state-owned enterprise and one of the major sources of revenue for the Lukashenka regime. The company has a 70-80 % share of the tobacco market in Belarus. Grodno Tobacco Factory Neman therefore benefits from and supports the Lukashenka regime.

    Manufactured in Belarus, Grodno Tobacco Factory Neman brands are among the most common cigarettes smuggled into the Union as part of the lucrative contraband tobacco trade. Train cars belonging to Belarusian state-owned companies Belaruskali and Grodno Azot are used in the contraband scheme. Grodno Tobacco Factory Neman therefore contributes to facilitating the illegal transfer of restricted goods into the territory of the Union.

    3.6.2022

    33.

    Beltamozhservice

    Рэспублiканскае унiтарнае прадпрыемства ‘Белмытсэрвiс’

    Республиканское унитарное предприятие ‘Белтаможсервис’

    Address: 17th km, Minsk- Dzerzhinsk highway, administrative building, office 75, Shchomyslitsky s/s, 223049 Minsk Region/Oblast, Belarus

    Date of registration: 9.6.1999

    Registration number: 101561144

    Beltamozhservice is a state-owned company and one of the largest logistics companies in Belarus. It is closely associated with the Belarusian authorities and is involved in the smuggling and re-export of goods from Belarus to Russia. The company benefits from links with the Belarusian authorities and provides significant revenue to the Lukashenka regime. Beltamozhservice is therefore benefitting from and supporting the Lukashenka regime.

    3.6.2022

    34.

    Open Joint Stock Company ‘Managing Company of Holding ‘Belkommunmash’’

    Адкрытае акцыянернае таварыства ‘Кiруючая кампанiя холдынгу ‘Белкамунмаш’’

    Открытое акционерное общество ‘Управляющая компания холдинга ‘Белкоммунмаш’’

    Address: 64B-2 Perekhodnaya St., 220070 Minsk, Belarus

    Date of registration: 13.8.1991

    Registration number: 100205408

    Belkommunmash is a Belarusian manufacturer of public transport vehicles. Aliaksandr Lukashenka is promoting Belkommunmash’s business, guaranteeing the company’s compliance with its contractual obligations to its partners and using his influence to support its business activity. Belkommunmash is therefore benefitting from the Lukashenka regime.

    Belkommunmash dismissed workers in retaliation for their protest against falsified presidential election results in 2020, and is therefore responsible for the repression of civil society and supports the Lukashenka regime.

    3.6.2022

    35.

    Belteleradio Company / National State Television and Radio Company of the Republic of Belarus

    Нацыянальная дзяржаўная тэлерадыёкампанiя Рэспублiкi Беларусь / Белтэлерадыёкампанiя

    Национальная государственная телерадиокомпания Республики Беларусь / Белтелерадиокомпания

    Address: 9 Makayonka St., Minsk, Belarus

    Date of registration: 14.9.1994

    Registration number: 100717729

    Website: tvr.by

    Belteleradio Company is the state television and radio broadcasting company, and controls seven television channels and five radio stations in Belarus. In the aftermath of fraudulent presidential elections in August 2020, Belteleradio Company dismissed protesting workers of the media outlets it controls and replaced them with Russian media employees. It is therefore responsible for the repression of civil society.

    The television and radio stations supervised by Belteleradio Company are actively spreading propaganda and thus supporting the Lukashenka regime.

    3.6.2022

    ▼M3




    ANNEX II

    ▼M4

    Websites for information on the competent authorities referred to in Articles 3, 4(2), and 5, and address for notifications to the European Commission

    ▼M49

    BELGIUM

    https://diplomatie.belgium.be/en/policy/policy_areas/peace_and_security/sanctions

    BULGARIA

    https://www.mfa.bg/en/EU-sanctions

    CZECHIA

    www.financnianalytickyurad.cz/mezinarodni-sankce.html

    DENMARK

    http://um.dk/da/Udenrigspolitik/folkeretten/sanktioner/

    GERMANY

    https://www.bmwi.de/Redaktion/DE/Artikel/Aussenwirtschaft/embargos-aussenwirtschaftsrecht.html

    ESTONIA

    https://vm.ee/et/rahvusvahelised-sanktsioonid

    IRELAND

    https://www.dfa.ie/our-role-policies/ireland-in-the-eu/eu-restrictive-measures/

    GREECE

    http://www.mfa.gr/en/foreign-policy/global-issues/international-sanctions.html

    SPAIN

    https://www.exteriores.gob.es/es/PoliticaExterior/Paginas/SancionesInternacionales.aspx

    FRANCE

    http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/fr/autorites-sanctions/

    CROATIA

    https://mvep.gov.hr/vanjska-politika/medjunarodne-mjere-ogranicavanja/22955

    ITALY

    https://www.esteri.it/it/politica-estera-e-cooperazione-allo-sviluppo/politica_europea/misure_deroghe/

    CYPRUS

    https://mfa.gov.cy/themes/

    LATVIA

    http://www.mfa.gov.lv/en/security/4539

    LITHUANIA

    http://www.urm.lt/sanctions

    LUXEMBOURG

    https://maee.gouvernement.lu/fr/directions-du-ministere/affaires-europeennes/organisations-economiques-int/mesures-restrictives.html

    HUNGARY

    https://kormany.hu/kulgazdasagi-es-kulugyminiszterium/ensz-eu-szankcios-tajekoztato

    MALTA

    https://foreignandeu.gov.mt/en/Government/SMB/Pages/SMB-Home.aspx

    NETHERLANDS

    https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/onderwerpen/internationale-sancties

    AUSTRIA

    https://www.bmeia.gv.at/themen/aussenpolitik/europa/eu-sanktionen-nationale-behoerden/

    POLAND

    https://www.gov.pl/web/dyplomacja/sankcje-miedzynarodowe

    https://www.gov.pl/web/diplomacy/international-sanctions

    PORTUGAL

    https://www.portaldiplomatico.mne.gov.pt/politica-externa/medidas-restritivas

    ROMANIA

    http://www.mae.ro/node/1548

    SLOVENIA

    http://www.mzz.gov.si/si/omejevalni_ukrepi

    SLOVAKIA

    https://www.mzv.sk/europske_zalezitosti/europske_politiky-sankcie_eu

    FINLAND

    https://um.fi/pakotteet

    SWEDEN

    https://www.regeringen.se/sanktioner

    Address for notifications to the European Commission:

    European Commission

    Directorate-General for Financial Stability, Financial Services and Capital Markets Union (DG FISMA)

    Rue de Spa 2

    B-1049 Brussels, Belgium

    E-mail: relex-sanctions@ec.europa.eu

    ▼M7




    ANNEX III

    List of equipment which might be used for internal repression as referred to in Article 1a and Article 1b

    1. Fire-arms, ammunition and related accessories therefor, as follows:

    1.1. 

    Firearms not controlled by ML 1 and ML 2 of the Common Military List of the European Union ( 7 ) (‘Common Military List’);

    1.2. 

    Ammunition specially designed for the firearms listed in item 1.1 and specially designed components therefor;

    1.3. 

    Weapon-sights not controlled by the Common Military List.

    2. Bombs and grenades not controlled by the Common Military List.

    3. Vehicles as follows:

    3.1. 

    Vehicles equipped with a water cannon, specially designed or modified for the purpose of riot control;

    3.2. 

    Vehicles specially designed or modified to be electrified to repel borders;

    3.3. 

    Vehicles specially designed or modified to remove barricades, including construction equipment with ballistic protection;

    3.4. 

    Vehicles specially designed for the transport or transfer of prisoners and/or detainees;

    3.5. 

    Vehicles specially designed to deploy mobile barriers;

    3.6. 

    Components for the vehicles specified in items 3.1 to 3.5 specially designed for the purposes of riot control.

    Note 1   This item does not control vehicles specially designed for the purposes of fire-fighting.

    Note 2   For the purposes of item 3.5 the term ‘vehicles’ includes trailers.

    4. Explosive substances and related equipment as follows:

    4.1. 

    Equipment and devices specially designed to initiate explosions by electrical or non-electrical means, including firing sets, detonators, igniters, boosters and detonating cord, and specially designed components therefor; except those specially designed for a specific commercial use consisting of the actuation or operation by explosive means of other equipment or devices the function of which is not the creation of explosions (e.g., car air-bag inflaters, electric-surge arresters of fire sprinkler actuators);

    4.2. 

    Linear cutting explosive charges not controlled by the Common Military List;

    4.3. 

    Other explosives not controlled by the Common Military List and related substances as follows:

    a. 

    amatol;

    b. 

    nitrocellulose (containing more than 12,5 % nitrogen);

    c. 

    nitroglycol;

    d. 

    pentaerythritol tetranitrate (PETN);

    e. 

    picryl chloride;

    f. 

    2,4,6-trinitrotoluene (TNT).

    5. Protective equipment not controlled by ML 13 of the Common Military List as follows:

    5.1. 

    Body armour providing ballistic and/or stabbing protection;

    5.2. 

    Helmets providing ballistic and/or fragmentation protection, anti-riot helmets, antiriot shields and ballistic shields.

    Note: This item does not control:

    — 
    equipment specially designed for sports activities,
    — 
    equipment specially designed for safety of work requirements,

    6. Simulators, other than those controlled by ML 14 of the Common Military List, for training in the use of firearms, and specially designed software therefor.

    7. Night vision, thermal imaging equipment and image intensifier tubes, other than those controlled by the Common Military List.

    8. Razor barbed wire.

    9. Military knives, combat knives and bayonets with blade lengths in excess of 10 cm.

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    9a. Riot control agents, as defined by article 1A004.a.4 of the Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2020/1749 of 7 October 2020 amending Council Regulation (EC) No 428/2009 setting up a Community regime for the control of exports, transfer, brokering and transit of dual-use items.

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    10. Production equipment specially designed for the items specified in this list.

    11. Specific technology for the development, production or use of the items specified in this list.

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    ANNEX IV

    EQUIPMENT, TECHNOLOGY AND SOFTWARE REFERRED TO IN ARTICLES 1c AND 1d

    General note

    Notwithstanding the contents of this Annex, it shall not apply to:

    (a) 

    equipment, technology or software which are specified in Annex I to Council Regulation (EC) No 428/2009 ( 8 ) or the Common Military List; or

    (b) 

    software which is designed for installation by the user without further substantial support by the supplier and which is generally available to the public by being sold from stock at retail selling points, without restriction, by means of:

    (i) 

    over the counter transactions;

    (ii) 

    mail order transactions;

    (iii) 

    electronic transactions; or

    (iv) 

    telephone order transactions; or

    (c) 

    software which is in the public domain.

    The categories A, B, C, D and E refer to the categories referred to in Regulation (EC) No 428/2009.

    The equipment, technology and software referred to in Articles 1c and 1d is:

    A. 

    List of equipment:

    — 
    Deep Packet Inspection equipment,
    — 
    Network Interception equipment including Interception Management Equipment (IMS) and Data Retention Link Intelligence equipment,
    — 
    Radio Frequency monitoring equipment,
    — 
    Network and Satellite jamming equipment,
    — 
    Remote Infection equipment,
    — 
    Speaker recognition/processing equipment,
    — 
    IMSI ( 9 ), MSISDN ( 10 ), IMEI ( 11 ), TMSI ( 12 ) interception and monitoring equipment,

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    — 
    Systems, equipment, and components therefor, specially designed or modified for the generation, command and control, or delivery of intrusion software as defined in Regulation (EU) 2021/821 of the European Parliament and of the Council ( 13 ),

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    — 
    Equipment designed or modified to perform cryptanalysis,
    — 
    Tactical SMS ( 14 ) /GSM ( 15 ) /GPS ( 16 ) /GPRS ( 17 ) /UMTS ( 18 ) /CDMA ( 19 ) /PSTN ( 20 ) interception and monitoring equipment,
    — 
    DHCP ( 21 ) /SMTP ( 22 ), GTP ( 23 ) information interception and monitoring equipment,
    — 
    Pattern Recognition and Pattern Profiling equipment,
    — 
    Remote Forensics equipment,
    — 
    Semantic Processing Engine equipment,
    — 
    WEP and WPA code breaking equipment,
    — 
    Interception equipment for VoIP proprietary and standard protocol.
    B. 

    Not used.

    C. 

    Not used.

    D. 

    "Software" for the "development", "production" or "use" of the equipment specified in point A and "software" having the characteristics of, or performing or simulating, the functions of the equipment specified in point A.

    E. 

    "Technology" for the "development", "production" or "use" of the equipment specified in point A.

    Equipment, technology and software falling within those categories is within the scope of this Annex only to the extent that it falls within the general description "internet, telephone and satellite communications interception and monitoring systems".

    For the purpose of this Annex, "monitoring" means acquisition, extraction, decoding, recording, processing, analysis and archiving call content or network data.

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    ANNEX V

    LIST OF NATURAL OR LEGAL PERSONS REFERRED TO IN ARTICLES 1e(7), 1f(7) AND 1fa(1)

    Belarus Ministry of Defence

    140 Repair Plant JSC

    558 Aircraft Repair Plant JSC

    2566 Radioelectronic Armament Repair Plant JSC

    AGAT - Control Systems - Managing Company of Geoinformation Control Systems Holding, JSC

    AGAT - Electromechanical Plant OJSC

    AGAT - SYSTEM

    ATE - Engineering LLC

    BelOMO Holding

    Belspetsvneshtechnika SFTUE

    Beltechexport CJSC

    BSVT-New Technologies

    Department of Internal Affairs of the Gomel Region Executive Committee

    Internal Troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Republic of Belarus

    KGB Alpha

    Kidma Tech OJSC

    Minotor-Service

    Minsk Wheeled Tractor Plant

    Oboronnye Initsiativy LLC

    OJS KB Radar Managing Company

    Peleng JSC

    State Authority for Military Industry of the Republic of Belarus

    State Security Committee of the Republic of Belarus

    Transaviaexport Airlines JSC

    Volatavto OJSC

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    ANNEX Va

    LIST OF GOODS AND TECHNOLOGY REFERRED TO IN ARTICLES 1f(1) AND 1fa(1)

    General Notes, Acronyms and Abbreviations, and Definitions in Annex I to Regulation (EU) 2021/821 apply to this Annex, with the exception of ‘Part I - General Notes, Acronyms and Abbreviations, and Definitions, General Notes to Annex I, point 2’.

    Definitions of terms used in the Common Military List (CML) of the European Union ( 24 ) apply to this Annex.

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    Without prejudice to Article 1m of this Regulation, non-controlled items containing one or more components listed in this Annex are not subject to the controls under Articles 1f and 1fa of this Regulation.

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    Category I - Electronics

    X.A.I.001 

    Electronic devices and components.

    a. 

    ‘Microprocessor microcircuits’, ‘microcomputer microcircuits’, and microcontroller microcircuits having any of the following:

    1. 

    A performance speed of 5 GigaFLOPS or more and an arithmetic logic unit with an access width of 32 bit or more;

    2. 

    A clock frequency rate exceeding 25 MHz; or

    3. 

    More than one data or instruction bus or serial communication port that provides a direct external interconnection between parallel ‘microprocessor microcircuits’ with a transfer rate of 2,5 Mbyte/s;

    b. 

    Storage integrated circuits, as follows:

    1. 

    Electrically erasable programmable read-only memories (EEPROMs) with a storage capacity:

    a. 

    Exceeding 16 Mbits per package for flash memory types; or

    b. 

    Exceeding either of the following limits for all other EEPROM types:

    1. 

    Exceeding 1 Mbit per package; or

    2. 

    Exceeding 256 kbit per package and a maximum access time of less than 80 ns;

    2. 

    Static random access memories (SRAMs) with a storage capacity:

    a. 

    Exceeding 1 Mbit per package; or

    b. 

    Exceeding 256 kbit per package and a maximum access time of less than 25 ns;

    c. 

    Analog-to-digital converters having any of the following:

    1. 

    A resolution of 8 bit or more, but less than 12 bit, with an output rate greater than 200 Mega Samples Per Second (MSPS);

    2. 

    A resolution of 12 bit with an output rate greater than 105 Mega Samples per Second (MSPS);

    3. 

    A resolution of more than 12 bit but equal to or less than 14 bit with an output rate greater than 10 Mega Samples per Second (MSPS); or

    4. 

    A resolution of more than 14 bit with an output rate greater than 2,5 Mega Samples Per Second (MSPS);

    d. 

    Field programmable logic devices having a maximum number of single-ended digital input/outputs between 200 and 700;

    e. 

    Fast Fourier Transform (FFT) processors having a rated execution time for a 1 024 point complex FFT of less than 1 ms;

    f. 

    Custom integrated circuits for which the function is unknown, or the control status of the equipment in which the integrated circuits will be used is unknown to the manufacturer, having any of the following:

    1. 

    More than 144 terminals; or

    2. 

    A typical ‘basic propagation delay time’ of less than 0,4 ns;

    g. 

    Traveling-wave ‘vacuum electronic devices’, pulsed or continuous wave, as follows:

    1. 

    Coupled cavity devices, or derivatives thereof;

    2. 

    Devices based on helix, folded waveguide, or serpentine waveguide circuits, or derivatives thereof, having any of the following:

    a. 

    An ‘instantaneous bandwidth’ of half an octave or more and average power (expressed in kW) times frequency (expressed in GHz) of more than 0,2; or

    b. 

    An ‘instantaneous bandwidth’ of less than half an octave; and average power (expressed in kW) times frequency (expressed in GHz) of more than 0,4;

    h. 

    Flexible waveguides designed for use at frequencies exceeding 40 GHz;

    i. 

    Surface acoustic wave and surface skimming (shallow bulk) acoustic wave devices, having either of the following:

    1. 

    A carrier frequency exceeding 1 GHz; or

    2. 

    A carrier frequency of 1 GHz or less; and

    a. 

    A ‘frequency side-lobe rejection’ exceeding 55 dB;

    b. 

    A product of the maximum delay time and bandwidth (time in microseconds and bandwidth in MHz) of more than 100; or

    c. 

    A dispersive delay of more than 10 microseconds;

    Technical Note: For the purpose of X.A.I.001.i ‘Frequency side-lobe rejection’ is the maximum rejection value specified in data sheet.

    j. 

    ‘Cells’ as follows:

    1. 

    ‘Primary cells’ having an ‘energy density’ of 550 Wh/kg or less at 293 K (20°C);

    2. 

    ‘Secondary cells’ having an ‘energy density’ of 350 Wh/kg or less at 293 K (20°C);

    Note: X.A.I.001.j does not control batteries, including single cell batteries.

    Technical Notes: 

    1. 

    For the purpose of X.A.I.001.j, energy density (Wh/kg) is calculated from the nominal voltage multiplied by the nominal capacity in ampere-hours (Ah) divided by the mass in kilograms. If the nominal capacity is not stated, energy density is calculated from the nominal voltage squared then multiplied by the discharge duration in hours divided by the discharge load in Ohms and the mass in kilograms.

    2. 

    For the purpose of X.A.I.001.j, a ‘cell’ is defined as an electrochemical device, which has positive and negative electrodes, and electrolyte, and is a source of electrical energy. It is the basic building block of a battery.

    3. 

    For the purpose of X.A.I.001.j.1, a ‘primary cell’ is a ‘cell’ that is not designed to be charged by any other source.

    4. 

    For the purpose of X.A.I.001.j.2, a ‘secondary cell’ is a ‘cell’ that is designed to be charged by an external electrical source.

    k. 

    ‘Superconductive’ electromagnets or solenoids specially designed to be fully charged or discharged in less than one minute, having all of the following:

    Note: X.A.I.001.k does not control ‘superconductive’ electromagnets or solenoids designed for Magnetic Resonance Imaging (MRI) medical equipment.

    1. 

    Maximum energy delivered during the discharge divided by the duration of the discharge of more than 500 kJ per minute;

    2. 

    Inner diameter of the current carrying windings of more than 250 mm; and

    3. 

    Rated for a magnetic induction of more than 8T or ‘overall current density’ in the winding of more than 300 A/mm2;

    l. 

    Circuits or systems for electromagnetic energy storage, containing components manufactured from ‘superconductive’ materials specially designed for operation at temperatures below the ‘critical temperature’ of at least one of their ‘superconductive’ constituents, having all of the following:

    1. 

    Resonant operating frequencies exceeding 1 MHz;

    2. 

    A stored energy density of 1 MJ/m3 or more; and

    3. 

    A discharge time of less than 1 ms;

    m. 

    Hydrogen/hydrogen-isotope thyratrons of ceramic-metal construction and rate for a peak current of 500 A or more;

    n. 

    Not used;

    o. 

    Solar cells, cell-interconnect-coverglass (CIC) assemblies, solar panels, and solar arrays, which are ‘space qualified’ and not controlled by 3A001.e.4 ( 25 ).

    X.A.I.002 

    General purpose "electronic assemblies", modules and equipment.

    a. 

    Electronic test equipment, other than those specified in the CML or in Regulation (EU) 2021/821;

    b. 

    Digital instrumentation magnetic tape data recorders having any of the following characteristics;

    1. 

    A maximum digital interface transfer rate exceeding 60 Mbit/s and employing helical scan techniques;

    2. 

    A maximum digital interface transfer rate exceeding 120 Mbit/s and employing fixed head techniques; or

    3. 

    ‘Space qualified’;

    c. 

    Equipment, with a maximum digital interface transfer rate exceeding 60 Mbit/s, designed to convert digital video magnetic tape recorders for use as digital instrumentation data recorders;

    d. 

    Non-modular analog oscilloscopes having a bandwidth of 1 GHz or greater;

    e. 

    Modular analog oscilloscope systems having either of the following characteristics:

    1. 

    A mainframe with a bandwidth of 1 GHz or greater; or

    2. 

    Plug-in modules with an individual bandwidth of 4 GHz or greater;

    f. 

    Analog sampling oscilloscopes for the analysis of recurring phenomena with an effective bandwidth greater than 4 GHz;

    g. 

    Digital oscilloscopes and transient recorders, using analog-to-digital conversion techniques, capable of storing transients by sequentially sampling single-shot inputs at successive intervals of less than 1 ns (greater than 1 Giga Samples per Second (GSPS)), digitizing to 8 bits or greater resolution and storing 256 or more samples.

    Note: X.A.I.002 controls the following specially designed components for analog oscilloscopes:

    1. 

    Plug-in units;

    2. 

    External amplifiers;

    3. 

    Pre-amplifiers;

    4. 

    Sampling devices;

    5. 

    Cathode ray tubes.

    X.A.I.003 

    Specific processing equipment, other than those specified in the CML or in Regulation (EU) 2021/821, as follows:

    a. 

    Frequency changers capable of operating in the frequency range from 300 up to 600 Hz, other than those specified in the CML or in Regulation (EU) 2021/821;

    b. 

    Mass spectrometers, other than those specified in the CML or in Regulation (EU) 2021/821;

    c. 

    All flash x-ray machines, or components of pulsed power systems designed thereof, including Marx generators, high power pulse shaping networks, high voltage capacitors, and triggers;

    d. 

    Pulse amplifiers, other than those specified in the CML or in Regulation (EU) 2021/821;

    e. 

    Electronic equipment for time delay generation or time interval measurement, as follows:

    1. 

    Digital time delay generators with a resolution of 50 nanoseconds or less over time intervals of 1 microsecond or greater; or

    2. 

    Multi-channel (three or more) or modular time interval meter and chronometry equipment with resolution of 50 nanoseconds or less over time intervals of 1 microsecond or greater;

    f. 

    Chromatography and spectrometry analytical instruments.

    X.B.I.001 

    Equipment for the manufacture of electronic components or materials, as follows, and specially designed components and accessories therefor.

    a. 

    Equipment specially designed for the manufacture of electron tubes, optical elements and specially designed components therefor controlled by 3A001 ( 26 ) or X.A.I.001;

    b. 

    Equipment specially designed for the manufacture of semiconductor devices, integrated circuits and ‘electronic assemblies’, as follows, and systems incorporating or having the characteristics of such equipment:

    Note: X.B.I.001.b. also controls equipment used or modified for use in the manufacture of other devices, such as imaging devices, electro-optical devices, acoustic-wave devices.

    1. 

    Equipment for the processing of materials for the manufacture of devices and components as specified in the heading of X.B.I.001.b, as follows:

    Note: X.B.I.001 does not control quartz furnace tubes, furnace liners, paddles, boats (except specially designed caged boats), bubblers, cassettes or crucibles specially designed for the processing equipment controlled by X.B.I.001.b.1.

    a. 

    Equipment for producing polycrystalline silicon and materials controlled by 3C001 ( 27 );

    b. 

    Equipment specially designed for purifying or processing III/V and II/VI semiconductor materials controlled by 3C001, 3C002, 3C003, 3C004, or 3C005 ( 28 ) except crystal pullers, for which see X.B.I.001.b.1.c below;

    c. 

    Crystal pullers and furnaces, as follows:

    Note: X.B.I.001.b.1.c does not control diffusion and oxidation furnaces.

    1. 

    Annealing or recrystallizing equipment other than constant temperature furnaces employing high rates of energy transfer capable of processing wafers at a rate exceeding 0,005 m2 per minute;

    2. 

    ‘Stored program controlled’ crystal pullers having any of the following characteristics:

    a. 

    Rechargeable without replacing the crucible container;

    b. 

    Capable of operation at pressures above 2,5 x 105 Pa; or

    c. 

    Capable of pulling crystals of a diameter exceeding 100 mm;

    d. 

    ‘Stored program controlled’ equipment for epitaxial growth having any of the following characteristics:

    1. 

    Capable of producing silicon layer with a thickness uniform to less than ± 2,5 % across a distance of 200 mm or more;

    2. 

    Capable of producing a layer of any material other than silicon with a thickness uniformity across the wafer of equal to or better than ± 3,5 %; or

    3. 

    Rotation of individual wafers during processing;

    e. 

    Molecular beam epitaxial growth equipment;

    f. 

    Magnetically enhanced ‘sputtering’ equipment with specially designed integral load locks capable of transferring wafers in an isolated vacuum environment;

    g. 

    Equipment specially designed for ion implantation, ion-enhanced or photo-enhanced diffusion, having any of the following characteristics:

    1. 

    Patterning capability;

    2. 

    Beam energy (accelerating voltage) exceeding 200 keV;

    3. 

    Optimised to operate at a beam energy (accelerating voltage) of less than 10 keV; or

    4. 

    Capable of high energy oxygen implant into a heated ‘substrate’;

    h. 

    ‘Stored program controlled’ equipment for the selective removal (etching) by means of anisotropic dry methods (e.g., plasma), as follows:

    1. 

    ‘Batch types’ having either of the following:

    a. 

    End-point detection, other than optical emission spectroscopy types; or

    b. 

    Reactor operational (etching) pressure of 26,66 Pa or less;

    2. 

    ‘Single wafer types’ having any of the following:

    a. 

    End-point detection, other than optical emission spectroscopy types;

    b. 

    Reactor operational (etching) pressure of 26,66 Pa or less; or

    c. 

    Cassette-to-cassette and load locks wafer handling;

    Notes:

     
    1. 

    ‘Batch types’ refers to machines not specially designed for production processing of single wafers. Such machines can process two or more wafers simultaneously with common process parameters, e.g., RF power, temperature, etch gas species, flow rates.

    2. 

    ‘Single wafer types’ refers to machines specially designed for production processing of single wafers. These machines may use automatic wafer handling techniques to load a single wafer into the equipment for processing. The definition includes equipment that can load and process several wafers but where the etching parameters, e.g., RF power or end point, can be independently determined for each individual wafer.

    i. 

    ‘Chemical vapor deposition’ (CVD) equipment, e.g., plasma-enhanced CVD (PECVD) or photo-enhanced CVD, for semiconductor device manufacturing, having either of the following capabilities, for deposition of oxides, nitrides, metals or polysilicon:

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    1. 

    "Chemical vapor deposition" equipment operating below 105 Pa; or

    ▼M46

    2. 

    PECVD equipment operating either below 60 Pa or having automatic cassette-to-cassette and load lock wafer handling;

    Note: X.B.I.001.b.1.i does not control low pressure ‘chemical vapor deposition’ (LPCVD) systems or reactive ‘sputtering’ equipment.

    j. 

    Electron beam systems specially designed or modified for mask making or semiconductor device processing having any of the following characteristics:

    1. 

    Electrostatic beam deflection;

    2. 

    Shaped, non-Gaussian beam profile;

    3. 

    Digital-to-analog conversion rate exceeding 3 MHz;

    4. 

    Digital-to-analog conversion accuracy exceeding 12 bit; or

    5. 

    Target-to-beam position feedback control precision of 1 micrometer or finer;

    Note: X.B.I.001.b.1.j does not control electron beam deposition systems or general purpose scanning electron microscopes.

    k. 

    Surface finishing equipment for the processing of semiconductor wafers as follows:

    1. 

    Specially designed equipment for backside processing of wafers thinner than 100 micrometer and the subsequent separation thereof; or

    2. 

    Specially designed equipment for achieving a surface roughness of the active surface of a processed wafer with a two-sigma value of 2 micrometer or less, total indicator reading (TIR);

    Note: X.B.I.001.b.1.k does not control single-side lapping and polishing equipment for wafer surface finishing.

    l. 

    Interconnection equipment which includes common single or multiple vacuum chambers specially designed to permit the integration of any equipment controlled by X.B.I.001 into a complete system;

    m. 

    ‘Stored program controlled’ equipment using ‘lasers’ for the repair or trimming of ‘monolithic integrated circuits’ with either of the following characteristics:

    1. 

    Positioning accuracy less than ± 1 micrometer; or

    2. 

    Spot size (kerf width) less than 3 micrometer.

    Technical Note: For the purpose of X.B.I.001.b.1, 'sputtering' is an overlay coating process wherein positively charged ions are accelerated by an electric field towards the surface of a target (coating material). The kinetic energy of the impacting ions is sufficient to cause target surface atoms to be released and deposited on the substrate. (Note: Triode, magnetron or radio frequency sputtering to increase adhesion of coating and rate of deposition are ordinary modifications of the process.).

    2. 

    Masks, mask substrates, mask-making equipment and image transfer equipment for the manufacture of devices and components as specified in the heading of X.B.I.001, as follows:

    Note: The term masks refers to those used in electron beam lithography, X-ray lithography, and ultraviolet lithography, as well as the usual ultraviolet and visible photo-lithography.

    a. 

    Finished masks, reticles and designs therefor, except:

    1. 

    Finished masks or reticles for the production of integrated circuits not controlled by 3A001 ( 29 ); or

    2. 

    Masks or reticles, having both of the following characteristics:

    a.