52000PC0847

Proposal for a DIRECTIVE OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL on occurrence reporting in civil aviation

(presented by the Commission)

EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM

It is widely recognised that air transport is among the safest modes of transport. Over the last ten years the annual average number of deaths in commercial air transport was 1243 per year in 49 accidents worldwide. Europe can report an even more favourable situation as it only accounts for 10 percent of the accidents while it produces about a third of the air traffic. In the Community, commercial air traffic provided by Community carriers resulted in a yearly average of 52 deaths (source: Airclaims). All the safety experts recognise however that the global rate of accidents is stabilising and, as a consequence, if nothing is done to improve it, the growth in air traffic will lead to an increase in the absolute number of fatal accidents per year. This would be clearly unacceptable and it is therefore necessary to explore new ways of improving air safety. For that reason the Commission proposes hereunder that the Community creates the necessary legal framework to collect and disseminate information on aviation incidents, at the widest scale, so that all parties involved in aviation can learn from mishaps and improve their performances to produce a safer system.

1. Previous Community initiatives

Even before Community competence in the field of transport safety was confirmed by the amendment of Article 75 of the Treaty [1], the Commission undertook constantly to share in the efforts to improve air transport safety : the first piece of Community legislation specific to air transport was a Directive of 1980 on accident investigation [2]. It then adopted its "Communication on Community initiatives concerning civil aviation incidents and accidents" [3]. Which suggested a policy to prevent accidents by launching initiatives in three areas: accident investigation, mandatory occurrence reports and confidential reporting systems.

[1] Now Article 71.

[2] Council Directive 80/1266/EEC of 16 December 1980 on future co-operation and mutual assistance between the Member States in the field of air accident investigation. OJ n° L 375 - 31.12.1980

[3] Document SEC(91)1419 final of 04.09.1991.

The adoption of a Directive on accident and incident investigation in November 1994 [4] was the first definitive achievement of this policy. That Directive aims at improving air safety by ensuring that any accident or serious incident is properly investigated with the sole objective of preventing its recurrence. However the limitations of this approach are mainly that, as the number of accidents is fortunately very low, the opportunities to learn from them are limited and that lessons are drawn only after a tragedy has already happened.

[4] Council Directive 94/56/EC of 21 November 1994 establishing the fundamental principles governing the investigation of civil aviation accidents and incidents. OJ n° L 319 - 12.12.1994.

It is now proposed to complement this first initiative with a more proactive one that will address both mandatory and confidential reporting of incidents, defects or malfunctions which may constitute a hazard for civil aviation operations, called under the generic term of "occurrences". Since accidents are usually preceded by a number of these "precursors", a better knowledge of occurrences may help to eliminate some of the causal factors leading to an accident and therefore prevent its happening.

2. Mandatory incident reporting

2.1. Current situation

Chapter 7 of Annex 13 to the Convention on International Civil Aviation recommends that "States should establish formal incident reporting systems to facilitate collection of information on actual or potential safety deficiencies" (7.3).

In view of this recommendation, the Commission has investigated the status of implementation of ICAO SARPs [5] on mandatory occurrence reporting systems. In a study carried out on behalf of the Commission, IFALPA [6] found that only few Member States collect mandatory occurrence reports and even fewer stored, retrieved or analysed the related data.

[5] Standards and Recommended Practices.

[6] International Federation of Air Line Pilots Associations.

Taken at the level of individual States, the number of significant occurrences may not be large enough to give an early indication of a potential serious hazard or to identify trends. The efficiency of a reporting system and the quality of the safety information that could be derived from it would therefore be improved if each Member State had access to a wider information base thanks to an exchange of information on occurrences. This is also confirmed by another recommendation from the same ICAO [7] document: "When practicable, States should establish systems, including data bases,.... The data base systems should use standardised formats to facilitate data exchange" (7.4).

[7] The International Civil Aviation Organisation.

Such is however not the case currently; existing data bases being not able to interconnect.

2.2. Feasibility of a Community mandatory incident reporting system

The Joint Research Centre of the Commission (JRC) was tasked to develop a tool enabling Member States to collect occurrence reports and exchange data without the need to change their current system, and furthermore to put at the disposal of Member States which do not have a data base or collect occurrence reports, the means for such collection and exchange.

This led the JRC to start a pilot project called ECCAIRS (European Co-ordination Centre for Aviation Incident Reporting Systems) under the supervision of an external Steering Committee consisting of representatives of Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Portugal, Sweden, United Kingdom, ICAO and the Commission.

At the end of the implementation phase the Steering Committee concluded "that the feasibility had been demonstrated.... Should a political decision to implement a co-ordinated system be taken, ...ECCAIRS could be the foundation for such a system. ...ECCAIRS would be an essential building block in establishing such (advanced analysis) techniques as it has the capability to bring together vast amounts of data from several sources".

A presentation seminar of ECCAIRS was organised by the Commission in March 1998 and strong support was expressed by the majority of the participants representing all the air transport sector (Civil Aviation Authorities, Accident Investigation Bodies, Air Traffic Management, manufacturers, airlines, staff representatives, research institutes, safety specialists, etc). As a European system, it would greatly enhance the effectiveness of national systems by allowing the establishment of a network that would permit easy access to data covering a much larger region. Also, the future european aviation safety organisation will need this kind of data to do its work properly.

In addition, the ECCAIRS system is fully compatible with ICAO's ADREP (Accident/incident Reporting) system and would enable Member States to report automatically, thus improving the presently far from satisfactory fulfilment of their reporting obligation under the Chicago Convention. It should also be noted that a number of third countries have expressed their interest in the ECCAIRS system and that the Community could be in a position to lead the way to the standardisation of accident and incident reporting for the benefit of air safety in other areas of the world.

In the meantime, efforts to arrive at the harmonisation of technical reporting requirements in Europe have also taken place in JAA and EUROCONTROL. The Commission participated in the working groups dedicated to these initiatives and the results of their work has been integrated in the annexes to this directive which list reportable events. In this way, consistency in all the reporting requirements is ensured.

The Commission is now convinced that the establishment at Community level of a mandatory occurrence reporting system is feasible and has developed a tool, which can work as a centralised system for those Member States which do not want to develop their own data base, or a decentralised one to facilitate the exchange and integration of information with those who have one.

2.3. Creating the necessary framework

As a consequence the Commission considers that it is fully consistent with the provisions of Article 80 (2) that the Community takes initiative leading to the establishment of a Community mandatory reporting scheme to collect, record, exchange and disseminate information on hazardous or potentially hazardous occurrences.

In this way, the Civil Aviation Authorities and persons or organisations having an influence on air safety may learn from them and an assessment of the safety implications of each occurrence, both in itself and in relation to similar occurrences happening all over the Community, can be made so that necessary action is taken in due time. In addition, selected information shall also be put at the disposal of other relevant players in the field of air safety on a case by case when they can benefit from it for the improvement of air safety.

In order to do that however all Member States must trust each other on the status of the information, which will be exchanged. Failing that, it must be recognized indeed that countries which consider that such information is confidential, will not communicate it to other countries where it would be put in the public. There is a need therefore to agree on a common regime for the dissemination of the information. Because of the sensitivity of such information and the risk that raw data may create in the public wrong assumptions on the safety of aviation, it is considered wise to keep all detailed information confidential and to limit its access to official bodies. Since however data must be made available to professionals which can use it to improve aviation safety (operators, manufacturers, designers, training organisations, research establishments,...) it is necessary to empower the Commission to develop a policy and to make decisions on selective dissemination to such interested parties, so as they can get the necessary information to fulfil their tasks and contribute to improving their own and the global level of aviation safety. Moreover, as it is legitimate that the public at large knows what is the general level of safety of aviation in the Community, aggregated statistics will be published regularly.

Finally, witnesses of occurrences may not be encouraged to report them if they run the risk to be punished for possible involvement in such events. This would dry out the source of information, which is so necessary to further improve aviation safety. It is necessary therefore to agree on protecting the source of information.

It should be stressed however that such mandatory reporting is distinct from the internal reporting established by manufacturers, airlines or maintenance organisations, as part of their safety audit systems, to fulfil their safety responsibilities. It is not intended therefore to replace the ones by the others. On the contrary, these internal procedures should be used to channel reportable occurrences [8] and filter the large number of non-reportable occurrences, which could otherwise swamp the mandatory reporting systems.

[8] The feasibility of connections between manufacturers, airlines or maintenance organisations reporting systems and mandatory occurrence reporting systems are currently being examined in order to enable automated transmission of relevant information.

3. Confidential incident reporting

3.1. Current situation

Experience has shown that mandatory reporting is relatively successful at collecting information on technical defects and other incidents, which do not involve the responsibility of reporters. On the opposite, human errors, even if they are induced for example by wrong cockpit design or complicated procedures, are seldom reported and there is little chance they will surface spontaneously. Knowing that human factors are involved to a certain extent in about eighty percent of the accidents, reporting system providing for the confidentiality of reporters are essential tools for accident prevention.

In September 1999, ICAO held an Accident Investigation and Prevention (AIG) Divisional Meeting in Montreal where aviation safety experts from 83 contracting states and 11 observer organisations reviewed the ICAO Standards and Recommended Practices, in particular those of Annex 13. They concluded inter alia that :

"A State should establish a voluntary [9] incident reporting system to facilitate the collection of information that may not be captured by a mandatory incident reporting system.

[9] In ICAO language, such a system is called "voluntary" as opposed to mandatory, while in Europe we usually designate it as "confidential" in order to avoid mixing up this concept with all the other systems established e.g. by manufacturers, airlines or maintenance organisations.

A voluntary incident reporting system shall be non-punitive and afford protection to the sources of information.

Note 1.- A non-punitive environment is fundamental to voluntary reporting.

Note 2.- States are encouraged to facilitate and promote the voluntary reporting of events that could affect aviation safety by adjusting their applicable laws, regulations and policies, as necessary.

Unfortunately, very few Member States have taken the necessary steps to allow the establishment of such confidential reporting schemes.

The Commission considers necessary that the Community provides the necessary framework to enable the setting up of a confidential incidents reporting programme which will encourage submission of voluntary reports of observed deficiencies in the aviation system perceived as an actual or potential hazard, and feed the aviation system with a view to contribute to the improvement of its safety level.

3.2. Feasibility of a Community confidential incident reporting system

As already identified in the above mentioned study carried out by IFALPA, the single main element to obtain the trust and confidence of reporters in the confidentiality of the reporting system is to disidentify as early as filed the datas they give so that nobody down in the chains of dissemination and analysis can anymore identify them.

In order to evaluate the feasibility of the concept, the Commission supported financially the establishment of a confidential reporting system in Germany. This system, called EUCARE, ran as a research prototype from 1993 to 1999. Its operation was monitored by a Steering Committee composed of safety experts of Member States and chaired by the Commission. On the basis of this experience, the Steering Committee produced a Requirement Document, which describes in detail how a confidential reporting system should be organised in order to gain the confidence of all parties. The involvement of the Commission in this experience enabled it also to participate in the meetings of the International Council of Aviation Safety Systems, which is the world-wide association of confidential reporting systems, to benefit from experiences in other parts of the world.

Another study was also conducted [10] to evaluate the legal feasibility of confidential reporting in countries where legal provisions derive from the "Napoleonic Code", in particular France and Spain. That study concluded that"...no truly relevant legal obstacle stands in the way of the establishment of voluntary air incident reports. ...The Community could ...establish the general legal framework for a standard voluntary aircraft incident reporting system ...From a strictly legal point of view it does not appear impossible to consider a system with operational principles that need not necessarily comply with the legal practices of each Member State and which therefore require special derogations from the criminal law".

[10] Legal problems posed by implementation of a Community voluntary incident reporting system in the field of air safety, by Prof. Lucien Rapp.

The organisation at Community level of confidential incident reporting is therefore feasible and enough knowledge and experience has been gained by Member States and the Commission to facilitate a mostly human factor oriented network of confidential reporting systems.

3.3. Creating the necessary framework

Since human factors are closely linked with culture, communication and local habits, Member States seem well placed to organise confidential reporting at national level. However, confidentiality may be very difficult to guarantee in the small circle of aviation at that level. As a consequence, trust and confidence of the would-be reporters could perhaps be better served by regional or sub-regional bodies.

Trust and confidence furthermore seem to be easier to gain if bodies managing the reports are not themselves official or administrative organisations and if interested parties can participate in their oversight so that confidentiality is guaranteed. This indicates that the best organisational status for bodies in charge with confidential reporting is likely to be that of foundations involving all interested parties and sponsored by governmental bodies and the industry. There are already some organisations created by national authorities and the industry operating with success.

Therefore, the Commission considers that the best option is for the Community to act as a facilitator, so that interested parties can establish the necessary structures, or existing bodies can expand their activities in the Community.

To do so, it is necessary to overcome the legal difficulties revealed by the feasibility studies. It is indeed essential that report can be disidentified throughout the Community, without reporters or persons in charge of disidentification can be accused of falsification, nor of destruction of evidence in case an accident would be later the subject of judicial enquiries. The Commission therefore proposes that the Member States adjust their laws, regulations and administrative practices so as to allow the disidentification of reports of occurrences, which are not subject to mandatory reporting.

If necessary the Commission could also examine how the Community budget allocated to improving air safety could be used to support existing or new foundations when they meet the necessary conditions, as identified by the EUCARE study, to win the trust and confidence of all interested parties.

4. Conclusion

The improvement of air safety justifies that more efforts are made to prevent accidents. This could be done through a better knowledge and analysis of large samples of data about incidents and many other mishaps which, without presenting by themselves any character of seriousness, may reveal weaknesses or malfunctionings which, if not corrected and happening in conjunction, could lead to an accident.

To obtain such large samples of data it is necessary to put in place a framework providing for the report of as many incidents as possible, the sharing of information and its dissemination towards those which can analyse it and draw the appropriate conclusions. Such a framework entails the establishment of mandatory and confidential reporting schemes, as well as the sharing of information on the basis of commonly agreed rules of confidentiality and dissemination.

Such are the objectives of the attached proposal.

SUBSIDIARITY / PROPORTIONALITY

The Commission has also considered the compatibility of the proposal with the principle of subsidiarity by addressing the following questions.

a) What are the objectives of the proposal in relation to the obligations of the Community and what is the Community dimension of the problem-

The main objective of the proposal is to increase air transport safety on the basis of article 80 (2) which requires the Community to take initiative in this field which is already covered by extensive Community legislation.

b) Does competence for the planned activities lie solely with the Community or is it shared with the Member States-

The envisaged action does not relate to an exclusive competence of the Community.

c) Which solution is most efficient in comparison between Community measures and measures of the Member States, what added value does the proposed Community action provide and what are the costs of no action-

Reporting systems operated by Member States in isolation are less efficient than a co-ordinated network with exchange of information enabling an earlier identification of possible safety problems. Experience has shown that incident occurring in one Member State were not known in other Member States and that similar circumstances led to a fatal accident.

Moreover, without establishing common legal bases for protecting the confidential reporting of incidents, such an essential tool for the improvement of aviation safety has no chance to prosper as necessary by lack of legal certainty across borders that reporters and persons working in the disidentification of reports may not be sued in one Member State for his involvement in confidential reporting in another Member State.

d) What kind of action is at the disposal of the Community-

In order to provide for the establishment of reporting schemes in all the Member States the Community could provide incentives in the form of financial support, and establishment of a central data bank, but this would not suffice because Member States do not have the same policies on disidentification or the disclosure to the public of safety information. To solve these problems there is no other choice for the Community than adopting a legislation which specify a common regime in these fields.

e) Is uniform regulation necessary or is it sufficient to draft a Directive, which outlines the general objectives while leaving execution to the Member States-

In such a domain, uniformity is not necessary and it is considered sufficient to use a framework Directive, setting goals that the Member States will apply with a degree of freedom.

Accordingly, the Commission reached the conclusion that its proposal is consistent with the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality.

COMMENTS ON THE VARIOUS ARTICLES

Article 1

This Article states the objective of the Directive.

Article 2

This Article sets the scope of the directive. It extends the reporting requirement outside the Community because the State of registration or of operation of an aircraft needs to be aware of all occurences involving their aircraft, independently of the place where it happened.

Article 3

This Article lays down the necessary definitions.

Article 4

This Article lists the persons involved in the public transport operations, which should be required to report occurrences. It also leaves the door open to reports coming from other areas of civil aviation and leaves the possibility to add new categories of reporters and of occurrences

Article 5

This Article requires that occurrence reports are collected, evaluated, processed and stored in a database. For this purpose, Member States must entrust a competent authority, which could be the civil aviation authority or the accident investigation body.

Article 6

This Article requires Member States to participate in an exchange of information. In order to facilitate it, the Commission put at the disposal of Member States a software that will enable them to fulfil this requirement. States, which already use another software, should seek to be compatible with the Commission software although it should be noted that compatibility was built from the start between this software and the ones presently in use in Member States.

Article 7

This Article ensures that information gathered from the reports should be made available for improving safety. The information collected and exchanged will be available to each national civil aviation authority which will use it for its day to day work as safety regulator and to the entities investigating civil aviation accidents and incidents. The different categories of reporters may have access to the relevant level of information in order for them to realise the usefulness of their participation and to learn from experience of their peers. Other parties involved in the improvement of aviation safety such as research centres, training organisations or universities may also receive selected information for their own use. Release of this information will be made on a case by case and "need to know" basis. The legitimate interest of the public to be informed of the safety level of aviation will also be taken into account by the publication of specific regular review and, if deemed necessary, extract from actual, disidentified reports.

Article 8

This Article establishes the status of the information exchanged under this directive and aims at protecting the reporters and the information they supply in order to guarantee free and confident reporting for the benefit of safety. This Article also aims at creating a blame-free safety environment substituting preventive corrective action to punitive reaction.

Article 9

This Article requires the Member States to adapt their legislation in order to enable the setting up of confidential reporting systems.

Article 10

This Article establishes a Committee to assist the Commission in the implementation of the provisions of this directive.

Article 11 to 13

Procedural Articles.

2000/0343 (COD)

Proposal for a DIRECTIVE OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL on occurrence reporting in civil aviation

(Text with EEA relevance)

THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,

Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community, and in particular Article 80 (2) thereof,

Having regard to the proposal from the Commission [11],

[11] OJ C , , p. .

Having regard to the opinion of the Economic and Social Committee [12],

[12] OJ C , , p. .

Having regard to the opinion of the Committee of the Regions [13],

[13] OJ C , , p. .

Acting in accordance with the procedure laid down in Article 251 of the Treaty [14],

[14] OJ C , , p. .

Whereas:

(1) The rate of accidents in civil aviation has remained fairly constant in the last decade, generating concern that the forecasted traffic increase could lead to an unacceptable increase in the number of accidents in the near future.

(2) Council Directive 94/56/EC of 21 November 1994 establishing the fundamental principles governing the investigation of civil aviation accidents and incidents aims at preventing future accidents by facilitating the expeditious holding of investigations.

(3) Experience has shown that before an accident occurs, a number of incidents and numerous other deficiencies have shown the existence of safety hazards.

(4) The improvement of the safety of civil aviation requires a better knowledge of these occurrences to facilitate analysis and trend monitoring in order to initiate corrective actions.

(5) When these occurrences involve aircraft registered in a Member State or operated by an undertaking established in a Member State, this occurrence should be reported even when it happened outside the territory of the Community

(6) Each Member State should set up mandatory reporting systems.

(7) Various categories of personnel working in civil aviation observe occurrences of interest for the prevention of accidents and should therefore report them.

(8) The efficiency of detection of potential hazard would be greatly enhanced by the exchange of information on occurrences.

(9) A supporting software for the exchange of information between different system is necessary.

(10) Safety information shall be available to entities entrusted to regulate civil aviation safety or to investigate accidents and incidents within the Community and, as appropriate, to the people who may learn from it and take or initiate the necessary action to improve safety.

(11) The sensitive nature of safety information is such that the only way to ensure the gathering of such information is by ensuring its confidentiality, the protection of its source and the confidence of the personnel working in civil aviation;

(12) The public should be provided with general information on the level of aviation safety.

(13) Mandatory reporting systems shall be supplemented by confidential reporting schemes to collect mainly human factor related incidents.

(14) Legal measures should be put in place to enable the setting up of confidential reporting schemes.

(15) The measures necessary for the implementation of this Directive should be adopted in accordance with Council Decision 1999/468/EC of 28 June 1999 laying down the procedures for the exercise of implementing powers conferred on the Commission [15].

[15] OJ L 184, 17.7.1999, p. 23.

(16) Consistency should be ensured with the technical reporting requirements developped by national experts in EUROCONTROL and the JAA, the list of reportable occurences takes into account the work of these two European organisations.

(17) In accordance with the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality as set out in Article 5 of the Treaty, the objective of the proposed action, improvement of air safety, cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States, because reporting systems operated by Member States in isolation are less efficient than a coordinated network with exchange of information enabling an earlier identification of possible safety problems, and can therefore be better achieved by the Community. This Directive confines itself to the minimum required in order to achieve this objective and does not go beyond what is necessary for that purpose.

HAVE ADOPTED THIS DIRECTIVE:

Article 1 - Objective

The purpose of this directive is to contribute to the improvement of air safety by ensuring that safety critical information is reported, collected, stored, protected and disseminated in order to facilitate its effective analysis and monitoring.

The sole objective of occurrence reporting is the prevention of future accidents and incidents and not to attribute blame or liability.

Article2 - Scope

1. This directive shall apply to occurrences which have occurred in the territory of the Community.

2. This directive shall also apply outside the territory of the Community to occurrences involving aircraft registered in a Member State or operated by an undertaking established in a Member State.

Article3 - Definitions

For the purpose of this Directive:

"Disidentification" means removing from reports submitted all personal details pertaining to the reporter and technical details, which might lead to the identity of the reporter, or third parties, being inferred from the information.

"Occurrence" means accidents, incidents and serious incidents as defined in Article 3, point (a), (j) and (k), of directive 94/56/EC as well as other defects or malfunctioning of an aircraft, its equipment, ground equipment and any element of the Air Navigation System which is used or intended to be used for the purpose or in connection with the operation of an aircraft or with the provision of an air traffic management service or navigational aid to an aircraft;

"Reportable occurrence" means an occurrence, endangering or, which if not corrected would endanger an aircraft, its occupants or any other person. A non-exhaustive list of examples of reportable occurences can be found in Annex I and II.

Article 4 - Mandatory reporting

1. Member States shall require that reportable occurrences are reported to the competent authority referred to in Article 5(1) by every person who:

a) is the operator or commander of a turbine powered aircraft or a public transport aircraft used or operated under the control of its competent civil aviation authority;

b) carries on the business of manufacturing or maintaining such an aircraft, or any equipment or part thereof;

c) signs a certificate of maintenance review, or of release to service in respect of such an aircraft, part or equipment;

d) performs a function for which he requires to be a qualified air traffic controller;

e) performs the function of manager of an aerodrome open to public transport aircraft;

f) performs a function connected with the installation, modification, maintenance, repair, overhaul, flight checking or inspection of equipment on the ground which is used or intended to be used for the purpose or in connection with the provision of an air traffic control service or navigational aid to an aircraft.

g) performs a function connected with the handling of aircraft on the ground, including fueling, servicing, loadsheet preparation, loading, de-icing and towing,

2. Member States shall encourage voluntary reporting by every person who exercise in other civil aviation operations, similar functions as those listed in paragraph 1.

3. The Commission may, in accordance with the procedure laid down in Article 10(2), decide on the addition to paragraph 1 of new categories of reporters and modify the Annexes in order to expand upon, or change, the examples.

Article 5 - Collection and storage of information

1. Member States shall designate a competent authority to put in place a mechanism to collect, evaluate, process and store occurrence reports.

The following authorities may be entrusted with that responsibility:

a) The national civil aviation provided that the independence of the exercise of this function from any other duty of that authority is duly assured.

b) The investigating body or entity established under Article 6 of Directive 94/56/EC.

2. The reports collected under the provisions of Article 4 shall be stored in a database.

3. Member States shall ensure that safety relevant information deriving from the analysis of confidential reporting covered by Article 9 are also stored in that database.

Article 6 - Exchange of information

1. Member States shall participate in a mutual exchange of information by making all relevant safety related information stored in the database mentionned in Article 5(2) available to the competent authorities of the other Member States and the Commission.

The database shall be compatible with the software described in paragraph 2.

2. The Commission shall develop a specific software for the purpose of this directive. Member States may use this software for running their own database.

3. The Commission may lay down appropriate measures to facilitate the exchange of information foreseen in paragraph 1 in accordance with the procedure set out in Article 10(2).

Article 7 - Dissemination of information

1. Any entity entrusted to regulate civil aviation safety or to investigate civil aviation accidents and incidents within the Community shall have access to information on occurrences collected and exchanged in accordance with articles 5 and 6 to enable it to draw the safety lessons from the reported occurrences.

2. The Commission may, in accordance with the procedure laid down in Article 10(2), decide on the release of selected information to the categories of reporters listed in Article 4(1) and to other interested parties. Such decisions, which can be generic or individual, shall be based on the need to:

-provide persons and/or organisations with the information they need to correct deficiencies in aviation safety and improve aviation safety, or

-allow the analysis of occurences by bodies specialised in aviation safety or directly related matters.

The decision to disseminate information under this paragraph may be limited to what is strictly required for the purpose of its user, without prejudice to the provisions of Article 8.

3. Member States shall publish at least annually a safety review containing information on the types of occurrences collected by their national mandatory occurrence-reporting scheme to inform the public of the safety level of information. Member States may also publish disidentified reports.

Article 8 - Protection of information

1. The information exchanged in accordance with Article 6 and disseminated in accordance with Article 7(1) and 7(2) shall be confidential and shall be used solely for the purpose covered by the activities of participants and addressees.

2. Regardless of type or classification of occurrence, names or addresses of individual persons shall never be recorded on the database mentionned in Article 5(2).

3. The competent authority shall not disclose the name of the person submitting a report or of a person to whom it relates unless required to do so in the context of judicial inquiries or unless the persons concerned authorise disclosure.

4. Member States shall refrain from instituting proceedings in respect of unpremeditated or inadvertent breaches of the law, which come to its attention only because they have been reported under the national mandatory occurrence-reporting scheme.

5. Member States shall adapt their laws, regulations and administrative provisions so as to ensure that employees who duly and accurately report incidents, of which they may have knowledge, are not subjected to any detriment by their employer.

6. This Article applies without prejudice to national rules related to access to information by judicial authorities.

Article 9 - Confidential reporting

Member States shall adapt their laws, regulations and administrative provisions to permit the disidentification of voluntary reports of non reportable occurrences by bodies created to collect, analyse and disseminate to parties able to use it for improving aviation safety, information on observed deficiencies in the aviation system perceived by the reporter as an actual or potential hazard.

Article 10 - Committee

1. The Commission shall be assisted by the committee instituted by Article 12 of Council Regulation (EEC) n° 3922/91 of 16 December 1991 on the harmonisation of technical requirements and administrative procedures in the field of civil aviation [16].

[16] OJ L 373, 31.12.91, p. 4.

2. Where reference is made to this paragraph, Article 5 and 7 of Decision 1999/468/EC shall apply, having regard to the provisions of Article 8 thereof.

3. The period provided for in Article 5(6) of Decision 1999/468/EC shall be set at three months.

Article 11 - Implementation

1. Member States shall bring into force the laws, regulations and administrative provisions necessary to comply with this Directive by at the latest. They shall forthwith inform the Commission thereof.

When Member States adopt those provisions, they shall contain a reference to this Directive or be accompanied by such a reference on the occasion of their official publication. Member States shall determine how such reference is to be made.

2. The Member States shall communicate to the Commission the texts of the main provisions of national law which they adopt in the field governed by this Directive.

Article 12 - Entry into force

This Directive shall enter into force on the twentieth day following that of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Communities.

Article 13 - Adressees

This Directive is addressed to the Member States.

Done at Brussels,

For the European Parliament For the Council

The President The President

ANNEX I

List of examples of reportable occurrences

NOTE: Although this Annex lists the majority of occurrences which should be reported it cannot be completely comprehensive and any other occurrences judged by those involved, to meet the criteria should be reported.

A) Aircraft Flight Operations

i) Operation of the Aircraft

a) An avoidance manoeuvre required to avoid a collision with an aircraft, terrain or other object or an unsafe situation, or when avoidance action would have been appropriate

b) Take-off or landing incidents, including precautionary or forced landings. Incidents such as under-shooting, overrunning or running off the side of runways. Take-offs, aborted take-offs, landings or attempted landings on a closed, occupied or incorrect runway.

c) Gross failures to achieve predicted performance during take-off or initial climb

d) Critically low fuel quantity or inability to transfer fuel or use total quantity of usable fuel.

e) Loss of control (including partial or temporary loss of control) from any cause

f) Occurrences close to or above V1 resulting from or producing a hazardous or potentially hazardous situation (e.g. rejected take-off, tail strike, engine power loss etc.).

g) Go-around producing a hazardous or potentially hazardous situation

h) Unintentional significant deviation from airspeed, intended track or altitude. (more than 300 ft in non RVSM airspace) from any cause

i) Descent below decision height/altitude or minimum descent height/altitude without the required visual reference.

j) Heavy landing - a landing deemed to require a 'heavy landing check'.

k) Exceedance of fuel imbalance limits

l) Incorrect setting of an SSR code or of an altimeter subscale resulting in, or could result in, a hazardous situation.

m) Incorrect programming of, or erroneous entries into, equipment used for navigation or performance calculations, or use of incorrect data, which resulted in, or could have resulted in, a hazardous situation

n) Incorrect receipt or interpretation of radiotelephony messages which resulted in, or could have resulted in, a hazardous situation.

o) Fuel system malfunctions or defects, which had a significant effect on fuel supply and/or distribution.

p) Aircraft leaving a paved surface which results in, or could have resulted in, a hazard

q) Inadvertent incorrect operation of any controls which resulted in, or could have resulted in, a significant hazard

r) Inability to achieve the intended aircraft configuration for any flight phase (e.g. landing gear and doors, flaps, stabilisers, slats etc)

s) A hazard or potential hazard which arises as a consequence of any deliberate simulation of failure conditions for training, system checks or training purposes

t) Abnormal vibration felt by the crew

u) abnormal ice accumulation leading to significant effects on performance or handling qualities

v) Operation of any primary warning system associated with manoeuvring of the aircraft e.g. configuration warning, stall warning (stick shake), over speed warning etc. unless:

w) the crew conclusively established that the indication was false. Provided that the false warning did not result in difficulty or hazard arising from the crew response to the warning.

x) Unless operated for training or test purposes

y) GPWS 'warning' when:

(1) the aircraft comes into closer proximity to the ground than had been planned or anticipated; or

(2) the warning is experienced in IMC or at night and is established as having been triggered by a high rate of descent (Mode 1); or

(3) the warning results from failure to select landing gear or land flap by the appropriate point on the approach (Mode 4); or

(4) any difficulty or hazard arises or might have arisen as a result of crew response to the 'warning' e.g. possible reduced separation from other traffic. This could include warning of any Mode or Type i.e. genuine, nuisance or false.

z) GPWS 'alert' when:

(1) any difficulty or hazard arises or might have arisen as a result of crew response to the 'alert'.

aa) ACAS RAs

bb) Jet or prop blast incidents resulting in significant damage or serious injury.

ii) Emergencies

a) Fire, explosion, smoke or toxic or noxious fumes, even though fires were extinguished.

b) The use of any non-standard procedure by the flight or cabin crew to deal with an emergency

c) Inadequacy of any procedures designed to be used in an emergency, including when being used for maintenance, training or test purposes.

d) An emergency evacuation.

e) Depressurisation

f) The use in flight or on the ground of any emergency equipment or prescribed emergency procedures in order to deal with a situation.

g) The declaration of an emergency ('Mayday' or 'Pan')

h) Failure of any emergency system or equipment, including all exit doors and lighting, to perform satisfactorily, including when being used for maintenance, training or test purposes.

i) Events requiring the emergency use of oxygen by the flight crew

iii) Crew Incapacitation

a) Incapacitation of any member of the flight crew, including that which occurs prior to departure if it is considered that it could have resulted in incapacitation after take-off.

b) Incapacitation of any member of the cabin crew which renders them unable to perform essential emergency duties.

iv) Injury

a) Occurrences, which have or could have led to significant injury to passengers or crew but which are not considered reportable as an accident.

v) Meteorology

a) A lightning strike which resulted in significant damage to the aircraft or loss or malfunction of any essential service.

b) A hail strike which resulted in significant damage to the aircraft or loss or malfunction of any essential service.

c) Severe turbulence encounter - an encounter resulting in injury to occupants or deemed to require a 'turbulence check' of the aircraft.

d) Windshear encounter resulting in significant handling difficulties

vi) Security

a) Unlawful interference of the aircraft including a bomb threat or hijack.

b) Difficulty in controlling intoxicated, violent or unruly passengers which resulted in a hazardous situation

c) Discovery of a stowaway

vii) Other Occurrences

a) Repetitive instances of a specific type of occurrence which in isolation would not be considered 'reportable' but which due to the frequency at which they arise form a potential hazard.

b) A bird strike which resulted in significant damage to the aircraft or loss or malfunction of any essential service.

c) Wake turbulence encounters resulting in significant handling difficulties

d) Any other occurrence of any type considered to have endangered or which might have endangered the aircraft or its occupants

B) Aircraft Technical

viii) Structural

a) Aircraft structural failures not classified as an accident."

Note: Not all structural failures need to be reported. Engineering judgement is required to decide whether a failure is serious enough to be reported. The following examples can be taken into consideration:

(1) Damage to a Principal Structural Element that has not been qualified as damage tolerant (life limited element). Principal Structural Elements are those which contribute significantly to carrying flight, ground, and pressurisation loads, and whose failure could result in a catastrophic failure of the aircraft

(2) Typical examples of such elements are listed for large aeroplanes in AC/ACJ 25.571(a) "damage tolerance and fatigue evaluation of structure", and in the equivalent ACJ material for rotorcraft

(3) Defect or damage exceeding admissible damages to a Principal Structural Element that has been qualified as damage tolerant, found during scheduled inspections.

(4) Damage to or defect exceeding allowed tolerances of a structural element which failure could reduce the structural stiffness to such an extent that the required flutter, divergence or control reversal margins are no longer achieved.

(5) Damage to or defect of a structural element which could result in the liberation of items of mass that may injure occupants of the aircraft.

(6) Damage to or defect of a structural element, which could jeopardise proper operation of systems.

(7) Loss of any part of the aircraft structure in flight

ix) Systems

The following generic criteria applicable to all systems are proposed:

a) Loss, significant malfunction or defect of any system, subsystem or set of equipment when standard-operating procedures, drills etc. could not be satisfactorily accomplished.

b) Inability of the crew to control the system: e.g.

(1) uncommented actions

(2) incorrect and or incomplete response, including limitation of movement or stiffness

(3) Runaway

(4) Mechanical disconnection or failure

c) Failure or malfunction of the exclusive(s) functions of the system. ( one system could integrate several functions)

d) Interference within or between systems.

e) Failure or malfunction of the protection device or emergency system associated with the system.

f) Loss of redundancy of the system outside the limits.

g) Any occurrence resulting from unforeseen behaviour of a system.

h) For aircraft types with single main systems, subsystems or sets of equipment

(1) Loss, significant malfunction or defect in any main system, subsystem or set of equipment.

i) For aircraft types with multiple independent main systems, subsystems or sets of equipment

(1) The loss, significant malfunction or defect of more than one main system, subsystem or set of equipment

j) Operation of any primary warning system associated with aircraft systems or equipment unless the crew conclusively established that the indication was false provided that the false warning did not result in difficulty or hazard arising from the crew response to the warning.

k) Leakage of hydraulic fluids, fuel, oil or other fluids which resulted in a fire hazard or possible hazardous contamination of aircraft structure, systems or equipment, or risk to occupants

l) Malfunction or defect of any indication system when this results in the possibility of misleading indications to the crew.

m) Any failure, malfunction or defect if it occurs at a critical phase of flight and relevant to the operation of that system.

n) Occurrences of significant shortfall of the actual performances compared to the approved performance which resulted in a hazardous situation (taking into account the accuracy of the performance calculation method) including braking action, fuel consumption etc.

o) Asymmetry of flight controls; e.g. flaps, slats, spoilers etc.

Annex II gives a list of examples of reportable occurrences resulting from the application of these generic criteria to specific systems

x) Propulsion and APU Systems (Including Engines, Propellers, Rotor Systems and APUs)

a) Engines

Aircraft types with one or two engines

(a) flameout, shutdown or significant malfunction of any engine

Aircraft types with three or more engines

(b) flameout, shutdown or significant malfunction of more than one engine

Engines: All aircraft types:

(c) Flameout, shutdown or significant malfunction of any engine when: it occurs at a critical phase of flight (e.g. V1, or during approach/landing) or exceptional circumstances exist or unforeseen consequences arise (e.g. uncontained failure, fire, aircraft handling problems etc)

(d) Uncontained failure, significant overspeed or inability to control the speed of any high speed-rotating component (for example: Auxiliary power unit, air starter, air cycle machine, air turbine motor, propeller or rotor).

(e) failure or malfunction of any part of an engine or powerplant resulting in any one or more of the following:

(1) non containment of high energy debris

(2) sustained internal or external fire, or hot gas breakout

(3) break up of the engine structure or mountings, or partial or complete loss of a major part of the powerplant

(4) engine defect causing visible fumes or any sort of invisible noxious or toxic fumes in the cabin conditioning air

(f) an uncommanded thrust/power loss , change or oscillation where:

(1) this could affect more than one engine in a multi-engine aircraft, particularly in the case of a twin engined aircraft, or

(2) it is considered excessive for a single engine aircraft application, or

(3) it involves a multi-engine aircraft where the same, or similar, engine type is used in a single engine aircraft application.

(g) any defect causing part retirement found in a life controlled part before completion of the full life of the part

(h) defects of common origin which could cause an in flight shut down rate so high that there is the possibility of more than one engine being shut down on the same flight

(i) thrust in a different direction from that demanded by the pilot, or a thrust reversing system failing to operate or operating inadvertently

(j) significant lack of response to pilot's throttle lever movement for a single engine application

(k) an engine limiter or control device failing to operate when required or operating inadvertently

(l) significant exceedance of engine parameters

(m) inability, by use of normal procedures, to shutdown an engine or to control power, thrust or rpm

(n) inability to restart a serviceable engine

b) Propellers and transmissions

(1) damage or defect which could lead to complete or partial blade separation, and or significant vibrations

(2) damage or defect of propeller gearbox / attachment which could lead to in flight separation of the propeller assembly, and /or malfunctions of propeller control

(3) untimely reverse thrust activation

(4) untimely auto feather or pitch change

(5) significant overspeed

(6) loss of ability to control the pitch

c) APUs

(1) shut down when APU is used in accordance with the MEL

(2) inability to shut down the APU

(3) significant overspeed

(4) inability to start the APU when needed for operational reasons

xi) ETOPS

a) Loss of one hydraulic system

b) Loss of one bleed air system

c) Any failure or malfunction that could affect the integrity of ETOPS operations.

xii) Other Occurrences

a) An occurrence not normally considered as reportable (for example, furnishing and cabin equipment, water systems, items included in the Minimum Equipment List), where the circumstances resulted in endangering of the aircraft or its occupants.

b) A fire, explosion, smoke or toxic or noxious fumes

c) Any other event which could hazard the aircraft , or affect the safety of the occupants of the aircraft, or people or property in the vicinity of the aircraft or on the ground

d) Failure or defect of passenger address system resulting in loss or inaudible passenger address system

e) Loss of pilots seat control during flight

C) Aircraft Maintenance and Repair

xiii) Incorrect assembly of parts or components of the aircraft found at the opportunity of an inspection or test procedure not intended for that specific purpose

xiv) Hot bleed air leak resulting in structural damage

xv) Any defect causing part retirement found in a life controlled part before completion of the full life of the part

xvi) Any damage or deterioration (i.e. fractures, cracks, corrosion, delamination, disbonding etc) resulting from any cause (such as flutter, loss of stiffness or structural failure) to:

a) primary structure or a principle structural element (as defined in the manufacturers' Repair Manual) where such damage or deterioration exceeds allowable limits specified in the Repair Manual and requires a repair or complete or partial replacement of the element;

b) secondary structure which consequently has or may have endangered the aircraft.

c) the engine, propeller or helicopter rotor system

xvii) Any failure, malfunction or defect of any system or equipment, or damage or deterioration found as a result of compliance with an Airworthiness Directive or other mandatory instruction issued by a Regulatory Authority, when:

a) it is detected for the first time by each operator or organisation implementing compliance;

b) on any subsequent compliance where it exceeds the permissible limits quoted in the instruction and/or published repair/rectification procedures are not available. For example, a report is required if the condition found necessitates a request to the Design Authority or Regulatory Authority for an extension of limits and/or special repair/rectification schemes or procedures;

xviii) Failures or defects to any part subject to a finite life or any rotorcraft 'critical parts ' (as defined in Manufacturers Manuals).

xix) Failure of any emergency system or equipment, including all exit doors and lighting, to perform satisfactorily, including when being used for maintenance or test purposes.

xx) Non compliance or significant errors in compliance with required maintenance procedures.

D) Air Traffic Services, Facilities and Ground Services

xxi) Air Traffic Services

a) Provision of significantly incorrect, inadequate or misleading information from any ground sources, e.g. ATC, ATIS, Meteorological Services, navigation databases, maps, charts, manuals, etc.

b) Provision of less than prescribed terrain clearance.

c) Provision of incorrect altimeter setting.

d) Incorrect transmission, receipt or interpretation of significant messages when this results in a hazardous situation.

e) Separation between aircraft less than that prescribed for the situation.

f) Unauthorised infringement of any form of regulated airspace.

g) Unauthorised or illegal RTF transmissions.

h) Failure of ATS ground or satellite facilities

i) Major failure or significant deterioration of aerodrome movement area surfaces.

j) Aerodrome movement areas obstructed by aircraft, vehicles, animals or foreign objects, resulting in a hazardous or potentially hazardous situation

k) Errors or inadequacies in marking of obstructions or hazards on aerodrome movement areas resulting in a hazardous situation.

xxii) Aerodrome and Aerodrome Facilities

a) Failure, significant malfunction or unavailability of airfield lighting.

b) Significant contamination of aircraft structure, or systems and equipment arising from the carriage of baggage or cargo.

c) Incorrect loading of passengers, baggage or cargo, likely to have a significant effect on aircraft mass and/or balance.

d) Incorrect stowage of baggage or cargo (including hand baggage) likely in any way to hazard the aircraft, its equipment or occupants or to impede emergency evacuation

e) Inadequate stowage of cargo containers or other substantial items of cargo.

f) Carriage or proposed carriage of dangerous goods in contravention of applicable regulations including incorrect labelling and packaging of dangerous goods

xxiii) Passenger Handling, Baggage and Cargo

a) Collision between a moving aircraft during flight and any other aircraft, vehicle or other ground object

b) Significant spillage during fuelling operations.

c) Loading of incorrect fuel quantities likely to have a significant effect on aircraft endurance, performance, balance or structural strength

d) Loading of contaminated or incorrect type of fuel or other essential fluids (including oxygen and potable water).

xxiv) Aircraft Ground Handling and Servicing

a) Failure, malfunction or defect of ground equipment used for test or checking of aircraft systems and equipment when the required routine inspection and test procedures did not clearly identify the problem when this results in a hazardous situation

b) Non compliance or significant errors in compliance with required servicing procedures.

ANNEX II

The following subparagraphs give examples of reportable occurrences resulting from the application of the generic criteria to specific systems listed in Annex I, point B), ix).

1. Air conditioning/ventilation

a) complete loss of avionics cooling

b) depressurisation

2. Autoflight system

a) failure of the autoflight system to achieve the intended operation while engaged

b) significant reported crew difficulty to control the aircraft linked to autoflight system functioning

c) failure of any autoflight system disconnect device

d) unexpected autoflight mode change

3. Communications

a) failure or defect of passenger address system resulting in loss or inaudible passenger address

b) total loss of communication in flight

4. Electrical system

a) loss of one electrical system distribution system ( AC or DC)

b) total loss or loss or more than one electrical generation system

c) failure of the back up ( emergency ) electrical generating system

5. Cockpit/Cabin/Cargo

a) pilot seat control loss during flight

b) failure of any emergency system or equipment, including emergency evacuation signalling system , all exit doors , emergency lighting, etc

c) loss of retention capability of the cargo loading system

6. Fire protection system

a) fire warnings, except those immediately confirmed as false

b) undetected failure or defect of fire/smoke detection/protection system, which could lead to loss or reduced fire detection/protection

c) absence of warning in case of actual fire

7. Flight controls

a) Asymmetry of flaps, slats, spoilers etc.

b) limitation of movement, stiffness or poor or delayed response in the operation of primary flight control systems or their associated tab and lock systems

c) flight control surface run away

d) flight control surface vibration felt by the crew

e) mechanical flight control disconnection or failure

f) significant interference with normal control of the aircraft or degradation of flying qualities

8. Fuel system

a) fuel quantity indicating system malfunction resulting in total loss or erroneous indicated fuel quantity on board

b) leakage of fuel which resulted in major loss, fire hazard , significant contamination

c) malfunction or defects of the fuel jettisoning system which resulted in inadvertent loss of significant quantity, fire hazard, hazardous contamination of aircraft equipment or inability to jettison fuel

d) fuel system malfunctions or defects which had a significant effect on fuel supply and/or distribution

e) inability to transfer or use total quantity of usable fuel

9. Hydraulics

a) loss of one hydraulic system ( ETOPS only)

b) failure of the isolation system to operate

c) loss of more than one hydraulic circuits

d) failure of the back up hydraulic system

e) inadvertent Ram Air Turbine extension

10. Ice detection/protection system

a) undetected loss or reduced performance of the anti-ice/de-ice system

b) loss of more than one of the probe heating systems

c) inability to obtain symmetrical wing de icing

d) abnormal ice accumulation leading to significant effects on performance or handling qualities

e) crew vision significantly affected

11. Indicating/warning/recording systems

a) malfunction or defect of any indicating system when the possibility of significant misleading indications to the crew could result in an inappropriate crew action on an essential system

b) loss of a red warning function on a system

c) failure or malfunction of recording systems ( FDR, CVR)

d) for glass cockpits: loss or malfunction of more than one display unit or computer involved in the display/warning function

12. Landing gear system /brakes/tyres

a) brake fire

b) significant loss of braking action

c) unsymmetrical braking leading to significant path deviation

d) failure of the L/G free fall extension system ( including during scheduled tests)

e) unwanted gear or gear doors extension/retraction

f) multiple tyres burst

13. Navigation systems ( including precision approaches system) and air data systems

a) loss or multiple navigation equipment failures

b) total failure or multiple air data system equipment failures

c) significant misleading indication

14. Oxygen

a) for pressurised aircraft: loss of oxygen supply in the cockpit

b) loss of oxygen supply to a significant number of passengers ( more than 10%) , including when found during maintenance or training or test purposes

15. Bleed air system

a) hot bleed air leak resulting in fire warning or structural damage

b) loss of all bleed air systems

c) failure of bleed air leak detection system

FINANCIAL STATEMENT

1. Title of operation

Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on occurrence reporting in civil aviation

2. Budget heading(s) involved

Until the end of 2002, JRC will spend 1,7M Euro under the Fifth Framework Programme, additional expenditures would be covered by DG TREN budget for competitive activities and A.07031 and B2-702.

After 2002, JRC and TREN will reassess the situation on the basis of the possibilities offered under the eventual Sixth Framework Programme with a view to complement the expenditures made by DG TREN under headings A.07031 and B2-702.

3. Legal basis

Article 80(2)

4. Description of operation

4.1 General objective

To contribute to the improvement of air safety by ensuring that safety critical information is reported, collected, stored, protected and disseminated in order to facilitate its effective analysis and monitoring. A network of national mandatory occurrences reporting systems will be based on the ECCAIRS system developed by the Joint Research Centre in Ispra and the creation of confidential reporting systems on regional or sub-regional basis will be supported, providing they comply with Commission's operational requirements.

4.2 Period covered and arrangements for renewal

Undefinite

5. Classification of expenditure or revenue

5.1 Non-compulsory expenditure

5.2 Differentiated appropriations

6. Type of expenditure or revenue

Each Member State will establish its own national mandatory occurrence-reporting scheme and will send information to the ECCAIRS database. The ECCAIRS system will need to be operated, maintained and technically updated by the Joint Research Centre Ispra during the launching phase of its operation. In the past, the development of ECCAIRS was financed under budgetary line B6-792 but the cancellation of this particular line lead the JRC to apply for the continuation of this activity under the 5th Framework Programme. In 2001 and 2002, JRC will devote 1.7 MEUR to the ECCAIRS programme under the 5th FP, balance of costs will be met by TREN. In the future, JRC and TREN will reassess the situation on the basis of the possibilities offered under the eventual Sixth Framework Programme with a view to complement the expenditures made by DG TREN under its normal dotation for transport safety or possible budget for competitive activities.

At regional or sub-regional level, confidential reporting systems will be created by air safety knowledgeable independent organisations to deal with mostly human factors related type of incidents. The independence and the non-profit making, general interest nature of these activities will require financial support for the benefit of the European citizens traveling by air or living in the vicinity of airports.

7. Financial impact

7.1 Method of calculating total cost of operation (relation between individual and total costs)

In the table in section 7.2, JRC staff costs for institutional support has been used : 205 KEUR per year for A6 and B2 and 120 KEUR for secretariat.

Consultant costs are estimated at about 500 EUR a day based on experience in the pilot phases of the ECCAIRS project.

System maintenance includes the costs for maintenance contracts as well as the replacement of phased-out equipment and the expansion of the database hardware and software necessitated by additional information to be stored centrally.

Consumables,...., literature comprise all running costs not covered by system maintenance. For feasibility studies and/or prototypes significant purchases are sometimes needed.

Since the starting environment for the activity is assumed to be available (resulting from previous ECCAIRS projects) the running costs over the years are assumed to be constant.

In the table from section 7.3 the costs, on the one hand, ensure financial support to confidential reporting systems and, on the other hand, include workshops/conferences organised for the EU authorities, education and training of involved staff, the publication of annual reports about the activity and its results and the invitation of external experts to review the processes and progress of the ECCAIRS central office.

7.2 Itemised breakdown of cost

Commitment appropriations EUR million (at current prices)

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7.3 Operational expenditure for studies, experts etc. included in Part B of the budget

Commitment appropriations EUR million (at current prices)

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7.4 Schedule of commitment and payment appropriations

EUR million

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8. Fraud prevention measures

Control on the basis of justifications by the competent services of the Commission and, if necessary, control on site.

9. Elements of cost-effectiveness analysis

9.1 Specific and quantified objectives; target population

- The objective is to contribute to the improvement of air safety by creating occurrences reporting. Each Member State will establish its own national mandatory occurrence-reporting scheme and will send information to the ECCAIRS database. The aggregated information will be shared between the Commission and the Member States to allow for the drafting of their long and medium term safety strategies on the basis of identified trends, the adoption of corrective measures for identified shortcomings, and quick reaction in case of emerging hazardous situations. Selected information will also be put at the disposal of other relevant players in the field of air safety (researchers, manufacturers, operators, pilots etc) on a "need to know basis" if they can benefit from it for the improvement of air safety. In addition, regional or sub-regional confidential incident reporting systems will treat mostly human factors related incidents which would not be reported otherwise.

- As the general objective is to improve safety, the main target population will be all air passengers in Europe as well as the populations living in the vicinity of airports.

9.2 Grounds for the operation

It is widely recognised that air transport is among the safest modes of transport. All the safety experts recognise however that the global rate of accidents is stabilising and, as a consequence, if nothing is done to improve it, the growth in air traffic will lead to an increase in the absolute number of fatal accidents. It is therefore necessary to explore new ways of improving air safety. If we consider that there is no single cause to an accident but rather a number of causal factors, a better knowledge of occurrences will help to eliminate some of these causal factors, leading to better accident prevention.

The Community contribution to the improvement of air safety will be twofold : - on the one hand, it will compel those Member States which do not collect safety information to establish a national system and it will allow for the sharing of this information through the ECCAIRS system. This will have a multiplier effect by enabling better identification of hazardous situations. Experience has shown (see e.g. the accident investigation report on the accident of an Airbus A.320 on the Mont Sainte Odile on 20/1/92) that incidents collected in one Member State where unknown in the others, such knowledge could help to prevent an accident; - on the other hand, it will create the legal and financial conditions to enable the creation of confidential incident reporting systems to improve the knowledge of human factors, involved to a certain extent in about 80% of the aviation accidents.

9.3 Monitoring and evaluation of the operation

As an expected improvement in the rate of accidents will result from a number of different initiatives undertaken at all levels of the air transport sector, the evaluation of the success of this particular Community initiative will have to be based on other indicators such as growth in the rate of reporting by the Member States, the number of safety recommendations that will be issued as a result of analysis of the shared data, and the number of requests for information received from all relevant players in the field of air safety.

These indicators could be published as part of the Commission regular report on transport safety requested at the 2108 Transport Council of 17 June 1998.

It is not possible to quantify the safety benefit of such a system (e.g. the number of accidents it could prevent) but the cost-efficiency could be appreciated on the basis of actual figures for a single major accident of a wide-body aircraft which is estimated at 650 MEUR in direct costs (value of the aircraft, liability claims, search & rescue, recovery & investigation and accident cleanup) while it would cost an additional 400 MEUR to a large carrier in indirect costs (aircraft loss of use, increase in insurance premium and loss of revenue due to the customers' loss of confidence)(source 3rd GAIN World Conference, 3-5 November 1998). The cost of a major accident would therefore represent about 500 times the annual costs of operation as described in section 7 above.

10. Administrative expenditure (Section III, Part A of the budget)

Actual mobilisation of the necessary administrative resources will depend on the Commission's annual decision on the allocation of resources, taking into account the number of staff and additional amounts authorised by the budgetary authority.

10.1 Effect on the number of posts

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If additional resources are required, indicate the pace at which they will have to be made available.

10.2 Overall financial impact of additional human resources

EUR

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The amounts given must express the total cost of additional posts for the entire duration of the operation, if this duration is predetermined, or for 12 months if it is indefinite.

10.3 Increase in other administrative expenditure as a result of the operation

EUR

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The amounts given must correspond to total expenditure arising from the operation if its duration is predetermined or expenditure for 12 months if it is indefinite.