26.3.2009   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 72/1

1.

Since mid-2007, the functioning of wholesale credit markets has been severely disrupted. The result has been a drying up of liquidity in the banking sector and a reluctance of banks to lend to each other and to the broader economy. As the disruption of credit markets has intensified over the past eighteen months, the financial crisis has intensified and the global economy has entered a severe recession.

2.

It is difficult to envisage a resolution of the financial crisis and a recovery in the global economy without assured stability in the banking sector and the broader financial system. Only then will investor confidence return and banks resume their normal lending behaviour. Accordingly, Member States have put measures in place to support the stability of their banking sectors and underpin lending, notably the injection of new capital using public funds and the provision of government guarantees for bank borrowing. These measures were announced in October 2008 and have been gradually implemented over the past months.

3.

Recently, several Member States have announced their intention to complement their existing support measures by providing some form of relief for impaired bank assets. Those announcements, in parallel with a similar initiative in the United States, have triggered a wider debate within the Community on the merits of asset relief as a government support measure for banks. In the context of that debate, this Communication has been prepared by the Commission, in consultation with the European Central Bank (ECB), and builds on the recommendations issued on 5 February 2009 by the Eurosystem (see Annex I).

4.

This Communication focuses on issues to be addressed by Member States in considering, designing and implementing asset relief measures. At a general level, those issues include the rationale for asset relief as a measure to safeguard financial stability and underpin bank lending, the longer-term considerations of banking-sector viability and budgetary sustainability to be taken into account when considering asset relief measures and the need for a common and co-ordinated Community approach to asset relief, notably to ensure a level playing field. In the context of such a Community approach, this Communication also offers more specific guidance on the application of State-aid rules to asset relief, focusing on issues such as (i) transparency and disclosure requirements; (ii) burden sharing between the State, shareholders and creditors; (iii) aligning incentives for beneficiaries with public policy objectives; (iv) principles for designing asset relief measures in terms of eligibility, valuation and management of impaired assets; and (v) the relationship between asset relief, other government support measures and the restructuring of banks.

5.

The immediate objectives of the Member State rescue packages announced in October 2008 are to safeguard financial stability and underpin the supply of credit to the real economy. It is too early to draw definitive conclusions on the effectiveness of the packages, but it is clear that they have averted the risk of financial meltdown and have supported the functioning of important inter-bank markets. On the other hand, the evolution in lending to the real economy since the announcement of the packages has been unfavourable, with recent statistics suggesting a sharp deceleration in credit growth (1). In many Member States, reports of businesses being denied access to bank credit are now widespread and it would seem that the squeeze on credit goes beyond that justified by cyclical considerations.

6.

A key reason identified for the insufficient flow of credit is uncertainty about the valuation and location of impaired assets, a source of problems in the banking sector since the beginning of the crisis. Uncertainty regarding asset valuations has not only continued to undermine confidence in the banking sector, but has weakened the effect of the government support measures agreed in October 2008. For example, bank recapitalisation has provided a cushion against asset impairment but much of the capital buffer provided has been absorbed by banks in provisioning against future asset impairments. Banks have already taken steps to address the problem of impaired assets. They have recorded substantial write-downs in asset values (2), taken steps to limit remaining losses by reclassification of assets within their balance sheets and gradually put additional capital aside to strengthen their solvency positions. However, the problem has not been resolved to a sufficient degree and the unexpected depth of the economic slowdown now suggests a further and more extensive deterioration in credit quality of bank assets.

7.

Asset relief would directly address the issue of uncertainty regarding the quality of bank balance sheets and therefore help to revive confidence in the sector. It could also help to avoid the risk of repeated rounds of recapitalisation of banks as the extent of asset impairment increases amid a deteriorating situation in the real economy. On this basis, several Member States are actively considering relief for impaired bank assets as a complement to other measures in implementing the strategy agreed by Heads of State and Government in October 2008.

8.

Asset relief measures must be designed and implemented in the manner that most effectively achieves the immediate objectives of safeguarding financial stability and underpinning bank lending. An important issue to be addressed in this context is ensuring an adequate participation in the asset relief measures by setting appropriate pricing and conditions and through mandatory participation if deemed necessary. However, the focus in designing and implementing asset relief measures should not be limited to these immediate objectives. It is essential that longer-term considerations are also taken into account.

9.

If asset relief measures are not carried out in such a way as to ring-fence the danger of serious distortions of competition among banks (both within Member States and on a cross-border basis) in compliance with the State aid rules of the Treaty establishing the European Community, including where necessary the restructuring of beneficiaries, the outcome will be a structurally weaker Community banking sector with negative implications for productive potential in the broader economy. Furthermore, it could lead to a recurrent need for government intervention in the sector, implying a progressively heavier burden on public finances. Such risks are serious given the likely scale of State exposure. In order to limit the risk of such longer-term damage, government intervention in the banking sector should be appropriately targeted and accompanied by behavioural safeguards that align the incentives of banks with the objectives of public policy. Asset-relief measures should form part of an overall effort to restore the viability of the banking sector, based on necessary restructuring. The need for restructuring in the banking sector as a counterpart of government support is discussed in more detail in the context of State aid rules in Sections 5 and 6.

10.

In considering the design and implementation of asset relief measures, it is also essential that Member States take account of the budgetary context. Estimates of total expected asset write-downs suggest that the budgetary costs — actual, contingent or both — of asset relief could be substantial — both in absolute terms and relative to gross domestic product (GDP) in Member States. Government support through asset relief (and other measures) should not be on such a scale that it raises concern about the sustainability of public finances such as over-indebtedness or financing problems. Such considerations are particularly important in the current context of widening budget deficits, rising public debt levels and challenges facing sovereign bond issuance.

11.

More specifically, the budgetary situation of Member States will be an important consideration in the choice of management arrangement for assets subject to relief, namely asset purchase, asset insurance, asset swap or a hybrid of such arrangements (3). The implications for budgetary credibility may not differ significantly between the various approaches to asset relief, as financial markets are likely to discount potential losses on a similar basis (4). However, an approach requiring the outright purchase of impaired assets would have a more immediate impact on budgetary ratios and government financing. While the choice of management arrangement for impaired assets is the responsibility of each Member State, hybrid approaches whereby bad assets are segregated from the balance sheet of banks in a separate entity (either within or outside the banks) which benefits in some way from a government guarantee could be considered. Such an approach is attractive as it provides many of the benefits of the asset purchase approach from the perspective of restoring confidence in the banking system, while limiting the immediate budgetary impact.

12.

In a context of scarce budgetary resources, it may be appropriate to focus asset relief measures on a limited number of banks of systemic importance. For some Member States, asset relief for banks may be severely constrained, due to their existing budgetary constraints and/or the size of their banks' balance sheet relative to GDP.

13.

In considering some form of asset relief measures, there is a need to reconcile the immediate objectives of financial stability and bank lending with the need to avoid longer-term damage to the banking sector within the Community, to the single market and to the broader economy. This can be achieved most effectively by a common and co-ordinated Community approach, with the following broad objectives:

14.

Co-ordination among Member States would only be necessary at a general level and could be achieved while retaining sufficient flexibility to tailor measures to the specific situations of individual banks. In the absence of sufficient coordination ex ante, many of those objectives will only be met by additional State aid control requirements ex post. Common guidance on the basic features of relief measures would, therefore, help to minimise the need for corrections and adjustments as a result of assessment under the State aid rules. Such guidance is provided in the following Sections.

15.

It is the normal duty of banks to assess the risk of the assets they acquire and to make sure they can cover any associated losses (5). Asset relief may, however, be considered to support financial stability. Public asset relief measures are State aid inasmuch as they free the beneficiary bank from (or compensate for) the need to register either a loss or a reserve for a possible loss on its impaired assets and/or free regulatory capital for other uses. This would notably be the case where impaired assets are purchased or insured at a value above the market price, or where the price of the guarantee does not compensate the State for its possible maximum liability under the guarantee (6).

16.

Any aid for asset relief measures should, however, comply with the general principles of necessity, proportionality and minimisation of the competition distortions. Such assistance implies serious distortions of competition between beneficiaries and non-beneficiary banks and among beneficiary banks with different degrees of need. Non-beneficiary banks that are fundamentally sound may feel obliged to consider seeking government intervention to preserve their competitive position in the market. Similar distortions in competition may arise among Member States, with the risk of a subsidy race between Member States (trying to save their banks without regard to the effects on banks in other Member States) and a drift towards financial protectionism and fragmentation of the internal market. Participation in the asset relief scheme should therefore be conditioned upon clearly defined and objective criteria, in order to avoid that individual banks take unwarranted advantage.

17.

The principles governing the application of the State aid rules and, in particular, Article 87(3)(b) of the Treaty to any support measure for banks in the context of the global financial crisis in were established in the Communication from the Commission — The application of State aid rules to measures taken in relation to financial institutions in the context of the current global financial crisis  (7). More detailed guidance on the practical implementation of these principles to recapitalisation was subsequently provided in the Communication from the Commission — The recapitalisation of financial institutions in the current financial crisis: limitation of aid to the minimum necessary and safeguards against undue distortions of competition  (8). In the same vein, the guidelines set out in this Communication, based on the same principles, identify the key features of asset relief measures or schemes, which determine their effectiveness as well as their impact on competition. These guidelines apply to all banks that are granted asset relief, irrespective of their individual situation, but the practical implications of their application may vary depending on the risk profile and viability of a beneficiary. The principles of these guidelines apply mutatis mutandis where two or more Member States coordinate measures to provide asset relief to cross-border banks.

18.

This Communication aims to establish coordinated principles and conditions to ensure the effectiveness of asset relief measures in the single market as far as possible, taking account of the long-term objective of a return to normal market conditions, while remaining flexible enough so as to cater for specific features or provide additional measures or procedures at individual or national levels for reasons of financial stability. Effective asset relief measures should have as a consequence the maintenance of lending to the real economy.

19.

Any asset relief measure must be based on a clear identification of the magnitude of the bank's asset-related problems, its intrinsic solvency prior to the support and its prospects for return to viability, taking into due consideration all possible alternatives, in order to facilitate the necessary restructuring process, prevent distortion in the incentives of all players and avoid waste of State resources without contributing to resumption in the normal flow of credit to the real economy.

20.

Therefore, in order to minimise the risk of a recurrent need for State interventions in favour of the same beneficiaries, the following criteria should be satisfied as a prerequisite for benefitting from asset relief:

21.

As a general principle, banks ought to bear the losses associated with impaired assets to the maximum extent. This requires, firstly, full ex ante transparency and disclosure, followed by the correct valuation of assets prior to government intervention and a correct remuneration of the State for the asset relief measure, whatever its form, so as to ensure equivalent shareholder responsibility and burden-sharing irrespective of the exact model chosen. The combination of those elements should lead to overall coherence concerning burden-sharing across various forms of State support, having regard to the specific distinctive features of different types of assistance (11).

22.

Once assets have been properly evaluated and losses are correctly identified (12), and if this would lead to a situation of technical insolvency without State intervention, the bank should either be put into administration or be wound up, according to Community and national law. In such a situation, with a view to preserving financial stability and confidence, protection or guarantees to bondholders (13) may be appropriate.

23.

Where putting a bank into administration or its orderly winding up appears unadvisable for reasons of financial stability (14), aid in the form of guarantee or asset purchase, limited to the strict minimum, could be awarded to banks so that they can continue to operate for the period necessary to allow to devise a plan for either restructuring or orderly winding-up. In such cases, shareholders should also be expected to bear losses at least until the regulatory limits of capital adequacy are reached. Nationalisation options may also be considered.

24.

Where it is not possible to achieve full burden-sharing ex ante, the bank should be requested to contribute to the loss or risk coverage at a later stage, for example in the form of claw-back clauses or, in the case of an insurance scheme, by a clause of ‘first loss’, to be borne by the bank (typically with a minimum of 10 %) and a clause of ‘residual loss sharing’, through which the bank participates to a percentage (typically with a minimum of 10 %) of any additional losses (15).

25.

As a general rule, the lower the contribution upfront, the higher the need for a shareholder contribution at a later stage, either in the form of a conversion of State losses into bank shares and/or in the form of additional compensatory measures to limit the distortion of competition when assessing necessary restructuring.

26.

As a general feature, impaired asset relief programmes should have an enrolment window limited to six months from the launch of the scheme by the government. This will limit incentives for banks to delay necessary disclosures in the hope of higher levels of relief at a later date, and facilitate a rapid resolution of the banking problems before the economic downturn further aggravates the situation. During the six-month window, the banks would be able to present eligible assets baskets to be covered by the asset relief measures, with the possibility of rollover (16).

27.

Appropriate mechanisms may need to be devised so as to ensure that the banks most in need of asset relief participate in the government measure. Such mechanisms could include mandatory participation in the programme, and should include at least mandatory disclosure to the supervisory authorities. The obligation for all banks to reveal the magnitude of their asset-related problems will contribute to the clear identification of the need and necessary scope for an asset relief scheme at the Member State level.

28.

Where participation is not mandatory, the scheme could include appropriate incentives (such as the provision of warrants or rights to existing shareholders so that they may participate in future private capital-raising at preferential terms) to facilitate take-up by the banks without derogating from the principles of transparency and disclosure, fair valuation and burden sharing.

29.

Participation after the expiration of the six month enrolment window should be possible only in exceptional and unforeseeable circumstances for which the bank is not responsible (17), and subject to stricter conditions, such as higher remuneration to the State and/or higher compensatory measures.

30.

Access to asset relief should always be conditional on a number of appropriate behavioural constraints. In particular, beneficiary banks should be subject to safeguards which ensure that the capital effects of relief are used for providing credit to appropriately meet demand according to commercial criteria and without discrimination and not for financing a growth strategy (in particular acquisitions of sound banks) to the detriment of competitors.

31.

Restrictions on dividend policy and caps on executive remuneration should also be considered. The specific design of behavioural constraints should be determined on the basis of a proportionality assessment taking account of the various factors that may imply the necessity of restructuring (see Section 6).

32.

When determining the range of eligible assets for relief, a balance needs to be found between meeting the objective of immediate financial stability and the need to ensure the return to normal market functioning over the medium turn. Assets commonly referred to as ‘toxic assets’ (for example, US mortgage backed securities and associated hedges and derivatives), which have triggered the financial crisis and have largely become illiquid or subject to severe downward value adjustments, appear to account for the bulk of uncertainty and scepticism concerning the viability of banks. Restricting the range of eligible assets to such assets would limit the State's exposure to possible losses and contribute to the prevention of competition distortions (18). However, an overly narrow relief measure would risk falling short of restoring confidence in the banking sector, given the differences between the specific problems encountered in different Member States and banks and the extent to which the problem of impairment has now spread to other assets. This would plead in favour of a pragmatic approach including elements of flexibility, which would ensure that other assets also benefit from relief measures to an appropriate extent and where duly justified.

33.

A common and coordinated Community approach to the identification of the assets eligible for relief measures is necessary to both prevent competitive distortions among Member States and within the Community banking sector, and limit incentives for cross-border banks to engage in arbitrage among different national relief measures. To ensure consistency in the identification of eligible assets across Member States, categories of assets ('baskets') reflecting the extent of existing impairment should be developed. More detailed guidance on the definition of those categories is provided in Annex III. The use of such categories of assets would facilitate the comparison of banks and their risk profiles across the Community. Member States would then need to decide which category of assets could be covered and to what extent, subject to the Commission's review of the degree of impairment of the assets chosen.

34.

A proportionate approach would need to be developed to allow a Member State whose banking sector is additionally affected by other factors of such magnitude as to jeopardise financial stability (such as the burst of a bubble in their own real estate market) to extend eligibility to well-defined categories of assets corresponding to the systemic threat upon due justification, without quantitative restrictions.

35.

Additional flexibility could further be envisaged by allowing for the possibility for banks to be relieved of impaired assets outside the scope of eligibility set out in paragraphs 32, 33 and 34 without the necessity of a specific justification for a maximum of 10-20 % of the overall assets of a given bank covered by a relief mechanism in view of the diversity of circumstances of different Member States and banks. However, assets that cannot presently be considered impaired should not be covered by a relief programme. Asset relief should not provide an open-ended insurance against future consequences of recession.

36.

As a general principle, the wider the eligibility criteria, and the greater the proportion which the assets concerned represent in the portfolio of the bank, the more thorough the restructuring and the remedies to avoid undue distortions of competition will have to be. In any case, the Commission will not consider assets eligible for relief measures where they have entered the balance sheet of the beneficiary bank after a specified cut-off date prior to the announcement of the relief programme (19). To do otherwise could result in asset arbitrage and would give rise to inadmissible moral hazard by providing incentives for banks to abstain from properly assessing risks in future lending and other investments and thus repeat the very mistakes that have brought about the current crisis (20).

37.

A correct and consistent approach to the valuation of assets, including assets that are more complex and less liquid, is of key importance to prevent undue distortions of competition and to avoid subsidy races between Member States. Valuation should follow a general methodology established at the Community level and should be closely co-ordinated ex ante by the Commission across the Member States in order to ensure maximum effectiveness of the asset relief measure and reduce the risk of distortions and damaging arbitrage, notably for cross-border banks. Alternative methodologies may need to be employed to take account of specific circumstances relating to, for example, timely availability of relevant data, provided they attain equivalent transparency. In any case, eligible banks should value their portfolios on a daily basis and make regular and frequent disclosures to the national authorities and to their supervisory authorities.

38.

Where the valuation of assets appears particularly complex, alternative approaches could be considered such as the creation of a ‘good bank’ whereby the State would purchase the good rather than the impaired assets. Public ownership of a bank (including nationalisation) could be an alternative option, with a view to carrying out the valuation over time in a restructuring or orderly winding-up context, thus eliminating any uncertainty about the proper value of the assets concerned (21).

39.

As a first stage, assets should be valued on the basis of their current market value, whenever possible. In general, any transfer of assets covered by a scheme at a valuation in excess of the market price will constitute State aid. The current market value may, however, be quite distant from the book value of those assets in the current circumstances, or non-existent in the absence of a market (for some assets the value may effectively be as low as zero).

40.

As a second stage, the value attributed to impaired assets in the context of an asset relief program (the ‘transfer value’) will inevitably be above current market prices in order to achieve the relief effect. To ensure consistency in the assessment of the compatibility of aid, the Commission would consider a transfer value reflecting the underlying long-term economic value (the ‘real economic value’) of the assets, on the basis of underlying cash flows and broader time horizons, an acceptable benchmark indicating the compatibility of the aid amount as the minimum necessary. Uniform hair-cuts applicable to certain asset categories will have to be considered to approximate the real economic value of assets that are so complex that a reliable forecast of developments in the foreseeable future would appear impracticable.

41.

Consequently, the transfer value for asset purchase or asset insurance (22) measures should be based on their real economic value. Moreover, adequate remuneration for the State must be secured. Where Member States deem it necessary — notably to avoid technical insolvency — to use a transfer value of the assets that exceeds their real economic value, the aid element contained in the measure is correspondingly larger. It can only be accepted if it is accompanied by far-reaching restructuring and the introduction of conditions allowing the recovery of this additional aid at a later stage, for example through claw-back mechanisms.

42.

The valuation process both with regard to the market value and the real economic value, as well as the remuneration of the State, should follow the same guiding principles and processes listed in Annex IV.

43.

When assessing the valuation methods put forward by Member States for asset relief measures, and their implementation in individual cases, the Commission will consult panels of valuation experts (23). The Commission will also build on the expertise of existing bodies organised at Community level in order to ensure the consistency of valuation methodologies.

44.

It is for Member States to choose the most appropriate model for relieving banks from assets, from the range of options set out in Section 3 and Annex II, in the light of the extent of the problem of impaired assets, the situation of the individual banks concerned and budgetary considerations. The objective of State aid control is to ensure that the features of the selected model are designed so as to ensure equal treatment and prevent undue distortions of competition.

45.

While the specific pricing arrangements for an aid measure may vary, their distinctive features should not have an appreciable impact on the adequate burden-sharing between the State and the beneficiary banks. On the basis of proper valuation, the overall financing mechanism of an asset management company, an insurance or a hybrid solution should ensure that the bank will have to assume the same proportion of losses. Claw-back clauses can be considered in this context. In general, all schemes must ensure that the beneficiary banks bear the losses incurred in the transfer of assets (see further paragraph 50 and footnote 10).

46.

Whatever the model, in order to facilitate the bank's focus on the restoration of viability and to prevent possible conflicts of interest, it is necessary to ensure clear functional and organisational separation between the beneficiary bank and its impaired assets, notably as to their management, staff and clientele.

47.

Detailed guidance on the implications of these guidelines on State aid procedure with regard to both the initial notification of aid and the assessment of restructuring plans, where necessary, is provided in Annex V.

48.

The principles and conditions in Section 5 set the framework for designing asset relief measures in compliance with State aid rules. State aid rules aim, in the present context, at ensuring the minimum and least distortive support for a removal of risks related to a separate category of assets from the beneficiary banks in order to prepare a solid ground for return to long-term viability without State support. While the treatment of impaired assets along the above principles is a necessary step for a return to viability for the banks, it is not in itself sufficient to achieve that goal. Depending on their particular situation and characteristics, banks will have to take appropriate measures in their own interest in order to avoid a recurrence of similar problems and to ensure sustainable profitability.

49.

Under State aid rules and notably those for rescue and restructuring aid, asset relief amounts to a structural operation and requires a careful assessment of three conditions: (i) adequate contribution of the beneficiary to the costs of the impaired assets programme; (ii) appropriate action to guarantee the return to viability; and (iii) necessary measures to remedy competition distortions.

50.

The first condition should normally be achieved by fulfilling the requirements set out in the Section 5, notably disclosure, valuation, pricing and burden-sharing. This should ensure a contribution by the beneficiary of at least the entirety of the losses incurred in the transfer of assets to the State. Where this is materially not possible, aid may still be authorised, by way of exception, subject to stricter requirements as to the other two conditions.

51.

Requirements to return to viability and the need for remedies for competition distortion will be determined on a case-by-case basis. As regards the second condition, the need to return to long-term viability, it should be noted that asset relief may contribute to that objective. The viability review should certify the actual and prospective capital adequacy of the bank after a complete assessment and consideration of the possible factors of risk (24).

52.

The Commission's assessment of the extent of necessary restructuring, following the initial authorisation of the asset relief measures, will be determined on the basis of the following criteria: criteria outlined in the Communication on the recapitalisation of financial institutions in the current financial crisis: limitation of aid to the minimum necessary and safeguards against undue distortions of competition, the proportion of the bank's assets subject to relief, the transfer price of such assets compared to the market price, the specific features of the impaired asset relief granted, the total size of State exposure relative to a bank's risk-weighted assets, the nature and origin of the problems of the beneficiary bank, and the soundness of the bank's business model and investment strategy. It will also take into account any additional granting of State guarantee or State recapitalisation, in order to draw a complete picture of the situation of the beneficiary bank (25).

53.

Long-term viability requires that the bank is able to survive without any State support, which implies clear plans for redeeming any State capital received and renouncing State guarantees. Depending on the outcome of that assessment, restructuring will have to comprise an in-depth review of the bank's strategy and activity, including, for example, focussing on core business, reorientation of business models, closure or divestment of business divisions/subsidiaries, changes in the asset-liability management and other changes.

54.

The need for in-depth restructuring will be presumed where an appropriate valuation of impaired assets according to the principles set out in Section 5.5 and Annex IV would lead to negative equity/technical insolvency without State intervention. Repeated requests for aid and departure from the general principles set out in Section 5, will normally point to the need for such in-depth restructuring.

55.

In-depth restructuring would also be required where the bank has already received State aid in whatever form that either contributes to coverage or avoidance of losses, or altogether exceeds 2 % of the total bank's risk weighted assets, while taking the specific features of the situation of each beneficiary in due consideration (26).

56.

The timing of any required measures to restore viability will take account of the specific situation of the bank concerned, as well as the overall situation in the banking sector, without unduly delaying the necessary adjustments.

57.

Thirdly, the extent of necessary compensatory measures should be examined, on the basis of distortions of competition resulting from the aid. This may involve downsizing or divestment of profitable business units or subsidiaries, or behavioural commitments to limit commercial expansion.

58.

The need for compensatory measures will be presumed if the beneficiary bank does not fulfil the conditions set out in Section 5 and notably those of disclosure, valuation, pricing and burden sharing.

59.

The Commission will assess the scope of the compensatory measures required, depending on its assessment of competition distortions resulting from the aid, and notably on the basis of the following factors: total amount of aid, including from guarantee and recapitalisation measures, volume of impaired assets benefiting from the measure, proportion of losses resulting from the asset, general soundness of the bank, risk profile of the relieved assets, quality of risk management of the bank, level of solvency ratios in the absence of aid, market position of the beneficiary bank and distortions of competition from the bank's continued market activities, and impact of the aid on the structure of the banking sector.

60.

The Commission applies this Communication from 25 February 2009, the date on which it agreed in principle its content, having regard to the financial and economic context which required immediate action.