1.

In a situation in which national law provides that a judge of the court ruling at final instance (a Supreme Court judge) may, by a discretionary decision of the President of that Court (First President of the Supreme Court), be appointed, without his or her consent, to sit for a fixed period per year in another chamber of that Court having jurisdiction to hear cases the nature of which differs from those with which that judge has hitherto dealt, instead of in a chamber of that Court in which, in accordance with his or her training and areas of competence, he or she normally sits, should the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU, read in conjunction with Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (‘the Charter’), be interpreted as requiring that such a judge should, for the purpose of protecting his or her independence and autonomy, have an effective remedy against that decision before an independent and impartial tribunal in a procedure which satisfies the requirements of Articles 47 and 48 of the Charter?

2.

Should [the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU, read in conjunction with Article 47 of the Charter] be construed as meaning that a court of final instance of a Member State (Supreme Court), whose collegial three-member composition includes two judges who, without their consent, have been appointed by the President of that Court to sit on that Court away from their home chamber and to sit in a chamber competent for hearing the case in question, and who have not previously had the opportunity to challenge their appointment before an impartial and independent tribunal in a procedure which satisfies the requirements of Articles 47 and 48 of the Charter, is not an independent, impartial tribunal previously established by law and giving individuals effective access to justice in areas covered by EU law?