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Document 62020CN0579
Case C-579/20: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Rechtbank Den Haag, sitting in Haarlem (Netherlands) lodged on 2 November 2020 — F, A, G, H, I v Staatssecretaris van Justitie en Veiligheid
Case C-579/20: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Rechtbank Den Haag, sitting in Haarlem (Netherlands) lodged on 2 November 2020 — F, A, G, H, I v Staatssecretaris van Justitie en Veiligheid
Case C-579/20: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Rechtbank Den Haag, sitting in Haarlem (Netherlands) lodged on 2 November 2020 — F, A, G, H, I v Staatssecretaris van Justitie en Veiligheid
OJ C 128, 12.4.2021, p. 6–7
(BG, ES, CS, DA, DE, ET, EL, EN, FR, HR, IT, LV, LT, HU, MT, NL, PL, PT, RO, SK, SL, FI, SV)
12.4.2021 |
EN |
Official Journal of the European Union |
C 128/6 |
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Rechtbank Den Haag, sitting in Haarlem (Netherlands) lodged on 2 November 2020 — F, A, G, H, I v Staatssecretaris van Justitie en Veiligheid
(Case C-579/20)
(2021/C 128/08)
Language of the case: Dutch
Referring court
Rechtbank Den Haag, sitting in Haarlem
Parties to the main proceedings
Applicants: F, A, G, H, I
Defendant: Staatssecretaris van Justitie en Veiligheid
Questions referred
1. |
Is Article 15(c) of the Qualification Directive (1) intended to provide protection only in the exceptional situation where the degree of indiscriminate violence in a situation of international or internal armed conflict reaches such a high level that there are substantial grounds for believing that a civilian, returned to the relevant country or, as the case may be, to the relevant region, would, solely on account of his presence on the territory of that country or region, face a real risk of being subject to the threat referred to in that provision? And does that exceptional situation fall under the ‘most extreme cases of general violence’ referred to in the judgment in N.A. v. United Kingdom? (2) If the first part of the first question is answered in the negative: |
2. |
Should Article 15(c) of the Qualification Directive be interpreted as meaning that a lesser degree of indiscriminate violence than the aforementioned exceptional situation, in conjunction with an applicant’s personal and individual circumstances, may also lead to there being substantial grounds for believing that an applicant who returns to the country or region concerned faces a risk of being subject to the threat referred to in that provision? If the second question is answered in the affirmative: |
3. |
In that situation, should a sliding scale be used which differentiates between possible degrees of indiscriminate violence and the associated degree of individual circumstances? And what are the personal and individual circumstances that can play a role in the assessment by the determining authority and the national court or tribunal? If the first question is answered in the affirmative: |
4. |
Is Article 15 of the Qualification Directive satisfied where an applicant who finds himself in a situation involving a lesser degree of indiscriminate violence than that of the exceptional situation referred to, and who is able to prove that he is specifically affected thereby (inter alia) for reasons relating to his personal circumstances, is granted subsidiary protection solely on the basis of Article 15(a) or (b) of the Qualification Directive? |
(1) Directive 2011/95/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 2011 on standards for the qualification of third-country nationals or stateless persons as beneficiaries of international protection, for a uniform status for refugees or for persons eligible for subsidiary protection, and for the content of the protection granted (OJ 2011 L 337, p. 9).
(2) ECtHR, 17 July 2008, CE:ECHR:2008:07l7JUDO02590407.