EUROPEAN COMMISSION

Brussels, 14.10.2021

SWD(2021) 287 final

COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT

The situation of young people in the European Union

Accompanying the document

Report from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions

on the implementation of the EU Youth Strategy 2019-2021

{COM(2021) 636 final} - {SWD(2021) 286 final}

The situation of

young people

in the European Union

Commission Staff
Working Document

EACEA A6 – June 2021

Contents

Table of Figures    4

Abbreviations    7

Introduction    9

1. Youth population    14

1.1. Trends in the youth population14

1.2. Youth migration among third and European countries17

1.2.1. Patterns in youth migration18

1.2.2. Impact of migration on demographic trends21

Conclusions23

2. Youth engagement in society    24

2.1. Voting in political elections24

2.2. Other forms of participation29

2.3. Volunteering32

2.4. Digital participation34

2.5. Support for and trust in national and EU institutions36

Conclusions38

3. Employment and entrepreneurship    40

3.1. Facing labour market challenges: youth unemployment40

3.1.1. Youth unemployment trends to 201940

3.1.2. Who faces the biggest challenges? Youth unemployment by educational attainment and gender44

3.1.3. Youth unemployment and the COVID-19 crisis46

3.2. Patterns of youth employment48

3.2.1. Temporary contracts49

3.2.2. Part-time work51

3.2.3. Self-employment and entrepreneurship53

3.3. Labour market digitalisation55

Conclusions57

4. Youth on the move    59

4.1. Going on a learning experience abroad60

4.2. Reasons for considering but not participating in a learning experience abroad62

4.3. Reasons for not considering a learning experience abroad64

4.4. Participation in Erasmus+ learning mobility actions67

4.5. Participation in the European Solidarity Corps71

Conclusions72

5. Youth and the digital world    74

5.1. Media literacy and online safety74

5.2. Use of the Internet76

5.2.1. E-government: interacting with public authorities77

5.2.2. E-commerce and collaborative economy79

5.2.3. Digital divides83

5.3. Online information and communication during the COVID-19 pandemic85

Conclusions88

6. Education and training    89

6.1. Non-formal learning89

6.2. Digital skills91

6.2.1. Level of digital skills91

6.2.2. Digital skills and digital divide93

6.3. E-learning95

6.3.1. E-learning among young Europeans95

6.3.2. Inequalities in the access to e-learning97

Conclusions99

7. Health and wellbeing    100

7.1. Psychological distress101

7.2. Relational well-being104

7.3. Impact of COVID-19 on the psychological wellbeing of youth and the total population107

Conclusions108

8. Social inclusion    109

8.1. Moving towards independence: young people leaving the parental home109

8.2. Poverty, low work intensity and deprivation111

8.2.1. The risk of poverty and social exclusion111

8.2.2. The risk of poverty113

8.2.3. Households with very low work intensity115

8.2.4. Severe material deprivation116

8.3. Young people not in employment, education or training (NEETs)118

8.4. Social inclusion and the COVID-19 pandemic120

Conclusions123

9. Youth work    125

9.1. Quality assurance126

9.1.1. Formal mechanisms: professional standards and public funding requirements126

9.1.2. Informal modalities: evaluations and self-assessment127

9.2. Digital youth work128

9.2.1. Enhancing young people’ inclusion in digital youth work129

9.2.2. Strengthening the digital competences of youth workers129

Conclusions131

References    132

Annexes    143

Dashboard of EU youth indicators143

Table of Figures

1. Youth population    14

Figure 1.1:Share of young people (15-19, 20-24 and 25-29) in the total population, by country, 201915

Figure 1.2:Trend in the share of young people in the total population (15-29), by country, 2010 and 201915

Figure 1.3:Projected trends in the number of young people (15-29) and total population, EU-27, 2021-207016

Figure 1.4:Projected trend in the share of young people (15-29), EU-27, 2021-2070 17

Figure 1.5:Share of young people (15-29) who immigrated (either from a third or a European country), and share of young people who emigrated from a European country, by country, 201918

Figure 1.6:Projected trend in the number of young people (15-29), with and without migration, EU-27, 2021-207019

Figure 1.7:     Share of young people (15-29) in the total population of emigrants in the reference year by country, 2019        20

 Figure 1.8:     Projected trend in the number of young people (15-29), with and without migration, EU-27, 2021-2070        21

2. Youth engagement in society    24

Figure 2.1:Proportions of young people (aged 15-30) who had voted at least once (2019) and who had voted in the previous 3 years (December 2014) by country25

Figure 2.2:Proportions of young people (aged 15-30) who had voted at least once in a local, national or European election by characteristic, 201926

Figure 2.3:Proportions of young people (aged 15-30) who declared having voted in the 2014 and 2019 elections to the European Parliament by country and age group27

Figure 2.4:Proportions of young people (aged 15-30) with a (very or fairly) positive view of the EU by country, 201928

Figure 2.5:Proportions of young people (aged 15-30) who reported having participated in certain activities, EU-28, 201929

Figure 2.6:Most common forms of participation among young people (%) by country (excluding voting and volunteering), 201933

Figure 2.7:Proportions of young people (aged 15-30) involved in organised voluntary activities by country, 2019 and 201432

Figure 2.8:Proportions of young people (aged 15-30) involved in organised voluntary activities by characteristic, 201933

Figure 2.9:Geographical scope of the voluntary activities (%), EU-28, 2019 and 201433

Figure 2.10:Proportions of young people (aged 16-29) who participated in online consultations, voting and websites in relation to civic or political issues in the past year by country, 2019 and 201534

Figure 2.11:Proportions of young people (aged 16-29) who participated in online consultations, voting and websites in relation to civic or political issues in the past year by characteristic, 201935

Figure 2.12:Young people’s trust in their country’s government and in the EU, satisfaction with democracy and image of the EU (%), 2019, 2015 and 202037

Figure 2.13:Proportions of people (very or fairly) satisfied with measures to fight the COVID-19 pandemic, 202038

3. Employment and entrepreneurship    40

Figure 3.1:Unemployment rates and ratios among young people (15-29)
compared with the prime working-age group (25-54), EU-28, 201941

Figure 3.2:Unemployment rates and ratios for 15- to 29-year-olds by country, 201942

Figure 3.3:Youth unemployment rates (15- to 29-year-olds), compared with the prime working-age group (25-54), EU-28, 2013-201943

Figure 3.4:Changes in unemployment rates between 2015 and 2019 among young people aged 15-29, by country43

Figure 3.5:Unemployment rates among young people (20–29), by educational attainment, EU-28, 201944

Figure 3.6:Comparison of youth unemployment rates among 20- to 29-year-olds with low and medium levels of education by country, 201945

Figure 3.7:Comparison of youth unemployment rates for men and women aged 15-29 by country, 201946

Figure 3.8:Unemployment rates among young people (15-29) compared with the prime working-age group (24-54), EU-27, 2019 and 202047

Figure 3.9:Change in unemployment rates (percentage points) among young people aged 15-29 between 2019 and 2020 by country48

Figure 3.10:Youth unemployment and employment rates of 15- to 29-year-olds, by country, 201949

Figure 3.11:Young temporary employees (15-29) as a percentage of the total number of employees in the same age group, by country, 201950

Figure 3.12:Part-time employment among young people (15-29) as a percentage of total youth employment, compared with the prime working-age group (25-54), by gender, EU-28, 201952

Figure 3.13:Part-time employment as a percentage of total employment among young people aged 15-29, including the percentage of involuntary part-time workers, by country, 201953

Figure 3.14:Self-employment as a percentage of total employment among young people (20-29) compared with the prime working-age group (25-54), by gender, EU-28, 201954

Figure 3.15:Self-employment as a percentage of total employment for young people (25-29), by country, 2015 and 201955

Figure 3.16:Percentages of young people (16-29) and people in the prime working-age group (25-54) who used the internet to search for a job or send an application, by country, 201957

4. Youth on the move    59

Figure 4.1:Proportions of young people (aged 15-30) having participated or not in a learning experience abroad by country, 201960

Figure 4.2:Proportions of young people (aged 15-30) reporting having gone abroad for a learning experience of at least 2 weeks by characteristic, 201961

Figure 4.3:Reasons given by young people (aged 15-30) for not taking part in a learning experience abroad despite having considered it (%), EU-28, 201962

Figure 4.4:Reasons given by young people (aged 15-30) for not taking part in a learning experience abroad despite having considered it (%) by country, 201963

Figure 4.5:Reasons given by young people (aged 15-30) for not considering a learning experience abroad (%), EU-28, 201965

Figure 4.6:Reasons given by young people (aged 15-30) for not considering a learning experience abroad (%) by country, 201966

Figure 4.7:Numbers of learners per 10 000 young people (aged 15-29) who participated in Erasmus+ mobility actions in HE and VET (for at least 1 month) starting in 201968

Figure 4.8:Percentage differences between 2015 and 2019 in the numbers of learners starting an Erasmus+ mobility action of at least 1 month in HE and VET69

Figure 4.9:Numbers of learners starting an Erasmus+ mobility action in 2019 and 2020 by gender and duration70

Figure 4.10:Numbers of young people per 10 000 population (aged 15-29) who took part in a volunteering project or partnership (individually or in a team) funded by the ESC starting in 201971

Figure 4.11:Percentage differences between the number of young volunteers starting an activity in the ESC in 2019 and the number of young volunteers starting an activity in the ESC in 202072

5. Youth and the digital world    74

Figure 5.1:National strategies on media literacy and online safety, September 202075

Figure 5.2:Shares of young people (16-29) and the total population who used the internet daily, by country, 2017 and 201977

Figure 5.3:Shares of young people (16-29) and of the total population who used the internet to interact with public authorities during the previous year, by country, 2017 and 201978

Figure 5.4:Shares of young people (16-29) and of the total population who made an online purchase during the previous 3 months, by country, 2017 and 201980

Figure 5.5:Shares of young people (16-29) and of the total population who sold goods or services online, by country, 2017 and 201980

Figure 5.6:Shares of young people (16-29) and of the total population who used any website or app to arrange an accommodation from another individual, by country, 2017 and 201982

Figure 5.7:Shares of young people (16-29) and of the total population who used any website or app to arrange a transport service from another individual, by country, 2017 and 201982

Figure 5.8:Share of young people (16-29) who used the internet daily, used it to interact with public authorities, to make an online purchase, to sell goods or services, to arrange accommodation and to arrange a transport service by level of education, EU-28, 201984

Figure 5.9:Level of young people’s trust in various sources of information about the COVID-19 pandemic, age group 16-24, by country, 202086

Figure 5.10:Share of young people (16-24) who engage or not in online debates on the measures against COVID-19, by country, 202086

Figure 5.11:Share of young people (16-24) in favour of public authorities using applications on their mobile phone to fight the COVID-19 pandemic, by country, 202087

6. Education and training    89

Figure 6.1:Share of young people (15-29) participating in non-formal learning and training by country, 2015 and 201990

Figure 6.2:Share of young people (16-29) with low, basic and above-basic levels of digital skills by country, 201992

Figure 6.3:Trend in the share of young people (16-29) with above-basic digital skills by country, 2015 and 201993

Figure 6.4:Share of young people (16-24) with above-basic digital skills by country and level of educational attainment, 201994

Figure 6.5:Share of young people (16-29) using the internet for learning activities by country, 2015, 2019 and first quarter of 202096

Figure 6.6:Share of young people (16-24) using the internet for learning activities by level of education and country, 201997

Figure 6.7:Country distribution based on the share of young people (16-29) using the internet for e-learning and the share of households without access to the internet because costs are too high, 201998

7. Health and wellbeing    100

Figure 7.1:Share of young people (15-24) who found confinement measures difficult to cope with by country, 2020102

Figure 7.2:Share of young people (16-24) experiencing uncertainty as their most common feeling about the pandemic by country, 2020103

Figure 7.3:Share of young people (16-24) concerned about the impact of COVID-19 on their health and that of their family and friends by country, 2020104

Figure 7.4:Share of young people (16-24) talking more often to people than before the pandemic by country, 2020105

Figure 7.5:Share of young people (16-24) who received help from people and provided help to persons in need by country, 2020106

Figure 7.6:Psychological distress factors among young people (15-24) and the total population, EU-27, 2020107

8. Social inclusion    109

Figure 8.1:Estimated average age of young people when leaving the parental household, by country, 2015 and 2019110

Figure 8.2:Estimated average age of young people when leaving the parental household, by gender, EU-28, 2019110

Figure 8.3:At-risk-of-poverty or social exclusion rate of young people (16-29) compared to children (younger than 16) and total population, by country, 2019112

Figure 8.4:At-risk-of-poverty or social exclusion rate for young people (16-29), by gender, EU-28, 2015 and 2019 112

Figure 8.5:At-risk-of-poverty rate of young people (16-29) compared to children (younger than 16) and total population by country, 2019113

Figure 8.6:At-risk-of-poverty rate for young people (16-29) by gender, EU-28, 2015 and 2019114

Figure 8.7:Proportion of people living in households with very low work intensity by age groups and country, 2019115

Figure 8.8:Proportions of young people (25-29) living in households with very low work intensity by gender, EU-28, 2015 and 2019116

Figure 8.9:Severe material deprivation rate for young people (16-29)
compared to children (younger than 16) and the total population, by country, 2019117

Figure 8.10:Severe material deprivation rates for young people (16-29) by gender, EU-28, 2015 and 2019118

Figure 8.11:Proportion of young people (15-29) not in employment, education or training (NEET rate), by country, 2015 and 2019119

Figure 8.12:Proportion of young people (15-29) not in employment, education or training (NEET rate) by labour market status, attitudes towards work, and gender, EU-28, 2019120

Figure 8.13:Proportion of young people (15-29) not in employment, education or training (NEET rate), total and by gender, EU-27, by quarter, 2020121

Figure 8.14:Proportions of young people (15-29) not in employment, education or training (NEET rate) by labour status and attitude towards work, EU-27, by quarter, 2020121

9. Youth work    125

Figure 9.1:Prevailing modalities of quality assurance, September 2020126

Figure 9.2:Measures supporting the digitalisation of youth work, September 2020128

Abbreviations

Statistical codes

:    Data not available

     Not participating

Country codes

Other abbreviations

Introduction

Part two of the EU Youth Report presents data and information on the situation of young people in Europe.

This part of the report builds on the Dashboard of EU youth indicators, a selection of 77 indicators, which measure the most crucial aspects of young people's lives in Europe. The dashboard was first released by the European Commission in spring 2011 and updated in 2021. It is presented as an annex to this document.

Relying on Eurostat data, Eurobarometer surveys and the Youth Wiki ( 3 ), the report targets young people between 15 and 29 years of age. The analysis often distinguishes between subgroups aged 15 to 19, 20 to 24, and 25 to 29. In a few cases, data for different youth age cohorts are represented, either because of the specifications of survey data, or because the issue in question affects a particular age group. In addition, for some indicators, data for children (under 16 years of age), older age groups and the total population are also included.

The reference year of the report is 2019, for which all data were available at the time of drafting (spring 2021). As far as the availability of data allows, the report illustrates the main trends occurred since 2015 and – when addressing the impact of COVID-19 pandemic – in the course of 2020.

The analysis covers the EU Member States, the United Kingdom, and the other 2014–2020 Erasmus+ programme countries (Iceland, Liechtenstein, North Macedonia, Norway, Serbia and Turkey). As the data collection of Eurobarometer surveys does not include the latter, they are excluded from the relevant graphs. In consideration of the fact that the United Kingdom was an EU Member State until the end of 2019, the EU-28 average is used in the graphs and in the analytical text. Nonetheless, figures for EU-27 are added below each graph when available.

Following an introductory chapter on demography, which presents the main trends and projections for the youth and total populations, chapters are dedicated to the topics covered by the core areas identified by the EU Youth Strategy: Engage, Connect, Empower.

Chapter 2 discusses young people participation in political and voluntary activities. The first section analyses young voters’ turnout in local, national and European elections. It then looks into young people’s involvement in political parties, youth and student organisations, and other forms of activism. Digital participation represents the focus of the third section, while, in its final part, the chapter reports on young people’s satisfaction with democracy and trust in national governments and the European Union – in particular during the COVID-19 pandemic.

Chapter 3 illustrates the situation of young Europeans on the labour market, focusing, in its first section, on unemployment and on the most vulnerable groups in the youth population. It also relates the consequence of the COVID-19 pandemic. The second part of the chapter is dedicated to a discussion of the main patterns of youth employment and to the digitalisation of the labour market.

Chapter 4 provides an overview of young people’s participation in learning experiences abroad, including volunteering. The first part of the chapter looks at youth mobility in a broad sense, also covering the reasons why some people do not take advantage of such opportunity. The second part of the chapter focuses on youth participation in two specific European programmes, namely Erasmus+ learning mobility and the European Solidarity Corps.

The impact of digitalisation on several aspect of young people’s lives is dealt with in Chapter 5. The chapter begins with an overview of the strategies established in European countries to reinforce youth media literacy and online safety. The second section explores several online activities conducted by young people and discusses some of the divides provoked and reinforced by digital technologies. The last section reports on young people’ trust in digital information during the COVID-19 pandemic.

Chapter 6 is dedicated to education and learning. The first section illustrates the level of participation of young people in non-formal learning and its trend over the last few years. The second section discusses young people’s digital skills and the impact of different levels of formal education. The final section considers the increasing use of digital technologies in education and learning.

The consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic on the psychological wellbeing of young people are the focus of chapter 7. The first section addresses the distress provoked by living for long periods in isolation and facing the health risks posed by the pandemic. The second section explores the changes that have occurred in interpersonal relations, and their impact on youth emotional wellbeing. The last section draws a comparison between the responses of young people and those of the general population to the pandemic.

Chapter 8 focuses on young people’ social inclusion. It first sets the context by analysing the age at which young people leave the family home and become independent. This is a phase that may trigger economic insecurity and a deterioration of living standards. Then, the analysis addresses the fundamental factors of exclusion: being at risk of poverty, living in households with very low work intensity and experiencing severe material deprivation. The final section brings into focus one of the groups in the youth population that face a high risk of exclusion: those who are not in employment, education or training (NEET).

Quality in youth work is the topic of chapter 9, whose first section illustrates the modalities of quality assurance across European countries. Since quality in youth work goes hand in hand with innovation in its practices to respond to the evolving needs of young people, the second section of the chapter illustrates the measures taken by European countries to support the digitalisation of youth work practices.

EUROPEAN YOUTH: A SNAPSHOT

Crosscutting issues: digitalisation and the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic

The report investigates various aspects of the situation of young people, focusing on two crosscutting issues: the digitalisation of society and the occurrence of the COVID-19 pandemic.

Over the past decades, digitalisation has grown to cover all aspects of life, transforming the way people participate in education and training, experience employment, and participate in society. The benefits are many. Digitalisation makes possible to participate in education and training even in circumstances when face-to-face learning is difficult. Obstacles to accessing learning establishments can be overcome by e-learning. The importance of this trend has become all the more evident during the lockdowns imposed to contain the spread of the COVID-19 pandemic.

Digitalisation has also changed the nature and modalities of employment. New jobs are created, such as platform work (i.e. work organised through online platforms) and coding (i.e. writing computer programmes). Working conditions change, often allowing for remote and flexible work. Online applications and platforms are used to find job openings, get in touch with prospective employers and participate in recruitment.

Spaces for participation also widen. Online consultations, exchanges with peers and public authorities, and access to information are examples of additional opportunities to take part in society.

At the same time, digital technologies may aggravate conditions of exclusion. Individuals with low levels of formal education and coming from disadvantaged socio-economic backgrounds risk staying at the margins of the digital society. The lack of adequate digital skills make them vulnerable to exclusion from the world of work, due to the disappearance of some non-automated jobs. Access to online education can also be restricted, as well as opportunities for online participation.

Such challenges become ever more serious as the COVID-19 pandemic has dramatically increased the use of digital applications. As the amount of time spent online has considerably increased during lockdowns, the risks of social isolation and exposure to online dangers have become all the more serious. Coupled with strong feelings of uncertainty and worry for health consequences, the pandemic has greatly affected the psychological wellbeing of many young Europeans.

This has also been impacted by the loss of employment that many young people have suffered in the course of the pandemic, caused by the economic crisis that has mostly hit the sectors where many of them work (for example, retail, food and hospitality).

COVID-19 has also curtailed youth mobility due to restrictions in travel and extended periods of confinement. Many Erasmus+ students had to suspend their learning experience abroad, and considerably fewer mobility activities started in the framework of this programme in 2020.

Nonetheless, in face of all these difficulties, young Europeans have demonstrated considerable resilience. They have swiftly adapted to the move from face-to-face to e-learning. They have cultivated relations with family members and friends through online means, as a coping practice against isolation. Moreover, they have shown awareness of the threats posed by news unreliability concerning the pandemic. Children and young people reported being able to detect fake news more promptly than before. This can partly be explained by the increased amount of time spent with family members during the lockdowns and their mediating effect in relation to news content. Indeed, scientific sources of information prove to be the most resorted to by young Europeans.

Main trends: a general improvement since 2015

While stressing the significant challenges caused by COVID-19, it is important to note the many respects in which the situation of young Europeans has improved since 2015.

As mentioned, the growing application of digital technologies in all spheres of society has greatly interested education and training. Accompanied by the expansion of online learning – particularly since the start of 2020, when the COVID-19 pandemic has forced learning institutions to close and teaching to move online – it has contributed to an increase in the shares of young Europeans reinforcing their digital skills.

Concomitantly, the report shows that young people have taken advantage of the opportunities offered by digitalisation to increasing degrees. The use of the internet has grown, and, in connection, the participation in several online activities such as interacting with public authorities and being active in the collaborative economy. In parallel, national governments in the vast majority of European countries have implemented measures to support digital literacy and ensure safe use of digital media.

Despite the downturn that took place during 2020, on average, youth unemployment has been steadily decreasing until the end of 2019. Linked to the amelioration of their situation in the labour market, between 2015 and 2019 the level of social inclusion of young Europeans has improved. All indicators analysed in this report – risk of poverty, very low work intensity and severe material deprivation – show positive trends. This also applies to the share of young people who are not in employment, education or training (NEETs) – up until 2020, when the economic crisis due to the pandemic pushed many young people out of employment.

Over the years considered, the level of youth political engagement also shows several elements of progress. Youth participation in the 2019 European elections was higher than in 2014. The proportion of young people who are satisfied with how democracy works in their countries and in the EU also increased from 2015 to 2019. Participation in voluntary activities has grown considerably, especially in national and international projects.

Young Europeans participate more in volunteering activities and in programmes for learning mobility. Since 2015, and until 2019, the total number of learners from Erasmus+ countries augmented.

Another noteworthy trend is the growing efforts by European countries to underpin quality and innovation in youth work, in order to support at best the inclusion, participation and wellbeing of young Europeans. The report illustrates how public authorities have established formal mechanisms of quality assurance in youth work projects in the vast majority of countries. Measures have also been established to reinforce the digitalisation of youth work (accelerated by the move to online activities during the COVID-19 pandemic), both by supporting youth workers in strengthening their digital skills and by encouraging youth participation through digital means.

Some challenges persist

Notwithstanding the general improvements, some challenges continue to affect young Europeans, particularly some specific groups.

Young age is frequently associated with worse working and social conditions compared with the total population and older age groups. Unemployment is higher among young people aged between 25 and 29 than among individuals in the prime working age (25–54). The same situation applies to the frequency of temporary contracts. In parallel, young people are at risk of poverty or social exclusion more than the total population.

Such risk tends to affect young women in particular. As the report illustrates, young women are more likely to be neither employed, nor in education or training (NEET) than men. A closer look at this gap reveals that women are more often inactive (i.e. not employed and not searching for a job). The fact that women tend to bear more family responsibilities and hold more precarious positions in the labour market than men concurs to explain the higher rate of inactivity. This is also reflected in the fact that, comparatively, they tend to work part time more frequently and to create their own business to a lesser extent. In addition, the risk of being poor affects young women more than men and the divide is also visible across years. Indeed, the decrease in the proportion of youth at risk of poverty between 2015 and 2019 was bigger for men than for women.

Young people with a low level of formal education are often at a disadvantage too. Compared to individuals with higher qualifications, they have less chances of finding a job. This is also related to the lower level of digital skills they tend to have, a fact that, in addition, makes them at risk of exclusion from education and training. As mentioned above, learning has increasingly made use of digital technologies – especially when face-to-face interactions are limited – and this requires an adequate capacity to use digital means.

The level of formal education also influences the level of political and civic participation. Higher levels of formal education tend to be associated with higher rates of participation in elections and in other forms of activism. This is again linked to the lower levels of digital skills possessed by young people with lower attainment, as digital technologies are increasingly applied to participative activities (for example, online consultations, interaction with public authorities, discussion of social and political issues).

Beside age, gender and education, a third potential source of inequalities is represented by where young Europeans live. For example, some remote or rural areas do not dispose of a stable broadband internet coverage, thus reducing the possibility for young people to take full advantage of the learning, working and participative opportunities they provide.

The level of urbanisation is not the only factor behind geographical inequalities. In some parts of southern and eastern Europe, young people face comparatively more challenges in various respects. On average, the level of digital skills tend to be lower as well as the use of the internet. Participation in politics, society, volunteering and mobility is also more limited compared to the rest of Europe. In addition, larger shares of young people are faced by the risk of poverty and social exclusion, and unemployment. In this last respect, the gender divide described above is even more marked that elsewhere.

1. Youth population

Although there is no universal definition of the specific period in life when a person is considered to be young, the age range of 15–29 years (used in this chapter and in the rest of the report) is most commonly used across European countries ( 4 ). Indeed, this is the reference age group used in the European Union Youth Strategy for 2019–2027 and, in general, in EU cooperation in the youth field ( 5 ).

Clearly, transformations in how the youth age group is defined occur in parallel to developments in society. In some contexts, the youth age group is considered to include people up to their mid-30s, based on the length of time spent in education and when they become independent from the family of origin ( 6 ).

The transition from adolescence to adulthood represents an important stage in the life course. Over this period, young people complete their education, enter the workforce, become involved in political participation, and acquire new social and family responsibilities ( 7 ). Some of the implications of this transition are discussed in Chapter 8 on social inclusion.

The first section of this chapter discusses the size of the youth population in Europe, its trends and their impact on the total European population. The second section focuses on the dynamics of youth migration and their influence on the demography of European youth.

1.1. Trends in the youth population

Approximately 86 million young people live in the EU-28 ( 8 ). On average, one in every six people are aged between 15 and 29 years (Figure 1.1). Young people are equally distributed between the three age cohorts (15–19, 20–24 and 25–29 years), with a slight predominance of the oldest group.

While no variation exists in the share of young men and women, differences between countries in the proportion of young people in the total population are evident. The highest proportions of young people in the EU-28 are found in Cyprus (21.3 %), followed by Malta (19.8 %), and Denmark, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Sweden and Ireland (all around 19 %). Conversely, the lowest proportions are found in several southern and eastern Member States (around 15 % in Bulgaria, Slovenia, Italy and Spain, and around 16 % in Czechia, Greece, Latvia, Portugal, Estonia and Romania).

Figure 1.1: Share of young people (15-19, 20-24 and 25-29) in the total population, by country, 2019

Source: Eurostat [yth_demo_020]. Data extracted on 09.03.2021.

Notes: Countries are ordered by ascending share of total youth population (15-29).

EU-27 averages: 15-29: 16.6 %; 15-19: 5.2 %; 20-24: 5.4 %; 25-29: 6 %.

In the non-EU countries analysed, the highest shares of young people are found in Turkey (23.5 %) and Iceland (21.7 %), while the lowest proportions in Serbia (16.6 %) and Liechtenstein (17 %).

Figure 1.2 illustrates the trends in the proportion of young people in the total population between 2010 and 2019. While, on average, the EU-28 saw a decline of 1.8 percentage points (p.p.), considerable differences exist between countries.

Figure 1.2: Trend in the share of young people in the total population (15-29), by country, 2010 and 2019

Source: Eurostat [yth_demo_020]. Data extracted on 09.03.2021.

Notes: EU-27 averages: 2019: 16.6 %; 2010: 18.4 %.

The Baltic and eastern European regions experienced the highest contractions. The share of young people fell by 5.6 p.p. in Latvia, 4.5 p.p. in Estonia and 3.9 p.p. in Lithuania. In the eastern region, Poland saw the proportion of young people decrease by 5.5 p.p., Slovakia by 5.3 p.p., Czechia by 4.2 p.p., and both Slovenia and Bulgaria by 4 p.p. On the other hand, the proportion of young people increased in Denmark (1.5 p.p.), the Netherlands (0.5 p.p.) and Luxembourg (0.3 p.p.).

Among the different factors that determine the proportion of young people in the total population, the trends over time and differences between countries are migratory dynamics and fertility rates ( 9 ). Fertility rates are discussed below, while migratory dynamics are discussed in Section 1.2.

Over the last few decades, the number of births has been declining – to different extents – in Europe, resulting in a progressive decrease in the total and youth population ( 10 ). Countries’ fertility rates clearly have an impact on the national proportions of young people. Times series from 1991 to 2007 (the span of years when today’s young people were born) show that countries currently reporting the lowest proportions of young people are among those that registered the lowest fertility rates over that period. Similarly, countries currently recording the highest proportions of young people had higher fertility rates during this period ( 11 ).

There are many reasons behind the variation in fertility rate between countries. For example, staying in education for longer, choosing a ‘child-free’ lifestyle and taking longer to find a partner all contribute to the birth of fewer children and at a later stage in life ( 12 ). An additional noteworthy factor is a country’s economic performance, which, combined with social benefits and family policies, influences the likelihood of young people becoming parents. For example, high levels of youth unemployment, precarious working conditions and downwards mobility result in many young people delaying having children and having fewer children ( 13 ).

The decline in the number of young people – and, in general, in the total population of Europe – is expected to continue in the future. As illustrated in Figure 1.3, it is predicted that, in the EU-27, the population of young people and the total population will progressively decrease over the next 50 years. From a current figure of 73 million in 2021, it is estimated that the youth population will decrease to 64 million in 2070. Meanwhile, the total population is projected to decrease by 24 million by 2070. In proportional terms, whereas the size of the total population in the EU-27 will diminish by 5 %, the youth population is expected to shrink by 12 %, more than twice the rate for the total population.

Because of the more pronounced projected decline in the youth population than in the total population, the decrease in the proportion of young people in the total population is expected to continue until 2050. (Figure 1.4).

The contraction in the size of the youth population is at the root of the progressive ageing of the European population ( 14 ). While longer life expectancy is a sign of improvements in people’s health and well-being, this trend has challenging implications for the future of society ( 15 ). For example, the contraction in the proportion

of the working-age population is deemed to reduce public revenue from fiscal sources and challenge the sustainability of public services ( 16 ). Moreover, social and healthcare services may be put under increasing pressure to cater for an ever-ageing population ( 17 ). Finally, the diminution in the size of the youth population and the ageing of society will bring significant changes to the education system, resulting in an oversupply of teachers and a lack of employment in the profession ( 18 ).

As mentioned above, besides fertility rates, migration dynamics are a powerful factor influencing trends in the youth – and therefore the general – population in Europe.

1.2. Youth migration

Youth migration within and towards Europe has accelerated since the 1990s ( 19 ). Increasingly higher numbers of young people from third countries ( 20 ) have been moving to European countries, and, at the same time, more and more young Europeans have become mobile across the continent (Chapter 4 provides an overview of learning mobility across European countries). In the case of young migrants, migration is often not permanent as young people tend to move again later in their lives. In such case, migration can be ‘temporary’ (establishing one’s residency in a foreign country for a definite length of time) or ‘circular’ (alternating periods in a foreign country with returns to the country or origin) ( 21 ).

These phenomena have resulted in important changes to Europe’s youth population. On one hand, the diversity of the population has increased, as more and more young people with different geographical backgrounds have come to live in Europe. On the other, migratory flows have had a large impact on the size of the youth cohort, both across and within European countries ( 22 ).

Section 1.2.1 provides an overview of migratory patterns among European countries, and Section 1.2.2 focuses on the impact of migration on the European youth population.

1.2.1. Patterns in youth migration

Figure 1.5 represents the share of young people (aged 15-29) born in a foreign country. The chart distinguishes between young people born in another EU-28 member State, and young people born in a country outside the EU.

Figure 1.5: Share of young people (15-29) born in a country different from the one where they reside by country, 2019

Source: Eurostat [yth_demo_060]. Data extracted on 08.06.2021.

Notes: countries are ordered according to the ascending share of young people born in a EU member State.

Ireland: estimated; France: forecast.

The highest shares are found in western and southern European countries. In the EU-28, Luxembourg presents the highest proportion, followed by Cyprus and Malta. On the contrary, the lowest figures are reported in several eastern and Baltic countries. Outside the EU-28, Liechtenstein reports the largest share of young people born in a foreign country.

In the majority of countries, the share of young people born in countries outside the EU-28 is higher than that of young people born in another EU member State. This is particularly the case in some south-European countries (Greece, Italy and Spain), eastern ones (Bulgaria and Romania), as well as in France, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovenia and Sweden. Conversely, the share of young people born in a EU member State is higher than that of those born outside of the EU-28 only in Slovakia, Ireland, Cyprus, Luxembourg, and, outside the EU-28, Iceland.

Overall, data indicate that western and southern regions of Europe tend to be destinations for comparatively largest scores of young people both coming from outside of the EU-28 and from other EU member states.

To complement the illustration of immigration dynamics among European countries, it is interesting to observe the proportion of young people in the total population of immigrants, defined as individuals establishing their usual residence in the territory of an EU member State for a period that is, or is expected to be, of at least 12 months, having previously been usually resident in another Member State or a third country ( 23 ).

Figure 1.6: Share of young people (15-29) in the total population of immigrants in the reference year by country, 2019

Source: Eurostat [yth_demo_070]. Data extracted on 16.06.2021.

Notes: countries are ordered according to the ascending share of young people in the total immigrant population.

Bulgaria: provisional; Poland and Slovakia: estimated and provisional

Figure 1.6 indicates that in western and southern European countries immigration tend to be “younger” than in eastern and Baltic ones. In particular, in 2019, the proportion of individuals aged 15-29 among immigrants was around 40 % in Denmark, the Netherlands and Cyprus. Outside of the EU-28, North Macedonia and Iceland reported figures above 30 %. Conversely, less than 25 % of immigrants were young in Bulgaria, Lithuania, Slovakia and Poland.

The tendency suggested by data on the share of young people born in a foreign country (Figure 1.5) is confirmed by the age composition of the immigrant population: larger shares of young people move to countries in the western and southern areas of Europe, compared with eastern and Baltic ones.

To fully understand the patterns of youth migration among European countries, it is essential to observe also the side of emigration. Figure 1.7 shows the proportions of young people among emigrants from the countries for which data are available. Emigrants are defined as people who, having previously been usually resident in the territory of an EU Member State, cease to have their usual residence in that Member State for a period that is, or is expected to be, of at least 12 months ( 24 ).

Figure 1.7: Share of young people (15-29) in the total population of emigrants in the reference year by country, 2019

Source: Eurostat [yth_demo_080]. Data extracted on 09.06.2021.

Notes: countries are ordered according to the ascending share of young people in the total population of emigrants.

In 2019, a remarkable share of emigrants from Lithuania and Bulgaria were aged between 15-29 (37.6 % and 30.8 %, respectively). High shares of young emigrants were also reported by Latvia (24.1 %) and Finland (21.7 %). On the contrary, western European countries saw the lowest proportions of young people in the total population of emigrants – around 5 % from both Luxembourg and Spain, 7 % from both Belgium and Denmark, and 10 % from Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden.

The data illustrated in the section suggest the existence of two main dynamics in Europe. Western countries attract higher proportions of young people (from both the EU-28 and third countries) and see lower proportions of young people emigrating. With the limitations posed by the limited number of countries with available data, the opposite trend is observed in eastern and Baltic countries: higher rates of emigration are accompanied by lower rates of immigration (mostly from outside of the EU-28).

Various circumstances contribute to these differences between countries ( 25 ). An important driver inducing many young people to move to western European countries is the opportunity to get a better education ( 26 ). Besides the desire to experience living and studying in a different country, for many young people who cannot access adequate education opportunities in their own countries, emigration is often a necessity ( 27 ). Indeed, degree mobility ( 28 ) (particularly in higher postgraduate education) sees educational institutions in western Europe attracting high numbers of young students. This phenomenon is at the root of imbalances in the level of mobility between countries, with some being ‘net exporters’ of students and others being ‘net importers’ ( 29 ).

Economic conditions also play a considerable role in determining migratory flows. In countries where young people struggle to access the labour market and are compelled to work in the informal sector – suffering the ensuing precarious living conditions – emigration is an option chosen by many ( 30 ). In Europe, northern and western countries tend to offer comparatively more opportunities for employment and are therefore the most sought-after destinations for many young job seekers ( 31 ).

These circumstances are expected to exert strong influences on the demographic situation of European countries for some time to come.

1.2.2. Impact of migration on demographic trends

Comparing data on the share of young people in the total population illustrated in Figures 1.1 and 1.2 with data discussed in the previous section provides evidence of the role played by migration in shaping the size of the youth population.

In countries where young people tend to immigrate (mainly in western and southern Europe), the general youth population has decreased comparatively less over the past decade. On the contrary, in countries where young people represent a comparatively bigger share of emigrants (as it is the case in eastern and Baltic regions), the contraction in the proportion of young people in the total population has been more pronounced.

Third-country immigration exerts a distinctive influence in terms of offsetting the demographic decline in the share of young people ( 32 ). This is because the proportions of young people among extra-European immigrants are larger than the proportions of young people living in European countries ( 33 ).

The balancing effect of third-countries’ immigration is expected to continue in the future. Data illustrated in Figure 1.8 show that, when migration is excluded from the calculation of the projected number of young people in the EU-27 up to 2070, the population decrease is bigger.

Under this scenario, instead of a 12 % reduction (as depicted in Figure 1.3), the youth population would decrease by 30 % between 2021 and 2070, i.e. from 74 to 50 million. Countries are expected to be affected to different degrees. In line with data discussed in Section 1.2.1, projections for southern countries such as Malta, Italy and Cyprus indicate a considerable difference between the baseline and net migration trends (data not shown ( 34 )). Conversely, the balancing effect of immigration is expected to be smaller in several countries in the Baltic and eastern European regions (e.g. Latvia, Estonia, Romania and Bulgaria) ( 35 ).

Conclusions

On average, in Europe, one in every six people are aged between 15 and 29 years. In line with the trend registered over the past decade, this proportion is expected to decline in the future. From a current figure of 73 million in 2021, it is estimated that the youth population will decrease to 64 million in 2070. Economic circumstances such as recurrent soars in unemployment, as well as changes in lifestyle (for example staying in education for longer) result in many young people delaying having children and having fewer children.

In some countries high rates of youth emigration have aggravated the demographic imbalance. Particularly in eastern and Baltic countries, the proportions of young people in the emigrant population are higher than in western ones, where, in turn, the shares of young people born in a foreign country are larger.

The contraction in the size of the youth population is at the root of the progressive ageing of the European population, which presents challenging social and economic implications for the future of society. This has been – and is expected to keep being – partially offset by immigration from third countries. The influx of immigrants compensates to a certain extent for the overall contraction in the population and counterbalances the demographic decline in the share of young people.

(1) ()    Alphabetical order according to country's name in national language.

(2) ()    Alphabetical order according to codes.

(3) ()    The Youth Wiki is the platform reporting on national policies in the youth field. To access the most recent developments, see its website: https://national-policies.eacea.ec.europa.eu/youthwiki . [Accessed on 28.05.2021]

(4) ()    The national descriptions on the Youth Wiki platform provide further information on how European countries define the youth age group. Available at: https://national-policies.eacea.ec.europa.eu/youthwiki . [Accessed on 09.04.2021]

(5) ()    The European Youth Strategy and information on EU cooperation in the youth field are available at: https://europa.eu/youth/strategy_en . [Accessed on 09.04.2021]

(6) ()    Billari, 2004; Belmonte et al., 2020.

(7) ()    OECD, 2020a.

(8) ()    Source: Eurostat [yth_demo_010]. Data extracted on 09.03.2021. Data refer to the EU-28. In 2020, 74 million young people lived in the EU-27. Approximately 22 million young people live in the non-EU Erasmus+ countries included in this report (Iceland, Liechtenstein, North Macedonia, Norway, Serbia and Turkey).

(9) ()    IMF, 2016.

(10) ()    Source: Eurostat [demo_find]. Data extracted on 09.03.2021

(11) ()    Ibid.

(12) ()    Sobotka, 2013.

(13) ()    Currie and Schwandt, 2014.

(14) ()    OECD, 2020a; Aurambout et al., 2021.

(15) ()    UN, 2015.

(16) ()    Ibid.

(17) ()    Ibid.

(18) ()    European Commission/EACEA/Eurydice, 2021b.

(19) ()    King, 2018.

(20) ()    A third country is a country that is not a member of the European Union, as well as a country or territory whose citizens do not enjoy the European Union right to free movement. See European Commission, ‘European Migration Network – EMN glossary’. Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/networks/european_migration_network/glossary_search/third-country_en . [Accessed on 09.04.2021]

(21) ()    For a glossary of migration terms, see European Commission, ‘European Migration Network – EMN glossary’. Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/networks/european_migration_network/glossary_search/third-country_en . [Accessed on 09.04.2021]

(22) ()    For a glossary of migration terms, ibid.

(23) ()    Eurostat, 2021h

(24) ()    Eurostat, 2021h.

(25) ()    Belmonte et al., 2020.

(26) ()    European Commission, 2018b; International Monetary Fund (IMF), 2016.

(27) ()    European Commission/EACEA/Eurydice, 2020b.

(28) ()    Degree mobility is the physical crossing of a national border to enrol in a tertiary-level degree programme in the country of destination. European Commission/EACEA/Eurydice, 2020a.

(29) ()    European Commission/EACEA/Eurydice, 2020a.

(30) ()    World Bank, 2016.

(31) ()    European Commission, 2018b.

(32) ()    For a detailed overview of how demographic change shapes the future of Europe, see the European Commission Atlas of Demography, available at: https://migration-demography-tools.jrc.ec.europa.eu/atlas-demography/ . [Accessed on 01.06.2021]

(33) ()    Eurostat, 2021h. Migration flows: immigration to the EU from non-member countries was 2.7 million in 2019.

(34) ()    Source: Eurostat [proj_19np]. Data extracted on 23.03.2021

(35) ()    Ibid.; Belmonte et al., 2021

EUROPEAN COMMISSION

Brussels, 14.10.2021

SWD(2021) 287 final

COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT

The situation of young people in the European Union

Accompanying the document

Report from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions

on the implementation of the EU Youth Strategy 2019-2021

{COM(2021) 636 final} - {SWD(2021) 286 final}

2. Youth engagement in society

A key objective of the new youth strategy is to encourage young people to become active citizens, agents of solidarity and positive change for communities across Europe, inspired by EU values and a European identity ( 1 ). In order to achieve this goal, it is necessary to promote young people’s participation in elections, to encourage their social and civic engagement, including their involvement in youth organisations and online activism, and to explore innovative and alternative forms of democratic participation.

Young people’s lower turnout in elections and level of engagement with political parties does not necessarily mean that they lack interest in politics or are disconnected from the civic life of their communities. They usually perceive voting as a very important channel of democratic participation and are actively involved in many other forms of civic and political participation, especially through civil society organisations and social movements ( 2 ). Compared to older adults, young people may be less likely to participate in institutionalised politics but engage more often in non-institutionalised forms of participation like political consumerism, demonstrations and internet activism ( 3 ). As this chapter will show, the youngest generations are also particularly supportive of the democratic system and political institutions.

The first section of the chapter analyses young voter turnout in local, national and European elections according to Eurobarometer and European Parliament surveys. The second section looks at young people’s involvement in political parties, youth and student organisations, and informal forms of participation, such as campaigns, strikes, street protests and social media activism. The third section examines young people’s digital participation, in online consultations, votes and websites, over recent years. The final section examines young people’s satisfaction with democracy and their degree of trust in the national government and in the European Union, in particular during the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic.

2.1. Voting in political elections

Young people have traditionally been less likely to turn out at the polls than older adults ( 4 ). Between 2011 and 2017, young voter turnout declined in most European countries ( 5 ). Although the proportion of those with a strong or moderate interest in politics increased more during this time among young people than the other age groups – probably as the result of young people’s use of social media – their interest in politics was still lower ( 6 ). In 2019, 52 % of people aged 15–24 years showed a strong or moderate interest in politics, compared with 63 % of people aged 25–39, 69 % of people aged 40–54, and 62 % of people aged 55 or older.

According to the Eurobarometer youth survey carried out in March 2019, an average of 72 % of young people aged 15–30 had voted at least once at local, national or European level (Figure 2.1). The voting age was generally 18, with the exception of Austria and Malta, where it was 16, and Greece, where it was 17. Voting is compulsory in Belgium and Luxembourg for registered citizens. In Greece, mandatory voting is not enforced.

In Austria, Sweden, Estonia, Latvia and the Netherlands, at least 80 % of young people declared having voted. The proportion of young people who had ever voted was also over the EU-28 average (72 %) in Poland, Denmark, Germany, Czechia, Slovakia, Italy, Slovenia, Luxembourg and Finland. By contrast, in Cyprus, Greece and Romania almost one in two respondents had never gone to the polls.

Figure 2.1: Proportions of young people (aged 15-30) who had voted at least once (2019) and who had voted in the previous 3 years (December 2014) by country

Source: Flash Eurobarometer 478 (2019). Volume A. Question Q6: ‘Have you ever participated in the following activities? Voting in local, national or European elections’. Flash Eurobarometer 408 (December 2014). Volume A. Question Q2: ‘During the last 3 years, did you vote in any political election at the local, regional, national or EU level?’.

Notes: EU Member States are displayed in descending order of proportion of respondents who had voted in local, national or European elections in the 2019 survey.

In the Eurobarometer youth survey conducted in December 2014, around half of the young people in Cyprus declared that they had not voted in a local, regional, national or European election in the previous 3 years. Ireland, Lithuania and the United Kingdom also had a participation rate below 50 % at that time.

By contrast, in Greece and Romania, more than 70 % of young people reported having voted in the 3 years before the December 2014 survey. This was also the case in Belgium, Czechia, Latvia, Austria, Slovenia, Slovakia and Sweden.

Figure 2.2 provides a breakdown of the data on participation from the 2019 Eurobarometer youth survey by gender, age, age at end of education, degree of urbanisation, opinion on the EU, participation in a learning experience abroad and involvement in voluntary activities.

The average participation in elections of young women and men was very similar. Nor were there large differences by degree of urbanisation, although average participation was slightly higher among young people living in the city. The differences were more evident between age groups and education levels.

The relation between likelihood to vote, on the one hand, and age and education level, on the other, is well documented ( 7 ). Older people tend to be more likely to vote than the younger population because they usually are more mature, are more settled in life and have a stronger sense of civic duty ( 8 ). People with a higher level of education are more likely to vote than those with a lower level of education because they are usually more interested in following politics, and better equipped to do so, and have more resources that enable them to be politically engaged ( 9 ). However, the digital revolution could be attenuating the effect of age and education on voter turnout, as attested to by the growing interest of the youngest in politics and the increasing capacity of certain political parties to mobilise voters who have a low level of education.

Figure 2.2: Proportions of young people (aged 15-30) who had voted at least once in a local, national or European election by characteristic, 2019

Source: Flash Eurobarometer 478. Volume A. Question Q6: ‘Have you ever participated in the following activities? Voting in local, national or European elections’.

According to the 2019 Eurobarometer youth survey, the proportion of young voters increased with age group (Figure 2.2). While only 27 % of young people aged under 20 years had ever voted, the percentage reached 82 % for those aged 20–24, and 86 % for those aged 25–30. Even if most of the respondents in the youngest age cohort had just not been eligible to vote, data on European Parliament elections suggest that they are less likely to vote even when they have reached voting age (see Figure 2.3).

The proportion of young voters also increased with the duration of their formal education. While 89 % of young people who had studied until (at least) the age of 20 reported having voted, the percentage decreased to 73 % for respondents with a shorter education and fell to 68 % for early leavers. Only 62 % of those still studying – which would include a large proportion of the youngest people – had ever voted.

The tendency to vote was similar among young people having a positive and those having a negative view of the EU. However, a positive opinion on the EU may be more determinant in motivating young people to vote in the European elections, as data from the European Parliament post-election surveys show (see Figure 2.4).

Other factors, such as going abroad for learning and participation in volunteering, also appeared to be related to youth voter turnout. The proportion of young people who had ever voted in local, national or European elections was above average among those who had taken part in a learning experience abroad or had participated in voluntary activities. In fact, as illustrated in Chapter 4, youth mobility is particularly high in countries with a large proportion of young voters, such as Sweden, Estonia and Latvia. In other countries with a high youth turnout, such as Austria, the Netherlands, Denmark and Germany, young people are not only likely to go abroad for learning but particularly involved in voluntary activities (see Section 2.3).

Data from the European Parliament post-election surveys point to a growing mobilisation of young voters and show that their participation tends to increase with age (Figure 2.3). Turnout among voters aged under 25 years increased from 28 % in 2014 to 42 % in 2019, and among voters aged 25–34 years from 33 % to 46 %. The higher young voter turnout had a positive effect on the overall turnout, which went from around 43 % in 2014 to almost 51 % in 2019.

The increase in young people’s participation in the European elections was particularly evident in Denmark, Spain, Hungary, the Netherlands, Austria, Poland and Romania. In Finland and Sweden, participation increased significantly among the youngest voters, but it decreased among those aged 25–34. Youth turnout also decreased in Belgium, Bulgaria, Italy, Latvia and the United Kingdom, and in Lithuania and Portugal among those aged under 25 years.

Figure 2.3: Proportions of young people (aged 15-30) who declared having voted in the 2014 and 2019 elections to the European Parliament by country and age group

Source: European Parliament, 2019 and 2014 post-electoral surveys. Volume C. Questions QG1 and QP1: ‘European Parliament elections were held on [date]. For one reason or another, some people in [country] did not vote in these elections. Did you yourself vote in the recent European Parliament elections?’.

Notes: In Malta and Austria, the youngest voter age group was 16–24 years; in Greece, it was 17–24 years. EU Member States are displayed in descending order of proportion of respondents aged 16/18–24 who reported having voted in the 2019 European elections.

Despite the increase in youth participation, young voter turnout in the European 2019 elections was lower than the overall turnout in all countries except in Greece, Spain and Sweden ( 10 ). Among young people, the oldest usually went to vote in larger proportions. Turnout among people aged 25–34 was on average 4 percentage points (p.p.) higher than that among those aged under 25. In Germany, Italy, Malta, the Netherlands, Portugal and Slovakia, it was more than 10 p.p. higher. However, in a few countries, the youngest voters turned out at the polls in larger proportions. This was particularly evident in Sweden, where more than 80 % of young people aged under 25 years declared having voted – compared with less than half of those aged 25–34. To a lesser extent, the same pattern could be seen in other countries, such as Spain, Denmark, Greece, France and Cyprus.

As shown in Figure 2.3, in the 2019 elections to the European Parliament more than 80 % of young people voted in Belgium and Luxembourg, where voting is compulsory for registered citizens. The percentage was similarly high for the youngest cohort (aged under 25 years) in Sweden, and for young people aged 25–34 in Malta. In Spain, Denmark and Germany, the participation rate was in the region of 60 %. In Greece, where voting is also compulsory but no sanctions are in force, more than half of young people reported having voted. A similar proportion of young voters turned out at the polls in Romania, Austria and Italy, and in the Netherlands in the case of voters aged 25–34 years.

Recent research has studied the positive relation between the decision to participate in the European elections and one’s engagement with European politics and opinion on the EU. Citizens who turn out at the polls for local or national elections out of a sense of duty will also participate in European elections when they feel that their vote can change things and when they know about and value positively the work of the EU ( 11 ). Generally, turnout in European elections is lower than in national elections ( 12 ).

Figure 2.4 shows that, in most countries with a high young voter turnout in the 2019 European elections, young people tend to have a positive opinion on the EU. In Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Germany, Austria, Denmark, Romania, Sweden and Italy the proportion of young people with a positive view of the EU was above the average (73 %). In Belgium, the percentage was exactly 73 %.

Greece and Spain were the only exceptions. In these two countries, youth turnout in the 2019 European elections was particularly high – even higher than the overall turnout. However, Greece had the lowest percentage of young people with a positive opinion on the EU, and the second lowest percentage of young people having voted at least once in any election (see Figure 2.1). These two percentages were also below the EU-28 average in Spain, where young people’s participation in the 2014 European Elections had been particularly low. This would speak for the success of political parties in connecting with the young electorate in the 2019 European elections, which would be worth further investigation.

Figure 2.4: Proportions of young people (aged 15-30) with a (very or fairly) positive view of the EU by country, 2019

Source: Flash Eurobarometer 478. Volume A. Question DX2: ‘In general, please tell me if you have a very positive, fairly positive, fairly negative or very negative view of the European Union?’.

Notes: Countries are displayed in descending order of proportion of respondents with a very or fairly positive view of the EU.

In the other countries where the proportion of young people with a positive view of the EU was below average (i.e. Hungary, Poland, Cyprus, Czechia, the United Kingdom, Slovakia and France), so was the youth voter turnout in the European elections.

In Lithuania, Estonia, Finland, Portugal, Latvia, Slovenia, Bulgaria and Croatia, the percentage of young people with a positive view of the EU was above the EU-28 average but their participation in the 2019 European elections was particularly low (see Figure 2.3). In most of these countries, the overall turnout was also among the lowest in the EU ( 13 ). In Ireland, youth participation was lower than the EU-28 average, and much lower than the national average (50 %), despite having the largest proportion of young people with a positive view of the EU.

2.2. Other forms of participation

This section provides further insight in young people’s participation in institutionalised politics by looking at their engagement in political parties and movements. It also examines their participation in youth and student organisations and other non-institutionalised forms of social and political activism.

According to the 2019 Eurobarometer youth survey, more than 40 % of young people had participated in student or youth organisations, 38 % had posted opinions on current issues on social media, and 35 % had taken part in campaigns, strikes or street protests (Figure 2.5). One quarter of respondents had made politically motivated consumer choices.

Figure 2.5: Proportions of young people (aged 15-30) who reported having participated in certain activities, EU-28, 2019

Proportions of young people (aged 15-30) who reported having participated in the following activities by age group, EU-28, 2019

Source: Flash Eurobarometer 478. Volume A. Question Q6: ‘Have you ever participated in the following activities?’.

By contrast, the participation of young people in political movements, political parties or unions was very modest (15 % on average). Research has shown that young people may not feel represented by the existing political parties, find it difficult to participate in such hierarchical and rigid structures, or prefer to be involved in promoting more specific objectives with shorter term results ( 14 ). Among other explanatory factors, political parties may have failed to engage with young people’s preferred forms of participation (e.g. demonstrations, social media and civil society organisations), to address the issues important to young people in their political manifestos or to include young candidates in their lists ( 15 ).

Youth participation in political movements, political parties or unions is low but increases with age. While only 12 % of young people aged 15–19 years reported having been engaged in this way, the percentage increased to 14 % for those aged 20–24 and reached 18 % for those aged 25–30.

The proportion of young people posting opinions on current issues on social media and making politically motivated consumer choices also increased with age (from 35 % to 40 %, and from 20 % to 27 %, respectively). Young people aged 25–30 were also the most active in campaigns, strikes and street protests. By contrast, young people aged 20–25 were the most engaged in student and youth organisations.

Figure 2.6 shows the two most common forms of civic and political participation in each country, excluding voting in elections (see Section 2.1) and volunteering (see Section 2.3).

Taking part in a student or youth organisation was the most common form of participation in 18 countries and the second most common in another seven. More than 60 % of respondents declared having participated in a student or youth organisation in Ireland, 54 % in Sweden, and around half in Belgium, Luxembourg, Slovenia, Finland and the United Kingdom. The percentage was 40 % or more in Czechia, Germany, Estonia, Italy, Latvia, the Netherlands, Poland and Portugal.

In Germany, Spain, France, Italy, Cyprus and Slovakia, the preferred form of participation was taking part in campaigns, strikes or street protests. This was also the second most common response in Belgium, Denmark, Ireland, Greece, Luxembourg and Austria. More than half of respondents had taken part in such an activity in Spain and Italy, and almost that proportion had done so in Germany, Ireland and Luxembourg.

In Bulgaria, Greece and Austria, the most common form of participation was posting opinions on current issues on social media. This was the second preferred option in another 12 countries. In Czechia, Spain, Poland and the United Kingdom, more than 40 % of respondents declared having used social media to express their opinion. In Latvia and Portugal, the percentage was almost as high. Chapter 5 examines the role of social media during the COVID-19 pandemic, both as a source of information for young people and a means to make their voices heard.

Making politically motivated consumer choices was a form of participation particularly popular among young people in the Netherlands and the Scandinavian Member States (Denmark, Finland and Sweden).

Countries with a low young voter turnout, such as Croatia, Cyprus, Hungary, Malta and Romania (see Figure 2.1) also had some of the lowest proportions of engagement of young people in these other forms of participation. Conversely, in Ireland, Spain and Portugal, the high degree of involvement of young people in youth or student organisations, campaigns, strikes or protests, and social media contrasts with their low turnout at the polls.

Figure 2.6: Most common forms of participation among young people (%) by country (excluding voting and volunteering), 2019

Source: Flash Eurobarometer 478. Volume A. Question Q6: ‘Have you ever participated in the following activities?’.

2.3. Volunteering

Not only do young people participate in youth organisations and informal forms of civic and political participation such as internet and street activism, they are also involved in voluntary activities in their local communities and beyond.

According to the Eurobarometer youth survey, around one in three young people were involved in organised voluntary activities in 2019 (Figure 2.7). In Ireland, this was the case for more than one in two of the respondents. In Germany, Austria, Belgium, the Netherlands, Denmark, Slovenia, Lithuania and the United Kingdom, more than one in three had participated in organised voluntary activities. A similar or higher proportion of young people had participated in student or youth organisations in all these countries (see Figure 2.6).

By contrast, less than one in four of the respondents reported having participated in organised voluntary activities in Croatia, Hungary, Sweden and Finland. Participation in student or youth organisations was similarly low in Croatia and Hungary, but in Sweden and Finland it was higher.

Figure 2.7: Proportions of young people (aged 15-30) involved in organised voluntary activities by country, 2019 and 2014

Source: Flash Eurobarometer 478, Volume A, Q8, and Flash Eurobarometer 408, Volume A, Q3: ‘In the last 12 months, have you been involved in any organised voluntary activities?’.

Notes: EU Member States are displayed in descending order of proportion of respondents involved in organised voluntary activities in 2019.

In 2014, 25 % of young people declared having been involved in organised voluntary activities in the previous 12 months, 9 p.p. fewer than in 2019. With the exceptions of Denmark, Malta, Croatia and Finland, the proportion of young volunteers increased in all the countries over these 5 years. The increase was 20 p.p. in Greece, 18 p.p. in Austria, 16 p.p. in Bulgaria, and at least 10 p.p. in Ireland, Germany, Belgium, Slovenia, Lithuania and Italy.

Figure 2.8 shows the positive relation between volunteering on the one hand, and civic and political participation and mobility on the other. Young people actively engaged in other forms of civic and political participation and those that had taken part in a learning experience abroad were involved in organised voluntary activities in larger proportions.

However, the profiles of the typical young volunteer and the typical young voter are slightly different. While the participation of young men and women at the polls is similar (see Figure 2.2), young women tend to be more active in volunteering than their male fellows. While the tendency to vote increases with age and education level, the propensity to participate in voluntary activities is higher the younger the age group. Young people with a post-secondary education are more engaged in voluntary activities than those with only a secondary education, but early school leavers and young students are the most engaged. Young people living in towns or suburbs are the least involved in voluntary activities, as they are in voting. However, those living in rural areas (not in cities) are the most active in volunteering. Finally, the typical young volunteer has a positive opinion on the EU, while this was not a distinctive characteristic of the typical young voter.

Figure 2.8: Proportions of young people (aged 15-30) involved in organised voluntary activities by characteristic, 2019

Source: Flash Eurobarometer 478. Volume B. Question Q8: ‘In the last 12 months, have you been involved in any organised voluntary activities?’.

As shown in Figure 2.9, two out of three young volunteers were involved in activities aiming to change something in their local communities, while for more than one in three the aim was to change something in their country. Of young volunteers in Ireland, Croatia, Hungary, Austria, Slovenia and the United Kingdom, 70 % or more volunteered at local level. Participation in voluntary activities aiming to change something at national level was particularly high in Bulgaria, Czechia, Ireland, Cyprus and Portugal, where more than half of young volunteers were engaged in such an activity.

Figure 2.9: Geographical scope of the voluntary activities (%), EU-28, 2019 and 2014

Source: Flash Eurobarometer 408. Volume A. Question Q4: ‘Were these voluntary activities aimed at changing something in ...?’.

In contrast, their participation in voluntary activities with an international focus was more modest. Only 10 % of young volunteers had contributed to projects aiming to change something in other European countries, and 13 % in another part of the world. Young volunteers from Belgium, Denmark, Spain, France, Luxembourg and Sweden were the most active in volunteering abroad or in projects with an external dimension.

While youth volunteering in local communities remained stable between 2014 and 2019, the percentage of young volunteers involved in projects with a national or an international focus increased over these 5 years. In 2019, an increased number reported having been involved in activities aiming to change something in their country in Bulgaria, Czechia, France and Romania, and outside their country in Germany, Spain and Portugal. In Denmark, Ireland, Latvia and Slovakia, an increased number of young volunteers were involved in projects with a national or an international impact.

2.4. Digital participation

Section 2.2 showed young people’s activism on social media to discuss current affairs – as reported in the Eurobarometer Youth survey. This section will examine Eurostat data on youth participation in online consultations, voting and websites in relation to civic and political issues, and its evolution over recent years.

According to 2019 Eurostat data (Figure 2.10), an average of 13 % of young people in the EU-28 had taken part (in the previous year) in online consultations or voting on civic or political issues (e.g. commenting on urban planning consultations, signing a petition), and 15 % had posted their opinions on civic or political issues on websites (e.g. blogs, social networks, etc.). The average for the total population was 3 p.p. lower in both cases (see Figure 2.11).

Figure 2.10: Proportions of young people (aged 16-29) who participated in online consultations, voting and websites in relation to civic or political issues in the past year by country, 2019 and 2015

Source: Eurostat, Internet use and activities [ISOC_BDE15CUA]. Data extracted on 02/02/2021.

Notes: EU Member States are displayed in descending order of proportion of respondents who had taken part in online consultations or voting on civic or political issues in 2019.

The country with the largest proportion of young people voting or participating in consultations online was Estonia (35 %). This was also the country with the largest increase between 2015 and 2019 (19 p.p.). It is worth noting that, in Estonia, where it is possible to vote using the internet, there were parliamentary elections in 2019. By contrast, the percentage of young people who had posted opinions on civic or political issues online in this country was below the EU-28 average. This was also a common feature in Finland and Sweden, where the relatively high participation of young people in online consultations or voting on civic or political issues (18 %) contrasted with their modest contribution to social or political discussions on websites (around 10 %).

In other countries, such as Croatia, Germany, Malta, Denmark, Luxembourg, Portugal and the United Kingdom, young people were quite active in both regards. At least 15 % of respondents had posted opinions on civic or political issues on blogs, social networks or other websites in these countries. The percentage reached 20 % in Denmark. Between 15 % and 19 %, depending on the country, had voted or participated in online consultations.

In Spain and Lithuania, young people participated in online consultations or votes on civic or political issues and expressed their opinion on websites more than average. In the Netherlands and Austria, they were particularly active in online consultations and votes, while in Italy, Latvia, Poland, Cyprus and Bulgaria they were more active in posting their opinion on blogs, social networks and other websites.

Romania, Ireland, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Slovakia, Hungary and Poland had the lowest rates of youth participation in online consultations and votes, while Slovenia, Austria, Belgium and France had the lowest rates in posting opinions on websites. In all these countries, the average participation of the total population was similarly low.

Compared with 2015, the largest increase in youth digital participation in online consultations and voting took place in the Baltic states. Regarding young people’s contribution to blogs, social networks or other websites on civic or political issues, Cyprus, Poland, Slovakia, Latvia and Hungary registered the largest increases over these 5 years.

Figure 2.11 provides a breakdown of youth digital participation by gender, age group and level of education, comparing the averages for the general population (EU-1) and for young people (EU-2).

Young men posted opinions on civic or political issues on websites more than their female fellows, but there was no difference between them regarding their participation in online voting or consultations.

Figure 2.11: Proportions of young people (aged 16-29) who participated in online consultations, voting and websites in relation to civic or political issues in the past year by characteristic, 2019

Source: Eurostat, Internet use and activities [ISOC_BDE15CUA]. Data extracted on 02/02/2021.

Young people aged 25–29 years old took part in online consultations or voting on civic or political issues and posted their opinions on blogs, social networks or other websites in larger proportions than their younger fellows (aged under 25 years). Nevertheless, all of them were more engaged in these activities than the average citizen.

It is worth noting that the level of formal education completed by the youngest age group is generally lower, and education also appears to have a role in digital participation, as was the case for voting. While only 10 % of young people with a low level of formal education reported having participated in online consultations or voting on political or civic issues in the previous year, the percentage was 12 % for those with a medium level of formal education, and reached 17 % for those with a high level of formal education. Similarly, only 12 % of young people with a low level of formal education reported having contributed to discussions on political or civic issues on websites, compared with 15 % of those with a medium level of formal education and 19 % of young people with a high level of formal education. Chapter 5 examines in detail the relation between education and use of the internet, and Chapter 6 analyses the digital divide in education.

2.5. Support for and trust in national and EU institutions

Previous sections have shown that the participation of young people in elections, political parties and digital platforms (i.e. posting their opinions on social media, blogs or other websites, or taking part in online consultations or votes on civic and political issues) increases with age. However, as this section will show, this does not indicate a lack of support among the youngest people for political institutions and the democratic system.

Figure 2.12 shows the average citizen’s and young people’s trust in their country’s government and in the EU, their satisfaction with how democracy works at national and EU levels, and their views on the EU.

Regarding trust in political institutions, citizens tend to trust the European Union more than the government of their country. This is also the case for young people.

They might be less fond of polling stations, but young people aged under 25 years tend to trust the national government more than adults, and, particularly, more than their older young fellows. According to the standard Eurobarometer survey, in the EU-28 in 2019, an average of 35 % of young people aged 15–24 trusted the national government, compared with 29 % of those aged 25–34.

Trust in the national government among the youngest people (15–24 years old) increased by 6 p.p. between 2015 and 2019. In the EU-27 in 2020, it increased by another 6 p.p. Among older groups of young people, trust in their country’s government did not vary between 2015 and 2019, but it also increased in 2020 during the COVID-19 pandemic. As shown in Chapter 5, national governments were among the most trusted sources of information on COVID-19.

The level of trust in the European Union is also higher among the youngest age group. In the EU-28 in 2019, an average of 54 % of young people aged 15–24 trusted the European Union, compared with 44 % of those aged 25–34. However, trust in the European Union increased among the latter group in the EU-27 in 2020.

Figure 2.12: Young people’s trust in their country’s government and in the EU, satisfaction with democracy and image of the EU (%), 2019, 2015 and 2020

Source: Standard Eurobarometers 83.3, 91.5 and 93.3. Questions:

‘I would like to ask you a question about how much trust you have in certain (media and) institutions. For each of the following (media and) institutions, please tell me if you tend to trust it or tend not to trust it’.

‘On the whole, are you very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied or not at all satisfied with the way democracy works in (your country, the EU)?’.

‘In general, does the EU conjure up for you a very positive, fairly positive, neutral, fairly negative or very negative image?’.

Even though most citizens do not trust their government, they are generally satisfied with how democracy works. This also applies to young people, in particular to the youngest.

In 2019, around 55 % of young people aged 25–34 declared being (very or fairly) satisfied with democracy in their country and in the European Union. The percentage was even higher among their younger fellows: around 65 % of young people aged under 25 years said that they were satisfied.

Satisfaction with democracy increased between 2015 and 2019 for both age groups. In 2020, the proportion of young people aged under 25 years who said they were satisfied with how democracy worked in their country was slightly larger than the year before. The proportion of young people aged over 25 who declared that they were satisfied with how democracy worked in the European Union was also slightly higher.

Finally, the European Union generally conjures up a more positive image for young people than for the older population.

In 2019, the difference between the proportion of citizens having a positive and a negative opinion on the European Union was 28 p.p., compared with 32 p.p. for those aged 25–34 and 42 p.p. for those aged under 25. The European Union conjured up a positive image for 53 % of young people aged under 25 and a negative image for only 11 % of them.

The percentage of young people in the EU-28 for whom the European Union conjured up a positive image increased between 2015 and 2019, but declined slightly in the EU-27 in 2020.

Satisfaction with measures to fight the COVID-19 pandemic was also higher among young people aged under 25 years than older adults (Figure 2.13).

Figure 2.13: Proportions of people (very or fairly) satisfied with measures to fight the COVID-19 pandemic, 2020

Source: Standard Eurobarometer 93.1. Volume B weighted. Question QA21a.2: ‘In general, how satisfied are you with the measures taken to fight the coronavirus outbreak by the national government and the EU?’.

Satisfaction with the measures taken by the EU decreased with age, with the lowest levels of satisfaction found among adults aged 45 years or older. On average, 45 % of citizens declared that they were satisfied with the measures taken by the EU to tackle the pandemic, compared with 48 % of those aged 25–34 and 53 % of young people aged under 25 years.

Citizens were generally more satisfied with the measures taken by their governments. On average, 62 % of all respondents declared that they were satisfied with the measures taken by their government to fight the COVID-19 pandemic. Support was higher among the youngest and the oldest generations: 68 % of those older than 75 and 64 % of those younger than 25 reported being very or fairly satisfied. By contrast, young people between 25 and 34 years old showed the lowest level of satisfaction with the measures taken by their governments.

Chapter 5 examines in further detail young people’s views on the information received about the pandemic and the use of apps on mobile phones to implement certain measures.

Conclusions

Despite being less eager to vote than older adults, European young people appear to take part in elections in a larger proportion than in other forms of civic and political participation, according to Eurobarometer youth surveys. On average, more than two thirds of young people in the EU have voted at least once in local, national or European elections. Their growing interest in voting was particularly evident in the 2019 elections to the European Parliament. Public opinion surveys show that age and education continue to play a role in youth voter turnout.

According to the Eurobarometer youth survey, more than one third of young people have participated in student or youth organisations, have taken part in campaigns, strikes or street protests, and have posted opinions on current issues on social media at least once in their lives.

In addition, one third of young people were involved in organised voluntary activities in 2019, compared with only one quarter in 2014. Most of these activities were aimed at making a change at local level, but the number of young volunteers contributing to projects with a national or an international focus increased over these 5 years. Young people who left education at the age of 15 or before and those still studying are the most likely to volunteer.

On average, almost three quarters of young people have a very or fairly positive view of the European Union. The EU conjures up a positive image for the youngest people in particular. Young people aged under 25 years also tend to trust the EU more and are more satisfied with how democracy works (at national and European levels) than older adults.

Although young people tend to trust the EU more than the government of their country, they were more supportive of the measures taken to fight the COVID-19 pandemic at national level than at EU level, and trust in national governments increased among young people during this time.

(1) ()    European Commission, 2018a.

(2) ()    Cammaerts et al., 2014.

(3) ()    Marien et al., 2010; Norris et al., 2005.

(4) ()    Wattemberg 2002; Fieldhouse et al., 2007; Gallego, 2009; Melo and Stockemer, 2014.

(5) ()    European Commission, 2018c, p. 86.

(6) ()    European Commission, 2018c, p. 83.

(7) ()    Wolfinger and Rosenstone, 1980; Blais, 2000.

(8) ()    Wattenberg, 2002; Melo and Stockemer, 2014.

(9) ()    Gallego, 2019; Stockemer, 2017.

(10) ()    European Parliament, 2019, p. 39.

(11) ()    Clark, 2014; Stockemer and Blais, 2019.

(12) ()    European Parliament, 2019, p. 34.

(13) ()    European Parliament, 2019, p. 34.

(14) ()    Bouza, 2014; Cammaerts et al., 2014.

(15) ()    Bouza, 2014.

EUROPEAN COMMISSION

Brussels, 14.10.2021

SWD(2021) 287 final

COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT

The situation of young people in the European Union

Accompanying the document

Report from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions

on the implementation of the EU Youth Strategy 2019-2021

{COM(2021) 636 final} - {SWD(2021) 286 final}

3. Employment and entrepreneurship

One of the major challenges for young people in establishing their independence is finding a stable job. The transition from education to employment is rarely a smooth and clear-cut path; it is often a rather complex and protracted process, with steps forwards and back, interruptions and periods of overlap between different types of activity. The traditional model of transition, whereby a young person finds his or her first job directly after graduation and embarks on a stable career path, is becoming far less common in our rapidly changing and globalised world. Many young people start working part-time or have summer jobs while still studying; many young people start on temporary or fixed-term contracts with spells of job-hunting in between. Some young people return to their studies after a period of employment in order to upgrade their skills or qualifications. When searching for the right job, some young people discover that they want a complete change from their original field of study or career and return to education in a different area ( 1 ).

In recent years, European economies were on a path towards recovery from the economic crisis, which has improved the situation of young people and eased their transition from education to employment. However, as this chapter will illustrate, in 2020 the COVID-19 crisis hit young people exceptionally hard. The chapter presents the employment situation of young people under these changing conditions and recent trends in youth employment and unemployment. The analysis is based on Eurostat data from the European Union (EU) Labour Force Survey on unemployment, temporary and part-time work, and self-employment. In addition, indicators on the digitalisation of labour markets are from the Eurostat survey on ICT usage.

3.1. Facing labour market challenges: youth unemployment

Entering the world of work after graduation poses significant challenges. Many young people encounter a gap between education and ‘real life’ and get caught in a vicious cycle of being unable to obtain a job owing to lack of experience and being unable to gain experience without a job ( 2 ). Those who leave education without formal qualifications and with a low level of skills have even less chance of gaining employment (see Section 3.1.2).

3.1.1. Youth unemployment trends to 2019

In the EU-28 in 2019, over 5 million people between the ages of 15 and 29 were unemployed (Figure 3.1). This number includes all people who were available for work and actively seeking a job, irrespective of their educational status. However, the numbers of those in education become very important when considering the youth unemployment rate – the most common measure of labour market conditions for young people.

The unemployment rate is the number of people unemployed as a percentage of the labour force (employed and unemployed persons) ( 3 ). The unemployment rate does not consider the economically inactive, who are not actively looking for a job, for example because they are fully concentrating on their education. When considering the prime working-age group (people aged 25–54), the labour force is closer to the total population, and therefore the unemployment rate does not differ much from the unemployed to population ratio (Figure 3.1). However, as many young people are still studying in their early 20s and therefore are not yet in the labour force, the unemployment rate and ratio differ greatly.

Relatively small numbers of unemployed people can generate high unemployment rates when divided by a small labour force. Therefore, it is also important to consider the youth unemployment ratio: the percentage of unemployed young people compared with the total population of that age group (not only the economically active but also the inactive, such as students) ( 4 ).

Figure 3.1: Unemployment rates and ratios among young people (15-29) compared with the prime working-age group (25-54), EU-28, 2019

Unemployment rates and ratios are depicted side by side in Figure 3.1. Both statistics reflect the same numbers of unemployed people (indicated under the figure below the age groups), but they display considerably different distributions. When considering the unemployed to labour force indicator (the unemployment rate), the younger age groups seem to be the most affected. In contrast, the unemployed to population indicator (the unemployment ratio) shows that the problem is worst for the 20–24 age group and, to a lesser extent, for the 25–29 age group.

Figure 3.2 shows youth unemployment rates and ratios in European countries. The number of unemployed people, in thousands, is indicated in the grey band in the centre of the figure. This figure largely depends on the country’s youth population and varies from more than 2 million unemployed 15- to 29-year-olds in Turkey and 800 000–900 000 in Spain, France and Italy, to 4 000–5 000 in Malta and Iceland.

In 2019, in the EU-28, 6.3 % of young people aged 15–29 were unemployed. The highest unemployment ratios were registered in Greece and Spain (around 13 %), and outside the EU-28, in North Macedonia (around 15 %). In contrast, only around 2–3 % of young people were looking for a job in Bulgaria, Czechia and Germany.

Youth unemployment rates vary between European countries to a greater degree than unemployment ratios, as they are calculated taking into account unemployed 15- to 29-year-olds in the labour force. As discussed earlier, the size of the labour force depends on the proportion of young people who are inactive, namely those in education, those engaged in unpaid caring activities, the disabled, or discouraged workers ( 5 ).

In the EU-28, the average proportion of young people aged 15–29 who were unemployed as a percentage of the youth labour force (i.e. the unemployment rate) was 11.1 % in 2019.

Unemployment rates among young people were the highest, above 20 %, in Greece, Spain and Italy within the EU-28, and in North Macedonia, Serbia and Turkey outside the EU. The lowest youth unemployment rates were registered in Czechia, Germany and the Netherlands. Certainly, youth unemployment rates depend not only on the activity and inactivity rates of young people but also on the general economic situation. The countries registering high youth unemployment rates are also those with relatively high unemployment rates among the prime working-age group ( 6 ).

As Figure 3.3 shows, both general and youth unemployment rates went down between 2013 and 2019 as economic growth resumed in Europe after the 2008 economic crisis. As the figure reveals, trends were very similar in the youth population (aged 15–29) and the prime working-age population (aged 25–54), with all unemployment rates and ratios in 2019 being around half of the 2013 level.

This strong improvement is also visible when looking at changes at country level. Given the parallel changes in youth unemployment rates and ratios, the following figures will concentrate on one unemployment indicator only: the youth unemployment rate.

Figure 3.4 shows the unemployment rates of young people aged 15–29 in 2015 and 2019. Over this period, youth unemployment rates decreased in all European countries except Iceland and Turkey. The biggest decrease, of over 16 percentage points (p.p.), was registered in Croatia, but youth unemployment rates also fell by more than 10 p.p. in southern European countries such as Greece, Spain, Cyprus and Portugal, as well as in North Macedonia and Serbia. In contrast, the situation of young people on the labour market did not change much between 2015 and 2019 in northern Europe (Denmark, Sweden, Iceland and Norway) and Luxembourg.

Figure 3.4: Changes in unemployment rates between 2015 and 2019 among young people aged 15-29, by country

Source: Eurostat [yth_empl_090]. Data extracted on 22.04.2021.

Notes: Countries are grouped based on EU membership and in descending order by change between 2015 and 2019.

EU-27 averages: 2015: 17.3 %; 2019: 11.9 %.

3.1.2. Who faces the biggest challenges? Youth unemployment by educational attainment and gender

Not all young people have access to the same resources when looking for employment. Young people differ in the time they have spent in education and their qualifications, their access to financial and material resources, their family background and networks, and their gender, ethnicity, migration status and disability. This section looks behind the term ‘youth unemployment’ and examines differences in the employment situation of young people based on their educational attainment and gender.

Educational attainment

A good level of education and relevant qualifications are critical in finding employment as they provide young people with the skills needed in rapidly changing modern economies.

As Figure 3.5 shows, the higher the educational level, the lower the unemployment rate. In 2019, in the EU-28, while the average unemployment rate for 20- to 29-year-olds with low educational attainment was 20.7 %, this rate was less than half that for those with a medium level of qualifications (9.4 %), and even lower, at 7.5 %, for highly qualified young people. Not surprisingly, young people without upper secondary qualifications therefore have the greatest difficulty in finding a job among all young people. Even having an upper secondary qualification significantly raises a young person’s chances of finding employment.

Figure 3.6 therefore compares the unemployment rates of young people with a low level and a medium level of qualifications in European countries.

As the figure shows, the largest differences between the unemployment rates of young people with a low and a medium level of qualifications can be found predominantly in central European countries, and also in Bulgaria and Sweden (in purple colour). The three countries with the largest differences in the employment prospects of young people are Czechia, Hungary and Slovakia. In Czechia and Slovakia, in 2019, the unemployment rate of young people without upper secondary qualifications was more than five times higher (in Slovakia, even more than six times higher) than the unemployment rate of their peers who possessed upper secondary or post-secondary non-tertiary degrees. On the one hand, this is due to relatively low unemployment rates of young people with upper secondary qualifications, which was the lowest in Czechia at 2.6 %, and also lower than the EU-28 average in all countries in this colour category. On the other hand, some of these countries, particularly Slovakia (42.6 %) and Sweden (29.3 %), have relatively high unemployment rates among low-skilled young people.

Figure 3.6: Comparison of youth unemployment rates among 20- to 29-year-olds with low and medium levels of education by country, 2019

Notes: Data have low reliability for the low skilled in Estonia, Ireland, Croatia, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovenia and Iceland.

There are only two countries where not having upper secondary qualifications does not mean being at a disadvantage when looking for a job: Cyprus and Turkey. In Cyprus, where only 8 % of young people aged 20–29 do not have an upper secondary level education ( 7 ), this may be an effect of over-education – that is, a discrepancy between the supply of education and the needs of the economy ( 8 ). In Turkey, a higher incidence of unemployment among more educated young people may be related to the fact that they are those who can afford to search for a job in the formal economy, while many unskilled young people are employed in the informal sector in low-paid, irregular and insecure jobs ( 9 ).

Gender

Gender patterns of unemployment are less straightforward than those relating to educational attainment. In the EU-28, average unemployment rates do not differ considerably between young men and young women, no matter which age group one looks at. In 2019, female unemployment rates were around 1 p.p. lower than male unemployment rates in the 15–19 and 20–24 age groups but identical in the 25–29 age group ( 10 ). Gender differences in unemployment ratios also show a mild female advantage, with slightly smaller proportions of women looking for a job in all age groups ( 11 ). This at least partly reflects the higher proportion of women enrolled in higher levels of education, as well as the higher proportion of women engaged in caring responsibilities.

The picture becomes more nuanced when examining gender differences in unemployment rates by country. Figure 3.7 depicts European countries coloured differently depending on the relationship between the unemployment rates for women and men aged 15–29. In around one third of the European countries shown in the figure, the unemployment rates of women and men do not differ considerably. Unemployment rates for men were higher than those for women in 13 countries in 2019, mostly in northern Europe, but also in Bulgaria and Malta. Gender differences were the most pronounced in Lithuania and Iceland, where the unemployment rates of young men were 10.3 % and 9.2 %, respectively, compared with the respective unemployment rates of 6.8 % and 5.9 % of young women.

Figure 3.7: Comparison of youth unemployment rates for men and women aged 15-29 by country, 2019

A higher proportion of young women than young men (among those who were economically active) were unemployed in 2019 in only eight countries, predominantly in southern and eastern Europe, with the largest gender differences in Estonia and Croatia. In Estonia, the unemployment rate among women aged 15–29 was 9 %, as opposed to 6.2 % among men; in Croatia, the respective rates were 16.7 % and 10.4 %.

3.1.3. Youth unemployment and the COVID-19 crisis

The year 2020 was marked by the COVID-19 crisis, with young people in both education and employment being strongly affected. The economic crisis triggered by the restrictions established to contain the pandemic has deeply affected young people’s likelihood of both finding and retaining employment ( 12 ). The halt in economic sectors such as the hospitality and retail, where young people often find employment, has reduced labour demand ( 13 ). In parallel, many young people who are transitioning from education to work have found it difficult to seek jobs owing to the limitations on mobility and lower levels of economic activity imposed during the pandemic ( 14 ).

As illustrated in the following sections, young people are more likely to have a temporary or part-time contract than people in the prime working-age group. These precarious conditions become even more challenging in times of economic crisis, when young people are more likely than older age groups to have their working time reduced ( 15 ). Thus, the COVID-19 crisis aggravated pre-existing inequalities in the position of young Europeans in the labour market compared with the rest of the working population.

In addition to hitting young people the hardest, the economic slump caused by the COVID-19 pandemic has created a cleavage within the youth population. Those in stable jobs where telework is possible suffer less from unemployment than those with precarious employment contracts, especially in sectors where telework is not possible (e.g. retail, hospitality, food services) ( 16 ). In this context, young women in particular are likely to be affected because they are employed in these sectors at higher levels than young men ( 17 ). This situation has serious consequences for the health and well-being of young people, and for their social inclusion, as discussed in Chapters 7 and 8, respectively.

Comparing youth unemployment rates in 2019 and 2020 shows that the declining trend of 2013–2019 was reversed in 2020 in all youth age groups, as well as in the prime working-age group, in the EU-27 (Figure 3.8). However, as the figure also shows, changes were proportionally more considerable for young people than for the prime working-age population.

This direction of change can be observed in the large majority of European countries (Figure 3.9). In the EU-27, unemployment rates of young people aged 15–29 increased from 11.9 % in 2019 to 13.3 % in 2020 (1.4 p.p.) ( 18 ). This corresponded to increased unemployment rates in all EU Member States, except Italy (although in the latter, the decrease was less than 1 p.p., so not significant).

Figure 3.9: Change in unemployment rates (percentage points) among young people aged 15-29 between 2019 and 2020 by country

Source: Eurostat [yth_empl_090] and [une_rt_a]. Data extracted on 22.04.2021.

Notes: Germany: 2020 data: provisional, break in series. Iceland: 2020 data: break in series.

Countries are grouped based on EU membership and in descending order by change between 2019 and 2020.

The increases in youth unemployment rates between 2019 and 2020 were most substantial in Estonia, Lithuania and Spain, amounting to more than 4 p.p.

3.2. Patterns of youth employment

The most important characteristic of labour markets is the proportion of people in employment. Employment rates show the percentage of employed persons in relation to the total population of the same age ( 19 ). As it can be expected, the employment rates of young people increase with age: in 2019 in the EU-28, while only 16.7 % of 15- to 19-year-olds were employed, this rate was 54 % for the 20- to 24-year-olds and 75.9 % for young people aged 25–29 ( 20 ). In comparison, the employment rate in the prime working-age population was 81.2 % ( 21 ).

Comparing youth employment and youth unemployment rates provides an interesting insight into the state of the youth labour market and the economy in general in the different European countries. Figure 3.10 shows the unemployment and employment rates of young people aged 15–29. As the figure illustrates, countries characterised by relatively high unemployment rates (above 20 %) and relatively low employment rates (around 40 % or below) form a clear cluster.

Figure 3.10: Youth unemployment and employment rates of 15- to 29-year-olds, by country, 2019

At the same time, countries with youth unemployment rates at or below 15 % can have very different youth employment rates. In 2019, 50.3 % of young Europeans aged 15–29 were employed in the EU-28. Countries below the blue line on Figure 3.10 had lower employment rates than the EU-28 average; in Bulgaria and Romania, employment rates were just above 40 %. In contrast, in the Netherlands and Iceland, with comparable proportions of unemployed young people, youth employment rates were above 70 %. The reasons behind such differences are manifold, and depend on factors such as the average length of higher education studies, the proportion of young people who are both in employment and education, the share of part-time work (see also Section 3.2.2), or the proportion of young people who are not in employment, education or training (NEET rate, see Chapter 8). The following sections will illustrate some of the specificities of youth labour markets and employment patterns.

3.2.1. Temporary contracts

An important characteristic of the youth labour market is the prevalence of temporary contracts in comparison with the labour market for other age categories. A temporary contract is a fixed-term contract that will terminate either after a period agreed in advance or when certain objective criteria are met, such as the completion of an assignment or the return of the employee who has been temporarily replaced ( 22 ).

Temporary employment can be an important step in the transition from education to the labour market. It gives young people work experience and makes it easier for them to find a stable job. Temporary employment also gives employers an opportunity to assess young people’s suitability and capacity to perform the tasks required. Often, temporary jobs serve as stepping stones to permanent jobs ( 23 ).

However, temporary employment entails higher levels of insecurity, both in terms of employment and financially, as well as fewer opportunities for developing skills and a longer term career. Young people can be trapped in a cycle of alternating periods of temporary employment and unemployment, which may adversely affect their status and their level of social protection into their 30s and beyond. Where this is the case, young people may lack the stability needed to allow them to live independently ( 24 ).

These higher levels of insecurity have also been highlighted by the COVID-19 crisis. The high proportion of young people who were working with temporary – and thus more easily terminable – contracts may have been one reason behind the fast rise in youth unemployment rates presented in the previous section.

Figure 3.11 shows that the proportion of temporary employees is very high among the youngest age group (15- to 19-year-olds) but it reduces rapidly with age. In the EU-28 in 2019, 58.7 % of all 15- to 19-year-olds in employment had temporary work contracts. This includes temporary ‘student’ or seasonal/summer jobs. The proportion drops to 38.1 % for 20- to 24-year-olds and even further, to 21.4 %, for 25- to 29-year olds. In contrast, only about 1 in 10 adult employees in the prime working-age group has a fixed-term contract. These proportions have been quite stable since 2015 in the EU-28 in all age groups ( 25 ).

As Figure 3.11 also shows, the types of contracts that young people have vary considerably across European countries. In several central and eastern European countries and the United Kingdom, very few young people (less than 10 % of all employees) have fixed-term contracts. This does not necessarily mean that young people have a more secure position in the labour market: the low proportion of temporary contracts could also reflect a high level of labour market flexibility in these countries. In flexible labour markets, it is easier for employers to hire and fire employees, even if they have permanent contracts ( 26 ). The countries with the lowest proportion of temporary contracts are Latvia, Lithuania and Romania, where only slightly more than 3 % of young people aged 15–29 have a temporary contract among all employees in this age group.

In contrast, in eight countries, mostly southern European countries, as well as in the Netherlands and Poland, the proportion of young employees with a temporary contract is higher than 40 %. In Spain, the percentage of temporary employees is as high as 55.4 %.

Figure 3.11: Young temporary employees (15-29) as a percentage of the total number of employees in the same age group, by country, 2019

3.2.2. Part-time work

The International Labour Organization (ILO) defines ‘part-time worker’ as an employed person whose normal hours of work are fewer than those of comparable full-time workers ( 27 ). This definition encompasses all forms of part-time work (half-day work, work for one, two or three days a week, etc.). For comparative statistical purposes, however, part-time work is usually considered as working for fewer than 35 hours, or 30 hours, per week ( 28 ).

Part-time employment can be beneficial to young people depending on the quality of the part-time job and whether working part-time is a choice. On the one hand, part-time jobs are the only way some groups of people can join or remain in the labour market. Many young people who are in education and training are able to work only some hours per week in term time. Often those with children or other care responsibilities work part-time, although this may be more relevant for the older age groups. On the other hand, part-time jobs are often characterised by less job security, lower average hourly earnings and fewer opportunities for training and promotion ( 29 ).

Part-time work is very common among the youngest employed people. Figure 3.12 shows that about every second 15- to 19-year-old who has a job works less than full-time. This may be because the majority of those who work in this age group combine work and study. Many 20- to 24-year-olds also work part-time, 26.9 % of all those employed in this age group. In contrast, only 16.9 % of employees in the prime working-age group (25–54) are not employed full-time. The proportion is even lower among 25- to 29-year-olds, at 15.9 %.

Women tend to work part-time much more than men in all age groups. As Figure 3.12 also shows, the differences are largest in the prime working-age group, where women tend to take on more caring or family responsibilities than men. Nevertheless, the gender gap in part-time employment is also there for younger age groups. Among 25- to 29-year-olds, the proportion of women having part-time jobs is still more than twice as high as that of men (23 % vs 9.8 %). The gaps are somewhat narrower in the youngest age groups but still significant.

As discussed earlier, there are various reasons for working less than full-time. When a person works part-time only because he or she is unable to find full-time employment, we talk about ‘involuntary’ part-time employment. In the EU-28 in the period between 2015 and 2019, the development was positive in this regard: while the proportion of young people in part-time employment stayed stable, the proportion of involuntary part-time workers among all young people working part-time decreased from around one third to one fourth ( 30 ). This shows that during the economic crisis, more young people were pushed into involuntary part-time work; but as conditions changed during the economic recovery, the proportion of involuntary part-time work decreased.

Figure 3.13 depicts part-time employment, including the proportion of involuntary part-time workers in 2019 by country. In the EU-28, around one in four young part-time workers aged 15–29 worked part-time involuntarily in 2019, which corresponds to around 6 % of total youth employment. In most countries with a high prevalence of part-time youth employment, the percentage of those working part-time involuntarily is rather low. This is the case in the Netherlands, Denmark and Iceland, where the proportions of part-time workers are among the highest in Europe but involuntary part-time employment represents only around 10 % or less of all part-time employment (and less than 5 % of total employment).

Figure 3.13: Part-time employment as a percentage of total employment among young people aged 15-29, including the percentage of involuntary part-time workers, by country, 2019

Source: Calculations based on Eurostat [yth_empl_060] and [yth_empl_080]. Data extracted on 30.04.2021.

Notes: ‘Involuntary part-time work’ means that respondents report that they work part-time because they are unable to find full-time work (Eurostat, 2021e).

Bulgaria, Croatia, Lithuania, Malta, Slovenia, Sweden: Low reliability of involuntary part-time work estimates.

Estonia, Latvia, Norway: Data not reliable.

Countries are grouped based on EU membership and in descending order by proportion of involuntary part-time work in total employment.

EU-27 avegares: involuntary part-time work as a percentage of total employment: 6.2 %; part-time work as a percentage of total employment: 23.0 %.

The proportion of involuntary part-time employment is very high in Italy, where 19.7 % of young people in employment are working part-time because they cannot find a full-time position. In other words, in Italy, involuntary part-time work constitutes 78.1 % of all part-time positions filled by young people. The proportions are also high in Spain and Greece: involuntary part-time work account for 14.1 % and 12.2 %, respectively, of all jobs held by young people, and 54.6 % and 65.4 % of part-time jobs. These three countries also have the highest youth unemployment rates in the EU (see Figure  3.2).

3.2.3. Self-employment and entrepreneurship

A self-employed person is the sole or joint owner of the unincorporated enterprise (one that has not been incorporated, i.e. formed into a legal corporation) in which they work, unless they are also in paid employment that is their main activity ( 31 ). There are two main drivers for becoming self-employed: ‘opportunity entrepreneurs’ use self-employment in order to realise a business idea, become their own boss or achieve a better work-life balance; ‘necessity entrepreneurs’, on the other hand, start their own business because they cannot find employment elsewhere and have no other means of making a living. While also providing new opportunities, the ‘Uberisation’ of service sectors and the emerging ‘collaborative economy’ might, for example, push young people into self-employment ( 32 ).

The first group, opportunity entrepreneurs, often report higher levels of happiness and job satisfaction, associated with creativity, autonomy and flexibility, while the second group tends to have levels of job satisfaction similar to or lower than regular employees ( 33 ). A Eurofound study shows that only one in four young self-employed people start their own business because they have no other alternative; however, they still turn to self-employment out of necessity more often than older age groups ( 34 ).

Although the self-employed population is a highly heterogeneous group, it is important to highlight that all these people have some issues in common with respect to job quality ( 35 ). On average, the self-employed generally have lower income than the employed, especially those without employees. Furthermore, self-employment appears to provide lower levels of social security than many other forms of employment ( 36 ). Working conditions vary greatly, but most entrepreneurs tend to work longer and more atypical hours. Moreover, the potential for stress and health-related issues is often greater for the self-employed than for employees ( 37 ).

Thus, self-employment may not be wholly beneficial for all young people ( 38 ), but unlocking the potential of youth entrepreneurship is still important to ensure that those who have good business ideas and the right skills can set up and run successful enterprises ( 39 ).

As self-employment among 15- to 19-year-olds is very rare (less than 2 % of 15- to 19-year-olds are self-employed in the EU-28), Figure 3.14 depicts the self-employment rate of young people aged 20–24 and 25–29 compared with the prime working-age group (25- to 54-year-olds).

Younger people are far less likely than older people to be self-employed. In the EU-28, only 4.4 % of employed young people in the 20–24 age group worked in their own business in 2019. The proportion was higher among 25- to 29-year-olds (7.7 %), but it still remained considerably lower than the proportion of self-employed people in the prime working-age group (13.4 %).

There is a strong gender divide in the self-employment figures. The rate for men is almost twice that for women in all age groups, with proportionally the biggest differences in the youngest age group, 20- to 24-year-olds. There are numerous explanations for this gender gap, including differences in attitudes to risk-taking; difficulties in combining self-employment with family responsibilities; family and tax policies that discourage labour market participation and entrepreneurship; and negative attitudes towards female entrepreneurs ( 40 ).

Figure 3.15 depicts the proportion of self-employed young people aged 25–29 by country. The proportion of self-employed young people was the highest in Greece (14.6 %) in 2019, followed by Italy (13.9 %), Czechia and Slovakia (11.2 % in both). It should be recalled that levels of youth unemployment are among the highest in Greece and Italy (see Figure 3.2), and in these two countries, self-employment rates most likely reflect a relatively high degree of necessity entrepreneurship. This is confirmed by the parallel decreases in youth unemployment and self-employment rates between 2015 and 2019. In contrast, in Czechia and Slovakia (and similarly, in Poland), youth unemployment rates have been relatively low, and self-employment remained relatively stable in this period. This suggests that there are other factors behind the relatively high self-employment rates in these countries, for example supportive policy environments ( 41 ).

Figure 3.15: Self-employment as a percentage of total employment for young people (25-29), by country, 2015 and 2019

Source: Calculations based on Eurostat [lfsa_esgan] and [lfsa_egan]. Data extracted on 03.05.2021.

Notes: Croatia: low data reliability.

EU-27 averages: 2015: 8.1 %; 2019: 7.5 %.

Countries are grouped based on EU membership and in descending order by self-employment as a percentage of total employment in 2019.

In 2019, the percentage of self-employed young people in the 25–29 age group was the lowest, below 4 %, in Austria, Germany and Croatia ( 42 ) within the EU-28, and in Norway outside the EU, with small decreases in all four countries between 2015 and 2019. At the EU-28 level, self-employment rates remained rather stable in this period.

3.3. Labour market digitalisation

Digitalisation has a fundamental impact on labour markets. It changes job dynamics, leading to the creation of new jobs while making other jobs redundant. It also transforms working conditions and work organisation by making flexible work possible and allowing the creation of new types of employment relationships ( 43 ). Digitalisation drives the economy towards a more flexible, online, on-demand economy ( 44 ). One example, as was mentioned above, is the Uberisation of service sectors and the emergence of a collaborative economy – as discussed in Chapter 5 – which has been made possible by new and more developed internet-based matching platforms and a resulting decrease in transaction costs ( 45 ). Finally, digitalisation creates a shift in skill needs and results in a new ‘digital divide’ ( 46 ). As Chapter 6 shows, this digital divide between young people with lower and higher levels of education is still strong in Europe. In addition to having diverging abilities to fulfil the new tasks required by a digital economy (see Chapter 5), inequalities in digital skills also mean differences in access to (digital) information, including information on jobs.

European countries are at different stages in their transitions to a digital economy. The European Commission’s Digital Economy and Society Index provides a tool to measure the extent of digitalisation and tracks the digital development of EU Member States ( 47 ). This index looks at the following five aspects of digitalisation: connectivity (availability of broadband infrastructure), human capital (skills), use of internet services (online activities of individuals), integration of digital technology (digitalisation of businesses), and digital public services (such as e-government) ( 48 ). While Chapter 6 focuses on the digital skills of young people, several other chapters in this report address different aspects of how and for what kind of activities young people use the internet in different European countries.

Figure 3.16 depicts the percentage of young people aged 16–29 who have used the internet to search for a job or send an application. These percentages depend on many different aspects of the labour market: on the extent of digitalisation in terms of broadband access, especially in remote/rural areas (see also Chapter 5), the percentage of jobs advertised online and the extent to which public employment services offer their services online; on the divide in digital skills among young people (see also Chapter 6); and also on the activity rate of the youth population. As discussed above, many young people – especially in younger age groups – are still in education and may not be looking for a job at all, either online or offline (for a comparison of employment rates, see Figure 3.10).

In the EU-28, around one third of young people aged 16–29 used the internet when searching for a job or sending an application in 2019. In contrast, only one in five people did the same in the prime working-age population. However, these averages hide huge disparities among EU Member States. While around half or even more young people used the internet when looking and applying for jobs in some Nordic countries (Finland, Denmark and Sweden), this percentage was below 20 % in some central and eastern European countries (Poland, Bulgaria and Czechia) and reached only 10 % in Romania.

The same tendencies can be observed in the prime working-age population, but at a lower level. A higher percentage of young people search and apply for jobs online than do so in older age groups in almost every country ( 49 ), despite the lower level of young people’s labour market activity. The differences between younger and older age groups are largest in Malta, Austria and Czechia in the EU-28, and in Iceland and North Macedonia outside the EU. In these countries the proportion of people looking for or applying for a job online in the prime working-age group is less than half of the same percentage in the youth population. In contrast, there are no differences between younger and older age groups in the extent of using the internet for such purposes in Serbia, and the differences are also relatively small in Denmark, Slovakia and Belgium.

Figure 3.16: Percentages of young people (16-29) and people in the prime working-age group (25-54) who used the internet to search for a job or send an application, by country, 2019

Source: Eurostat [isoc_ci_ac_i]. Data extracted on 07.05.2021.

Notes: EU-27 averages: internet use: 29 % (16–29) and 20 % (25–54); activity rate (15–29): 54.7 %.

Countries are grouped based on EU membership and in descending order by proportion of young people using the internet to search for a job or send an application.

Conclusions

Young people entering the world of work usually experience multiple and often protracted transitions between education, the labour market and inactivity. The youngest age groups are rarely employed and, when they are, it is usually in part-time ‘student’ or seasonal jobs, combining employment and education. However, the chances of finding employment for young people who do seek it are lower than those of the prime working-age group.

In the majority of European countries, youth employment rates mirror those of the adult population at a higher level. Higher proportions of young people are in unemployment in those countries where adult unemployment rates are higher.

It is not only the unemployment rate that is higher among young people than in the prime working-age population. A much higher proportion of young employees than of those in the prime working-age population have temporary or fixed-term contracts. In contrast, few young people have set up their own business. The digitalisation of labour markets also changes working conditions, and young people may be more likely to embrace the changes.

On average, in Europe, unemployment in both the youth population and the prime working-age population was steadily decreasing between 2013 and 2019. Nevertheless, employment prospects are not the same for all young people. Young people with lower levels of education have higher unemployment rates. While gender differences in unemployment do not follow the same pattern in all European countries, gender gaps in employment patterns are persistent: women tend to work part-time much more and create their own businesses to a much lesser extent.

The COVID-19 crisis has had a large impact on the lives of young people, both those in education and those in employment. While unemployment rates increased for all age groups in 2020 after the steady decrease of the economic recovery period, the increase was more substantial for young people. The future will tell whether such changes are temporary or if they will have a lasting impact.

(1) ()    For more details, see Kahn et al., 2011; Eurofound, 2014; Mourshed, Patel and Suder, 2014; O’Reilly 2015; STYLE, 2017.

(2) ()    Kahn et al., 2011.

(3) ()    Eurostat, 2021a.

(4) ()    Eurostat, 2021b.

(5) ()    These conditions are at the root of differences between groups in the NEET population, as discussed in Chapter 8.

(6) ()    Source: Eurostat [une_rt_a]. Data extracted on 22.04.2021.

(7) ()    Source: Eurostat [yth_demo_040], data extracted on 22.04.2021.

(8) ()    Ioannou and Sonan, 2016.

(9) ()    Scarpetta and Sonnet, 2012.

(10) ()    Source: Eurostat [yth_empl_090], data extracted on 22.04.2021.

(11) ()    Source: Eurostat [yth_empl_140], data extracted on 22.04.2021.

(12) ()    Eurofound, 2020.

(13) ()    Ibid.

(14) ()    Gómez, A. and Montero, J., 2020.

(15) ()    Eurofound, 2020.

(16) ()    Blustein et al., 2020.

(17) ()    ILO, 2020. 

(18) ()    Quarterly figures show an increase in unemployment rates for young people aged 15–24 until Q3, followed by a decrease in Q4. This may be owing to the different support measures countries put in place by this time. Source: Eurostat [une_rt_q], data extracted on 02.06.2021.

(19) ()    Eurostat, 2021c.

(20) ()    Source: Eurostat [yth_empl_010]. Data extracted on 02.06.2021.

(21) ()    Source: Eurostat [lfsi_emp_a]. Data extracted on 02.06.2021.

(22) ()    Eurostat, 2021d.

(23) ()    Eurofound, 2013.

(24) ()    Eurofound, 2010.

(25) ()    Source: Eurostat [yth_empl_050] and [lfsi_pt_a]. Data extracted on 28.04.2021.

(26) ()    See for example the OECD indicators of employment protection, such as the ‘Strictness of employment protection – individual dismissals (regular contracts)’ on OECD.Stat ( https://stats.oecd.org/ ).

(27) ()    ILO, 1994.

(28) ()    ILO, 2017. In the Eurostat Labour Force Survey, the distinction between full-time and part-time work is generally based on a spontaneous response by the respondent (Eurostat, 2021e).

(29) ()    Fagan et al., 2015.

(30) ()    Source: Eurostat [yth_empl_060] and [yth_empl_080], data extracted on 30.04.2021.

(31) ()     Eurostat, 2021f.

(32) ()    Nurvala, 2015. See also Section 3.3 on labour market digitalisation.

(33) ()    Baumol, 1990; Blanchflower, 2000; Reynold et al., 2005; Binder and Coad, 2013; Fairlie and Fossen, 2017.

(34) ()    One quarter of the self-employed people aged under 35 (24 %) say they have no other alternatives for work, compared with 18–19 % of the self-employed in older age groups (Eurofound, 2017).

(35) ()    Van Praag and Versloot, 2007; Binder and Coad, 2013; OECD, 2019.

(36) ()    OECD, 2019.

(37) ()    Gevaert, J., Van Aerden, K., De Moortel, D., and Vanroelen, C., 2021.

(38) ()    Burchell et al., 2015; Hatfield, 2015.

(39) ()    Eurofound, 2015.

(40) ()    Wagner, 2007; Andersson Joona and Wadensjö, 2008; OECD, 2019.

(41) ()    Dvouletý and Orel, 2020.

(42) ()    Data reliability is low in Croatia.

(43) ()    European Parliament, 2015; EESC, 2017.

(44) ()    EESC, 2017.

(45) ()    Nurvala, 2015.

(46) ()    European Parliament, 2015.

(47) ()    European Commission, 2021a.

(48) ()    Ibid.

(49) ()    The only exception is Serbia, where the two proportions are identical.

EUROPEAN COMMISSION

Brussels, 14.10.2021

SWD(2021) 287 final

COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT

The situation of young people in the European Union

Accompanying the document

Report from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions

on the implementation of the EU Youth Strategy 2019-2021

{COM(2021) 636 final} - {SWD(2021) 286 final}

4. Youth on the move

Taking part in a learning experience abroad gives young people the opportunity to develop a wide range of skills and competences, strengthening both subject-specific knowledge and transversal skills such as critical thinking, communication and problem-solving. They may also learn a foreign language or improve their language skills. Moreover, youth mobility promotes intercultural understanding and contributes to broadening young people’s perspectives of Europe and the world, so that they are better equipped to face the challenges of an increasingly diverse society ( 1 ).

Erasmus+ is the EU’s programme to support education, training, youth and sport in Europe. It aims to support participating countries to use the potential talent and social assets in a lifelong learning perspective and promote opportunities for cooperation and mobility between them. Participants in the Erasmus+ programme usually report feeling more ready to take on new challenges, having better career prospects and being more aware of the benefits that the EU brings to their daily lives ( 2 ).

The European Solidarity Corps (ESC) is the EU’s new programme providing opportunities for young people (aged 18–30 years) to carry out volunteering activities, gain experience in traineeships and jobs, and run their own solidarity projects. Young volunteers who have taken part in ESC activities report developing additional skills and knowledge that will be useful in their future careers ( 3 ).

However, not all young people have equal access to these opportunities. According to Eurostudent data, students with lower socio-economic status – measured by the education level or profession of their parents – are less likely to participate in student mobility schemes ( 4 ). Further studies have confirmed this trend based on extensive graduate data from specific countries ( 5 ). Moreover, the mobility uptake varies significantly across universities and fields of study, and preliminary research shows that those with a low mobility uptake have larger proportions of disadvantaged students, which could further limit their access to mobility schemes ( 6 ). They would have fewer chances to be in contact with other young people having enjoyed such an experience and to receive information about existing opportunities. They could also face more difficulties to go through the procedures and to get the necessary financial means.

This chapter provides an overview of young people’s participation in learning experiences abroad, including volunteering. The first part of the chapter looks at youth mobility in a broad sense. Section 4.1 shows the proportions of young people who have considered going abroad or who have been abroad for study, training, work, exchanges or volunteering, according to the Eurobarometer youth surveys. Section 4.2 examines why some of them considered it but did not go, while Section 4.3 analyses why some people have never considered such an opportunity. The second part of the chapter focuses on youth participation in two specific activities, namely the Erasmus+ learning mobility activities (Section 4.4) and the ESC (Section 4.5).

4.1. Going on a learning experience abroad

In the 2019 Eurobarometer youth survey How do we build a stronger, more united Europe? The views of young people, young people in EU Member States were asked whether they had gone abroad for at least 2 weeks for study, training, work, exchanges or volunteering (i.e. excluding travel for tourism or living with one’s family abroad). On average, one in three had taken part in such experiences.

As illustrated in Figure 4.1, more than half of the respondents in Luxembourg reported having gone abroad for such a purpose. Youth mobility was also high in the three Baltic states, Italy, Cyprus and Sweden, where around 40 % of the interviewees reported having participated in a learning experience abroad for at least 2 weeks.

This mobility includes, among other things, the completion of part or all of a university degree in a foreign country. According to the Bologna process implementation report, Cyprus and Luxembourg have the largest proportions of graduates earning a university degree abroad ( 7 ). In Luxembourg, it is a requirement for all university students to complete part of their degree programme in another country. The proportion of students getting their degree or taking a number of credits of their study programme abroad is relatively high in Italy, Latvia, Lithuania and Sweden.

In the Eurobarometer youth survey, the proportion of young people who had gone abroad for study, training, work, exchanges or volunteering was also above the EU-28 average (of 31 %) in Bulgaria, Czechia, Denmark, Ireland, Spain, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovenia and Slovakia.

Figure 4.1: Proportions of young people (aged 15-30) having participated or not in a learning experience abroad by country, 2019

Source: Flash Eurobarometer 478. Volume A. Question D7Q (1 and 2): ‘Excluding travel for tourism or living with one’s family abroad, have you ever stayed abroad for at least two weeks? For example, for studies, training, work, exchanges or volunteering’.

Notes: EU Member States are displayed in descending order of proportion of respondents having participated in a learning experience abroad.

By contrast, only around 20 % of the respondents in Greece, Croatia and Malta reported having taken part in a learning experience abroad. In these countries, around 40 % reported that they had not even considered such a possibility. Although youth mobility was higher in Hungary, Austria and Romania, 40 % of the respondents in these three countries also had not considered going abroad for study or volunteering. Many of these young people were just not interested in such an experience, whereas others felt that it would not be possible because of family-, work- or study-related issues (see Section 4.3). On average, 32 % of young people in the EU-28 had not ever considered taking part in a learning experience abroad.

A larger proportion (37 %) had considered the possibility of taking part in such an experience but had never participated in one. This was the case for 40 % or more of the respondents in Germany, Greece, Spain, Croatia, the Netherlands, Portugal, Slovenia and Finland, and for 39 % in Belgium, Denmark and France.

In all these countries, the ratio of the young people who considered participating in a learning experience abroad but did not participate to all young people who considered participating (including those who took part) was particularly high. Despite their interest, these young people could not go for financial or other reasons (see Section 4.2). In Greece, Croatia and Portugal, more than two in three of the respondents who had considered it did not take part in a learning experience abroad. This was the case for more than one in two of the respondents in Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Spain, France, the Netherlands, Slovenia and Finland.

Figure 4.2 shows the EU-28 averages for the proportions of young people who went abroad for at least 2 weeks for learning or volunteering, by gender, age, degree of urbanisation, opinion on the EU, involvement in voluntary activities and level of civic and political participation. The averages for young men and young women are very similar. The differences are larger between age groups, with the outbound mobility increasing with age. On average, only 23 % of the respondents aged under 20 had taken part in a learning experience abroad, compared with 32 % of those aged 20–24, and 35 % of those aged 25–30.

Figure 4.2: Proportions of young people (aged 15-30) reporting having gone abroad for a learning experience of at least 2 weeks by characteristic, 2019

Source: Flash Eurobarometer 478. Volume B. Question D7Q: ‘Excluding travel for tourism or living with one’s family abroad, have you ever stayed abroad for at least two weeks? For example, for studies, training, work, exchanges or volunteering’.

The outbound mobility among young people living in rural areas was lower than that among young people living in urban areas. While, on average, only 26 % of young people living in a rural area had gone abroad for at least 2 weeks for learning or volunteering, this percentage increased to 30 % for those living in a small or mid-sized town and 37 % for young people living in a large town.

The proportion of young people who had participated in a learning experience abroad was higher among those who had a positive opinion of the EU, were involved in voluntary activities and were more engaged in society by voting or through other forms of participation (see Chapter 2). Recent literature also suggest that better-off students could be participating in larger proportions than young people with a lower socio-economic status. Next sections will provide further insight on the matter by examining the reasons given by young people for not participating in such an experience.

4.2. Reasons for considering but not participating in a learning experience abroad

This section examines the reasons why more than one third of the respondents to the Eurobarometer youth survey considered taking part in a learning experience abroad but did not participate. Considering a learning experience abroad may not have the same meaning for all the respondents. Some may have taken active steps or even applied, while others may have just thought about it.

As illustrated in Figure 4.3, an average of 42 % of these young people reported that they did not have the necessary financial means. A similar proportion (41 %) did not go for family, personal or work-related reasons. These data suggest that many of the young people who considered a learning experience abroad but eventually could not participate could be coming from a low socio-economic background. The 2011 Eurostudent report showed that finances and separation from family is particularly problematic for disadvantaged students ( 8 ).

Almost 20 % of the respondents said that they did not know the language sufficiently or how to apply. This could also concern to a greater extent young people with a low socio-economic status.

Figure 4.3: Reasons given by young people (aged 15-30) for not taking part in a learning experience abroad despite having considered it (%), EU-28, 2019

Source: Flash Eurobarometer 478. Volume B. Q3a: ‘For which of these reasons did you not take part in a learning experience abroad even though you considered it? (Max. 3 answers)’.

Finally, 18 % of the respondents could not find any opportunities that matched their interests, 14 % felt that their absence from home would be too long, 8 % feared that their experience would not be recognised on their return, and 4 % could not go because their application was not accepted.

Figure 4.4 shows which of these reasons for not taking part in a learning experience abroad were most frequently given by young people in each country. The lack of financial means and family, personal or work-related issues were the main obstacles preventing young people from participating in a learning experience abroad in almost all countries.

Figure 4.4: Reasons given by young people (aged 15-30) for not taking part in a learning experience abroad despite having considered it (%) by country, 2019

Source: Flash Eurobarometer 478. Volume A. Q3a: ‘For which of these reasons did you not take part in a learning experience abroad even though you considered it? (Max. 3 answers)’.

Family, personal or work-related reasons was the main obstacle in 15 countries and the lack of financial means was the main obstacle in 11 countries. Each of these reasons was provided by similar proportions of respondents in Bulgaria. Only in Malta was the most common reason neither of these but that respondents could not find any opportunities abroad that matched their interests.

In countries with a high proportion of respondents who had considered participating but had not taken part in a learning experience abroad (see Figure 4.1), the lack of financial means appears to be an important hurdle. This was the case for more than half of these young people in Ireland, Spain, France, Portugal and the United Kingdom. The proportion was almost as high in Belgium, Greece, Croatia and the Netherlands. In all these countries, the second most common factor was work or other personal or family circumstances, which generally affected around one third of the respondents, but more in France, the Netherlands and Portugal.

In Czechia, Denmark, Germany and Finland, where a large proportion of young people had also not participated in a learning experience abroad despite their potential interest, around half or more of the respondents reported family, personal or work-related reasons for not participating, and more than one third reported a lack of financial means. Similarly, in Bulgaria and Slovenia, more than one third of respondents indicated that they did not participate because of a lack of financial means and family, personal or work-related reasons.

As shown in the right panel of Figure 4.4, the lack of financial means was the second most frequent response in 12 countries, and family, personal or work-related issues was the second most frequent response in another 11 countries, including the United Kingdom, where the same number of respondents also reported insufficient language skills as an obstacle. Insufficient language skills was also the second most frequent response in Poland. In Malta, several second reasons were reported by similar proportions of young people, namely the lack of financial means, family, personal or work-related issues and the fact that their absence from home would have been too long. The long absence from home was also the second most frequent response in Bulgaria, while in Cyprus it was the lack of information on how to apply and in Lithuania it was the lack of opportunities matching respondents’ interests.

4.3. Reasons for not considering a learning experience abroad

As shown in the previous section, family, personal and work-related issues prevented many young people who were interested in taking part in a learning experience abroad from doing so. Similar reasons prevented many other young people from even considering a learning experience abroad.

Figure 4.5 shows the main reasons given by young people for not considering taking part in a learning experience abroad. On average, 45 % were simply not interested. However, for a large proportion it would not have been possible because of their work or studies (30 %) or family circumstances (25 %). The family situation was a stronger explanatory factor for young women than for young men: 29 % of the female respondents reported family issues as a reason for not considering a learning experience abroad, compared with 21 % of the male respondents. By contrast, work or studies seemed to be more often an obstacle for young men (32 %) than for young women (27 %).

Factors concerning young people’s confidence to live abroad were the next most common reasons reported. An average of 22 % of these young people did not feel comfortable living in a foreign country, and 13 % felt too young for such an experience. A similar percentage (14 %) reported not being aware of such opportunities. Generally, young men (16 %) appeared to be less informed than young women (11 %). There could also be a relationship between the lack of information and young people’s socio-economic status, which may be worth further investigation. Finally, only a small percentage of the respondents expressed concerns about the quality of education in the other country.

Figure 4.5: Reasons given by young people (aged 15-30) for not considering a learning experience abroad (%), EU-28, 2019

Source: Flash Eurobarometer 478. Volume B. Q3b: ‘For which of these reasons did you not consider taking part in a learning experience abroad? (Max. 3 answers)’.

Figure 4.6 shows the reasons most often provided by young people in each country for not considering the possibility of travelling abroad for learning, working or volunteering. The largest proportion of respondents in all countries except France (where this was the third most common answer), Luxembourg and Hungary (where it was the second) reported a lack of interest.

The lack of interest was an explanatory factor for half or more of the respondents in 10 countries (Denmark, Germany, Latvia, the Netherlands, Austria, Poland, Slovenia, Slovakia, Finland and Sweden). The proportion was almost as high in another 10 countries (Belgium, Bulgaria, Czechia, Estonia, Croatia, Lithuania, Malta, Portugal, Romania and the United Kingdom).

In France and Luxembourg, the largest proportions of these young people (43 % and 51 %, respectively) reported that a learning experience abroad would not have been possible because of their work or studies. This was the second most reported reason in Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Spain, Croatia, Italy, the Netherlands, Austria, Sweden and the United Kingdom.

In Hungary, the most common reason reported by young people who had not considered going abroad on a learning experience (40 %) was family circumstances. This was the second most reported reason in Czechia, Estonia, Ireland, France, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Portugal and Slovakia.

In Bulgaria, Poland and Slovenia, more than 30 % of the respondents said that they would not feel comfortable living in a foreign country. In Malta, Romania and Finland, this was also the second most common response.

Figure 4.6: Reasons given by young people (aged 15-30) for not considering a learning experience abroad (%) by country, 2019

Source: Flash Eurobarometer 478. Volume A. Q3b: ‘For which of these reasons did you not consider taking part in a learning experience abroad? (Max. 3 answers)’.

4.4. Participation in Erasmus+ learning mobility actions

The 2014–2020 Erasmus+ programme included five actions. Key action 1 aimed to support the mobility of individuals (learners and staff) to allow them to undertake a learning or professional experience in another country ( 9 ).

For learners (i.e. students, trainees, apprentices and young people), the main aim was to improve their learning, employability and career prospects, their sense of initiative and entrepreneurship, their self-empowerment and self-esteem, their foreign language competences and their motivation to pursue further education or training after the mobility period abroad. The aim was also to promote active participation in society, intercultural understanding, and awareness of the European project and EU values ( 10 ).

This section looks at the participation of learners in Erasmus+ mobility actions of at least 1 month in the fields of higher education (HE) and vocational education and training (VET) ( 11 ). The reference years (2015, 2019 and 2020) refer to the starting year of the learning experience abroad ( 12 ). Many other students from these countries may have studied abroad outside the Erasmus+ programme. The Bologna implementation reports cover in detail the overall credit and degree mobility in higher education ( 13 ). In addition, the mobility scoreboard includes information on credit mobility by type of mobility scheme ( 14 ).

Figure 4.7 shows the numbers of learners from Erasmus+ countries per 10 000 young people (aged 15–29) who took part in Erasmus+ mobility actions in HE and VET starting in 2019. The table beneath the figure displays the total numbers of learners per country who took part.

Liechtenstein and the Baltic states recorded the highest participation rates. Compared with the sizes of their young populations, engagement in these Erasmus+ mobility actions was also relevant in other small countries such as Slovenia, Malta and Luxembourg. The participation rate was smaller in Cyprus, where a small proportion of graduates go abroad to study some credits only, but around one third study their complete programme abroad ( 15 ).

Medium-sized countries such as the Netherlands, Austria, Portugal and Finland also had high participation rates in Erasmus+ mobility learning actions in the field of HE and VET. Almost 18 800 participants came from the Netherlands, more than twice the number who came from countries with similar populations such as Romania. There were also twice as many participants from Portugal (almost 11 800) as from Greece, Hungary and Sweden. The number of participants from Finland (around 6 500) was also significantly higher than the numbers of participants from other countries with similar populations such as Bulgaria and Slovakia.

Figure 4.7: Numbers of learners per 10 000 young people (aged 15-29) who participated in Erasmus+ mobility actions in HE and VET (for at least 1 month) starting in 2019

per 10 000 young people    per 10 000 young people

Numbers of learners participating in Erasmus+ mobility actions in HE and VET (for at least 1 month) starting in 2019

Source: Erasmus+ Dashboard, Directorate-General for Education, Youth, Sport and Culture (data extracted on 5 March 2021) and Eurostat [yth_demo_060].

Notes: Countries in the column chart are displayed in descending order of number of learners per 10 000 young people who participated in Erasmus+ mobility actions in HE and VET (for at least 1 month) starting in 2019.

In the case of Sweden, a large proportion of young people reported having taken part in an experience abroad in the Eurobarometer youth survey (see Figure 4.1). In fact, the outward mobility in this country is relatively high but most of the credit mobility takes place outside the Erasmus programme ( 16 ).

Among the large countries, young people from Spain and Italy were among those who benefited the most from the Erasmus+ programme, in both relative and absolute terms. Almost 50 000 participants came from each of these countries. More than 54 000 participants came from France, but the number of young people aged 15–29 is higher in this country. By contrast, less than 15 000 came from Poland.

More than 90 % of these learning experiences abroad were in the field of HE, usually consisting of a study period and/or traineeship at a partner higher education institution as part of the study programme to complete a university degree ( 17 ). VET mobility activities, which represented less than 10 % of these learning experiences abroad, usually took the form of a full work placement in a company or a combination of school-based learning and a strong work-based component organised by a VET provider.

In 12 countries, participation in a learning experience abroad in the field of VET was particularly significant. Estonia, Finland and the Netherlands had the highest participation rates per 10 000 young people. They also had the highest proportions of VET learners, amounting to around 22 % of all learners in the Netherlands and Finland and more than 30 % in Estonia. Participation in VET learning activities abroad relative to the size of the young population was also high in Spain, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Austria, Portugal, Iceland and Liechtenstein.

The total number of learners from these Erasmus+ countries who started a mobility action abroad in 2019 was nearly 17 % higher than in 2015. As shown in Figure 4.8, between 2015 and 2019 the number of participants increased in almost all countries. Only Finland, Slovakia, Czechia, Lithuania and Poland saw a decrease.

Figure 4.8: Percentage differences between 2015 and 2019 in the numbers of learners starting an Erasmus+ mobility action of at least 1 month in HE and VET

Source: Erasmus+ Dashboard, Directorate-General for Education, Youth, Sport and Culture. Data extracted on 5 March 2021.

Notes: Countries are displayed in descending order of percentage difference between 2015 and 2019 in the number of learners starting an Erasmus+ mobility action of at least 1 month in HE and VET.

The highest increases took place in countries with the lowest number of participants in 2015, namely Serbia, Northern Macedonia, Liechtenstein and Malta. In 2015, only 24 learners came from Serbia, compared with almost 900 in 2019. There were twice as many participants from Northern Macedonia in 2019 as in 2015, and the numbers of learners increased by more than half in Liechtenstein and Malta.

Similarly, in Norway, the number of participants increased by nearly 50 % in 2019 compared with 2015. In Italy, Spain and France, which had had among the highest numbers of participants in 2015, the increase in 2019 was in the region of 30 %. Romania and Ireland also showed similar increases. In Croatia and Portugal, the numbers of participants increased by more than 20 %.

In terms of gender, around 60 % of the participants were women and 40 % were men. The proportion of male participants was slightly higher for VET than for HE.

Around 60 % of these learning experiences abroad lasted from 3 to 6 months, around 22 % lasted between 1 and 3 months, and around 17 % lasted for more than 6 months. As shown in Figure 4.9, while the learning experience for the great majority of HE students lasted for more than 3 months, for most VET students their experience abroad lasted for 1–3 months. In HE, the proportion of male participants increased with the duration of the learning experience abroad. In VET, activities lasting between 3 and 6 months registered the lowest proportion of male participants.

Figure 4.9: Numbers of learners starting an Erasmus+ mobility action in 2019 and 2020 by gender and duration