EUROPEAN COMMISSION

Strasbourg, 12.12.2023

COM(2023) 630 final

COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS

on Defence of Democracy

1.INTRODUCTION

Democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights are founding values of the European Union 1 . They underpin all the EU’s achievements in fostering peace, prosperity, economic competitiveness, social cohesion and stability across the continent and around the world 2 . The essence of democracy is that citizens can freely express their views and participate in democratic life, choose their political representatives, and have a say in their future. Citizens should be able to form their own opinions in a public space where different views can be expressed, where they have a right to disagree and to change governments through elections, free from interference, either foreign or domestic. With the wealth of local, regional, national and European elections, the EU and its Member States represent one of the deepest democratic experiences in the world. European democracy and the rights and freedoms associated with it are at the core of our open and transparent societies.

But democracy also has its challenges and its enemies. Authoritarian regimes see it as a threat, whether at home or abroad. This has resulted in some such regimes adopting a conscious policy to undermine the democratic process in the EU. They aim at undermining democratic institutions, put pressure on the media and reduce the space for civil society. This can range from attempts to exploit societal division and stoke mistrust of, and disillusionment with, established institutions, to weakening the democratic voice of citizens and civil society 3 , engaging in information manipulation and disinformation, and direct distortion of election campaigns 4 . Recent experience shows how quickly those wishing to foment hatred in our society can seize on new opportunities, and the need for the EU to be in the vanguard of countering such destructive forces 5 .

Interference from outside the EU in our democratic process, including by the use of proxies, has received increasing political attention, at both national level and in the EU institutions. The Commission shares many of the concerns expressed by the European Parliament 6 , including on the need for a coordinated EU strategy against foreign interference and information manipulation 7 .  Free and fair elections are a cornerstone of democracy, and independent and transparent electoral processes are vital to a competitive electoral environment to ensure citizens’ trust in the integrity of elections and their results. There is increasing evidence of cases such as lawmakers hacked ahead of elections, covert lobbying via proxies, fake research issued to whitewash human rights records, and websites purporting to be independent media platforms while covertly facilitating political interference campaigns. The Russian war of aggression against Ukraine, which is also a war on democracy and on all the values for which the EU stands, has further intensified the risk of outside interference. A recent Eurobarometer survey shows that 81% of people surveyed in the EU believe that foreign interference in our democratic systems is a serious problem that needs to be addressed 8 .

The EU has increasingly acknowledged the need to be proactive in safeguarding democracy, and in strengthening the rule of law and protecting fundamental rights and freedoms. Work on the measures put forward by the Commission in 2020 in the European Democracy Action Plan 9 is well under way, helping to strengthen democratic resilience by promoting election integrity, protecting media freedom and pluralism, and strengthening the fight against disinformation, foreign information manipulation and interference. This Communication sets out how the Commission, in close cooperation with the High Representative, has worked on all these fronts through key legislation and other political initiatives, bolstering societal resilience from within and the direct engagement of citizens 10 .

At the same time, the EU has responded to the different risks of foreign interference in a variety of ways. This includes addressing risks affecting economic security, due to the involvement in the internal market of actors associated with third countries not primarily motivated by market rationales. Steps have included a proposal for a new tool to counter the use of economic coercion by third countries 11 , rules on screening foreign direct investments where security or public order might be at risk 12 , as well as measures in the field of cybersecurity 13 , research security 14 and countering hybrid threats 15 . In particularly serious circumstances, to respond to threats or risk of threats to the fundamental interests of the Union and the objectives of the common foreign and security policy, the EU has imposed restrictive measures under EU sanctions regimes 16 .

This Communication introduces the defence of democracy package announced in the 2022 State of the Union address . The package centres on a legislative proposal aiming to enhance transparency and democratic accountability by shedding light on covert foreign influence, as well as to improve the functioning of the internal market through common standards for interest representation activities carried out on behalf of third countries. The proposal has been developed through an extensive public and stakeholder consultation and a fully-fledged impact assessment.

The upcoming European elections will be a crucial test case for the resilience of our democratic processes. The package includes a targeted recommendation to promote free, fair and resilient elections, and to protect them from cyberattacks and other efforts to distort or manipulate our democratic and electoral environment.

The Commission also works with Member States to promote and protect a civic space where an active and independent civil society and citizens are provided with the enabling conditions and tools to become more engaged. This can contribute to making our democracies more resilient. This builds on investment already made and using new avenues for citizen participation in the public sphere as boosted by the Conference on the Future of Europe and its follow up 17 . A dedicated recommendation sets out ways to promote the engagement and effective participation of citizens and civil society organisations in public policy-making processes.

The defence of democracy package is part of a set of initiatives which represent a proactive approach to uphold EU values. Since 2020, the Commission has examined the situation in Member States in its annual Rule of Law Reports. The anti-corruption 18 and ethics 19 initiatives put forward in early 2023 also seek to protect democracy from the corrosive impact of corruption, including from foreign actors. The recent Joint Communication on combating hatred 20 aims to step up the EU action against hatred and promote an inclusive, diverse and democratic Europe. The Commission has been implementing strategies to combat discrimination, which also promote equal opportunities for inclusive participation and engagement 21 . The 2022 report on the application of the Charter of Fundamental Rights 22 focused on the civic space and its role in protecting and promoting fundamental rights. Putting people and their rights at the centre of the digital transformation are also core principles in the EU approach to digitalisation and technological advancement 23 . This approach is also at the heart of the EU’s enlargement policy, and guide the EU’s work worldwide to support and promote democracy and the universal values of human rights and the rule of law in line with the EU Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy (2020-2024) 24 . In all its actions, the EU commits to engage with organisations which respect democratic values and fundamental rights, as enshrined in Article 2 of TEU and in the Charter.

2.    ENSURING TRANSPARENCY OF FOREIGN INTEREST REPRESENTATION in THE EU democratic sphere through harmonised requirements

The EU is open to the world and actively engaged with partners across the globe. Transparent and open exchanges across countries and cultures and access to information are part of our identity and are mutually beneficial at all levels. Governments, public authorities and political actors from outside the EU have the possibility to present their views and may try to have these views reflected in the democratic debate and influence policies on various issues. When they do this via entities that represent their interests, the legitimacy of such interest representation rests on its transparency and accountability.

There is however a growing concern in the EU that the openness of our societies can be exploited: interference by foreign governments seeking to manipulate public opinion and distort the democratic debate poses a threat to the EU’s democracies 25 . This risk has increased due to a dynamic threat landscape, and third country governments can make use of public resources to carry out wide-ranging and sustained influence campaigns 26 , sometimes covertly, and to promote their political and geopolitical interests at the expense of domestic constituencies. Comparable data about this phenomenon in the EU is scarce. This also results in limited accountability and oversight. Instilling transparency and openness in the way that foreign interests are represented is the best way to protect the integrity of our democratic space and to prevent foreign interference 27 . More broadly, a political and institutional system based on integrity, transparency and accountability in public life is the best guarantee against corruption 28 , and public bodies should seek the highest standards of transparency as an important part of broader efforts to tackle corruption.

Interest representation activities are increasingly used by third country governments alongside formal diplomatic channels and processes 29 to promote their policy objectives. The transparency and reporting requirements for interest representation activities are currently regulated in different ways, and to different extents, in Member States. Some national laws make it compulsory to register while others rely on self-regulation. In substance, the rules may differ, for instance in terms of the types of activities and entities caught by obligations. Given that interest representation is an increasingly cross-border activity, an EU response is necessary to prevent the emergence of additional obstacles in the internal market and the risk of a patchwork of regulatory landscapes. Fragmentation imposes additional costs and creates legal uncertainty, with providers required to invest in separate compliance steps and adapt to the various requirements of the different EU jurisdictions. Without EU action, Member States address the identified risks and threats to democracy unilaterally 30 , undermining the internal market, and facilitating attempts by third countries to use diverging rules to their advantage when they seek to covertly influence our democratic process. 

The Commission is therefore putting forward a proposal for a harmonised approach to remove obstacles in the internal market and equip the EU with transparency tools that will enable it to defend democracy, remain an open society and protect fundamental rights, in particular freedom of expression and access to information. It aims to ensure a common high level of transparency and democratic accountability across the EU in relation to lobbying campaigns provided as a service, as well as similar activities performed by entities on behalf of a third country government that are attempting to influence the development, formulation or implementation of public policy or legislation, or of public decision-making processes. As such it will also contribute in the medium term to a better understanding and public awareness of the magnitude, trends and actors involved in such activities. This would allow EU citizens and public authorities to understand the motivation behind them and to see which third countries invest in influencing democratic debate and the decision-making processes in the EU.

The Commission proposal would enhance the integrity and openness of public debate by ensuring that when third countries seek to influence EU democratic processes through intermediaries, this is done in a transparent manner. Freedom of expression and association, as well as academic freedom and the freedom of scientific research, are paramount to the democratic debate and should not be significantly affected by the limited and proportionate transparency requirements foreseen. It is up to service providers to decide which services they want to offer. Funding received by civil society organisations or others from a third country government that is unrelated to an interest representation activity would not be covered by the requirements. The proposal also includes comprehensive safeguards to ensure that entities subject to the transparency requirements would not be stigmatised, nor incur consequences for the mere fact of being registered 31 .

The proposed Directive 32 focuses on interest representation activities, i.e. activities carried out with a view to influencing democratic processes, that are of an economic nature and which are carried out on behalf of third countries. It would cover all entities engaging in an activity seeking to influence the development, formulation or implementation of policy or legislation, or public decision-making processes, in the EU. This could include lobbying and public relations companies, think tanks, civil society organisations, private research institutes, and public research institutes offering research services, as well as consultants and in-house lobbyists, carried out on behalf of third countries with a view to influence public life and the democratic process in the EU 33 . When this happens, the fact that a foreign government is behind the activity needs to be transparent. The proposal specifically excludes activities such as diplomatic representation or legal representation in a trial 34 . 

The Directive would apply in a fair, and non-discriminatory manner, with minimal administrative formalities. It would subject the entities within its scope to mandatory, but limited and proportionate, registration requirements. Member States would be asked to establish, or adapt existing, national registers to ensure the transparency of interest representation activities. Such registers should have simple and clear access requirements to facilitate registration and enforcement. To limit administrative burden, Member States would be invited to ensure that entities having to register can re-use data already submitted in other national registers ('Once Only' principle), where possible. Information on the registration obligations and formalities established by this Directive should be available via the Single Digital Gateway 35 which sets up a one-stop shop to give businesses and citizens information about rules and procedures in the Single Market. 36  The most important elements of the registered data would be publicly available, allowing for transparency and enhanced public scrutiny, in full compliance with EU data protection rules 37 .

In line with the Court of Justice’s case law 38 and guidelines from the Venice Commission of the Council of Europe 39 , the Directive would also include safeguards to avoid registration requirements being misused to limit fundamental rights and freedoms, such as the freedoms of expression or of association, academic or artistic freedom, or to unduly restrict the civic space. First, independent supervisory authorities would be empowered to request limited records in duly justified cases only, and in a proportionate manner. The supervisory authority should have clearly defined and circumscribed powers, and should be competent for supervision and enforcement activities, including to ensure that no adverse consequences arise from registration. Secondly, there should be proportionate administrative fines for non-compliance, subject to judicial review and effective remedies, to avoid potential chiling effects. The proposal would also create a cooperation framework for the exchange of information between supervisory authorities.

Full harmonisation for matters falling within the scope of the proposed directive would prevent Member States from maintaining or introducing additional requirements within the framework of the harmonised rules. This would further limit the risk of divergent and potentially disproportionate and repressive national rules and practices 40 . At the same time, in line with the principle of subsidiarity, Member States would remain free to establish rules for areas not covered by the Directive, for example rules on contacts between their public officials and interest representatives.

This proposal would be a key first step in tackling foreign interference based on a framework that will harmonise transparency requirements in the internal market and allow an overview of third countries’ interests represented in the EU. It is a targeted and proportionate response to current concerns. Its implementation, and in particular the effectiveness and proportionality of the rules, would need to be kept under review and a timely assessment made as to whether revisions or further steps are needed, including as regards the scope of intervention 41  and as well as a reflexion on the possibility of creating a Union level portal connecting national registers. In parallel, the Commission will continue to monitor and support reforms in Member States to ensure the transparency of lobbying. The Rule of Law reports recognise this to be key element of fostering integrity, transparency and accountability in public life 42 . The Commission will also organise regular stakeholder group meetings to touch base on the application of the rules.

At EU level, the EU Transparency Register 43 covers activities carried out by interest representatives with the objective of influencing the formulation or implementation of policy or legislation, or the decision-making processes of the EU institutions. Citizens and interest groups can use it to look at the potential influence of interest representatives towards decision-makers, thereby promoting ethical and transparent interest representation. It is supplemented by a code of conduct, as well as by internal transparency measures in the EU institutions concerning meetings and other interactions with lobbyists 44 . Although it has a different scope compared to the proposed Directive 45 , the EU Transparency Register already covers activities of foreign influence when carried out by foreign entities without diplomatic status, or any entitites that lobby the EU institutions on behalf of third countries 46 . Once the outcome of the discussions between the European Parliament and the Council on the proposed Directive is clear, the Commission will consider how to best address issues such as double registration and whether to develop possible links between national registers under the Directive and the Transparency Register.

The proposed Directive would complement the rules that apply to digital services under the Digital Services Act and to advertising service providers and publishers under the proposal on political advertising, both of which have a different scope 47 . Concrete preventive measures proposed in the European Research Area to create awareness about foreign interference and build resilience across the sector, building on the Toolkit on Tackling Research and Innovation Foreign Interference 48 , are also complementary. It is also in line with standards at international level 49 . The Commission will also support actions such as the exchange of best practice in relation to informing citizens, building resilience and engaging actively with the topic of interference in the European democratic sphere, including training, media literacy, awareness-raising and critical thinking. The Commission has also put in place a set of actions 50 to support Member States’ administrations preparing reforms, anticipating future trends and strengthening administrative cooperation which support democractic structures. There is also support for efforts at national level to further reforms that reinforce democractic structures and processes 51 . 

With this proposal, the Commission seeks to contribute to setting standards, not only in the EU, but also on a global scale, on how to address covert foreign influence in a coherent, balanced and proportionate way, fully respecting fundamental rights. By focusing on transparency and democratic accountability and by introducing targeted rules accompanied by strong safeguards, the approach strikes a balance between the exercise of fundamental rights and the public interest.

Understanding and taking action to tackle the phenomenon of foreign interference has been gaining ground globally. Some jurisdictions outside the EU – such as Australia, the United States, Canada and the United Kingdom – have introduced or are preparing frameworks to regulate the transparency of foreign government influence by means of specific disclosure and registration requirements applicable to lobbying on behalf of foreign governments.

Other jurisdictions have adopted ‘foreign agent’ laws which go beyond transparency requirements and have been found to be in violation of fundamental rights and freedoms. The aim of such laws has been to restrict the civic space by stigmatising and intimidating certain civil society organisations and human rights defenders – which often rely on funding from abroad, including from the EU – and curtailing their activities. For example, the Russian ‘foreign agent’ law effectively empowers authorities to hinder the work of independent civil society organisations through intrusive inspections, direct oversight over programmes and events, and the threat of dissolution and of taking criminal proceedings against non-compliant organisations and their members – even when foreign support is fully transparent. The label of ‘foreign agent’ under such laws undermines the financial stability of an organisation, due to the heavy fines imposed on those who do not abide by its rules. It also harms its credibility, as it carries with it connotations of spying, which can in turn incite violence against members of targeted civil society organisations online and offline. Such ‘foreign agent’ laws are profoundly undemocratic and have been found to violate international laws and standards 52 . 

Not all risks of foreign interference are associated with state actors. Some non‑state entities may also use similar tactics to promote actions that directly contravene EU values, such as actions designed to amplify polarisation and incite hatred. This is particularly true online, as evidenced recently in an explosion of violent extremist, hateful and divisive content.

The Commission strongly encourages Member States to remain vigilant and share information with one another and at EU level on such non-state entities, even if they are not linked to, or dependent on, a foreign government. In line with this, the Commission’s proposed recast of the Financial Regulation includes adding a new ground of exclusion from EU funding for ‘incitement to discrimination, hatred or violence.’ The new ground would be applicable for funds disbursed in direct and indirect management, even in the absence of a final judgment at national level. In addition, the Commission is introducing internal awareness-raising measures and developing internal working methods to ensure increased scrutiny in the selection of projects 53 . 

3 TAKING THE EUROPEAN DEMOCRACY ACTION PLAN FORWARD

The European Democracy Action Plan (EDAP) adopted in December 2020 aims to strengthen the resilience of EU democracies, identifying key actions to address the areas where our systems and citizens are most vulnerable. These actions seek to better protect the integrity of elections, safeguard media freedom and media pluralism, and fight disinformation 54 . The Action Plan also recognised that a healthy democracy relies on meaningful and inclusive citizen engagement exercises and an active civil society, not only at election time, but on an ongoing basis, and that engaged, informed and empowered citizens and a vibrant civil society are vital to guarantee the resilience of our democracies, including resilience to foreign interference. 

Taking stock of the state of implementation of the actions under EDAP 55 , this section highlights areas where the EU can be proactive in the face of existing and evolving challenges.

3.1    Protecting election integrity and promoting democratic participation ahead of and beyond the 2024 European elections

Free and fair elections are at the very core of our democracy. If left unaddressed, risks to the electoral process can both distort the process itself and undermine citizens’ trust in the fairness and integrity of elections.

Together with this Communication, the Commission is putting forward a Recommendation on inclusive and resilient electoral processes in the European Union and enhancing the European nature and efficient conduct of the elections to the European Parliament 56 . It is addressed to Member States, European and national political parties, foundations and campaign organisations in the context of the preparation of elections in general and with regard to the upcoming European elections in particular. It aims to promote high democratic standards for elections in the EU, supporting high turnout, inclusive participation, easy and equal exercise of electoral rights and resilient electoral processes. To this end, it includes specific recommendations to support voter turnout and inclusive participation, with a particular focus on gender equality and addressing the needs of specific groups 57 . 

There is a constant need to step up the cybersecurity of election technology. The Recommendation sets out specific proposals to ensure the security, integrity and resilience of elections and election-related entities and infrastructure, in light of the requirements established by the revised Directive on security of network and information systems (NIS2 Directive) 58 and the Directive on the resilience of critical entities 59 . Building on a first experience from 2019 60 , a new EU tabletop exercise took place on 21 November 2023 with the participation of the Commission, European Parliament, the EU Agency for Cybersecurity and Member States. The NIS Cooperation Group should also continue the review of the Compendium on Cybersecurity of Election Technology, to ensure it keeps pace with the evolving threat landscape.

In addition to the direct risk posed to election infrastructure, the intentional and coordinated manipulation of the information environment by foreign state actors likewise poses a threat to democracy and security.  There are numerous reports of large-scale coordinated efforts combining different tactics, techniques and procedures, such as the use of fake social media accounts to ‘like’, comment on or share information to artificially boost its visibility, the spread of disinformation including through manipulated audio-visual content such as deepfakes 61 , or opaquely targeting voters to influence them and manipulate the outcome of elections. Additionally, information manipulation can occur in concert with activity in other domains, such as cyber threats in the case of hack-and-leak operations. To this end, and building on the Eurobarometer data, the Recommendation puts forward a series of measures to protect election-related information from manipulation and disinformation 62 .

A free and fair democratic debate relies on legality and fair play. Surveillance tools may be used by public authorities, under certain conditions, for reasons of national security, but the use of spyware to gain political advantage is very different. The recommendation stresses that surveillance tools should never be used to interfere with the democratic debate and deploying such tools to target political actors and journalists for political gain is unacceptable. The Commission has always made clear that the notion of national security should be interpreted in accordance with the criteria laid down by EU case law. The country chapters of the Rule of Law report cover this issue insofar as the functioning of institutional checks and balances is concerned. There are also strong safeguards against the use of spyware against media, journalists, and their families in the proposal for a European Media Freedom Act 63 . The European Parliament has set up an important strand of work on spyware with a Committee of Inquiry to investigate the use of Pegasus and equivalent surveillance spyware (PEGA Committee). In its resolution of June 2023 the Parliament strongly condemned the illegal use of spyware, calling on action at both national and EU level 64 . The Commission is preparing a non-legislative initiative clarifying the boundaries and the interplay between EU law, in particular the data protection and privacy acquis, and national security 65 .

Other recommendations include the use of campaign pledges and codes of conduct by political parties to encourage election integrity and fair campaigning; efforts to ensure the transparency of political advertising; and promoting the observation of elections as an efficient means of encouraging citizens to actively engage with the electoral process and improve public trust in elections. It also touches upon the funding of political parties and foundations, with a view to limiting any risk of covert foreign influence, including by means of covert donations, to distort the level playing field in the electoral process.

The recommendation builds on the decisive steps taken by the Commission since 2020 to address identified loopholes and to ensure citizens can form their own judgments and make electoral choices in a public space where a plurality of views can be expressed, free from interference, be it domestic or foreign.

When it comes to the digital sphere, the rules under the Digital Services Act  66  set out the responsibilities of online platforms and search engines in addressing the risks related to civic discourse and electoral processes stemming from the functioning, design or use of their services, including through disinformation, inauthentic use or tactics involving artificially generated content. The rules also provide for more transparency and support people to take informed decisions about the information they see online. In addition, the regulation on transparency and targeting of political advertising 67  will allow for better public scrutiny and accountability in relation to political advertising services, including through a European public repository for online political ads, and introduce stricter conditions around the use of personal data for the targeting and delivery of political adverts. To address the risk of foreign interference, it will also prohibit sponsoring political advertising by non-EU actors three months before elections or referenda. The role of European political parties and political groups in the European elections is also recognised. In 2021, the Commission also proposed a revision of the rules on the statute and funding of European political parties and foundations 68 . The proposal aims at giving European political parties more possibilities to fulfil their role in building and nurturing a truly European political sphere, while at the same time protecting their action from foreign interference. The enforcement of these rules is a top priority for the Commission. When it comes to the Digital Services Act, the Commission is supervising and enforcing the application of the rules by very large online platforms and search engines.

Although the organisation of national elections is a Member State competence, it is informed by international standards, and governed by this broader framework of EU law. Reinforced mutual support and cooperation among Member States is now well established, centred on the work of bodies such as the European Cooperation Network on Elections, also drawing on the EU’s structures to promote information security and tackle disinformation. In preparation of the European Parliament elections, the Commission organised a high-level event on elections in October 2023 bringing together Member States, EU institutions, NGOs, and academia to put forward ideas on supporting voter turnout, the resilience of the electoral systems and fair and inclusive elections across the Union.

A Joint mechanism for electoral resilience was launched in January 2022, aiming to build capacity in Member States to address risks to elections, through expert exchanges, in particular on disinformation and cyber-related threats. The mechanism has also been used to support the preparation of the compendium on e-Voting and other ICT Practices 69 , in addition to targeted exchanges on how to ensure parity of treatment and balanced media coverage during elections. Exchanges between national parliaments could also be a valuable way to share experience and the Commission will support such exchanges.

The EU has refined its external electoral observation methodology in recent years, including through common guidelines based on international standards, that consolidate its capacity to tackle the use of new technologies in the electoral process. Good practices are regularly discussed within the European Cooperation Network on Elections and in the context of the Declaration of Principles for International Election Observation.

The EU does not act in isolation. Under EDAP, the Commission has continued its efforts to help build resilience in third countries, with a view to better equipping societies and public authorities with the means to respond to common external threats to the democratic process. Such efforts are a priority in EU enlargement policy 70 . The EU also facilitates international cooperation on electoral matters between EU networks, partner countries and international organisations such as the Council of Europe, UNESCO and the OSCE 71 . The European External Action Service conducts election observation missions in close coordination with other international and regional observation organisations. It complements these activities with dedicated support to governments, civil society and independent media to help build resilience against and prevent, deter and respond to foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI), including through insights into how FIMI has been used in electoral contexts. EU action has also included participation in the two Summits for Democracy 72 and financial support for capacity-building and electoral reform, including in the countries in the EU’s immediate neighbourhood 73 .

3.2Strengthening media freedom and pluralism

Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine has also dramatically highlighted the essential role journalists play in informing citizens about the reality on the ground. The Russian authorities have engaged in a systematic crackdown on and censorship of independent media, which remains essential to fight propaganda.

Under EDAP, the EU’s efforts to protect media freedom and counter disinformation are two sides of the same coin. As part of this vision, the Commission proposed key new initiatives to improve the safety of journalists 74 and to protect journalists and human rights defenders and others from abusive lawsuits against public participation (SLAPPs) 75 . The anti-SLAPP directive brings a system of powerful procedural safeguards for cross-border SLAPP cases, which equip courts to deal with abusive litigation and act as a deterrent to potential new SLAPP cases. The directive includes rules that allow the early dismisal of such cases and provide effective remedies for SLAPP victims. Together with the related recommendation, the rules form a strong package of measures to fight SLAPP and protect public participation and the freedom of expression in the EU.   The Commission also proposed to harmonise certain aspects of national rules related to media services under the European Media Freedom Act. The proposal aims to address fragmented national regulatory approaches related to media freedom and pluralism and editorial independence and to ensure the free provision of media services within the internal market. It also puts a focus on the independence and stable funding of public service media as well as on the transparency of media ownership and of the allocation of state advertising, two key objectives under the EDAP. Under the new provisions, Member States would also have to look at the impact of national measures and media concentrations on media freedom and pluralism. When it comes to the dissemination of media content in the online environment, the European Media Freedom Act proposal builds on the horizontal framework established by the Digital Services Act.