19.11.2011   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 339/7

(1)

This Decision is addressed to 36 legal entities belonging to 17 prestressing steel undertakings for having participated in a single and continuous infringement of Article 101 of the TFEU and Article 53 of the EEA Agreement. They engaged in price-fixing, quota-fixing, client allocation and the exchange of commercially sensitive information in a cartel regarding prestressing steel with the exception of special strand and stays. The cartel lasted between January 1984 and September 2002 and concerned all the countries that then formed the EU-15 except Ireland, Greece and the United Kingdom. It also affected Norway. The cartel stopped in 2002, when DWK/Saarstahl revealed its existence under the Commission Leniency Notice (2) introduced that year.

(2)

The case was opened on the basis of an immunity application of DWK Drahtwerk Köln GmbH (DWK) on 18 June 2002.

(3)

Following the information provided, inspections took place on 19 and 20 September 2002 at the premises of 14 undertakings in six countries.

(4)

Subsequently, between 21 September 2002 and 28 June 2007, the Commission received leniency applications from six undertakings. Four undertakings also provided self-incriminating information in reply to requests for information.

(5)

The investigation of the case was followed by addressing several requests for information to all the companies involved in the anti-competitive arrangements and by an additional inspection on 7 and 8 June 2006 at the premises of Mr (…), external consultant to the (Italian part of the) cartel.

(6)

The Statement of Objections was adopted on 30 September 2008 and the Oral Hearing took place on 11 and 12 February 2009.

(7)

The Commission adopted a decision on 30 June 2010 and an amendment decision correcting some errors in the calculation of the fine on 30 September 2010.

(8)

On 4 April 2011, the Commission adopted a further amendment decision in which it exercised its margin of appreciation to reduce the fines for which four of the legal entities involved in the cartel were solely liable, in that they related only to those periods in which the legal entities participated without their current parent companies, in order to ensure that the level of those fines was not disproportionate to their own size and turnover. The Commission reduced the relevant fines to ten percent of the legal entities’ own turnovers.

(9)

This case concerns an infringement of Article 101 of the TFEU and, from 1 January 1994, of Article 53 of the EEA Agreement with regards to prestressing steel with the exception of special strand and stays. Prestressing steel consists of long, curled steel wires used with concrete on construction sites to make foundations, balconies or bridges and also is used in underground engineering and bridge-building.

(10)

The suppliers concerned engaged in price fixing, quota fixing, client allocation and exchange of commercially sensitive information in a cartel with a duration of over 18 years, lasting between at least 1 January 1984 and 19 September 2002. In addition, they monitored price, client and quota arrangements through a system of national coordinators and bilateral contacts. Some suppliers were also involved in a specific form of client allocation towards one big Nordic client. The infringement constitutes by its very nature one of the worst kinds of Article 101 of the TFEU.

(11)

The cartel consisted of a pan-European arrangement, first referred to as ‘Club Zurich’, named after the place in Switzerland where the first cartel meetings were held, and later as ‘Club Europe’. But there were also two regional arrangements, in Italy (Club Italia) and in Spain/Portugal (Club España). The different arrangements of the cartel constituted one single, complex and continuous infringement because they were interconnected by overlapping territory, membership and chronology. They, moreover, shared the same goal and used identical mechanisms. Indeed, the goal of the cartel was to stabilise the suppliers’ market shares in order to stabilise prices and facilitate price increases. This was done by agreeing on quotas, prices and/or client allocation. The agreements were monitored and compensation mechanisms were set up. In addition, the participants to the different arrangements were mutually aware of each others’ attempts to stabilise the market shares/prices and there were efforts to agree on a common equilibrium and to fix prices together.

(12)

The companies involved usually met in the margin of official trade meetings in hotels all over Europe. The Commission has evidence of over 550 cartel meetings.

(13)

The addressees of the Decision participated in the infringement during at least the following periods:

(14)

In setting the fines, the Commission took into account the sales of the companies involved in the market concerned in the last year prior to the end of the cartel (2001; except for DWK, 2000), the very serious nature of the infringement, the geographic scope of the cartel and its long duration.

(15)

The Commission increased the fines for ArcelorMittal Fontaine and ArcelorMittal Wire France because they had already been fined for prior cartel involvement. Saarstahl was previously fined in the steel beams cartel, but received full immunity in the present cartel because it was the first to come forward with information under the Commission’s 2002 Leniency Notice.

(16)

The Commission recognised the more limited participation of Proderac and Emme Holding by reducing their fine by 5 %. The fine for ArcelorMittal España was reduced by 15 % for its cooperation outside the Leniency Notice.

(17)

The fine on several companies would have exceeded the legal maximum of 10 % of the 2009 turnover, and was therefore reduced to this level.

(18)

The Commission granted full immunity from the fine to DWK/Saarstahl and a reduction of the fine for cooperation under the 2002 Leniency Notice to Italcables/Antonini (50 %), Nedri (25 %), Emesa and Galycas (5 %), ArcelorMittal and its subsidiaries (20 %) and WDI/Pampus (5 %). Redaelli and SLM did not meet the requirements for cooperation and therefore received no reduction of the fine.

(19)

The Commission accepted three inability-to-pay applications and granted reductions of respectively 25 %, 50 % and 75 % of the fine that would otherwise have been imposed. It had received applications from 13 undertakings under the Commission’s 2006 Fines Guidelines.

(20)

The following fines were imposed pursuant to Article 23(2) of Regulation (EC) No 1/2003: