ORDER OF THE GENERAL COURT (Fourth Chamber)

18 February 2026 (*)

( Action for annulment – Environment – Urban wastewater treatment – Articles 9 and 10 of, and Annex III to, Directive (EU) 2024/3019 – Extended producer responsibility for medicinal products for human use and cosmetic products – Standing to bring proceedings – Lack of individual concern – Inadmissibility )

In Case T‑169/25,

Cosmetics Europe – The Personal Care Association, established in Auderghem (Belgium), represented by J.-P. Montfort and A. de Moncuit de Boiscuillé, lawyers,

applicant,

v

European Parliament, represented by L. Taïeb, W. Kuzmienko and A. Droin, acting as Agents,

and

Council of the European Union, represented by A. Maceroni and O. Segnana, acting as Agents,

defendants,

THE GENERAL COURT (Fourth Chamber),

composed of G. De Baere, President, J. Svenningsen (Rapporteur) and D. Jočienė, Judges,

Registrar: V. Di Bucci,

makes the following

Order

1        By its action under Article 263 TFEU, the applicant, Cosmetics Europe – The Personal Care Association, seeks the annulment of Article 9 and Article 10 of, Annex III to, and, to the extent necessary, point (c) of the second subparagraph of Article 30(1) of, Directive (EU) 2024/3019 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 November 2024 concerning urban wastewater treatment (OJ L, 2024/3019) (‘the contested provisions’), in so far as that directive introduces an extended producer responsibility system (‘the EPR system’) for cosmetic products.

 Background to the dispute

2        The applicant is an international non-profit association established under Belgian law which represents the interests of cosmetics producers and national associations of those producers.

3        Directive 2024/3019 provides for a recast of Council Directive 91/271/EEC of 21 May 1991 concerning urban waste-water treatment (OJ 1991 L 135, p. 40), as amended by Regulation (EC) No 1137/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 October 2008 (OJ 2008 L 311, p. 1), by introducing an obligation for Member States to ensure that certain discharges from urban wastewater treatment plants comply with the requirements for quaternary treatment.

4        Quaternary treatment, also established by Directive 2024/3019 and defined in Article 2(14) thereof, is a means of treating urban wastewater by a process taking place after traditional treatment (primary, secondary and tertiary), which reduces a broad spectrum of micropollutants in urban wastewater.

5        Given that quaternary treatment involves additional costs, Directive 2024/3019 relies on the polluter-pays principle in order to cover them.

6        In that regard, recital 20 of Directive 2024/3019 states that pharmaceuticals and cosmetic residues currently represent the main sources of micropollutants found in urban wastewater requiring quaternary treatment.

7        Article 9(1) of Directive 2024/3019 introduces the EPR system for two categories of products listed in Annex III to that directive, namely medicinal products for human use falling within the scope of Directive 2001/83/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 November 2001 on the Community code relating to medicinal products for human use (OJ 2001 L 311, p. 67), and cosmetic products falling within the scope of Regulation (EC) No 1223/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 November 2009 on cosmetic products (OJ 2009 L 342, p. 59).

8        Article 9(2)(a) and (b) of Directive 2024/3019 provides for two exemptions from the EPR system, namely (i) an exemption for producers in respect of which the total quantity of substances contained in products placed on the EU market amounts to small quantities, that is to say, less than one tonne per year, and (ii) an exemption for producers in respect of which the substances contained in the products they place on the market are rapidly biodegradable in wastewater or do not generate micropollutants in wastewater at the end of their life.

9        Article 9(3) of Directive 2024/3019 provides that Member States are to ensure that producers of medicinal products for human use and cosmetic products exercise their extended producer responsibility collectively through an organisation that fulfils the minimum requirements set out in Article 10 of that directive.

10      Article 10 of Directive 2024/3019 lists the minimum requirements for producer responsibility organisations which Member States must lay down.

11      Article 10(5) of that directive provides, specifically, that ‘Member States shall organise regular dialogues on [the] implementation [of the EPR system]’ and ‘shall ensure that those dialogues involve relevant stakeholders and, where relevant, associations of stakeholders involved in the implementation of extended producer responsibility, including producers and distributors, producer responsibility organisations, private or public operators of urban wastewater treatment plants, local authorities and civil society organisations’.

12      Article 30 of Directive 2024/3019 provides that, by 31 December 2033, and then by 31 December 2040, the European Commission shall carry out an evaluation of that directive based on a number of elements and assess the possibility of adapting the list of products covered by the EPR system.

 Forms of order sought

13      The applicant claims that the Court should:

–        annul the contested provisions;

–        order the European Parliament and the Council of the European Union to pay the costs.

14      In their pleas of inadmissibility, the Parliament and the Council contend that the Court should:

–        dismiss the action as inadmissible;

–        order the applicant to pay the costs.

15      In its observations regarding the pleas of inadmissibility, the applicant claims that the Court should:

–        principally, reject the pleas of inadmissibility;

–        in the alternative, reserve its decision on the pleas of inadmissibility until it rules on the merits of the case;

–        order the Parliament and the Council to pay the costs.

 Law

16      Under Article 130(1) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court, the Court may give a decision on inadmissibility without going to the substance of the case if a defendant submits an application asking it to do so. Under Article 130(7) of those rules, the Court is to decide on the application as soon as possible or, where special circumstances so justify, reserve its decision on that application until it rules on the substance of the case.

17      In the present case, as the Parliament and the Council have applied for a decision on inadmissibility, the Court, considering that it has sufficient information from the material in the case file, has decided to give a decision on those applications without taking further steps in the proceedings.

18      It should be recalled that the fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU provides for two situations in which natural or legal persons are accorded standing to institute proceedings against an act which is not addressed to them. First, such proceedings may be instituted if the act is of direct and individual concern to those persons. Second, such persons may bring proceedings against a regulatory act not entailing implementing measures if that act is of direct concern to them (judgment of 13 March 2018, European Union Copper Task Force v Commission, C‑384/16 P, EU:C:2018:176, paragraph 32).

19      Directive 2024/3019, which was adopted on the basis of Article 192(1) TFEU in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure, is a legislative act within the meaning of Article 289(3) TFEU, with the result that the examination of the admissibility of the present action does not fall within the second situation referred to in paragraph 18 above, since the third limb of the fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU relates to regulatory acts, which, according to the case-law, are acts of general application other than legislative acts (see, to that effect, judgment of 3 October 2013, Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami and Others v Parliament and Council, C‑583/11 P, EU:C:2013:625, paragraphs 60 and 61).

20      Accordingly, the applicant falls within the first situation referred to in paragraph 18 above and must be directly and individually concerned by the contested provisions.

21      It should be noted that the applicant seeks the annulment of the contested provisions in so far as they establish the EPR system. Therefore, it is in the light of the scope of that system as defined in Annex III to Directive 2024/3019 that it is necessary to examine whether the applicant is individually concerned by the contested provisions.

22      Natural or legal persons can be individually concerned by a provision of general application only if that provision affects them by reason of certain attributes which are peculiar to them or by reason of circumstances in which they are differentiated from all other persons and by virtue of those factors distinguishes them individually just as in the case of the person addressed (see judgment of 26 September 2024, ATPN v Commission, C‑340/23 P, not published, EU:C:2024:806, paragraph 36 and the case-law cited).

23      In that regard, the case-law states that actions brought by associations are admissible in three well-defined situations: first, where a legal provision expressly grants a series of procedural powers to trade associations; second, where the association represents the interests of its members, who would themselves be entitled to bring proceedings; and, third, where the association is distinguished individually because its own interests as an association are affected, in particular because its position as negotiator has been affected by the act in respect of which annulment is sought (see order of 8 May 2019, Carvalho and Others v Parliament and Council, T‑330/18, not published, EU:T:2019:324, paragraph 51 and the case-law cited).

24      In the present case, it must be examined, first, whether the applicant is entitled to bring the present action in its own name on the basis of the first and third situations referred to in paragraph 23 above and, second, whether it is entitled to do so on behalf of its members on the basis of the second situation referred to in that paragraph.

 The applicant’s standing to bring proceedings in its own name

25      It must be stated at the outset that, in its observations regarding the Council’s plea of inadmissibility, the applicant does not dispute that the contested provisions do not grant it procedural powers in relation to the first situation referred to in paragraph 23 above.

26      Thus, in the present case, it is sufficient to ascertain whether the applicant has demonstrated that it is distinguished individually because its own interests as an association are affected, in particular because its position as negotiator has been affected by the contested provisions.

27      In that regard, the Parliament and the Council contend that the applicant did not have a position as a ‘negotiator’ during the procedure which led to the adoption of Directive 2024/3019, within the meaning of the judgments of 2 February 1988, Kwekerij van der Kooy and Others v Commission (67/85, 68/85 and 70/85, EU:C:1988:38), and of 24 March 1993, CIRFS and Others v Commission (C‑313/90, EU:C:1993:111). The concept of ‘negotiator’ used in those two judgments cannot be extended to any representative of interest groups which voluntarily took part in a legislative procedure.

28      In addition, the Parliament and the Council maintain that Article 10(5) of Directive 2024/3019, relating to the dialogues which Member States must organise in the context of the implementation of the EPR system, concerns any ‘stakeholders’ or ‘associations of stakeholders’ involved in that implementation and provides for an open list of operators that may potentially participate in it.

29      They contend that, accordingly, the role claimed by the applicant, namely that of coordinating the national associations which are its members in the context of those dialogues, cannot distinguish it individually because its own interests are affected.

30      The applicant submits that the Parliament and the Council failed to take proper account of its position as ‘negotiator’ during the procedure which led to the adoption of Directive 2024/3019.

31      In that regard, the applicant refers to a number of steps taken vis-à-vis the institutions of the European Union and national institutions throughout that procedure.

32      Thus, the applicant argues that, contrary to what the Parliament and the Council assert, the judgment of 24 March 1993, CIRFS and Others v Commission (C‑313/90, EU:C:1993:111), must be applied to its situation. It claims that it was the Commission’s sole interlocutor for the cosmetics sector during the procedure which led to the adoption of Directive 2024/3019 and that some of its suggestions were accepted by the Commission.

33      The applicant submits that the Parliament and the Council also failed to take proper account of the impact of the contested provisions on its own interests as an association.

34      First of all, the applicant argues that its task as defined in its statutes and the cooperation already in place with the Commission’s services in the areas falling within its activities distinguish it individually by affecting its own interests.

35      Next, the applicant submits that the Parliament and the Council underestimate the significance of Article 10(5) of Directive 2024/3019. In that regard, it claims that the national associations which are its members do not have the scientific expertise and budget necessary to make an effective contribution to the dialogues that will be set up in accordance with that provision. It argues that it therefore has an essential coordinating role in the negotiations that the associations which are its members will conduct with national authorities in determining the EPR system.

36      In that context, the applicant also maintains that, unlike other stakeholders that will benefit from Directive 2024/3019, it will be the only one affected by the contested provisions. It claims that, since the cosmetics industry will have to contribute financially to the establishment of the EPR system, that entails financial and operational consequences for the applicant. It has already appointed the scientific staff necessary to monitor the implementation of the contested provisions and has a budget to pursue that objective.

37      In addition, the applicant states that it was invited to the meeting of the committee of Member State experts on Directive 2024/3019 in order to present the cosmetics industry’s position and that, during that meeting, it was confirmed that it would be invited to become an observer member of that committee.

38      Lastly, the applicant maintains that it will be involved in the long-term evaluation process relating to the contested provisions under Article 30 of Directive 2024/3019.

39      It should be borne in mind that the mere provision of information to the institutions of the European Union during the legislative process leading to the adoption of a measure, or the fact that an association has taken the initiative of contacting those institutions with a view to influencing their action, and has been heard or consulted in that context, is not sufficient to establish that the measure in question adversely affects a clearly defined position as negotiator, or a similar position, which an applicant occupies and which places it in a factual situation which distinguishes it from all other persons (order of 7 April 2022, Bloom v Parliament and Council, T‑645/21, not published, EU:T:2022:230, paragraph 52).

40      Moreover, in accordance with settled case-law, an organisation formed for the protection of the collective interests of a category of persons cannot be regarded as being directly and individually concerned by a measure affecting the general interests of that category (see judgment of 15 September 2016, TAO-AFI and SFIE-PE v Parliament and Council, T‑456/14, EU:T:2016:493, paragraph 57 and the case-law cited).

41      In addition, associations have no right, in the legal order of the European Union, that protects the objectives of their activities from being influenced by acts of the European Union. Therefore, even if the contested provisions were to have an impact on the activities carried out by the applicant and on its task as defined in its statutes, it would, in any event, be only a factual and not a legal impact (see, by analogy, orders of 28 September 2016, PAN Europe and Others v Commission, T‑600/15, EU:T:2016:601, paragraph 40, and of 7 April 2022, Bloom v Parliament and Council, T‑645/21, not published, EU:T:2022:230, paragraph 63).

42      In the present case, as regards the applicant’s arguments that its position as negotiator during the procedure for the adoption of Directive 2024/3019 was disregarded, it must be held that, in accordance with the case-law cited in paragraph 39 above, all the voluntary steps which it took during that procedure are not sufficient to establish that that directive adversely affects a clearly defined position as negotiator or a similar position.

43      In that context, the applicant’s situation is not comparable to that of the applicants in the cases which gave rise to the judgments of 2 February 1988, Kwekerij van der Kooy and Others v Commission (67/85, 68/85 and 70/85, EU:C:1988:38), and of 24 March 1993, CIRFS and Others v Commission (C‑313/90, EU:C:1993:111).

44      Indeed, it must be pointed out that the judgments of 2 February 1988, Kwekerij van der Kooy and Others v Commission (67/85, 68/85 and 70/85, EU:C:1988:38), and of 24 March 1993, CIRFS and Others v Commission (C‑313/90, EU:C:1993:111), concerned specific situations in the field of State aid.

45      In the judgment of 2 February 1988, Kwekerij van der Kooy and Others v Commission (67/85, 68/85 and 70/85, EU:C:1988:38, paragraphs 20 to 24), the Court of Justice recognised the standing of a professional public-interest body which had not only taken an active part in the procedure, inter alia by submitting written comments to the Commission, but also had negotiated, in the interests of the professionals concerned, gas tariffs that were subsequently considered by the Commission to be aid incompatible with the internal market, and which was, in that capacity, one of the parties to the contract which established the tariffs disallowed by the Commission.

46      In the judgment of 24 March 1993, CIRFS and Others v Commission (C‑313/90, EU:C:1993:111, paragraphs 29 and 30), the Court of Justice similarly recognised the standing of a trade association which not only had taken an active part in the procedure, but also had acted as a negotiator in the introduction of the ‘discipline’ aimed at providing a framework for granting aid to the industry concerned in that case.

47      Thus, it is apparent from the judgments of 2 February 1988, Kwekerij van der Kooy and Others v Commission (67/85, 68/85 and 70/85, EU:C:1988:38), and of 24 March 1993, CIRFS and Others v Commission (C‑313/90, EU:C:1993:111), that the applicants occupied a clearly defined position as negotiators which was intimately linked to the actual subject matter of the decisions at issue, with the result that they were in a factual situation which distinguished them from all other persons (judgment of 26 September 2024, ATPN v Commission, C‑340/23 P, not published, EU:C:2024:806, paragraph 40).

48      There is no such situation in the present case, even if the applicant provided information during the legislative process leading to the adoption of Directive 2024/3019, took the initiative of contacting the institutions of the European Union with a view to influencing their action, and was heard or consulted in that context. Those circumstances are not sufficient to establish that the contested provisions adversely affect a position as negotiator within the meaning of the case-law cited in paragraph 39 above.

49      Next, as regards the applicant’s argument that its own interests are affected by the contested provisions on account of its task as defined in its statutes, it suffices to observe that, in accordance with the case-law cited in paragraph 41 above, even if those provisions were to have an impact on the abovementioned task, it would, in any event, be only a factual and not a legal impact.

50      As regards, first, the argument concerning the coordinating role which the applicant claims to have in relation to the activities of the national associations which are its members in the light of Article 10(5) of Directive 2024/3019, it must be observed that that provision refers to dialogues which must involve ‘relevant stakeholders’ and, only ‘where relevant’, ‘associations of stakeholders involved in the implementation of [the EPR system]’, including, inter alia, the national associations which are members of the applicant.

51      In that regard, it must be stated that, even though Member States are under an obligation to establish dialogues on the implementation of the EPR system, in accordance with Article 10(5) of Directive 2024/3019, the applicant’s argument that that provision entrusts the national associations which are its members with the co-governance of that system and, therefore, entrusts the applicant with the coordination of that system cannot succeed, since that argument is based on an incorrect premiss.

52      It is clear that the purpose of such dialogues is to involve the actors concerned by the EPR system in its implementation, but not to provide them with a legal instrument to compel the Member States in that implementation (see, by analogy, order of 5 November 2024, Apc Europe and Others v Commission, T‑1194/23, not published, under appeal, EU:T:2024:795, paragraph 38).

53      In addition, contrary to what the applicant claims, Article 10(5) of Directive 2024/3019 merely determines, in a general manner, the actors which are or could be involved in the dialogues concerning the implementation of the EPR system.

54      It is therefore apparent from the wording of that provision that ‘associations of stakeholders involved in the implementation of [the EPR system]’, a category to which the national associations which are members of the applicant belong, will participate in those dialogues only ‘where relevant’. Thus, the participation of those national associations in the dialogues organised by the Member States is left to the discretion of those Member States and is therefore hypothetical.

55      Furthermore, even if the national associations which are members of the applicant were to participate in those dialogues, they would do so in the same way as other actors covered by Article 10(5) of Directive 2024/3019, with the result that such participation would not distinguish them individually from those other actors.

56      Consequently, in view of the nature of those dialogues and the number of actors which are or could be involved, even if it were accepted that the applicant might have a role, as it claims, in coordinating the activities of the national associations which are its members, it cannot validly maintain that Article 10(5) of Directive 2024/3019 distinguishes it individually because its own interests as an association are affected.

57      As regards, next, the applicant’s argument relating to the implementation of Article 30 of Directive 2024/3019, it suffices to observe that the applicant merely claims that it will participate in the long-term evaluation process relating to that directive, without providing any evidence to establish that that provision grants it, in the context of that process, a role capable of distinguishing it individually from all other actors participating in that process.

58      As regards, in addition, the applicant’s argument relating to its participation in the committee of Member State experts on Directive 2024/3019, it must be held that that participation, which may be linked to the activities which the applicant carries out in the context of its task as defined in its statutes, is not capable of distinguishing it individually because its own interests as an association are affected.

59      Lastly, with respect to the applicant’s argument that the contested provisions had organisational and financial consequences for it, it need only be stated that, even if that were true, it would, in any event, be only a factual and not a legal impact.

60      In the light of those considerations, it must be concluded that the applicant is not entitled to bring the present action in its own name.

 The applicant’s standing to bring proceedings on behalf of its members

61      It should be recalled that, according to the case-law, an association’s ability to bring an action is based on the consideration that an action brought by the association presents procedural advantages, since it obviates the institution of numerous separate actions against the same acts, as the association has substituted itself for one or more of its members whose interests it represents, who could themselves have brought an admissible action (judgment of 15 September 2016, Molinos Río de la Plata and Others v Council, T‑112/14 to T‑116/14 and T‑119/14, not published, EU:T:2016:509, paragraph 35).

62      In addition, for the purpose of examining whether an association which brings an action on behalf of the associations which are its members has standing to bring proceedings, it is necessary to ascertain whether those associations would have standing to bring proceedings on the basis of one of the three situations referred to in paragraph 23 above (see, to that effect, order of 10 December 2004, EFfCI v Parliament and Council, T‑196/03, EU:T:2004:355, paragraphs 45 and 68).

63      Furthermore, according to the case-law, in the second situation referred to in paragraph 23 above, the question whether those associations would have had standing to bring an action depends, in turn, on the question whether the undertakings which they comprise are individually concerned by the contested measure (order of 10 December 2004, EFfCI v Parliament and Council, T‑196/03, EU:T:2004:355, paragraph 45).

64      In that respect, as regards the first situation referred to in paragraph 23 above, it suffices to note that the applicant has not claimed that procedural guarantees in favour of the national associations which are its members have been provided for, either by the contested provisions or by any other provision of EU law.

65      As regards the third situation, the Parliament and the Council contend that the national associations represented by the applicant constitute only a part of the broad category of stakeholders and associations of stakeholders covered by Article 10 of Directive 2024/3019, such that the situation of those associations is not capable of distinguishing the applicant from all other parties covered by that article.

66      In addition, the Parliament and the Council state that the obligation to consult stakeholders is a common practice in EU legislation, as a typical means of involving members of the public in different kinds of decision-making processes. Accordingly, they argue, the fact that the contested provisions have an impact on the national associations which are members of the applicant does not in any way distinguish those associations from all other persons.

67      The applicant, in essence, in relying on the judgment of 15 July 2025, ECB and Commission v Corneli (C‑777/22 P and C‑789/22 P, EU:C:2025:580), and on the Opinion of Advocate General Emiliou in Nicoventures Trading and Others v Commission (C‑731/23 P, EU:C:2025:435), which, according to it, justifies a more favourable interpretation of the concept of individual concern, reiterates what it has maintained with regard to its own interest, in the light of Article 10(5) of Directive 2024/3019.

68      According to the applicant, that provision grants the national associations which are its members a role in the governance of the EPR system or at least in the dialogues concerning the implementation of that system and the fact that those associations will contribute financially to that system through their members proves that they must be regarded as individually concerned by the contested provisions.

69      In addition, the applicant submits that the obligations laid down in Article 10(5) of Directive 2024/3019 are not standard in EU legislation. Furthermore, it maintains that the Parliament underestimates the practical impact of that provision and the role of the national associations which are its members.

70      Lastly, the applicant claims that there is only one association representing the cosmetics industry in the vast majority of the Member States, with the result that each of those associations is individually concerned by the contested provisions within its Member State by virtue of Article 10(5) of Directive 2024/3019. The applicant cites the example of the French association Fédération des Entreprises de la Beauté (FEBEA), which, it argues, is individually concerned due to the fact that the establishment of a stakeholder committee within eco-organisations has been mandatory in France since 2020.

71      In that regard, it must be held that, as has already been stated in paragraphs 51 to 56 above, Article 10(5) of Directive 2024/3019 does not distinguish individually the national associations which are members of the applicant.

72      Accordingly, the applicant’s argument that in the vast majority of Member States there is only one national association, with the result that each of the associations which are its members is affected by virtue of Article 10(5) of Directive 2024/3019, cannot succeed. That argument is based on the incorrect premiss that that provision grants national associations a role in the governance of the EPR system which is capable of distinguishing them individually.

73      Moreover, even if the national associations which are members of the applicant were to be involved in the dialogues concerning the implementation of the EPR system, they would not be involved any more than other actors that might participate in them in accordance with Article 10(5) of Directive 2024/3019.

74      The same applies to the applicant’s argument that FEBEA is individually concerned and, in that regard, it suffices to state that the role accorded in France to that national association is irrelevant for the purpose of assessing whether the applicant is individually concerned by Article 10(5) of Directive 2024/3019.

75      As regards the second situation referred to in paragraph 23 above, the Council contends that the applicant has not identified the companies represented by the national associations which are its members, or even argued that those companies would be directly or individually concerned by the contested provisions and therefore have standing to bring proceedings.

76      The applicant submits that direct and individual concern should be examined not with regard to the companies that are members of its national associations, but with regard to those associations. In that respect, the applicant maintains that, in the light of Article 10(5) of Directive 2024/3019, the national associations which are its members are affected by the contested provisions.

77      Contrary to what the applicant claims, according to the case-law cited in paragraphs 61 to 63 above, as regards the second situation referred to in paragraph 23 above, it should have demonstrated, in view of the logic underlying the institution of an action by an association, namely the procedural advantages arising from the fact that that association has substituted itself for one or more of its members whose interests it represents, that the undertakings which are members of the national associations which are themselves its members were directly and individually concerned, and not that this is the case in respect of those associations themselves, their standing to bring proceedings having been examined in the context of the first and third situations.

78      In that regard, in view of the case-law according to which it is for the applicant to provide proof of its standing to bring proceedings and to demonstrate, where appropriate, that its legal situation is directly and individually concerned by the contested measure (see, by analogy, judgment of 21 September 2023, China Chamber of Commerce for Import and Export of Machinery and Electronic Products and Others v Commission, C‑478/21 P, EU:C:2023:685, paragraph 71), it must be held that the applicant has failed to provide such proof.

79      In addition, it must be observed that, in order to establish the admissibility of the present action on the basis of the second situation referred to in paragraph 23 above, applied to the national associations which are its members, the applicant puts forward arguments which correspond to those that have already been examined and rejected, in the context of the examination of the third situation referred to in paragraph 23 above concerning those associations, in paragraphs 71 to 74 above.

80      Accordingly, the applicant has not demonstrated that it was entitled to bring the present action on behalf of its members.

81      That conclusion cannot be called into question by the arguments put forward by the applicant in its observations regarding the pleas of inadmissibility raised by the Parliament and the Council, in which it claims, first, that new evidence supports the admissibility of the present action. In that regard, the applicant maintains that, on 17 April 2025, that is to say a date subsequent to that on which the present action was brought, it received a response from the Commission in which that institution acknowledged errors in the determination of the products considered to belong to the category of cosmetic products for the purpose of establishing the EPR system. Therefore, according to the applicant, that demonstrates the need for the present action to be declared admissible so that it may be examined on the merits.

82      Second, the applicant argues that if the present action were to be dismissed as inadmissible, that would be contrary to Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.

83      As regards the argument that new evidence establishes the admissibility of the present action, it should be borne in mind that the conditions governing the admissibility of an action for annulment are distinct from and prior to the question of the legality of the measure itself, which is a matter for the substance of the action (see, to that effect, order of 13 August 2024, Mead Johnson Nutrition (Asia Pacific) and Others v Commission, T‑37/23, not published, under appeal, EU:T:2024:570, paragraph 64). Thus, that new evidence, which relates to the legality of the contested provisions, is not relevant for the purpose of examining the admissibility of the present action, and therefore that argument must be rejected.

84      As regards the argument that the dismissal of the present action would be contrary to Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, it suffices to state that, while it is true that the conditions of admissibility laid down in the fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU must be interpreted in the light of the fundamental right to effective judicial protection, such an interpretation must not have the effect of setting aside the conditions expressly laid down in that Treaty (see, to that effect, judgments of 3 October 2013, Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami and Others v Parliament and Council, C‑583/11 P, EU:C:2013:625, paragraph 98, and of 28 April 2015, T & L Sugars and Sidul Açúcares v Commission, C‑456/13 P, EU:C:2015:284, paragraph 44).

85      Since the applicant has not demonstrated that it has standing to bring proceedings against the contested provisions, according it such standing would de facto entail setting aside the conditions expressly laid down in the fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU, which would be contrary to the case-law referred to in paragraph 84 above.

86      Accordingly, those arguments put forward by the applicant must be rejected and, accordingly, the present action must be dismissed in its entirety as inadmissible.

 The applications to intervene

87      The Commission, Bundesverband der Energie- und Wasserwirtschaft (BDEW) eV and Verband Kommunaler Unternehmen (VKU) eV have applied for leave to intervene in support of the Parliament and the Council.

88      Pursuant to Article 144(3) of the Rules of Procedure, where the defendant lodges a plea of inadmissibility or of lack of competence, as provided in Article 130(1) of those rules, a decision on the application to intervene is not to be given until after the plea has been rejected or the decision on the plea reserved. Under Article 142(2) of those rules, the intervention is to become devoid of purpose, inter alia, where the application is declared inadmissible. In the present case, since the action has been dismissed as inadmissible, there is no longer any need to adjudicate on the applications to intervene.

 Costs

89      Under Article 134(1) of the Rules of Procedure, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings. Since the applicant has been unsuccessful, it must be ordered to pay the costs in accordance with the forms of order sought by the Parliament and the Council.

90      In addition, under Article 144(10) of the Rules of Procedure, if, as in the present case, the proceedings in the main case are concluded before the application to intervene has been decided, the applicant for leave to intervene and the main parties are each to bear their own costs relating to the application to intervene. Given that the applications to intervene were not notified either to the applicant or to the Parliament and the Council and they were therefore not put in a position where they might incur costs in that regard, it must be held that the Commission, BDEW and VKU shall each bear their own costs relating to the applications to intervene.

On those grounds,

THE GENERAL COURT (Fourth Chamber)

hereby orders:

1.      The action is dismissed as inadmissible.

2.      There is no longer any need to adjudicate on the applications to intervene made by the European Commission, Bundesverband der Energie- und Wasserwirtschaft (BDEW) eV and Verband Kommunaler Unternehmen (VKU) eV.

3.      Cosmetics Europe – The Personal Care Association shall pay the costs.

4.      The Commission, BDEW and VKU shall each bear their own costs relating to the applications to intervene.

Luxembourg, 18 February 2026.

*      Language of the case: English.