

Den Europæiske Unions Tidende

C 197 E



56. årgang

Dansk udgave

Meddelelser og oplysninger

10. juli 2013

Informationsnummer

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AGENTURER

Europa-Parlamentet

FORESPØRGSLER TIL SKRIFTLIG BESVARELSE

2013/C 197 E/01

Forespørsler til skriftlig besvarelse fra medlemmer af Europa-Parlamentet og svarene fra en
EU-institution

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DA

Meddelelse til læseren

Denne publikation indeholder forespørgsler til skriftlig besvarelse fra medlemmer af Europa-Parlamentet og svarene fra en EU-institution.

Den oprindelige sprogudgave af forespørgslen og svaret er afsørt før en eventuel oversættelse.

Det er muligt, at svaret i visse tilfælde er givet på et andet sprog end forespørgslen. Det afhænger af arbejdssproget i det udvalg, der er blevet anmodet om et svar.

Forespørgsler og svar offentliggøres i overensstemmelse med artiklerne 117 og 118 i Europa-Parlamentets forretningsorden.

Der er adgang til alle forespørgsler og svar gennem Europa-Parlamentets websted (Europarl) under overskriften parlamentariske spørgsmål og forespørgsler:

<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/plenary/da/parliamentary-questions.html>

FORKORTELSER FOR DE POLITISKE GRUPPER

PPE Det Europæiske Folkepartis Gruppe (Kristelige Demokrater)

S&D Gruppen for Det Progressive Forbund af Socialdemokrater i Europa-Parlamentet

ALDE Gruppen Alliancen af Liberale og Demokrater for Europa

Verts/ALE Gruppen De Grønne/Den Europæiske Fri Alliance

ECR De Europæiske Konservative og Reformister

GUE/NGL Den Europæiske Venstrefløjs Fællesgruppe/Nordisk Grønne Venstre

EFD Gruppen for Europæisk Frihed og Demokrati

NI Løsgængere

DA

IV

(Oplysninger)

**OPLYSNINGER FRA DEN EUROPÆISKE UNIONS INSTITUTIONER,
ORGANER, KONTORER OG AGENTURER**

EUROPA-PARLAMENTET

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(Slovenské znenie)

**Otázka na písomné zodpovedanie E-000095/12
Komisii**

Monika Flašíková Beňová (S&D)

(13. januára 2012)

Vec: Situácia v utečeneckých táboroch v Grécku

Európsky súd pre ľudské práva zistil, že Grécko v roku 2011 v troch odlišných prípadoch porušilo Európsky dohovor na ochranu ľudských práv a základných slobôd. Toto porušenie sa okrem iného týkalo nezákonného zadržiavania osôb v nepriateľných podmienkach. Podmienky v gréckych utečeneckých táboroch sú však naďalej otriasné. Nedávno na tento problém upozornila aj skupina poslancov nemeckého Spolkového snemu, ktorí žiadajú okamžité prijatie návrhu na zlepšenie tejto situácie. Gréckej vláde a gréckemu parlamentu už bolo adresovaných niekoľko výziev na prijatie potrebných opatrení, ktoré zlepšia neľudské podmienky vo svojich utečeneckých táboroch a ukončia porušovanie ľudských práv a základných slobôd osôb, ktoré sa v nich nachádzajú. Grécko však momentálne musí pod tlakom vykonávať zásadné škrtky a náprava situácie vo jeho utečeneckých táboroch nepatrí medzi prioritne riešené problémy. Táto situácia je však vecou zodpovednosti celej Európskej únie.

Plánuje Komisia vzhľadom na túto skutočnosť vyčleniť na zlepšenie situácie v utečeneckých táboroch v Grécku finančné prostriedky z osobitných fondov?

Odpoveď pani Malmströmovej v mene Komisie

(10. februára 2012)

Ako sa uvádzá v odpovedi Komisie na parlamentnú otázku E-5426/2009⁽¹⁾, Grécko dostáva finančnú podporu v rámci Európskeho fondu pre utečencov, aby okrem iných cieľov zabezpečilo riadne podmienky prijímania žiadateľov o azyl a osôb, ktoré potrebujú medzinárodnú ochranu. Grécko najmä implementuje opatrenia zamerané na zvýšenie kapacity prijímacích centier, zlepšenie existujúcich zariadení na prijímanie, poskytovanie tlmočníckych a prekladateľských služieb, ako aj právnej, sociálnej, lekárskej a psychologickej podpory s dôrazom na zraniteľné skupiny.

Komisia nedávno poskytla Grécku v rámci Európskeho fondu pre utečencov ďalších 3,75 mil. EUR nádzovej finančnej pomoci, aby predovšetkým zvýšilo svoje prijímacie kapacity a dokázalo zvládnuť osobitný tlak, ktorému je v súčasnosti vystavené.

⁽¹⁾ <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/QP-WEB>

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-000095/12
to the Commission**

Monika Flášiková Beňová (S&D)

(13 January 2012)

Subject: The situation in refugee camps in Greece

The European Court of Human Rights has found that Greece breached the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms in three different cases in 2011. These breaches related *inter alia* to the illegal detention of people in unacceptable conditions. Conditions in Greek refugee camps are still appalling, however. Attention was drawn to this problem recently by a group of MPs from the Bundestag, who are demanding the immediate adoption of a plan to improve the situation. A number of calls have been addressed to the Greek Government and Greek Parliament to take the measures needed to improve the inhuman conditions in their refugee camps and end violations of the human rights and fundamental freedoms of those inside. However, Greece is currently under pressure to make essential cuts, and remedying the situation in its refugee camps is not an issue for priority resolution. This situation is, however, the responsibility of the entire European Union.

In this light, does the Commission plan to set aside resources from special funds to improve the situation in refugee camps in Greece?

Answer given by Ms Malmström on behalf of the Commission

(10 February 2012)

As indicated in the Commission reply to the parliamentary Question E-5426/2009⁽¹⁾, Greece receives financial support, under the European Refugee Fund (ERF), in order, among other goals, to ensure proper reception conditions for asylum-seekers and persons in need of international protection. In particular, Greece is implementing measures aiming at increasing the capacity of reception centres, the improvement of the existing reception facilities, the provision of interpretation and translation services as well as legal, social, medical and psychological support with a focus on vulnerable groups.

The Commission has recently granted to Greece a further EUR 3.75 million as emergency funding under the European Refugee Fund, mainly for reinforcing its reception capacities in order to manage the particular pressure the country is currently confronted with.

⁽¹⁾ <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/QP-WEB>.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-000116/12
to the Commission
Jim Higgins (PPE)
(16 January 2012)**

Subject: EU standardisation of carbon monoxide detectors

Could the Commission outline what steps it will take in order to ensure adequately standardised carbon monoxide detectors in the EU market?

At present EU carbon monoxide detectors are subject to the Carbon Monoxide Standard BS EN 50291, however it is respectfully submitted that this standard is inadequate in that it fails to ensure that each detector has an end of life indicator and also fails to make provision for mandatory third party certification.

In 2009, 360 faulty carbon monoxide detectors were unsuccessfully recalled from the Irish market.

How does the Commission intend to proceed in order to ensure that there will be a harmonised EU standard for carbon monoxide detectors, which will ensure mandatory end of life indicators and third party certification in all detectors present on the EU market?

**Answer given by Mr Dalli on behalf of the Commission
(15 February 2012)**

The Commission has not been made aware by any national surveillance authority that standard EN 50291 is inadequate in ensuring the safety of carbon monoxide detectors.

The Commission is aware of faulty carbon monoxide detectors which have posed a risk in different Member States. However, notifications related to this product received via the RAPEX system (Rapid Alert System for Non-Food Products) have not been linked to the inadequacy of the EN 50291 standard with regard to either end of life indicators or third party certification. Faulty products mainly failed to detect carbon monoxide concentrations at the minimum level required by EN 50291, or lacked warnings as to how the alarm operates, what action to be taken should the alarm go off, or the effects of carbon monoxide on humans.

Consulting Member States is required prior to any decision to prepare a mandate for a standard or to request its harmonisation. As carbon monoxide detectors are within the scope of the General Product Safety Directive (GPSD)⁽¹⁾, the Commission intends to raise the issue with the Member States in one of the next GPSD Committee meetings.

⁽¹⁾ Directive 2001/95/EC. OJ L 11, 15.1.2002.

(*Versione italiana*)

**Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-000121/12
alla Commissione
Erminia Mazzoni (PPE)
(17 gennaio 2012)**

Oggetto: Violazione del principio di responsabilità degli Stati membri

La Corte di giustizia dell'Unione europea ha introdotto il principio generale di responsabilità degli Stati membri per violazione del diritto comunitario da parte di un proprio organo giurisdizionale di ultimo grado; tale principio, ribadito con giurisprudenza costante, prevede che i danni eventualmente causati al singolo cittadino saranno imputati alla responsabilità dello Stato solo qualora la violazione del diritto dell'Unione sia ritenuta «manifesta», in relazione ai criteri fissati dalla Corte, di determinatezza delle norme o di scusabilità dell'errore.

L'art. 2, secondo comma, della legge italiana n. 117/88 sul risarcimento dei danni cagionati nell'esercizio delle funzioni giudiziarie e sulla responsabilità civile dei magistrati esclude qualsiasi responsabilità dello Stato italiano per i danni causati a singoli dalla violazione del diritto dell'Unione da parte di un proprio organo giurisdizionale, anche di ultimo grado, qualora tale violazione derivi da un'interpretazione di norme di diritto o dalla valutazione di fatti e prove effettuate dall'organo giurisdizionale medesimo; l'art. 2, primo comma, della legge n. 117/88, limita, fatta eccezione dei casi di interpretazione di norme di diritto o dalla valutazione di fatti e prove, la possibilità di invocare tale responsabilità alle sole ipotesi di dolo o colpa grave.

Con sentenza del 24 novembre 2011, la Corte di giustizia dell'Unione europea ha condannato la Repubblica italiana, ritenendo l'art. 2, commi 1 e 2, della legge n. 117/88 non conformi al summenzionato principio.

Può la Commissione europea dire se e quali azioni ritenga necessario intraprendere al fine di garantire che lo Stato italiano si conformi ai principi elaborati dalla giurisprudenza della Corte di giustizia?

**Risposta data dal sig Barroso a nome della Commissione
(15 febbraio 2012)**

Conformemente all'articolo 260, paragrafo 1, del TFUE (ex articolo 228 CE), in caso di constatazione, da parte della Corte di Giustizia dell'Unione che uno Stato membro ha mancato ad uno degli obblighi ad esso incombenti, tale Stato «è tenuto a prendere i provvedimenti che l'esecuzione della sentenza della Corte comporta». In tale contesto, la Corte ha sottolineato che «sebbene l'articolo 228 CE non precisi il termine entro il quale deve aver luogo l'esecuzione di una sentenza della Corte che accerti l'esistenza di un inadempimento, da una giurisprudenza consolidata risulta che l'esigenza di un'immediata e uniforme applicazione del diritto comunitario impone che tale esecuzione sia iniziata immediatamente e conclusa entro termini il più possibile ristretti»⁽¹⁾.

La Commissione, conformemente ai poteri conferitile dai trattati, verifica che l'Italia prenda le misure necessarie per eseguire la sentenza della Corte del 24 novembre 2011 (causa C-379/10).

Nell'eventualità in cui dovesse ritenere che lo Stato membro non prenda le misure necessarie per l'attuazione della sentenza, la Commissione procederà ad avviare la procedura di cui all'articolo 260, paragrafo 2, del TFUE.

⁽¹⁾ Si veda, in particolare, la causa C-109/08, Commissione delle Comunità europee contro Repubblica ellenica, racc. 2009 pag. I-04657, punto 14.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-000121/12
to the Commission
Erminia Mazzoni (PPE)
(17 January 2012)**

Subject: Breach of the principle of liability of Member States

The Court of Justice of the European Union has introduced the general principle of liability of the Member States for breaches of EC law by their own courts of last instance. This principle, reaffirmed by consistent case-law, states that any damage caused to individual citizens will be considered to be the responsibility of the State only if the breach of EC law is deemed 'manifest' in the light of the criteria adopted by the Court of Justice of determinacy of the legal provisions or excusability of the error.

Article 2, paragraph 2, of Italian Law 117/88 on compensation for damage caused in the exercise of judicial functions and the civil liability of the judiciary excludes the Italian State from all liability for damages caused to individuals as a result of breaches of EC law by its own courts, including courts of last instance, if such breaches result from an interpretation of provisions of law or from the assessment of facts and evidence made by one of those courts. Article 2, paragraph 1, of Law 117/88 limits, except in cases of interpretation of provisions of law or of assessment of facts and evidence, the possibility of invoking such liability to cases of wilful misconduct or gross negligence.

By judgment of 24 November 2011, the Court of Justice ruled against the Italian Republic, deeming Article 2, paragraphs 1 and 2, of Law 117/88 not to be in conformity with the above principle.

Can the European Commission state whether action needs to be taken so as to ensure that the Italian State complies with the principles established by the case-law of the Court of Justice? If so, what action?

(*Version française*)

**Réponse donnée par M. Barroso au nom de la Commission
(15 février 2012)**

En vertu de l'article 260 (1) TFUE (ex article 228 CE), en cas de constatation d'un manquement par la Cour dans son arrêt, l'État membre «est tenu de prendre les mesures que comporte l'exécution de l'arrêt de la Cour». La Cour a souligné dans ce contexte que «Bien que l'article 228 CE ne précise pas le délai dans lequel l'exécution d'un arrêt de la Cour constatant l'existence d'un manquement doit intervenir, il résulte d'une jurisprudence constante que l'intérêt qui s'attache à une application immédiate et uniforme du droit communautaire exige que cette exécution soit entamée immédiatement et qu'elle aboutisse dans des délais aussi brefs que possible (¹)».

La Commission, conformément à la mission qui lui est confiée par le Traité, vérifie si l'Italie prend les mesures nécessaires pour exécuter l'arrêt de la Cour du 24 novembre 2011 (affaire C-379/10).

Dans l'éventualité où la Commission estimerait que l'État membre ne prend pas les mesures que comporte l'exécution de cet arrêt, la Commission déclencherait la procédure prévue à l'article 260, paragraphe 2 TFUE.

(¹) Voir notamment affaire C-109/08, Commission/Grèce, Rec. 2009, p. I-4657, point 14.

(Versiunea în limba română)

**Întrebarea cu solicitare de răspuns scris E-000148/12
adresată Comisiei
Daciana Octavia Sârbu (S&D) și Vasilica Viorica Dăncilă (S&D)
(18 ianuarie 2012)**

Subiect: Prelungirea sprijinului cuplat pentru roșii destinate procesării

România a putut beneficia de plăți cuplate tranzitorii pentru roșii destinate procesării până la 31 decembrie 2011.

În țara noastră schema a utilizat 869 000 de euro din plafonul corespunzător tomaterelor, conform Regulamentului (CE) nr. 73/2009, ceea ce a făcut ca suprafața cultivată cu roșii pentru procesare să ajungă la aproximativ 1 000 ha.

Din păcate, conform Regulamentului (CE) nr. 73/2009, pentru România posibilitatea acordării de ajutoare cuplate pentru roșii va expira la sfârșitul acestui an.

În acest context,

1. Poate spune Comisia dacă există posibilitatea continuării ajutoarelor cuplate pentru roșii destinate procesării și după decembrie 2011?

2. Ce posibilități există ca fermierii care cultivă roșii destinate procesării să beneficieze cel puțin de prevederile din regulamentul susmenționat referitoare la citrice, pere, piersici și prune d'Ente și anume să primească un ajutor suplimentar?

**Răspuns dat de dl Cioloș în numele Comisiei
(15 februarie 2012)**

Posibilitatea de a acorda atât plățile tranzitorii pentru fructe și legume în temeiul articolului 54 din Regulamentul (CE) nr. 73/2009 (¹), cât și plățile tranzitorii separate pentru fructe și legume în conformitate cu articolul 128 din același regulament a fost instituită ca o opțiune de tranzitie. Această opțiune a fost inclusă în acordul privind reforma în sectorul fructelor și legumelor cu scopul de a asigura o fază de ajustare pentru sectoarele în cauză înainte de decuplarea totală, acordându-le agricultorilor flexibilitatea necesară pentru a-și ajusta producția la cererea de pe piață și conferindu-le o poziție mai favorabilă în raport cu industria de prelucrare.

Prelungirea perioadei de acordare a ajutoarelor ar afecta caracterul tranzitoriu al acestei opțiuni și nu ar fi conformă cu principiul ajutoarelor directe decuplate. În plus, aplicarea în cazul tomaterelor a termenului limită stabilit pentru citrice ar necesita modificarea regulamentului Consiliului.

Revizuirea principiilor plăților directe pentru fructe și legume nu este oportună, având în vedere discuțiile în curs referitoare la propunerile legislative privind reforma PAC, care prevăd posibilitatea de a acorda sprijin cuplat facultativ. De asemenea, modificarea Regulamentului (CE) nr. 73/2009 al Consiliului prin procedura legislativă ordinată ar atrage după sine întârzieri.

Comisia încurajează statele membre în cauză să analizeze posibilitățile oferite în cadrul măsurilor de dezvoltare rurală din anii 2012 și 2013.

⁽¹⁾ JO L 30, 31.1.2009, p. 16.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-000148/12
to the Commission**

Daciana Octavia Sârbu (S&D) and Vasilica Viorica Dăncilă (S&D)

(18 January 2012)

Subject: Extending coupled support for tomatoes intended for processing

Romania received transitional coupled payments for tomatoes intended for processing until 31 December 2011.

In that country, EUR 869 000 of the ceiling amount for tomatoes set in EC Regulation No 73/2009 was utilised under the programme, with the result that the area used to produce tomatoes intended for processing now stands at 1 000 hectares.

Unfortunately, under Regulation (EC) No 73/2009, the possibility of Romania being granted coupled aid for tomatoes will cease at the end of this year.

Given these circumstances:

1. Can the Commission state whether there is a possibility of coupled aid for tomatoes intended for processing continuing after December 2011?
2. What are the possibilities of farmers who grow tomatoes intended for processing at least benefiting from the provisions of the above-mentioned regulation relating to citrus fruits, pears, peaches and d'Ente plums and, specifically, of their receiving additional support?

Answer given by Mr Cioloş on behalf of the Commission

(15 February 2012)

The possibility of granting both the transitional fruit and vegetables payments under Article 54 and the separate transitional fruit and vegetables payment under Article 128 of Regulation (EC) No 73/2009 (¹) was established as a transitional option. This was a part of the agreement on the reform in the fruit and vegetables sector aimed at providing an adjustment phase for the sectors concerned, before total decoupling which will provide farmers with real flexibility to adjust their production to market demand and put them in a better position towards the processing industry.

The extension of the period for granting the aid would affect the transitional nature of this option and would not be consistent with the principle of decoupled direct aids. Furthermore, applying the deadline laid down for citrus to the case of tomatoes would require amending the Council Regulation.

Reviewing the principles for fruit and vegetables direct payments is not opportune in view of ongoing discussions on the legal proposals for the CAP reform, which foresee possibilities for voluntary coupled support. As well, amending Council Regulation (EC) No 73/2009 under the ordinary legislative procedure would entail delays.

The Commission encourages the Member States concerned to reflect on the possibilities provided under the rural development measures in the years 2012 and 2013.

(¹) OJ L 30, 31.1.2009, p. 16.

(Svensk version)

**Frågor för skriftligt besvarande P-000187/12
till kommissionen
Carl Schlyter (Verts/ALE)
(24 januari 2012)**

Angående: Öppenhet

Öppenheten är mycket viktig när det gäller etiken i EU:s institutioner.

Kommer kommissionen att offentliggöra en regelbunden och uppdaterad förteckning över alla sina "roterdörrar", för att garantera fullständig öppenhet på det viktiga personaletiska området?

Hur tolkar kommissionen verksamhet som "riskerar att vara oförenlig med institutionens legitima intresse", enligt artikel 16 i tjänsteföreskrifterna? I samband med vilka typer av arbeten eller omständigheter skulle kommissionen anse att ett nytt arbete eller en ny verksamhet av en tidigare personalmedlem skulle vara oförenlig med institutionens legitima intresse?

Har kommissionen en fungerande definition av "intressekonflikt"? Vilken är den i så fall?

**Svar från Maroš Šefčovič på kommissionens vägnar
(23 februari 2012)**

Kommissionen delar ledamotens åsikt och anser att öppenhet och frågor som rör etik är av stor vikt.

När det gäller offentliggörandet av ansökningarna i enlighet med artikel 16 i tjänsteföreskrifterna ber kommissionen att få hänvisa till sitt svar på den skriftliga frågan E-8839/2011 ställd av Nessa Childers (¹).

Formuleringen om yrkesverksamhet som riskerar att vara oförenlig med institutionernas legitima intressen ska tolkas mot bakgrund av tjänsteföreskrifternas artikel 16 som helhet. Kommissionen beaktar i detta sammanhang det arbete som utförts av tjänstemannen under de senaste tre årens tjänsteutövning och karaktären hos den nya föreslagna verksamheten. Tillsättningsmyndigheten gör en bedömning i varje enskilt fall och kan för godkännande uppställa sådana villkor som den anser skäligen lämpliga. Vid tillämpningen av dessa restriktioner måste den före detta tjänstemannens grundläggande rätt till arbete, kontexten och omständigheterna kring den planerade verksamheten och kommissionens intressen beaktas mot bakgrund av särdrag i det politikområde där den före detta tjänstemannen arbetade respektive kommer att arbeta efter avslutad tjänstgöring, liksom övriga omständigheter i ärendet.

En intressekonflikt i den mening som avses i artikel 16 är en konflikt mellan den före detta tjänstemannens nya yrkesverksamhet och kommissionens intressen. Dessa intressen ska fastställas och motiveras med hänsyn till det ärende som bedöms och får inte definieras i abstrakta termer.

(¹) <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/QP-WEB/application/home.do?language=SV>.

(English version)

**Question for written answer P-000187/12
to the Commission
Carl Schlyter (Verts/ALE)
(24 January 2012)**

Subject: Transparency

It is very important that there is transparency when it comes to ethics within the European institutions.

Will the Commission publish a regular and updated list of all its 'revolving door' cases, in order to ensure full transparency in this important area of staff ethics?

How does the Commission interpret the phrase 'activity ... which could lead to a conflict with the legitimate interests of the institution', which appears in Article 16 of the Staff Regulations? In connection with what kinds of jobs or circumstances would the Commission consider that a new job or activity by a former staff member would lead to a conflict with the legitimate interests of the institution?

Does the Commission have a working definition of 'conflict of interest'? If so, what is it?

**Answer given by Mr Šefčovič on behalf of the Commission
(23 February 2012)**

The Commission agrees with the Honourable Member and considers that transparency and ethics issues are of high importance.

As far as the publication of the requests under Article 16 of the Staff Regulations is concerned, the Commission would refer the Honourable Member to its answer to Written Question E-8839/2011 by Mrs Childers (¹).

The phrase referring to the activity, which could lead to a conflict with the legitimate interests of the institution, must be interpreted in the whole context of Article 16 of the Staff Regulations. In this respect, the Commission takes into account the work carried out by the official during the last three years of service and the characteristics of the new proposed activity. The Appointing Authority makes a case by case analysis and may subject its authorisation to any conditions that it reasonably sees fit. These restrictions have to be applied by taking account of the fundamental right to work of a former member of the staff, the context and circumstances of the envisaged activity and the interests of the Commission in the light of the particular characteristics of a policy area in which the former agent was working and will work after leaving the service as well as all other circumstances of the case.

A conflict of interest in the sense of Article 16 is a conflict of the former agent's new activity with the interests of the Commission. These interests must be defined and substantiated with regard to the case under examination and cannot be defined in abstract terms.

¹) <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/QP-WEB/application/home.do?language=EN>

(Dansk udgave)

**Forespørgsel til skriftlig besvarelse E-001299/12
til Kommissionen
Bent Bendtsen (PPE)
(10. februar 2012)**

Om: Moms på magasiner

Den danske regering har den 9. november 2011 fremsat lovforslaget L 12, der vil betyde så store prisstigninger (500-700 %) på magasiner og tidsskrifter fra lande udenfor EU, at loven reelt bevirket et stop for abonnementer på sådanne magasiner.

Finder Kommissionen at en sådan lov, der begrænser muligheden for, at borgere med rødder i lande udenfor EU kan holde kontakt med udviklingen i deres oprindelsesland, og standser et væsentligt medie for udvekslingen af ideer og kultur, er i overensstemmelse med Den Europæiske Unions politik for ytringsfrihed og kulturel udveksling? Hvis ikke, vil Kommissionen da gøre den danske regering opmærksom herpå?

**Forespørgsel til skriftlig besvarelse E-002215/12
til Kommissionen
Morten Løkkegaard (ALDE)
(28. februar 2012)**

Om: Dansk lov om moms på magasiner trykt uden for EU

I Danmark har regeringen, som en del af Finanslovs aftalen, netop afsluttet arbejdet om en ny lov om moms på magasiner trykt uden for EU. Regeringen forsøger med den nye lovgivning (som skal gælde fra 1. april 2012) at lukke et hul i momslovgivningen, der gør det muligt for danske bladhus at få deres magasiner trykt i lande uden for EU og sendt til abonnenterne derfra. Dermed undgår bladhusene at betale moms i Danmark. Bladet til under 80 DKK er fritaget for moms ifølge gældende dansk lov, men det vil man lave om på, så arbejdspladserne og produktionen rykker tilbage til Danmark og EU.

Det er der i sig selv ikke noget problem i, men problemet opstår, når det danske postvæsen — Post Danmark — skal sortere alle magasinerne og finde ud af, om de er sendt fra et land uden for EU. Det arbejde vil Post Danmark opkræve 160 DKK pr. magasin for at udføre. Og så skal forbrugeren i øvrigt selv hente magasinet på posthuset i stedet for at få det leveret til postkassen.

Det betyder, at et blad, der før kostede 30 DKK nu vil komme til at koste 197,50 DKK (momsgebyr på 7,50 DKK og importgebyr på 160 DKK.)

I en forordning ((EF) nr. 1186/2009) hedder det, at uddannelsesmæssige, videnskabelige og kulturelle publikationer, der sælges af forlag eller lignende uden for EU, skal fritages for importafgifter.

Vil Kommissionen svare på, om den nye danske lovgivning om moms på magasiner — med dertil hørende importgebyr på 160 DKK — er i strid med denne forordning?

Finder Kommissionen endelig, at forslaget er i overensstemmelse med gældende EU-ret, eller er forslaget efter Kommissionens opfattelse konventionsstridigt?

**Samlet svar afgivet på Kommissionens vegne af Algirdas Šemeta
(21. marts 2012)**

Kommissionen er ganske rigtigt blevet underrettet om et lovudkast, som har til formål at indføre et gebyr i forbindelse med toldbehandling af magasiner, som pålægges moms ved import. Gebyret, som vil blive opkrævet af Post Danmark, vil gøre det dyrere at købe magasiner, som trykkes i lande uden for EU.

Kommissionens tjenestegrene havde oprindeligt påtænkt at tage de fornødne kontakter med det formål at undersøge gebyret og dets anvendelse, samt hvorvidt det er foreneligt med EU-lovgivningen.

Set i lyset af det seneste lovgivningsarbejde lader det nu imidlertid til, at indførelsen af gebyret er blevet stillet i bero. Kommissionen holder øje med sagens udvikling.

(Ελληνική έκδοση)

Ερώτηση με αίτημα γραπτής απάντησης E-001148/12

προς την Επιτροπή

Niki Tzavela (EFD)

(8 Φεβρουαρίου 2012)

Θέμα: Δανικό σχέδιο νόμου περί ΦΠΑ

Στις 6 Ιουνίου 2011 το δανικό Υπουργείο Φορολογίας κατέθεσε σχέδιο νόμου με το οποίο προτείνονταν διάφορες τροποποιήσεις στη δανική νομοθεσία περί ΦΠΑ. Μετά την ολοκλήρωση της διαδικασίας διαβούλευσης, το τελικό νομοσχέδιο υπεβλήθη στο Δανικό Κοινοβούλιο στις 9 Νοεμβρίου 2011.

Σύμφωνα με το νέο σχέδιο νόμου, τα περιοδικά, οι περιοδικές εκδόσεις και τα συναφή έντυπα που τυπώνονται εκτός ΕΕ θα υπόκεινται όχι μόνο στον δανικό ΦΠΑ, αλλά και ένα πρόσθιτο τέλος που ανέρχεται σε 160 δανικές κορώνες. Επιπροσθέτως, οι συνδρομητές θα υποχρεούνται να παραλαμβάνουν το παραγγελθέν υλικό στο ταχυδρομείο, αντί να το παραλαμβάνουν κατ' οίκον. Αν το νομοθέτημα αυτό εγκριθεί στο δανικό κοινοβούλιο δεν θα είναι ιδιαίτερα δύσκολο για τους εκτός ΕΕ εκδότες να πωλούν συνδρομές στη Δανία, και το εν λόγω σχέδιο νόμου έρχεται σε άμεση αντίθεση με τις υποχρεώσεις στο δανικό κράτος στο πλαίσιο της Συνθήκης για τη Λειτουργία της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης, και ιδίως με τα άρθρα 42 και 23 του Κανονισμού του Συμβουλίου αριθ. 1186/2009.

Ποια είναι η θέση της Επιτροπής για το εν λόγω σχέδιο νόμου και ποια μέτρα προτίθεται να λάβει για να αποτρέψει την παράβαση αυτή;

Κοινή απάντηση του κ. Šemeta εξ ονόματος της Επιτροπής

(21 Μαρτίου 2012)

Η Επιτροπή είχε πράγματι ενημερωθεί για την ύπαρξη νομοσχεδίου που στόχευε στην επιβολή, από το δανικό ταχυδρομείο, τέλους που σχετίζόταν με τον εκτελωνισμό περιοδικών υποκείμενων στην εφαρμογή του ΦΠΑ στην εισαγωγή, η οποία θα είχε ως αποτέλεσμα την αύξηση του κόστους αγοράς εκδόσεων προερχόμενων από χώρες εκτός Ενώσεως.

Οι υπηρεσίες της Επιτροπής είχαν αρχικά προγραμματίσει να πραγματοποιήσουν τις απαραίτητες επαφές για να εξεταστεί τόσο η φύση, όσο και οι λεπτομέρειες του τέλους αυτού, καθώς και η συμβατότητά του με τις διατάξεις του δικαίου της Ένωσης.

Οστόσο, υπό το φως της πρόσφατης νομοθετικής κινητικότητας, φαίνεται ότι η εφαρμογή του μέτρου αυτού έχει ανασταλεί. Η Επιτροπή θα παρακολουθήσει εκ του σύνεγγυς το θέμα.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-001148/12
to the Commission
Niki Tzavela (EFD)
(8 February 2012)**

Subject: Danish VAT bill

On 6 June 2011 the Danish Ministry of Taxation introduced a draft bill proposing various changes to Danish VAT legislation. After concluding the consultation procedure, the final bill was presented to the Danish Parliament on 9 November 2011.

According to the new bill, magazines, periodicals and the like that are printed outside the EU will be subject not only to Danish VAT, but also to an additional fee of DKK 160. In addition to that, subscribers will be forced to collect the ordered materials at the post office, instead of receiving them at their homes. If this law is passed in the Danish parliament it will render it barely viable for publishers outside of the EU to sell subscriptions in Denmark, and such a bill is in direct contradiction with the obligations of the Danish state under the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and in particular with Articles 42 and 23 of Council Regulation (EC) No 1186/2009.

What is the Commission's position on this bill and what measures is it considering in order to prevent this infringement?

**Question for written answer E-001299/12
to the Commission
Bendt Bendtsen (PPE)
(10 February 2012)**

Subject: VAT on magazines

On 9 November 2011, the Danish Government introduced draft law L12 which will lead to such steep price increases (500-700 %) for magazines and periodicals from countries outside the EU that it will effectively stop subscriptions to these magazines.

Does the Commission believe that a law of this kind, which limits the ability of citizens with roots in countries outside the EU to maintain contact with developments in their country of origin and which halts the distribution of a medium essential to the exchange of ideas and culture, is in accordance with the policy of the European Union on freedom of expression and cultural interaction? If not, will the Commission make the Danish Government aware of this fact?

**Question for written answer E-002215/12
to the Commission
Morten Løkkegaard (ALDE)
(28 February 2012)**

Subject: Danish law on VAT on magazines printed outside the EU

As part of the Budget Agreement, the Danish Government has recently concluded work on a new law on VAT on magazines printed outside the EU. The Government is introducing new legislation (applicable from 1 April 2012) to try and close a loophole in VAT legislation which makes it possible for Danish publishers to have their magazines printed in countries outside the EU and sent to subscribers from there. In doing so, publishers avoid paying VAT in Denmark. Under Danish law, as it currently stands, magazines costing less than DKK 80 are VAT-exempt, but the aim is to change this so that jobs and production return to Denmark and the EU.

This is not in itself a problem; the problem arises when the Danish Postal Service has to sort through all magazines to establish which have been sent from a country outside the EU. The Danish Postal Service wants to charge DKK 160 per magazine for this. In addition, consumers will have to collect magazines from post offices themselves instead of having them delivered.

This means that a magazine which used to cost DKK 30 will now cost DKK 197.50 (DKK 7.50 in VAT and a DKK 160 import charge).

Regulation (EC) No 1186/2009 states that educational, scientific and cultural publications sold by publishers or similar enterprises outside the EU must be exempt from import duties.

Does the Commission consider that the new Danish legislation on VAT on magazines, involving an import charge of DKK 160, is in breach of this regulation?

Lastly, does the Commission believe that the proposal is in accordance with applicable EC law, or in the Commission's view, is the proposal, in the view of the Commission, in breach of the Florence Agreement?

(*Version française*)

Réponse commune donnée par M. Šemeta au nom de la Commission
(21 mars 2012)

La Commission avait effectivement été informée de l'existence d'un projet de loi qui visait à faire appliquer, par la poste danoise, une redevance liée au dédouanement de magazines soumis à l'application d'une TVA à l'importation, redevance qui aurait pour effet d'augmenter le coût d'acquisition des publications provenant de pays tiers à l'Union.

Les services de la Commission avaient initialement envisagé de prendre les contacts nécessaires pour examiner tant la nature que les modalités de cette redevance, ainsi que sa compatibilité avec les dispositions du droit de l'Union.

Toutefois, à la lumière des récents travaux législatifs, il apparaît que la mise en œuvre de cette disposition est suspendue. La Commission suivra ce dossier de près.

(българска версия)

**Въпрос с искане за писмен отговор Е-001195/12
до Комисията**

Roberta Angelilli (PPE), Gianni Pittella (S&D), Alfredo Pallone (PPE), Mario Mauro (PPE), David-Maria Sassoli (S&D), Giuseppe Gargani (PPE), Francesco Enrico Speroni (EFD), Niccolò Rinaldi (ALDE), Sonia Alfano (ALDE), Alfredo Antoniozzi (PPE), Raffaele Baldassarre (PPE), Paolo Bartolozzi (PPE), Mario Borghezio (EFD), Antonello Antinoro (PPE), Pino Arlacchi (S&D), Salvatore Caronna (S&D), Francesco De Angelis (S&D), Carlo Fidanza (PPE), Roberto Gualtieri (S&D), Erminia Mazzoni (PPE), Claudio Morganti (EFD), Aldo Patriciello (PPE), Fiorello Provera (EFD), Crescenzio Rivellini (PPE), Oreste Rossi (EFD), Marco Scurria (PPE), Gianluca Susta (S&D), Salvatore Tatarella (PPE), Giommaria Uggias (ALDE), Gianni Vattimo (ALDE), Andrea Zanoni (ALDE), Iva Zanicchi (PPE), Sergio Paolo Frances Silvestris (PPE), Giancarlo Scottà (EFD), Giovanni La Via (PPE), Guido Milana (S&D), Francesca Balzani (S&D), Paolo De Castro (S&D), Lara Comi (PPE), Carlo Casini (PPE), Gabriele Albertini (PPE), Lorenzo Fontana (EFD), Sergio Gaetano Cofferati (S&D), Patrizia Toia (S&D), Vito Bonsignore (PPE), Magdi Cristiano Allam (EFD), Cristiana Muscardini (PPE), Salvatore Iacolino (PPE), Antonio Cancian (PPE), Clemente Mastella (PPE), Herbert Dorfmann (PPE), Mario Pirillo (S&D), Elisabetta Gardini (PPE), Vincenzo Iovine (ALDE), Barbara Matera (PPE), Tiziano Motti (PPE), Pier Antonio Panzeri (S&D), Vittorio Prodi (S&D), Amalia Sartori (PPE), Potito Salatto (PPE), Debora Serracchiani (S&D), Ivo Belet (PPE), Илиана Иванова (PPE), Rareş-Lucian Niculescu (PPE), Georgios Papastamkos (PPE), Marietta Giannakou (PPE), Vasilica Viorica Dăncilă (S&D), Luís Paulo Alves (S&D), Mojca Kleva (S&D), Othmar Karas (PPE), Iuliu Winkler (PPE), Monica Luisa Macovei (PPE), Hans-Peter Mayer (PPE), Marian Harkin (ALDE), Katarína Neved'álová (S&D), Filip Kaczmarek (PPE), Constance Le Grip (PPE), Jörg Leichtfried (S&D), Elena Băsescu (PPE), Pavel Poc (S&D), László Surján (PPE), Georgios Papanikolaou (PPE), Ildikó Gáll-Pelcz (PPE), Liisa Jaakonsaari (S&D), Marian-Jean Marinescu (PPE), Nikolaos Salavrakos (EFD), Konstantinos Poupanakis (PPE), Evelyn Regner (S&D), Iliana Malinova Iotova (S&D), Rui Tavares (Verts/ALE), József Szájer (PPE), Juozas Imbrasas (EFD), Димитър Стоянов (NI), Ioan Mircea Pașcu (S&D), Vilja Savisaar-Toomast (ALDE), Danuta Jazłowiecka (PPE), Seán Kelly (PPE), Rolandas Paksas (EFD), Ioannis A. Tsoukalas (PPE), Phil Prendergast (S&D), Saïd El Khadraoui (S&D), Ioan Enciu (S&D), Jaroslav Paška (EFD), Peter Simon (S&D), Niki Tzavela (EFD), Ádám Kósa (PPE), Josef Weidenholzer (S&D), Theodor Dumitru Stolojan (PPE), Cornelis de Jong (GUE/NGL), Кристиан Вигенин (S&D), Mário David (PPE), Ryszard Antoni Legutko (ECR), Georgios Koumoutsakos (PPE) и Salvador Sedó i Alabart (PPE)

(1 февруари 2012 г.)

Относно: Създаване на европейска агенция за кредитен рейтинг

С оглед гарантирането на максимално доверие, прозрачност и независимост на рейтинговите агенции, Комисията си постави за цел да актуализира действащата регуляторна рамка, внасяйки на 15 ноември 2011 г. предложение за изменение на Директива 2009/65/EU относно координирането на законовите, подзаконовите и административните разпоредби относно предприятията за колективно инвестиране в прехвърлими ценни книжа (ПКИПЦК), и на Директива 2011/61/EU относно лицата, управляващи алтернативни инвестиционни фондове, по отношение на прекомерното използване на кредитни рейтинги, както и за изменение на Регламент (EO) № 1060/2009 относно агенциите за кредитен рейтинг.

Целта е също така да се предотвратят конфликти на интереси между рейтинговите агенции и да се осигури пълна безпристрастност на дадените оценки, което е абсолютна гаранция, особено на фона на тежката икономическа и финансова ситуация.

Също така е целесъобразно да се определят правилата за несъвместимост между консултантските дейности в полза на банки, инвестиционни фондове и/или други финансови институции и определянето на рейтинга на публичните дружества.

За целта Европейският парламент с резолюцията си от 8 юни 2011 г. относно агенциите за кредитен рейтинг поиска да разгледа и определи възможността за създаване на европейска агенция за кредитен рейтинг.

С оглед на изложените обстоятелства може ли Комисията да посочи:

1. дали подкрепя създаването на европейска агенция за кредитен рейтинг;
2. започнало ли е проучване на осъществимостта във връзка със създаването на такава агенция, както поиска Европейският парламент?

Съвместен отговор, даден от г-н Барние от името на Комисията
(26 март 2012 г.)

На 15 ноември 2011 г. Комисията прие предложение за изменение на регламента относно агенциите за кредитен рейтинг (АКР III). Това е третият елемент от една амбициозна регуляторна рамка за агенциите за кредитен рейтинг. Предложението включва широкообхватни изменения в действащия регламент относно агенциите за кредитен рейтинг. Основните инициативи са следните: намаляване на зависимостта на инвеститорите от рейтинги; по-прозрачни и своевременни рейтинги; по-голямо многообразие и независимост на агенциите за кредитен рейтинг; повече прозрачност и сравнимост на агенциите за кредитен рейтинг; гражданска отговорност на агенциите за кредитен рейтинг.

Създаването на нова независима агенция за кредитен рейтинг е един от вариантите, очертани в консултивативния документ на службите на Комисията от 5 ноември 2010 г., който беше обсъден също със заинтересованите страни на кръгла маса на 6 юли 2011 г. Комисията направи оценка на целесъобразността на създаването на нова независима Европейска фондация за кредитен рейтинг, както и на независима европейска АКР, в оценката на въздействието, придвижаваща последното ѝ законодателно предложение. Този анализ показва, че създаването на агенция за кредитен рейтинг с публични средства, независимо от нейния конкретен модел, би струвало скъпо (според оценка приблизително 300-500 млн. EUR за период от 5 години) и би могло да породи загриженост относно надеждността и независимостта на тази АКР.

По тези причини Комисията реши да не преследва тази идея на настоящия етап. Комисията обаче подкрепя и приветства всяка частна инициатива за създаване на Европейска агенция за кредитен рейтинг.

Комисията също така предприе действия за насърчаване на разнообразието на рейтинговия пазар и независимостта на агенциите за кредитен рейтинг, като предложи, наред с други мерки, въвеждането на задължителна ротация на АКР след определен период.

(Versión española)

**Pregunta con solicitud de respuesta escrita E-001195/12
a la Comisión**

Roberta Angelilli (PPE), Gianni Pittella (S&D), Alfredo Pallone (PPE), Mario Mauro (PPE), David-Maria Sassoli (S&D), Giuseppe Gargani (PPE), Francesco Enrico Speroni (EFD), Niccolò Rinaldi (ALDE), Sonia Alfano (ALDE), Alfredo Antoniozzi (PPE), Raffaele Baldassarre (PPE), Paolo Bartolozzi (PPE), Mario Borghezio (EFD), Antonello Antinoro (PPE), Pino Arlacchi (S&D), Salvatore Caronna (S&D), Francesco De Angelis (S&D), Carlo Fidanza (PPE), Roberto Gualtieri (S&D), Erminia Mazzoni (PPE), Claudio Morganti (EFD), Aldo Patriciello (PPE), Fiorello Provera (EFD), Crescenzo Rivellini (PPE), Oreste Rossi (EFD), Marco Scurria (PPE), Gianluca Susta (S&D), Salvatore Tatarella (PPE), Giommaria Uggias (ALDE), Gianni Vattimo (ALDE), Andrea Zanoni (ALDE), Iva Zanicchi (PPE), Sergio Paolo Frances Silvestris (PPE), Giancarlo Scottà (EFD), Giovanni La Via (PPE), Guido Milana (S&D), Francesca Balzani (S&D), Paolo De Castro (S&D), Lara Comi (PPE), Carlo Casini (PPE), Gabriele Albertini (PPE), Lorenzo Fontana (EFD), Sergio Gaetano Cofferati (S&D), Patrizia Toia (S&D), Vito Bonsignore (PPE), Magdi Cristiano Allam (EFD), Cristiana Muscardini (PPE), Salvatore Iacolino (PPE), Antonio Cancian (PPE), Clemente Mastella (PPE), Herbert Dorfmann (PPE), Mario Pirillo (S&D), Elisabetta Gardini (PPE), Vincenzo Iovine (ALDE), Barbara Matera (PPE), Tiziano Motti (PPE), Pier Antonio Panzeri (S&D), Vittorio Prodi (S&D), Amalia Sartori (PPE), Potito Salatto (PPE), Debora Serracchiani (S&D), Ivo Belet (PPE), Iliana Ivanova (PPE), Rareş-Lucian Niculescu (PPE), Georgios Papastamkos (PPE), Marietta Giannakou (PPE), Vasilica Viorica Dăncilă (S&D), Luís Paulo Alves (S&D), Mojca Kleva (S&D), Othmar Karas (PPE), Iuliu Winkler (PPE), Monica Luisa Macovei (PPE), Hans-Peter Mayer (PPE), Marian Harkin (ALDE), Katarína Neved'álová (S&D), Filip Kaczmarek (PPE), Constance Le Grip (PPE), Jörg Leichtfried (S&D), Elena Băsescu (PPE), Pavel Poc (S&D), László Surján (PPE), Georgios Papanikolaou (PPE), Ildikó Gáll-Pelcz (PPE), Liisa Jaakonsaari (S&D), Marian-Jean Marinescu (PPE), Nikolaos Salavrakos (EFD), Konstantinos Poupanakis (PPE), Evelyn Regner (S&D), Iliana Malinova Iotova (S&D), Rui Tavares (Verts/ALE), József Szájer (PPE), Juozas Imbrasas (EFD), Dimitar Stoyanov (NI), Ioan Mircea Pașcu (S&D), Vilja Savisaar-Toomast (ALDE), Danuta Jazłowiecka (PPE), Seán Kelly (PPE), Rolandas Paksas (EFD), Ioannis A. Tsoukalas (PPE), Phil Prendergast (S&D), Saïd El Khadraoui (S&D), Ioan Enciu (S&D), Jaroslav Paška (EFD), Peter Simon (S&D), Niki Tzavela (EFD), Ádám Kósa (PPE), Josef Weidenholzer (S&D), Theodor Dumitru Stolojan (PPE), Cornelis de Jong (GUE/NGL), Kristian Vigenin (S&D), Mário David (PPE), Ryszard Antoni Legutko (ECR), Georgios Koumoutsakos (PPE) y Salvador Sedó i Alabart (PPE)

(1 de febrero de 2012)

Asunto: Creación de una agencia europea de calificación crediticia

Con el fin de garantizar la máxima credibilidad, transparencia e independencia de las agencias de calificación crediticia, la Comisión ha tratado de actualizar el marco legal que se encuentra en vigor actualmente, para lo que propuso el 15 de noviembre de 2011 la modificación de la Directiva 2009/65/CE, por la que se coordinan las disposiciones legales, reglamentarias y administrativas sobre determinados organismos de inversión colectiva en valores mobiliarios (OICVM), y la Directiva 2011/61/UE, relativa a los gestores de fondos de inversión alternativos, en lo que atañe a la dependencia excesiva de las calificaciones crediticias y la modificación del Reglamento (CE) nº 1060/2009 sobre las agencias de calificación crediticia.

El objetivo también consiste en asegurar que las agencias de calificación no tengan conflictos de intereses, a fin de garantizar una imparcialidad total en las evaluaciones realizadas, una garantía indispensable sobre todo en vista de la grave situación económica y financiera.

También es recomendable definir normas de incompatibilidad entre las actividades de consultoría a favor de los bancos, de los fondos de inversión o de otras sociedades financieras, y la evaluación de las calificaciones de los organismos públicos.

A tal efecto, el Parlamento Europeo, mediante la Resolución de 8 de junio de 2011 sobre las agencias de calificación crediticia, ha solicitado que se analice y evalúe la posibilidad de crear una agencia europea de calificación crediticia.

En vista de todo lo expuesto anteriormente, instamos a la Comisión a que nos informe de:

1. Si aprueba la creación de una agencia europea de calificación crediticia.
2. Si se está realizando un estudio de viabilidad sobre la creación de dicha agencia, tal como ha solicitado el Parlamento Europeo.

Respuesta conjunta del Sr. Barnier en nombre de la Comisión*(26 de marzo de 2012)*

La Comisión adoptó una propuesta de modificación del Reglamento sobre las agencias de calificación crediticia el 15 de noviembre de 2011. Es el tercer elemento de un ambicioso marco reglamentario para las agencias de calificación crediticia. La propuesta incluye amplias modificaciones del Reglamento vigente sobre las agencias de calificación crediticia. Las más importantes son las siguientes: menor dependencia de los inversores de las calificaciones crediticias; calificaciones de la deuda soberana más transparentes y oportunas; mayor diversidad e independencia de las agencias de calificación crediticia; mayor transparencia y comparabilidad de las agencias de calificación crediticia, y responsabilidad civil de las agencias de calificación crediticia.

La creación de una nueva agencia de calificación crediticia independiente fue una de las opciones examinadas en el documento de consulta de los servicios de la Comisión de 5 de noviembre de 2010 y también se debatió con los sectores interesados en una mesa redonda celebrada el 6 de julio de 2011. En la evaluación de impacto adjunta a su última propuesta legislativa, la Comisión ha evaluado la viabilidad de crear una nueva fundación de calificación crediticia europea independiente y una agencia de calificación crediticia europea, también independiente. Este análisis ha puesto de manifiesto que la creación de una agencia de calificación crediticia con dinero público, independientemente de su modelo concreto, sería costosa (costes estimados de 300-500 millones de euros a lo largo de cinco años) y podría suscitar dudas en cuanto a su credibilidad e independencia.

Por estos motivos, la Comisión ha decidido no seguir con esta idea por el momento. Sin embargo, la Comisión apoya y acoge favorablemente cualquier iniciativa privada de creación de una agencia de calificación crediticia europea.

La Comisión también va a tomar medidas para promover la diversidad en el mercado de la calificación crediticia y la independencia de las agencias de calificación, proponiendo, entre otras medidas, una rotación obligatoria de las agencias de calificación tras un plazo de tiempo determinado.

(České znění)

Otázka k písemnému zodpovězení E-001195/12

Komisi

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(1. února 2012)

Předmět: Vytvoření evropské ratingové agentury

Aby byla zaručena co největší důvěryhodnost, transparentnost a nezávislost ratingových agentur, měla Komise v úmyslu aktualizovat platný předpisový rámec a dne 15. listopadu 2011 navrhla změnu směrnice 2009/65/ES o koordinaci právních a správních předpisů týkajících se subjektů kolektivního investování do převoditelých cenných papírů (SKIPCP) a směrnice 2011/61/EU o správcích alternativních investičních fondů, pokud jde o nadměrné spoléhání na rating, a změnu nařízení (ES) č. 1060/2009 o ratingových agenturách.

Cílem je rovněž zabezpečit, aby u ratingových agentur neexistoval konflikt zájmu a aby tak mohly zajistit naprostou nestrannost vydávaných hodnocení, což je záruka nezbytná zejména v souvislosti s vážnou hospodářskou a finanční situací.

Důležité je rovněž stanovit pravidla neslučitelnosti konzultační činnosti ve prospěch bank, investičních fondů nebo finančních společností s hodnocením veřejnoprávních subjektů.

Evropský parlament tak ve svém usnesení ze dne 8. června 2011 o ratingových agenturách požádal za tímto účelem o přezkum a vyhodnocení možnosti vytvořit evropskou ratingovou agenturu.

Může na základě toho Komise informovat o tom:

1. zda je pro vytvoření evropské ratingové agentury;
2. zda v současné době přezkoumává proveditelnost vytvoření této agentury tak, jak požaduje Evropský parlament?

Odpověď pana Barniera jménem Komise
(26. března 2012)

Komise dne 15. listopadu 2011 přijala návrh, kterým se mění nařízení o ratingových agenturách (CRA III). Jde o třetí složku rozsáhlého regulačního rámce pro ratingové agentury. Návrh zahrnuje dalekosáhlé změny platného nařízení o ratingových agenturách. Hlavní opatření jsou tato: menší spoléhání investorů na rating; transparentnější a včasné ratingy státních dluhopisů; větší rozmanitost a nezávislost ratingových agentur; větší transparentnost a porovnatelnost ratingových agentur; občanskoprávní odpovědnost ratingových agentur.

Vytvoření nové nezávislé ratingové agentury bylo jednou z možností uvedených v konzultačním dokumentu útvary Komise ze dne 5. listopadu 2010 a bylo rovněž předmětem diskuse u kulatého stolu se zúčastněnými subjekty dne 6. července 2011. Komise v posouzení dopadů ke svému nejnovějšímu legislativnímu návrhu vyhodnotila proveditelnost vytvoření nového nezávislého evropského ratingového nadačního subjektu a nezávislé evropské ratingové agentury. Z této analýzy vyplynulo, že zřízení ratingové agentury z veřejných prostředků by bez ohledu na její konkrétní podobu bylo nákladné (podle odhadů přibližně 300 až 500 milionů EUR na období 5 let) a mohlo by vzbuzovat obavy ohledně její důvěryhodnosti a nezávislosti.

Z tohoto důvodu se Komise rozhodla tuto myšlenku v současnosti dále nerozvíjet. Zároveň by však uvítala a podpořila jakoukoli soukromou iniciativu na vytvoření evropské ratingové agentury.

Komise rovněž přijímá opatření na podporu rozmanitosti na ratingovém trhu a nezávislosti ratingových agentur tím, že mimo jiné navrhuje povinnou rotaci ratingových agentur v určitých intervalech.

(Deutsche Fassung)

**Anfrage zur schriftlichen Beantwortung E-001195/12
an die Kommission**

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(1. Februar 2012)

Betreff: Schaffung einer europäischen Ratingagentur

Um eine größtmögliche Glaubwürdigkeit, Transparenz und Unabhängigkeit der Ratingagenturen zu garantieren, beabsichtigt die Kommission die Überarbeitung des derzeitig gültigen Rechtsrahmens und hat dazu am 15. November 2011 eine Änderung der Richtlinie 2009/65/EG zur Koordinierung der Rechts- und Verwaltungsvorschriften betreffend bestimmte Organisationen für gemeinsame Anlagen in Wertpapieren (OGAW) und der Richtlinie 2011/61/EU über die Verwalter alternativer Investmentfonds im Hinblick auf das übermäßige Vertrauen in das Kreditrating sowie der Verordnung (EG) Nr. 1060/2009 über Ratingagenturen vorgeschlagen.

Zweck dieser vorgeschlagenen Änderungen ist es auch sicherzustellen, dass es bei den Ratingagenturen keine Interessenkonflikte gibt, damit eine absolute Unparteilichkeit der abgegebenen Bewertungen garantiert ist. Diese Garantie ist insbesondere angesichts der schwierigen Wirtschafts- und Finanzsituation unerlässlich.

Ferner sollten Regeln hinsichtlich der Unvereinbarkeit einer Beratungsaktivität zugunsten von Banken, Investmentfonds und/oder anderen Finanzgesellschaften und der Bewertung von öffentlichen Rechtssubjekten definiert werden.

Zu diesem Zweck hat das Europäische Parlament mit seiner Entschließung vom 8. Juni 2011 über Ratingagenturen einen Antrag auf Überprüfung und Bewertung der Möglichkeit zur Schaffung einer europäischen Ratingagentur gestellt.

Kann die Kommission angesichts dieser Ausführungen mitteilen:

1. ob sie die Schaffung einer europäischen Ratingagentur befürwortet;
2. ob eine Durchführbarkeitsstudie hinsichtlich der Schaffung einer solchen Agentur im Gange ist, wie vom Europäischen Parlament beantragt?

Gemeinsame Antwort von Herrn Barnier im Namen der Kommission
(26. März 2012)

Am 15. November 2011 hat die Kommission einen Vorschlag zur Änderung der Verordnung über Ratingagenturen (CRA III) angenommen. Es handelt sich dabei um die dritte Komponente eines umfassenden Regulierungsrahmens für Ratingagenturen. Der Vorschlag enthält weitreichende Änderungen der derzeit geltenden Verordnung über Ratingagenturen. Im Folgenden werden die wichtigsten Maßnahmen aufgeführt: geringerer Rückgriff der Anleger auf Ratings; transparentere und zeitlich unabhängige Ratings; größere Vielfalt und Unabhängigkeit der Ratingagenturen; höhere Transparenz und Vergleichbarkeit der Ratingagenturen; zivilrechtliche Haftung der Ratingagenturen.

Die Einrichtung einer neuen unabhängigen Ratingagentur war eine der Möglichkeiten, die im Konsultationspapier der Kommissionsdienststellen vom 5. November 2010 dargelegt wurde, und wurde auch am 6. Juli 2011 mit den Interessenträgern an einem Runden Tisch diskutiert. Die Kommission hat in der Folgenabschätzung, die mit dem letzten Legislativvorschlag vorgelegt wurde, die Umsetzbarkeit der Einrichtung einer neuen unabhängigen europäischen Ratingstiftung und einer unabhängigen europäischen Ratingagentur bewertet. Die Bewertung hat gezeigt, dass die Einrichtung einer Ratingagentur mit öffentlichen Mitteln, ungeachtet ihrer jeweiligen Form, sehr kostenintensiv wäre (Schätzungen dafür liegen bei rund 300 bis 500 Mio. EUR für einen Zeitraum von fünf Jahren) und dass dies zu Bedenken in Bezug auf ihre Glaubwürdigkeit und Unabhängigkeit führen könnte.

Aus diesem Grund hat die Kommission sich für Erste gegen die weitere Verfolgung dieser Idee entschieden. Allerdings befürwortet und begrüßt die Kommission jegliche private Initiative zur Einrichtung einer europäischen Ratingagentur.

Die Kommission arbeitet außerdem an Maßnahmen zur Förderung der Vielfalt im Ratingmarkt und der Unabhängigkeit der Ratingagenturen, indem sie unter anderem eine obligatorische Rotation der Ratingagenturen in festgelegten Abständen vorschlägt.

(Eestikeelne versioon)

**Kirjalikult vastatav küsimus E-001195/12
komisjonile**

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(1. veebruar 2012)

Teema: Euroopa reitinguagentuuri loomine

Reitinguagentuuride maksimaalse usaldusvääruse, läbipaistvuse ja sõltumatuse tagamiseks on komisjon hakanud ajakohastama kehtivat õigusraamistikku ning esitas 15. novembril 2011 ettepaneku muuta direktiivi 2009/65/EÜ vabalt võõrandatavatesse väärtpaberitesse ühiseks investeeringuks loodud ettevõtjaid (eurofondid) käsitlevate õigus— ja haldusnormide kooskõlastamise kohta ning direktiivi 2011/61/EÜ alternatiivsete investeeringufondide valitsejate kohta seoses liigse tuginemisega krediidireitingutele, samuti muudetakse määrust (EÜ) nr 1060/2009 reitinguagentuuride kohta.

Samas on muutmise eesmärk ka tagada, et reitinguagentuuridel ei esineks huvide konflikte, sest siis on võimalik kindlustada hindamise täielik erapoolelus, mis on tööst majanduslikku ja finantsolukorda arvesse võttes välimatult vajalik.

Lisaks oleks asjakohane määrata kindlaks pankadele, investeeringufondidele ja/või muudele finantsasutustele nõustamisteenuse osutamise ning avaliku sektori asutustele reitingu andmise ühitamatuse eeskirjad.

Sel eesmärgil palus Euroopa Parlament oma 8. juuni 2011. aasta resolutsioonis reitinguagentuuride kohta uurida ja hinnata Euroopa reitinguagentuuri loomise võimalust.

Eelnevad arvesse võttes palume komisjonil vastata järgmistele küsimustele.

1. Kas komisjon pooldab Euroopa reitinguagentuuri loomist?
2. Kas on juba hakatud tegema nimetatud agentuuri loomise teostatavusuuringut, mille koostamist nõudis Euroopa Parlament?

Komisjoni nimel vastanud hr Barnier
(26. märts 2012)

Komisjon võttis 15. novembril 2011 vastu ettepaneku, millega muudetakse reitinguagentuuride määrust (CRA III). See moodustab kolmada osa reitinguagentuuride käsitlevast suuremamahulisest õigusraamistikust. Ettepanek hõlmab praeguse reitinguagentuuride määrase laiaulatuslikku muutmist. Põhialgatused on järgmised: investorite väiksem tuginemine reitingutele, läbipaistvamad ja sobivamal ajal antud riigireitingud, reitinguagentuuride suurem mitmekülgus ja sõltumatus, reitinguagentuuride suurem läbipaistvus ja võrreldavus ning reitinguagentuuride tsiviilvastutus.

Uue sõltumatu reitinguagentuuri loomine oli üks võimalus, mida käsitleti komisjoni talituste 5. novembri 2010. aasta konsultatsionidokumendis ning seda arutati ka sidusrühmade ümarlaus 6. juulil 2011. Komisjon hindas oma viimase õigusakti ettepanekule lisatud mõjuhinnangus Euroopa uue sõltumatu reitingusatuse ja Euroopa sõltumatu reitinguagentuuri loomise teostatavust. Selle analüüs põhjal oleks avaliku sektori rahaga uue krediidiasutuse (sõltumata selle konkreetset mudelist) loomine kulukas (hinnanguliselt 300-500 miljonit eurot 5 aasta jooksul) ning sellega seoses võib tõusetuda reitinguagentuuri usaldusväärseuse ja sõltumatuse küsimus.

Sel põhjusel on komisjon otsustanud praeguses etapis seda ideed mitte edasi arendada. Sellegipoolest toetab komisjon mis tahes eraalgatust Euroopa reitinguagentuuri loomiseks.

Komisjon võtab ka meetmeid krediidireitinguturul mitmekülgse suurendamiseks ja reitinguagentuuride sõltumatuse soodustamiseks, tehes sealhulgas ettepaneku muuta kohustuslikuks teatava aja järel reitinguagentuuri vahetamise.

(Ελληνική έκδοση)

**Ερώτηση με αίτημα γραπτής απάντησης E-001195/12
προς την Επιτροπή**

Roberta Angelilli (PPE), Gianni Pittella (S&D), Alfredo Pallone (PPE), Mario Mauro (PPE), David-Maria Sassoli (S&D), Giuseppe Gargani (PPE), Francesco Enrico Speroni (EFD), Niccolò Rinaldi (ALDE), Sonia Alfano (ALDE), Alfredo Antoniozzi (PPE), Raffaele Baldassarre (PPE), Paolo Bartolozzi (PPE), Mario Borghezio (EFD), Antonello Antinoro (PPE), Pino Arlacchi (S&D), Salvatore Caronna (S&D), Francesco De Angelis (S&D), Carlo Fidanza (PPE), Roberto Gualtieri (S&D), Erminia Mazzoni (PPE), Claudio Morganti (EFD), Aldo Patriciello (PPE), Fiorello Provera (EFD), Crescenzo Rivellini (PPE), Oreste Rossi (EFD), Marco Scurria (PPE), Gianluca Susta (S&D), Salvatore Tatarella (PPE), Giommaria Uggias (ALDE), Gianni Vattimo (ALDE), Andrea Zanoni (ALDE), Iva Zanicchi (PPE), Sergio Paolo Frances Silvestris (PPE), Giancarlo Scottà (EFD), Giovanni La Via (PPE), Guido Milana (S&D), Francesca Balzani (S&D), Paolo De Castro (S&D), Lara Comi (PPE), Carlo Casini (PPE), Gabriele Albertini (PPE), Lorenzo Fontana (EFD), Sergio Gaetano Cofferati (S&D), Patrizia Toia (S&D), Vito Bonsignore (PPE), Magdi Cristiano Allam (EFD), Cristiana Muscardini (PPE), Salvatore Iacolino (PPE), Antonio Cancian (PPE), Clemente Mastella (PPE), Herbert Dorfmann (PPE), Mario Pirillo (S&D), Elisabetta Gardini (PPE), Vincenzo Iovine (ALDE), Barbara Matera (PPE), Tiziano Motti (PPE), Pier Antonio Panzeri (S&D), Vittorio Prodi (S&D), Amalia Sartori (PPE), Potito Salatto (PPE), Debora Serracchiani (S&D), Ivo Belet (PPE), Iliana Ivanova (PPE), Rareş-Lucian Niculescu (PPE), Georgios Papastamkos (PPE), Marietta Giannakou (PPE), Vasilica Viorica Dăncilă (S&D), Luís Paulo Alves (S&D), Mojca Kleva (S&D), Othmar Karas (PPE), Iuliu Winkler (PPE), Monica Luisa Macovei (PPE), Hans-Peter Mayer (PPE), Marian Harkin (ALDE), Katarína Neved'álová (S&D), Filip Kaczmarek (PPE), Constance Le Grip (PPE), Jörg Leichtfried (S&D), Elena Băsescu (PPE), Pavel Poc (S&D), László Surján (PPE), Georgios Papanikolaou (PPE), Ildikó Gáll-Pelcz (PPE), Liisa Jaakonsaari (S&D), Marian-Jean Marinescu (PPE), Nikolaos Salavrakos (EFD), Konstantinos Poupkis (PPE), Evelyn Regner (S&D), Iliana Malinova Iotova (S&D), Rui Tavares (Verts/ALE), József Szájer (PPE), Juozas Imbrasas (EFD), Dimitar Stoyanov (NI), Ioan Mircea Pașcu (S&D), Vilja Savisaar-Toomast (ALDE), Danuta Jazłowiecka (PPE), Seán Kelly (PPE), Rolandas Paksas (EFD), Ioannis A. Tsoukalas (PPE), Phil Prendergast (S&D), Saïd El Khadraoui (S&D), Ioan Enciu (S&D), Jaroslav Paška (EFD), Peter Simon (S&D), Niki Tzavela (EFD), Ádám Kósa (PPE), Josef Weidenholzer (S&D), Theodor Dumitru Stolojan (PPE), Cornelis de Jong (GUE/NGL), Kristian Vigenin (S&D), Mário David (PPE), Ryszard Antoni Legutko (ECR), Georgios Koumoutsakos (PPE) και Salvador Sedó i Alabart (PPE)

(1 Φεβρουαρίου 2012)

Θέμα: Δημιουργία ευρωπαϊκού οργανισμού αξιολόγησης πιστοληπτικής ικανότητας

Για να εξασφαλιστεί η μέγιστη αξιοπιστία, διαφάνεια και ανεξαρτησία των οργανισμών αξιολόγησης, η Επιτροπή εξέφρασε τη βούληση να ενημερώσει το ισχύον κανονιστικό πλαίσιο, προτείνοντας στις 15 Νοεμβρίου 2011 την τροποποίηση της οδηγίας 2009/65/EK για τον συντονισμό των νομοθετικών, κανονιστικών και διοικητικών διαστάξεων σχετικά με ορισμένους οργανισμούς συλλογικών επενδύσεων σε κινητές αξίες (ΟΣΕΚΑ) και της οδηγίας 2011/61/EU σχετικά με τους διαχειριστές οργανισμών εναλλακτικών επενδύσεων όσον αφορά την υπερβολική εμπιστοσύνη στις αξιολογήσεις πιστοληπτικής ικανότητας, καθώς και την τροποποίηση του κανονισμού (ΕΚ) αριθ. 1060/2009 για τους οργανισμούς αξιολόγησης πιστοληπτικής ικανότητας.

Στόχος είναι επίσης η διασφάλιση ότι οι οργανισμοί αξιολόγησης δεν τελούν υπό κατάσταση σύγκρουσης συμφερόντων, για την εγγύηση της απόλυτης αμεροληψίας των αξιολογήσεων που διεξάγονται, εγγύηση που έχει καταστεί απαραίτητη κυρίως ενόψει της σοβαρής οικονομικής και δημοσιονομικής κατάστασης.

Είναι επίσης σκόπιμο να οριστούν κανόνες ασυμβατότητας ανάμεσα στη δραστηριότητα παροχής συμβουλών υπέρ τραπεζών, αμοιβαίων κεφαλαίων και/ή άλλων χρηματοδοτικών εταιρειών, αφενός, και την αποτίμηση των αξιολογήσεων δημόσιων φορέων αφετέρου.

Για τον σκοπό αυτό, το Ευρωπαϊκό Κοινοβούλιο ζήτησε με το ψήφισμα της 8ης Ιουνίου 2011 σχετικά με τους οργανισμούς αξιολόγησης πιστοληπτικής ικανότητας να εξεταστεί και να αξιολογηθεί η δυνατότητα δημιουργίας ενός ευρωπαϊκού οργανισμού αξιολόγησης πιστοληπτικής ικανότητας.

Λαμβάνοντας υπόψη τα ανωτέρω, ερωτάται η Επιτροπή:

1. Διάκειται ευνοϊκά στη δημιουργία ενός ευρωπαϊκού οργανισμού αξιολόγησης πιστοληπτικής ικανότητας;
2. Συντάσσεται μελέτη σκοπιμότητας για τη δημιουργία του εν λόγω οργανισμού, όπως ζητήθηκε από το Ευρωπαϊκό Κοινοβούλιο;

Κοινή απάντηση του κ. Barnier εξ ονόματος της Επιτροπής
(26 Μαρτίου 2012)

Μία πρόταση για την τροποποίηση του κανονισμού που διέπει τους οργανισμούς αξιολόγησης της πιστοληπτικής ικανότητας (ΟΑΠΙ III) εγκρίθηκε από την Επιτροπή στις 15 Νοεμβρίου 2011. Πρόκειται για την τρίτη συνιστώσα ενός φιλόδοξου ρυθμιστικού πλαισίου για τους οργανισμούς αξιολόγησης της πιστοληπτικής ικανότητας. Η πρόταση περιλαμβάνει εκτεταμένες τροποποιήσεις του ισχύοντος κανονισμού για τους φορείς αξιολόγησης της πιστοληπτικής ικανότητας. Οι κυριότερες πρωτοβουλίες είναι οι εξής: λιγότερη στήριξη των επενδυτών στα συμπεράσματα των αξιολογήσεων-διαφανέστερη και έγκαιρη διαδικασία αξιολογήσεων του δημόσιου χρέους· αύξηση της ποικιλομορφίας και ενίσχυση της ανεξαρτησίας των οργανισμών αξιολόγησης της πιστοληπτικής ικανότητας· μεγαλύτερη διαφάνεια και συγκρισιμότητα των οργανισμών αξιολόγησης της πιστοληπτικής ικανότητας· αστική ευθύνη των οργανισμών αξιολόγησης της πιστοληπτικής ικανότητας.

Η δημιουργία ενός νέου, ανεξάρτητου οργανισμού αξιολόγησης της πιστοληπτικής ικανότητας ήταν μία από τις επιλογές που περιγράφονται στο έγγραφο διαβούλευσης των υπηρεσιών της Επιτροπής της 5ης Νοεμβρίου 2010, το οποίο συζητήθηκε επίσης με τους ενδιαφερόμενους σε συζήτηση στρογγυλής τραπέζης στις 6 Ιουλίου 2011. Η Επιτροπή εκτίμησε τη σκοπιμότητα της σύστασης ενός νέου, ανεξάρτητου ευρωπαϊκού φορέα αξιολόγησης της πιστοληπτικής ικανότητας και ανεξάρτητων ευρωπαϊκών οργανισμών αξιολόγησης της πιστοληπτικής ικανότητας (ΟΑΠΙ) στην εκτίμηση του αντικτύπου που συνοδεύει την τελευταία νομοθετική της πρόταση. Από τη σχετική ανάλυση προέκυψε ότι η σύσταση ενός οργανισμού αξιολόγησης της πιστοληπτικής ικανότητας με δημόσια χρηματα, ανεξάρτητα από το συγκεκριμένο μοντέλο της, θα ήταν δαπανηρή (υπολογίστηκε σε 300-500 εκατ. ευρώ περίπου για μία περίοδο 5 ετών) και θα μπορούσε να εγείρει ανησυχίες όσον αφορά την αξιοπιστία και την ανεξαρτησία του ΟΑΠΙ.

Για τους λόγους αυτούς, η Επιτροπή αποφάσισε να μην προωθήσει περαιτέρω την ιδέα αυτή σε αυτό το στάδιο. Ωστόσο, η Επιτροπή είναι υπέρ της και χαιρετίζει οποιαδήποτε ιδιωτική πρωτοβουλία για τη σύσταση ευρωπαϊκού φορέα αξιολόγησης της πιστοληπτικής ικανότητας.

Η Επιτροπή λαμβάνει επίσης μέτρα για την προώθηση της ποικιλότητας στην αγορά των φορέων αξιολόγησης της πιστοληπτικής ικανότητας και της ανεξαρτησίας των ΟΑΠΙ, προτείνοντας, μεταξύ άλλων μέτρων, την υποχρεωτική εναλλαγή των ΟΑΠΙ ανά τακτά χρονικά διαστήματα.

(Version française)

**Question avec demande de réponse écrite E-001195/12
à la Commission**

Roberta Angelilli (PPE), Gianni Pittella (S&D), Alfredo Pallone (PPE), Mario Mauro (PPE), David-Maria Sassoli (S&D), Giuseppe Gargani (PPE), Francesco Enrico Speroni (EFD), Niccolò Rinaldi (ALDE), Sonia Alfano (ALDE), Alfredo Antoniozzi (PPE), Raffaele Baldassarre (PPE), Paolo Bartolozzi (PPE), Mario Borghezio (EFD), Antonello Antinoro (PPE), Pino Arlacchi (S&D), Salvatore Caronna (S&D), Francesco De Angelis (S&D), Carlo Fidanza (PPE), Roberto Gualtieri (S&D), Erminia Mazzoni (PPE), Claudio Morganti (EFD), Aldo Patriciello (PPE), Fiorello Provera (EFD), Crescenzo Rivellini (PPE), Oreste Rossi (EFD), Marco Scurria (PPE), Gianluca Susta (S&D), Salvatore Tatarella (PPE), Giommaria Uggias (ALDE), Gianni Vattimo (ALDE), Andrea Zanoni (ALDE), Iva Zanicchi (PPE), Sergio Paolo Frances Silvestris (PPE), Giancarlo Scottà (EFD), Giovanni La Via (PPE), Guido Milana (S&D), Francesca Balzani (S&D), Paolo De Castro (S&D), Lara Comi (PPE), Carlo Casini (PPE), Gabriele Albertini (PPE), Lorenzo Fontana (EFD), Sergio Gaetano Cofferati (S&D), Patrizia Toia (S&D), Vito Bonsignore (PPE), Magdi Cristiano Allam (EFD), Cristiana Muscardini (PPE), Salvatore Iacolino (PPE), Antonio Cancian (PPE), Clemente Mastella (PPE), Herbert Dorfmann (PPE), Mario Pirillo (S&D), Elisabetta Gardini (PPE), Vincenzo Iovine (ALDE), Barbara Matera (PPE), Tiziano Motti (PPE), Pier Antonio Panzeri (S&D), Vittorio Prodi (S&D), Amalia Sartori (PPE), Potito Salatto (PPE), Debora Serracchiani (S&D), Ivo Belet (PPE), Iliana Ivanova (PPE), Rareş-Lucian Niculescu (PPE), Georgios Papastamkos (PPE), Marietta Giannakou (PPE), Vasilica Viorica Dăncilă (S&D), Luís Paulo Alves (S&D), Mojca Kleva (S&D), Othmar Karas (PPE), Iuliu Winkler (PPE), Monica Luisa Macovei (PPE), Hans-Peter Mayer (PPE), Marian Harkin (ALDE), Katarína Neved'álová (S&D), Filip Kaczmarek (PPE), Constance Le Grip (PPE), Jörg Leichtfried (S&D), Elena Băsescu (PPE), Pavel Poc (S&D), László Surján (PPE), Georgios Papanikolaou (PPE), Ildikó Gáll-Pelcz (PPE), Liisa Jaakonsaari (S&D), Marian-Jean Marinescu (PPE), Nikolaos Salavrakos (EFD), Konstantinos Poupanakis (PPE), Evelyn Regner (S&D), Iliana Malinova Iotova (S&D), Rui Tavares (Verts/ALE), József Szájer (PPE), Juozas Imbrasas (EFD), Dimitar Stoyanov (NI), Ioan Mircea Pașcu (S&D), Vilja Savisaar-Toomast (ALDE), Danuta Jazłowiecka (PPE), Seán Kelly (PPE), Rolandas Paksas (EFD), Ioannis A. Tsoukalas (PPE), Phil Prendergast (S&D), Saïd El Khadraoui (S&D), Ioan Enciu (S&D), Jaroslav Paška (EFD), Peter Simon (S&D), Niki Tzavela (EFD), Ádám Kósa (PPE), Josef Weidenholzer (S&D), Theodor Dumitru Stolojan (PPE), Cornelis de Jong (GUE/NGL), Kristian Vigenin (S&D), Mário David (PPE), Ryszard Antoni Legutko (ECR), Georgios Koumoutsakos (PPE) et Salvador Sedó i Alabart (PPE)

(1^{er} février 2012)

Objet: Création d'une Agence européenne de notation de crédit

Afin de garantir au mieux la fiabilité, la transparence et l'indépendance des agences de notation, la Commission a entendu mettre à jour le cadre normatif actuellement en vigueur et proposé, le 15 novembre 2011, de modifier la directive 2009/65/CE portant coordination des dispositions législatives, réglementaires et administratives concernant certains organismes de placement collectif en valeurs mobilières (OPCVM) ainsi que la directive 2011/61/UE sur les gestionnaires de fonds d'investissement alternatifs en ce qui concerne la confiance excessive dans les notations du crédit. Elle a également proposé de modifier le règlement (CE) n°1060/2009 sur les agences de notation de crédit.

L'objectif est également d'assurer que les agences de notation ne se trouvent pas en situation de conflit d'intérêts, afin de garantir l'impartialité absolue des évaluations qu'elles réalisent, garantie indispensable en particulier à la lumière de la grave situation économique et financière.

Il est tout aussi opportun de définir des règles d'incompatibilité entre l'activité de consultance pour des banques, des fonds d'investissement et/ou d'autres sociétés financières et l'évaluation de la notation de sujets publics.

À cette fin, le Parlement européen, dans sa résolution du 8 juin 2011 sur les agences de notation de crédit, a demandé à la Commission d'explorer et d'analyser la piste d'une Agence européenne de notation de crédit.

Eu égard à ce qui précède, la Commission pourrait-elle indiquer:

1. si elle est favorable à la création d'une Agence européenne de notation de crédit;
2. si elle réalise actuellement une étude de faisabilité sur la création d'une telle Agence, comme l'a demandé le Parlement européen?

Réponse commune donnée par M. Barnier au nom de la Commission
(26 mars 2012)

Le 15 novembre 2011, la Commission a adopté une proposition modifiant le règlement sur les agences de notation de crédit («ANC III»). Troisième volet d'un cadre réglementaire ambitieux applicable aux agences de notation de crédit, cette proposition prévoit de modifier en profondeur l'actuel règlement sur les agences de notation de crédit. Ses principales initiatives consistent à diminuer l'importance que les investisseurs accordent aux notations, à accroître la transparence et la rapidité des notations souveraines, à augmenter la diversité et l'indépendance des agences de notation de crédit, à renforcer la transparence et la comparabilité des agences de notation de crédit, et à assurer la responsabilité civile des agences de notation de crédit.

L'établissement d'une nouvelle agence indépendante de notation de crédit figurait parmi les options présentées dans le document de consultation des services de la Commission du 5 novembre 2010 et a par ailleurs fait l'objet d'un débat avec les parties prenantes lors d'une table ronde qui s'est tenue le 6 juillet 2011. Dans l'analyse d'impact accompagnant sa dernière proposition législative, la Commission a évalué la faisabilité de la mise en place d'une nouvelle fondation européenne indépendante de notation de crédit et d'une agence européenne indépendante de notation de crédit. Cette analyse a montré que la création d'une agence de notation de crédit à l'aide de fonds publics, quel que soit son modèle particulier, serait coûteuse (estimation située entre 300 et 500 millions d'euros sur une période de 5 ans) et qu'elle pourrait soulever des inquiétudes en ce qui concerne la crédibilité et l'indépendance de cette agence de notation de crédit.

C'est pourquoi la Commission a décidé de ne pas approfondir cette idée à ce stade. Elle se montre cependant favorable à toute initiative privée visant à mettre en place une agence européenne de notation de crédit et s'en félicite.

La Commission prend également des mesures pour promouvoir la diversité du marché des notations et l'indépendance des agences de notation de crédit en proposant, entre autres, une rotation obligatoire des agences de notation de crédit après un certain laps de temps.

(Versione italiana)

**Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-001195/12
alla Commissione**

Roberta Angelilli (PPE), Gianni Pittella (S&D), Alfredo Pallone (PPE), Mario Mauro (PPE), David-Maria Sassoli (S&D), Giuseppe Gargani (PPE), Francesco Enrico Speroni (EFD), Niccolò Rinaldi (ALDE), Sonia Alfano (ALDE), Alfredo Antoniozzi (PPE), Raffaele Baldassarre (PPE), Paolo Bartolozzi (PPE), Mario Borghezio (EFD), Antonello Antinoro (PPE), Pino Arlacchi (S&D), Salvatore Caronna (S&D), Francesco De Angelis (S&D), Carlo Fidanza (PPE), Roberto Gualtieri (S&D), Erminia Mazzoni (PPE), Claudio Morganti (EFD), Aldo Patriciello (PPE), Fiorello Provera (EFD), Crescenzo Rivellini (PPE), Oreste Rossi (EFD), Marco Scurria (PPE), Gianluca Susta (S&D), Salvatore Tatarella (PPE), Giommaria Uggias (ALDE), Gianni Vattimo (ALDE), Andrea Zanoni (ALDE), Iva Zanicchi (PPE), Sergio Paolo Frances Silvestris (PPE), Giancarlo Scottà (EFD), Giovanni La Via (PPE), Guido Milana (S&D), Francesca Balzani (S&D), Paolo De Castro (S&D), Lara Comi (PPE), Carlo Casini (PPE), Gabriele Albertini (PPE), Lorenzo Fontana (EFD), Sergio Gaetano Cofferati (S&D), Patrizia Toia (S&D), Vito Bonsignore (PPE), Magdi Cristiano Allam (EFD), Cristiana Muscardini (PPE), Salvatore Iacolino (PPE), Antonio Cancian (PPE), Clemente Mastella (PPE), Herbert Dorfmann (PPE), Mario Pirillo (S&D), Elisabetta Gardini (PPE), Vincenzo Iovine (ALDE), Barbara Matera (PPE), Tiziano Motti (PPE), Pier Antonio Panzeri (S&D), Vittorio Prodi (S&D), Amalia Sartori (PPE), Potito Salatto (PPE), Debora Serracchiani (S&D), Ivo Belet (PPE), Iliana Ivanova (PPE), Rareş-Lucian Niculescu (PPE), Georgios Papastamkos (PPE), Marietta Giannakou (PPE), Vasilica Viorica Dăncilă (S&D), Luís Paulo Alves (S&D), Mojca Kleva (S&D), Othmar Karas (PPE), Iuliu Winkler (PPE), Monica Luisa Macovei (PPE), Hans-Peter Mayer (PPE), Marian Harkin (ALDE), Katarína Neved'álová (S&D), Filip Kaczmarek (PPE), Constance Le Grip (PPE), Jörg Leichtfried (S&D), Elena Băsescu (PPE), Pavel Poc (S&D), László Surján (PPE), Georgios Papanikolaou (PPE), Ildikó Gáll-Pelcz (PPE), Liisa Jaakonsaari (S&D), Marian-Jean Marinescu (PPE), Nikolaos Salavrakos (EFD), Konstantinos Poupanakis (PPE), Evelyn Regner (S&D), Iliana Malinova Iotova (S&D), Rui Tavares (Verts/ALE), József Szájer (PPE), Juozas Imbrasas (EFD), Dimitar Stoyanov (NI), Ioan Mircea Paşcu (S&D), Vilja Savisaar-Toomast (ALDE), Danuta Jazłowiecka (PPE), Seán Kelly (PPE), Rolandas Paksas (EFD), Ioannis A. Tsoukalas (PPE), Phil Prendergast (S&D), Saïd El Khadraoui (S&D), Ioan Enciu (S&D), Jaroslav Paška (EFD), Peter Simon (S&D), Niki Tzavela (EFD), Ádám Kósa (PPE), Josef Weidenholzer (S&D), Theodor Dumitru Stolojan (PPE), Cornelis de Jong (GUE/NGL), Kristian Vigenin (S&D), Mário David (PPE), Ryszard Antoni Legutko (ECR), Georgios Koumoutsakos (PPE) e Salvador Sedó i Alabart (PPE)

(1° febbraio 2012)

Oggetto: Realizzazione di un'Agenzia europea di rating del credito

Per garantire la massima credibilità, trasparenza e indipendenza delle agenzie di rating, la Commissione ha inteso aggiornare il quadro normativo attualmente in vigore proponendo il 15 novembre 2011 la modifica della direttiva 2009/65/CE concernente il coordinamento delle disposizioni legislative, regolamentari e amministrative in materia di taluni organismi d'investimento collettivo in valori immobiliari (OICVM) e della direttiva 2011/61/UE sui gestori di fondi di investimento alternativi per quanto riguarda l'eccessivo affidamento ai rating del credito nonché la modifica del regolamento (CE) n. 1060/2009 relativo alle agenzie di rating del credito.

Lo scopo è anche di assicurare che le agenzie di rating non abbiano conflitti di interesse, in modo da garantire l'assoluta imparzialità delle valutazioni rese, garanzia indispensabile soprattutto alla luce della grave situazione economica e finanziaria.

È altresì opportuno definire regole di incompatibilità tra l'attività di consulenza in favore di banche, fondi di investimento e/o altre società finanziarie e la valutazione del rating di soggetti pubblici.

A tal fine il Parlamento europeo con la risoluzione dell'8 giugno 2011 sulle agenzie di rating del credito ha chiesto di esaminare e valutare la possibilità di creare un'Agenzia europea di rating del credito.

Ciò premesso, può la Commissione far sapere:

1. se è favorevole alla creazione di un'Agenzia europea di rating del credito;
2. se è in corso uno studio di fattibilità sulla realizzazione di tale Agenzia, così come richiesto dal Parlamento europeo?

**Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-001558/12
alla Commissione
Sergio Paolo Frances Silvestris (PPE)
(9 febbraio 2012)**

Oggetto: Agenzia di rating europea

L'agenzia Fitch ha tagliato il rating a cinque banche italiane. Secondo l'agenzia di rating, la decisione è legata al declassamento del debito sovrano dell'Italia e alla contrazione del PIL, che potrebbe provocare un peggioramento della qualità degli asset.

Il voto sul merito di credito, in questo caso una bocciatura, avrà vistosi effetti sui mercati, come si è visto in questi giorni nel caso della Grecia, della Spagna e dell'Italia, vittime delle speculazioni finanziarie.

Alla luce dei fatti sopraesposti, s'interroga dunque la Commissione per sapere:

1. se intende regolamentare lo status di agenzia di rating, che fino a oggi è un soggetto non inquadrato da nessuna disposizione internazionale,
2. se intende costituire una agenzia di rating europea, dipendente e controllata dall'Unione europea, per contrastare l'oligarchia delle agenzie di rating, che in passato hanno anche commesso grossolani errori di valutazione danneggiando migliaia di piccoli risparmiatori.

**Risposta congiunta data da Michel Barnier a nome della Commissione
(26 marzo 2012)**

Il 15 novembre 2011 la Commissione ha adottato una proposta di modifica del regolamento relativo alle agenzie di rating del credito (CRA III). Si tratta della terza componente di un ambizioso quadro di regolamentazione per le agenzie di rating. La proposta, che prospetta profonde modifiche all'attuale regolamento sulle agenzie di rating del credito, prevede tra le innovazioni principali un minore affidamento sui rating da parte degli investitori, rating sovrani più trasparenti e tempestivi, nonché agenzie di rating più numerose, indipendenti, trasparenti, comparabili e civilmente responsabili.

L'eventualità di istituire una nuova agenzia di rating indipendente era una delle opzioni delineate nel documento di consultazione dei servizi della Commissione del 5 novembre 2010, discussa con le parti interessate il 6 luglio 2011 nel corso di una tavola rotonda. Nella valutazione d'impatto che accompagna la sua ultima proposta legislativa, la Commissione ha valutato la fattibilità della creazione di una fondazione europea di rating del credito indipendente e di un'agenzia europea di rating del credito indipendente. Dall'analisi è emerso che l'istituzione di un'agenzia di rating con fondi pubblici, a prescindere dalla sua impostazione, sarebbe onerosa sotto il profilo finanziario (con un costo stimato di circa 300-500 milioni di euro per un periodo di 5 anni) e problematica in termini di credibilità e indipendenza.

Per questi motivi la Commissione ha deciso, al momento, di abbandonare questa ipotesi. Ciononostante, la Commissione approva e accoglie con favore ogni eventuale iniziativa privata intesa a creare un'agenzia di rating del credito europea.

La Commissione si sta inoltre adoperando per promuovere una maggiore varietà sul mercato dei rating e l'indipendenza delle agenzie, proponendo, tra le altre misure, una rotazione obbligatoria delle agenzie dopo un determinato periodo.

(Tekstas lietuvių kalba)

Klausimas, į kurį atsakoma raštu, Nr. E-001195/12

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(2012 m. vasario 1 d.)

Tema: Europos kredito reitingų agentūros įkūrimas

Kad užtikrintų aukštą reitingų agentūrų patikimumą, skaidrumą ir nepriklausomumą, Komisija siekė atnaujinti galiojančią reglamentavimo sistemą ir 2011 m. lapkričio 15 d. pateikė pasiūlymą dėl per didelio pasitikėjimo kredito reitingais iš dalies pakeisti Direktyvą 2009/65/EB dėl įstatymų ir kitų teisės aktų, susijusių su kolektyvinio investavimo į perleidžiamus vertybinius popierius subjektais (KIPVPS), derinimo ir Direktyvą 2011/61/ES dėl alternatyvaus investavimo fondų valdytojų, taip pat iš dalies pakeisti Reglamentą (EB) Nr. 1060/2009 dėl kredito reitingų agentūrų.

Be to, siekiama užtikrinti, kad reitingų agentūros išvengtų interesų konfliktų, taip garantuojant visišką atlirkų vertinimų nešališkumą; ši garantija labai svarbi, visų pirma atsižvelgiant į sunkią ekonominę ir finansinę padėtį.

Taip pat tikslinga nustatyti bankų, investicinių fondų ir (arba) kitų finansų įstaigų konsultavimo veiklos ir viešųjų subjektų kredito reitingų vertinimo nesuderinamumo taisykles.

Todėl Europos Parlamentas savo 2011 m. birželio 8 d. rezoliucijoje dėl kredito reitingų agentūrų prašo persvarstyti ir įvertinti galimybę įkurti Europos kredito reitingų agentūrą.

Atsižvelgiant į tai, ar Komisija gali atsakyti į šiuos klausimus.

1. Ar ji pritaria Europos kredito reitingų agentūros įkūrimui?
2. Ar atliekama tokios agentūros įkūrimo galimybų studija, kaip reikalauja Europos Parlamentas?

Bendras atsakymas, M. Barnier atsakymas Komisijos vardu
(2012 m. kovo 26 d.)

2011 m. lapkričio 15 d. Komisija priėmė pasiūlymą, kuriuo iš dalies keičiamas Kredito reitingų agentūrų reglamentas (KRA III). Tai platus užmojo kredito reitingų agentūrų reguliavimo sistemos trečasis elementas. Pasiūlyme numatyti esminiai dabartinio Kredito reitingų agentūrų reglamento pakeitimai. Pagrindinės iniciatyvos: mažesnis investuotojų klivimasis reitingais; skaidresni, laiku suteikiami valstybių reitingai; didesnė kredito reitingų agentūrų įvairovė ir nepriklausomumas; didesnis kredito reitingų agentūrų veiklos skaidrumas ir palyginamumas; civilinė kredito reitingų agentūrų atsakomybė.

2010 m. lapkričio 5 d. Komisijos tarnybų konsultacijų dokumente ir 2011 m. liepos 6 d. apvaliojo stalo diskusijoje su suinteresuotosiomis šalimis kaip vienas iš variantų aptartas naujos nepriklausomos kredito reitingų agentūros įkūrimas. Naujo nepriklausomo Europos kredito reitingų agentūrų fondo ir nepriklausomos Europos KRA įkūrimo galimybę Komisija įvertino poveikio vertinime, pridėtame prie paskutinio Komisijos teisės akto pasiūlymo. Analizės rezultatai parodė, kad viešosiomis lėšomis įsteigtį kredito reitingų agentūrą (kad ir koks būtų jos modelis) būtų brangu (apytikriaiai 300-500 mln. EUR per 5 metų laikotarpį) ir tai galėtų sukelti abejonių dėl KRA patikimumo ir nepriklausomumo.

Todėl Komisija nusprendė šiame etape šio sumanymo atsisakyti. Tačiau Komisija palankiai vertina visas privačias iniciatyvas steigti Europos kredito reitingų agentūrą.

Be to, Komisija imasi veiksmų įvairovei reitingų rinkoje ir KRA nepriklausomumui skatinti, be kitų priemonių, siūlydama privalomą KRA rotaciją po tam tikro laiko.

(Magyar változat)

**Írásbeli választ igénylő kérdés E-001195/12
a Bizottság számára**

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 (2012. február 1.)

Tárgy: Európai Hitelminősítő Intézet létrehozása

A hitelminősítő intézetek lehető legnagyobb fokú hitelességének, átláthatóságának és függetlenségének biztosítása érdekében az Európai Bizottság naprakésszé kívánta tenni a hatályos szabályozási keretet, és ennek érdekében 2011. november 15-én javaslatot tett az átruházható értékpapírokkal foglalkozó kollektív befektetési vállalkozókra (ÁÉKBV) vonatkozó törvényi, rendeleti és közigazgatási rendelkezések összehangolásáról szóló 2009/65/EK irányelvnek és az alternatív befektetési alap-kezelőkről szóló 2011/61/EU irányelvnek a hitelminősítések túlzott figyelembevétele tekintetében történő módosítására, valamint az hitelminősítő intézetekről szóló 1060/2009/EK rendelet módosítására.

Ennek célja a hitelminősítő intézetek összeférhetetlenségének elkerülése, biztosítandó ezáltal a kiadott minősítések teljes pártatlanságát, amely a nehéz gazdasági és pénzügyi helyzetben rendkívül fontos biztosíték.

Rendelkezéseket kell meghatározni a bankok, befektetési alapok és/vagy más pénzügyi vállalkozások számára nyújtott tanácsadási tevékenység, illetve az állami szerelők minősítésének kiadása közötti összeférhetetlenség vonatkozásában is.

Ennek érdekében az Európai Parlament a hitelminősítő intézetekről szóló, 2011. június 8-i állásfoglalásában kérte, hogy vizsgálják meg és elemezzék az Európai Hitelminősítő Intézet létrehozásának lehetőségét.

Mindezek alapján a következő kérdéseket szeretnénk feltenni a Bizottságnak:

1. Támogatja-e az Európai Hitelminősítő Intézet létrehozását?
2. Az Európai Parlament kérésével összhangban készítenek-e megvalósíthatósági tanulmányt ezen intézet létrehozásáról?

Michel Barnier egyesített válasza a Bizottság nevében
(2012. március 26.)

A Bizottság 2011. november 15-én javaslatot fogadott el a hitelminősítő intézetekről (CRA III) szóló rendelet módosításáról, amely a hitelminősítő intézetekre vonatkozó ambiciózus szabályozási keret harmadik komponense. A javaslat alapjaiban módosítja a hitelminősítő intézetekről szóló hatályos rendeletet. A változtatások célja elsősorban az, hogy a befektetők kisebb mértékben hagyatkozzanak a minősítésekre, az államadósságra vonatkozó minősítések legyenek átláthatóbbak és ütemezettebbek, a hitelminősítő intézetek pedig legyenek diverzifikáltabbak és függetlenebbek, működésük váljon átláthatóból és összehasonlíthatóvá, és nyerjen megállapítást polgári jogi felelősségek.

A bizottsági szolgálatok 2010. november 5-i konzultációs anyagukban egyebek mellett felvázolták egy új, független hitelminősítő intézet létrehozásának lehetőségét, amelyről az érdekeltek felekkel is egyeztettek egy 2011. július 6-i kerekasztal-beszélgetésen. A Bizottság a legutóbbi jogalkotási javaslatát kísérő hatásvizsgálatában értékelte egy új, független, európai hitelminősítő alapítvány, valamint egy független, európai hitelminősítő intézet létrehozásának megvalósíthatóságát. A hatásvizsgálat rámutatott, hogy egy közpénzből létrehozandó hitelminősítő intézet – a választandó modelltől függetlenül – költséges lenne (becslések szerint kb. 300-500 millió EUR öt éves időszakra vetítve), továbbá a források közpénz volta aggályos lehet a hitelminősítő intézet hitelessége és függetlensége szempontjából.

A Bizottság ezért úgy döntött, jelenleg nem foglalkozik tovább ezzel a lehetőséggel. A Bizottság ugyanakkor támogat és üdvözöl minden olyan magánkezdeményezést, amely európai hitelminősítő intézet létrehozására irányul.

A Bizottság lépéseket tesz továbbá a hitelminősítői piac diverzifikálásának és a hitelminősítő intézetek függetlenségének előmozdítására, többek között javasolja, hogy a hitelminősítő intézetek bizonyos időközönként kötelezően rotáljanak.

(Nederlandse versie)

**Vraag met verzoek om schriftelijk antwoord E-001195/12
aan de Commissie**

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(1 februari 2012)

Betreft: Oprichting van een Europees ratingbureau

Om ratingbureaus een maximale geloofwaardigheid, transparantie en onafhankelijkheid te geven heeft de Commissie het huidige van kracht zijnde wettelijke kader willen bijwerken met het voorstel van 15 november 2011 tot wijziging van Richtlijn 2009/65/EG tot coördinatie van de wettelijke en bestuursrechtelijke bepalingen betreffende bepaalde instellingen voor collectieve belegging in effecten (icbe's), Richtlijn 2011/61/EU inzake beheerders van alternatieve beleggingsinstellingen ter voorkoming van een overdreven vertrouwen in ratings, evenals Verordening (EG) nr. 1060/2009 inzake ratingbureaus.

Het doel is eveneens te voorkomen dat ratingbureaus te maken krijgen met belangenconflicten en ervoor te zorgen dat de beoordelingen in absolute onpartijdigheid worden gemaakt, wat een onontbeerlijke waarborg is, vooral in het licht van de ernstige economische en financiële situatie.

Het is eveneens opportuun om regels op te stellen voor de onverenigbaarheid van beleggingsadviesering voor banken, beleggingsinstellingen en/of ander financiële instellingen, met de ratingbeoordeling van overheidsinstellingen.

Te dien einde heeft het Europees Parlement met zijn resolutie van 8 juni 2011 inzake ratingbureaus verzocht de mogelijkheid te onderzoeken en te beoordelen van de oprichting van een Europees ratingbureau.

Kan de Commissie gezien het bovenstaande mededelen:

1. of zij voorstander is van de oprichting van een Europees ratingbureau;
2. of er momenteel een haalbaarheidsstudie over de oprichting van een dergelijk bureau wordt gemaakt, zoals verzocht door het Europees Parlement?

Antwoord van de heer Barnier namens de Commissie
(26 maart 2012)

Op 15 november 2011 heeft de Commissie haar goedkeuring gehecht aan een voorstel tot wijziging van de verordening inzake ratingbureaus (CRA III). Het voorstel vormt het derde onderdeel van een ambitieus toezicht- en regelgevingskader voor ratingbureaus. Het bevat verregaande wijzigingen in de bestaande verordening inzake ratingbureaus en moet er met name voor zorgen dat beleggers minder op ratings gaan vertrouwen, dat overheidsratings transparanter en tijdiger beschikbaar zijn, dat ratingbureaus door een grotere diversiteit en onafhankelijkheid worden gekenmerkt en transparanter en beter vergelijkbaar zijn, en dat de wettelijke aansprakelijkheid van ratingbureaus wordt geregeld.

Het opzetten van een nieuw, onafhankelijk ratingbureau was een van de opties die in het raadplegingsdocument van de diensten van de Commissie van 5 november 2010 aan de orde is gekomen. Deze mogelijkheid is ook besproken met belanghebbenden tijdens een rondetafelconferentie, die op 6 juli 2011 heeft plaatsgevonden. In de effectbeoordeling waarvan haar laatste wetgevingsvoorstel vergezeld gaat, heeft de Commissie de haalbaarheid van de oprichting van een nieuwe onafhankelijke Europees stichting voor kreditratings en van een onafhankelijk Europees ratingbureau onderzocht. Uit deze analyse bleek dat het opzetten van een ratingbureau met overheidsmiddelen, ongeacht voor welk model zou worden gekozen, veel geld zou kosten (naar schatting 300 à 500 miljoen EUR over een periode van 5 jaar) en vragen zou kunnen doen rijzen omtrent de geloofwaardigheid en onafhankelijkheid van een dergelijk ratingbureau.

Om die redenen heeft de Commissie besloten deze mogelijkheid voorhands niet verder te onderzoeken. De Commissie staat echter wel achter en verwelkomt elk privé-initiatief om een Europees ratingbureau op te zetten.

Voorts spant de Commissie zich momenteel in om de diversiteit op de ratingmarkt en de onafhankelijkheid van ratingbureaus te bevorderen, onder meer door het voorstellen van een verplicht roulatiemechanisme waarbij na een zekere periode van ratingbureau moet worden veranderd.

(Wersja polska)

**Pytanie wymagające odpowiedzi pisemnej E-001195/12
do Komisji**

Roberta Angelilli (PPE), Gianni Pittella (S&D), Alfredo Pallone (PPE), Mario Mauro (PPE), David-Maria Sassoli (S&D), Giuseppe Gargani (PPE), Francesco Enrico Speroni (EFD), Niccolò Rinaldi (ALDE), Sonia Alfano (ALDE), Alfredo Antoniozzi (PPE), Raffaele Baldassarre (PPE), Paolo Bartolozzi (PPE), Mario Borghezio (EFD), Antonello Antinoro (PPE), Pino Arlacchi (S&D), Salvatore Caronna (S&D), Francesco De Angelis (S&D), Carlo Fidanza (PPE), Roberto Gualtieri (S&D), Erminia Mazzoni (PPE), Claudio Morganti (EFD), Aldo Patriciello (PPE), Fiorello Provera (EFD), Crescenzo Rivellini (PPE), Oreste Rossi (EFD), Marco Scurria (PPE), Gianluca Susta (S&D), Salvatore Tatarella (PPE), Giommaria Uggias (ALDE), Gianni Vattimo (ALDE), Andrea Zanoni (ALDE), Iva Zanicchi (PPE), Sergio Paolo Frances Silvestris (PPE), Giancarlo Scottà (EFD), Giovanni La Via (PPE), Guido Milana (S&D), Francesca Balzani (S&D), Paolo De Castro (S&D), Lara Comi (PPE), Carlo Casini (PPE), Gabriele Albertini (PPE), Lorenzo Fontana (EFD), Sergio Gaetano Cofferati (S&D), Patrizia Toia (S&D), Vito Bonsignore (PPE), Magdi Cristiano Allam (EFD), Cristiana Muscardini (PPE), Salvatore Iacolino (PPE), Antonio Cancian (PPE), Clemente Mastella (PPE), Herbert Dorfmann (PPE), Mario Pirillo (S&D), Elisabetta Gardini (PPE), Vincenzo Iovine (ALDE), Barbara Matera (PPE), Tiziano Motti (PPE), Pier Antonio Panzeri (S&D), Vittorio Prodi (S&D), Amalia Sartori (PPE), Potito Salatto (PPE), Debora Serracchiani (S&D), Ivo Belet (PPE), Iliana Ivanova (PPE), Rareş-Lucian Niculescu (PPE), Georgios Papastamkos (PPE), Marietta Giannakou (PPE), Vasilica Viorica Dăncilă (S&D), Luís Paulo Alves (S&D), Mojca Kleva (S&D), Othmar Karas (PPE), Iuliu Winkler (PPE), Monica Luisa Macovei (PPE), Hans-Peter Mayer (PPE), Marian Harkin (ALDE), Katarína Nevedalová (S&D), Filip Kaczmarek (PPE), Constance Le Grip (PPE), Jörg Leichtfried (S&D), Elena Băsescu (PPE), Pavel Poc (S&D), László Surján (PPE), Georgios Papanikolaou (PPE), Ildikó Gáll-Pelcz (PPE), Liisa Jaakonsaari (S&D), Marian-Jean Marinescu (PPE), Nikolaos Salavrakos (EFD), Konstantinos Poupanakis (PPE), Evelyn Regner (S&D), Iliana Malinova Iotova (S&D), Rui Tavares (Verts/ALE), József Szájer (PPE), Juozas Imbrasas (EFD), Dimitar Stoyanov (NI), Ioan Mircea Pașcu (S&D), Vilja Savisaar-Toomast (ALDE), Danuta Jazłowiecka (PPE), Seán Kelly (PPE), Rolandas Paksas (EFD), Ioannis A. Tsoukalas (PPE), Phil Prendergast (S&D), Saïd El Khadraoui (S&D), Ioan Enciu (S&D), Jaroslav Paška (EFD), Peter Simon (S&D), Niki Tzavela (EFD), Ádám Kósa (PPE), Josef Weidenholzer (S&D), Theodor Dumitru Stolojan (PPE), Cornelis de Jong (GUE/NGL), Kristian Vigenin (S&D), Mário David (PPE), Ryszard Antoni Legutko (ECR), Georgios Koumoutsakos (PPE) oraz Salvador Sedó i Alabart (PPE)

(1 lutego 2012 r.)

Przedmiot: Utworzenie europejskiej agencji ratingowej

Aby zapewnić jak największą wiarygodność, przejrzystość i niezależność agencji ratingowych, Komisja podjęła zamiar zaktualizowania obowiązujących obecnie ram prawnych i w dniu 15 listopada 2011 r. przedstawiła wniosek dotyczący zmiany dyrektywy 2009/65/WE w sprawie koordynacji przepisów ustawowych, wykonawczych i administracyjnych odnoszących się do przedsiębiorstw zbiorowego inwestowania w zbywalne papiery wartościowe (UCITS) oraz dyrektywy 2011/61/UE w sprawie zarządzających alternatywnymi funduszami inwestycyjnymi – w odniesieniu do kwestii nadmiernego polegania na ratingach kredytowych – a także wniosek dotyczący zmiany rozporządzenia (WE) nr 1060/2009 w sprawie agencji ratingowych.

Ma to również na celu zapewnienie niewystępowania konfliktów interesów między agencjami ratingowymi, tak aby zagwarantować całkowitą bezstronność sporządzanych ocen, co stanowi niezbędną gwarancję przede wszystkim w świetle poważnej sytuacji gospodarczej i finansowej.

Właściwe jest również określenie reguł dotyczących niemożności łączenia działalności polegającej na świadczeniu usług doradztwa na rzecz banków, funduszy inwestycyjnych oraz innych instytucji finansowych z działalnością polegającą na przeprowadzaniu ocen ratingowych podmiotów publicznych.

Aby osiągnąć ten cel, w rezolucji z dnia 8 czerwca 2011 r. w sprawie agencji ratingowych Parlament Europejski zwrócił się o zbadanie i ocenę możliwości utworzenia europejskiej agencji ratingowej.

Biorąc pod uwagę powyższe, prosi się Komisję o poinformowanie, czy:

1. popiera ona utworzenie europejskiej agencji ratingowej;
2. prowadzona jest analiza wykonalności utworzenia takiej agencji, zgodnie z wnioskiem Parlamentu Europejskiego.

Wspólna odpowiedź udzielona przez komisarza Michela Barniera w imieniu Komisji
(26 marca 2012 r.)

Dnia 15 listopada 2011 r. Komisja przyjęła wniosek zmieniający rozporządzenie w sprawie agencji ratingowych (CRA III). Jest to trzeci element ambitnych ram regulacyjnych dotyczących agencji ratingowych. Wniosek zawiera daleko idące zmiany do obowiązującego rozporządzenia w tej sprawie. Główne inicjatywy sformułowane we wniosku to: mniejsze zaufanie inwestorów do ratingów; bardziej przejrzyste i aktualne ratingi państw; większa różnorodność i niezależność agencji ratingowych; większa przejrzystość i porównywalność agencji ratingowych; odpowiedzialność cywilna agencji ratingowych.

Powołanie nowej niezależnej europejskiej agencji ratingowej było jednym z wariantów opisanych w przygotowanym przez służby Komisji dokumencie do dyskusji z dnia 5 listopada 2010 r., a także było przedmiotem debaty z udziałem zainteresowanych stron zorganizowanej dnia 6 lipca 2011 r. W ocenie skutków dołączonej do ostatniego wniosku ustawodawczego Komisja oceniła możliwość ustanowienia takiej agencji, a także nowej niezależnej europejskiej fundacji ratingów kredytowych. Z analizy Komisji wynika, że powołanie takiej agencji ratingowej przy wykorzystaniu środków publicznych, niezależnie od modelu, na jakim miałaby się opierać, byłoby kosztowne (szacowany koszt w okresie pięciu lat to 300-500 mln EUR) oraz zrodziłoby wątpliwości co do wiarygodności i niezależności takiej agencji.

W związku z powyższym Komisja zdecydowała o zaniechaniu tego pomysłu na tym etapie. Niemniej jednak Komisja popiera wszelkie prywatne inicjatywy na rzecz powołania europejskiej agencji ratingowej.

Ponadto Komisja podejmuje działania mające na celu promowanie różnorodności na rynku ratingów kredytowych oraz niezależności agencji ratingowych, występując, między innymi, o obowiązkową rotację agencji ratingowych po upływie określonego terminu.

(Versão portuguesa)

**Pergunta com pedido de resposta escrita E-001195/12
à Comissão**

Roberta Angelilli (PPE), Gianni Pittella (S&D), Alfredo Pallone (PPE), Mario Mauro (PPE), David-Maria Sassoli (S&D), Giuseppe Gargani (PPE), Francesco Enrico Speroni (EFD), Niccolò Rinaldi (ALDE), Sonia Alfano (ALDE), Alfredo Antoniozzi (PPE), Raffaele Baldassarre (PPE), Paolo Bartolozzi (PPE), Mario Borghezio (EFD), Antonello Antinoro (PPE), Pino Arlacchi (S&D), Salvatore Caronna (S&D), Francesco De Angelis (S&D), Carlo Fidanza (PPE), Roberto Gualtieri (S&D), Erminia Mazzoni (PPE), Claudio Morganti (EFD), Aldo Patriciello (PPE), Fiorello Provera (EFD), Crescenzo Rivellini (PPE), Oreste Rossi (EFD), Marco Scurria (PPE), Gianluca Susta (S&D), Salvatore Tatarella (PPE), Giommaria Uggias (ALDE), Gianni Vattimo (ALDE), Andrea Zanoni (ALDE), Iva Zanicchi (PPE), Sergio Paolo Frances Silvestris (PPE), Giancarlo Scottà (EFD), Giovanni La Via (PPE), Guido Milana (S&D), Francesca Balzani (S&D), Paolo De Castro (S&D), Lara Comi (PPE), Carlo Casini (PPE), Gabriele Albertini (PPE), Lorenzo Fontana (EFD), Sergio Gaetano Cofferati (S&D), Patrizia Toia (S&D), Vito Bonsignore (PPE), Magdi Cristiano Allam (EFD), Cristiana Muscardini (PPE), Salvatore Iacolino (PPE), Antonio Cancian (PPE), Clemente Mastella (PPE), Herbert Dorfmann (PPE), Mario Pirillo (S&D), Elisabetta Gardini (PPE), Vincenzo Iovine (ALDE), Barbara Matera (PPE), Tiziano Motti (PPE), Pier Antonio Panzeri (S&D), Vittorio Prodi (S&D), Amalia Sartori (PPE), Potito Salatto (PPE), Debora Serracchiani (S&D), Ivo Belet (PPE), Iliana Ivanova (PPE), Rareş-Lucian Niculescu (PPE), Georgios Papastamkos (PPE), Marietta Giannakou (PPE), Vasilica Viorica Dăncilă (S&D), Luís Paulo Alves (S&D), Mojca Kleva (S&D), Othmar Karas (PPE), Iuliu Winkler (PPE), Monica Luisa Macovei (PPE), Hans-Peter Mayer (PPE), Marian Harkin (ALDE), Katarína Neved'álová (S&D), Filip Kaczmarek (PPE), Constance Le Grip (PPE), Jörg Leichtfried (S&D), Elena Băsescu (PPE), Pavel Poc (S&D), László Surján (PPE), Georgios Papanikolaou (PPE), Ildikó Gáll-Pelcz (PPE), Liisa Jaakonsaari (S&D), Marian-Jean Marinescu (PPE), Nikolaos Salavrakos (EFD), Konstantinos Poupakis (PPE), Evelyn Regner (S&D), Iliana Malinova Iotova (S&D), Rui Tavares (Verts/ALE), József Szájer (PPE), Juozas Imbrasas (EFD), Dimitar Stoyanov (NI), Ioan Mircea Pașcu (S&D), Vilja Savisaar-Toomast (ALDE), Danuta Jazłowiecka (PPE), Seán Kelly (PPE), Rolandas Paksas (EFD), Ioannis A. Tsoukalas (PPE), Phil Prendergast (S&D), Saïd El Khadraoui (S&D), Ioan Enciu (S&D), Jaroslav Paška (EFD), Peter Simon (S&D), Niki Tzavela (EFD), Ádám Kósa (PPE), Josef Weidenholzer (S&D), Theodor Dumitru Stolojan (PPE), Cornelis de Jong (GUE/NGL), Kristian Vigenin (S&D), Mário David (PPE), Ryszard Antoni Legutko (ECR), Georgios Koumoutsakos (PPE) e Salvador Sedó i Alabart (PPE)

(1 de fevereiro de 2012)

Assunto: Criação de uma agência europeia de notação de risco

A fim de garantir o máximo de credibilidade, transparência e independência das agências de notação de risco, a Comissão decidiu atualizar o quadro legislativo presentemente em vigor, propondo, em 15 de novembro de 2011, a alteração da Diretiva 2009/65/CE que coordena as disposições legislativas, regulamentares e administrativas respeitantes a alguns organismos de investimento coletivo em valores mobiliários (OICVM) e da Diretiva 2011/61/UE relativa aos gestores de fundos de investimento alternativos no que se refere à excessiva dependência relativamente às notações de risco, bem como a alteração do Regulamento (CE) n.º 1060/2009 relativo às agências de notação de risco.

O objetivo é também garantir que as agências de notação de risco sejam isentas de conflitos de interesses, de modo a assegurar a imparcialidade absoluta das avaliações apresentadas, sendo esta uma garantia indispensável sobretudo à luz da grave situação económica e financeira.

É igualmente oportuno estabelecer regras de incompatibilidade entre os serviços de consultoria prestados aos bancos, fundos de investimento e/ou outras sociedades financeiras e a avaliação das notações de risco de entidades públicas.

Para este fim, o Parlamento Europeu, na sua resolução de 8 de junho de 2011 sobre as agências de notação de risco, solicitou a análise e a avaliação da possibilidade de criação de uma agência europeia de notação de risco.

Neste contexto, poderia a Comissão informar:

1. Se é favorável à criação de uma agência europeia de notação de risco;
2. Se existe algum estudo de viabilidade em curso sobre a criação dessa agência, como foi solicitado pelo Parlamento Europeu?

Resposta conjunta dada por Michel Barnier em nome da Comissão
(26 de março de 2012)

A proposta de alteração do regulamento relativo às agências de notação de risco foi adotada pela Comissão em 15 de novembro de 2011. Terceira componente de um quadro regulamentar ambicioso aplicável às agências de notação de risco, a proposta inclui alterações profundas ao regulamento atual relativo a essas agências. As principais iniciativas contempladas na proposta consistem em diminuir a importância que os investidores atribuem às notações, aumentar a transparência e a rapidez das notações soberanas, tornar mais diversificadas e independentes as agências de notação, aumentar a sua transparência e comparabilidade e garantir que as agências sejam civilmente responsáveis.

A criação de uma nova agência de notação de risco independente foi uma das opções consideradas no documento de consulta dos serviços da Comissão de 5 de novembro de 2010, tendo sido igualmente discutida com as partes interessadas numa mesa redonda realizada em 6 de julho de 2011. Na avaliação de impacto que acompanha a sua proposta legislativa mais recente, a Comissão debruçou-se sobre a viabilidade da criação de uma nova instituição europeia independente de notação de risco e de uma agência de notação de risco europeia. Essa análise mostrou que a criação de uma tal agência com dinheiros públicos, independentemente do seu modelo concreto, seria uma iniciativa cara (estimada em cerca de 300 a 500 milhões de euros num período de 5 anos) e poderia suscitar dúvidas quanto à credibilidade e independência da agência.

Foi por estes motivos que a Comissão decidiu não levar por diante a ideia neste momento. No entanto, a Comissão é favorável a qualquer iniciativa privada que vise a criação de uma agência de notação europeia e saudá-la-á.

A Comissão está também a tomar medidas para promover a diversidade no mercado das notações e a independência das agências de notação de risco, propondo, nomeadamente, a sua rotação obrigatória após um certo período.

(Versiunea în limba română)

**Întrebarea cu solicitare de răspuns scris E-001195/12
adresată Comisiei**

Roberta Angelilli (PPE), Gianni Pittella (S&D), Alfredo Pallone (PPE), Mario Mauro (PPE), David-Maria Sassoli (S&D), Giuseppe Gargani (PPE), Francesco Enrico Speroni (EFD), Niccolò Rinaldi (ALDE), Sonia Alfano (ALDE), Alfredo Antoniozzi (PPE), Raffaele Baldassarre (PPE), Paolo Bartolozzi (PPE), Mario Borghezio (EFD), Antonello Antinoro (PPE), Pino Arlacchi (S&D), Salvatore Caronna (S&D), Francesco De Angelis (S&D), Carlo Fidanza (PPE), Roberto Gualtieri (S&D), Erminia Mazzoni (PPE), Claudio Morganti (EFD), Aldo Patriciello (PPE), Fiorello Provera (EFD), Crescenzio Rivellini (PPE), Oreste Rossi (EFD), Marco Scurria (PPE), Gianluca Susta (S&D), Salvatore Tatarella (PPE), Giommaria Uggias (ALDE), Gianni Vattimo (ALDE), Andrea Zanoni (ALDE), Iva Zanicchi (PPE), Sergio Paolo Frances Silvestris (PPE), Giancarlo Scottà (EFD), Giovanni La Via (PPE), Guido Milana (S&D), Francesca Balzani (S&D), Paolo De Castro (S&D), Lara Comi (PPE), Carlo Casini (PPE), Gabriele Albertini (PPE), Lorenzo Fontana (EFD), Sergio Gaetano Cofferati (S&D), Patrizia Toia (S&D), Vito Bonsignore (PPE), Magdi Cristiano Allam (EFD), Cristiana Muscardini (PPE), Salvatore Iacolino (PPE), Antonio Cancian (PPE), Clemente Mastella (PPE), Herbert Dorfmann (PPE), Mario Pirillo (S&D), Elisabetta Gardini (PPE), Vincenzo Iovine (ALDE), Barbara Matera (PPE), Tiziano Motti (PPE), Pier Antonio Panzeri (S&D), Vittorio Prodi (S&D), Amalia Sartori (PPE), Potito Salatto (PPE), Debora Serracchiani (S&D), Ivo Belet (PPE), Iliana Ivanova (PPE), Rareş-Lucian Niculescu (PPE), Georgios Papastamkos (PPE), Marietta Giannakou (PPE), Vasilica Viorica Dăncilă (S&D), Luís Paulo Alves (S&D), Mojca Kleva (S&D), Othmar Karas (PPE), Iuliu Winkler (PPE), Monica Luisa Macovei (PPE), Hans-Peter Mayer (PPE), Marian Harkin (ALDE), Katarína Neved'álová (S&D), Filip Kaczmarek (PPE), Constance Le Grip (PPE), Jörg Leichtfried (S&D), Elena Băsescu (PPE), Pavel Poc (S&D), László Surján (PPE), Georgios Papanikolaou (PPE), Ildikó Gáll-Pelcz (PPE), Liisa Jaakonsaari (S&D), Marian-Jean Marinescu (PPE), Nikolaos Salavrakos (EFD), Konstantinos Poupanakis (PPE), Evelyn Regner (S&D), Iliana Malinova Iotova (S&D), Rui Tavares (Verts/ALE), József Szájer (PPE), Juozas Imbrasas (EFD), Dimitar Stoyanov (NI), Ioan Mircea Pașcu (S&D), Vilja Savisaar-Toomast (ALDE), Danuta Jazłowiecka (PPE), Seán Kelly (PPE), Rolandas Paksas (EFD), Ioannis A. Tsoukalas (PPE), Phil Prendergast (S&D), Saïd El Khadraoui (S&D), Ioan Enciu (S&D), Jaroslav Paška (EFD), Peter Simon (S&D), Niki Tzavela (EFD), Ádám Kósa (PPE), Josef Weidenholzer (S&D), Theodor Dumitru Stolojan (PPE), Cornelis de Jong (GUE/NGL), Kristian Vigenin (S&D), Mário David (PPE), Ryszard Antoni Legutko (ECR), Georgios Koumoutsakos (PPE) și Salvador Sedó i Alabart (PPE)

(1 februarie 2012)

Subiect: Inființarea unei agenții europene de rating de credit

Pentru a garanta credibilitatea maximă, transparența și independența agenților de rating, Comisia a urmărit să actualizeze cadrul legislativ în vigoare, propunând, la 15 noiembrie 2011, modificarea Directivei 2009/65/CE de coordonare a actelor cu putere de lege și a actelor administrative privind organismele de plasament colectiv în valori mobiliare (OPCVM) și a Directivei 2011/61/UE privind administratorii fondurilor de investiții alternative în ceea ce privește încrederea excesivă acordată ratingurilor de credit, precum și modificarea Regulamentului (CE) nr. 1060/2009 privind agențile de rating de credit.

Scopul este, în egală măsură, de a asigura faptul că agențile de rating nu au conflicte de interes, astfel încât să garanteze absoluta imparțialitate a evaluărilor efectuate, garanție indispensabilă mai ales în lumina situației economice și financiare grave.

De asemenea, este necesar să se stabilească regulile de incompatibilitate între activitatea de consultanță pentru bănci, fondurile de investiții și/sau alte societăți financiare și evaluarea ratingului acordat entităților publice.

În acest scop, prin Rezoluția sa din 8 iunie 2011 privind agențile de rating de credit, Parlamentul European a solicitat examinarea și evaluarea posibilității de a înființa o agenție europeană de rating de credit.

În aceste condiții, Comisia poate preciza:

1. dacă este de acord cu crearea unei agenții europene de rating de credit;
2. dacă se află în curs de pregătire un studiu de fezabilitate privind înființarea unei astfel de agenții, conform solicitării Parlamentului European?

Răspuns comun dat de dl Barnier în numele Comisiei
(26 martie 2012)

La 15 noiembrie 2011, Comisia a adoptat o propunere de modificare a regulamentului privind agențile de rating de credit (CRA III). Aceasta reprezintă a treia componentă a unui cadru ambițios de reglementare în ceea ce privește agențile de rating de credit. Propunerea include o serie de modificări radicale ale actualului regulament privind agențile de rating de credit. Printre principalele inițiative se numără: diminuarea importanței pe care investitorii o acordă ratingurilor; creșterea transparenței și a promptitudinii ratingurilor suverane; sporirea diversității și a independenței agenților de rating de credit; creșterea transparenței și a comparabilității agenților de rating de credit; asigurarea răspunderii civile a agenților de rating de credit.

Înființarea unei noi agenții de rating de credit independente a reprezentat una dintre opțiunile prezentate în documentul de consultare al serviciilor Comisiei din 5 noiembrie 2010, făcând de asemenea obiectul discuțiilor cu părțile interesate care au avut loc cu ocazia mesei rotunde din 6 iulie 2011. În cadrul evaluării impactului care a însoțit cea mai recentă propunere legislativă a sa, Comisia a evaluat fezabilitatea înființării unei noi fundații europene independente de rating de credit și a unei agenții europene independente de credit de rating. Această analiză a demonstrat că înființarea unei agenții de rating de credit din fonduri publice, indiferent de modelul specific, ar fi costisitoare (aproximativ 300-500 MEUR pe o perioadă de 5 ani) și că ea ar putea ridica semne de întrebare cu privire la credibilitatea și independența agenției de rating de credit respective.

Din aceste motive, Comisia a decis să nu aprofundeze această idee la momentul actual. Cu toate acestea, Comisia susține și salută orice inițiativă privată de înființare a unei agenții europene de rating de credit.

De asemenea, Comisia ia măsuri de promovare a diversității pe piața de rating și a independenței agenților de rating de credit, propunând, printre altele, o rotație periodică obligatorie a agenților de rating de credit.

(Slovenské znenie)

Otázka na písomné zodpovedanie E-001195/12

Komisii

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(1. februára 2012)

Vec: Vytvorenie Európskej ratingovej agentúry

Pre zabezpečenie maximálnej dôveryhodnosti, transparentnosti a nezávislosti ratingových agentúr a s úmyslom aktualizovať v súčasnosti platný právny rámec Komisia dňa 15. novembra 2011 navrhla zmenu a doplnenie smernice 2009/65/ES o koordinácii zákonov, iných právnych predpisov a správnych opatrení týkajúcich sa podnikov kolektívneho investovania do prevoditeľných cenných papierov (PKIPCP) a smernice 2011/61/EÚ o správcoch alternatívnych investičných fondov, pokiaľ ide o nadmerné spoliehanie sa na úverové ratingy, ako aj zmenu a doplnenie nariadenia (ES) č. 1060/2009 o ratingových agentúrach.

Cieľom je tiež zabezpečiť, aby ratingové agentúry nemali konflikty záujmov a aby tak bola zabezpečená úplná nestrannosť vykonaných hodnotení, pričom táto záruka je nevyhnutná predovšetkým s ohľadom na vážnu hospodársku a finančnú situáciu.

Je tiež vhodné stanoviť pravidlá nezlučiteľnosti poradenskej činnosti v prospech bánk, investičných fondov a/alebo iných finančných korporácií s hodnotením ratingu verejných inštitúcií.

Na tento účel Európsky parlament uznesením zo dňa 8. júna 2011 o ratingových agentúrach požadal o preskúmanie a prehodnotenie možnosti vytvoriť Európsku ratingovú agentúru.

Mohla by Komisia v tejto súvislosti uviesť:

1. či podporuje vytvorenie Európskej ratingovej agentúry;
2. či sa pripravuje štúdia realizovateľnosti takejto agentúry, ako to požaduje Európsky parlament?

Spoločná odpoveď pána Barniera v mene Komisie
(26. marca 2012)

Komisia 15. novembra 2011 prijala návrh na zmenu a doplnenie nariadenia o ratingových agentúrach (CRA III). Ide o tretiu časť ambiciozného regulačného rámca pre ratingové agentúry. Návrh zahŕňa ďalekosiahle zmeny a doplnenia súčasného nariadenia o ratingových agentúrach. Medzi najdôležitejšie iniciatívy patrí: zníženie závislosti investorov od ratingov; transparentnejšie a aktuálnejšie ratingy štátov; väčšia rozmanitosť a nezávislosť ratingových agentúr; väčšia transparentnosť a porovnatelnosť ratingových agentúr; občianskoprávna zodpovednosť ratingových agentúr.

Vytvorenie novej nezávislej ratingovej agentúry bolo jednou z možností navrhnutých 5. novembra 2010 v konzultačnom dokumente útvarov Komisie, ako aj predmetom rokovania so zainteresovanými stranami na zasadnutí za okrúhlym stolom 6. júla 2011. Komisia posúdila realizovateľnosť zriadenia novej nezávislej európskej nadácie pre úverový rating a nezávislej európskej ratingovej agentúry v posúdení vplyvu priloženom k jej najnovšiemu legislatívному návrhu. Z tejto analýzy vyplynulo, že vytvorenie ratingovej agentúry z verejných prostriedkov by bez ohľadu na jej konkrétny model bolo nákladné (podľa odhadu približne 300 – 500 miliónov EUR za 5 rokov) a mohlo by viesť k zvýšeniu obáv týkajúcich sa dôveryhodnosti a nezávislosti tejto ratingovej agentúry.

Z týchto dôvodov sa Komisia v tomto štádiu rozhodla, že sa touto myšlienkou ďalej nebude zaoberať. Komisia však podporuje a ocení akúkoľvek súkromnú iniciatívu súvisiacu s vytvorením európskej ratingovej agentúry.

Komisia takisto urobí kroky na podporu rozmanitosti na trhu úverových ratingov a nezávislosti ratingových agentúr, a to okrem iných opatrení aj návrhom povinnej rotácie ratingových agentúr po určitom období.

(Slovenska različica)

**Vprašanje za pisni odgovor E-001195/12
za Komisijo**

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(1. februar 2012)

Zadeva: Ustanovitev evropske bonitetne agencije

Evropska komisija namerava, z namenom zagotoviti čim večjo verodostojnost, preglednost in neodvisnost bonitetnih agencij, posodobiti veljavni pravni okvir, zato je 15. novembra 2011 predlagala spremembo Direktive 2009/65/ES o usklajevanju zakonov in drugih predpisov o kolektivnih naložbenih podjemih za vlaganja v prenosljive vrednostne papirje (KNPVP) in Direktive 2011/61/EU o upraviteljih alternativnih investicijskih skladov v zvezi s prevelikim zanašanjem na bonitetne ocene ter spremembo Uredbe (ES) št. 1060/2009 o bonitetnih agencijah.

Namen je tudi zagotoviti preprečevanje navzkrižja interesov bonitetnih agencij, da se zagotovi popolna nepristranskost bonitetnih ocen, ki jo je nujno treba zagotoviti zlasti zaradi težkih gospodarskih in finančnih razmer.

Treba bi bilo tudi določiti pravila o nezdružljivosti dejavnosti svetovanja bankam, investicijskim skladom in/ali drugim finančnim družbam z ocenjevanjem bonitev javnih subjektov.

V ta namen je Evropski parlament z resolucijo z dne 8. junija 2011 o bonitetnih agencijah zahteval raziskavo in oceno možnosti ustanovitev evropske bonitetne agencije.

Glede na zgoraj navedeno, ali bi Komisija lahko pojasnila:

1. ali podpira ustanovitev evropske bonitetne agencije?
2. ali je v pripravi študija o izvedljivosti ustanovitve take agencije, ki jo je zahteval Evropski parlament?

Skupni odgovor g. Barnierja v imenu Komisije
(26. marec 2012)

Komisija je 15. novembra 2011 sprejela predlog o spremembi uredbe o bonitetnih agencijah (CRA III). Predlog predstavlja tretji element ambiciozne zakonodajne ureditve za bonitetne agencije in vsebuje korenite spremembe obstoječe uredbe o bonitetnih agencijah. Glavni cilji predloga so: manj zanašanja vlagateljev na bonitetne ocene, bolj pregledne in pravočasne bonitetne ocene držav, večja raznolikost in neodvisnost bonitetnih agencij, večja preglednost in primerljivost bonitetnih agencij ter civilnopravna odgovornost bonitetnih agencij.

Ustanovitev nove neodvisne bonitetne agencije je bila ena od možnosti, opisanih v posvetovalnem dokumentu služb Komisije z dne 5. novembra 2010, o kateri se je razpravljalo tudi z zainteresiranimi strankami na okrogli mizi, ki je potekala 6. julija 2011. Komisija je v oceni učinka, ki je bila priložena njenemu zadnjemu zakonodajnemu predlogu, ocenila izvedljivost ustanovitve nove neodvisne evropske ustanove za bonitetno ocenjevanje in neodvisne evropske bonitetne agencije. Analiza je pokazala, da bi ustanovitev bonitetne agencije z javnim denarjem, ne glede na to, po kakšnem modelu, stala veliko (po ocenah 300–500 milijonov evrov v obdobju 5 let) in da bi to lahko privedlo do dvomov o njeni verodostojnosti in neodvisnosti.

Zaradi zgornjih razlogov se je Komisija odločila, da bo zaenkrat opustila to idejo. Vsekakor pa podpira in pozdravlja kakršno koli zasebno pobudo za ustanovitev evropske bonitetne agencije.

Komisija si prizadeva tudi za spodbujanje raznolikosti na trgu bonitetnega ocenjevanja in neodvisnosti bonitetnih agencij zato je, med drugim, predlagala obvezno rotacijo bonitetnih agencij po preteklu določenega obdobja.

(Suomenkielinen versio)

**Kirjallisesti vastattava kysymys E-001195/12
komissiolle**

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(1. helmikuuta 2012)

Aihe: Eurooppalaisen luottoluokituslaitoksen perustaminen

Luottoluokituslaitosten mahdollisimman suuren luottavuuden, avoimuuden ja riippumattomuuden takaamiseksi komissio aikoo saattaa ajan tasalle nykyään voimassa olevan säädelyjärjestelmän. Näin ollen se ehdotti 15. marraskuuta 2011 siirtokelpoisii arvopapereihin kohdistuvaa yhteistä sijoitustoimintaa harjoittavia yrityksiä (yhteissijoitusyritykset) koskevien lakiens, asetusten ja hallinnollisten määräysten yhteensovittamisesta annetun direktiivin 2009/65/EY ja vaihtoehtoisten sijoitusrahastojen hoitajien liallista luottoluokituslaitosten käyttöä sekä luottoluokituslaitoksia koskevan asetuksen (EY) N:o 1060/2009 muuttamista koskevan direktiivin 2011/61/EU muuttamista.

Tavoitteena on myös varmistaa, ettei luottoluokituslaitoksissa synny eturistiriitoja, jotta laitokset voivat taata tekemiensä arvioiden täydellisen riippumattomuuden. Tämä on välttämätön edellytys, kun otetaan huomioon erityisesti vakava talous- ja rahoituskriisi.

Lisäksi on syytä määrittää pankkien, sijoitusrahastojen ja/tai muiden rahoitusyhtiöiden hyväksi tehtävän konsultointitoiminnan ja julkisen sektorin toimijoiden luokitusarvioiden väliset yhteensopimattomuussäännot.

Tässä tarkoitukseissa Euroopan parlamentti pyysi luottoluokituslaitoksista 8. kesäkuuta 2011 antamassaan päättöslauselmassa harkitsemaan ja arvioimaan mahdollisuutta perustaa eurooppalainen luottoluokituslaitos.

Voiko komissio edellä esitetyn perusteella vastata seuraaviin kysymyksiin:

1. Kannattaako se eurooppalaisen luottoluokituslaitoksen perustamista?
2. Toteutetaanko Euroopan parlamentin pyytämää kyseisen laitoksen perustamista koskevaa toteutettavuustutkimusta parhaillaan?

Michel Barnier'n komission puolesta antama yhteinen vastaus
(26. maaliskuuta 2012)

Komissio hyväksyi 15. marraskuuta 2011 luottoluokituslaitosasetusta koskevan muutosehdotuksen (CRA III). Tämä ehdotus muodostaa kolmannen osan luottoluokituslaitoksia koskevasta kunnianhimoisesta sääntelykehyksestä. Ehdotus sisältää kauaskantoisia muutoksia nykyiseen luottoluokituslaitosasetukseen. Tärkeimmät muutokset ovat seuraavat: sijoittajien riippuvuus luokituksesta vähenee, valtion luottoluokituslaitosten avoimuus ja oikea-aikaisuus lisääntyvät, luottoluokituslaitoksista tulee monimuotoisempia ja riippumattomampia, luottoluokituslaitosten avoimuus ja vertailukelpoisuus paranevat, ja luottoluokituslaitosten vastuuvelvollisuutta lisätään.

Komission yksiköiden 5. marraskuuta 2010 julkaisemassa kuulemisasiakirjassa esitettiin yhtenä vaihtoehtona uuden riippumattoman luottoluokituslaitoksen perustamista. Asiasta keskusteltiin myös sidosryhmien kanssa 6. heinäkuuta 2011 järjestetyssä pyöreän pöydän keskustelussa. Komissio on arvioinut uuden riippumattoman Euroopan luottoluokitussektoriin ja riippumattoman eurooppalaisen luottoluokituslaitoksen perustamisen toteutuskelpoisuutta viimeisimmän lainsääädäntöehdotuksensa ohessa esitetystä vaikuttustenarvioinnissa. Arvointi osoitti, että luottoluokituslaitoksen perustaminen julkisen varoin sen toteuttamismuodosta riippumatta olisi kallista (arvioiden mukaan noin 300-500 miljoonaa euroa viiden vuoden aikana). Huolta herättäisi myös luottoluokituslaitoksen luotettavuus ja riippumattomuus.

Edellä esitetystä syistä komissio on päättänyt, että ajatus haudataan toistaiseksi. Komissio suhtautuu kuitenkin myönteisesti kaikkiin eurooppalaisen luottoluokituslaitoksen perustamista koskeviin yksityisiin aloitteisiin.

Komissio aikoo myös toteuttaa toimia lisätäkseen monimuotoisuutta luottoluokitusmarkkinoilla ja lisätäkseen luottoluokituslaitosten riippumattomuutta ehdottamalla muun muassa luottoluokituslaitosten pakollista vahitamista tietyn ajan jälkeen.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-001195/12
to the Commission**

Roberta Angelilli (PPE), Gianni Pittella (S&D), Alfredo Pallone (PPE), Mario Mauro (PPE), David-Maria Sassoli (S&D), Giuseppe Gargani (PPE), Francesco Enrico Speroni (EFD), Niccolò Rinaldi (ALDE), Sonia Alfano (ALDE), Alfredo Antoniozzi (PPE), Raffaele Baldassarre (PPE), Paolo Bartolozzi (PPE), Mario Borghezio (EFD), Antonello Antinoro (PPE), Pino Arlacchi (S&D), Salvatore Caronna (S&D), Francesco De Angelis (S&D), Carlo Fidanza (PPE), Roberto Gualtieri (S&D), Erminia Mazzoni (PPE), Claudio Morganti (EFD), Aldo Patriciello (PPE), Fiorello Provera (EFD), Crescenzo Rivellini (PPE), Oreste Rossi (EFD), Marco Scurria (PPE), Gianluca Susta (S&D), Salvatore Tatarella (PPE), Giommaria Uggias (ALDE), Gianni Vattimo (ALDE), Andrea Zanoni (ALDE), Iva Zanicchi (PPE), Sergio Paolo Frances Silvestris (PPE), Giancarlo Scottà (EFD), Giovanni La Via (PPE), Guido Milana (S&D), Francesca Balzani (S&D), Paolo De Castro (S&D), Lara Comi (PPE), Carlo Casini (PPE), Gabriele Albertini (PPE), Lorenzo Fontana (EFD), Sergio Gaetano Cofferati (S&D), Patrizia Toia (S&D), Vito Bonsignore (PPE), Magdi Cristiano Allam (EFD), Cristiana Muscardini (PPE), Salvatore Iacolino (PPE), Antonio Cancian (PPE), Clemente Mastella (PPE), Herbert Dorfmann (PPE), Mario Pirillo (S&D), Elisabetta Gardini (PPE), Vincenzo Iovine (ALDE), Barbara Matera (PPE), Tiziano Motti (PPE), Pier Antonio Panzeri (S&D), Vittorio Prodi (S&D), Amalia Sartori (PPE), Potito Salatto (PPE), Debora Serracchiani (S&D), Ivo Belet (PPE), Iliana Ivanova (PPE), Rareş-Lucian Niculescu (PPE), Georgios Papastamkos (PPE), Marietta Giannakou (PPE), Vasilica Viorica Dăncilă (S&D), Luís Paulo Alves (S&D), Mojca Kleva (S&D), Othmar Karas (PPE), Iuliu Winkler (PPE), Monica Luisa Macovei (PPE), Hans-Peter Mayer (PPE), Marian Harkin (ALDE), Katarína Neved'álová (S&D), Filip Kaczmarek (PPE), Constance Le Grip (PPE), Jörg Leichtfried (S&D), Elena Băsescu (PPE), Pavel Poc (S&D), László Surján (PPE), Georgios Papanikolaou (PPE), Ildikó Gáll-Pelcz (PPE), Liisa Jaakonsaari (S&D), Marian-Jean Marinescu (PPE), Nikolaos Salavrakos (EFD), Konstantinos Poupanakis (PPE), Evelyn Regner (S&D), Iliana Malinova Iotova (S&D), Rui Tavares (Verts/ALE), József Szájer (PPE), Juozas Imbrasas (EFD), Dimitar Stoyanov (NI), Ioan Mircea Paşcu (S&D), Vilja Savisaar-Toomast (ALDE), Danuta Jazłowiecka (PPE), Seán Kelly (PPE), Rolandas Paksas (EFD), Ioannis A. Tsoukalas (PPE), Phil Prendergast (S&D), Saïd El Khadraoui (S&D), Ioan Enciu (S&D), Jaroslav Paška (EFD), Peter Simon (S&D), Niki Tzavela (EFD), Ádám Kósa (PPE), Josef Weidenholzer (S&D), Theodor Dumitru Stolojan (PPE), Cornelis de Jong (GUE/NGL), Kristian Vigenin (S&D), Mário David (PPE), Ryszard Antoni Legutko (ECR), Georgios Koumoutsakos (PPE) and Salvador Sedó i Alabart (PPE)

(1 February 2012)

Subject: Establishment of a European credit rating agency

On 15 November 2011 the Commission, seeking to ensure the highest levels of credibility, transparency and independence among rating agencies, set out to update the regulatory framework currently in force by submitting proposals amending Directive 2009/65/EC on the coordination of laws, regulations and administrative provisions relating to undertakings for collective investment in transferable securities (UCITS) and Directive 2011/61/EU on Alternative Investment Fund Managers in respect of the excessive reliance on credit ratings, as well as Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009 on credit rating agencies.

The aim is also to ensure that rating agencies are not affected by conflicts of interest, so as to guarantee that evaluations are made in absolute impartiality. Ensuring such impartiality is essential, particularly in the light of the serious economic and financial situation.

Rules should also be laid down on the incompatibility between assistance to banks, investment funds and/or other financial institutions and the rating of public entities.

The European Parliament accordingly asked in its resolution of 8 June 2011 on credit rating agencies for possibility of setting up a European credit rating agency to be explored and assessed.

1. Is the Commission in favour of setting up of European credit rating agency?
2. Is any study currently being conducted on the feasibility of establishing such an agency, as requested by Parliament?

**Question for written answer E-001558/12
to the Commission
Sergio Paolo Frances Silvestris (PPE)
(9 February 2012)**

Subject: European credit rating agency

The Fitch credit rating agency has cut the credit ratings of five Italian banks. According to the agency, the decision was linked to the downgrading of Italy's sovereign debt and the reduction in GDP, which could reduce the quality of assets.

This vote on Italy's creditworthiness — which in this case represents a defeat — will have a considerable impact on the markets, as has recently been seen in the case of Greece, Spain and Italy itself, all victims of financial speculation.

In light of these facts, can the Commission therefore say:

1. whether it intends to regulate the status of credit rating agencies, which have hitherto not been governed by any international provisions;
2. whether it will set up a European credit rating agency, dependent on and controlled by the EU, to counter the oligarchy of the other credit rating agencies, which have previously committed gross errors of judgment, damaging thousands of small-scale investors?

**Joint answer given by Mr Barnier on behalf of the Commission
(26 March 2012)**

A proposal amending the Credit Rating Agencies (CRA III) Regulation was adopted by the Commission on 15 November 2011. It is the third component of an ambitious regulatory framework for credit rating agencies. The proposal includes far reaching amendments to the current Credit Rating Agencies Regulation. The major initiatives are the following: less investors' reliance on ratings; more transparent and timely sovereign ratings; more diversity and independence of credit rating agencies; more transparency and comparability of credit rating agencies; civil liability of credit rating agencies.

The setting up of a new independent credit rating agency was one of the options outlined in the Commission services' consultation paper of 5 November 2010 and was also discussed with stakeholders at a roundtable on 6 July 2011. The Commission has assessed the feasibility of establishing a new independent European credit rating foundation and independent European CRA in the impact assessment accompanying its latest legislative proposal. This analysis showed that setting up a credit rating agency with public money, irrespective of its particular model, would be costly (estimated ca EUR 300-500 million over a period of five years) and it could raise concerns regarding the CRA's credibility and independence.

For these reasons, the Commission has decided not to pursue this idea further at this stage. However, the Commission is in favour of and welcomes any private initiative of setting up of European credit rating agency.

The Commission is also taking action to promote diversity in the rating market and independence of CRAs by proposing, among other measures, a mandatory rotation of CRAs after a certain period.

(Versione italiana)

**Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-001702/12
alla Commissione
Niccolò Rinaldi (ALDE)
(13 febbraio 2012)**

Oggetto: Procedura d'infrazione n. 2010/4227 per violazione della direttiva quadro europea 89/391/CEE

Il 30 settembre del 2011, a seguito della petizione 1919-09, è stata aperta la procedura d'infrazione (n. 2010/4227) contro l'Italia per violazione di alcuni punti della direttiva quadro europea 89/391/CEE sulla sicurezza sul lavoro.

Il 30 settembre 2011 è stata inviata all'Italia una lettera di costituzione di messa in mora, contenente i seguenti punti:

1. deresponsabilizzazione del datore di lavoro in caso di delega e subdelega;
2. violazione dell'obbligo di disporre di una valutazione dei rischi per la sicurezza e la salute durante il lavoro per i datori di lavoro che occupano fino a 10 lavoratori;
3. proroga dei termini impartiti per la redazione del documento di valutazione dei rischi per le nuove imprese o per modifiche sostanziali apportate ad imprese esistenti;
4. posticipazione dell'obbligo di valutazione del rischio di stress legato al lavoro;
5. posticipazione dell'applicazione della legislazione in materia di protezione della salute e sicurezza sul lavoro per le persone appartenenti a cooperative sociali e a organizzazioni di volontariato della protezione civile;
6. proroga del termine per completare l'adeguamento alle disposizioni di prevenzione incendi per le strutture ricettive turistico-alberghiere con oltre 25 posti letto esistenti in data 9 aprile 1994.

Si chiede quindi alla Commissione:

visto che sono passati quasi tre mesi dal termine entro cui l'Italia doveva inviare le sue osservazioni, a che punto è la procedura d'infrazione?

**Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-002017/12
alla Commissione**

**Sergio Gaetano Cofferati (S&D), Andrea Cozzolino (S&D), Luigi Berlinguer (S&D), Rita Borsellino (S&D),
Salvatore Caronna (S&D), Silvia Costa (S&D), Rosario Crocetta (S&D), Leonardo Domenici (S&D), Roberto
Gualtieri (S&D), Pier Antonio Panzeri (S&D), Gianni Pittella (S&D), David-Maria Sassoli (S&D), Debora
Serracchiani (S&D), Gianluca Susta (S&D) e Patrizia Toia (S&D)**
(21 febbraio 2012)

Oggetto: Recepimento in Italia della direttiva 89/391/CEE concernente l'attuazione di misure volte a promuovere il miglioramento della sicurezza e della salute dei lavoratori durante il lavoro

Il 30 Settembre 2011 la Commissione europea, facendo seguito alla petizione 1919-2009, ha trasmesso al Governo italiano le sue osservazioni circa il non corretto recepimento della direttiva 89/391/CEE, con particolare riferimento al decreto legge italiano n. 106/2009.

Considerando che la Commissione ha comunicato al Parlamento europeo, il 13 Gennaio 2011, di avere intenzione di procedere con la messa in mora, con particolare riferimento alla deresponsabilizzazione del datore di lavoro, all'aggiornamento dell'obbligo di valutazione del rischio di stress da lavoro, alla proroga dei termini per la redazione del documento di valutazione dei rischi per una nuova impresa o per modifiche sostanziali apportate a un'impresa esistente.

Considerando che la Commissione ha comunicato al Parlamento europeo, il 18 luglio 2011, di volere integrare, anche a seguito di chiarimenti con le autorità italiane, il progetto di lettera di messa in mora con riferimento alla violazione dell'obbligo di disporre di una valutazione dei rischi per i datori di lavoro che occupano fino a 10 lavoratori, alla relazione sull'applicazione della legislazione in materia di salute e sicurezza sul lavoro anche per le cooperative sociali e le organizzazioni di volontariato e di protezione civile e sulla proroga del termine fissato per le disposizioni per la prevenzione degli incendi negli edifici di accoglienza turistica con più di 25 posti letto.

Chiediamo alla Commissione:

- il Governo italiano ha replicato alle obiezioni ad esso sottoposte e, in caso affermativo, in che modo?
- a fronte di tali risposte o della mancanza di queste, ritiene la Commissione necessario proseguire con la procedura di infrazione per violazione del diritto dell'Unione secondo l'art. 258 del TFUE, al fine di un corretto recepimento della direttiva 89/391/CEE?

Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-002178/12
alla Commissione
Sonia Alfano (ALDE)
(27 febbraio 2012)

Oggetto: Presunte violazioni della direttiva sulla sicurezza sul lavoro da parte dell'Italia

Viste le interrogazioni scritte P-1144/10 e E-1152/10,

Vista la petizione 1919-09 del signor Marco Bazzoni la quale ha fatto aprire la procedura d'infrazione numero 2010/4227 contro l'Italia per violazioni di alcuni punti della direttiva 89/391/CEE del Consiglio, del 12 giugno 1989, riguardante l'applicazione di provvedimenti volti a promuovere il miglioramento della sicurezza e della salute dei lavoratori sul luogo di lavoro;

Considerando che il 30 settembre 2011 è stata inviata all'Italia una lettera di costituzione di messa in mora, contenente i seguenti punti: 1) deresponsabilizzazione del datore di lavoro in caso di delega e subdelega; 2) violazione dell'obbligo di disporre di una valutazione dei rischi per la sicurezza e la salute durante il lavoro per i datori di lavoro che occupano fino a 10 lavoratori; 3) proroga dei termini impartiti per la redazione del documento di valutazione dei rischi per le nuove imprese o per modifiche sostanziali apportate ad imprese esistenti; 4) posticipazione dell'obbligo di valutazione del rischio di stress legato al lavoro; 5) posticipazione dell'applicazione della legislazione in materia di protezione della salute e sicurezza sul lavoro per le persone appartenenti a cooperative sociali e a organizzazioni di volontariato della protezione civile; 6) proroga del termine per completare l'adeguamento alle disposizioni di prevenzione incendi per le strutture ricettive turistico-alberghiere con oltre 25 posti letto esistenti in data 9 aprile 1994;

Considerando che l'Italia doveva presentare entro il 30 novembre 2011 le sue osservazioni in merito;

Considerando che la Commissione europea doveva esaminare tali osservazioni e, nel caso si fossero dimostrate insufficienti, emettere un parere motivato, in cui si chiedeva all'Italia di adeguarsi alle disposizioni della messa in mora;

Considerando che in caso contrario la Commissione potrebbe adire la Corte di giustizia europea, la cui sentenza è vincolante per l'Italia;

Considerando che ad oggi sono passati quasi tre mesi dal termine entro il quale l'Italia doveva inviare le sue osservazioni;

Può la Commissione comunicare la data in cui l'Italia ha presentato ufficialmente le sue osservazioni e fornire informazioni precise sullo stato della procedura d'infrazione?

Risposta congiunta data da Laszlo Andor a nome della Commissione
(2 aprile 2012)

In data 8 dicembre 2011 l'Italia ha notificato alla Commissione la sua risposta alla lettera di costituzione in mora relativa all'infrazione 2010/4227. Tale risposta, contenente spiegazioni dettagliate che si estendevano su diverse dozzine di pagine, è stata immediatamente inviata al servizio incaricato della traduzione. In seguito al ricevimento della traduzione alla fine del mese di febbraio 2012 la Commissione ha avviato l'analisi giuridica della risposta italiana. Tale analisi è ancora in corso.

Il Parlamento è tenuto al corrente dello stato d'avanzamento di questa procedura d'infrazione per il tramite delle informazioni fornite regolarmente e aggiornate dalla Commissione nel quadro del trattamento di una petizione deposta presso il Parlamento europeo e avente quale base la stessa che denuncia che è all'origine della procedura d'infrazione in questione.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-001702/12
to the Commission
Niccolò Rinaldi (ALDE)
(13 February 2012)**

Subject: Infringement procedure No 2010/4277 for breach of European Framework Directive 89/391/EEC

On 30 September 2011, following petition 1919-09, an infringement procedure (No 2010/4227) was launched against Italy for failure to comply with certain sections of European Framework Directive 89/391/EEC on safety in the workplace.

On 30 September 2011, a letter of formal notice was sent to Italy addressing the following points:

1. avoidance of employer responsibilities with regard to delegation and sub-delegation;
2. breach of obligation to provide an assessment of health and safety risks at work for employers with up to 10 employees;
3. extension of proposed deadline for drafting documentation for the evaluation of risks for new businesses or for substantial changes made to existing businesses;
4. postponement of the obligation to assess the risks of work-related stress;
5. delay in the application of legislation on health and safety at work for persons belonging to social cooperatives and voluntary civil protection organisations;
6. extension of the deadline to comply with fire prevention regulations for tourist accommodation facilities and hotels with more than 25 beds in existence on 9 April 1994.

Can the Commission therefore say:

- since almost three months have passed since the deadline within which Italy was expected to send its observations, what stage has the infringement procedure now reached?

**Question for written answer E-002017/12
to the Commission**

Sergio Gaetano Cofferati (S&D), Andrea Cozzolino (S&D), Luigi Berlinguer (S&D), Rita Borsellino (S&D), Salvatore Caronna (S&D), Silvia Costa (S&D), Rosario Crocetta (S&D), Leonardo Domenici (S&D), Roberto Gualtieri (S&D), Pier Antonio Panzeri (S&D), Gianni Pittella (S&D), David-Maria Sassoli (S&D), Debora Serracchiani (S&D), Gianluca Susta (S&D) and Patrizia Toia (S&D)
(21 February 2012)

Subject: Transposition in Italy of Directive 89/391/EEC on the introduction of measures to encourage improvements in the safety and health of workers at work

On 30 September 2011, in its follow-up to petition 1919/2009, the Commission sent the Italian Government its observations regarding the incorrect transposition of Directive 89/391/EEC, with particular reference to Italian Decree-Law No 106/2009.

The Commission notified Parliament on 13 January 2011 of its intention to serve formal notice, with particular reference to the exoneration of the employer from responsibility, delays regarding the mandatory work-related stress risk assessment, and the extension of deadlines for drafting the risk assessment report for a new undertaking or in respect of substantial modifications to an existing undertaking.

The Commission notified Parliament on 18 July 2011 that, following further clarifications with the Italian authorities, it wished to add the following to the draft letter of formal notice: violation of the requirement for employers employing 10 or fewer workers to have risk assessment documentation; the postponement of health and safety at work legislation also being applied to social cooperatives and voluntary organisations in the civil protection sector; and the extension of the deadline for the provisions on fire prevention in hotel buildings sleeping more than 25 people.

In light of these facts, we wish to ask the Commission:

- Has the Italian Government replied to the objections directed at it, and if so, how?
- Following its reply — or the lack thereof — does the Commission consider it necessary to continue infringement proceedings for breach of EC law pursuant to Article 258 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, to enable correct transposition of Directive 89/391/EEC?

Question for written answer E-002178/12

to the Commission

Sonia Alfano (ALDE)

(27 February 2012)

Subject: Alleged infringements of the EU Workplace Health and Safety Directive by Italy

With reference to Written Questions P-1144/10 and E-1152/10 and Petition 1919-09 lodged by Mr Marco Bazzoni, who started infringement proceeding No 2010/4227 against Italy for breaching several points of Council Directive 89/391/EEC of 12 June 1989 on the introduction of measures to encourage improvements in the safety and health of workers at work;

In view of the fact that on 30 September 2011 a letter of formal notice was issued to Italy in relation to the following points: 1) employer negligence through proxy and sub-proxy; 2) failure to ensure that employers with up to 10 employees conduct the obligatory assessment of risks to safety and health at work; 3) extension of the prescribed risk assessment drafting period for new businesses or established businesses undergoing significant changes; 4) postponement of the requirement for a work-related stress risk assessment; 5) postponement of the application of legislation pertaining to health protection and safety at work for members of social cooperatives and civil protection voluntary organisations; 6) extension of the deadline for implementing adjustments to fire safety provisions for tourist hotel facilities accommodating more than 25 people, if built on or before 6 April 1994;

In view of the fact that Italy had to submit its comments by 30 November 2011;

In view of the fact that the European Commission must review these comments and, if they are deemed to be insufficient, deliver a reasoned opinion calling on Italy to comply with the terms of the formal notice;

In view of the fact that if Italy does not comply, the Commission may call on the Court of Justice of the European Union, whose judgment is binding on Italy;

In view of the fact that it has been almost three months since the end of the period by which Italy was due to submit its comments;

Could the Commission state the date on which Italy officially submitted its comments and provide detailed information on the stage reached in the infringement proceedings?

(Version française)

Réponse commune donnée par M. Andor au nom de la Commission

(2 avril 2012)

En date du 8 décembre 2011, l'Italie a notifié à la Commission sa réponse à la lettre de mise en demeure dans le cas d'infraction 2010/4227. Cette réponse contenant des explications détaillées sur plusieurs dizaines de pages a été immédiatement envoyée au service chargé de la traduction. Dès la réception de la traduction à la fin du mois de février 2012, la Commission a entamé l'analyse juridique de la réponse italienne. Cette analyse est encore en cours.

Le Parlement est informé de l'avancée de cette procédure d'infraction via les informations fournies et régulièrement mises à jour par la Commission dans le cadre du traitement d'une pétition déposée auprès du Parlement européen et ayant comme base la même plainte que celle qui est à l'origine de la procédure d'infraction en question.

(Ελληνική έκδοση)

Ερώτηση με αίτημα γραπτής απάντησης E-001814/12
προς την Επιτροπή
Rodi Kratsa-Tsagaropoulou (PPE)
(15 Φεβρουαρίου 2012)

Θέμα: Καταστροφικές πλημμύρες στην Ηλεία και κινητοποίηση του Κοινοτικού Μηχανισμού Πολιτικής Προστασίας

Η καταρρακτώδης βροχή της 5ης Φεβρουαρίου 2012 στο νομό της Ηλείας είχε ως αποτέλεσμα το θάνατο πολίτη όπως και τεράστιες καταστροφές σε κρατικές υποδομές, οικίες και καλλιέργειες⁽¹⁾, θέτοντας δύο δήμους της περιοχής σε κατάσταση εκτάκτου ανάγκης. Η ίδια περιοχή είχε πληγεί ανεπανόρθωτα από πυρκαϊές το 2007 καθιστώντας επείγουσα την ανάγκη προπαρασκευαστικών έργων για την αντιμετώπιση ακριών καιρικών φαινομένων. Σύμφωνα με την απόφαση του Ευρωπαϊκού Συμβουλίου, «ο μηχανισμός παρέχει, κατόπιν αιτήματος, υποστήριξη σε μείζονες καταστάσεις έκτακτης ανάγκης όλων των τύπων» ... «Η Κοινότητα βοηθάει τα κράτη μέλη να ελαχιστοποιούν το χρόνο αντίδρασης στις καταστροφές» και «θα πρέπει να λαμβάνονται προπαρασκευαστικά μέτρα σε επίπεδο κρατών μελών και στο κοινοτικό επίπεδο, ώστε οι ομάδες επέμβασης για την παροχή βοήθειας σε καταστάσεις έκτακτης ανάγκης να κινητοποιούνται γρήγορα».

Δεδομένων των ανωτέρω, ερωτάται η Επιτροπή:

1. Έχει λάβει η Επιτροπή έως σήμερα 14.2.2012 αίτημα υποστήριξης από τις ελληνικές αρχές προκειμένου να ενεργοποιηθεί ο μηχανισμός πολιτικής προστασίας;
2. Πως σκοπεύει να αντιδράσει στην προκειμένη περίπτωση δεδομένης της ιδιαίτερα δυσχερούς δημοσιονομικής οικονομικής και κοινωνικής κατάστασης στην Ελλάδα;
3. Σκοπεύει να εγκρίνει αναπροσαρμογή πόρων από τα Διαφρωτικά Ταμεία για την αντιμετώπιση των σοβαρών έκτακτων αναγκών στην εν λόγω περιοχή; Σκοπεύει να συνεργαστεί με τις ελληνικές αρχές για τη διοχέτευση πόρων υπέρ των μικρομεσαίων επιχειρήσεων και της απασχόλησης των νέων από το πρόγραμμα των αδιάθετων 82 δις ευρώ σε ευρωπαϊκό επίπεδο;
4. Πως κρίνει το επίπεδο αποκατάστασης των ζημιών από τις πυρκαϊές του 2007 και την κατασκευή ειδικών έργων για πρόληψη φυσικών καταστροφών;

Απάντηση της κας Georgieva εξ ονόματος της Επιτροπής
(10 Μαΐου 2012)

1. Η Επιτροπή θα ήθελε να πληροφορήσει το Αξιότιμο Μέλος ότι δεν έχει λάβει αίτημα βοήθειας από τις ελληνικές αρχές μέσω του ευρωπαϊκού μηχανισμού πολιτικής προστασίας σχετικά με τις πλημμύρες της 5ης Φεβρουαρίου. Επίσης, μέχρι σήμερα, η Επιτροπή δεν έχει λάβει αίτηση για οικονομική ενίσχυση από το Ταμείο Αλληλεγγύης της ΕΕ.
2. Η Επιτροπή θα ήθελε να τονίσει ότι μπορεί, αν της ζητηθεί, να χρησιμοποιήσει μόνο αυτά τα δύο μέσα, τα οποία έχουν σχεδιαστεί για περιπτώσεις έκτακτης ανάγκης ορισμένου μεγέθους. Λεπτομέρειες σχετικά με τη λειτουργία του μηχανισμού πολιτικής προστασίας είναι διαθέσιμες στον δικτυακό τόπο της Επιτροπής⁽²⁾.
3. Μετά την πρωτοβουλία του Προέδρου Barroso για τη στήριξη των μικρών και μεσαίων επιχειρήσεων (MME) και την καταπολέμηση της ανεργίας των νέων, η Επιτροπή συνεργάζεται στενά με τις ελληνικές αρχές για την εκπόνηση προγράμματος δράσης με στόχο τη τόνωση της απασχόλησης και την παροχή χρηματοδότησης στις MME. Για τον σκοπό αυτό, οι ελληνικές αρχές σκοπεύουν να επαναπρογραμματίσουν το Εθνικό Στρατηγικό Πλαίσιο Αναφοράς και τα επιχειρησιακά του προγράμματα, ώστε να εξασφαλίσουν τους απαραίτητους χρηματοδοτικούς πόρους.
4. Σχετικά με τις ανεξέλεγκτες πυρκαϊές του 2007, το μεγαλύτερο μέρος των καταστροφών έχει αποκατασταθεί πλήρως μέσω σημαντικών συνεισφορών από τα διαφρωτικά ταμεία. Το επιχειρησιακό πρόγραμμα «Δυτική Ελλάδα 2000-2006», στήριξε έργα για τη πρόληψη φυσικών καταστροφών. Μετά τις πυρκαϊές του 2007, πολλά μέτρα στηρίζονται από το Ταμείο Αλληλεγγύης της ΕΕ για την πρόληψη και τον περιορισμό των καταστροφών που προκαλούν τέτοιες πυρκαϊές. Κατά την περίοδο προγραμματισμού 2007-2013, ενισχύθηκαν οι παρεμβάσεις για τον μετριασμό του κινδύνου, ιδιαίς στον νομό Ηλείας.

(1) <http://www.apd-depin.gov.gr/mediaupload/%CE%91%CE%9D%CE%91%CE%9A%CE%9F%CE%99%CE%9D%CE%A9%CE%A3%CE%95%CE%99%CE%A3%202012/07-02-2012.pdf>

(2) <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2007:314:0009:01:EL:HTML>

(3) http://ec.europa.eu/echo/policies/disaster_response/mechanism_en.htm
http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/projects/stories/index_en.cfm

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-001814/12
to the Commission
Rodi Kratsa-Tsagaropoulou (PPE)
(15 February 2012)**

Subject: Devastating floods in Ileia and mobilisation of Community Civil Protection Mechanism

The torrential rain of 5 February 2012 in the prefecture of Ileia resulted in the death of one citizen as well as huge destruction to public infrastructure, houses and crops (¹), resulting in a state of emergency being declared in two municipalities. The same area had already been irreparably damaged by fires in 2007, requiring urgent preparatory measures to deal with extreme weather events. According to the Council decision, 'the general purpose of the Mechanism is to provide, on request, support in the event of major emergencies (²) as the Mechanism should facilitate the civil protection response to all types of major emergencies ... the Community should assist Member States in minimising the lead time to respond to disasters' and 'preparatory measures need to be taken at Member State and Community level to enable assistance intervention teams in emergencies to be mobilised rapidly'.

In view of this:

1. Has the Commission received a request for support from the Greek authorities prompting it to mobilise the Civil Protection Mechanism to date (14 February 2012)?
2. How does it intend to respond in this case given the particularly unfortunate economic and social situation in Greece?
3. Does it intend to authorise the reorganisation of Structural Fund resources to deal with the serious state of emergency in this area? Does it intend to work with the Greek authorities in channelling resources to small and medium-sized businesses and youth employment from the programme, amounting to EUR 82 billion in unused funds, on a European level?
4. How does it assess the level of restoration of the damage caused by the 2007 fires and the launching of special projects to prevent natural disasters?

**Answer given by Mrs Georgieva on behalf of the Commission
(10 May 2012)**

1. The Commission would like to inform the Honourable member that it has not received a request for assistance from the Greek authorities through the European Civil Protection Mechanism related to the 5 February floods. Likewise, to date the Commission has not received an application for financial assistance from the EU Solidarity Fund.
2. The Commission would like to point out that it may only use these two instruments, which have been designed for emergencies of a certain magnitude, if requested to do so. Details on the functioning of the Civil Protection Mechanism and the EU Solidarity Fund can be found on the Commission's website (³).
3. Following President Barroso's initiative to support small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and fight youth unemployment, the Commission is in close cooperation with the Greek authorities to set up an action plan to boost employment and provide financing to SMEs. To that end, the Greek authorities intend to re-programme the National Strategic Reference Framework and its operational programmes in order to accommodate the necessary financial resources.
4. As regards the wild fires of 2007, most of the damage has been fully restored through significant contributions from the Structural Funds. The operational programme Western Greece 2000-2006 supported projects for the prevention of natural disasters. Since the fires of 2007, several measures are being supported by the EU Solidarity Fund to prevent and limit the damage of such fires. During the programming period 2007-2013, risk mitigating interventions have been reinforced, particularly in the prefecture of Ileia.

(¹) <http://www.apd-depin.gov.gr/mediaupload/%CE%91%CE%9D%CE%91%CE%9A%CE%9F%CE%99%CE%9D%CE%A9%CE%A3%CE%95%CE%99%CE%A3%202012/07-02-2012.pdf>

(²) <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2007:314:0009:01:EL:HTML>

(³) http://ec.europa.eu/echo/policies/disaster_response/mechanism_en.htm;
http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/thefunds/solidarity/index_en.cfm.

(Ελληνική έκδοση)

Ερώτηση με αίτημα γραπτής απάντησης E-001951/12
προς την Επιτροπή
Nikolaos Chountis (GUE/NGL)
(20 Φεβρουαρίου 2012)

Θέμα: Ενδο-ομιλικές συναλλαγές πολυεθνικών επιχειρήσεων σε Ελλάδα και Ευρώπη

Η ελληνική κυβέρνηση ανακοίνωσε πρόσφατα ότι εξετάζει αρκετές φορολογικές υποδέσεις ενδο-ομιλικών συναλλαγών, πολυεθνικών εταιρειών που δραστηριοποιούνται στην Ελλάδα, για τις οποίες ενδέχεται, από τη μια, να υπάρχουν φορολογικές παρανομίες που επισύρουν κυρώσεις και πρόστιμα, και, από την άλλη, να επηρεάζονται αυξητικά οι τιμές των προϊόντων που προσφέρουν στην ελληνική αγορά, σε σχέση με τις αντίστοιχες ευρωπαϊκές.

Με δεδομένο ότι συνήθησε πρακτική των πολυεθνικών εταιρειών, προκειμένου να αποφύγουν τη φορολόγηση των κερδών τους, αποτελούν οι ενδο-ομιλικές συναλλαγές (transfer pricing), όπως πχ τα δικαιώματα χρήσης σημάτων, οι υπερκοστολόγημένες αγορές προϊόντων, ο ενδοεπιχειρησιακός δανεισμός κ.α., με τις οποίες επλέγουν να μεταφέρουν τα κέρδη τους σε θυγατρικές τους που βρίσκονται σε χώρες με το πιο ευνοϊκό φορολογικό καθεστώς, ερωτάται η Επιτροπή:

1. Γνωρίζει εάν στην Ελλάδα έχουν επιβληθεί πρόστιμα και κυρώσεις σε πολυεθνικές εταιρείες, τα τελευταία 10 χρόνια, που να αφορούν φορολογικές παραβάσεις ενδο-ομιλικών συναλλαγών; Μπορεί να πληροφορηθεί για τα συνολικά ποσά των προστίμων και ποιες εταιρείες αφορούσαν;
2. Διαδέτει στοιχεία από τα υπόλοιπα κράτη μέλη της ΕΕ, για τον τρόπο αντιμετώπισης ανάλογων περιπτώσεων φοροαποφυγής μέσω ενδο-ομιλικών συναλλαγών; Ποιες είναι, κατά τη γνώμη της Επιτροπής, οι βέλτιστες πρακτικές για την αντιμετώπιση του φαινομένου;
3. Ποια μέτρα του μνημονίου που συνοδεύει τη νέα δανειακή σύμβαση μεταξύ Ελλάδας-ΔΝΤ-ΕΕ, συμβάλλουν στην καταπολέμηση του παραπάνω φαινομένου; Τι προτείνει στην ελληνική κυβέρνηση η Επιτροπή;

Απάντηση του κ. Šemeta εξ ονόματος της Επιτροπής
(25 Απριλίου 2012)

Η Επιτροπή δεν συγκεντρώνει τακτικά τις πληροφορίες σχετικά με τις κυρώσεις και τα πρόστιμα που αφορούν φορολογικές παραβάσεις ενδοομιλικών συναλλαγών και επιβάλλοντα σε πολυεθνικές κρατών μελών της ΕΕ.

Τα μόνα στοιχεία που διαδέτει η Επιτροπή χρονολογούνται από το 2007 και είναι αυτά που κοινοποίησε η Ελλάδα στο Κοινό Φόρουμ για τον Καθορισμό των Τιμών Μεταβίβασης (ΚΦΤΜ), μια ομάδα εμπειρογνωμόνων της Επιτροπής για τις ενδοομιλικές συναλλαγές. Τότε ο αντιπρόσωπος της Ελλάδας δήλωσε ότι «Δεν έχουν επιβληθεί μέχρι σήμερα κυρώσεις στην Ελλάδα που θα μπορούσαν να θεωρηθούν σοβαρές σύμφωνα με τη Σύμβαση Διαιτησίας»⁽¹⁾. Πρόσφατα στοιχεία σχετικά με τις κυρώσεις δεν διαδέτει η Επιτροπή.

Συνίσταται στο Αξιότιμο Μέλος του Κοινοβουλίου να απευθυνθεί για πληροφορίες κατευθείαν στις εθνικές φορολογικές αρχές.

Το ΚΦΤΜ επικουρεί και συμβουλεύει την Επιτροπή, ώστε να βρίσκει πρακτικές λύσεις για την επίτευξη ενιαίας εφαρμογής των κανόνων ενδοομιλικών συναλλαγών εντός της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης. Επίσης, ο Οργανισμός Οικονομικής Συνεργασίας και Ανάπτυξης (ΟΟΣΑ) παρέχει οδηγίες κυρίως για τις τιμές μεταβίβασης του ΟΟΣΑ, οι οποίες αναθεωρήθηκαν πρόσφατα, τον Ιούλιο 2010.

Τα μέτρα που συμφωνήθηκαν από την Ελλάδα και την Επιτροπή (εκ μέρους των κρατών μελών) δεν κάνουν ειδική αναφορά στο θέμα των ενδοομιλικών συναλλαγών. Ωστόσο, όπως αναφέρεται στο τελευταίο Μνημόνιο Συνεννόησης (βλέπε παράρτημα του N 4046/2012), η Κυβέρνηση αναμένεται να προετοιμάσει φορολογική μεταρρύθμιση έως τον Ιούνιο. Στο πλαίσιο αυτό η Ελλάδα πρέπει να εξετάσει αν κρίνονται απαραίτητες οι προσαρμογές στους κανόνες του για τις ενδοομιλικές συναλλαγές. Κατόπιν αιτήσεων της ελληνικής φορολογικής αρχής για τεχνική βοήθεια, οι υπηρεσίες της Επιτροπής προετοιμάζουν μια ενημερωτική ημερίδα για τις ενδοομιλικές συναλλαγές.

(¹) Έγγρ. JTPF/011/2007/EN, ΠΡΑΚΤΙΚΑ ΤΗΣ ΔΕΚΑΤΗΣ ΕΝΑΤΗΣ ΣΥΝΕΔΡΙΑΣΗΣ ΤΟΥ ΚΟΙΝΟΥ ΦΟΡΟΥΜ ΓΙΑ ΤΟΝ ΚΑΘΟΡΙΣΜΟ ΤΩΝ ΤΙΜΩΝ ΜΕΤΑΒΑΣΗΣ ΤΗΣ ΕΕ που πραγματοποιήθηκε στις 28 Ιουνίου 2007, σελ. 5, σύνδεσμος http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/taxation/company_tax/transfer_pricing/forum/index_en.htm.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-001951/12
to the Commission
Nikolaos Chountis (GUE/NGL)
(20 February 2012)**

Subject: Multinational companies transfer pricing in Greece and in Europe

The Greek Government recently announced that it is examining several tax-related cases of transfer pricing by multinational companies operating in Greece, which might, on one hand, involve tax irregularities incurring penalties and fines and, on the other, cause the prices of the products they offer to the Greek market to increase, compared with respective European prices.

Given that multinational companies commonly seek to avoid taxation of their profits by means of transfer pricing, for example trademarks' user rights, over-costing product markets, intragroup loans etc., through which they transfer their profits to their subsidiaries located in countries with the most favourable tax regimes:

1. Does the Commission know whether any penalties and fines regarding tax-related offences of transfer pricing have been imposed on multinational companies in the last 10 years in Greece? Could it obtain information on the total amount of fines and which companies were involved?
2. Does it have any data from the other EU Member States, about the way they deal with similar cases of tax evasion through transfer pricing? What are the best practices for dealing with this problem?
3. What measures of the memorandum accompanying the new loan agreement between Greece, the IMF and the EU can contribute to the elimination of the abovementioned problem? Does the Commission have any proposals for the Greek Government?

**Answer given by Mr Šemeta on behalf of the Commission
(25 April 2012)**

The Commission does not regularly collect the information concerning penalties and fines regarding tax offences of transfer pricing imposed on multinationals in EU Member States.

The only information the Commission has dates from 2007, from a Greek contribution to the Joint Transfer Pricing Forum (JTPF), a Commission expert group on transfer pricing. At that time, the Greek representative reported that 'Greece had not imposed any penalties which could be considered as serious under the Arbitration Convention so far' ('). More recent information on penalties is not available at Commission level.

The Honourable Member is advised to request information directly from the respective domestic tax administrations.

The Joint Transfer Pricing Forum (JTPF) assists and advises the Commission in finding practical solutions in order to achieve a more uniform application of transfer pricing rules within the Union. The OECD too provides guidance notably in their OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, recently updated in July 2010.

Measures agreed between Greece and the Commission (on behalf of the Member States), do not specifically refer to the issue of transfer pricing. However, as included in the latest Memorandum of Understanding (see annex to Law n. 4046/2012), the Government will prepare a tax reform by June. In this context, Greece should consider whether adjustments to its rules on transfer pricing are necessary. Following requests by the Greek tax administration for technical assistance, The Commission services are preparing a workshop on transfer pricing.

(') Doc JTPF/011/2007/EN, Summary Record of the Nineteenth Meeting of the EU Joint Transfer Pricing Forum held in Brussels on 28 June 2007, page 5; http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/taxation/company_tax/transfer_pricing/forum/index_en.htm

(English version)

Question for written answer E-001952/12

to the Commission

Jim Higgins (PPE)

(20 February 2012)

Subject: Air quality

Can the Commission please outline what strategies, if any, it is using to improve air quality in European cities?

Answer given by Mr Potočnik on behalf of the Commission

(2 April 2012)

The 6th Environment Action Programme (¹) set the ambition to ‘achieve levels of air quality that pose no significant risk for human health and the environment’, and the 2005 Thematic Strategy on Air pollution (TSAP) (²) established a gap closure strategy in order to make substantial interim progress by 2020. This strategy combines legislation limiting pollutant concentration levels in ambient air (³), legislation reducing overall emissions per Member State (⁴), and legislation reducing emissions at source (⁵). The Commission is pursuing effective implementation of these measures with Member States as the best way of ensuring improvements in air quality in European cities.

The Commission is currently conducting a review of the EU air quality policy to reflect on what has been achieved, what remains to be done and ensuring coherence with other relevant initiatives, and this will address the remaining urban air quality challenge in the EU. A dedicated webpage (⁶) has been put in place where the public is invited to participate in the discussions preparing the review which is due to be finalised in 2013.

(¹) OJ L 242, 10.9.2002.

(²) COM(2005) 446 final.

(³) The Ambient Air Quality Directive 2008/50/EC and the 4th daughter Directive 2004/107/EC.

(⁴) The National Emission Ceilings Directive 2001/81/EC.

(⁵) Including legislation on vehicle emissions, emissions from large combustion plants and others.

(⁶) http://ec.europa.eu/environment/air/review_air_policy.htm

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-001953/12
to the Commission
Jim Higgins (PPE)
(20 February 2012)**

Subject: Forced labour

Does the Commission have any plans to ban the import of goods into EU Member States where it is suspected that forced labour has been used in their production?

**Answer given by Mr De Gucht on behalf of the Commission
(28 March 2012)**

The Commission refers to its joint reply to previous written questions E-010606/2011 by Mr Provera and E-010839/2011 by Mr Fontana⁽¹⁾.

The Commission does not rule out the possibility of introducing an import prohibition for goods produced using forced labour, but this must be feasible and effective, applied in a non-discriminatory manner and a proportionate response to the issue. In any event, no import prohibition could be based on a mere suspicion that forced labour has been used in the production of a product.

⁽¹⁾ <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/QP-WEB/application/home.do?language=EN>.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-001954/12

to the Commission

Jim Higgins (PPE)

(20 February 2012)

Subject: Participation in sport

Given the increasing trends of weight gain and obesity among children in Member States and the positive impact participation in sport can have in this area, can the Commission please outline what steps are being taken in order to increase participation in sports among children?

Answer given by Ms Vassiliou on behalf of the Commission

(3 April 2012)

The Commission fully shares the Honourable Member's views on the importance of participation in sport and of regular physical activity in addressing the challenges of overweight and obesity, among children in particular. Evidence suggests that physical activity is one of the most effective ways of preventing non-communicable diseases and combating obesity and other public health problems. The Commission notes in its 2011 communication on sport (¹) that despite the benefits of exercise, the majority of Europeans do not practice sport regularly. In the 2010 Eurobarometer survey on sport and physical activity 60 % of respondents claimed indeed that they never or seldom exercised or played sport. Over the past years, the Commission has therefore taken several steps in promoting health-enhancing physical activity and participation in sport, in particular through its policies and financial instruments in the fields of sport and of health. Details are outlined, *inter alia*, in the Commission's replies to Written Questions E-006640/2011, E-007443/2011, E-009306/2011, E-009537/2011, E-012544/2011 and E-000698/2012.

In 2012, the Commission's activities to promote participation in sport and health-enhancing physical activity focus a) on the preparation of a proposal for an EU policy initiative based on the EU Physical Activity Guidelines and b) on the implementation of the Preparatory Action 'European Partnerships on Sport'. The Commission's proposal for an 'Erasmus for All' Programme for the next budgetary period 2014-2020 also includes provisions for supporting transnational projects in the field of health-enhancing physical activity.

⁽¹⁾ COM(2012) 12 final.

(Dansk udgave)

**Forespørgsel til skriftlig besvarelse E-001956/12
til Kommissionen**
Krišjānis Kariņš (PPE), Gunnar Hökmark (PPE) og Bendt Bendtsen (PPE)
(20. februar 2012)

Om: Nødvendigheden af et europæisk kreditvurderingsbureau

Kommissionen har foreslået lovgivning om yderligere regulering af markedet for kreditvurderingsbureauer. Det bliver stadig debatteret, hvorvidt et europæisk kreditvurderingsbureau er nødvendigt, og hvad de eventuelle fordele ved en sådan institution er. Konkurrence på markedet er uden tvivl nødvendig, og en situation, hvor kun tre store kreditvurderingsbureauer sidder på 95 % af verdensmarkedet, kan godt forbedres.

Den markedsforskelse, som er skabt af de eksisterende bureauer, er kraftig, og små selskaber mangler midler og ressourcer til at klare konkurrencen. At introducere et europæisk kreditvurderingsbureau på markedet vil uden tvivl være dyrt for så vidt angår ressourcer og tid. Derudover findes der mange mindre, uafhængige kreditvurderingsbureauer i EU, og disse selskaber vil komme til at lide tab, hvis der introduceres et nyt bureau, som får støtte af EU selv.

- Har Kommissionen overvejet, hvilke foranstaltninger der kan tages for at støtte de eksisterende mindre kreditvurderingsbureauer i EU?
- Hvorfor skal der oprettes et europæisk kreditvurderingsbureau, når andre kreditvurderingsbureauer, der allerede er aktive inden for EU, vil kunne levere de samme tjenester?
- Mener Kommissionen, at andre vurderingsbureauer ud over Standard & Poor's, Moody's og Fitch mangler kapacitet og midler til at tilbyde tjenester på EU-niveau?
- Hvad kan et europæisk kreditvurderingsbureau, som andre bureauer ikke kan?
- Bør et EU-sponsoreret europæisk kreditvurderingsbureau ikke anses for at være en form for statsstøtte?

Svar afgivet på Kommissionens vegne af Michel Barnier
(4. april 2012)

Den 15. november 2011 vedtog Kommissionen et forslag om ændring af den nuværende forordning om kreditvurderingsbureauer⁽¹⁾. Et af målene i forslaget er af forbedre markedsbetingelserne for kreditvurderinger, således at man får vurderinger af høj kvalitet og et større udvalg på markedet.

Især obligatoriske rotationsordninger bør give nye potentielle aktører mulighed for at komme ind på markedet. Endvidere har Kommissionen foreslået, at det gøres lettere at sammenligne ratinger fra forskellige kreditvurderingsbureauer ved hjælp af en harmoniseret ratingskala og at give mindre kendte kreditvurderingsbureauer større anerkendelse via en gratis offentlig database over alle ratinger. Det er Kommissionens opfattelse, at dette vil føre til, at man bliver mindre afhængig af de større kreditvurderingsbureauers ratinger.

Det skal bemærkes, at Kommissionen ikke foreslår oprettelse af et europæisk kreditvurderingsbureau. Kommissionen har vurderet muligheden for at etablere en ny uafhængig europæisk kreditvurderingsfond og et uafhængigt kreditvurderingsbureau i den konsekvensanalyse, som ledsgede Kommissionens seneste lovgivningsforslag. Det fremgik af denne analyse, at det ville være dyrt at etablere et kreditvurderingsbureau med offentlige midler, uanset hvilken model man valgte (skønsmæssigt 300-500 mio. EUR over 5 år), og det kunne give anledning til problemer med hensyn til dette kreditvurderingsbureaus troværdighed og uafhængighed. Derfor har Kommissionen besluttet ikke at gå videre med denne tanke.

⁽¹⁾ Europa-Parlamentets og Rådets forordning om kreditvurderingsbureauer af 16. september 2009, EUT L 302 af 7.11.2009, ændret ved Europa-Parlamentets og Rådets forordning af 11. maj 2011, EUT L 145/30 af 31.5.2011.

(Latviešu valodas versija)

Jautājums, uz kuru jāatbild rakstiski, E-001956/12

Komisijai

Krišjānis Kariņš (PPE), Gunnar Hökmark (PPE) un Bendt Bendtsen (PPE)

(2012. gada 20. februāris)

Temats: Eiropas Kredītreitingu aģentūras nepieciešamība

Komisija ir ierosinājusi tiesību aktus kredītreitingu aģentūru tirgus papildu reglamentācijai. Vēl joprojām norit debates par jautājumu, vai Eiropas Kredītreitingu aģentūra ir nepieciešama, kā arī par iespējamiem ieguvumiem, ko varētu sniegt šāda iestāde. Bez šaubām, tirgū ir vajadzīga konkurence, un tā varētu uzlabot situāciju, kurā trīs lielākās kredītreitingu aģentūras kontrolē 95 % pasaules tirgus.

Darbojošos aģentūrus izveidotā tirgus niša ir spēcīga, un mazākiem uzņēmumiem nav vajadzīgo iespēju un resursu, lai konkurētu ar šīm aģentūrām. Eiropas Kredītreitingu aģentūras iesaistīšanās tirgū, bez šaubām, palielinātu laika un resursu patēriņu. Turklat ES darbojas liels skaits mazāku kredītreitingu aģentūru, un fakts, ka tirgū ienāktu jauna aģentūra, kuru atbalsta ES, radītu šiem uzņēmumiem zaudējumus.

- Vai Komisija ir izskatījusi jautājumu par to, kādus pasākumus varētu veikt, lai atbalstītu mazākas kredītreitingu aģentūras, kas darbojas ES?
- Kāpēc būtu vajadzīga Eiropas Kredītreitingu aģentūras izveide, ja identiskus pakalpojumus varētu sniegt citas kredītreitingu aģentūras, kuras jau aktīvi darbojas ES?
- Vai Komisija uzskata, ka citām kredītreitingu aģentūrām, izņemot "S&P", "Moody's" un "Fitch", nav iespēju un līdzekļu, lai sniegtu pakalpojumus ES līmenī?
- Kādus unikālus pasākumus, ko nespēj īstenot citas kredītreitingu aģentūras, veiktu Eiropas Kredītreitingu aģentūra?
- Vai ES finansētā Eiropas Kredītreitingu aģentūra nebūtu jāuzskata par valsts atbalsta gadījumu?

Atbildi Komisijas vārdā sniedza Mišels Barnjē

(2012. gada 4. aprīlis)

Komisija 2011. gada 15. novembrī pieņēma priekšlikumu, ar ko groza pašreizējo Regulu par kredītreitingu aģentūrām⁽¹⁾. Viens no priekšlikuma mērķiem ir uzlabot kredītreitingu tirgus apstākļus, lai tie sekmētu augstu reitingu kvalitāti un labākas izvēles iespējas tirgū.

Obligātās rotācijas principam būtu jāsniedz jauniem potenciālajiem dalībniekiem iespēja ienākt tirgū. Turklat Komisija ir ierosinājusi atvieglot dažādu kredītreitingu aģentūru noteikto reitingu salīdzināšanu, izmantojot saskaņotu reitingu skalu, un padarīt atpazīstamākas mazāk zināmās kredītreitingu aģentūras, visus reitingus iekļaujot bezmaksas publiskā datubāzē. Komisija uzskata, ka tā rezultātā tiks mazināta pāļaušanās uz lielāko kredītreitingu aģentūru noteiktajiem reitingiem.

Jāatzīmē, ka Komisija neierosina izveidot Eiropas Kredītreitingu aģentūru. Ietekmes novērtējumā, kurš pievienots tās jaunākajam likumdošanas priekšlikumam, Komisija ir izvērtējusi iespējas izveidot jaunu neatkarīgu Eiropas kredītreitingu organizāciju un neatkarīgu kredītreitingu aģentūru. Šīs analīzes rezultāti liecināja, ka kredītreitingu aģentūras izveide par publiskajiem līdzekļiem (neatkarīgi no tās konkrētā modeļa) būtu dārga – saskaņā ar aplēsem tā izmaksātu 300–500 miljonus euro piecu gadu laikā –, un tas varētu radīt bažas par kredītreitingu aģentūru uzticamību un neatkarību. Šo iemeslu dēļ Komisija nolēma neturpināt darbu pie šīs idejas īstenošanas.

⁽¹⁾ Eiropas Parlamenta un Padomes 2009. gada 16. septembra Regula par kredītreitingu aģentūrām (OV L 302, 17.11.2009.), kurā grozījumi izdarīti ar Eiropas Parlamenta un Padomes 2011. gada 11. maija Regulu (OV L 145/30, 31.5.2011.).

(Svensk version)

**Frågor för skriftligt besvarande E-001956/12
till kommissionen**
Krišjānis Kariņš (PPE), Gunnar Hökmark (PPE) och Bendt Bendtsen (PPE)
(20 februari 2012)

Angående: Nödvändigheten av ett europeiskt kreditvärderingsinstitut

Kommissionen har föreslagit lagstiftning för ytterligare marknadsreglering av kreditvärderingsinstitut. Det finns fortfarande en diskussion om det är nödvändigt med ett europeiskt kreditvärderingsinstitut och om de möjliga fördelarna med ett sådant institut. Det är utan tvekan nödvändigt med konkurrens på marknaden, och det går att förbättra en situation där endast tre stora kreditvärderingsinstitut har 95 procent av världsmarknaden.

Marknadsklyftan som har skapats av de befintliga företagen är stor och mindre företag saknar medel och resurser för att kunna konkurrera. En inbrytning på marknaden av det europeiska kreditvärderingsinstitutet skulle utan tvekan bli kostsam när det gäller resurs- och tidsaspekterna. Det finns dessutom många mindre, oberoende kreditvärderingsinstitut i EU, och dessa företag skulle göra förluster om ett nytt institut, som stöds av EU självt, skulle bli verksamt på marknaden.

- Har kommissionen beaktat vilka åtgärder som kan vidtas för att främja de befintliga mindre kreditvärderingsinstituten i EU?
- Varför bör man inrätta ett europeiskt kreditvärderingsinstitut när det redan finns verksamma kreditvärderingsinstitut i EU som kan tillhandahålla samma tjänster?
- Anser kommissionen att övriga kreditvärderingsinstitut förutom S&P, Moody's och Fitch saknar kapaciteten och medlen att erbjuda sina tjänster på EU-nivå?
- Vad kan ett europeiskt kreditvärderingsinstitut göra som inte andra institut kan?
- Skulle inte ett europeiskt kreditvärderingsinstitut med stöd från EU betraktas som ett fall av statsstöd?

Svar från Michel Barnier på kommissionens vägnar
(4 april 2012)

Den 15 november 2011 antog kommissionen ett förslag om ändring av den befintliga förordningen om kreditvärderingsinstitut⁽¹⁾. Ett av syftena med förslaget är att förbättra förhållandena på kreditvärderingsmarknaden för att ge värderingar av hög kvalitet och ett större urval på marknaden.

I synnerhet borde obligatorisk rotation ge nya potentiella aktörer möjlighet att komma in på marknaden. Vidare föreslog kommissionen att jämförelsen av värderingar från olika kreditvärderingsinstitut ska förenklas genom en harmoniserad bedömningskala och att mindre kända kreditvärderingsinstitut ska göras mer kända via en kostnadsfri allmän databas över alla värderingar. Kommissionen anser att detta kommer att leda till att man i mindre utsträckning förlitar sig på de större institutens värderingar.

Det bör påpekas att kommissionen inte föreslår att ett europeiskt kreditvärderingsinstitut upprättas. I den konsekvensbedömning som medföljde det senaste lagstiftningsförslaget utvärderade kommissionen möjligheten att upprätta en ny oberoende europeisk kreditvärderingsstiftelse och ett oberoende kreditvärderingsinstitut. Analysen visade att det skulle vara kostsamt att finansiera ett nytt kreditvärderingsinstitut, oavsett modell, med allmänna medel (uppskattningsvis 300–500 miljoner euro under fem år), och det skulle kunna skapa oro beträffande institutets trovärdighet och oberoende. Av dessa anledningar har kommissionen beslutat att inte gå vidare med detta.

⁽¹⁾ Europaparlamentets och rådets förordning av den 16 september 2009 om kreditvärderingsinstitut (EUT L 302, 17.11.2009), ändrad genom Europaparlamentets och rådets förordning av den 11 maj 2011 (EUT L 145/30, 31.5.2011).

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-001956/12
to the Commission**

Krišjānis Kariņš (PPE), Gunnar Hökmark (PPE) and Bendt Bendtsen (PPE)

(20 February 2012)

Subject: Necessity of the European Credit Rating Agency

The Commission has proposed legislation for the further market regulation of credit rating agencies. There is still a debate taking place on whether a European Credit Rating Agency is necessary and on the possible advantages of such an institution. Without any doubt, competition is necessary in the marketplace, and a situation in which only three major credit rating agencies hold 95 % of the world market could be improved.

The market gap created by the existing agencies is strong, and smaller companies lack means and resources to compete. Market penetration by the European Credit Rating Agency would, without any doubt, prove costly in resources and time. Furthermore, there are many smaller independent credit rating agencies in the EU, and those companies would suffer losses due to the fact that a new agency, promoted by the EU itself, would emerge.

- Has the Commission considered what steps could be taken to promote the existing smaller credit rating agencies in the EU?
- Why should a European Credit Rating Agency be established when other credit rating agencies that are already active in the EU could provide the same services?
- Does the Commission consider that other rating agencies besides S&P, Moody's and Fitch lack the capacity and the means to offer services at EU level?
- What could a European Credit Rating Agency do that other agencies cannot?
- Should an EU-sponsored European Credit Rating Agency not be deemed a case of state aid?

Answer given by Mr Barnier on behalf of the Commission
(4 April 2012)

On 15 November 2011, the Commission adopted a proposal amending the existing CRA Regulation⁽¹⁾. One of the objectives of the proposal is to improve credit rating market conditions so that they are conducive to high-quality ratings and more choice in the market.

Specifically, mandatory rotation should give an opportunity for new potential players to enter the market. Moreover, the Commission proposed to facilitate comparison of ratings issued by different credit rating agencies (CRAs) via a harmonised rating scale and to provide more recognition to less known CRAs via a free public database of all ratings. It is the Commission's belief that this will lead to less reliance on the ratings of the bigger CRAs.

It should be noted that the Commission does not propose the creation of a European Credit Rating Agency (CRA). The Commission assessed the feasibility of establishing a new independent European credit rating foundation and independent CRA in the impact assessment accompanying its latest legislative proposal. This analysis showed that setting up a CRA with public money, irrespective of its particular model, would be costly (estimated EUR 300–500 million over five years) and it could raise concerns regarding the CRA's credibility and independence. For these reasons, the Commission has decided not to pursue this idea further.

⁽¹⁾ Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on credit rating agencies of 16 September 2009, OJ L 302, 17.11.2009, as amended by Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 May 2011, OJ L 145/30, 31.5.2011.

(Versione italiana)

**Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-001969/12
alla Commissione (Vicepresidente/Alto Rappresentante)**

Patrizia Toia (S&D), Elisabetta Gardini (PPE), Silvia Costa (S&D) e Sergio Gaetano Cofferati (S&D)

(20 febbraio 2012)

Oggetto: VP/HR — Land grabbing in Etiopia

È stato pubblicato il 16 gennaio da Human Rights Watch un rapporto sulla rapina delle terre in Etiopia, che segnala la deportazione in corso di circa 70 000 persone, strappate con la violenza dalle loro abitazioni e condotte verso villaggi senza cibo, terra, educazione e presidi sanitari. Ulteriori informazioni al riguardo sono state pubblicate il 27 gennaio dallo «Oakland Institute».

Tra il 2008 e il 2011, l'Etiopia risulta avere ceduto almeno 3,6 milioni di terre (una superficie pari all'estensione dell'Olanda) attraverso il *villagisation program*, sotto le cui insegne il governo etiope, con la falsa promessa di ricollocare le popolazioni in nuove aree provviste dei servizi essenziali, procede all'evacuazione dei suoi cittadini dalle aree cedute agli stranieri, in violazione della stessa costituzione etiope e dei diritti umani sanciti dalle convenzioni internazionali.

Considerato che l'Unione europea, attraverso la Commissione europea, è tra i principali donatori di aiuti internazionali all'Etiopia.

Considerato il ruolo dell'Unione europea nella difesa dei diritti umani e l'impegno a proteggere le categorie più vulnerabili, può il Vicepresidente/Alto Rappresentante rispondere alle seguenti domande:

1. è a conoscenza delle gravissime violazioni dei diritti umani denunciate in Etiopia?
2. In che modo intende intervenire per verificare queste ingiustizie e fermare queste pratiche?
3. Quali azioni sono state intraprese dalla Commissione e dal Vicepresidente/Alto Rappresentante, al fine di evitare altri casi come quelli denunciati dal rapporto, collaborando anche con la delegazione UE-Africa?
4. Onde chiarire ogni dubbio circa la destinazione dei fondi comunitari, sarebbe possibile far sapere in maniera dettagliata la quantità e la destinazione dei fondi inviati in Etiopia?

Risposta data dall'Alta Rappresentante/Vicepresidente Catherine Ashton a nome della Commissione
(10 maggio 2012)

La Commissione è consapevole del fatto che in alcune zone dell'Etiopia sono in corso programmi di reinsediamento, attuati dal governo nel quadro di un programma volto a fornire servizi di base in modo più efficiente.

La Commissione osserva questo processo in stretta cooperazione con tutti i membri del gruppo di assistenza dei donatori (DAG) in Etiopia e ha esortato il governo etiope ad attuare tale politica nel modo meno traumatico possibile, evitando di agire con rapidità eccessiva per soddisfare obiettivi arbitrari. I donatori hanno fornito al governo etiope il documento *Good Practice Guidelines and Principles Regarding Resettlement* sulle buone pratiche internazionali e i principi relativi al reinsediamento.

Nel 2011 sono state effettuate visite esplorative di più organismi nelle regioni etiopi Gambella, Benishangul Gumuz e Somali e la delegazione dell'UE riceve relazioni periodiche in merito. Le informazioni raccolte non sembrano avvalorare la tesi di Human Rights Watch, secondo cui il processo di reinsediamento non sta avvenendo in modo volontario ed è accompagnato da violazioni sistematiche e diffuse dei diritti umani.

La Commissione continuerà a vegliare sulla situazione e, nel caso riscontri prove di violazioni di diritti umani, ne discuterà con le opportune autorità governative.

I programmi dell'UE e degli altri membri del gruppo di assistenza dei donatori (DAG) in Etiopia non finanziano direttamente i programmi di reinsediamento attuati dal governo. L'attuale programma di cooperazione dell'Unione europea (10° Fondo europeo di sviluppo, programma indicativo nazionale) si articola intorno a tre settori prioritari: i) sviluppo rurale e sicurezza alimentare; ii) trasporti e integrazione regionale e iii) questioni macroeconomiche e buongoverno. Per maggiori informazioni sui progetti in corso, si può consultare il sito web della delegazione dell'UE in Etiopia ⁽¹⁾.

⁽¹⁾ http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/ethiopia/projects/list_of_projects/projects_en.htm

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-001969/12
to the Commission (Vice-President/High Representative)
Patrizia Toia (S&D), Elisabetta Gardini (PPE), Silvia Costa (S&D) and Sergio Gaetano Cofferati (S&D)
(20 February 2012)**

Subject: VP/HR — Land grabbing in Ethiopia

A report published by Human Rights Watch on 16 January 2012 on the theft of land in Ethiopia details the ongoing resettlement of around 70 000 people who have been forcibly uprooted from their homes and taken to villages where there is no food, land, education or healthcare facilities. The Oakland Institute published additional information on this on 27 January 2012.

Between 2008 and 2011 Ethiopia appears to have leased out at least 3.6 million hectares of land, (an area the size of the Netherlands) through its 'villagisation programme'. Now, under this programme, the Ethiopian Government is relocating its citizens with false promises of moving them to new areas equipped with essential services, evacuating them from the areas leased to foreigners and thereby violating its own constitution and human rights as defined by international conventions.

Given that the European Union, through the Commission, is one of the main donors of international aid to Ethiopia, and in view of the European Union's role in defending human rights and its commitment to protecting the most vulnerable, can the Vice-President/High Representative respond to the following questions:

1. Is she aware of the extremely serious human rights violations reported in Ethiopia?
2. What action will she take to confirm these injustices and put a stop to these practices?
3. What actions have the Commission and the Vice-President/High Representative taken to prevent other cases such as those described in this report, in collaboration also with the EU-Africa delegation?
4. To remove any doubts surrounding the use of EU funds, would it be possible to provide a detailed account of sums sent to Ethiopia in funding and their use?

**Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission
(10 May 2012)**

The Commission is aware that resettlement programmes are underway in parts of Ethiopia as part of a Government programme aiming to deliver basic services more efficiently.

This process is being observed in close cooperation with all members of the Donor Assistance Group (DAG) to Ethiopia. The Commission has urged the Government of Ethiopia to implement resettlement as well as it can, and not to rush to meet arbitrary targets. Donors provided the Ethiopian Government with Good Practice Guidelines and Principles Regarding Resettlement, based on international best practice.

In 2011, multi-agency fact finding missions visited the Gambella, Benishangul Gumuz and Somali Regions and regular reports are received from the EU Delegation. The information gathered does not support allegations being made by Human Rights Watch that the resettlement processes are not voluntary and are accompanied by systematic and widespread human rights abuses.

The Commission will continue to remain diligent. If evidence of human rights abuses is found, it will address them with the appropriate government authorities.

The EU programmes, as well as those of other members of the DAG to Ethiopia, are not directly supporting the Government of Ethiopia's resettlement programmes. The current EU cooperation programme (10th European Development Fund, National Indicative Programme) centres around three focal sectors, (i) rural development and food security; (ii) transport and regional integration; and (iii) macroeconomics and governance. More information on ongoing projects can be found on the website of the EU Delegation to Ethiopia ⁽¹⁾.

⁽¹⁾ http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/ethiopia/projects/list_of_projects/projects_en.htm

(Versione italiana)

**Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-001972/12
alla Commissione
Vito Bonsignore (PPE)
(20 febbraio 2012)**

Oggetto: Uso prolungato degli occhiali per la visione in 3D nei bambini al di sotto dei sei anni

Negli ultimi anni si è registrato un crescente uso del sistema di visione stereoscopica, la cosiddetta visione in 3D (letteralmente 3 dimensioni). Una tecnica che, adottata dapprima al cinema poi sempre più frequentemente anche per console e televisori di ultima generazione, si serve di appositi occhialini in grado di rendere ottimale la visione.

Dato che la maggior parte degli strumenti tecnologici che si avvalgono di tale tecnica visiva è rivolta a un pubblico di adolescenti e bambini, ci si è posto il problema di eventuali effetti collaterali che potrebbero generarsi da un utilizzo prolungato, soprattutto per i minori di sei anni.

Al di sotto di tale età, infatti, si sono riscontrati alcuni disturbi di ordine funzionale, dei quali però non è per ora possibile valutare eventuali rischi e intensità, dal momento che la visione binoculare non è presente o non è del tutto sviluppata nei bambini in tenera età, ma anche perché essi possono essere affetti da strabismo, ambliopia o da altri difetti visivi. Il funzionamento degli occhiali in 3D, infatti, è strutturato in modo tale che ogni lente agisca in maniera differente sugli occhi dando una profondità che poi viene rielaborata dal cervello con la sensazione della tridimensionalità. Nei bambini la fase di associazione e rielaborazione non è sviluppata come negli adulti; per questo, gli studi scientifici potranno appurare eventuali difetti o patologie solo quando i bambini cresceranno.

Intanto, il ministero della Salute italiano, in seguito a un parere espresso dal Consiglio superiore di sanità italiano interpellato sulla questione, nella circolare del 17 marzo 2010, ha ritenuto controindicato l'uso degli occhiali 3D per i bambini minori di sei anni.

In assenza di studi scientifici su eventuali controindicazioni, può la Commissione comunicare:

1. se, nella sostanziale incertezza sull'uso di occhiali 3D, ritiene opportuno sostenere analisi mirate al fine di fugare ogni dubbio sulla loro sicurezza;
2. se, in attesa di conoscere risultati scientifici certi, intende comunque avviare campagne di informazione, invitando i cittadini europei ad un uso moderato e controllato di tali strumenti, soprattutto per i più piccoli;
3. se, in presenza di casi riscontrati di danni permanenti o temporanei ai minori di sei anni, intende inserire a livello comunitario il divieto dell'uso del sistema 3D ai bambini minori di sei anni?

**Risposta data da John Dalli a nome della Commissione
(3 aprile 2012)**

La questione se vi siano rischi per la salute associati alla visione di immagini in 3D sui prodotti quali gli apparecchi televisivi e le console per videogiochi o al cinema è stata discussa con gli Stati membri nella riunione della Rete per la sicurezza dei consumatori tenutasi a Bruxelles il 14 ottobre 2011.

Sulla base delle informazioni che la Commissione ha ricevuto finora dagli Stati membri non vi sono indicazioni quanto al fatto che la visione 3D presenti un grave rischio per la salute dei consumatori rispetto a una visione in 2D. La Commissione rimarrà tuttavia vigilante nel merito.

Spetta ai fabbricanti assicurare che i prodotti 3D immessi sul mercato siano sicuri, accettare gli eventuali rischi per la salute e fornire gli avvertimenti o le informazioni di sicurezza prescritti. Gli Stati membri hanno la responsabilità di assicurare che i fabbricanti ottemperino ai loro obblighi in forza della legislazione applicabile.

Alla luce di quanto sopra la Commissione non prevede di avviare una campagna d'informazione né di vietare l'uso di prodotti 3D o la visione di film 3D al cinema ai bambini di meno di sei anni.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-001972/12
to the Commission
Vito Bonsignore (PPE)
(20 February 2012)**

Subject: Prolonged use of 3D glasses in children under the age of six

There has been increasing use in recent years of the stereoscopic vision system known as 3D vision (literally 3-dimensional vision). First used in cinemas and now increasingly used with the latest generation of consoles and televisions, this technique relies on the use of appropriate glasses to optimise vision.

Given that most of the technological devices that use this visual technique are aimed at teenagers and children, consideration has been given to the possibility of side effects being brought on by prolonged use, especially in those under the age of six.

Some functional disorders have in fact been encountered below this age, although the potential risks and intensity cannot be assessed for the moment because binocular vision is not yet present or is not fully developed in children at such a young age, but also because they may be affected by strabismus, amblyopia or other visual defects. 3D glasses work in such a way that each lens acts differently on the eyes, creating depth which is then reworked by the brain giving a sense of three dimensions. In children, the association and reworking stage is not as developed as in adults; for this reason, scientific studies will only be able to verify possible defects and pathologies once the children are older.

In the meantime, following an opinion given by the Italian Senior Health Council when consulted on this matter, the Italian Ministry of Health, in its circular of 17 March 2010, decided to contraindicate the use of 3D glasses in children under the age of six.

In the absence of scientific studies on possible contraindications:

1. Does the Commission believe, in view of the substantial uncertainty with regard to the use of 3D glasses, that it would be appropriate to support tests aimed at dispelling any doubts about their safety?
2. Will the Commission, however, while awaiting definite scientific results, launch information campaigns encouraging the moderate and controlled use of such devices by the EU public, and especially by young children?
3. Should cases of permanent or temporary damage to children under the age of six be detected, will the Commission introduce a ban at Union level on the use of 3D systems by children under the age of six?

**Answer given by Mr Dalli on behalf of the Commission
(3 April 2012)**

The question of whether there are any health risks associated with viewing 3D images on products such as televisions and games consoles or at the cinema was discussed with the Member States at the meeting of the Consumer Safety Network that was held in Brussels on 14 October 2011.

On the basis of the information that the Commission has received to date from the Member States, there is no indication that 3D viewing poses a serious risk to the health of consumers compared to 2D viewing. The Commission will nevertheless remain attentive to the issue.

It is the responsibility of manufacturers to ensure that 3D products placed on the market are safe, to assess any possible health risks and to provide any necessary warnings or safety information. Member States are responsible for ensuring that manufacturers comply with their obligations under the applicable legislation.

In view of the above, the Commission has no plans to launch an information campaign or to ban the use of 3D products or the watching of 3D films at the cinema for children under six years.

(Wersja polska)

**Pytanie wymagające odpowiedzi pisemnej E-001974/12
do Komisji
Zbigniew Ziobro (EFD)
(20 lutego 2012 r.)**

Przedmiot: Dyskryminacja chrześcijan w Unii Europejskiej

W odpowiedzi udzielonej na moją interpelację z dnia 8 czerwca 2011 r. dotyczącej dyskryminacji chrześcijan w UE, przygotowaną na podstawie raportu Obserwatorium Nietolerancji i Dyskryminacji Chrześcijan w Europie, komisarz Viviane Reding stwierdziła, że „nie widzi naruszenia art. 21 Karty praw podstawowych Unii Europejskiej wśród państw Wspólnoty” oraz decyzji ramowej Rady 2008/913/WSiSW, jak również dyrektywy Rady 89/552/EWG. Nie zauważała również „zaniechania działań przez wymienione (we wskazanym przeze mnie raporcie) państwa członkowskie”. Potwierdziła także, iż „Komisja jest bardzo zaangażowana w zapewnienie poszanowania zakazu dyskryminacji ze względu na wiarę”.

Wobec powyższego proszę o odpowiedź:

1. Jakie konkretne działania podjęła Komisja, aby zbadać wskazane przez raport przypadki dyskryminacji chrześcijan w państwach UE?
2. Czy i w jaki sposób Komisja bada i ocenia, jak państwa reagują na przypadki łamania art. 21 Karty praw podstawowych, decyzji ramowej Rady 2008/913/WSiSW, jak również dyrektywy Rady 89/552/EWG?
3. W jakich państwach stwierdzono brak przepisów chroniących chrześcijan przed dyskryminacją?
4. Czy Komisja zaobserwowała różnicę w reakcji państw Wspólnoty na przypadki łamania praw chrześcijan oraz muzułmanów bądź przedstawicieli innych wyznań?
5. W jakich państwach Unii Europejskiej Komisja zanotowała najwięcej przypadków łamania praw chrześcijan?
6. Na jakiej podstawie w konkretnych przypadkach przywołanych przeze mnie w interpelacji Komisja zajęła stanowisko, że nie naruszają one wspomnianych konwencji? W szczególności, w jaki sposób Komisja weryfikuje doniesienia? Czy Komisja kontaktowała się z organizacjami, które opisywały naruszenia? Czy ktoś z Komisji kontaktował się z osobami i instytucjami, które zostały bezpośrednio dotknięte przejawami agresji i napaści na tle religijnym?
7. Czy Komisja występowała o stanowisko wymienionych w raporcie państw, w których dochodziło do wskazanych przypadków napaści i dyskryminacji?

**Odpowiedź udzielona przez komisarz Viviane Reding w imieniu Komisji
(3 kwietnia 2012 r.)**

Komisja pragnie odesłać Szanownego Pana Posła do odpowiedzi, jakiej udzieliła na zapytanie E-005508/2011⁽¹⁾. Z wymienionych w tej odpowiedzi powodów Komisja nie ma uprawnień, aby podejmować działania w przypadkach, o których wspomina Szanowny Pan Poseł.

Jeżeli chodzi o wdrożenie przepisów UE chroniących przed dyskryminacją, dyrektywa 2000/78/EC o równym traktowaniu w zakresie zatrudnienia i pracy⁽²⁾ zakazuje dyskryminacji w dziedzinie zatrudnienia i pracy ze względu na religię lub przekonania. Wszystkie państwa członkowskie dokonały już transpozycji tej dyrektywy do prawa krajowego. Aby zagwarantować, że państwa członkowskie będą przestrzegać zapisów dyrektywy, Komisja monitoruje zgodność przepisów krajowych z dyrektywą i w razie konieczności wszczęyna postępowanie w sprawie uchybienia zobowiązaniom państwa członkowskiego. Ponadto Komisja ściśle monitoruje we wszystkich państwach członkowskich proces transpozycji decyzji ramowej 2008/913/WSiSW⁽³⁾, zakazującej umyślnego publicznego nawoływania do przemocy lub nienawiści ze względów religijnych. W 2013 r. Komisja sporządzi sprawozdanie dotyczące wdrożenia tej decyzji ramowej.

⁽¹⁾ <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/QP-WEB/application/home.do?language=PL>.

⁽²⁾ Dyrektywa Rady 2000/78/WE z dnia 27 listopada 2000 r. ustanawiająca ogólne warunki ramowe równego traktowania w zakresie zatrudnienia i pracy, Dz.U. L 303 z 2.12.2000, s. 16.

⁽³⁾ Decyzja ramowa Rady 2008/913/WSiSW z dnia 28 listopada 2008 r. w sprawie zwalczania pewnych form i przejawów rasizmu i ksenofobii za pomocą środków prawnokarnych, Dz.U. L 328 z 6.12.2008, s. 55.

Komisja nie dysponuje danymi statystycznymi dotyczącymi łamania praw chrześcijan lub reakcji państwa członkowskich w takich przypadkach. Jak wskazano w odpowiedzi na zapytanie E-000318/2012 (⁴), Komisja uznaje jednak znaczenie gromadzenia danych, w ramach uprawnień UE, dotyczących kwestii związanych z dyskryminacją na tle religijnym. Dlatego też uwzględniała religię jako jeden z powodów wyszczególnionych we wniosku dotyczącym dziedzin tematycznych działalności Agencji Praw Podstawowych Unii Europejskiej w latach 2013-2017 (⁵).

(⁴) <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/QP-WEB/application/home.do?language=PL>.
(⁵) COM(2011) 880 wersja ostateczna, art. 2 lit. h) wniosku.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-001974/12
to the Commission
Zbigniew Ziobro (EFD)
(20 February 2012)**

Subject: Discrimination against Christians in the European Union

In the reply given to my question of 8 June 2011 concerning discrimination against Christians in the European Union, prepared on the basis of the report of the Observatory on Intolerance and Discrimination against Christians in Europe, Commissioner Reding stated that 'she sees no violation of Article 21 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union among Community States' or of Council Framework Decision 2008/913/JHA, or of Council Directive 89/552/EEC. She likewise did not detect any 'failure to act by the said states' (named in the report I cited earlier). She affirmed, too, that 'the Commission is very committed to ensuring respect for the prohibition of discrimination on grounds of belief.'

In the light of the above:

1. What definite steps have been taken by the Commission to investigate the cases of discrimination against Christians in the EU states highlighted in the report?
2. Does the Commission investigate, and if so, by what means, how states react to breaches of Article 21 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, Council Framework Decision 2008/913/WJHA and Council Directive 89/552/EEC?
3. In which countries has it been established that there is insufficient legislation to protect Christians against discrimination?
4. Has the Commission observed any difference in the reactions of Member States to violations of the rights of Christians, Muslims or members of any other faiths?
5. In which Member States of the European Union has the Commission noted most incidences of violations of the rights of Christians?
6. On what grounds in the specific cases cited in my question did the Commission adopt the stance that the abovementioned conventions were not being breached? In particular, how does the Commission verify the reports? Has the Commission made contact with the organisations that compiled these reports? Has anyone from the Commission contacted any of the individuals or institutions directly affected by manifestations of aggression and assaults committed on religious grounds?
7. Has the Commission made any representations regarding the situation in the states cited in the report in which the aforementioned cases of assault and discrimination occurred?

**Answer given by Mrs Reding on behalf of the Commission
(3 April 2012)**

The Commission would like to refer the Honourable Member to its reply to Question E-005508/2011⁽¹⁾. For the reasons explained in this reply, the Commission is not in a position to investigate the individual cases to which the Honourable Members refers.

As for the implementation of EU legislation protecting against discrimination, Directive 2000/78/EC on Employment Equality⁽²⁾ prohibits discrimination on the ground of religion or belief in employment. All the Member States have transposed this directive into national law. The Commission has monitored the conformity of national laws with the directive and has used the infringement proceedings, when appropriate, to ensure that Member States comply with the directive. The Commission is also monitoring closely the transposition by all Member States of Framework Decision 2008/913/JHA⁽³⁾, which prohibits the intentional public incitement to violence and hatred based on religion. The Commission will prepare a report on the implementation of this framework Decision for 2013.

⁽¹⁾ <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/QP-WEB/home.jsp>

⁽²⁾ Council Directive 2000/78/EC of 27 November 2000 establishing the general framework for equal treatment in employment and occupation, OJ L 303, 2.12.2000, p. 16.

⁽³⁾ Council Framework Decision 2008/913/JHA of 28 November 2008 on combating certain forms and expressions of racism and xenophobia by means of criminal law, OJ L 328, 6.12.2008, p. 55.

The Commission does not have at its disposal statistics on violations of rights of Christians or Member States' reactions to such violations. As indicated in its reply to Question E-000318/2012 (⁴), the Commission has taken into account the importance of collecting data, within the scope of EU powers, on issues relating to discrimination based on religion. It has therefore included religion as one of the grounds specifically mentioned in its proposal for the thematic areas of work of the EU Agency for Fundamental Rights in 2013-2017 (⁵).

(⁴) <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/QP-WEB/home.jsp>
(⁵) COM(2011) 880 final, Article 2(h) of the proposal.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-001996/12
to the Commission
Liam Aylward (ALDE)
(21 February 2012)**

Subject: EU action towards achieving the Millennium Development Goals

In the Commission communication on a 12-point EU action plan in support of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), it states that:

'To support achieving the MDGs, the EU should pay particular attention to the goals furthest from being achieved. However, the MDGs must not be seen as a collection of separate sectoral targets and indicators. On the contrary, they are interconnected and mutually reinforcing and should be addressed as such.'

- Could the Commission clarify what developments there have been in order to try to achieve the Millennium Development Goals by 2015?
- How does the Commission propose to coordinate different sectoral areas of development in order to achieve the most effective results with regard to improvements in the standard of living for people living in extreme poverty?
- With specific reference to health, does the Commission plan to further develop its vaccination and treatment programmes for chronic diseases such as malaria, tuberculosis, HIV/AIDS and polio?

**Answer given by Mr Piebalgs on behalf of the Commission
(10 April 2012)**

The particular attention paid to the most off-track countries toward the MDGs is confirmed in the recent communication 'Increasing the Impact of EU Development Policy. An Agenda for Change' (¹) that proposes to focus EU development assistance on good governance and inclusive and sustainable growth, and on those countries most in need for poverty reduction and where it can make the most difference. Even if the EU contribution to achieving the MDGs goes beyond direct inputs to concerned sectors, since 2009, more than EUR 14 billion have been committed to health, education, training, employment and social inclusion.

With specific reference to health, the Commission will continue to implement the actions outlined in the 2010 Communication and Council conclusions on Global Health. Control of infectious diseases such as HIV, tuberculosis, malaria, and polio will be addressed in a comprehensive manner and will continue to be a priority. The EUR 1 billion MDG initiative has resulted in the selection of 11 country proposals in 2011 for accelerated progress towards the achievement of MDG 4 (child health) and 5 (maternal health) for a total amount of EUR 280.4 millions. This is in addition to the ongoing health sector support in partner countries.

The new Agenda for Change proposes continued support to the health sector and at least 20 % of EU aid is proposed to be spent on social inclusion and human development in the period of the next MFF (2014-2020).

Country Strategy Papers and subsequent reviews facilitate coordination of initiatives at country level. By identifying the most relevant articulations between areas, donors and allocations (²), the EU Joint Programming of Aid (³) also helps to increase impact and the results of aid.

(¹) http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/news/agenda_for_change_en.htm

(²) See EU Common Position for the Fourth High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness (Busan, 29 November-1 December 2011) — Council conclusions — 3124th Foreign Affairs Development Council meeting Brussels, 14 November 2011 — Annex A — http://consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/126060.pdf

(³) See the Joint Multi-annual Programming — Final Report: http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/how/ensure-aid-effectiveness/documents/report-joint-multi-annual-programming_en.pdf

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-001997/12
to the Commission
Liam Aylward (ALDE)
(21 February 2012)**

Subject: Transparency in EU relations with regard to extractive industries in developing countries

A recent publication from the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative stated that '3.5 billion people live in countries rich in oil, gas and minerals. With good governance, the exploitation of these resources can generate large revenues to foster economic growth and reduce poverty. However, when governance is weak, such resource revenues may result in poverty, corruption and conflict'.

The Commission has recently submitted a proposal on improving standards of transparency in business with extractive industries in developing countries by amending the current transparency Directive 2004/109/EC:

- Does the Commission plan to promote further legislation aimed at increasing transparency in relations with countries in the developing world?
- How does the Commission monitor corruption and illegal activity in resource-rich developing countries that receive EU funding?
- What measures does the Commission have in place to penalise countries in receipt of European aid which engage in such illegal activity?

**Answer given by Mr Piebalgs on behalf of the Commission
(3 May 2012)**

On 25 October 2011 the Commission adopted a legislative proposal requiring the disclosure of payments to governments on a country and — where available — a project basis by listed and large unlisted companies with activities in the extractive (oil, gas and mining) and forestry sectors. This proposal is currently being discussed in the Council and Parliament. A review clause has been incorporated in the text to examine the implementation and the effectiveness of the rules, in particular as regards the scope of the reporting obligations. Furthermore, the Commission will continue to promote country-by-country reporting in global fora to ensure a coherent level playing field. The Commission also supports, financially and politically, other initiatives such as the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), in whose governance it participates.

The increase in transparency in line with the Commission's proposal on the disclosure of payments to governments will help reduce the opportunities for corruption, increase resource-rich countries' accountability and improve domestic revenue mobilisation. This will be reinforced by the recent strengthening of the eligibility criteria as regards transparency assessments to granting budget support by the Commission to third countries, many of which depend greatly on their extractive sectors.

The Commission's October 2011 Communication on Budget Support foresees the possibility to withdraw budget support in case of government corruption. This is in line with the General Conditions in the Financing Agreements to provide aid to third countries, which also foresee the possibility to suspend a programme in case of corruption.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-002031/12
to the Commission
Diane Dodds (NI)
(21 February 2012)**

Subject: Discard reduction measures

Can the Commission provide a summary of the process to be followed by Member States which allows projects that for example have successfully identified *discard reduction measures to be assessed by the STECF and approved by the Commission?*

Answer given by Ms Damanaki on behalf of the Commission
(30 March 2012)

If a Member State intends to put in place particular discard reduction measures in EC law, it should write to the Commission both stating the precise measures requested and backing scientific information from the relevant projects. The Commission will then seek STECF advice before considering whether to propose these measures.

Member States may introduce national conservation measures provided they apply only to their own vessels and supplement existing measures or go beyond minimum legislative requirements (¹).

Information or analysis provided by the Member States to develop additional or alternative measures can be derived from pilot projects funded under the European Fisheries Fund (²). Such projects may develop and test methods to improve gear selectivity, reduce by-catches, discards or the impact on the environment, in particular on the seabed. They should always include adequate scientific follow-up in order to yield significant results.

(¹) Article 46 of Regulation (EC) No 850/98, OJ L 125, 27.4.1998, p.1.
(²) Council Regulation (EC) No 1198/2006.

(Versione italiana)

**Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-002032/12
alla Commissione (Vicepresidente/Alto Rappresentante)**

Marco Scurria (PPE)

(21 febbraio 2012)

Oggetto: VP/HR — Camp Ashraf

In una dichiarazione dello scorso 25 gennaio 2012, rilasciata durante una riunione a Strasburgo, la commissione affari politici e democrazia dell'Assemblea parlamentare del Consiglio d'Europa si è rivolta alle autorità irachene affinché queste non permettano che il Camp Ashraf diventi una prigione e ha fatto appello all'Alto Commissario delle Nazioni Unite per i Rifugiati (UNHCR) affinché avvii il suo lavoro ad Ashraf e ponga fine all'attuale ritardo nel riconoscimento dello stato di rifugiato ai residenti.

L'area originalmente destinata ai residenti in Camp Liberty è stata ridotta di 80 volte e le condizioni di vita all'interno del campo sono ben lontane da quelle inizialmente delineate e proposte. Attualmente, l'area è quasi completamente circondata da vere e proprie mura, non è concessa libertà di movimento, vi sono restrizioni sempre crescenti per i residenti, come ad esempio l'impossibilità di trasferire i propri veicoli a Camp Liberty o inviare una squadra di tecnici di Ashraf per valutare le effettive condizioni del campo. Questo implicherebbe il trasferimento forzoso in prigione.

— Può dire la Vicepresidente/Alto Rappresentante quali azioni intende mettere in atto affinché le persone malate possano lasciare Camp Ashraf per essere curate?

— Può dire, altresì, quali azioni intende mettere in atto per assicurare il rispetto dei diritti umani delle persone che vivono nel Camp Ashraf?

Risposta data dall'Alta Rappresentante/Vicepresidente Catherine Ashton a nome della Commissione
(24 aprile 2012)

L'UE segue con attenzione la questione dei residenti di Camp new Iraq (ex Camp Ashraf), la cui situazione continua a destare preoccupazione. Trattandosi di una questione umanitaria, è necessario che l'UE e la comunità internazionale facciano tutto il possibile per aiutare il governo iracheno a trovare una soluzione pacifica ed ordinata.

Per questo motivo l'Alta Rappresentante/Vicepresidente ha sottolineato ripetutamente il suo pieno sostegno al processo in atto agevolato dalle Nazioni Unite e al Rappresentante speciale del Segretario generale Martin Kobler. L'Ufficio dell'Alto Commissario delle Nazioni Unite per i rifugiati sta procedendo come previsto alla verifica e alla determinazione dello status di «rifugiato» dei primi residenti che sono arrivati nel sito temporaneo di Camp Hurriya in attesa di reinsediamento.

Le difficoltà verificatesi durante e dopo i primi trasferimenti da Camp New Iraq a Camp Hurriya evidenziano l'importanza di sostenere tali sforzi. I residenti e il governo dell'Iraq devono cercare di colmare eventuali divergenze attraverso il dialogo. Il rappresentante speciale Kobler e i suoi collaboratori stanno facendo tutto il possibile per facilitare questo processo e per aiutare le parti a risolvere i problemi, compresa la questione della fornitura di assistenza medica, in maniera costruttiva. Occorre fare il possibile per promuovere e incoraggiare la collaborazione di ognuna delle parti.

Tutti i gruppi o tutti coloro in grado di apportare un contributo in questa situazione devono considerare la protezione e la sicurezza dei residenti una priorità assoluta.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-002032/12
to the Commission (Vice-President/High Representative)
Marco Scurria (PPE)
(21 February 2012)**

Subject: VP/HR — Camp Ashraf

In a statement released on 25 January 2012 during a meeting in Strasbourg, the Committee on Political Affairs and Democracy of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe appealed to the Iraqi authorities not to allow Camp Ashraf to become a prison and has asked the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) to begin work at Ashraf and end the delay in recognising the refugee status of its residents.

The area originally intended for the residents of Camp Liberty was 80 times smaller and living conditions inside the camp bear little resemblance to the original proposals. Currently the area is almost entirely surrounded by solid walls, freedom of movement is denied and residents are facing more and more restrictions. They cannot, for example, bring their own vehicles to Camp Liberty or send a group of technicians to Ashraf to evaluate conditions in the camp. This would appear to involve a forced transfer to prison.

- Can the Vice-President/High Representative state what measures she intends to implement so that the sick can leave Camp Ashraf and receive treatment?
- Can she also state what measures she intends to take to protect the human rights of the people living in Camp Ashraf?

**Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission
(24 April 2012)**

The EU follows the issue of the residents of Camp New Iraq (formerly known as Camp Ashraf) very closely. Their future continues to be a cause for concern. As a humanitarian issue, it requires the EU and the international community to do all we can to help the Government of Iraq to pursue a peaceful and orderly solution.

This is why the High Representative/Vice-President has repeatedly stressed her full support to the ongoing process facilitated by the United Nations and to the Special Representative of the Secretary General Martin Kobler himself. The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees is proceeding as foreseen with the verification and 'refugee status determination' of the first residents who have arrived at the temporary transit location — Camp Hurriya — pending resettlement.

The challenges arising during and after the first moves of residents from Camp New Iraq to Camp Hurriya serve only to underline the importance of supporting these efforts. The residents and the government of Iraq must seek to bridge any differences through dialogue. Mr Kobler and his staff have been doing all they can to facilitate this, and to help the parties resolve problems, including the issue of provision of medical care, in a constructive manner. We must all do our utmost to promote and encourage a cooperative approach from all sides.

Every individual and group who can bring any influence to bear on this matter has a responsibility to place the security and safety of the residents as their utmost priority.

(Versiunea în limba română)

Întrebarea cu solicitare de răspuns scris E-002034/12
adresată Comisiei
Corina Crețu (S&D)
(21 februarie 2012)

Subiect: Justiția în materie de infracțiuni postelectorale — Côte d'Ivoire

La sfârșitul anului 2010, milioane de cetățeni din Côte d'Ivoire au mers la vot pentru a-și alege președintele. În ciuda victoriei lui Alassane Ouattara, recunoscută internațional, președintele aflat la sfârșitul mandatului, Laurent Gbagbo, a refuzat să plece. Acest refuz a dus la izbucnirea de violențe, care au fost organizate în mare parte de administrația Gbagbo și care au avut ca rezultat conflicte armate care au cazat peste 3 000 de victime de ambele părți.

Acțiunile lui Laurent Gbagbo contravin drepturilor omului și cu siguranță acesta va plăti un preț ridicat după procesul său intentat la Curtea Penală Internațională. Cu toate acestea, comunitatea internațională a neglijat abuzurile comise de tabăra lui Ouattara. Forțele republicane ale lui Ouattara au lansat atacuri armate asupra presupușilor partizani simpatizanți ai lui Gbagbo și asupra membrilor mai multor grupuri etnice care sunt de acord cu Gbagbo.

Deși mai mulți susținători lui Gbagbo au fost condamnați, niciun membru al Forțelor republicane nu a fost arestat pentru infracțiunile comise pe parcursul conflictului. Deși președintele Ouattara a promis comunității internaționale că va efectua o anchetă imparțială, realitatea este că nu s-a făcut aproape nimic în acest sens.

— Ce acțiuni va întreprinde Comisia pentru a pune capăt condițiilor de impunitate care domină în prezent în Côte d'Ivoire?

Răspuns dat de dna Ashton, în numele Comisiei
(31 mai 2012)

UE împărtășește preoccupările onorabilului membru, exprimându-le și la cel mai înalt nivel cu ocazia vizitei președintelui Ouattara la Bruxelles, la 23 noiembrie 2011. În timpul reuniunii, președintele Barroso a subliniat importanța investigării și urmăririi penale a persoanelor din ambele facțiuni care este posibil să fi jucat roluri principale în încălcările grave ale drepturilor omului. Președintele Barroso a subliniat, de asemenea, rolul justiției și al reconciliierii naționale în consolidarea democrației și a statului de drept din Republica Côte d'Ivoire.

UE sprijină pe deplin acțiunea Curții Penale Internaționale, care efectuează investigații în legătură cu unii dintre susținătorii președintelui Ouattara, precum și în legătură cu susținătorii din tabăra Gbagbo. Înaltul Reprezentant/Vicepreședintele va continua să monitorizeze îndeaproape acest proces, precum și procesul de reconciliere, în strânsă colaborare cu delegația UE la Abidjan.

Şefii de misiuni ai UE au solicitat oficial un dialog politic oficial, pe baza articolului 8 din Acordul de la Cotonou, priorități de discuție fiind, printre altele, imparțialitatea justiției și lupta împotriva impunității.

În plus, Comisia a lansat un proiect cu guvernul din Côte d'Ivoire pentru sprijinirea reformei justiției și a sistemului penitenciar, inclusiv un dialog mai complet privind o justiție echitabilă și eficace și privind lupta împotriva impunității.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-002034/12
to the Commission
Corina Crețu (S&D)
(21 February 2012)**

Subject: Justice for post-election crimes — Côte d'Ivoire

At the end of 2010, millions of citizens of Côte d'Ivoire went to the polls to elect their president. Despite the internationally recognised victory of Alassane Ouattara, the outgoing president, Laurent Gbagbo, refused to step down. This refusal led to an outbreak of violence, perpetrated mostly by the Gbagbo administration, which resulted in armed conflict that left over 3 000 victims in both camps.

Laurent Gbagbo's actions are contrary to human rights, and he will surely pay a heavy price after his trial at the International Criminal Court. However, the international community has overlooked the abuses perpetrated by the Ouattara camp. Ouattara's Republican Forces launched an armed attack targeting alleged pro-Gbagbo partisans and members of several ethnic groups aligned with Gbagbo.

While several Gbagbo supporters have been sentenced, no member of the Republican Forces has been arrested for crimes committed during the conflict. Although President Ouattara has promised the international community that he will conduct an impartial investigation, the reality is that very little has been done.

— What action will the Commission take with a view to ending the climate of impunity now reigning in Côte d'Ivoire?

**Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission
(31 May 2012)**

The EU shares the concerns of the Honourable Member and expressed them at the highest level on the occasion of President Ouattara's visit to Brussels on 23 November 2011. During their meeting, President Barroso underlined the importance of investigating and prosecuting those people from both factions who may have played leading roles in serious human rights violations. President Barroso also stressed the role of justice and national reconciliation in consolidating democracy and the rule of law in the Ivory Coast.

The EU fully supports the action of the International Criminal Court, which is carrying out investigations into some of President Ouattara's supporters as well as those from the Gbagbo camp. The High Representative/Vice-President will continue to monitor closely this process, as well as the reconciliation process, working closely with the EU Delegation in Abidjan.

The EU Heads of Mission have officially requested a formal political dialogue, on the basis of Article 8 of the Cotonou Agreement, where impartial justice and the fight against impunity will be amongst the priorities for discussion.

In addition, the Commission has launched a project with the Ivorian government to support the reform of the Justice and Penitentiary sector, including a more complete dialogue on fair and effective justice and the fight against impunity.

(Versiunea în limba română)

Întrebarea cu solicitare de răspuns scris E-002035/12
adresată Comisiei
Corina Crețu (S&D)
(21 februarie 2012)

Subiect: Consumul de droguri în Europa

Raportul mondial privind drogurile întocmit de Oficiul ONU în 2011 pentru combaterea traficului de droguri și prevenirea criminalității evidențiază nivelul încă ridicat de utilizare a substanțelor ilegale în Europa. Deși consumul de cannabis rămâne în continuare ridicat, iar consumul de heroină s-a stabilizat, s-a înregistrat o creștere alarmantă a consumului de cocaïnă și de pastile sintetice de către cetățenii europeni. Rapoartele recente provenite din Rusia au indicat, de asemenea, apariția unui puternic nou drog denumit „Krokodil”. Mult mai puternic și mult mai ieftin decât heroina, drogul „Krokodil” are efecte letale asupra utilizatorilor deoarece, în medie, aceștia nu supraviețuiesc mai mult de trei ani. Pentru moment, consumul acestei substanțe este încă foarte puțin răspândit în Europa. Cu toate acestea, dacă nu se acționează în niciun fel pentru a stopa extinderea sa pe teritoriul european, am putea fi martori la distrugerea vieților a numeroși oameni.

— Aș dori să aflu ce acțiuni încearcă Comisia pentru a combate consumul de droguri ilegale în Europa. Deși sunt aplicate măsuri de prevenire în numeroase școli și colegii europene, ce alte măsuri intenționează Comisia să aplique în vederea combaterii creșterii consumului de droguri ilegale?

Răspuns dat de dna Reding în numele Comisiei
(16 martie 2012)

Comisia îl invită pe distinsul membru să consulte răspunsul acesteia la întrebarea scrisă E-011248/2011⁽¹⁾, în care este prezentat răspunsul Comisiei cu privire la fenomenul drogurilor.

⁽¹⁾ <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getAllAnswers.do?reference=E-2011-011248&language=EN>.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-002035/12
to the Commission
Corina Crețu (S&D)
(21 February 2012)**

Subject: Drug consumption in Europe

The 2011 World Drug Report compiled by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime highlights the still elevated use of illicit substances in Europe. While the consumption of cannabis remains high and the use of heroin has stabilised, there has been an alarming increase in the use of cocaine and synthetic pills by European citizens. Recent reports from Russia also showed the appearance of a new powerful drug called Krokodil. Stronger and much cheaper than heroin, Krokodil has deadly effects for its users as they do not live, on average, longer than three years. For now the use of this substance in Europe is still very rare; however, if nothing is done to stop its expansion on our territories, we could see it destroy the lives of a great number of people.

— I would like to know what the Commission is doing to fight against the use of illegal drugs in Europe. While prevention is carried out in many European schools and colleges, what other measures does the Commission intend to apply in order to combat the rising use of illicit drugs?

**Answer given by Mrs Reding on behalf of the Commission
(16 March 2012)**

The Commission would refer the Honourable Member to its answer to Written Question E-011248/2011⁽¹⁾, in which the Commission's response to the drug phenomenon is outlined.

⁽¹⁾ <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getAllAnswers.do?reference=E-2011-011248&language=EN>.

(Versiunea în limba română)

Întrebarea cu solicitare de răspuns scris E-002036/12
adresată Comisiei
Corina Crețu (S&D)
(21 februarie 2012)

Subiect: Prizonierii politici din Georgia

Odată cu venirea la putere a președintelui prooccidental, Mihail Saakașvili, după Revoluția trandafirilor, comunitatea internațională a sperat la o schimbare în istoria politică a Greciei. Din nefericire, în noiembrie 2007, nou-alesul regim a utilizat represiuni brutale și disproportioante împotriva demonstranților opoziției, ceea ce a dus la înregistrarea a câteva sute de răniți și la arestarea arbitrară a mult mai multora. Mai multe organizații interguvernamentale și ONG-uri internaționale au documentat și au denunțat represiunile aplicate oponenților politici de Guvernul din Georgia.

Intern, Avocatul Poporului din Georgia a susținut în mod public aceste acuzații și a adresat întrebări guvernului cu privire la cazurile în care au fost arestate în mod arbitrar persoanele reținute. Cu toate acestea, până acum comunitatea internațională nu a ridicat în mod convingător problema prizonierilor politici în care este vizată Georgia, deși a procedat astfel în cazul țărilor vecine Greciei, Armenia și Azerbaidjan.

Existența unor bune relații între Georgia și Uniunea Europeană nu ar trebui să împiedice o dezbatere mai profundă cu liderii de la Tbilisi privind drepturile omului.

- Intenționează Comisia să abordeze această problemă într-un mod mai eficient?
- În cazul în care Guvernul din Georgia refuză să coopereze, ce măsuri va adopta Comisia?

Răspuns dat de dl Füle în numele Comisiei
(31 mai 2012)

UE ia foarte în serios orice acuzații de persecuții din motive politice din Georgia și monitorizează îndeaproape evoluțiile din acest domeniu. Aspectele legate de drepturile omului fac în mod periodic obiectul discuțiilor cu Georgia în cadrul reuniunilor de dialog politic, inclusiv la nivel ministerial. Mai multe cazuri de persecuții din motive politice au fost, de asemenea, abordate cu autoritățile georgiene cu ocazia reuniunilor anuale de dialog dedicate aspectelor legate de drepturile omului. UE oferă un sprijin substanțial consolidării Biroului apărătorului public în activitatea acestuia de monitorizare și de recomandare de politici, în cadrul noului program „Consolidare instituțională cuprinzătoare”. Începând din 2008, UE a sprijinit reforma sistemului judiciar penal cu suma de 16 milioane EUR. Un nou program de justiție penală, în valoare de 18 milioane EUR, a fost semnat în februarie 2012. Aceasta este menit să consolideze statul de drept și drepturile omului în Georgia. Având în vedere alegerile viitoare, UE a comunicat guvernului că persecuțiile din motive politice directe sau indirecte din partea agenților de asigurare a aplicării legii sau utilizarea selectivă a justiției împotriva adversarilor politici sunt incompatibile cu valorile democratice. Democrația și drepturile omului se situează în centrul Parteneriatului estic. Pentru ca Georgia să aibă posibilitatea de a progrăsa pe calea asocierea politică și a integrării economice cu UE, este în continuare esențial să respecte în totalitate valorile la care acesta s-a angajat în mod voluntar.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-002036/12
to the Commission
Corina Crețu (S&D)
(21 February 2012)**

Subject: Political prisoners in Georgia

With the arrival in power of the pro-West president Mikheil Saakashvili after the Rose Revolution, the international community hoped for a new turn in Georgia's political history. Unfortunately, in November 2007 the newly elected regime used brutal and disproportionate repression against opposition demonstrations, which led to a toll of several hundred injured and to the arbitrary arrest of dozens more. Several intergovernmental organisations and international NGOs have documented and denounced the Georgian government repression of political opponents.

Internally, the Public Defender of Georgia has publicly supported these accusations and questioned the government about the cases in which detainees have been arbitrarily arrested. However, so far, the international community has failed to forcefully raise the issue of political prisoners where Georgia is concerned, although it has done so in the cases of Georgia's neighbours, Armenia and Azerbaijan.

The existence of good relations between Georgia and the European Union should not prevent a more in-depth discussion about human rights with the Tbilisi leaders.

- Does the Commission plan to address this issue in a more effective way?
- If the Georgian Government refuses to cooperate, what measures will the Commission take?

**Answer given by Mr Füle on behalf of the Commission
(31 May 2012)**

The EU takes very seriously any accusations of politically motivated persecution in Georgia and closely monitors developments in this area. Human rights matters are regularly discussed with Georgia in political dialogue meetings, including at ministerial level. Several cases of politically motivated persecution were also raised with the Georgian authorities during the annual dedicated Human Rights dialogue meetings. The EU provides substantial support to strengthen the Public Defender's Office in its monitoring and policy recommendation activities under the new 'Comprehensive Institutional Building' Programme. Since 2008, the EU has been supporting the reform of the criminal justice system amounting to EUR 16 million. A new EUR 18 million criminal justice programme was signed in February 2012. It is meant to strengthen the rule of law and human rights in Georgia. In view of the upcoming elections, the EU communicated to the government that direct or indirect politically motivated persecution by law enforcement agencies or selective use of justice against political contenders are incompatible with democratic values. Human rights and democracy lie at the heart of the Eastern Partnership. For Georgia to be able to progress on the path of political association and economic integration with the EU, it remains essential that the country fully respects the values to which it has voluntarily committed itself.

(Versiunea în limba română)

Întrebarea cu solicitare de răspuns scris E-002037/12

adresată Comisiei

Corina Crețu (S&D)

(21 februarie 2012)

Subiect: Civilii judecați în curțile militare din Uganda

Situatia sistemului de justiție din Uganda este îngrijorătoare. De mai bine de zece ani, peste o mie de ugandezi a fost judecați de curți militare, deși anchetarea militară a civililor este ilegală. ONG-urile din domeniul drepturilor omului au denunțat sute de procese conduse de curțile militare în care civililor li s-au refuzat drepturi de bază, inclusiv dreptul la un avocat, dreptul de a nu se autoincrimina și dreptul la un proces imparțial.

Atunci când a fost întrebat despre transferul deținuților civili în custodia militară, președintele ugandez, Yoweri Museveni, a apărut procedura, acuzând curțile civile că nu reușesc să asigure condamnările penale.

De-a lungul anilor, mai multe state membre, inclusiv Țările de Jos, Irlanda și Regatul Unit, au contribuit cu fonduri în speranța îmbunătățirii sectorului justiției, dar rezultatele nu au fost satisfăcătoare. Dimpotrivă, abuzurile comise de curțile militare au sporit foarte mult.

— Intenționează Comisia să examineze mai indeaproape situația din Uganda? Va acorda aceasta prioritate majorării asistenței financiare în vederea îmbunătățirii performanțelor curților civile?

— Dacă aceste încălcări ale drepturilor omului vor continua, Comisia va solicita sancțiuni?

Răspuns dat de dna Ashton în numele Comisiei

(10 mai 2012)

Este dificil de estimat numărul exact de civili judecați de instanța militară, având în vedere că instanțele sunt în mare măsură inaccesibile. În trecut, UE a sprijinit sistemul judiciar din Uganda. Cu toate acestea, în momentul de față, sistemul judiciar nu beneficiază de niciun sprijin direct, acesta fiind acordat doar Forței de poliție ugandize (UPF) și Serviciului penitenciarelor din Uganda (UPS).

În raportul său anual pentru 2010, Comisia pentru drepturile omului din Uganda (UHRC) a subliniat problema întârzierii judecării de către instanța militară a suspecților reținuți în arest preventiv. Această comisie a vizitat într-o încisoare 19 deținuți care fuseseră plasați în arest preventiv de către Forțele de apărare a poporului din Uganda (UPDF), instanța militară divizia a 3-a, și care petrecuseră între 68 și 1 435 de zile în arest preventiv. UHRC a observat, pe baza informațiilor obținute de la UPDF, că 524 de soldați au fost urmăriți penal și condamnați la diferite pedepse cu închisoarea pentru infracțiuni legate de deținerea de arme de foc. Dintre aceștia, 386 au fost judecați de către instanța militară, în vreme ce ceilalți 138 au fost judecați de către instanțele civile.

Ca răspuns la hotărârea Curții Supreme privind judecarea civililor de către instanțele militare, în 2011, UPDF a anunțat constituirea unei comisii (alcătuite din funcționari provenind din organele de conducere a Serviciului militar de informații, din Direcția procurură, din UPF și din UPS) cu scopul de a reexamina aproximativ 400 de cazuri în vederea unei posibile trimiteri a cauzelor deschise împotriva civililor spre a fi soluționate de instanțele civile. Toate cauzele noi în care sunt implicați civili urmează să fie deferite justiției civile.

S-a înregistrat o tendință pozitivă de eliminare a judecării civililor de către instanțele militare. UE speră că inițiativa UPDF menționată anterior va avea succes. În cazul în care situația se va deteriora, UE va folosi căile disponibile, inclusiv dialogul politic, pentru a face presiuni în sensul eliminării judecării civililor de către instanțele militare.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-002037/12
to the Commission
Corina Crețu (S&D)
(21 February 2012)**

Subject: Civilians prosecuted in military courts in Uganda

The situation of Uganda's justice system is worrisome. Over almost 10 years now, more than one thousand Ugandans have been tried by military courts despite the fact that military prosecutions of civilians are unlawful. Human rights NGOs have denounced hundreds of trials held by military courts at which civilians have been denied basic rights, including the right to a lawyer, the right against self-incrimination and the right to an impartial trial.

When questioned on the transfer of civilian detainees to military custody, Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni has defended the procedure, accusing the civil courts of failing to secure convictions.

Over the years, several Member States, including the Netherlands, Ireland and the UK, have contributed funds in the hope of improving the justice sector, but the results have not been satisfactory. On the contrary, the abuses committed by the military courts have greatly increased.

- Does the Commission intend to take a closer look at the situation in Uganda? Will it give priority to increasing financial assistance in order to improve the performance of the civil courts?
- If these human rights violations continue, will the Commission call for sanctions?

**Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission
(10 May 2012)**

It is difficult to give an exact number of civilians tried by the military court as the courts are largely inaccessible. In the past, the EU supported the justice system in Uganda. However, currently, there is no direct support to the Judiciary, only to the Uganda Police Force (UPF) and Uganda Prisons Service (UPS).

In its annual report for 2010, the Uganda Human Rights Commission (UHRC) highlighted as a problem the issue of delayed trial of suspects remanded by court martial. In one prison, it visited 19 inmates that had been remanded by the Uganda People's Defence Force (UPDF) 3rd Division Court Martial and had spent between 68 and 1 435 days on remand. UHRC noted, on the basis of information that it obtained from the UPDF, 524 soldiers were prosecuted and sentenced to various terms of imprisonment on offences related to possession of firearms. Of these, 386 were tried by court martial while the rest of the 138 were tried by the civil courts.

In response to the ruling of the Supreme Court on the trial of civilians in military courts, in 2011, UPDF announced that it had constituted a committee (comprised of officials from Chieftancy of Military Intelligence, Directorate of Public Prosecution, UPF and UPS) to review about 400 cases for a possible referral of those against civilians to the civil courts for further prosecution. All new cases involving civilians would be referred to the civil justice system.

There has been a positive trend towards the elimination of trials of civilians by the military courts. The EU hopes that the abovementioned UPDF initiative will be successful. Should the situation deteriorate the EU will use the available avenues including political dialogue, to press for the elimination of trial of civilians by the military courts.

(Versione italiana)

**Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-002038/12
alla Commissione (Vicepresidente/Alto Rappresentante)**

Mara Bizzotto (EFD)

(21 febbraio 2012)

Oggetto: VP/HR — Arresto di due militari italiani da parte del governo indiano

Il governo italiano è attualmente impegnato in un confronto con le autorità dell'India, a causa dell'arresto da parte di queste ultime di due militari italiani impegnati in un'operazione anti-pirateria nell'Oceano indiano. I due militari sono stati infatti arrestati con l'accusa di aver ucciso due pescatori locali. Tuttavia, numerosi fonti e osservatori internazionali ritengono che l'accusa sia completamente infondata, e che l'ordine di arrestare i militari sia stato emesso per ragioni esclusivamente politiche. Tale ipotesi sembra confermata dal fatto che le manifestazioni anti-italiane organizzate davanti all'abitazione del magistrato che dovrà condurre il processo sono composte esclusivamente da membri di partiti politici, mentre non è presente alcun pescatore.

Inoltre, secondo alcune fonti, le autorità indiane avrebbero utilizzato un falso pretesto per attirare entro il porto di Kochi la nave su cui i militari erano imbarcati, al fine di impedire il loro allontanamento.

- Il Vicepresidente/Alto Rappresentante è a conoscenza dei fatti sopra esposti? Dispone di ulteriori informazioni sul caso in questione?
- Ritiene che se le accuse sull'utilizzo dell'inganno da parte delle autorità indiane risultassero vere, tale comportamento costituirebbe una violazione del diritto internazionale a danno di un Stato membro dell'UE? Come ritiene di dover agire sul piano diplomatico in tal caso?
- Il Vicepresidente/Alto Rappresentante intende intervenire in sostegno dello Stato membro coinvolto al fine di impedire che i due militari italiani vengano condannati ingiustamente e al fine di verificare la trasparenza delle azioni del governo indiano?

Risposta data dall'Alta Rappresentante/Vicepresidente Catherine Ashton a nome della Commissione
(22 maggio 2012)

I militari italiani Massimiliano Latorre e Salvatore Girone sono tuttora sotto custodia delle autorità indiane, in attesa di una decisione dell'Alta Corte del Kerala in merito alla giurisdizione da applicare in questo caso. La nave mercantile non ha ancora avuto l'autorizzazione a lasciare il porto di Kochi, in attesa di garanzie adeguate per il pagamento del risarcimento alle famiglie delle vittime.

Su richiesta del governo italiano, l'Alta Rappresentante/Vicepresidente ha dato istruzioni al servizio europeo per l'azione esterna (SEAE) di intensificare i contatti con le controparti indiane e di attirare la loro attenzione sulla complessità del caso. Pur riconoscendo che la questione è ora innanzi alla giurisdizione indiana, il SEAE a Bruxelles e la delegazione dell'UE a New Delhi hanno entrambi discusso con le autorità indiane competenti sui vari elementi del caso e sulla necessità di trovare quanto prima una soluzione soddisfacente.

Gli sforzi dell'Alta Rappresentante/Vicepresidente sia a Bruxelles che a New Delhi si sono altresì concentrati nel dialogo con l'India in merito alla regolamentazione della presenza di soggetti armati a bordo delle navi mercantili come protezione contro la pirateria.

La questione del personale armato a bordo delle navi mercantili è oggetto di consultazione nei fori internazionali, in particolare nell'ambito dell'IMO e del gruppo di contatto internazionale antipirateria al largo delle coste somale. L'UE e l'India hanno concordato di intensificare i contatti in tal senso e di perseguire con fermezza una revisione delle attuali prassi per prevenire l'insorgere di incidenti simili in futuro.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-002038/12
to the Commission (Vice-President/High Representative)
Mara Bizzotto (EFD)
(21 February 2012)**

Subject: VP/HR — Arrest of two Italian soldiers by the Indian government

The Italian Government is currently involved in a confrontation with the Indian authorities due to the arrest of two Italian soldiers deployed in an anti-piracy operation in the Indian Ocean. The two soldiers have been arrested on suspicion of killing two local fishermen. Several sources and international observers, however, believe that the charge is entirely without grounds and that the order to arrest the soldiers was given purely for political motives. This theory would appear to be borne out by the fact that the anti-Italian protests organised outside the home of the magistrate appointed to conduct the trial actually only involved members of political parties, with no fishermen present.

Furthermore, some sources believe that the Indian authorities may have used a false pretext to attract the ship carrying the soldiers into the port of Kochi, in order to then prevent them from leaving.

— Is the Vice-President/High Representative aware of the above events? Does she have any additional information on the case in question?

— Does she believe that if the accusations of foul play on the part of the Indian authorities were true, this would constitute a breach of international law against an EU Member State? What diplomatic action should be taken in this case, in her view?

— Does the Vice-President/High Representative intend to intervene in support of the Member State involved in order to prevent the two Italian soldiers from being unfairly sentenced and to verify the transparency of the actions of the Indian government?

**Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission
(22 May 2012)**

The Italian marines Mr Massimilano Latorre and Mr Salvatore Girone still remain under Indian custody, awaiting a decision by the Kerala High Court on the jurisdiction over this case. The merchant vessel has not been authorised yet to leave the Cochin harbour, pending agreement on appropriate guarantees for payment of compensations to the families of the victims.

At the request of the Italian Government, the High Representative/Vice-President (HR/VP) has directed the European External Action Service (EEAS) to intensify contacts with Indian counterparts to draw their attention to the complexity of the case. Whilst acknowledging that the matter is now in front of the Indian jurisdiction, both the EEAS Headquarters and the EU Delegation in Delhi have discussed the various elements with the competent Indian authorities and the need to find a satisfactory solution as soon as possible.

The HR/VP efforts both here in Brussels and in New Delhi, have concentrated as well on engaging in a dialogue with India in order to address the issue of the regulation of the presence of armed elements on board merchant vessels with the aim of protecting against piracy.

The issue of armed personnel on board merchant vessels is the object of consultation in international fora, in particular within the International Maritime Organisation (IMO) and the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia. The EU and India have agreed to intensify contacts in this regard and to vigorously pursue review of the current practices in order to prevent such incidents from happening again.

(Tekstas lietuvių kalba)

Klausimas, į kurį atsakoma raštu, Nr. E-002039/12
Komisijai
Juozas Imbrasas (EFD)
(2012 m. vasario 21 d.)

Tema: Vairuotojų pažymėjimai

1. Ar Lietuva privalo į savo nacionalinę teisę perkelti 2006 m. gruodžio 20 d. Europos Parlamento ir Tarybos direktyvą dėl vairuotojo pažymėjimų (nauja redakcija)? Jei taip, iki kada?
2. Ar Komisija jau pradėjo pažeidimo nagrinėjimo procedūrą prieš Lietuvą, jei Lietuva neperkélė šios direktyvos laiku?
3. Ar tarybinio pavyzdžio ir LT1 pavyzdžio vairuotojo pažymėjimai yra Europos Sąjungos negaliojančių vairuotojo pažymėjimų kataloge? Iki kada šio pavyzdžio pažymėjimai turi būti pakeisti? Iki kada jie galios?
4. Ar būtent 2006 m. gruodžio 20 d. Europos Parlamento ir Tarybos direktyva dėl vairuotojo pažymėjimų (nauja redakcija) įpareigoja Lietuvą pakeisti tarybinio pavyzdžio ir LT1 pavyzdžio vairuotojo pažymėjimus?
5. Ar, atsižvelgiant į 2006 m. gruodžio 20 d. Europos Parlamento ir Tarybos direktyvos dėl vairuotojo pažymėjimų (nauja redakcija) 3 straipsnį, reiškia, kad Lietuvoje visi šiandien galiojantys vairuotojo pažymėjimai nustos galioti tik 2033 m. sausio 19 d.?

S. Kallaso atsakymas Komisijos vardu
(2012 m. balandžio 3 d.)

1. Taip, Lietuva privalo į nacionalinę teisę perkelti Direktyvą 2006/126/EB⁽¹⁾. Visos valstybės narės Direktyvą 2006/126/EB į savo nacionalinę teisę turėjo perkelti iki 2011 m. sausio 19 d.
2. Taip, prieš Lietuvą pradėta pažeidimo nagrinėjimo procedūra dėl to, kad Direktyva 2006/126/EB į nacionalinę teisę perkelta tik iš dalies.
- 3 ir 4. Negaliojančių vairuotojo pažymėjimų katalogo Komisija neturi. Iki 2013 m. sausio 19 d. Lietuvos išduoti ar pripažinti vairuotojo pažymėjimai galios iki tos dienos (ne vėliau kaip iki 2033 m. sausio 19 d.⁽²⁾), kurią pagal gyvenamosios šalies teisės aktus vairuotojo pažymėjimas turės būti atnaujintas ar pakeistas.
5. Visi vairuotojo pažymėjimai, kuriuos valstybė narė išdavė iki 2013 m. sausio 19 d., turės būti atnaujinti arba pakeisti į Direktyvos 2006/126/EB reikalavimus atitinkantį vairuotojo pažymėjimą iki 2033 m. sausio 19 d.

⁽¹⁾ OLL 403, 2006 12 30, p. 18.
⁽²⁾ Direktyvos 2006/126/EB 3 straipsnis.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-002039/12
to the Commission
Juozas Imbrasas (EFD)
(21 February 2012)**

Subject: Driving licences

1. Is Lithuania obliged to transpose Directive 2006/126/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 December 2006 on driving licences (Recast) into its national law? If so, by when?
2. Has the Commission already launched infringement proceedings against Lithuania, because Lithuania failed to transpose this directive on time?
3. Are the Soviet- and LT1-format driving licences listed in the European Union's catalogue of invalid driving licences? By what date should these licence formats be changed? Until when are they valid?
4. Does Directive 2006/126/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 December 2006 on driving licences (Recast) require Lithuania to change Soviet- and LT1-format driving licences?
5. In view of Article 3 of Directive 2006/126/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 December 2006, will all currently-valid driving licences in Lithuania expire on 19 January 2033?

**Answer given by Mr Kallas on behalf of the Commission
(3 April 2012)**

1. Yes, Lithuania is obliged to transpose Directive 2006/126/EC⁽¹⁾ into its national law. For all Member States the transposition of Directive 2006/126/EC into national law had to be completed by 19 January 2011.
 2. Yes, an infringement procedure is currently open against Lithuania for partial transposition of Directive 2006/126/EC into national law.
- 3 and 4. The Commission does not hold a catalogue of invalid driving licences. Driving licences issued or recognised by Lithuania before 19 January 2013 will remain valid until the date — at the latest by 19 January 2033⁽²⁾ — when in accordance with the legislation of the country of residence, the driving licence will have to be renewed or exchanged.
5. All driving licences issued by a Member State before 19 January 2013 will have to be renewed or exchanged before 19 January 2033 towards a driving licence complying with the requirements of Directive 2006/126/EC.

⁽¹⁾ OJ L 403, 30.12.2006, p. 18.
⁽²⁾ Article 3 of Directive 2006/126/EC.

(Versiunea în limba română)

**Întrebarea cu solicitare de răspuns scris E-002040/12
adresată Comisiei
Petru Constantin Luhan (PPE)
(21 februarie 2012)**

Subiect: Debiocratizarea și simplificarea procedurilor pentru proiectele derulate din fonduri UE

În conformitate cu Agenda de reglementare inteligentă a Comisiei și cu comunicarea Comisiei COM(2012)42 final „O agendă de simplificare pentru CFM pentru perioada 2014-2020”, prezentată la 8 februarie 2012, Uniunea Europeană are responsabilitatea, prin controale și măsurători eficiente de performanță, nu numai să se asigure că fondurile europene sunt bine cheltuite ci, de asemenea, să ia măsuri pentru a răspunde la necesitatea simplificării programelor sale de cheltuieli cu scopul de a reduce birocrația, povara administrativă și costurile pentru beneficiarii de fonduri și pentru toți actorii implicați.

Pentru proiectele finanțate din fonduri comunitare, debiocratizarea, simplificarea regulilor și introducerea procedurilor de depunere/evaluare/verificare online ar scurta mult durata diferitelor etape ale proiectelor, ar spori transparența procesului de alocare a fondurilor și, nu în ultimul rând, ar reduce în mod semnificativ costurile administrative și consumul de hârtie al actorilor implicați.

— Referitor la aceste aspecte, are Comisia în vedere introducerea unor astfel de proceduri pentru accesarea fondurilor provenite de la Uniunea Europeană?

— În cazul în care astfel de proceduri sunt în curs de elaborare, care este stadiul lor actual și care este calendarul preconizat pentru implementarea lor?

**Răspuns dat de dl Lewandowski în numele Comisiei
(3 aprilie 2012)**

După cum se arată în Comunicarea Comisiei intitulată „O agendă de simplificare pentru CFM pentru perioada 2014-2020”⁽¹⁾, cadrul propus pentru următoarea perioadă de programare ar trebui să contribuie în mod semnificativ la simplificare, atât pentru beneficiari și statele membre, cât și pentru ceilalți parteneri implicați. Scopul propunerilor elaborate de Comisie pentru anumite sectoare este în special facilitarea accesului la fondurile UE datorită unor norme și proceduri mai ușor de aplicat.

În primul rând, se prevede reducerea numărului de programe și instrumente, ceea ce ar trebui să permită o mai bună interpretare și implementare a normelor aplicabile.

În paralel, se propune un cadru clarificat și armonizat pentru accesarea fondurilor: de exemplu, în cazul fondurilor din cadrul strategic comun (CSC)⁽²⁾ sau al programului „Orizont 2020”⁽³⁾, ar trebui să se aplice norme de eligibilitate simplificate și metode și proceduri de punere în aplicare raționalizate și simplificate. Este, de asemenea, autorizată utilizarea mai largă a unor forme simplificate de granturi (cum ar fi sumele forfetare, finanțările la rate forfetare și baremele standard pentru costurile unitate), în cadrul unor programe precum „Erasmus pentru toți”⁽⁴⁾.

În al doilea rând, un alt pas în direcția e-guvernantei este faptul că statelor membre li s-a solicitat să instituie sisteme care să permită beneficiarilor să prezinte toate informațiile necesare prin mijloace electronice și numai o singură dată.

În cele din urmă, actuala revizuire a Regulamentului financiar⁽⁵⁾ promovează o abordare proporțională și eficientă din punctul de vedere al costurilor, care implică un control în funcție de riscuri. Aceasta ar trebui să reducă numărul cerințelor detaliate impuse beneficiarilor, fără ca riscul financiar pe care și-l asumă Uniunea să crească.

În ceea ce privește a doua întrebare formulată de onorabilul membru, adoptarea finală a CFM este o condiție prealabilă pentru punerea în aplicare a programelor de cheltuieli. Adoptarea propunerilor sectoriale este preconizată în 2013, pentru ca noile programe să poată începe la 1 ianuarie 2014.

⁽¹⁾ COM(2012) 42 final.

⁽²⁾ COM(2011) 615 final.

⁽³⁾ COM(2011) 809 final.

⁽⁴⁾ COM(2011) 788 final.

⁽⁵⁾ COM(2010) 815 final.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-002040/12
to the Commission**
Petru Constantin Luhan (PPE)
(21 February 2012)

Subject: Reduction of bureaucracy and simplifying procedures for EU-funded projects

In accordance with the intelligent regulation agenda of the Commission and Commission communication COM(2012)42 final 'A Simplification Agenda for the MFF 2014-2020', presented on 8 February 2012, the European Union is responsible, through controls and efficient performance measures, not only to ensure that European funds are well spent but also to take measures to respond to the need to simplify its spending programmes so as to reduce bureaucracy, the administrative burden and costs for beneficiaries of the funds and for all parties involved.

For projects financed through Community funds, bureaucracy reduction, rule simplification and the introduction of online filing/evaluation/verification rules would greatly shorten the duration of different stages of the projects, would increase transparency of the funding allocation process and last, but not least, would significantly reduce the administration costs and paper consumption of the parties involved.

In view of this:

1. Would the Commission consider such procedures for the accessing of funds from the European Union?
2. If such procedures are being developed, what is their current position and what is the expected timetable for their implementation?

Answer given by Mr Lewandowski on behalf of the Commission
(3 April 2012)

As detailed in the Commission communication 'A simplification Agenda for the Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) 2014-2020' (¹), the proposed framework for the next programming period should produce significant simplification gains, both for beneficiaries, Member States and other involved partners. In designing its sector-specific proposals, the Commission has notably aimed at facilitating access to EU funds through more user-friendly rules and procedures.

Firstly, the foreseen reduction in the number of programmes and instruments should help interpretation and implementation of applicable rules.

In parallel, a clarified and harmonised framework for the accessing of funds is proposed: simplified eligibility rules, as well as streamlined and lighter implementing methods and procedures should for instance apply to the Common Strategic Framework (CSF) Funds (²) or to the Horizon 2020 programme (³). A broader use of simplified forms of grants (such as lump sums, flat rates and standard scales of unit costs) is also authorised, as in the 'Erasmus for all' programme (⁴).

Secondly, a step further towards eGovernance is taken by requiring Member States to set up systems that enable beneficiaries to submit all needed information by electronic means, and only once.

Finally, the current revision of the Financial Regulation (⁵) promotes a proportionate and cost effective approach entailing risk-based control. This should relieve concerned beneficiaries from detailed requirements, without increasing the financial risk to the Union.

Concerning the second point of the question raised by the Honourable Member, the final adoption of the MFF is a precondition for the implementation of spending programmes. The adoption of the sectoral proposals is expected in 2013, in order to ensure that new programmes can start as of 1 January 2014.

(¹) COM(2012) 42 final.
 (²) COM(2011) 615 final.
 (³) COM(2011) 809 final.
 (⁴) COM(2011) 788 final.
 (⁵) COM(2010) 815 final.

(Versiunea în limba română)

**Întrebarea cu solicitare de răspuns scris E-002041/12
adresată Comisiei
Petru Constantin Luhan (PPE)
(21 februarie 2012)**

Subiect: Ghid privind metodele de punere în practică a principiilor de guvernanță pe mai multe niveluri și a abordării integrate

Parlamentul European, în rezoluția sa din 14 decembrie 2010 referitoare la buna guvernanță în materie de politică regională a UE: procedurile de asistență și control ale Comisiei Europene (2009/2231(INI)), îndeamnă Comisia să elaboreze un ghid pentru actorii din sectorul public și privat privind metodele de punere în practică a principiilor de guvernanță pe mai multe niveluri și a abordării integrate și recomandă ca măsurile ce vizează promovarea acestor două abordări să fie finanțate în cadrul asistenței tehnice oferite de FEDER.

— A inițiat Comisia un astfel de demers? Care este stadiul actual?

**Răspuns dat de dl Hahn în numele Comisiei
(29 martie 2012)**

Parteneriatul este unul dintre principiile cheie ale realizării politicii de coeziune și un instrument al angajamentului comun și asumării obiectivelor și rezultatelor programului. Propunerile legislative ale Comisiei privind politica de coeziune pentru perioada 2014-2020 prevăd implicarea partenerilor de la toate nivelurile în procesul de încheiere a contractelor de parteneriat și, în continuare, în punerea în aplicare a programelor. Comisia consideră că parteneriatul este strâns legat de abordarea bazată pe guvernanță pe mai multe niveluri din domeniul politicii de coeziune, permitând respectarea principiilor gestionării comune și proporționalității în ceea ce privește această politică. Prin urmare, Comisia consideră că partenerii trebuie să fie implicați activ în întregul ciclu de programare. De asemenea, guvernanța pe mai multe niveluri facilitează coordonarea și contribuie la reducerea dezechilibrelor de capacitate în elaborarea politicilor în ceea ce privește informarea, resursele, finanțarea și fragmentarea administrativă și politică.

Propunerile legislative prevăd, de asemenea, elaborarea unui cod de conduită european care să prezinte obiectivele și criteriile pentru a sprijini punerea în aplicare a principiului parteneriatului și a facilita schimbul de informații, experiență, rezultate și bune practici între statele membre. Comisia preconizează finalizarea primei versiuni a codului în primăvara anului 2012.

Este important de amintit și că autoritățile de management din mai multe state membre utilizează în prezent măsurile de asistență tehnică pentru consolidarea capacităților parteneriatului (sesiuni de formare) și sprijinirea participării partenerilor în cadrul comitetelor de monitorizare a programelor.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-002041/12
to the Commission**
Petru Constantin Luhan (PPE)
(21 February 2012)

Subject: Guide on methods for implementing the principles of multi-level governance and an integrated approach

In its resolution of 14 December 2010 on good governance with regard to the EU regional policy: procedures of assistance and control by the European Commission (2009/2231(INI)), the European Parliament urges the Commission to draw up a guide for the public and private sectors regarding methods for implementing the principles of multi-level governance and an integrated approach and recommends that measures aimed at promoting these two approaches be financed under ERDF technical assistance.

— Has the Commission initiated such action? What is the current stage?

Answer given by Mr Hahn on behalf of the Commission
(29 March 2012)

Partnership is one of the key principles in the implementation of cohesion policy, and an instrument for collective commitment and ownership of programme objectives and results. The Commission's legislative proposals for cohesion policy in 2014-2020 provide for the involvement of partners at all levels in the process of establishing the Partnership Contracts, and subsequently in the implementation of the programmes. The Commission believes that partnership is closely linked with the cohesion policy multi-level governance approach and allows for the respect of the shared management and proportionality principles of this policy. The Commission, therefore, believes that partners should be actively involved in the whole programming cycle. In addition, multi-level governance facilitates coordination and helps to reduce capacity gaps in policy making in terms of information, resources, funding and administrative and policy fragmentation.

The legislative proposals also foresee a European Code of Conduct setting out objectives and criteria to support the implementation of the partnership principle and facilitating the sharing of information, experiences, results and good practices among Member States. The Commission plans to finalise a first version of the Code in spring 2012.

It is also worth noting that technical assistance measures are currently being used by managing authorities in several Member States to build partnership capacity building (training sessions) and support partners' participation in programme Monitoring Committees.

(Versiunea în limba română)

Întrebarea cu solicitare de răspuns scris E-002042/12
adresată Comisiei
Corina Crețu (S&D)
(21 februarie 2012)

Subiect: Măsuri coordonate la nivel european pentru combaterea sărăciei, în special în rândul copiilor

Cele mai ridicate rate ale riscului sărăciei în UE, în anul 2010, s-au înregistrat în Bulgaria (42%) și România (41%), iar cele mai scăzute în Cehia (14%), Suedia și Olanda (15%). Conform Eurostat, la nivelul Uniunii Europene, 115 milioane de persoane, adică 23% din populație, erau amenințate de sărăcie și excludere socială.

Cel mai îngrijorător este faptul că, în rândul copiilor, ponderea celor amenințați de sărăcie a fost mai mare decât în cazul adulților, ajungând la 27% ca medie europeană și la 48,7% în România — procent record în Uniunea Europeană, în condițiile în care în celelalte state membre variază între 15% în Slovenia și țările scandinave și 44,6% în Bulgaria. În România și Ungaria se înregistrează și cele mai mari diferențe între situația copiilor și a celorlalte categorii de vârstă.

Principalii factori determinanți ai sărăciei în rândul minorilor, potrivit Eurostat, sunt situația locurilor de muncă ale părinților, compoziția și starea generală a familiilor și eficiența intervenției guvernamentale prin ajutoarele și serviciile sociale. Iată, aşadar, canticul statistic, efectul dramatic al politicilor anti-sociale adoptate în contextul crizei economice.

— Consideră Comisia că sunt necesare și posibile măsuri coordonate la nivel european pentru combaterea sărăciei prin politici focalizate și instrumente de intervenție concretă în vederea sprijinirii categoriilor celor mai defavorizate, în special a copiilor?

Răspuns dat de dl Andor în numele Comisiei
(3 aprilie 2012)

Comisia acordă o mare importanță combaterii sărăciei în rândul copiilor și prevenirii transmiterii de la o generație la alta a dezavantajelor. Ea a recunoscut această problemă ca fiind o prioritate în cadrul eforturilor sale mai ample în vederea combaterii sărăciei și a excluziunii sociale, mobilizând coordonarea de diverse politici, învățarea reciprocă și instrumente financiare.

Metoda deschisă de coordonare pentru protecție socială și incluziune socială a contribuit la dezvoltarea unei mai bune înțelegeri a cauzelor care stau la baza sărăciei în rândul copiilor, precum și a unora dintre cele mai eficiente soluții politice pentru abordarea lor.

Sărăcia în rândul copiilor a fost identificată de multe state membre ca fiind o prioritate importantă în programele lor naționale de reformă elaborate în cadrul strategiei „Europa 2020” pentru o creștere inteligentă, durabilă și favorabilă incluziunii și Analiza anuală a creșterii 2012 a recunoscut că situația copiilor expuși riscului de sărăcie și excluziune socială este deosebit de îngrijorătoare.

De asemenea, sprijinul finanțier din partea UE este disponibil pentru acțiuni care vizează îmbunătățirea situației copiilor, printre altele prin Fondul european de dezvoltare regională și Fondul social european.

Astfel cum s-a anunțat în Programul de lucru al Comisiei Europene pe 2012, Comisia intenționează în acest an să prezinte o recomandare privind sărăcia în rândul copiilor. Recomandarea va sprijini eforturile UE și ale statelor membre prin oferirea de orientări și instrumente clare de monitorizare în domenii-cheie cum ar fi sprijinirea familiilor, accesul la servicii esențiale (inclusiv cele de îngrijire a copiilor, cazare, sănătate și educație), precum și participarea copiilor.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-002042/12
to the Commission
Corina Crețu (S&D)
(21 February 2012)**

Subject: Coordinated measures at European level for combating poverty, especially among children

The highest poverty risk rates in the EU in 2010 were recorded in Bulgaria (42 %) and Romania (41 %), and the lowest in the Czech Republic (14 %), Sweden and Netherlands (15 %). According to Eurostat, 115 million people, 23 % of the population at European level, were threatened by poverty and social exclusion.

The most worrying fact is that the ratio of those threatened by poverty was higher among children than adults: reaching 27 % on average in Europe and 48.7 % in Romania — a record percentage in the European Union — while in other Member States it ranges from 15 % in Slovenia and the Scandinavian countries to 44.6 % in Bulgaria. The greatest differences between the situation of children and other age categories are also recorded in Romania and Hungary.

According to Eurostat, the principal determining factors of poverty among minors are the employment situation of the parents, the composition and general situation of the families and the efficiency of government intervention through benefits and social services. This is, therefore, the statistically quantified dramatic effect of anti-social policies adopted following the economic crisis.

— Does the Commission think that coordinated measures at European level are necessary and possible in order to combat poverty through focused policies and concrete interventional instruments with the aim of helping the most disadvantaged categories of people, especially children?

**Answer given by Mr Andor on behalf of the Commission
(3 April 2012)**

The Commission attaches great importance to combating child poverty and preventing the transmission of disadvantage across generations. It has recognised the issue as a priority within its broader efforts to address poverty and social exclusion, mobilising various policy coordination, mutual learning and financial instruments.

The Open Method of Coordination on Social Protection and Social Inclusion has helped develop a better understanding of the root causes of child poverty, as well as some of the most effective policy solutions to address these.

Child poverty has been identified as an important priority by many Member States in their National Reform Programmes elaborated in the framework of the Europe 2020 strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth and the Annual Growth Survey 2012 has acknowledged that the situation of children at risk of poverty and social exclusion is of particular concern.

Besides, EU financial support is available for actions aimed at improving children's situation, among others through the European Regional Development Fund and the European Social Fund.

As announced in the European Commission's Work Programme 2012, the Commission intends to present a recommendation on child poverty this year. The recommendation will support the EU and Member States' efforts by providing guidance and clear monitoring instruments in key areas such as support to families, access to essential services (including childcare, housing health and education) as well as children's participation.

(Deutsche Fassung)

Anfrage zur schriftlichen Beantwortung P-002044/12
an die Kommission
Peter Jahr (PPE)
(22. Februar 2012)

Betreff: Agrarbeihilfen durch Brasilien und Indien

Aus dem Bericht „Domestic Support and WTO Obligations in Key Developing Countries“ der US-amerikanischen Agrarberatergruppe DTB Associates geht hervor, dass Brasilien und Indien mehr Fördermittel an ihre Bauern zahlen als von der Welthandelsorganisation (WTO) erlaubt.

1. Ist der Kommission der Bericht der US-amerikanischen Agrarberatergruppe DTB Associates bekannt? Wenn ja, wie bewertet die Kommission den Bericht und dessen Ergebnisse?
2. Hat die Kommission den Inhalt dieses Berichts überprüft, und plant die Kommission, zu diesem Thema eine eigene Studie durchzuführen oder in Auftrag zu geben?
3. Plant die Kommission, insbesondere aufgrund der Ergebnisse des Berichts, die europäischen Ausfuhrbeschränkungen zu überprüfen und gegebenenfalls konkrete politische Maßnahmen zu ergreifen?

Antwort von Herrn Cioloş im Namen der Kommission
(18. April 2012)

Die Kommission hat den Bericht von DTB Associates über Disziplinen der internen Stützung im Zusammenhang mit Entwicklungsländern analysiert. In dem Bericht werden die Notifizierungspraktiken von Brasilien, Indien, der Türkei und Thailand in Bezug auf Marktstützungsmaßnahmen geprüft ⁽¹⁾.

Der DTB-Analyse liegt die Annahme zugrunde, dass die landwirtschaftliche Stützung in Schwellenländern dramatisch zugenommen hat und der WTO nicht korrekt notifiziert wird. Auf dieser Grundlage argumentiert DTB, dass die betreffenden Länder gegen ihre WTO-Verpflichtungen in Bezug auf die interne Stützung verstößen. Die von DTB für ihre Analyse verwendete Methodik könnte allerdings infrage gestellt werden. So geht DTB insbesondere bei der Berechnung der Marktpreisstützung davon aus, dass die gesamte Erzeugung des betreffenden Erzeugnisses die „förderfähige Erzeugung“ sein sollte. Die Kommission verweist in diesem Zusammenhang auf die Feststellung des Berufungsgremium im Südkorea-Rindfleisch-Fall ⁽²⁾, wo es heißt: „Bei der Aufstellung ihres Programms für eine künftige Marktpreisstützung kann eine Regierung die ‚förderfähige‘ Erzeugung definieren und begrenzen“ ⁽³⁾.

Die Kommission weist darauf hin, dass die interne Stützung der WTO-Partner der EU, einschließlich der Schwellenländer, im Rahmen der Überprüfung der Notifizierungen analysiert wird, die in regelmäßigen Sitzungen des WTO-Ausschusses für Landwirtschaft in Genf stattfindet. Die Europäische Union spielt eine sehr aktive Rolle in diesem Prozess, der es ermöglicht, die Entwicklung der Disziplinen der internen Stützung in den verschiedenen WTO-Mitgliedstaaten genau zu verstehen.

Außerdem führt die Kommission regelmäßig ihre eigenen Analysen zu den neuesten Entwicklungen der Agrarpolitiken der wichtigsten internationalen Handelspartner durch.

Was die dritte Frage des Herrn Abgeordneten betrifft, so bittet die Kommission um eine Klarstellung, um die Frage beantworten zu können. Die Europäische Union wendet bei landwirtschaftlichen Erzeugnissen keine Ausfuhrbeschränkungen an.

⁽¹⁾ Siehe Anhang 3 des WTO-Landwirtschaftsabkommens.

⁽²⁾ DS161, 169: Maßnahmen Südkoreas, die Einführen von frischem, gekühltem und gefrorenem Rindfleisch betreffen.

⁽³⁾ Absatz 120 des Berichts des Berufungsgremiums.

(English version)

**Question for written answer P-002044/12
to the Commission
Peter Jahr (PPE)
(22 February 2012)**

Subject: Agricultural subsidies paid by Brazil and India

The report 'Domestic Support and WTO Obligations in Key Developing Countries' by the US agricultural consulting group DTB Associates indicates that Brazil and India pay higher subsidies to their farmers than is permitted by the World Trade Organisation (WTO).

1. Is the Commission aware of the abovementioned report? If so, how does it assess the report and its findings?
2. Has the Commission examined the contents of this report and does it intend to conduct or commission a study on this issue?
3. Does the Commission plan to review European export restrictions in view of this report's findings and, if necessary, to take specific political action?

**Answer given by Mr Cioloş on behalf of the Commission
(18 April 2012)**

The Commission did analyse the report prepared by DTB Associates concerning domestic support disciplines in the context of developing countries. The report reviews notification practices of Brazil, India, Turkey and Thailand with regard to market support measures ⁽¹⁾.

The underlying argument of the DTB analysis is that agricultural support has increased dramatically in emerging developing countries and that it is not correctly notified to the WTO. On this basis DTB argues that the countries in question are in breach of their WTO commitments on domestic support. However, questions could be raised on the methodology used by DTB in their analysis. In particular, when calculating market price support, DTB considers that 'eligible production' should be the entire production of the product concerned. In this respect the Commission notes the finding of the Appellate Body in the Korea-beef case ⁽²⁾ stating that 'In establishing its program for future market price support, a government is able to define and to limit "eligible" production' ⁽³⁾.

The Commission would like to underline that domestic support of EU's WTO partners, including the emerging developing countries, is analysed in the review of notifications which takes place in regular meetings of the WTO Committee on Agriculture in Geneva. The European Union plays a very active role in this process which permits to have a sound understanding of the development of domestic support disciplines in the different WTO member countries.

Furthermore, the Commission conducts on a regular basis its own analysis on the latest developments of the agricultural policies of the most important trading partners in the world.

As far as the Honourable Member's third question is concerned, the Commission would request a clarification in order to be able to reply. The European Union does not apply export restrictions on agricultural products.

⁽¹⁾ Please refer to Annex 3 of the WTO Agreement on Agriculture.

⁽²⁾ DS161,169: Korea — Measures affecting imports of fresh, chilled and frozen beef.

⁽³⁾ Par. 120 of the AB report.

(Versión española)

**Pregunta con solicitud de respuesta escrita E-002045/12
a la Comisión
Antolín Sánchez Presedo (S&D)
(22 de febrero de 2012)**

Asunto: Aproximación de legislaciones sobre el impuesto de sociedades

El artículo 115 del Tratado de Funcionamiento de la Unión Europea establece que, siguiendo un procedimiento legislativo especial, el Consejo adoptará por unanimidad directivas para la aproximación de las disposiciones de los Estados miembros que incidan directamente en el establecimiento o funcionamiento del mercado interior.

La Comisión Europea presentó el 16 de marzo de 2011 una propuesta para establecer una base imponible consolidada común del impuesto sobre sociedades al objeto de superar algunos de los principales obstáculos para el crecimiento del mercado único.

El Pacto por el Euro Plus, incorporado a las conclusiones del Consejo Europeo de 24 y 25 de marzo de 2011, sostiene que el desarrollo de una base común sobre el impuesto de sociedades sería un camino neutral sobre los ingresos para asegurar consistencia entre los sistemas impositivos nacionales respetando las estrategias nacionales y contribuyendo a la sostenibilidad fiscal y a la competitividad de los negocios a escala europea.

El pasado 7 de febrero, Francia y Alemania han presentado un libro verde para la armonización de sus respectivas legislaciones sobre el impuesto de sociedades en cumplimiento del acuerdo alcanzado por sus respectivos Jefes de Gobierno para contar con una legislación única antes de 2013.

1. ¿Considera que la iniciativa franco-alemana es compatible con la propuesta presentada por la Comisión?
2. ¿Su desarrollo es respetuoso con el método de la Unión y la cooperación establecida en los Tratados?
3. ¿Cómo va a asegurar el Consejo que los compromisos del Pacto por el Euro Plus y la senda de armonización franco-alemana se inscriben en el proceso en curso de aproximación de legislaciones en el ámbito de la Unión Europea?
4. ¿Va a adoptar alguna iniciativa adicional o específica para avanzar en este proceso con una perspectiva europea?

**Respuesta del Sr. Šemeta en nombre de la Comisión
(3 de abril de 2012)**

La Comisión acoge con satisfacción la iniciativa franco-alemana relativa a la convergencia en materia de fiscalidad de las empresas y la considera un elemento de apoyo al trabajo realizado en el marco de su propuesta relativa a una base imponible consolidada común del impuesto sobre sociedades (Biccis). En opinión de la Comisión, el Libro Verde podría suponer un nuevo impulso a la acción de la UE en el ámbito del impuesto de sociedades. De hecho, el documento incluye referencias a la labor desarrollada en relación con la Biccis, concretamente con una serie de cuestiones técnicas (por ejemplo, la consolidación).

Francia y Alemania han colaborado de forma bilateral en la elaboración del Libro Verde y prosiguen al mismo tiempo su participación activa en las tareas técnicas del grupo de trabajo del Consejo que examina la propuesta sobre una Biccis. El hecho de que siga pendiente en el Consejo una propuesta de la Comisión no impide que los Estados miembros adopten sus propias medidas, siempre que cumplan las obligaciones generales que les incumben en virtud de los Tratados de la UE. La Comisión cree, además, que el Libro Verde apoya y fomenta la labor que desarrolla en relación con la Biccis.

El Consejo está debatiendo actualmente los elementos técnicos detallados de la propuesta relativa a una Biccis. La Presidencia danesa se ha comprometido a avanzar en este asunto y la Comisión espera que se logre este objetivo.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-002045/12
to the Commission
Antolín Sánchez Presedo (S&D)
(22 February 2012)**

Subject: Harmonisation of corporation tax law

Article 115 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union states that the Council, acting in accordance with a special legislative procedure, will unanimously adopt directives for the approximation of the laws of the Member States that directly affect the establishment or functioning of the internal market.

On 16 March 2011 the European Commission presented a proposal to establish a Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base with a view to overcoming some of the main obstacles to the growth of the single market.

According to the Euro Plus Pact, included in the European Council conclusions of 24 and 25 March 2011, the development of a common corporate tax base could be a revenue-neutral way forward to ensure consistency among national tax systems while respecting national strategies, and to contribute to fiscal sustainability and the competitiveness of European businesses.

On 7 February 2012 France and Germany presented a Green Paper on the harmonisation of their respective corporation tax laws, based on the agreement reached by their respective Heads of Government aimed at harmonising their legislation by 2013.

1. Does the Commission consider that the Franco-German initiative is compatible with the proposal submitted by the Commission?
2. Was the initiative developed in a manner in keeping with the Community method and the provisions for cooperation established in the Treaties?
3. How will the Council ensure that the commitments in the Euro Plus Pact and the Franco-German harmonisation initiative fit in to the current process of harmonising legislation within the European Union?
4. Does it plan to adopt any further or specific initiatives to move this process forward from a European perspective?

**Answer given by Mr Šemeta on behalf of the Commission
(3 April 2012)**

The Commission welcomes the Franco-German initiative on convergence in business taxation and considers that it is a supportive element of the work on its proposal for a Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB). In the Commission's view, the Green Paper could have an effect of increasing the momentum for EU action in the field of corporate taxation. Indeed, the document contains references to the work on the CCCTB in connection with a number of technical issues (e.g. consolidation).

France and Germany worked on the Green Paper bilaterally and, during that time, continued to actively participate in the technical work of the Council working party which examines the CCCTB proposal. The fact that a Commission proposal is pending in Council cannot prevent Member States from undertaking their own action, subject only to their general duties under the EU Treaties. Moreover, the Commission believes that the Green Paper tends to support and promote its work on the CCCTB.

The detailed technical elements of the proposal for a CCCTB are currently under discussion in Council. The Danish Presidency is committed to make progress on this file and the Commission hopes that this objective is achieved.

(Ελληνική έκδοση)

Ερώτηση με αίτημα γραπτής απάντησης E-002046/12
προς την Επιτροπή
Charalampos Angourakis (GUE/NGL)
(22 Φεβρουαρίου 2012)

Θέμα: Μισθοί πείνας στην επιχείρηση «Αριάδνη ΑΕΒΕ», στο Ηράκλειο Κρήτης

Από τις 13 Γενάρη, οι εργαζόμενοι στην επιχείρηση «Αριάδνη ΑΕΒΕ», στο Ηράκλειο Κρήτης, πραγματοποιούν απεργιακές κινητοποιήσεις απαντώντας στα σχέδια της εργοδοσίας να τους επιβάλει συνθήκες απόλυτης εξαθλίωσης.

Στις 5.1.2012 η επιχείρηση προχώρησε στη μονομερή επιβολή εκ περιτροπής εργασίας καλώντας την πλειοψηφία των εργαζομένων να εργάζονται 2 ημέρες την εβδομάδα και τους προϊσταμένους τμημάτων 3 ημέρες, με μισθούς που κυμαίνονται από 240 έως 450 ευρώ το μήνα! Η εργοδοσία ομολόγησε ότι στόχος της είναι να εξαναγκάσει τους εργαζόμενους που δουλεύουν εκεί πολλά χρόνια σε παραίτηση προκειμένου να μην πληρώσει τις αποζημιώσεις τους!

Ο όμιλος «Αριάδνη» (ΑΕΒΕ και ΑΕ) έχει μια δυναμική παρουσία στον κλάδο του εμπορίου τροφίμων στην Κρήτη. Με επίσημα στοιχεία πριν από ένα χρόνο είχε τέλειο 200 εκατομμύρια ευρώ συνολικά.

Ερωτάται η Επιτροπή εάν η λογική του να μειώνονται οι μισθοί των 700 ευρώ σε 240 ευρώ το μήνα, να μειώνεται η εβδομαδιαία απασχόληση σε διήμερη, να γενικεύεται η ημιαπασχόληση και να απολύνονται όσοι δεν συμφωνούν με αυτά τα μέτρα σε μια κερδοφόρα επιχείρηση αποτελεί εφαρμογή των κατευθύνσεων της ΕΕ για την απασχόληση ή των εμβληματικών πρωτοβουλιών στα πλαίσια της στρατηγικής Ευρώπη 2020.

Απάντηση του κ. Andor εξ ονόματος της Επιτροπής
(3 Απριλίου 2012)

Δεν υπάρχει ενωσιακή νομοθεσία που να εμποδίζει τους εργοδότες να μειώνουν τα ημερομίδια (¹) και/ή τον εβδομαδιαίο χρόνο εργασίας (²). Ούτε υπάρχουν κανόνες της ΕΕ που να περιορίζουν ή να εμποδίζουν την απόλυτη εργαζομένων από προσοδοφόρες επιχειρήσεις. Τα θέματα αυτά ρυθμίζονται προς το παρόν από την εθνική νομοθεσία του ενδιαφερόμενου κράτους μέλους.

Η Επιτροπή, ωστόσο, προσδίδει μεγάλη βαρύτητα στην προστασία των δικαιωμάτων των εργαζομένων, σύμφωνα με το ισχύον δίκαιο της ΕΕ, ιδίως υπό τις συνθήκες της παρούσας κρίσης.

Ταυτόχρονα, οι οδηγίες 2002/14/EK και 98/59/EK (³) μπορούν να ισχύουν σε περιπτώσεις όπως εκείνη στην οποία αναφέρεται ο κ. βουλευτής. Οι εν λόγω οδηγίες προβλέπουν συγκεκριμένα την ενημέρωση και διαβούλευση με τους εκπροσώπους των εργαζομένων σε περίπτωση αποφάσεων της εργοδοσίας που είναι πιθανό να συνεπάγονται ουσιαστική μεταβολή των συμβατικών σχέσεων καθώς και στην περίπτωση ομαδικών απολύσεων. Οι εν λόγω οδηγίες έχουν μεταφερθεί στην ελληνική έννομη τάξη.

Υπεύθυνες για τη διασφάλιση της ορθής και αποτελεσματικής εφαρμογής της νομοθεσίας, σύμφωνα με τις απαιτήσεις της ΕΕ, είναι οι αρμόδιες εθνικές αρχές, συμπεριλαμβανομένων των δικαστικών αρχών, όσον αφορά τους όρους των συμβάσεων εργασίας και τις ειδικές περιστάσεις κάθε επιμέρους περίπτωσης.

Η Επιτροπή επιθυμεί να επιστήσει την προσοχή του κ. βουλευτή στο γεγονός ότι οι κατευθυντήρες γραμμές της ΕΕ σε θέματα απασχόλησης στόχο έχουν να κατευθύνουν την πολιτική των κρατών μελών σε θέματα απασχόλησης (συμπεριλαμβανομένων των μηχανισμών καθορισμού των ημερομισθίων) και δεν αφορούν άμεσα τις επιμέρους αποφάσεις των επιχειρήσεων.

(¹) Βλέπε άρθρο 153 παράγραφος 5 της ΣΛΕΕ όσον αφορά τις αμοιβές.

(²) Η οδηγία 2003/88 προβλέπει ανώτατο εβδομαδιαίο χρόνο εργασίας για την προστασία της υγείας και ασφάλειας των εργαζομένων.

(³) <http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=581&langId=en>.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-002046/12
to the Commission**
Charalampos Angourakis (GUE/NGL)
(22 February 2012)

Subject: Starvation wages at the Ariadne AEVE company in Iraklio in Crete

Since 13 January 2012, employees at Ariadne AEVE in Iraklio, Crete, have been on strike against the employer's plans to submit them to completely degrading conditions.

On 5 January 2012, the company unilaterally introduced a job rotation system, asking the majority of employees to work 2 days a week and heads of departments to work 3 days a week, at wages between EUR 240 and EUR 450 per month! The employer has admitted that the purpose of this move was to force employees who have been working there for a long time to resign in order to avoid paying them compensation.

The Ariadne group (AEVE and AE) has a strong presence in the food retail sector in Crete. According to official data, last year the group had a turnover of EUR 200 million in total.

Does the Commission believe that the logic of a profitable company reducing wages from EUR 700 to EUR 240 per month, reducing employment to two days a week, increasing part-time employment and dismissing those employees who disagree with these measures constitutes the implementation of the EU guidelines on employment or the flagship initiatives under the Europe 2020 strategy?

Answer given by Mr Andor on behalf of the Commission
(3 April 2012)

There is no Union law specifically preventing an employer from reducing wages⁽¹⁾ and/or the weekly working time⁽²⁾. Nor are there any EU rules restricting or prohibiting the dismissal of workers by profitable companies. These issues are currently regulated by the national law of the Member State concerned.

The Commission however attaches great importance to the protection of employees' rights in accordance with the applicable EC law, in particular against the background of the current crisis.

At the same time, Directives 2002/14/EC and 98/59/EC⁽³⁾ may be applicable in cases such as the one referred to by the Honourable member. These Directives provide in particular for information and consultation of workers' representatives in case of employers' decisions which are likely to lead to substantial changes in contractual relations as well as in the case of collective redundancies. These Directives have been transposed in the Greek legal order.

It is for the competent national authorities, including the courts, to ensure that the national transposing legislation is correctly and effectively applied in line with the EU requirements, having regard to the terms of the employment contracts and the specific circumstances of each case.

The Commission would like to draw the attention of the Honourable Member to the fact that EU employment guidelines are aimed at guiding Member States' employment policy (including on wage-setting mechanisms) and they do not directly deal with individual companies' decisions.

⁽¹⁾ See Article 153 (5) TFEU as regards pay.

⁽²⁾ Directive 2003/88 provides for maximum weekly working time aiming at protecting workers' health and safety.

⁽³⁾ <http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=707&langId=en>.

(Ελληνική έκδοση)

**Ερώτηση με αίτημα γραπτής απάντησης E-002047/12
προς την Επιτροπή**
Charalampos Angourakis (GUE/NGL)
(22 Φεβρουαρίου 2012)

Θέμα: Απόλυτη 98 συμβασιούχων του Δήμου Χερσονήσου, στο Νομό Ηρακλείου Κρήτης

Απολύονται 98 συμβασιούχοι εργαζόμενοι της Υπηρεσίας Καθαριότητας στο Δήμο Χερσονήσου, στο Νομό Ηρακλείου Κρήτης, αφού την αποκομιδή των απορριμμάτων αναλαμβάνει ιδιώτης. Ουσιαστικά ο Δήμος Χερσονήσου ακολουθώντας τη μεταρρύθμιση του «Καλλικράτη» στην τοπική αυτοδιοίκηση, που από κοινού στηρίζουν ΠΑΣΟΚ και Νέα Δημοκρατία, προχωρεί σε μαζικές απολύσεις, σε στιγμές έκρηξης της ανεργίας, παραδίδοντας στο ιδιωτικό κεφάλαιο υπηρεσίες του Δήμου, ενώ την ίδια στιγμή αυξάνει φόρους, δημοτικά τέλη κ.λπ.

Οι δημοτικές αρχές του Δήμου Χερσονήσου αντέδρασαν με ενέργειες εκφοβισμού και τρομοκράτησης στις δίκαιες, ειρηνικές διεκδικήσεις των εργαζομένων που κατατέθηκαν σε μορφή ψηφίσματος στο Δημοτικό Συμβούλιο.

Ερωτάται η Επιτροπή εάν οι απολύσεις των εργαζομένων της υπηρεσίας καθαριότητας του Δήμου Χερσονήσου, στο Νομό Ηρακλείου Κρήτης, είναι συνέπεια των κατευθύνσεων της ΕΕ για τη συνεργασία του δημοσίου με τον ιδιωτικό τομέα στην τοπική αυτοδιοίκηση ή εάν συνδέονται με την εφαρμογή εμβληματικής πρωτοβουλίας στο πλαίσιο της στρατηγικής Ευρώπη 2020 ή με την εφαρμογή του τροποποιημένου κανονισμού (ΕΚ) αριθ.1083/2006 σχετικά με τα εργαλεία για χώρες μελη που αντιμετωπίζουν ή απειλούνται με σοβαρές δυσκολίες σχετικά με τη χρηματοοικονομική τους σταθερότητα.

Απάντηση του κ. Rehn εξ ονόματος της Επιτροπής
(25 Απριλίου 2012)

Η Επιτροπή πληροφορεί το Αξιότιμο Μέλος του Ευρωπαϊκού Κοινοβουλίου ότι δεν γνωρίζει τη συγκεκριμένη απόφαση του Δήμου Χερσονήσου.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-002047/12
to the Commission**

Charalampos Angourakis (GUE/NGL)
(22 February 2012)

Subject: Dismissal of 98 municipally-contracted employees in Hersonissos in Iraklio prefecture of Crete, Greece

Ninety-eight contracted employees working for the Hersonissos municipal cleaning service in Iraklio prefecture, Crete, have been dismissed because waste collection is being done by a private firm. Essentially, the Hersonissos municipality, in line with the 'Kallikratis plan' for local government supported by both PASOK and Nea Dimokratia, is carrying out wholesale redundancies at a time when unemployment is surging, transferring municipal services to the private sector while at the same time raising taxes and municipal charges.

Hersonissos municipal authorities have reacted with intimidation and bullying tactics to the lawful, peaceful claims of workers set out in a petition to the municipal council.

Does the Commission believe that the dismissal of the Hersonissos municipal cleaning service workers in Iraklio prefecture, Crete, is a consequence of the EU guidelines for cooperation between municipal authorities and the private sector? Is it connected with the implementation of a flagship initiative under the Europe 2020 strategy or the implementation of amended Council Regulation (EC) No 1083/2006 on the tools for Member States facing or threatened by serious difficulties related to their financial stability?

Answer given by Mr Rehn on behalf of the Commission
(25 April 2012)

The Commission would like to inform the Honourable Member of the European Parliament that it is not familiar with the specific decision by the Hersonissos municipality.

(Version française)

**Question avec demande de réponse écrite E-002048/12
à la Commission (Vice-présidente/Haute Représentante)**

Sonia Alfano (ALDE), Leonidas Donskis (ALDE), Liisa Jaakonsaari (S&D), Bart Staes (Verts/ALE), Andrzej Grzyb (PPE), Bogdan Kazimierz Marcinkiewicz (PPE), Piotr Borys (PPE), Paul Murphy (GUE/NGL), Nicole Kiil-Nielsen (Verts/ALE), Keith Taylor (Verts/ALE), Norica Nicolai (ALDE) et Marek Henryk Migalski (ECR)
(22 février 2012)

Objet: VP/HR — Poursuite de la répression de l'opposition politique et des médias au Kazakhstan

Nous avons récemment appris que, le 23 janvier, M. Vladimir Kozlov, chef de file du parti politique kazakh de l'opposition, «Alga!», inscrit sur les listes électorales au Kazakhstan, a été arrêté par le comité national kazakh de la sécurité à son retour d'une rencontre avec les députés du Parlement européen et des représentants de la Commission pour discuter de la catastrophe de Janaozen et des élections parlementaires kazakhes. Son domicile a également été fouillé. Le même jour, cinq autres opposants politiques, Mikhail Sizlov, Zhanbolat Mamay, Gulzhan Lepesova, Askar Tokmurzin, Serik Sapargali et Vadim Kuramshin, ont également été arrêtés et leurs domiciles perquisitionnés. Quinze autres personnes ont été retenues dans les bureaux de l'«Alga!». Enfin, le rédacteur en chef du journal «Vzglyad», Igor Vinyavsky, a été inculpé en vertu du code pénal kazakh pour avoir fomenter «un renversement ou bouleversement violent de l'ordre constitutionnel ou la violation de l'unité du territoire de la République du Kazakhstan». Le 26 janvier, Vladimir Kozlov, Igor Vinyavsky et Serik Sapargali ont été condamnés à deux mois de prison.

1. La Vice-présidente/Haute Représentante pourrait-elle indiquer si elle a entrepris des démarches pour discuter de cette question avec ses homologues kazakhs?
2. Les observateurs électoraux internationaux et l'Organisation pour la sécurité et la coopération en Europe (OSCE) ont déclaré que les élections parlementaires kazakhes ne répondent pas aux principes démocratiques de base. À cet égard, quelles démarches la Vice-présidente/Haute Représentante entreprend-elle pour surveiller la situation de l'opposition politique au Kazakhstan?
3. La Vice-présidente/Haute Représentante prévoit-elle d'intervenir pour répondre aux événements qui secouent le Kazakhstan et exprimer la ferme opposition de l'UE aux violations des droits fondamentaux des citoyens tels que la liberté de parole et d'expression, la liberté de réunion pacifique et la liberté d'association?
4. La Vice-présidente/Haute Représentante pourrait-elle décrire avec précision la situation concernant le renforcement récent de l'accord de partenariat et de coopération entre le Kazakhstan et la Commission européenne, conclu il y a sept mois à l'occasion de la douzième session du comité de coopération entre l'Union européenne et le Kazakhstan?
5. Compte tenu de la situation récente, l'Union européenne appuie-t-elle toujours l'adhésion rapide du Kazakhstan à l'OMC?

Réponse donnée par la Vice-présidente/Haute Représentante Ashton au nom de la Commission
(24 avril 2012)

La Vice-présidente/Haute Représentante (HR/VP) suit de près la situation au Kazakhstan. Suite aux élections parlementaires, Mme la Vice-présidente/Haute Représentante a fait une déclaration dans laquelle elle encourage les autorités Kazakhes «à s'employer [...] à remédier aux insuffisances relevées par l'OSCE». Le service européen pour l'action extérieure ainsi que la délégation de l'UE à Astana ont été en contact régulier avec les autorités pour leur offrir de l'aide et inciter le Kazakhstan à respecter ses obligations et engagements au niveau international, en particulier en matière de liberté d'expression, d'association et de réunion. Mme la Vice-présidente/Haute Représentante a rencontré le ministre des affaires étrangères kazakh, M. Kazykhanov, le 2 février 2012. À cette occasion, elle a soulevé la question de l'emprisonnement de militants de l'opposition, notamment M. Kozlov et M. Viyavski, ainsi que d'autres membres de l'opposition, notamment M. Sapargali, et a fait part de sa très vive inquiétude face à cette situation. Le 9 février 2012, la délégation de l'UE à Astana a entrepris des démarches pour obtenir des informations sur l'état de santé de M. Kozlov, auquel elle a, par la suite, rendu visite, en prison. Les procès de tous les individus accusés d'avoir pris part aux violences de décembre 2011 se sont ouverts le 27 mars 2012, et la délégation de l'UE à Astana suit maintenant de près le déroulement des procès. Entre-temps, le 16 mars 2012, M. Vinyavski a été amnistié et remis en liberté.

La Commission continue à soutenir l'adhésion du Kazakhstan à l'OMC — procédure fondée sur des considérations commerciales et économiques. Les négociations concernant cette adhésion — pour autant qu'elles soient menées avec l'engagement politique nécessaire — seraient un signe évident que le pays est prêt à accélérer ses réformes économiques et à s'engager à suivre des règles multilatérales. L'adhésion du Kazakhstan représenterait un intérêt non seulement pour le Kazakhstan, mais également pour l'UE; toutefois, du coté kazakh, il reste encore beaucoup à faire pour parvenir à cet objectif — notamment en ce qui concerne les engagements en matière de droits à l'exportation.

(*Versione italiana*)

**Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-002048/12
alla Commissione (Vicepresidente/Alto rappresentante)**

Sonia Alfano (ALDE), Leonidas Donskis (ALDE), Liisa Jaakonsaari (S&D), Bart Staes (Verts/ALE), Andrzej Grzyb (PPE), Bogdan Kazimierz Marcinkiewicz (PPE), Piotr Borys (PPE), Paul Murphy (GUE/NGL), Nicole Kiil-Nielsen (Verts/ALE), Keith Taylor (Verts/ALE), Norica Nicolai (ALDE) e Marek Henryk Migalski (ECR)

(22 febbraio 2012)

Oggetto: VP/HR — Persistente repressione dell'opposizione politica e dei media in Kazakhstan

Il leader del partito di opposizione kazako «Alga!», che attualmente sta procedendo alla sua registrazione in Kazakhstan, Vladimir Kozlov, è stato arrestato il 23 gennaio dal comitato di sicurezza nazionale kazako mentre ritornava da incontri con deputati del Parlamento europeo e rappresentanti della Commissione europea per discutere la tragedia di Janaozen e le elezioni parlamentari in Kazakhstan. Inoltre, anche il suo domicilio è stato perquisito. Lo stesso giorno, altri cinque esponenti del partito di opposizione, Mikhail Sizlov, Zhanbolat Mamay, Gulzhan Lepesova, Askar Tokmurzin, Serik Sapargali e Vadim Kuramshin, sono stati arrestati e i loro domicili perquisiti, mentre altre quindici persone sono state trattenute negli uffici del partito «Alga!». Infine, il caporedattore del giornale «Vzglyad», Igor Vinyavsky, è stato accusato, ai sensi del codice penale kazako, del reato di «incitamento al rovesciamiento violento dell'ordine costituzionale e alla violazione dell'unità del territorio della repubblica del Kazakhstan». Il 26 gennaio Vladimir Kozlov, Igor Vinyavsky e Serik Sapargali sono stati condannati a due mesi di detenzione.

1. Può il vicepresidente/alto rappresentante indicare se ha intrapreso iniziative per esaminare la questione con la controparte kazaka?
2. Alla luce delle dichiarazioni degli osservatori elettorali internazionali e dell'Organizzazione per la sicurezza e la cooperazione in Europa (OSCE), secondo le quali durante le elezioni parlamentari in Kazakhstan non sono stati rispettati i principi democratici fondamentali, quali iniziative intende adottare il vicepresidente/alto rappresentante al fine di monitorare la situazione dell'opposizione politica nel paese?
3. Intende il vicepresidente/alto rappresentante intervenire in risposta agli eventi accaduti in Kazakhstan ed esprimere la ferma opposizione dell'UE alla violazione dei diritti fondamentali dei cittadini, quali la libertà di parola e di espressione, la libertà di riunione pacifica e la libertà di associazione?
4. Può il vicepresidente/alto rappresentante illustrare il nuovo accordo relativo al rafforzamento del partenariato e della cooperazione tra il Kazakhstan e la Commissione europea, avviato sette mesi fa in occasione della dodicesima sessione del comitato di cooperazione tra l'Unione europea e il Kazakhstan?
5. Considerata la situazione attuale, intende l'Unione europea continuare a sostenere un'adesione del Kazakhstan all'OMC in tempi rapidi?

Risposta data dall'Alta rappresentante/vicepresidente Catherine Ashton a nome della Commissione
(24 aprile 2012)

L'Alta rappresentante/vicepresidente (AR/VP) sta seguendo attentamente la situazione in Kazakhstan. Dopo le elezioni parlamentari, l'AR/VP ha rilasciato una dichiarazione in cui sollecita le autorità kazake ad ovviare alle carenze riscontrate dall'OSCE. Il servizio europeo per l'azione esterna e la delegazione dell'UE ad Astana intrattengono contatti periodici con le autorità per offrire assistenza e spronare il Kazakhstan a rispettare i suoi obblighi e impegni internazionali, in particolare per quanto concerne la libertà di espressione, associazione e riunione. Nel suo incontro del 2 febbraio 2012 con il ministro degli Esteri kazako Kazykhanov l'AR/VP ha sollevato la questione della detenzione di attivisti dell'opposizione, tra cui Kozlov, Vinyavski e altri membri dell'opposizione, compreso Sapargali, esprimendo profonda preoccupazione per la situazione. Il 9 febbraio 2012 la delegazione dell'UE ad Astana ha compiuto passi diplomatici per informarsi sullo stato di salute di Kozlov e gli ha successivamente fatto visita in carcere. I processi di tutte le persone accusate di aver partecipato alle violenze del dicembre 2011 sono iniziati il 27 marzo 2012 e la delegazione dell'UE ad Astana sta seguendo con attenzione i dibattimenti. Nel frattempo, Vinyavski è stato rilasciato il 16 marzo 2012 a seguito di amnistia.

La Commissione continua a sostenere l'adesione del Kazakistan all'OMC, un processo fondato su considerazioni di ordine commerciale ed economico. Se condotti con il necessario impegno politico, i negoziati sull'adesione del Kazakistan all'OMC costituirebbero un chiaro segnale che il paese è pronto ad accelerare le sue riforme economiche e a vincolarsi a regole multilaterali. L'adesione del Kazakistan sarebbe nell'interesse di tale paese ma anche nell'interesse dell'UE; tuttavia, per raggiungere questo obiettivo la parte kazaka deve fare di più, in particolare per quanto riguarda gli impegni sui dazi all'esportazione.

(Tekstas lietuvių kalba)

Klausimas, į kurį atsakoma raštu, Nr. E-002048/12

Komisijai (Komisijos pirmininko pavaduotojai ir vyriausiajai įgaliotinei)

Sonia Alfano (ALDE), Leonidas Donskis (ALDE), Liisa Jaakonsaari (S&D), Bart Staes (Verts/ALE), Andrzej Grzyb (PPE), Bogdan Kazimierz Marcinkiewicz (PPE), Piotr Borys (PPE), Paul Murphy (GUE/NGL), Nicole Kiil-Nielsen (Verts/ALE), Keith Taylor (Verts/ALE), Norica Nicolai (ALDE) ir Marek Henryk Migalski (ECR)
 (2012 m. vasario 22 d.)

Tema: VP/HR – Besitęsiančios politinės opozicijos ir žiniasklaidos represijos Kazachstane

Buvome informuoti, kad sausio 23 d. Kazachstano opozicinės politinės partijos „Alga!“, šiuo metu įregistruotos Kazachstane, vadovą Vladimirą Kozlovą suėmė Kazachstano nacionalinio saugumo komiteto pareigūnai jam grįžtant iš susitikimų su EP nariais Europos Parlamente ir su Europos Komisijos pareigūnais, per kuriuos buvo aptariama tragedija Janaozenė ir Kazachstano parlamento rinkimai. Be to, V. Kozlovo namuose buvo atlakta krata. Tą pačią dieną buvo suimiti kiti penki politinės opozicijos veikėjai – Mikhail Sizlov, Zhanbolat Mamay, Gulzhan Lepesova, Askar Tokmurzin, Serik Sapargali ir Vadim Kuramshin, o jų namuose taip pat atlakta krata. Dar penkiolika žmonių buvo „ikalinti“ partijos „Alga!“ biuruose. Galiausiai laikraščio „Vzglyad“ vyriausiajam redaktoriui Igoriui Vinyavskiu pagal Kazachstano baudžiamąjį kodeksą buvo pateikti kaltinimai dėl raginimo „imtis smurtinių konstitucinės santvarkos nuvertimo ar pakeitimo veiksmų arba prievertinių Kazachstano Respublikos teritorijos vientisumu pažeidimo veiksmų“. Sausio 26 d. Vladimir Kozlov, Igor Vinyavsky ir Serik Sapargali buvo nuteisti kalėti du mėnesius.

1. Ar Sajungos vyriausioji įgaliotinė ir Komisijos pirmininko pavaduotoja gali nurodyti, ar ji ēmési veiksmų šiam klausimui aptarti su atitinkamomis Kazachstano institucijomis?
2. Tarptautiniai rinkimų stebėtojai ir Europos saugumo ir bendradarbiavimo organizacija (ESBO) paskelbė, kad Kazachstano parlamento rinkimai vyko nesilaikant pagrindinių demokratijos principų. Atsižvelgiant į tai, kokių priemonių Sajungos vyriausioji įgaliotinė ir Komisijos pirmininko pavaduotoja ketina imtis Kazachstano politinės opozicijos padėčiai stebėti?
3. Ar Sajungos vyriausioji įgaliotinė ir Komisijos pirmininko pavaduotoja ketina įsikišti reaguodama į įvykius Kazachstane ir ryžtingai išreikšti ES prieštaravimą piliečių pagrindinių teisių, kaip antai žodžio ir saviraškos laisvės, taikių susirinkimų laisvės ir asociacijų laisvės, pažeidimams?
4. Ar Sajungos vyriausioji įgaliotinė ir Komisijos pirmininko pavaduotoja gali tiksliai apibūdinti naujojo Kazachstano ir Europos Komisijos susitarimo dėl glaudesnės partnerystės ir bendradarbiavimo, sudaryto prieš septynis mėnesius, per dyvilyktąjį Europos Sajungos ir Kazachstano bendradarbiavimo komiteto sesiją, padėti?
5. Turint omenyje dabartinę padėtį, ar Europos Sajunga vis dar pritaria tam, kad Kazachstanas prisijungtų prie PPO kuo anksčiau?

Sajungos vyriausiosios įgaliotinės ir Komisijos pirmininko pavaduotojos Catherine Ashton atsakymas

Komisijos vardu

(2012 m. balandžio 24 d.)

Vyriausioji įgaliotinė ir Komisijos pirmininko pavaduotoja (VJKPP) atidžiai stebi padėtį Kazachstane. Po parlamento rinkimų ji paskelbė pareiškimą, kuriuo Kazachstano valdžios institucijas paragino „pašalinti trūkumus, kuriuos nustatė ESBO“. Europos išorės veiksmų tarnyba ir ES delegacija Astanoje nuolat palaikė ryšius su valdžios institucijomis, siūlė pagalbą ir ragino Kazachstaną laikytis savo tarptautinių prievolių ir įsipareigojimų, visų pirmą dėl saviraškos, asociacijų ir susirinkimų laisvės. 2012 m. vasario 2 d. VJKPP susitiko su Kazachstano užsienio reikalų ministru E. Kazychanovu ir per susitikimą iškėlė opozicijos aktyvistų, išskaitant V. Kozlovą ir I. Vinjavskį, taip pat kitų opozicijos narių, išskaitant S. Sapargalį, įkalinimo klausimą ir išreiškė didelį susirūpinimą dėl šios padėties. 2012 m. vasario 9 d. ES delegacija Astanoje surengė demaršą, prašydama informacijos apie V. Kozlovo sveikatą, ir vėliau aplankė jį sulaikymo vietoje. 2012 m. kovo 27 d. pradėti visų asmenų, kaltinamų prisidėjus prie 2011 m. gruodžio mėn. smurto, teismo procesai ir minėta delegacija juos atidžiai stebi. I. Vinjavskiui pritaikyta amnestija ir 2012 m. kovo 16 d. jis išlaisvintas.

Komisija tebepritaria Kazachstano stojimui į PPO. Šalys į šią organizaciją priimamos atsižvelgiant į įvairius prekybos ir ekonomikos veiksnius. Derybos dėl Kazachstano stojimo į PPO – jeigu būtų vedamos vykdant būtinus politinius įsipareigojimus – būtų aiškus ženklas, kad šalis pasirengusi stiprinti ekonomikos reformas ir laikytis daugiašalių taisyklių. Kazachstano įstojimas būtų naudingas ne tik Kazachstanui, bet ir ES. Tačiau tam, kad šis tikslas būtų pasiektas, Kazachstanas turi dėti daugiau pastangų, visų pirma vykdyti įsipareigojimus dėl eksporto muitų.

(Nederlandse versie)

**Vraag met verzoek om schriftelijk antwoord E-002048/12
aan de Commissie (Vicevoorzitter — Hoge Vertegenwoordiger)**

Sonia Alfano (ALDE), Leonidas Donskis (ALDE), Liisa Jaakonsaari (S&D), Bart Staes (Verts/ALE), Andrzej Grzyb (PPE), Bogdan Kazimierz Marcinkiewicz (PPE), Piotr Borys (PPE), Paul Murphy (GUE/NGL), Nicole Kiil-Nielsen (Verts/ALE), Keith Taylor (Verts/ALE), Norica Nico.a. (ALDE) en Marek Henryk Migalski (ECR)
(22 februari 2012)

Betreft: VP/HR — Aanhoudende repressie van de politieke oppositie en media in Kazachstan

We ontvingen meldingen dat Vladimir Kozlov, de leider van de Kazachse oppositiepartij „Alga!”, die momenteel in Kazachstan wordt geregistreerd, op 23 januari door het Kazachse Comité voor Nationale Veiligheid werd gearresteerd bij zijn terugkeer na ontmoetingen met Europese parlementsleden en ambtenaren bij de Europese Commissie waar hij de tragedie in Zhanaozen en de Kazachse parlementsverkiezingen had besproken. Daarnaast werd.d. woning van de heer Kozlov doorzocht. Op dezelfde dag werden tevens vijf andere oppositieleden — Mikhail Sizlov, Zhanbo.a. Mamay, Gulzhan Lepeso.a. Askar Tokmurzin, Serik Sapargali en Vadim Kuramshin — gearresteerd. Ook hun woningen werden doorzocht. Nog vijftien anderen werden afgezonderd in de kantoren van de „Alga!” partij. Ten slotte werd.d. eindredacteur van de krant „Vzglyad”, Igor Vinyavsky, krachtens het Kazachse wetboek van strafrecht, beschuldigd van het „met geweld oproepen tot het omverwerpen of wijzigen van de grondwettelijke orde of een schending met geweld van de eenheid van het grondgebied van de Republiek Kazachstan”. Op 26 januari werden Vladimir Kozlov, Igor Vinyavsky en Serik Sapargali veroordeeld tot twee maanden gevangenis.

1. Kan de vicevoorzitter/hoge vertegenwoordiger aangeven of ze al dan niet stappen heeft ondernomen om deze kwestie te bespreken met haar Kazachse tegenhangers?
2. Internationale verkiezingswaarnemers en de Organisatie voor Veiligheid en Samenwerking in Europa (OVSE) verklaarden dat bij de Kazachse parlementsverkiezingen niet werd voldaan aan de democratische basisprincipes. Welke zijn de stappen die de vicevoorzitter/hoge vertegenwoordiger in het licht van deze situatie neemt om de situatie met betrekking tot de politieke situatie in Kazachstan op te volgen?
3. Heeft de vicevoorzitter/hoge vertegenwoordiger de intentie om tussen te komen als antwoord op de gebeurtenissen in Kazachstan en uiting te geven van de resolute afwijzing door de EU van de schending van de fundamentele rechten van burgers zoals het recht op vrije meningsuiting, de vrijheid van vreedzame vergadering en de vrijheid van vereniging?
4. Kan de vicevoorzitter/hoge vertegenwoordiger een juiste beschrijving geven van de stand van zaken met betrekking tot de nieuwe overeenkomst over een uitgebreide partnership en samenwerking tussen Kazachstan en de Europese Commissie die zeven maanden geleden werd gesloten tijdens de twaalfde sessie van het Samenwerkingscomité tussen de EU en Kazachstan?
5. Steunt de Europese Unie, gelet op de huidige situatie, nog steeds de snelle toetreding van Kazachstan tot de Wereldhandelsorganisatie WTO?

Antwoord van hoge vertegenwoordiger/vicevoorzitter Ashton namens de Commissie
(24 april 2012)

De hoge vertegenwoordiger/vicevoorzitter volgt de situatie in Kazachstan van nabij. Na de parlementsverkiezingen heeft de hoge vertegenwoordiger/vicevoorzitter een verklaring afgelegd waarin zij de Kazachse autoriteiten aanmaande de door de Organisatie voor Veiligheid en Samenwerking in Europa (OVSE) vastgestelde tekortkomingen aan te pakken. De Europese Dienst voor extern optreden (EDEO) en de EU-delegatie in Astana hebben regelmatig contact gehouden met de Kazachse autoriteiten om hulp aan te bieden en tegelijkertijd.d. nadruk te leggen op de internationale verplichtingen en verbintenissen, met name wat betreft de vrijheid van meningsuiting, vereniging en vergadering. Op 2 februari 2012 heeft de hoge vertegenwoordiger/vicevoorzitter tijdens een ontmoeting met de Kazachse minister van Buitenlandse Zaken Kazychanov de gevangenneming van de heer Kozlov, de heer Vinyavski, en de heer Sapargali (en nog andere leden van de oppositie) aan de orde gesteld en haar ernstige bezorgdheid over de situatie uitgedrukt. Op 9 februari 2012 heeft de EU-delegatie in Astana een demarche ondernomen om zich te informeren over de gezondheidstoestand van de heer Kozlov en hem te bezoeken in de gevangenis. De EU-delegatie in Astana volgt van nabij de processen van 27 maart 2012 tegen de mensen die worden beschuldigd van deelname aan de gewelddadigheden van december 2011. Inmiddels heeft de heer Vinyavski amnestie gekregen en is hij op 16 maart 2012 weer vrijgelaten.

De Commissie is nog steeds voor de toetreding van Kazachstan tot de Wereldhandelsorganisatie. Dit proces gaat uit van handels— en economische overwegingen. Indien de onderhandelingen plaatsvinden met de nodige politieke betrokkenheid, zou dit een duidelijk teken zijn dat het land klaar is om de economische hervormingen op te voeren en multilaterale regels in acht te nemen. Niet alleen Kazachstan zelf zou belang hebben bij deze toetreding, maar ook de EU. Kazachstan moet wel nog meer inspanningen leveren om dit waar te maken, met name wat de verplichtingen inzake uitvoerrechten betreft.

(Wersja polska)

**Pytanie wymagające odpowiedzi pisemnej E-002048/12
do Komisji (Wiceprzewodniczącej / Wysokiej Przedstawiciel)**

Sonia Alfano (ALDE), Leonidas Donskis (ALDE), Liisa Jaakonsaari (S&D), Bart Staes (Verts/ALE), Andrzej Grzyb (PPE), Bogdan Kazimierz Marcinkiewicz (PPE), Piotr Borys (PPE), Paul Murphy (GUE/NGL), Nicole Kiil-Nielsen (Verts/ALE), Keith Taylor (Verts/ALE), Norica Nicolai (ALDE) oraz Marek Henryk Migalski

(ECR)

(22 lutego 2012 r.)

Przedmiot: Wiceprzewodnicząca/Wysoka Przedstawiciel – Nieustanne represje wobec opozycji politycznej i mediów w Kazachstanie

Poinformowano nas, że dnia 23 stycznia Vladimir Kozlov, lider kazaskiej partii opozycyjnej „Algaj!”, która jest obecnie rejestrowana w Kazachstanie, został aresztowany przez funkcjonariuszy Komitetu Bezpieczeństwa Narodowego Kazachstanu w trakcie powrotu ze spotkania z posłami do PE w siedzibie Parlamentu Europejskiego i ze spotkania z urzędnikami w siedzibie Komisji, podczas których dyskutowano o tragedii w mieście Żanaozen oraz o wyborach parlamentarnych w Kazachstanie. Przeszukano również dom Kozłowa. Tego samego dnia aresztowano też sześciu innych opozycjonistów. Byli to: Mikhail Sizlov, Zhanbolat Mamay, Gulzhan Lepesova, Askar Tokmurzin, Serik Sapargali i Vadim Kuramshin. Przeszukano również ich domy. Piętnastu innych ludzi zamknięto w siedzibie partii „Algaj!”. Z kolei redaktor naczelny gazety „Vzglyad”, Igor Vinyavsky, na mocy Kodeksu karnego Kazachstanu otrzymał zarzut podżegania „do obalenia lub zmiany porządku konstytucyjnego bądź naruszenia integralności terytorialnej Republiki Kazachstanu z użyciem siły”. Dnia 26 stycznia Vladimir Kozlov, Igor Vinyavsky i Serik Sapargali zostali skazani na dwa lata więzienia.

1. Czy Wiceprzewodnicząca/Wysoka Przedstawiciel może udzielić informacji o działaniach podjętych w celu przedyskutowania tej sprawy z jej kazaskimi odpowiednikami?
2. Międzynarodowi obserwatorzy wyborów i Organizacja Bezpieczeństwa i Współpracy w Europie (OBWE) oświadczyli, że wybory parlamentarne w Kazachstanie nie spełniały podstawowych standardów demokratycznych. Jakie działania podejmuje w związku z tym Wiceprzewodnicząca/Wysoka Przedstawiciel w celu monitorowania sytuacji opozycji politycznej w Kazachstanie?
3. Czy Wiceprzewodnicząca/Wysoka Przedstawiciel planuje interweniować w związku z wydarzeniami w Kazachstanie i wyrazić stanowczy sprzeciw UE wobec naruszania praw podstawowych obywateli, takich jak wolność słowa i wypowiedzi, wolność pokojowego zgromadzania się i wolność stwarzyszania się?
4. Czy Wiceprzewodnicząca/Wysoka Przedstawiciel może dokładnie opisać stan prac nad nową umową w sprawie rozszerzonego partnerstwa i współpracy pomiędzy Kazachstanem a Komisją Europejską rozpoczętych siedem miesięcy temu podczas dwunastej sesji Komisji współpracy Unia Europejska-Kazachstan?
5. Czy w obecnej sytuacji Unia Europejska nadal popiera szybkie przystąpienie Kazachstanu do WTO?

**Odpowiedź udzielona przez Wysoką Przedstawiciel i Wiceprzewodniczącą Komisji Catherine Ashton w imieniu Komisji
(24 kwietnia 2012 r.)**

Wysoka Przedstawiciel/Wiceprzewodnicząca uważało śledzi sytuację w Kazachstanie. Po wyborach parlamentarnych wydała ona oświadczenie, wzywając kazachskie władze do „zajęcia się nieprawidłowościami wskazanymi przez OBWE”. ESDZ i delegatura UE w Astanie pozostają w stałym kontakcie z władzami, oferując im pomoc i wzywając Kazachstan do spełnienia międzynarodowych obowiązków i zobowiązań, zwłaszcza w kwestii wolności słowa, zrzeszania się i zgromadzeń. Wysoka Przedstawiciel/Wiceprzewodnicząca spotkała się z ministrem spraw zagranicznych Kazachstanu Yerzhanem Kazykhanovem w dniu 2 lutego 2012 r. i poruszyła kwestię uwięzienia opozycjonistów, w tym Vladimira Kozłowa, Igory Vinyavskiego i innych członków opozycji, takich jak Serik Sapargali, wyrażając głębokie zaniepokojenie zaistniałą sytuacją. W dniu 9 lutego 2012 r. delegatura UE w Astanie wystosowała démarch, prosząc o informacje na temat stanu zdrowia Vladimira Kozłowa, po czym złożyła mu wizytę w więzieniu. Procesy wszystkich osób oskarżonych o udział w aktach przemocy z grudnia 2011 r. rozpoczęły się w dniu 27 marca 2012 r. i delegatura UE w Astanie uważnie śledzi ich przebieg. W międzyczasie, w dniu 16 marca 2012 r., Igor Vinyavskiy został zwolniony z aresztu w ramach amnestii.

Komisja wciąż popiera przystąpienie Kazachstanu do WTO, organizacji opartej na uwarunkowaniach handlowych i gospodarczych. Negocjacje na temat przystąpienia Kazachstanu do WTO, jeżeli będą realizowane z należytym zaangażowaniem politycznym, będą wyraźnym znakiem, że kraj ten jest gotowy do poszerzenia programu reform

gospodarczych i do zobowiązania się do przestrzegania zasad wielostronnych. Przystąpienie Kazachstanu do WTO leży w interesie nie tylko Kazachstanu, ale i UE. Kazachstan musi jednak dolożyć dodatkowych starań, aby osiągnąć ten cel, szczególnie w zakresie zobowiązań dotyczących należności wywozowych.

(Versiunea în limba română)

**Întrebarea cu solicitare de răspuns scris E-002048/12
adresată Comisiei (Vicepreședintelui/Înaltului Reprezentant)**

Sonia Alfano (ALDE), Leonidas Donskis (ALDE), Liisa Jaakonsaari (S&D), Bart Staes (Verts/ALE), Andrzej Grzyb (PPE), Bogdan Kazimierz Marcinkiewicz (PPE), Piotr Borys (PPE), Paul Murphy (GUE/NGL), Nicole Kiil-Nielsen (Verts/ALE), Keith Taylor (Verts/ALE), Norica Nicolai (ALDE) și Marek Henryk Migalski (ECR)

(22 februarie 2012)

Subiect: VP/HR — Continuarea represiunii asupra opoziției politice și a mass-mediei din Kazahstan

La 23 ianuarie, am primit informații conform cărora Vladimir Kozlov, liderul partidului „Alga!” al opoziției politice kazahe, înregistrat în prezent în Kazahstan, a fost arestat de Comisia pentru Securitate Națională din Kazahstan la întoarcerea sa de la reuniunile avute cu deputați în Parlamentul European și cu funcționari ai Comisiei Europene pentru a discuta despre tragedia de la Janaozen și despre alegerile parlamentare din Kazahstan. În plus, locuința lui Kozlov a fost percheziționată. În aceeași zi, alți cinci oponenți politici, Mihail Sizlov, Janbolat Mamai, Guljan Lepesova, Askar Tokmurzin, Serik Sapargali și Vadim Kuramšin, au fost arestați, iar locuințele lor au fost percheziționate. Cincisprezece alte persoane au fost izolate în birourile partidului „Alga!”. În cele din urmă, redactorul-șef al ziarului „Vzglyad”, Igor Vineavski, a fost acuzat în temeiul Codului penal al Kazahstanului de infracțiunea de instigare la „lovitură de stat sau schimbare a ordinii constituționale violentă sau încălcare forțată a unității teritoriale a Republicii Kazahstan”. La 26 ianuarie, Vladimir Kozlov, Igor Vineavski și Serik Sapargali au fost condamnați la două luni de închisoare.

1. Poate Vicepreședintele/Înaltul Reprezentant indică dacă a făcut demersuri pentru a discuta această problemă cu omologii săi din Kazahstan?
2. Observatorii electoralni internaționali și Organizația pentru Securitate și Cooperare în Europa (OSCE) au declarat că alegerile parlamentare din Kazahstan nu au respectat principiile democratice de bază. În lumina celor de mai sus, ce demersuri face Vicepreședintele/Înaltul Reprezentant pentru a monitoriza situația opoziției politice din Kazahstan?
3. Intenționează Vicepreședintele/Înaltul Reprezentant să intervină ca reacție la evenimentele din Kazahstan și să exprime opoziția fermă a UE față de încălcarea drepturilor fundamentale ale cetățenilor, precum libertatea de exprimare, libertatea de întrunire pașnică și libertatea de asociere?
4. Poate Vicepreședintele/Înaltul Reprezentant să descrie cu exactitate situația actuală a noului acord extins de parteneriat și cooperare dintre Kazahstan și Comisia Europeană lansat în urmă cu șapte luni, pe parcursul celei de-a douăsprezecea sesiuni a Comisiei de cooperare Uniunea Europeană-Kazahstan?
5. Având în vedere situația actuală, mai susține Uniunea Europeană aderarea anticipată a Kazahstanului la OMC?

**Răspuns dat de dna Ashton, în numele Comisiei
(24 aprilie 2012)**

Înaltul Reprezentant/Vicepreședinte al Comisiei (IR/VP) urmărește îndeaproape situația din Kazahstan. După alegerile parlamentare, IR/VP a făcut o declarație prin care încuraja autoritățile din Kazahstan să „remedieze deficiențele identificate de OSCE”. SEAE și Delegația UE la Astana au avut contacte în mod periodic cu autoritățile, oferind asistență și făcând apel la Kazahstan să își respecte obligațiile și angajamentele internaționale, îndeosebi pe acelea legate de libertatea de expresie, de asociere și de reunire. Cu prilejul întâlnirii cu ministrul de externe kazah, Kazykhanov, la data de 2 februarie 2012, Înaltul Reprezentant/Vicepreședintele a abordat chestiunea arestării activiștilor opoziției, între care domnii Kozlov, Vineavski, precum și alți opozanți, între care dominul Sapargali, exprimându-și profunda îngrijorare cu privire la această situație. Delegația UE din Astana a întreprins un demers la 9 februarie 2012, solicitând informații cu privire la starea de sănătate a domnului Kozlov și vizitându-l, ulterior, pe acesta la închisoare. Procesele tuturor persoanelor acuzate de a fi luat parte la violențele din decembrie 2011 au început pe 27 martie 2012 și Delegația UE din Astana urmărește în prezent cu atenție desfășurarea acestora. Între timp, domnul Vineavski a fost eliberat pe 16 martie 2012, ca urmare a unei amnistii.

Comisia sprijină în continuare aderarea Kazahstanului la OMC, care este un proces bazat pe considerații comerciale și economice. Dacă vor fi desfășurate cu suficient angajament politic, negocierile de aderare a Kazahstanului la OMC vor reprezenta semnalul clar că această țară este gata să își intensifice reformele economice și să se angajeze să respecte regulile multilaterale. Aderarea Kazahstanului ar fi nu numai în interesul acestei țări, ci și al UE. Cu toate acestea, mai sunt necesare eforturi ale părții kazahe pentru a se atinge acest obiectiv, în special în ceea ce privește angajamentele privind taxele la export.

(Suomenkielinen versio)

**Kirjallisesti vastattava kysymys E-002048/12
komissiolle (Varapuheenjohtajalle/Korkealle edustajalle)**
Sonia Alfano (ALDE), Leonidas Donskis (ALDE), Liisa Jaakonsaari (S&D), Bart Staes (Verts/ALE), Andrzej Grzyb (PPE), Bogdan Kazimierz Marcinkiewicz (PPE), Piotr Borys (PPE), Paul Murphy (GUE/NGL), Nicole Kiil-Nielsen (Verts/ALE), Keith Taylor (Verts/ALE), Norica Nicolai (ALDE) ja Marek Henryk Migalski (ECR)
(22. helmikuuta 2012)

Aihe: VP/HR – Poliittiseen oppositioon ja tiedotusvälineisiin kohdistuva jatkuva sorto Kazakstanissa

Olemme saaneet raportteja siitä, että Kazakstanin kansallinen turvallisuuskomitea pidätti 23. tammikuuta Kazakstanissa tällä hetkellä rekisteröidyn oppositiopuolueen Alga:n puheenjohtajan Vlaminir Kozlovin. Hän oli ollut palaamassa Euroopan parlamentin jäsenten ja Euroopan komission virkamiesten kanssa järjestetyistä tapaamisista, joissa keskusteltiin Zhanaozenen tragediasta ja Kazakstanin parlamenttivaaleista. Lisäksi Vladimir Kozlovin kotiin tehtiin kotietsintä. Samana päivänä pidätettiin myös viisi muuta poliittisen opposition edustajaa: Mikhail Sizlov, Zhanbolat Mamay, Gulzhan Lepesova, Askar Tokmurzin, Serik Sapargali ja Vadim Kuramshin. Heidänkin koteihinsa tehtiin kotietsintä. Viittätoista muuta henkilöä on pidetty erityksissä Alga-puolueen toimitiloissa. Vzglyadsanomalehdien päätoimittaja Igor Vinyavsky puolestaan sai Kazakstanin rikoslain nojalla syytteen siitä, että hän oli kehottanut perustuslaillisen määräyksen väkivaltaiseen kumoamiseen tai muuttamiseen tai Kazakstanin tasavallan alueellisen yhtenäisyden väkivaltaiseen loukkaamiseen. Vladimir Kozlov, Igor Vinyavsky ja Serik Sapargali saivat 26. tammikuuta kahden kuukauden vankilatuomion.

1. Voiko varapuheenjohtaja/korkea edustaja ilmoittaa, onko hän ryhtynyt toimenpiteisiin asian ottamiseksi esille Kazakstanin edustajien kanssa?
2. Kansainväliset vaalitarkkailijat ja Euroopan turvallisuus- ja yhteistyöjärjestö (ETY) ovat julistaneet, etteivät Kazakstanin parlamenttivaalit noudattaneet demokraattisia perusperiaatteita. Mihin toimiin varapuheenjohtaja/korkea edustaja aikoo tämän perusteella ryhtyä Kazakstanin poliittisen opposition tilanteen seuraamiseksi?
3. Aikoo varapuheenjohtaja/korkea edustaja puuttua Kazakstanin tapahtumiin ja ilmaista EU:n tuomitsevan jyrkästi kansalaisten perusoikeuksien, kuten sananvapauden ja ilmaisunvapauden, rauhanomaisen kokoontumisvapauden ja yhdistymisvapauden, rikkomisen?
4. Voiko varapuheenjohtaja/korkea edustaja kuvata seikkaperäisesti seitsemän kuukautta sitten EU-Kazakstan-yhteistyökomitean kahdennessatoista istunnossa alulle pantua Kazakstanin ja Euroopan komission uuden tehostetun kumppanius- ja yhteistyösopimuksen tämänhetkistä tilannetta?
5. Kannattaako Euroopan unioni nykyisen tilanteen perusteella edelleen Kazakstanin aikaista WTO-jäsenyyttä?

Korkean edustajan, varapuheenjohtaja Catherine Ashtonin komission puolesta antama vastaus
(24. huhtikuuta 2012)

Korkea edustaja/varapuheenjohtaja seuraa tiiviisti Kazakstanin tilannetta. Maan parlamenttivaalien jälkeen korkea edustaja/varapuheenjohtaja kehotti lausunnoissaan Kazakstanin viranomaisia paneutumaan Etjin osoittamiin puutteisiin. Euroopan ulkosuhdehallinto ja EU:n edustusto Astanassa ovat pitäneet säädöllistä yhteyttä viranomaisiin. Ne ovat tarjonneet apua ja kehottaneet Kazakstania tunnioittamaan kansainvälistä velvoitteitaan ja sitoumuksiaan erityisesti sananvapauden sekä yhdistymis- ja kokoontumisvapauden alalla. Korkea edustaja/varapuheenjohtaja tapasi Kazakstanin ulkoministerin Yerzan Kazihanovin 2. helmikuuta 2012. Hän otti tuolloin esille oppositioaktivistien, erityisesti Vladimir Kozlovin ja Igor Vinjavskin, ja muiden opposition jäsenten, kuten Serik Sapargalin, vangitsemisen ja ilmoitti olevansa vakavasti huolissaan tilanteesta. EU:n edustusto Astanassa esitti 9. helmikuuta 2012 virallisen selvityspyyynnön, jossa pyydettiin tietoja Vladimir Kozlovin terveydentilasta. Edustoston edustaja pääsi tämän jälkeen tapaamaan Vladimir Kozlovia vankilaan. Oikeudenkäynnit kaikkia joulukuun 2011 väkivaltaisuksiin osallistumisesta syytettyjä vastaan alkoivat 27. maaliskuuta 2012. EU:n edustusto Astanassa seuraa näitä oikeudenkäyntejä tarkoin. Igor Vinjavski puolestaan vapautettiin 16. maaliskuuta 2012 hänelle myönnetyn armahuksen perusteella.

Komissio tukee edelleen Kazakstanin WTO-jäsenyyttä, jossa on kyse kauppa- ja talousnäkökohtiin perustuvasta prosessista. Jos Kazakstanin WTO-jäsenyyttä koskevat neuvottelut hoidetaan riittävästi poliittista sitoutumista osoittaen, ne olisivat selkeä merkki siitä, että maa on valmis nopeuttamaan talousuudistuksiaan ja sitoutumaan monenvälisiin sääntöihin. Kazakstanin liittyminen WTO:hon olisi sekä Kazakstanin että EU:n etujen mukaista. Tavoitteen saavuttaminen edellyttää kuitenkin lisää työtä Kazakstanin puolella, erityisesti siltä osin kuin on kyse vientitulleja koskevista sitoumuksista.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-002048/12
to the Commission (Vice-President/High Representative)**

Sonia Alfano (ALDE), Leonidas Donskis (ALDE), Liisa Jaakonsaari (S&D), Bart Staes (Verts/ALE), Andrzej Grzyb (PPE), Bogdan Kazimierz Marcinkiewicz (PPE), Piotr Borys (PPE), Paul Murphy (GUE/NGL), Nicole Kiil-Nielsen (Verts/ALE), Keith Taylor (Verts/ALE), Norica Nicolai (ALDE) and Marek Henryk Migalski (ECR)

(22 February 2012)

Subject: VP/HR — Continuing repression of political opposition and media in Kazakhstan

We have received reports that, on 23 January, Vladimir Kozlov, leader of the Kazakh opposition political party 'Alga!', currently being registered in Kazakhstan, was arrested by the Kazakh Committee of National Security on his return from meetings with MEPs at the European Parliament, and officials at the European Commission to discuss the tragedy in Janaozen and the Kazakh parliamentary elections. In addition, Mr Kozlov's house was searched. The same day, five other political opponents, Mikhail Sizlov, Zhanbolat Mamay, Gulzhan Lepesova, Askar Tokmurzin, Serik Sapargali and Vadim Kuramshin were also arrested and had their houses searched. Fifteen other people have been isolated in the offices of the 'Alga!' party. Finally, the editor-in-chief of 'Vzglyad' newspaper, Igor Vinyavsky, was charged under the Kazakhstan Criminal Code with the offence of calling 'for violent overthrow or change of the constitutional order or forcible violation of the unity of the territory of the Republic of Kazakhstan'. On 26 January, Vladimir Kozlov, Igor Vinyavsky and Serik Sapargali were sentenced to two months imprisonment.

1. Can the Vice-President/High Representative indicate whether or not she has taken steps to discuss this issue with her Kazakh counterparts?
2. International election monitors and the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) have declared that Kazakhstan's parliamentary elections failed to meet basic democratic principles. In light of this, what steps is the Vice-President/High Representative taking to monitor the situation regarding political opposition in Kazakhstan?
3. Does the Vice-President/High Representative intend to intervene in response to the events in Kazakhstan and express the EU's resolute opposition to the violation of citizens' fundamental rights such as freedom of speech and expression, freedom of peaceful assembly and freedom of association?
4. Can the Vice-President/High Representative accurately describe the state of play regarding the new agreement on enhanced partnership and cooperation between Kazakhstan and the European Commission launched seven months ago during the twelfth session of the European Union-Kazakhstan Cooperation Committee?
5. Given the current situation, does the European Union still support Kazakhstan's early accession to the WTO?

**Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission
(24 April 2012)**

The High Representative/Vice-President (HR/VP) is following closely the situation in Kazakhstan. After the parliamentary elections, the HR/VP made a statement encouraging the Kazakh authorities 'to address the shortcomings identified by the OSCE'. The EEAS and the EU Delegation in Astana have been in regular contact with the authorities offering assistance and calling on Kazakhstan to uphold its international obligations and commitments, especially regarding freedom of expression, association and assembly. The HR/VP met with the Kazakh Foreign Minister Kazykhhanov on 2 February 2012, where she raised the imprisonment of opposition activists, including Mr Kozlov, Mr Viyavski and other opposition members including Mr Sapargali, expressing serious concern about the situation. The EU Delegation in Astana carried out a demarche on 9 February 2012, asking for information on the health of Mr Kozlov and consequently visited Mr Kozlov in detention. The trials of all people accused of taking part in the violence of December 2011 started on 27 March 2012 and the EU Delegation in Astana is now closely following the trials process. Meanwhile, Mr Vinyavski has been freed on 16 March 2012 under an amnesty.

The Commission still supports the accession of Kazakhstan to the WTO — which is a process based on trade and economic considerations. The negotiations on the accession of Kazakhstan to the WTO — if pursued with the necessary political commitment — would be a clear sign that the country is ready to step up its economic reforms and to commit to multilateral rules. The accession of Kazakhstan would be in the interest not only of Kazakhstan but the EU; however, more work needs to be done to achieve this objective on the Kazakh side — notably as regards commitments on export duties.

(Svensk version)

**Frågor för skriftligt besvarande E-002049/12
till kommissionen**
Isabella Lövin (Verts/ALE)
(22 februari 2012)

Angående: Förbud mot slutna recirkulerande vattenbruksystem vid ekologisk uppfödning

Anläggningar för djurproduktion med slutna recirkulerande vattenbruksystem är i dag förbjudna vid ekologiskt vattenbruk, t.ex. i kommissionens förordning (EG) nr 710/2009 och rådets förordning (EG) nr 834/2007. Sådana system kan dock tillhandahålla de minst miljöfarliga produktionsmetoderna bland många mycket miljömässigt problematiska produktionsmetoder inom vattenbruket. Ur ett miljöperspektiv bör det inte finnas några skäl till att sådana system skulle vara sämre än andra typer av vattenbruk. Slutna recirkulerande system är för närvarande det bästa miljöalternativet eftersom exkrementer kan kontrolleras och användas som gödningsmedel i jordbruksproduktion och riskerna för vilda bestånd av förrymd fisk, sjukdomar och parasiter minimeras.

Det aktuella förbjudet mot att miljömärka dessa metoder kan paradoxalt nog skada utvecklingen av mer miljövänliga metoder. Man har inte klargjort syftet med att inte tillåta att dessa metoder klassificeras som ekologiska.

1. Jag vill veta skälet till varför man har infört detta förbud i kommissionens förordning (EG) nr 710/2009 och förordning (EG) nr 834/2007.

En effekt som detta förbud kan ha, är att utvecklingen av resurseffektiva metoder, där man använder överskottsvärme från industriproduktion, hämmas. I förordningarna meddelas också att stöd bara kan ges till ekologiska jordbruk som uppfyller normerna i förordningarna. Vid oberoende miljömärkning av tredje part, t.ex. KRAV (den svenska nationella miljömärkningen) är det även ett villkor att EU:s ekologiska produktionsnormer ska vara uppfyllda före märkning.

2. Kommer kommissionen att föreslå ändringar i EU:s förordningar om ekologisk produktion, så att slutna recirkulerande vattenbruksystem tillåts vid ekologisk produktion i EU, dvs. för miljömärkning?

3. Om svaret på fråga 2 är nekande, hur ska då kommissionen se till att hållbarheten inom vattenbruket förbättras?

Svar från Maria Damanaki på kommissionens vägnar
(16 april 2012)

Ekologisk produktion är ett övergripande system för jordbruksverksamhet och livsmedelsproduktion där man kombinerar bästa miljöpraxis, en hög grad av biologisk mångfald, bevarande av naturresurser, tillämpning av stränga djurskyddskrav och användning av naturliga processer och ämnen. Ekologisk märkning ska inte förväxlas med märkning som enbart handlar om miljöskydd ("miljömärkning").

Enligt EU:s lagstiftning för ekologisk produktion (kommissionens förordning (EG) nr 889/2008⁽¹⁾), ändrad genom kommissionens förordning (EG) nr 710/2009⁽²⁾) är slutna recirkulerande produktionsanläggningar för vattenbruksdjur förbjudna, med undantag av kläckerier och yngelanläggningar och anläggningar för produktion av arter som används som ekologiskt foder.

Slutna recirkulerande system undantogs därför att processen inte bedömdes vara tillräckligt naturlig (i likhet med buruppfödning av kycklingar eller industrijordbruk) och med hänsyn till djurskyddet, eftersom recirkulation också innebär hög djurtäthet.

Kommissionen håller för närvarande på att undersöka möjligheten att införa ett tema om ekologiskt vattenbruk i arbetsprogrammet för 2013 inom sjunde ramprogrammet, där man kan ta upp frågor som denna för den rättsliga ramen.

⁽¹⁾ EUT L 250, 18.9.2008, s. 1.

⁽²⁾ EUT L 204, 6.8.2009, s. 15.

Slutna recirkulerande system har miljöfördelar. För närvarande är de uteslutna från ekologisk livsmedelsproduktion i EU, men det finns ingenting som hindrar att de certifieras inom ramen för system som överensstämmer med FAO:s (FN:s livsmedels- och jordbruksorganisation) tekniska riktlinjer för certifiering av vattenbruk från 2011 (³). Åtgärder för att främja en effektiv vattenvård och korrekt hantering av avloppsvatten ingår i miljökriterierna i FAO:s riktlinjer.

(³) <http://www.fao.org/docrep/015/i2296t/i2296t00.pdf>

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-002049/12
to the Commission
Isabella Lövin (Verts/ALE)
(22 February 2012)**

Subject: Exclusion of closed recirculation aquaculture from organic farming

Closed recirculation aquaculture animal production facilities are prohibited in organic aquaculture today, for instance in Commission Regulation (EC) No 710/2009 and Council Regulation (EC) No 834/2007. However, such systems may provide the least environmentally damaging production methods among many very environmentally problematic aquaculture production methods. From an environmental perspective, there should be no reasons that such systems are less preferable than other types of aquaculture. Closed recirculation systems are currently the best environmental alternative as excrement can be controlled and utilised as fertiliser in agricultural production and the risks to wild stocks of escaped fish, diseases and parasites are minimised.

Currently the ban on these methods being ecolabelled may paradoxically harm the development of more environmentally friendly methods. It is not clear what the objective is for banning these methods from organic labelling.

1. I would like to know the reason for instigating this ban in Commission Regulation (EC) No 710/2009 and Regulation (EC) No 834/2007.

One effect this ban may have is that development of resource-efficient methods, using excess heat from industrial production, is discouraged. The regulations also states that aid can only be given to organic farms meeting the regulation standards. Also, third party independent ecolabels such as KRAV (the Swedish national ecolabel) make labelling conditional upon meeting the EU organic production standards.

2. Will the Commission propose changes to the EU organic production regulations so that closed recirculation aquaculture production systems may become eligible for EU organic production, i.e. for the ecolabel?

3. If the answer to question 2 is negative, how would the Commission ensure that aquaculture sustainability improves?

**Answer given by Ms Damanaki on behalf of the Commission
(16 April 2012)**

Organic production is an overall system of farm management and food production that combines best environmental practices, a high level of biodiversity, the preservation of natural resources, the application of high animal welfare standards and the use of natural processes and substances. The organic label should not be confused with labels dealing with environmental integrity alone ('ecolabels').

Under the EU legislation for organic production (Commission Regulation (EC) No 889/2008⁽¹⁾, as amended by Commission Regulation (EC) No 710/2009⁽²⁾) closed recirculation aquaculture animal production facilities are prohibited, with the exception of hatcheries and nurseries or for the production of species used for organic feed.

Closed recirculation systems were excluded because the process was judged not to be sufficiently natural (akin to battery rearing of chickens or factory farming) and on account of concerns for animal welfare, in that recirculation goes along with high densities.

The Commission is currently examining the possibility of including a topic on organic aquaculture, which could address issues such as this with regard to the regulatory framework, in the 2013 Work Programme of the 7th Framework Programme.

⁽¹⁾ OJ L 250, 18.9.2008, p. 1.
⁽²⁾ OJ L 204, 6.8.2009, p. 15.

Closed recirculation systems have environmental merits and while they are presently excluded from organic food production in the EU there is nothing to prevent their certification under schemes which are in compliance with the Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations (FAO) Technical Guidelines on Aquaculture Certification of 2011 (¹). Among the criteria for addressing environmental integrity in the FAO Guidelines are measures to promote efficient water management and proper management of effluents.

(¹) <http://www.fao.org/docrep/015/i2296t/i2296t00.pdf>

(Versiunea în limba română)

Întrebarea cu solicitare de răspuns scris E-002050/12
adresată Comisiei
Corina Crețu (S&D)
(22 februarie 2012)

Subiect: Persoanele din categoria NEET din Europa

Pentru o lungă perioadă de timp, fenomenul NEET (persoane care nu sunt încadrate profesional și care nu urmărează niciun program educațional sau de formare) a fost cel mai vizibil în țări asiatici precum Japonia și Coreea de Sud. Cu toate acestea, și tinerii din UE și-au văzut perspectivele de angajare grav afectate de recesiunea globală.

Creșterea economică lentă a atras după sine o rată a șomajului în rândul tinerilor din Europa de aproape 21 %, ceea ce înseamnă că aproximativ 7,5 milioane de tineri pot fi clasificați drept persoane din categoria NEET. În astfel de momente, tinerii sunt vulnerabili, deoarece ei sunt primii care ies și ultimii care intră pe piețele forței de muncă, fiind dificil pentru ei să concureze cu persoanele aflate în căutarea unui loc de muncă care au mai multă experiență. Excluderea socială și izolarea în rândul persoanelor din categoria NEET nu le sunt dăunătoare numai lor, ci și societății și economiilor naționale.

- Are Comisia vreun plan în vederea abordării acestei probleme?
- Lucrează aceasta la crearea de programe care încurajează participarea socială?
- Ce politici de ocupare a forței de muncă și educaționale propune Comisia pentru a sprijini integrarea în societate a persoanelor din categoria NEET?

Răspuns dat de dl Andor în numele Comisiei
(4 aprilie 2012)

Comunicarea Comisiei „Inițiativa privind oportunitățile pentru tineri”⁽¹⁾ conturează acțiuni posibile pentru ajutarea tinerilor șomeri:

- care au părăsit școala sau formarea profesională fără a fi obținut o calificare secundară superioară, pentru a reveni într-un sistem educațional sau de formare profesională adaptat nevoilor pieței, sau
- care au obținut o calificare secundară superioară, dar nu și-au găsit un loc de muncă, pentru a dobânde prima experiență profesională.

Prin urmare, Comisia solicită încheierea unor parteneriate mai strânsă între autoritățile politice și partenerii sociali la nivel național, regional și local.

Inițiativa prezintă un set de măsuri la nivelul UE, printre care:

- punerea în aplicare a unei acțiuni pregătitoare a Parlamentului European în valoare de 4 milioane EUR, pentru a ajuta statele membre să instituie sisteme de „garanții pentru tineret”, prin care să se asigure că, la patru luni de la părăsirea școlii, tinerii sunt activi fie pe piața muncii, fie în instituții educaționale sau de formare;
- asigurarea de asistență tehnică, prin Fondul social european, în valoare de 1,3 milioane de EUR pentru sprijinirea instituirii de programe de licenție și de sprijin pentru tinerii întreprinzători și pentru întreprinderile sociale, în valoare de 3 milioane EUR, din aceeași sursă;
- orientarea de fonduri, pe cât posibil, către plasamente în întreprinderi, având drept scop plasarea a cel puțin 130 000 de tineri în 2012, în cadrul programelor Erasmus și Leonardo da Vinci;
- acordarea de sprijin finanțier pentru a ajuta 5 000 de tineri să-și găsească un loc de muncă într-un alt stat membru, în perioada 2012-2013, prin inițiativa „Primul loc de muncă EURES”;
- creșterea alocării bugetare pentru Serviciul European de Voluntariat pentru a oferi cel puțin 10 000 de posibilități de voluntariat în 2012.

⁽¹⁾ COM (2011) 933 final, 20 decembrie 2011.

Inițiativa a fost urmată de misiuni în cele opt state membre cu cele mai ridicate rate ale șomajului în rândul tinerilor, iar Comisia va prezenta, în aprilie, un raport privind rezultatele Inițiativei privind oportunitățile pentru tineri.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-002050/12
to the Commission
Corina Crețu (S&D)
(22 February 2012)**

Subject: NEETs in Europe

For a long time, the NEET (people currently not in education, employment, or training) phenomenon was most visible in Asian countries such as Japan and South Korea. However, young people in the EU have also seen their employment prospects hit hard by the global recession.

Slow economic growth has resulted in a European youth unemployment rate of almost 21 %, meaning that some 7.5 million young people can be classified as NEETs. At such times, young people are vulnerable because they are the first to exit and the last to enter the labour markets, as it is difficult for them to compete with more experienced jobseekers. Social exclusion and isolation among NEETs are not only harmful to NEETs themselves, but also to society and national economies.

- Does the Commission have a plan to address this issue?
- Is it working on creating programmes that encourage social participation?
- What employment and education policies is the Commission proposing in order to help integrate NEETs into society?

**Answer given by Mr Andor on behalf of the Commission
(4 April 2012)**

The Commission communication 'Youth Opportunities Initiative' (¹) outlines action to help unemployed young people who:

- have left school or training without an upper secondary qualification to get back into school or vocational training that is geared to labour market needs; or
- have an upper secondary qualification but cannot find a job to get their first work experience.

The Commission therefore calls for a closer partnership between the political authorities and social partners, national, regional and local level.

The initiative provides for a set of EU-level measures which include:

- implementing a European Parliament preparatory action worth EUR 4 million to help Member States set up 'Youth Guarantee' schemes to ensure young people are either in employment, education or training within four months of leaving school;
- providing technical assistance from the European Social Fund worth EUR 1.3 million to support the setting-up of apprenticeship schemes and support for young entrepreneurs and social enterprises worth another EUR 3 million from the same source;
- gearing funds as much as possible to placements in enterprises with a target of at least 130 000 placements in 2012 under the Erasmus and Leonardo da Vinci programmes;
- providing financial assistance to help 5 000 young people find a job in another Member State in 2012-2013 through 'Your first EURES Job';
- increasing the budget allocation for the European Voluntary Service to provide at least 10 000 volunteering opportunities in 2012.

¹) COM(2011) 933 final of 20 December 2011.

The initiative has been followed up by missions in the eight Member States with the highest youth unemployment rates and the Commission will report on the findings to the YOI in April.

(Versiunea în limba română)

Întrebarea cu solicitare de răspuns scris E-002051/12
adresată Comisiei
Corina Crețu (S&D)
(22 februarie 2012)

Subiect: Căsătoriile între copii

Peste tot în lume, milioane de fete cu vârstă sub 18 ani sunt în prezent căsătorite, chiar dacă această practică este interzisă în multe țări în curs de dezvoltare și în acordurile internaționale.

India, Yemen, Afganistan, Nepal și Etiopia sunt statele cu cele mai numeroase încalcări.

Căsătoriile între copii răspândite pe scară largă pun în pericol acestora la educație, afectează sănătatea lor personală și îi mențin ca cetăteni de mâna a două. Aceștia se confruntă, de asemenea, cu complicații medicale asociate cu experiența traumatizantă a sarcinii la o vîrstă mică, precum fistula, circumcizia la femei etc.

Statisticile arată că rata deceselor cauzate de sarcină la miresele minore este de două ori mai ridicată decât în cazul femeilor care au în jur de 20 de ani și, de asemenea, că o căsătorie forțată între copii le face pe acestea să fie extrem de vulnerabile la violența domestică, ce poate include abuzul fizic, sexual sau psihologic.

— Având în vedere gravitatea situației și efectele sale negative de lungă durată, precum și faptul că indicii de dezvoltare sunt printre cei mai scăziți în aceste țări și că sărăcia, discriminarea de gen, teama de răpire, lipsa de informații, lipsa educației și migrația au un impact semnificativ asupra căsătoriilor între copii și asupra sănătății fetelor și a femeilor tinere, ce măsuri urmează să adopte Comisia?

— Cum are de gând Comisia să sprijine un acces mai bun pentru aceste fete la educație, precum și la servicii de sănătate reproductivă, echipamente și surse de aprovizionare și să îmbunătățească accesul lor la informații?

Răspuns dat de dl Piebalgs în numele Comisiei
(12 aprilie 2012)

Este recunoscut faptul că pentru abandonarea practicilor tradiționale dăunătoare, precum căsătoria precoce, este necesară o abordare holistică. Din acest motiv, UE promovează adoptarea unei legislații corespunzătoare și implică lideri tradiționali, religioși și guvernamentalni în dialoguri privind practicile tradiționale la nivel național și comunitar. Pe această bază, UE a finanțat un proiect condus de UNICEF, care vizează abandonarea practicilor dăunătoare, cum ar fi căsătoriile între copii. Ca rezultat al acestui proiect, în India au fost elaborate la nivel de stat patru planuri de acțiune privind căsătoriile între copii, ceea ce a condus la sensibilizarea și mobilizarea pe scară largă, sub responsabilitatea comunității, în favoarea stopării căsătoriilor între copii. UE sprijină, de asemenea, un proiect regional realizat în colaborare cu Institutul MAMTA pentru Ocrotirea Mamei și Copilului (India) și intitulat „Îmbunătățirea sănătății reproductive și sexuale a tinerilor prin creșterea vîrstei la căsătorie în India, Nepal și Bangladesh”.

UE recunoaște importanța educației pentru sănătate și pentru viața socială, având în vedere că părinții cu un nivel ridicat de educație își vor lăsa fetele la școală o perioadă mai mare de timp, ceea ce va avea efecte pozitive pentru familiile lor. UE își asumă pe deplin angajamentul față de al doilea obiectiv de dezvoltare al mileniului (ODM 2) privind accesul universal la educația primară și față de ODM 3 privind egalitatea de gen. UE sprijină ferm accelerarea progreselor către realizarea ODM 5 privind sănătatea mamelor și accesul universal la sănătate reproductivă, acordând în mod constant sprijin la nivel de țară pentru sectorul sănătății. La acesta se adaugă sprijinul la nivel de țară acordat prin intermediul inițiativei ODM în valoare de 1 miliard de euro, precum și sprijinul tematic acordat sănătății reproductive în cadrul programului „Investiții în resurse umane”, care aduce beneficii în principal campaniilor naționale și internaționale de sensibilizare și asigurării aprovizionării. Atenția se concentrează din ce în ce mai mult asupra tinerilor, în special asupra fetelor și femeilor tinere.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-002051/12
to the Commission
Corina Crețu (S&D)
(22 February 2012)**

Subject: Child marriage

Throughout the world, millions of girls below the age of 18 are currently married, even though this practice is forbidden in many developing countries and international agreements.

India, Yemen, Afghanistan, Nepal and Ethiopia are the states with the most numerous violations.

Widespread child marriage jeopardises their access to education, harms their personal health, and keeps them second-class citizens. Also they face medical complications associated with the traumatising experience of pregnancy at a young age, like fistula, female circumcision, etc.

Statistics show that the pregnancy death rate for child brides is double that of women in their 20s, and also forced child marriages makes them extremely vulnerable to domestic violence, which may include physical, sexual or psychological abuse.

— Given the seriousness of the situation and its lasting negative effects, as well as the fact that development indicators are among the lowest in these countries and that poverty, gender discrimination, the fear of abduction, the lack of information, the lack of education and migration have a big impact on child marriage and on the health of girls and young women, what actions is the Commission going to take?

— How is the Commission going to support better access for these girls to education, as well as adequate reproductive health services, equipment and supplies and to improve their access to information?

**Answer given by Mr Piebalgs on behalf of the Commission
(12 April 2012)**

It is recognised that in order to abandon harmful traditional practices, like early marriage, a holistic approach is necessary. For this reason the EU promotes the adoption of appropriate legislation and engages traditional, religious and government leaders in dialogues on traditional practices at national and community levels. On this basis, the EU has funded a project managed by Unicef, aiming at the abandonment of harmful practices such as child marriage. As a result of this project, in India four state-wide action plans on child marriage have been established, leading to large-scale community-led awareness-raising and mobilisation in favour of ending child marriage. The EU is also supporting a regional project with MAMTA Health Institute for Mother and Child (India) on 'Improving reproductive and sexual health of young people by increasing the age at marriage in India, Nepal, and Bangladesh'.

The EU recognises the importance of education on health and social life considering that educated parents will keep their girls in school longer with positive effects for their families. The EU is fully committed to Millennium Development Goal (MDG) 2 Universal Primary Education and MDG3 Gender Equality. The EU strongly supports accelerated progress towards the achievement of MDG 5 on maternal health and universal access to reproductive health through ongoing country-level health sector support and additional country-level support through the EUR 1 billion MDG Initiative and through thematic support to reproductive health under the Investing in People Programme which mainly benefits national and international advocacy and securement of supplies. Increasingly the focus is on young persons, especially girls and young women.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-005402/12
to the Commission
James Elles (ECR)
(30 May 2012)

Subject: Budget implementation rates — economic and financial affairs

Parliament's resolution of 14 March 2012 setting out general guidelines for the preparation of the 2013 budget drew particular attention to the need for levels of payments to be 'determined on the basis of technical criteria such as implementation figures' (paragraph 20) and for the 'optimal and timely use of existing EU financing' (paragraph 12).

In the light of the above, can the Commission explain the low implementation rate as of 31 December 2011 for the budget lines set out below?

Title 01 (Economic and financial affairs):

- Chapter 01 02 (Economic and monetary union)
- Chapter 01 03 (International economic and financial affairs)

Question for written answer E-005403/12
to the Commission
James Elles (ECR)
(30 May 2012)

Subject: Budget implementation rates — enterprise

Parliament's resolution of 14 March 2012 setting out general guidelines for the preparation of the 2013 budget drew particular attention to the need for levels of payments to be 'determined on the basis of technical criteria such as implementation figures' (paragraph 20) and for the 'optimal and timely use of existing EU financing' (paragraph 12).

In the light of the above, can the Commission explain the low implementation rate as of 31 December 2011 for the budget lines set out below?

Title 02 (Enterprise):

- Chapter 02 01 (Administrative expenditure of the 'economic and financial affairs' policy area)
- Chapter 02 03 (Internal market for goods and sectoral policies)

Question for written answer E-005404/12
to the Commission
James Elles (ECR)
(30 May 2012)

Subject: Budget implementation rates — employment and social affairs

Parliament's resolution of 14 March 2012 setting out general guidelines for the preparation of the 2013 budget drew particular attention to the need for levels of payments to be 'determined on the basis of technical criteria such as implementation figures' (paragraph 20) and for the 'optimal and timely use of existing EU financing' (paragraph 12).

In the light of the above, can the Commission explain the low implementation rate as of 31 December 2011 for the budget lines set out below?

Title 04 (Employment and social affairs):

- Chapter 04 01 (Administrative expenditure of the 'employment and social affairs' policy area)
- Chapter 04 04 (Employment, social solidarity and gender equality)

- Chapter 04 05 (European Globalisation Adjustment Fund (EGF))
- Chapter 04 06 (Instrument for pre-accession assistance (IPA) — human resources development)

Question for written answer E-005405/12
to the Commission
James Elles (ECR)
(30 May 2012)

Subject: Budget implementation rates — agriculture and rural development

Parliament's resolution of 14 March 2012 setting out general guidelines for the preparation of the 2013 budget drew particular attention to the need for levels of payments to be 'determined on the basis of technical criteria such as implementation figures' (paragraph 20) and for the 'optimal and timely use of existing EU financing' (paragraph 12).

In the light of the above, can the Commission explain the low implementation rate as of 31 December 2011 for the budget lines set out below?

Title 05 (Agriculture and rural development):

- Chapter 05 01 (Administrative expenditure of the 'agriculture and rural development' policy area)
- Chapter 05 06 (International aspects of the 'agriculture and rural development' policy area)
- Chapter 05 08 (Policy strategy and coordination of the 'agriculture and rural development' policy area)

Question for written answer E-005406/12
to the Commission
James Elles (ECR)
(30 May 2012)

Subject: Budget implementation rates — mobility and transport

Parliament's resolution of 14 March 2012 setting out general guidelines for the preparation of the 2013 budget drew particular attention to the need for levels of payments to be 'determined on the basis of technical criteria such as implementation figures' (paragraph 20) and for the 'optimal and timely use of existing EU financing' (paragraph 12).

In the light of the above, can the Commission explain the low implementation rate as of 31 December 2011 for the budget line set out below?

Title 06 (Mobility and transport):

- Chapter 06 01 (Administrative expenditure of the 'mobility and transport' policy area)

Question for written answer E-005407/12
to the Commission
James Elles (ECR)
(30 May 2012)

Subject: Budget implementation rates — environment and climate action

Parliament's resolution of 14 March 2012 setting out general guidelines for the preparation of the 2013 budget drew particular attention to the need for levels of payments to be 'determined on the basis of technical criteria such as implementation figures' (paragraph 20) and for the 'optimal and timely use of existing EU financing' (paragraph 12).

In the light of the above, can the Commission explain the low implementation rate as of 31 December 2011 for the budget lines set out below?

Title 07 (Environment and climate action):

- Chapter 07 01 (Administrative expenditure of the 'environment and climate action' policy area)
- Chapter 07 02 (Global environmental affairs)

- Chapter 07 12 (Implementation of Union policy and legislation on climate action)
- Chapter 07 13 (Climate mainstreaming and innovation)

Question for written answer E-005408/12
to the Commission
James Elles (ECR)
(30 May 2012)

Subject: Budget implementation rates — information society and media

Parliament's resolution of 14 March 2012 setting out general guidelines for the preparation of the 2013 budget drew particular attention to the need for levels of payments to be 'determined on the basis of technical criteria such as implementation figures' (paragraph 20) and for the 'optimal and timely use of existing EU financing' (paragraph 12).

In the light of the above, can the Commission explain the low implementation rate as of 31 December 2011 for the budget line set out below?

Title 09 (Information society and media):

- Chapter 09 01 (Administrative expenditure of the 'information society and media' policy area)

Question for written answer E-005409/12
to the Commission
James Elles (ECR)
(30 May 2012)

Subject: Budget implementation rates — direct research

Parliament's resolution of 14 March 2012 setting out general guidelines for the preparation of the 2013 budget drew particular attention to the need for levels of payments to be 'determined on the basis of technical criteria such as implementation figures' (paragraph 20) and for the 'optimal and timely use of existing EU financing' (paragraph 12).

In the light of the above, can the Commission explain the low implementation rate as of 31 December 2011 for the budget line set out below?

Title 10 (Direct research):

- Chapter 10 01 (Administrative expenditure of the 'direct research' policy area)

Question for written answer E-005410/12
to the Commission
James Elles (ECR)
(30 May 2012)

Subject: Budget implementation rates — maritime affairs and fisheries

Parliament's resolution of 14 March 2012 setting out general guidelines for the preparation of the 2013 budget drew particular attention to the need for levels of payments to be 'determined on the basis of technical criteria such as implementation figures' (paragraph 20) and for the 'optimal and timely use of existing EU financing' (paragraph 12).

In the light of the above, can the Commission explain the low implementation rate as of 31 December 2011 for the budget lines set out below?

Title 11 (Maritime affairs and fisheries):

- Chapter 11 02 (Fisheries markets)
- Chapter 11 07 (Conservation, management and exploitation of living aquatic resources)
- Chapter 11 09 (Maritime policy)

**Question for written answer E-005411/12
to the Commission
James Elles (ECR)
(30 May 2012)**

Subject: Budget implementation rates — internal market

Parliament's resolution of 14 March 2012 setting out general guidelines for the preparation of the 2013 budget drew particular attention to the need for levels of payments to be 'determined on the basis of technical criteria such as implementation figures' (paragraph 20) and for the 'optimal and timely use of existing EU financing' (paragraph 12).

In the light of the above, can the Commission explain the low implementation rate as of 31 December 2011 for the budget line set out below?

Title 12 (Internal market):

- Chapter 12 01 (Administrative expenditure of the 'internal market' policy area)

**Question for written answer E-005412/12
to the Commission
James Elles (ECR)
(30 May 2012)**

Subject: Budget implementation rates — regional policy

Parliament's resolution of 14 March 2012 setting out general guidelines for the preparation of the 2013 budget drew particular attention to the need for levels of payments to be 'determined on the basis of technical criteria such as implementation figures' (paragraph 20) and for the 'optimal and timely use of existing EU financing' (paragraph 12).

In the light of the above, can the Commission explain the low implementation rate as of 31 December 2011 for the budget line set out below?

Title 13 (Regional policy):

- Chapter 13 01 (Administrative expenditure of the 'regional policy' policy area)

**Question for written answer E-005413/12
to the Commission
James Elles (ECR)
(30 May 2012)**

Subject: Budget implementation rates — taxation and customs union

Parliament's resolution of 14 March 2012 setting out general guidelines for the preparation of the 2013 budget drew particular attention to the need for levels of payments to be 'determined on the basis of technical criteria such as implementation figures' (paragraph 20) and for the 'optimal and timely use of existing EU financing' (paragraph 12).

In the light of the above, can the Commission explain the low implementation rate as of 31 December 2011 for the budget lines set out below?

Title 14 (Taxation and customs union):

- Chapter 14 01 (Administrative expenditure of the 'taxation and customs union' policy area)
- Chapter 14 03 (International aspects of taxation and customs)

Question for written answer E-005414/12
to the Commission
James Elles (ECR)
(30 May 2012)

Subject: Budget implementation rates — education and culture

Parliament's resolution of 14 March 2012 setting out general guidelines for the preparation of the 2013 budget drew particular attention to the need for levels of payments to be 'determined on the basis of technical criteria such as implementation figures' (paragraph 20) and for the 'optimal and timely use of existing EU financing' (paragraph 12).

In the light of the above, can the Commission explain the low implementation rate as of 31 December 2011 for the budget line set out below?

Title 15 (Education and culture):

- Chapter 15 01 (Administrative expenditure of the 'education and culture' policy area)

Question for written answer E-005415/12
to the Commission
James Elles (ECR)
(30 May 2012)

Subject: Budget implementation rates — communication

Parliament's resolution of 14 March 2012 setting out general guidelines for the preparation of the 2013 budget drew particular attention to the need for levels of payments to be 'determined on the basis of technical criteria such as implementation figures' (paragraph 20) and for the 'optimal and timely use of existing EU financing' (paragraph 12).

In the light of the above, can the Commission explain the low implementation rate as of 31 December 2011 for the budget line set out below?

Title 16 (Communication):

- Chapter 16 01 (Administrative expenditure of the 'communication' policy area)

Question for written answer E-005416/12
to the Commission
James Elles (ECR)
(30 May 2012)

Subject: Budget implementation rates — health and consumer protection

Parliament's resolution of 14 March 2012 setting out general guidelines for the preparation of the 2013 budget drew particular attention to the need for levels of payments to be 'determined on the basis of technical criteria such as implementation figures' (paragraph 20) and for the 'optimal and timely use of existing EU financing' (paragraph 12).

In the light of the above, can the Commission explain the low implementation rate as of 31 December 2011 for the budget line set out below?

Title 17 (Health and consumer protection):

- Chapter 17 01 (Administrative expenditure of the 'health and consumer protection' policy area)

**Question for written answer E-005417/12
to the Commission
James Elles (ECR)
(30 May 2012)**

Subject: Budget implementation rates — home affairs

Parliament's resolution of 14 March 2012 setting out general guidelines for the preparation of the 2013 budget drew particular attention to the need for levels of payments to be 'determined on the basis of technical criteria such as implementation figures' (paragraph 20) and for the 'optimal and timely use of existing EU financing' (paragraph 12).

In the light of the above, can the Commission explain the low implementation rate as of 31 December 2011 for the budget lines set out below?

Title 18 (Home affairs):

- Chapter 18 01 (Administrative expenditure of the 'home affairs' policy area)
- Chapter 18 08 (Policy strategy and coordination)

**Question for written answer E-005418/12
to the Commission
James Elles (ECR)
(30 May 2012)**

Subject: Budget implementation rates — external relations

Parliament's resolution of 14 March 2012 setting out general guidelines for the preparation of the 2013 budget drew particular attention to the need for levels of payments to be 'determined on the basis of technical criteria such as implementation figures' (paragraph 20) and for the 'optimal and timely use of existing EU financing' (paragraph 12).

In the light of the above, can the Commission explain the low implementation rate as of 31 December 2011 for the budget lines set out below?

Title 19 (External relations):

- Chapter 19 01 (Administrative expenditure of the 'external relations' policy area)
- Chapter 19 11 (Policy strategy and coordination for the 'external relations' policy area)

**Question for written answer E-005419/12
to the Commission
James Elles (ECR)
(30 May 2012)**

Subject: Budget implementation rates — trade

Parliament's resolution of 14 March 2012 setting out general guidelines for the preparation of the 2013 budget drew particular attention to the need for levels of payments to be 'determined on the basis of technical criteria such as implementation figures' (paragraph 20) and for the 'optimal and timely use of existing EU financing' (paragraph 12).

In the light of the above, can the Commission explain the low implementation rate as of 31 December 2011 for the budget line set out below?

Title 20 (Trade):

- Chapter 20 02 (Trade policy)

**Question for written answer E-005420/12
to the Commission
James Elles (ECR)
(30 May 2012)**

Subject: Budget implementation rates — development and relations with ACP States

Parliament's resolution of 14 March 2012 setting out general guidelines for the preparation of the 2013 budget drew particular attention to the need for levels of payments to be 'determined on the basis of technical criteria such as implementation figures' (paragraph 20) and for the 'optimal and timely use of existing EU financing' (paragraph 12).

In the light of the above, can the Commission explain the low implementation rate as of 31 December 2011 for the budget lines set out below?

Title 21 (Development and relations with African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) States):

- Chapter 21 01 (Administrative expenditure of the 'Development and relations with ACP States' policy area)
- Chapter 21 08 (Policy strategy and coordination for the 'development and relations with ACP States' policy area)

**Question for written answer E-005421/12
to the Commission
James Elles (ECR)
(30 May 2012)**

Subject: Budget implementation rates — humanitarian aid

Parliament's resolution of 14 March 2012 setting out general guidelines for the preparation of the 2013 budget drew particular attention to the need for levels of payments to be 'determined on the basis of technical criteria such as implementation figures' (paragraph 20) and for the 'optimal and timely use of existing EU financing' (paragraph 12).

In the light of the above, can the Commission explain the low implementation rate as of 31 December 2011 for the budget lines set out below?

Title 23 (Humanitarian aid):

- Chapter 23 01 (Administrative expenditure of the 'humanitarian aid' policy area)
- Chapter 23 03 (Civil protection financial instrument)

**Question for written answer E-005422/12
to the Commission
James Elles (ECR)
(30 May 2012)**

Subject: Budget implementation rates — Commission's administration

Parliament's resolution of 14 March 2012 setting out general guidelines for the preparation of the 2013 budget drew particular attention to the need for levels of payments to be 'determined on the basis of technical criteria such as implementation figures' (paragraph 20) and for the 'optimal and timely use of existing EU financing' (paragraph 12).

In the light of the above, can the Commission explain the low implementation rate as of 31 December 2011 for the budget line set out below?

Title 26 (Commission's administration):

- Chapter 26 01 (Administrative expenditure of the 'Commission's administration' policy area)

Question for written answer E-005423/12
to the Commission
James Elles (ECR)
(30 May 2012)

Subject: Budget implementation rates — budget

Parliament's resolution of 14 March 2012 setting out general guidelines for the preparation of the 2013 budget drew particular attention to the need for levels of payments to be 'determined on the basis of technical criteria such as implementation figures' (paragraph 20) and for the 'optimal and timely use of existing EU financing' (paragraph 12).

In the light of the above, can the Commission explain the low implementation rate as of 31 December 2011 for the budget line set out below?

Title 27 (Budget):

- Chapter 27 01 (Administrative expenditure of the 'budget' policy area)

Question for written answer E-005424/12
to the Commission
James Elles (ECR)
(30 May 2012)

Subject: Budget implementation rates — energy

Parliament's resolution of 14 March 2012 setting out general guidelines for the preparation of the 2013 budget drew particular attention to the need for levels of payments to be 'determined on the basis of technical criteria such as implementation figures' (paragraph 20) and for the 'optimal and timely use of existing EU financing' (paragraph 12).

In the light of the above, can the Commission explain the low implementation rate as of 31 December 2011 for the budget lines set out below?

Title 32 (Energy):

- Chapter 32 01 (Administrative expenditure of the 'energy' policy area)
- Chapter 32 03 (Trans-European networks)
- Chapter 32 04 (Conventional and renewable energies)

Joint answer given by Mr Lewandowski on behalf of the Commission
(16 July 2012)

The Honourable Member asks for explanations of the implementation rates for payments for a number of budget chapters.

For a large number of policy areas (Titles 02, 04, 05, 06, 07, 09, 10, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 21, 23, 26, 27, 32) the chapters listed by the Honourable Member concern administrative expenditure. Here there is a common reason for the rate of implementation at the end of 2011. For lines belonging to Chapter XX 01, which are non-differentiated appropriations for administrative expenditure, payments not used during the year (2011), due to the timing of contracts, are automatically carried over to next year (2012) and must be used in that year. This corresponds to legal obligations committed in 2011 but leading to payments in 2012 (such as contracts signed at the end of 2011).

With respect to the following operational chapters mentioned by the Honourable Member, the apparent under-implementation at the end of 2011 is explained by the fact that the payments concerned were carried over to 2012 in accordance with Articles 9(2) and 9(3) of the Financial Regulation. For further details, see Commission Decision C(2012)936 of 13.2.2012: Chapters 04 04; 04 05; 05 08; 11 09; 20 02.

For the remaining operational chapters cited by the Honourable Member, the explanations are included in an annex.

(Version française)

**Question avec demande de réponse écrite P-005425/12
à la Commission (Vice-Présidente / Haute Représentante)
Patrick Le Hyaric (GUE/NGL)
(30 mai 2012)**

Objet: VP/HR — Destructions d'infrastructures financées par l'Union en Cisjordanie

Un rapport, publié par des ONG locales et internationales d'aide humanitaire et supervisé par le Bureau des Nations unies pour la coordination des affaires humanitaires (Ocha), a dénoncé la destruction de 620 structures en 2011 en Cisjordanie, dont 62 d'entre elles financées par l'Union européenne. La quasi-totalité de ces structures se trouvaient dans la zone C de la Cisjordanie, où Israël assume les pouvoirs civils et la sécurité, et 110 autres sont aujourd'hui menacées de disparition.

D'après la liste détaillée qui a été établie, les installations détruites ont trait aux besoins alimentaires et hydriques de base, on y trouve un bon nombre de citernes à eau, des abris pour animaux, des établissements agricoles, des habitations et même une route, le tout financé par sept pays (France, Pays-Bas, Royaume-Uni, Pologne, Irlande, Espagne et Suède).

Quant aux installations qui risquent bientôt d'être démolies, elles comprennent un système électrique destiné à un village, une crèche, des panneaux solaires, un puits, un centre médical, des logements, des projets d'assainissement des eaux, et, encore, des citernes et deux routes. Sont concernés, en plus des pays déjà cités, l'Allemagne, la Belgique, la Suisse et la Norvège.

Au total, sur une période de dix ans allant de 2001 à 2011, la Commission européenne estime que les pertes causées par la destruction ou l'endommagement des projets dépassent 49 millions d'euros. De cette somme, l'Union a financé 29 millions d'euros.

La Vice-présidente/Haute Représentante est-elle au courant de ce rapport supervisé par le Bureau des Nations unies pour la coordination des affaires humanitaires (Ocha)?

La Vice-présidente/Haute Représentante a-t-elle appelé le gouvernement israélien à cesser les démolitions des projets d'aide et des infrastructures civiles?

La Vice-présidente/Haute Représentante a-t-elle exigé d'Israël la reconstruction de toutes les infrastructures financées par l'Union et qui ont été détruites ou endommagées?

La Vice-présidente/Haute Représentante a-t-elle été interpellée par les États membres concernés par les destructions israéliennes? Que compte-t-elle faire pour protéger les infrastructures menacées de disparition?

**Réponse donnée par Mme Ashton, Vice-présidente/Haute Représentante au nom de la Commission
(30 juillet 2012)**

L'Union européenne est au fait du rapport auquel l'Honorable Parlementaire fait référence dans sa question. Dans les conclusions du Conseil «Affaires étrangères» sur le processus de paix au Moyen-Orient du 14 mai 2012, l'Union européenne a appelé Israël à respecter ses obligations concernant les conditions de vie des populations palestiniennes dans la zone C de la Cisjordanie, notamment en mettant fin à la démolition d'infrastructures et de logements palestiniens. Elle a également déclaré qu'elle attendait d'Israël qu'il protège les investissements de l'UE visant à soutenir le développement palestinien dans la zone C en vue d'une utilisation future. Ces questions sont également soulevées par l'Union européenne dans le cadre de son dialogue bilatéral avec Israël, en utilisant les instruments établis conformément à l'accord d'association EU-Israël. La Vice-présidente/Haute Représentante est très impliquée dans le dialogue avec le gouvernement d'Israël afin d'améliorer le système de planification actuel dans la zone C.

Pour ce qui est du troisième élément de la question de l'Honorable Parlementaire, la Commission renvoie à sa réponse à la question écrite E-000053/2012 concernant la destruction d'installations financées par l'Union européenne.

(English version)

**Question for written answer P-005425/12
to the Commission (Vice-President/High Representative)
Patrick Le Hyaric (GUE/NGL)
(30 May 2012)**

Subject: VP/HR — Destruction of EU-funded infrastructure in the West Bank

A report published by local and international humanitarian aid NGOs supervised by the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) has revealed that 620 structures were destroyed in the West Bank in 2011, 62 of which had been funded by the European Union. Almost all of these structures were in Area C of the West Bank, where Israel has civilian and security control, while 110 other structures are currently at risk.

According to the detailed list drawn up, the facilities destroyed concern basic food and water needs, including a large number of water cisterns, animal shelters, farm buildings, homes and even a road, all financed by seven countries (France, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Poland, Ireland, Spain and Sweden).

The structures at risk of being demolished in the near future include an electrical system for a village, a crèche, solar panels, a well, a medical centre, housing, water sanitation projects and, once again, water cisterns and two roads. In addition to the above countries, Germany, Belgium, Switzerland and Norway were also involved in these projects.

In total, over a period of 10 years from 2001 to 2011, the Commission estimates that the losses caused by the destruction of, or damage to, projects exceed EUR 49 million. Of this, the European Union provided EUR 29 million.

Is the Vice-President/High Representative aware of this OCHA-supervised report?

Has she called on the Israeli Government to put an end to the demolition of aid projects and civilian infrastructure?

Has she demanded that Israel rebuild all the EU-funded infrastructure which has been destroyed or damaged?

Has she been questioned by the Member States involved in the projects relating to the Israeli demolitions? What does she intend to do to protect the infrastructure at threat of destruction?

**Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission
(30 July 2012)**

The EU is aware of the report referred to in the Honourable Member's question. In the Foreign Affairs Council conclusions on the Middle East Peace Process of 14 May 2012 the EU called upon Israel to meet its obligations regarding the living conditions of the Palestinian population in Area C of the West Bank, including halting demolition of Palestinian housing and infrastructure. It also stated that it expects Israel to protect EU investments in support of Palestinian development in Area C for future use. These issues are also raised by EU in its bilateral dialogue with Israel by using the instruments established in conformity with the EU-Israel Association Agreement. The HR/VP is actively engaged in dialogue with the Government of Israel in order to improve the current planning system in Area C.

As regards the third element of the Honourable Member's question, the Commission would refer to its reply to previous Written Question E-000053/2012 on destruction of EU-funded projects.

(Nederlandse versie)

**Vraag met verzoek om schriftelijk antwoord E-005426/12
aan de Commissie
Marietje Schaake (ALDE)
(30 mei 2012)**

Betreft: Bevindingen van BEREC en EU-maatregelen inzake netneutraliteit

Op 29 mei 2012 heeft het Orgaan van Europese regelgevende instanties voor elektronische communicatie (BEREC) de resultaten gepubliceerd van zijn grondige onderzoek naar vraagstukken zoals belemmeringen bij het overstappen naar een andere aanbieder, het blokkeren of beperken van de snelheid van internetverkeer en de transparantie en kwaliteit van de dienstverlening. Op haar blog herneemt commissaris Kroes (¹) het standpunt van de Commissie dat transparantie en de mogelijkheid om over te stappen naar een andere aanbieder moeten volstaan om de netneutraliteit en de keuzevrijheid van de consument te garanderen. De cijfers die door BEREC worden voorgelegd, tonen echter aan wat velen al verwacht hadden: als de markt niet gereglementeerd wordt, is het in het belang van aanbieders van telecommunicatiediensten en ISP's om de snelheid van bepaalde gegevensstromen te beperken en bepaalde diensten te blokkeren. Om een open internet te garanderen, met alle economische en sociale voordelen die zulk internet biedt, moet de netneutraliteit in wetgeving gesloten worden.

1. Is de Commissie het ermee eens dat eerlijke mededingingsvooraarden waarbij alle aanbieders in de EU de mogelijkheid bieden om een abonnement te nemen op onbeperkte internettoegang tegen volledige snelheid, enkel gegarandeerd kunnen worden als deze verplichting wordt vastgelegd in telecommunicatiewetgeving van de EU? Indien niet, waarom niet?
2. Is de Commissie het ermee eens dat louter sturing ontoereikend is gebleken? Hoe zal de naleving van de bestaande richtsnoeren afgedwongen worden?
3. Zal de Commissie eveneens van aanbieders eisen dat zij de optie van een open internet betaalbaar houden voor het ruime publiek, om te vermijden dat de digitale kloof nog groter wordt?
4. Is de Commissie voornemens het gebruik van technologieën die naar alle waarschijnlijkheid aangewend zullen worden om de snelheid van bepaalde gegevensstromen te beperken, te verbieden? Indien niet, waarom niet?
5. Is de Commissie voornemens transparantie-eisen op te nemen in de wetgeving en een correcte tenuitvoerlegging daarvan door de lidstaten te verzekeren? Indien niet, kunnen aanbieders gedwongen worden om de transparantie-eisen na te leven als die niet in de wetgeving zijn vastgelegd?
6. Is de Commissie het ermee eens dat als zij niet onmiddellijk maatregelen treft, de lidstaten de resultaten van het BEREC-onderzoek zullen aanwenden om hun eigen wetten inzake netneutraliteit op te stellen, wat tot een bijzonder versnipperde Europese teleommekmarkt zou kunnen leiden? Als zij het daar niet mee eens is, waarom niet?

**Antwoord van mevrouw Kroes namens de Commissie
(4 juli 2012)**

Het regelgevingskader voor elektronische communicatie, zoals gewijzigd door het Europees Parlement en de Raad in 2009, omvat verscheidene elementen met betrekking tot netneutraliteit, waaronder inzake transparantie, die de lidstaten vorig jaar in nationale wetgeving moesten omzetten. De Commissie zal erop toezien dat deze naar behoren in nationale wetten worden omgezet en in de lidstaten ten uitvoer worden gelegd. In afwachting van de tenuitvoerlegging van deze nieuwe bepalingen is het nog te vroeg om te bepalen of er verdere wetgevende maatregelen nodig zijn. Eveneens op basis van de door het geachte Parlementslid vermelde bevindingen van BEREC is de Commissie echter van mening dat er sturing nodig is om mededinging te waarborgen en de consumenten in alle 27 lidstaten de keuze te bieden die zij verdienen. Het is voor de consument belangrijk een keuze te hebben tussen aanbiedingen en diensten van verschillende aanbieders en verschillende aanbiedingen met elkaar te kunnen vergelijken. Concurrentie en keuzevrijheid van de consument moeten internetdiensten betaalbaar maken. Het geachte Parlementslid heeft ook vragen bij het gebruik van technologieën om bepaalde gegevensstromen te beperken. De Commissie is van mening dat door het gebruik van zulke instrumenten geen inbraak mag worden gemaakt op de rechten van consumenten, waaronder het recht op privacy. Voorts zal de Commissie erop blijven toezien dat er geen versnippering van de digitale eengemaakte markt plaatsvindt, onder meer door haar nieuwe bevoegdheden uit hoofd van artikel 22, lid 3, van de universeledienstenrichtlijn aan te wenden.

(¹) <http://blogs.ec.europa.eu/neelie-kroes/netneutrality/>.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-005426/12
to the Commission
Marietje Schaake (ALDE)
(30 May 2012)**

Subject: BEREC findings and EU action on net neutrality

On 29 May 2012, the Body of European Regulators for Electronic Communications (BEREC) published the results of its rigorous fact-finding exercise on issues such as barriers to switching operators, blocking or throttling of Internet traffic, and transparency and quality of service. In her blog, Commissioner Kroes⁽¹⁾ reiterates the Commission's position that transparency and the ability to switch operators should be enough to preserve net neutrality and consumer choice. However, the figures presented by BEREC show what many people suspected: when the market is left unregulated, it is in the interests of telecom providers and ISPs to throttle certain data streams and block certain services. In order to preserve an open Internet, with all the economic and societal benefits it offers, net neutrality must be enshrined in law.

1. Does the Commission agree that the only way to ensure a level playing field where all EU providers offer the option to subscribe to full, unthrottled Internet access is to enshrine this obligation in EU telecommunications law? If not, why not?
2. Does the Commission agree that mere guidance has proved insufficient? How will the existing guidelines be enforced?
3. Will the Commission also require providers to keep the open Internet option affordable for the general public, to avoid widening the digital divide?
4. Will the Commission ban the use of technologies likely to be used to throttle certain data streams? If not, why not?
5. Does the Commission intend to transcribe transparency requirements into law and ensure proper implementation by the Member States? If not, can an operator be forced to adhere to transparency requirements if they are not regulated by law?
6. Does the Commission agree that, if it does not act immediately, Member States will use the results of the BEREC research to draw up their own net neutrality laws, which may lead to a very fragmented European telecom market? If it disagrees, what are its grounds for doing so?

**Answer given by Ms Kroes on behalf of the Commission
(4 July 2012)**

The electronic communications framework, as amended by the European Parliament and Council in 2009, includes various elements relating to net neutrality, including on transparency, which Member States had to transpose into national law last year. The Commission will ensure that these are properly transposed and implemented into national laws. Pending implementation of these new provisions, it is still too early to determine whether further legislative action is required. Nevertheless, the Commission believes, also on the basis of BEREC's findings mentioned by the Honourable Member, that guidance is needed to ensure competition and provide consumers with the choice they deserve across all 27 Member States. It is important for consumers to be able to have choice of offers and services from different providers and that they are able to compare between different offers. Competition and consumer choice should make Internet services affordable. The Honourable Member also asks regarding the use of technologies to throttle certain data streams. The Commission considers that the use of such tools should not infringe the rights of consumers, including the right to privacy. Moreover, the Commission will further ensure that there is no fragmentation in the Digital Single Market, amongst others by using its new powers under Article 22(3) of the Universal Service Directive.

⁽¹⁾ <http://blogs.ec.europa.eu/neelie-kroes/netneutrality/>.

(Version française)

Question avec demande de réponse écrite E-005427/12
à la Commission
Gaston Franco (PPE)
(30 mai 2012)

Objet: Rôle de l'Union européenne dans la Plateforme internationale sur la biodiversité et les services écosystémiques

La Plateforme internationale sur la Biodiversité et les services écosystémiques (IPBES) a été officiellement créée le 21 avril 2012 à Panama City. Elle a pour objectif de placer la préservation de la biodiversité et des écosystèmes au même rang des préoccupations des scientifiques et des gouvernements que la lutte contre le changement climatique. IPBES se présente d'ailleurs comme le pendant du GIEC (le Groupe d'experts intergouvernemental sur l'évolution du climat) pour la biodiversité.

Il semble aujourd'hui impératif de travailler sur les connaissances en matière de biodiversité car les données fiables manquent. La mise en réseau des centres de recherche aux niveaux local, national, européen et mondial apparaît par conséquent fondamentale. La réussite de la stratégie Biodiversité 2020 de l'Union européenne en dépend.

Quelle coopération la Commission compte-t-elle établir avec la plateforme IPBES, notamment s'agissant de BISE, le système d'information européen sur la biodiversité, ou de GMES, le programme européen de surveillance de la Terre?

L'Union européenne sera-t-elle membre à part entière d'IPBES?

Quel rôle politique ambitionnerait-t-elle de jouer dans ce cadre?

Réponse donnée par M. Potočnik au nom de la Commission
(10 juillet 2012)

Bien que l'UE ait figuré au rang des principaux promoteurs de la plateforme intergouvernementale scientifique et politique sur la biodiversité et les services écosystémiques (IPBES), et malgré l'accord conclu en 2010 sur la possibilité d'une adhésion des organisations d'intégration économique régionale (OIER), il s'est avéré impossible, au cours de la réunion finale instituant l'IPBES qui s'est tenue au Panama en avril 2012, de parvenir à un consensus international concernant le statut de membre à part entière de l'UE lors des plénières de l'IPBES. À l'heure actuelle, la possibilité d'une adhésion des OIER, et par conséquent de l'UE, fait toujours l'objet de discussions, avec pour objectif d'aboutir dès que possible à une décision. Jusqu'à ce que cette question soit tranchée, l'UE bénéficiera d'un statut d'observateur auprès de l'IPBES.

Dans le sillage des discussions sur l'adhésion qui se sont déroulées au Panama, l'UE a pour le moment suspendu son aide financière à l'IPBES. Plus généralement, le statut de non-adhérent de l'UE restreint sa capacité de participer aux travaux et aux activités de l'IPBES. Dès que l'UE deviendra membre à part entière de l'IPBES, elle apportera son expérience en matière d'interface science-politique au niveau régional.

Les structures régionales joueront un rôle important au sein de l'IPBES si cette dernière veut réussir à faire le lien entre les échelles locale, régionale et internationale en matière de gouvernance de la biodiversité. L'UE s'emploie d'ores et déjà à faire le lien entre science et politique en matière de biodiversité et de services écosystémiques sur la scène européenne, au moyen notamment du Système d'information européen sur la biodiversité (BISE) ainsi que de l'initiative pour la surveillance mondiale de l'environnement et de la sécurité (GMES). L'IPBES bénéficiera de ces actions.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-005427/12
to the Commission
Gaston Franco (PPE)
(30 May 2012)

Subject: Role of the European Union in the Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services

The Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services (IPBES) was officially set up on 21 April 2012 in Panama City. Its aim is to ensure that scientists and governments accord the same level of importance to the preservation of biodiversity and ecosystems as to combating climate change. IPBES is also putting itself forward as the biodiversity counterpart of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.

The lack of reliable data now makes it vital to work on biodiversity knowledge. The networking of research centres at local, national, European and global levels is therefore extremely important. The success of the European Union's Biodiversity 2020 strategy depends on it.

What sort of cooperation does the Commission intend to have with IPBES, particularly regarding the Biodiversity Information System for Europe and GMES, the European programme to monitor the earth?

Will the European Union be a full member of IPBES?

What political role would it like to play within this framework?

Answer given by Mr Potočnik on behalf of the Commission
(10 July 2012)

Despite the fact that the EU was one of the key supporters of IPBES, and despite the agreement in 2010 on the possibility of membership of regional economic integration organisations (REIOs), in the final meeting establishing the IPBES in Panama in April 2012 it proved impossible to forge international consensus on the full membership status of the EU in the IPBES plenary. At the present time, the possibility of membership for REIOs, and therefore that of the EU, remains under discussion with a view to resolution as soon as possible. Until the resolution of this discussion the EU will have an observer status at the IPBES.

The EU has ceased its financial support to the IPBES for the time being, as a result of the Panama outcome on membership. More broadly, the non-member status of the EU limits its ability to engage in the work and activities of IPBES. As soon as the EU becomes a full member of the IPBES, it will contribute its experience in the science-policy interface at regional level.

Regional structures will be an important element of the IPBES if it is to successfully link the local/national and global level of biodiversity governance. The EU is already committed to interfacing science and policy on biodiversity and ecosystem services in Europe, including the Biodiversity Information System for Europe (BISE) and the Global Monitoring for Environment and Security (GMES). This work will be of benefit to IPBES.

(Version française)

Question avec demande de réponse écrite E-005428/12
à la Commission
Gaston Franco (PPE)
(30 mai 2012)

Objet: Législation européenne sur les espèces envahissantes

La Commission pourrait-elle expliquer précisément l'articulation entre l'instrument législatif spécifique pour lutter contre les espèces envahissantes qu'elle compte proposer d'ici fin 2012 et le régime phytosanitaire communautaire qu'elle est sur le point de réviser?

Quels seront les champs de compétences respectifs de la direction générale de l'environnement et de la direction générale de la santé?

Réponse donnée par M. Potočnik au nom de la Commission
(10 juillet 2012)

Comme indiqué dans sa communication sur la stratégie de l'UE en faveur de la biodiversité à l'horizon 2020 (¹), la Commission met au point et établit un instrument législatif ad hoc concernant les espèces allogènes envahissantes pour fin 2012. Dans ce cadre, la Commission analyse tous les aspects concernés, y compris le champ d'application de la législation par rapport aux instruments existants, de même que le régime phytosanitaire et sa révision, en vue de combler le vide juridique existant et de garantir l'application univoque de la future législation.

^(¹) COM(2011) 244 final.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-005428/12

to the Commission

Gaston Franco (PPE)

(30 May 2012)

Subject: European legislation on invasive species

Can the Commission explain the exact link between the specific legislation it will propose by the end of 2012 for combating invasive species and the EU plant-health system that it is about to review?

What will be the respective remits of the Directorate-General for the Environment and the Directorate-General for Health and Consumers?

Answer given by Mr Potočnik on behalf of the Commission

(10 July 2012)

As outlined in the communication on an EU biodiversity strategy to 2020 (¹), the Commission is developing and drafting a dedicated legislative instrument on invasive alien species by the end of 2012. In this context the Commission is analysing all aspects including the scope of the legislation in relation to existing instruments, including the plant health regime and its review, with a view to closing the existing legislative gap and to ensure an unambiguous implementation of future legislation.

(¹) COM(2011) 244 final.

(Svensk version)

**Frågor för skriftligt besvarande E-005429/12
till kommissionen
Olle Ludvigsson (S&D)
(30 maj 2012)**

Angående: Mervärdesskatt för ideella organisationer

I oktober 2011 antog Europaparlamentet med bred majoritet ett betänkande i momsfrågan där det tydligt slogs fast att medlemsstaterna bör ges större flexibilitet att i de nationella regelverken tillämpa generella momsundantag riktade mot den ideella sektorn. Parlamentet betonade även att utökat manöverutrymme bör ges för länder som vill vidta specifika åtgärder för att minska den administrativa bördan för föreningarna.

Dessa synpunkter tog man från kommissionens sida ingen hänsyn till i det meddelande om översynen av momsdirektivet som presenterades i december 2011. Kommissionen deklarerade att man inte kan tänka sig en förändring av de existerande reglerna för ideella föreningar. Ett generellt momsundantag för den ideella sektorn – i stil med det som för närvarande finns i Sverige – skulle enligt kommissionen även fortsättningvis vara oförenligt med direktivet.

I slutsatserna från Ecofin-mötet den 15 maj 2012 uttryckte finansministrarna en önskan om att förtydliga momsreglerna för icke vinstdrivande organisationer. Denna nya markering går stick i stav med kommissionens position såsom den framställdes i meddelandet. Ministrarna förefaller inte vara nöjda med att inte göra några justeringar av momsregelverket för ideella föreningar. Tvärtom antyder ministrarna att förändringar är nödvändiga.

1. Vilken tolkning gör kommissionen av den del av dessa slutsatser som rör de icke vinstdrivande organisationerna?
2. Innebär finansministrarnas markering att kommissionen, trots meddelandet från december, nu ändå kommer att presentera förslag om förändringar i momsreglerna för ideella föreningar?
3. Är kommissionen – i det förändrade politiska läget efter Ecofin-mötet – beredd att gå Europaparlamentet till mötes och föreslå regler som tillåter att medlemsstaterna gör generella momsundantag för ideell sektor?

**Svar från Algirdas Šemeta på kommissionens vägnar
(21 juni 2012)**

I sina slutsatser om mervärdesskattens framtid av den 15 maj 2012 fastställde rådet att det finns en önskan att förtydliga reglerna för icke-statliga organisationer. Kommissionens tolkning av dessa slutsatser är att det behövs bättre vägledning om hur de mervärdesskatteregler som berör frivilligsektorn ska tolkas och tillämpas. Detta skulle kunna uppnås med hjälp av riktlinjer från mervärdesskattekommittén eller genom förklarande anmärkningar.

I rådets slutsatser uppmanas inte kommissionen att utarbeta något särskilt förslag till ändring av mervärdesskattereglerna för frivilligsektorn.

I linje med kommissionens meddelande om mervärdesskattens framtid (KOM(2011) 851 slutlig, punkt 5.2.1) bör det betonas att mervärdesskattedirektivet redan innehåller bestämmelser som medför en betydande lättnad av mervärdesskattebördan för icke-statliga organisationer.

1. Icke-statliga organisationers verksamhet omfattas till stor del av skattebefrielse i allmänhetens intresse enligt artikel 132 i mervärdesskattedirektivet.
2. För verksamhet som inte omfattas av dessa särskilda undantag undviker de flesta medlemsstater att beskatta icke-statliga organisationer genom att tillämpa allmänna system för skattebefrielse för små och medelstora företag.
3. För icke-statliga organisationer vars icke-skattebefriade omsättning överskrider ett sådant tröskelvärde finns det också möjlighet att införa förenklade förfaranden för att minska den potentiella administrativa bördan i samband med mervärdesbeskattning, till exempel schablonregler för mervärdesbeskattning.

Slutligen kan medlemsstaterna också införa riktade kompensationssystem, utanför mervärdesskattesystemet, för att lindra effekterna av mervärdesskatt på förvärv.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-005429/12
to the Commission
Olle Ludvigsson (S&D)
(30 May 2012)**

Subject: VAT on not-for-profit organisations

In October 2011, the European Parliament adopted, by a large majority, a report on the future of VAT which clearly stated that Member States should be given greater flexibility to generally exempt the not-for-profit sector from VAT in their national legislation. Parliament also stressed that countries wishing to take specific measures to ease the administrative burden on such organisations should be given greater room for manoeuvre.

The Commission did not take these views into account in its communication on the future of VAT, which was presented in December 2011. The Commission declared that it could not envisage any change to the existing rules governing not-for-profit organisations. According to the Commission, a general VAT exemption for the not-for-profit sector of the kind currently in place in Sweden would be incompatible with the directive.

In the conclusions of the Ecofin meeting of 15 May 2012, the finance ministers expressed a wish for clarification of the VAT rules governing non-profit-making organisations. This sends a new signal running counter to the Commission's position as set out in the communication. The ministers seem to be dissatisfied with the refusal to consider changes to the VAT regulatory framework governing not-for-profit organisations. On the contrary, they indicate that such changes are necessary.

1. How does the Commission interpret the part of these conclusions relating to not-for-profit organisations?
2. Does the request by the finance ministers mean, despite the December Communication, that the Commission will now put forward proposals for changes to the VAT rules for not-for-profit organisations?
3. Given the changed political situation since the Ecofin meeting, will the Commission meet the European Parliament half way and propose rules to allow Member States to make general VAT exemptions for the not-for-profit sector?

**Answer given by Mr Šemeta on behalf of the Commission
(21 June 2012)**

In its conclusions on the future of VAT of 15 May 2012 the Council 'acknowledged the desire to clarify the rules concerning NGOs'. The Commission's understanding of these conclusions is that there is a need for more guidance on how the VAT rules which are relevant for the non-profit-making sector should be interpreted and applied. This could be done through guidelines of the VAT Committee or through explanatory notes.

The Council conclusions do not invite the Commission to prepare a specific proposal amending the VAT rules on the non-profit making sector.

In line with the Commission's communication on the future of VAT (COM(2011) 851 final, bullet point 5.2.1) it must be stressed that the VAT Directive already provides for provisions to alleviate significantly the burden of VAT on NGOs.

1. Activities of NGOs are covered to a large extent by the tax exemptions in the public interest pursuant to Article 132 of the VAT Directive.
2. Regarding those activities which would not be covered by these specific exemptions, most Member States avoid taxation for most NGOs by making use of general SME exemption schemes.
3. For those NGOs whose non-exempt turnover would exceed such a threshold, there would also be a possibility to introduce simplified procedures to mitigate the potential administrative burden of VAT, such as flat-rate schemes, for charging and collecting VAT.

Finally, Member States can also introduce targeted compensation mechanisms, outside the VAT system, to alleviate the cost of VAT on acquisitions.

(Wersja polska)

**Pytanie wymagające odpowiedzi pisemnej P-005431/12
do Komisji
Janusz Władysław Zemke (S&D)
(30 maja 2012 r.)**

Przedmiot: Budowa autostrady A1 w województwie kujawsko-pomorskim w Polsce

Systematycznie interesuję się budową autostrady A1 w Polsce. Najdłuższy odcinek tej autostrady przebiega przez województwo kujawsko-pomorskie, a zakończenie tej inwestycji ma zasadnicze znaczenie dla poprawy bezpieczeństwa komunikacji i rozwoju regionu. Niezwykle ważna jest zatem solidna i terminowa budowa autostrady A1.

Proszę w związku z tym o informację, czy budowa tej autostrady w województwie kujawsko-pomorskim, zwłaszcza na odcinkach od Torunia do Kowala, przebiega zgodnie z przyjętym harmonogramem, a także, gdyby występowały w tym zakresie opóźnienia, proszę o konkretną informację, jakie są obecnie przyjęte terminy zakończenia budowy tej autostrady w województwie kujawsko-pomorskim.

**Odpowiedź udzielona przez komisarza Johanna Hahna w imieniu Komisji
(6 lipca 2012 r.)**

Pytanie Szanownego Pana Posła dotyczy dużego projektu 2010PL161PR030 „Budowa autostrady Toruń-Stryków”. Decyzja Komisji w sprawie współfinansowania tej inwestycji ze środków Funduszu Spójności została przyjęta w dniu 27 kwietnia 2011 r. Zgodnie z planem finansowym Fundusz Spójności ma udzielić w 2012 r. współfinansowania w wysokości 1,2 mld EUR.

Zgodnie z dokumentacją projektu przestawioną Komisji projekt jest podzielony na siedem zamówień na roboty budowlane. Trzy odcinki: Czerniewice (Toruń) – Odolion, Odolion – Brzezie i Brzezie – Kowal miały zostać zakończone do dnia 15 maja 2012 r. Realizacja czterech pozostałych odcinków, mianowicie: Kowal – Sójki, Sójki – Kotliska, Kotliska – Piątek i Piątek – Stryków, była przewidziana do dnia 30 kwietnia 2012 r.

Komisja skontaktowała się z władzami Polski, aby uzyskać bardziej szczegółowe informacje na temat aktualnego stanu rzeczy i będzie informować Szanownego Pana Posła bezpośrednio.

(English version)

Question for written answer P-005431/12

to the Commission

Janusz Władysław Zemke (S&D)

(30 May 2012)

Subject: Construction of the A1 motorway in the Kujawsko-Pomorskie province in Poland

I have an ongoing interest in the construction of the A1 motorway in Poland. The longest section of this motorway runs through the Kujawsko-Pomorskie province. It is essential to complete this investment in order to improve transport safety and regional development. The reliable and timely construction of the A1 motorway is therefore extremely important.

In connection with the above, I would like to ask whether the construction of the A1 motorway in the Kujawsko-Pomorskie province, in particular the sections between Toruń and Kowal, is progressing on schedule. If there have been any delays, I would like to ask for details of the current deadlines for completion of the construction of the motorway in this province.

Answer given by Mr Hahn on behalf of the Commission

(6 July 2012)

The Honourable Member's question concerns the major project 2010PL161PR030 'Construction of the motorway Torun-Strykow'. The Commission decision on co-financing this project by the Cohesion Fund was adopted on 27 April 2011. According to the financial plan, EUR 1.2 billion is intended to be co-financed by the Cohesion Fund in 2012.

According to the project documentation submitted to the Commission, the project is split into seven work contracts. Three sections Czerniewice (Toruń) — Odolion, Odolion — Brzezie and Brzezie — Kowal were supposed to be completed by 15 May 2012. Four other sections, namely Kowal-Sójki, Sójki-Kotliska, Kotliska-Piątek and Piątek-Stryków were foreseen to be implemented by 30 April 2012.

The Commission has contacted the Polish authorities to have more detailed information on the latest state of play and will inform the Honourable Member directly.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-005433/12
to the Commission
John Stuart Agnew (EFD)
(30 May 2012)**

Subject: Plastic bag use

What actual evidence is there that so-called 'single use' plastic carrier bags are, in reality, only used once — noting in particular the very substantial visual evidence that they frequently substitute quite satisfactorily for more costly, higher-grade waste disposal bags?

**Question for written answer E-005434/12
to the Commission
John Stuart Agnew (EFD)
(30 May 2012)**

Subject: Plastic bags: need for legal action

The Commission ordered an assessment report to consider the impact of different options for reducing the use of so-called 'single-use' plastic carrier bags. The study concluded that the scale of the problem caused by single-use plastic carrier bags varies from one Member State to another and did not examine the question of whether a legislative measure is needed at European level.

1. Are similar environmental problems caused by single-use plastic carrier bags in all Member States and, if not, will the Commission explain the differences?
2. Did the Commission assess the Member States' legal and practical ability to reduce the consumption of single-use plastic carrier bags?
3. What are the legal grounds for the European Union implementing a policy to reduce the use of single-use plastic carrier bags, when the problem actually only affects certain Member States?

**Joint answer given by Mr Potočnik on behalf of the Commission
(5 July 2012)**

The assessment of various options to reduce the environmental impacts of plastic carrier bags is still ongoing. The study that the Honourable Member is referring to is part of this assessment but it is not the only source of information.

In accordance with standard Commission practice, the potential environmental, economic and social costs and benefits of various policy options are being comprehensively assessed. Experiences made with initiatives in various Member States will also be analysed in this context, as will be questions related to the need for action at EU level.

A decision on a possible Commission initiative on plastic bags and its possible scope will be taken upon completion of this assessment process.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-005436/12
to the Commission
Roger Helmer (EFD)
(30 May 2012)**

Subject: Energy policy in Germany

1. Does the Commission know what percentage of German electricity generating capacity is currently based on coal?
2. Is it the case that Germany has a significant number of coal-fired power stations, especially in the former East Germany, which it would find difficult to close in terms of social, political and energy supply priorities?
3. What confidence does the Commission have that Germany will comply with the terms of the revised Large Combustion Plant Directive?

**Answer given by Mr Oettinger on behalf of the Commission
(12 July 2012)**

1. Based on the latest numbers from Eurostat (covering 2010), about 263 TWh of German electricity was produced from solid fuels⁽¹⁾. This number represents almost 42% of the gross electricity generation in Germany which in 2010 amounted to almost 630 TWh. Within the group of German electricity generated from solid fuels in 2010, lignite represented 55%, other bituminous coal stood at 37%, coking coal and anthracite contributed to 5% and 2.5% and the remaining share (0.5%) came from peat briquettes.
2. Member States have the basic responsibility for the choice of their energy mix. The motives for energy mix choices are not commented on by the Commission.
3. Directive 2010/75/EU⁽²⁾ on Industrial Emissions (IED) entered into force on 06/01/2011. This directive will replace Directive 2001/80/EC on the limitation of emissions of certain pollutants into the air from large combustion plants (LCP) as of 01/01/2016. From the same date, the IED will apply to existing combustion plants (for new plants it will apply from 07/01/2013). According to the available information, Germany will transpose the IED by the required deadline. The national law will afterwards be subject to conformity checking, and its practical implementation will also be closely followed up. At this stage the Commission cannot predict the level of compliance in terms of transposition and implementation.

⁽¹⁾ According to the combined Eurostat, IEA and UN Annual questionnaire, the group of solid fossil fuels contains the following products: 1) Hard Coal (including coking coal, anthracite and other bituminous coal); 2) Sub-Bituminous Coal; 3) Lignite/Brown Coal and 4) Peat.

⁽²⁾ Directive 2010/75/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 November 2010 on industrial emissions (integrated pollution prevention and control) (Recast) — OJ L 334, 17.12.2010.

(Versione italiana)

**Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta P-005437/12
alla Commissione
David-Maria Sassoli (S&D)
(30 maggio 2012)**

Oggetto: Deroga al patto di stabilità per comuni e province del nord Italia colpite dal terremoto

Le forti scosse di terremoto in Emilia Romagna e in altre regioni del nord Italia, avvenute nelle ultime due settimane, hanno causato molte vittime e ingenti danni alla popolazione, a numerose imprese locali, soprattutto di piccole e medie dimensioni, e al patrimonio artistico-culturale dell'intera area. Lo sciame sismico è sempre in corso e, di conseguenza, i danni a persone e cose potrebbero aumentare.

Ciò premesso, può la Commissione europea rispondere ai seguenti quesiti:

1. ritiene possibile attivare il fondo di solidarietà europeo per una risposta rapida ed efficace e per garantire gli interventi di emergenza, assistenza alle popolazioni colpite dal sisma e sostegno alle imprese e ai lavoratori?
2. Può concedere ai comuni e alle province del nord Italia colpite dal sisma una deroga al patto di stabilità per consentire loro di accedere alle risorse necessarie e già disponibili nei loro bilanci per interventi urgenti e necessari anche per la ripresa delle attività economiche e lavorative, nonché per la tutela del patrimonio culturale?

**Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta P-005438/12
alla Commissione
Patrizia Toia (S&D)
(30 maggio 2012)**

Oggetto: Deroga al patto di stabilità per comuni e province del nord Italia colpite dal terremoto

Le forti scosse di terremoto in Emilia Romagna e in altre regioni del nord Italia, avvenute nelle ultime due settimane, hanno causato molte vittime e ingenti danni alla popolazione, a numerose imprese locali, soprattutto di piccole e medie dimensioni, e al patrimonio artistico-culturale dell'intera area. Lo sciame sismico è sempre in corso e, di conseguenza, i danni a persone e cose potrebbero aumentare.

Ciò premesso, può la Commissione europea rispondere ai seguenti quesiti:

1. ritiene possibile attivare il fondo di solidarietà europeo per una risposta rapida ed efficace e per garantire gli interventi di emergenza, assistenza alle popolazioni colpite dal sisma e sostegno alle imprese e ai lavoratori?
2. Può concedere ai comuni e alle province del nord Italia colpite dal sisma una deroga al patto di stabilità per consentire loro di accedere alle risorse necessarie e già disponibili nei loro bilanci per interventi urgenti e necessari anche per la ripresa delle attività economiche e lavorative, nonché per la tutela del patrimonio culturale?

**Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta P-005439/12
alla Commissione
Silvia Costa (S&D)
(30 maggio 2012)**

Oggetto: Deroga al patto di stabilità per comuni e province del nord Italia colpite dal terremoto

Le forti scosse di terremoto in Emilia Romagna e in altre regioni del nord Italia, avvenute nelle ultime due settimane, hanno causato molte vittime e ingenti danni alla popolazione, a numerose imprese locali, soprattutto di piccole e medie dimensioni, e al patrimonio artistico-culturale dell'intera area. Lo sciame sismico è sempre in corso e, di conseguenza, i danni a persone e cose potrebbero aumentare.

Ciò premesso, può la Commissione europea rispondere ai seguenti quesiti:

1. ritiene possibile attivare il fondo di solidarietà europeo per una risposta rapida ed efficace e per garantire gli interventi di emergenza, assistenza alle popolazioni colpite dal sisma e sostegno alle imprese e ai lavoratori?

2. Può concedere ai comuni e alle province del nord Italia colpite dal sisma una deroga al patto di stabilità per consentire loro di accedere alle risorse necessarie e già disponibili nei loro bilanci per interventi urgenti e necessari anche per la ripresa delle attività economiche e lavorative, nonché per la tutela del patrimonio culturale?

Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta P-005450/12

alla Commissione

Andrea Cozzolino (S&D)

(30 maggio 2012)

Oggetto: Deroga al patto di stabilità per comuni e province nel Nord Italia colpiti dal terremoto

A seguito delle forti scosse di terremoto in Emilia Romagna e in altre regioni del Nord Italia avvenute nelle ultime due settimane che hanno causato molte vittime ed ingenti danni alla popolazione, a numerose imprese locali, soprattutto di piccole e medie dimensioni, e al patrimonio artistico-culturale dell'intera area e considerato che lo sciamo sismico è sempre in corso e che pertanto i danni a persone e cose potrebbero aumentare, può la Commissione far sapere:

1. se intende attivare il fondo di solidarietà europeo per una risposta rapida ed efficace e per garantire gli interventi di emergenza, assistenza alle popolazioni colpite dal sisma e sostegno alle imprese e ai lavoratori;
2. inoltre se intende concedere ai comuni e alle province del Nord Italia colpiti dal sisma una deroga al patto di stabilità per consentire loro di accedere alle risorse necessarie e già disponibili nei loro bilanci per interventi urgenti e necessari anche per la ripresa delle attività economiche e lavorative, nonché per la tutela del patrimonio culturale?

Risposta congiunta di Johannes Hahn a nome della Commissione

(2 luglio 2012)

1. La Commissione rinvia gli onorevoli deputati alla propria risposta cumulativa alle interrogazioni scritte E-005139/12, P-005189/12, E-005229/12, E-005257/12 ed E-005312/12 (¹).

2. Non compete alla Commissione concedere deroghe al Patto di stabilità nazionale che disciplina le relazioni fiscali tra i diversi livelli del governo nazionale poiché tale questione rientra nella responsabilità esclusiva delle autorità nazionali. Se però le interrogazioni degli onorevoli deputati si riferivano al Patto europeo di stabilità e di crescita, questo prevede che «se è stato dato seguito effettivo alla raccomandazione di cui all'articolo 126, paragrafo 7, del trattato sul funzionamento dell'Unione europea (TFUE) e si verificano eventi economici sfavorevoli imprevisti con importanti conseguenze negative per le finanze pubbliche dopo l'adozione di tale raccomandazione, il Consiglio può decidere, su raccomandazione della Commissione, di adottare una raccomandazione riveduta». Per tale motivo, monitorando da vicino l'attuazione della strategia di consolidamento di cui all'aggiornamento del programma di stabilità 2012 in vista della correzione del deficit eccessivo nel 2012, la Commissione e il Consiglio terranno conto dell'impatto economico e finanziario del tragico sisma che ha colpito l'Emilia Romagna.

(¹) <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/QP-WEB/home.jsp>

(English version)

**Question for written answer P-005437/12
to the Commission
David-Maria Sassoli (S&D)
(30 May 2012)**

Subject: Stability Pact exemption for municipalities and provinces hit by the earthquake in northern Italy

The violent earthquakes in Emilia-Romagna and other regions of northern Italy over the past two weeks have claimed many victims and caused huge losses for the population, numerous local businesses — especially SMEs — and the artistic and cultural heritage of the entire area. The earthquake swarm continues and there could therefore be further loss of life and damage to property.

1. Does the Commission think that the European Solidarity Fund could be mobilised to provide a quick and effective response comprising emergency action, assistance for people hit by the earthquakes and support for businesses and workers?
2. Could it grant an exemption from the Stability Pact to municipalities and provinces in northern Italy affected by the earthquakes, allowing them to access the necessary resources already available in their budgets for measures needed urgently, not least to enable economic activities and employment to resume, and to protect the cultural heritage?

**Question for written answer P-005438/12
to the Commission
Patrizia Toia (S&D)
(30 May 2012)**

Subject: Stability Pact exemption for municipalities and provinces hit by the earthquake in northern Italy

The violent earthquakes in Emilia-Romagna and other regions of northern Italy over the last two weeks have claimed many victims and caused immense damage to the population, numerous local businesses — especially SMEs — and the artistic and cultural heritage of the entire area. The earthquake swarm is continuing and could consequently lead to further loss of life and damage to property.

1. Does the Commission think that the European Solidarity Fund could be used to provide a quick and effective response comprising emergency operations, assistance to the earthquake victims, and support for businesses and workers?
2. Could it grant an exemption from the Stability Pact to municipalities and provinces in northern Italy affected by the earthquakes, allowing them to access the necessary resources already available in their budgets for measures needed urgently, not least to enable economic and work activities to resume and to protect cultural heritage?

**Question for written answer P-005439/12
to the Commission
Silvia Costa (S&D)
(30 May 2012)**

Subject: Stability Pact exemption for municipalities and provinces hit by the earthquake in northern Italy

The violent earthquakes in Emilia-Romagna and other regions of northern Italy over the past two weeks have claimed many victims and caused huge losses for the population, numerous local businesses — especially SMEs — and the artistic and cultural heritage of the entire area. The earthquake swarm is continuing and there could therefore be further loss of life and damage to property.

1. Does the Commission think that the European Solidarity Fund could be used to provide a quick and effective response comprising emergency action, assistance for people hit by the earthquakes and support for businesses and workers?
2. Could it grant an exemption from the Stability Pact for municipalities and provinces in northern Italy hit by the earthquakes, allowing them to access the necessary resources already available in their budgets for urgently needed measures, not least to enable economic activities and employment to resume, and to protect the cultural heritage?

**Question for written answer P-005450/12
to the Commission
Andrea Cozzolino (S&D)
(30 May 2012)**

Subject: Stability Pact exemption for municipalities and provinces hit by the earthquake in northern Italy

The violent earthquakes in Emilia-Romagna and other regions of northern Italy over the last two weeks have claimed many victims and caused substantial losses to the population, numerous local businesses — especially SMEs — and the artistic and cultural heritage of the entire area. The earthquakes persist and there could be further loss of life and damage to property.

Could the Commission answer the following:

1. Can the European Solidarity Fund be used to provide a quick and effective response and take emergency action to assist the people hit by the earthquakes and support businesses and workers?
2. Can it grant an exemption from the Stability Pact to municipalities and provinces in northern Italy hit by the earthquakes, to allow them to access the necessary resources already available in their budgets for urgent and necessary measures, so that economic and work activities can resume and cultural heritage be protected?

**Joint answer given by Mr Hahn on behalf of the Commission
(2 July 2012)**

1. The Commission would refer the Honourable Members to its joint answer to Written Questions E-005139/12, P-005189/12, E-005229/12, E-005257/12, and E-005312/12 (').
2. It is not the responsibility of the Commission to grant derogations from the Domestic Stability Pact, which governs fiscal relations between the different levels of the national government and as such falls under the exclusive responsibility of the national authorities. In the event that the Honourable Members' questions were instead referring to the European Stability and Growth Pact, this does foresee that '*if effective action has been taken in compliance with a recommendation under Article 126 (7) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) and unexpected adverse economic events with major unfavourable consequences for government finances occur after the adoption of that recommendation, the Council may decide, on a recommendation from the Commission, to adopt a revised recommendation*'. Therefore, in closely monitoring the implementation of the consolidation strategy set out in the 2012 Stability programme update towards the correction of the excessive deficit in 2012, the Commission and the Council will take account of the economic and budgetary impact of the tragic earthquake in Emilia Romagna.

(') <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/QP-WEB/home.jsp>

(Deutsche Fassung)

Anfrage zur schriftlichen Beantwortung E-005441/12
an die Kommission
Andreas Mölzer (NI)
(30. Mai 2012)

Betreff: Abbau der Ökostromförderung — Strafzölle für Solarmodule

Mitte Mai des Jahres hat sich die Kommission dafür ausgesprochen, dass die Förderprogramme der EU-Staaten für den Ausbau von Sonnen- und Windkraft so schnell wie möglich auslaufen sollen, da sich der Ausbau und vor allem die Marktreife erneuerbarer Energien wie der Sonnen- und Windkraft viel schneller entwickelt hätten als erwartet. Befürchtet wird anscheinend auch, dass die Kosten für den Ausbau erneuerbarer Energiequellen untragbar würden, wenn die Produzenten überkompensieren.

Fast zeitgleich hat das US-Handelsministerium Mitte Mai vorläufig einen neuen Strafzoll auf Einführen von chinesischen Solarmodulen eingeführt, während überprüft wird, ob die Chinesen ihre Produkte tatsächlich wegen staatlicher Beihilfen unter den Herstellungskosten anbieten können. In der Branche fallen die Preise seit etwa zwei Jahren derart, dass weltweit einige Firmen (beispielsweise Evergreen oder Solyndra in den USA und Solon, Solar Millenium oder Solahybrid in Europa) Insolvenz anmelden mussten. Im Gegenzug prüft nun Peking, ob die staatlichen Beihilfen für Hersteller von Windräder und für andere auf erneuerbare Energien spezialisierte Firmen in den USA nicht ein unzulässiges Handelshemmnis darstellen.

1. Wurden bei der Forderung der Kommission nach einer Beschränkung der Förderprogramme für erneuerbare Energie der ruinöse Preiskampf in dieser Branche und die (angesichts der beginnenden Insolvenzwelle) Gefahr bevorstehender potenzieller Preiserhöhungen (mit) berücksichtigt?
2. Welche Auswirkungen hätte die neue Strategie auf die Energiesicherheit der EU?
3. Welche Auswirkungen hätte die neue Strategie auf die EU-Ziele der Emissionsminderung?
4. Wie beurteilt die Kommission die Vorwürfe, dass die Chinesen bei Solarmodulen Dumpingpreise praktizieren?
5. Was ist hinsichtlich des US-chinesischen Handelskriegs bei Solarmodulen geplant?
6. Welche Auswirkungen werden diesbezüglich für Europa erwartet?

Antwort von Herrn Oettinger im Namen der Kommission
(17. Juli 2012)

1. Die Kommission hat zu Reformen der Förderprogramme aufgerufen, um sicherzustellen, dass erneuerbare Energie so kostensparend wie möglich erzeugt wird und dass Anreize erhalten werden, die Kosten niedrig zu halten. Bestimmte Technologien zur Nutzung erneuerbarer Energien erreichen zurzeit in einigen Teilen Europas Marktreife und nationale Förderregelungen wurden aus diesem Grund angepasst. Insbesondere der größer als erwartet ausgefallene Erfolg der Fotovoltaik-Technologie hat zu einer verstärkten Massenproduktion und entsprechend zu geringeren Kosten geführt. In diesem dynamischen Markt mit zunehmend internationalem Wettbewerb sind gewisse Anpassungen unvermeidlich, sie führen aber nicht automatisch zu höheren Energiepreisen.

2. Die kürzlich veröffentlichte Strategie der Kommission zur Förderung erneuerbarer Energieträger⁽¹⁾ soll einen Anstoß zur Diskussion über die erneuerbaren Energien im Zeitraum nach 2020 geben, mit dem deutlichen Signal, dass die Kommission für den europäischen Markt für erneuerbare Energien fortgesetztes Wachstum über das Jahr 2020 hinaus anstrebt. Bis zum Jahr 2020 und auch danach ist es wichtig, den effizienten Einsatz der zunehmend knapper werdenden Ressourcen zu forcieren, um erneuerbare Energien in Europa zu fördern und so weiter zur Verbesserung der Versorgungssicherheit beizutragen. Eine Integration der Märkte und Mechanismen der Zusammenarbeit sind Teil der Lösung.

⁽¹⁾ KOM(2012)271 endg.: Mitteilung der Kommission an das Europäische Parlament, den Rat, den Europäischen Wirtschafts- und Sozialausschuss und den Ausschuss der Regionen — Erneuerbare Energien: ein wichtiger Faktor auf dem europäischen Energiemarkt.

3. Die Strategie beinhaltet ausdrücklich, dass der politische Rahmen für erneuerbare Energien nach 2020 in Übereinstimmung mit anderen relevanten EU-Politikbereichen, einschließlich der Klimapolitik, ausgearbeitet werden muss. Daher muss die Kommission in jedem Fall jetzt damit beginnen, zu prüfen, welche Auswirkungen der politische Rahmen für erneuerbare Energien nach 2020 auf die Ziele zur Verringerung der Treibhausgasemissionen hat.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-005441/12
to the Commission
Andreas Möller (NI)
(30 May 2012)**

Subject: Waning support for ecological power generation — punitive tariffs on solar modules

In mid-May this year, the Commission stated that the subsidy programmes operating in EU Member States for the development of solar and wind energy should be wound down as soon as possible. This is because renewable energies such as solar and wind energy have developed and, above all, reached market maturity much more quickly than expected. There also seems to be a fear that the costs associated with the expansion of renewable energy sources would be unsustainable if producers were to be over-subsidised.

Also in mid-May, the US Department of Commerce provisionally introduced a new punitive customs tariff on Chinese solar modules while it verifies whether it is admissible for the Chinese to grant state aid with a view to selling their products at below cost price. Prices in the industry have been declining for about two years, to such an extent that a number of companies around the world (such as Evergreen or Solyndra in the US and Solon, Solar Millennium or Solahybrid in Europe) have been forced to file for insolvency. As a countermeasure, Beijing is now looking at whether state aid to manufacturers of wind turbines and other renewable energy companies in the US might constitute an unjustified obstacle to trade.

1. When the Commission called for restrictions to the subsidy programmes for renewable energies, did it take account of the ruinous price war in this sector and the imminent risk of potential price rises as a result of the incipient wave of insolvencies?
2. What is the possible impact of the new strategy on energy security in the EU?
3. What is the possible impact of the new strategy on the EU's emissions reduction targets?
4. What view does the Commission take of allegations of price dumping by China in respect of solar modules?
5. What action is envisaged regarding the US-Chinese trade war in solar modules?
6. What is the expected impact on Europe?

**Answer given by Mr Oettinger on behalf of the Commission
(17 July 2012)**

1. The Commission has called for reforms of subsidy programmes, in order to ensure that renewable energy is developed as cheaply as possible and that incentives are maintained to keep costs low. Certain renewable energy technologies are reaching market maturity in some parts of Europe and thus national support schemes have been adapted. The higher than expected uptake of photo voltaic technology in particular has led to increased production economies of scale and thus lower costs. In this dynamic market with increasing international competition, certain adjustments are unavoidable but do not forcibly result in higher energy prices.
2. The Commission's newly published Strategy for renewable energy (⁽¹⁾) aims to kick-start the debate on the post-2020 renewable energies era with a clear signal that the Commission wants Europe's renewable energy market to continue to grow beyond 2020. Up to 2020 and beyond, it is important to increase the efficient allocation of increasingly scarce resources to foster renewable energy in Europe and continue contributing to improving security of supply. Market integration and cooperation mechanisms are part of the solution.
3. The strategy is clear on the fact that the post-2020 renewable energy policy framework must be developed in conjunction with other relevant European policies, including climate policy. Thus, the impact of post-2020 renewable energy policy on greenhouse gas emissions targets is clearly something the Commission must now start to explore.

⁽¹⁾ COM(2012) 271 final: Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions — Renewable Energy: a major player in the European energy market.

(Deutsche Fassung)

Anfrage zur schriftlichen Beantwortung E-005442/12
an die Kommission
Andreas Möller (NI)
(30. Mai 2012)

Betreff: Nabucco-Alternative — Nabucco-West

Die Nabucco-Pipeline, welche Gas nach Europa bringen und somit die Unabhängigkeit von Russland garantieren sollte, wird anscheinend immer teurer. Die Kosten sollen sich von rund acht auf etwa 15 Mrd. EUR fast verdoppelt haben. Zudem sollen nach wie vor keine tragfähigen Gasverträge mit Aserbaidschan und Turkmenistan in Sicht sein.

Ende April dieses Jahres teilte der ungarische Energiekonzern MOL mit, dass die Finanzierung nicht vertretbar sei und MOL daher dem Haushalt für 2012 nicht zugestimmt habe. Mitte Mai machte auch der deutsche Energiekonzern RWE publik, dass ein Ausstieg aus dem Gaspipeline-Projekt in Erwägung gezogen wird.

Als Alternative ist dem Vernehmen nach eine kleinere Lösung Nabucco-West im Gespräch. Dabei würde das Gas von der bulgarisch-türkischen Grenze bis Österreich gefördert (statt des ursprünglich geplanten Beginns der Pipeline am Kaspischen Meer). Der Energieminister Aserbaidschans soll zudem mit der Türkei bereits Lieferverträge abgeschlossen haben (sozusagen eine Gaspipeline nach Europa ohne Nabucco).

1. Ist die ins Gespräch gebrachte Alternative „Nabucco-West“ aus Sicht der Kommission ausreichend, um die Energieunabhängigkeit Europas voranzubringen?
2. Wird/würde eine solche abgespeckte Lösung auf EU-Ebene ebenso gefördert wie das ursprüngliche Nabucco-Projekt?
3. Kann die Kommission bestätigen, dass Aserbaidschan tatsächlich bereits umfassende Lieferverträge mit der Türkei abgeschlossen hat?
4. Falls ja, wie bewertet die Kommission eine potenzielle Energieabhängigkeit von der Türkei?

Antwort von Herrn Oettinger im Namen der Kommission
(5. Juli 2012)

Nach den der Kommission vorliegenden Informationen sind die geschäftlichen Verhandlungen mit dem Konsortium Shah Deniz 2 noch im Gange. Das Nabucco-Projekt in seiner ursprünglichen Konzeption ist nach wie vor Gegenstand dieser Verhandlungen, obwohl der Projektträger auch eine verkürzte Alternative (mit Beginn an der bulgarisch-türkischen Grenze) vorgeschlagen hat.

1. Die Strategie des südlichen Gaskorridors zielt vor allem darauf ab, auf der gesamten Strecke zwischen den neuen Gaslieferanten und der EU ein zuverlässiges Gastransportsystem zu errichten. „Nabucco-West“ könnte für die weitere Gasverteilung auf EU-Gebiet ein nützliches Projekt sein, muss aber um eine zweckgebundene, rechtlich abgesicherte Gasleitung durch türkisches Gebiet ergänzt werden.
2. Auch ein solches kleineres Projekt stellt nach wie vor ein Element der transeuropäischen Energienetze (nach den TEN-E-Leitlinien⁽¹⁾) dar und verdient daher, von der EU gefördert zu werden. Wenn das Projekt weiter fortgeschritten ist, wird sich zeigen, in welchem Umfang öffentliche Unterstützung für seine erfolgreiche Umsetzung erforderlich ist.
3. Zwischen Aserbaidschan und der Türkei besteht ein Vertrag über Gaslieferungen aus der ersten Phase des Fördergebiets Shah Deniz, und das Gas wird bereits an die Türkei geliefert. Die Kommission geht davon aus, dass die Türkei weitere Gasmengen aus der zweiten Phase des Fördergebiets Shah Deniz beziehen will, ihr ist jedoch nicht bekannt, ob ein entsprechender Vertrag bereits unterzeichnet wurde.
4. Die Strategie des südlichen Gaskorridors zielt genau darauf ab, die potenzielle Energieabhängigkeit von Transitländern durch ein zweckgebundenes, rechtlich abgesichertes Leitungssystem zu verringern.

⁽¹⁾ Entscheidung Nr. 1364/2006/EG vom 6. September 2006 zur Festlegung von Leitlinien für die transeuropäischen Energienetze und zur Aufhebung der Entscheidung 96/391/EG und der Entscheidung Nr. 1229/2003/EG.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-005442/12
to the Commission
Andreas Möller (NI)
(30 May 2012)**

Subject: Nabucco West: an alternative to Nabucco

It would seem that the Nabucco pipeline, which was supposed to carry gas to Europe and guarantee independence from Russia, is becoming increasingly expensive. The costs are said to have almost doubled from around EUR 8 billion to around EUR 15 billion. In addition, there still seems to be no prospect of viable gas supply contracts being concluded with Azerbaijan or Turkmenistan.

In late April 2012, the Hungarian energy group MOL announced that the financial outlay on Nabucco was no longer justifiable and that it had therefore not approved the project's budget for 2012. In mid-May, German energy group RWE also issued a public statement indicating that it too was considering withdrawing from the gas pipeline project.

Reports indicate that a smaller-scale project, Nabucco West, is under discussion as an alternative. This would involve transporting gas to Austria from the Bulgarian-Turkish border (instead of building the pipeline from the Caspian Sea, as originally planned). What is more, Azerbaijan's energy minister has apparently already concluded supply agreements with Turkey (what might be termed a gas pipeline to Europe without Nabucco).

1. In the Commission's view, is the 'Nabucco West' alternative now under discussion enough to enhance Europe's energy independence?
2. Would/will a scaled-down project such as this receive the same support at EU level as the original Nabucco project?
3. Can the Commission confirm that Azerbaijan has in fact already concluded comprehensive supply contracts with Turkey?
4. If so, what view does the Commission take of a scenario involving EU energy dependence on Turkey?

**Answer given by Mr Oettinger on behalf of the Commission
(5 July 2012)**

According to the information available to the Commission, the commercial negotiations with the Shah Deniz 2 consortium are still ongoing and the Nabucco project, in its original design, is still part of the negotiations, even though its promoter also proposed a shorter alternative (starting on the Bulgarian-Turkish border).

1. The key objective of the Southern Gas Corridor strategy is to create a reliable gas transportation system all the way between new suppliers of gas and the EU. The 'Nabucco West' might be a useful project to further distribute the gas on the EU territory but it needs to be complemented with a dedicated pipeline across the territory of Turkey with a robust legal framework.
2. Such a scaled-down project is still an element of Trans-European Energy Networks (in line with the TEN-E Guidelines⁽¹⁾) and hence merits EU support. It remains to be seen, once the project is more advanced, what level of public support such a project will require to be successfully constructed.
3. There is a supply contract between Azerbaijan and Turkey concerning the gas from the first phase of the Shah Deniz field which is already being delivered to Turkey. The Commission also understands that Turkey intends to buy further volumes of gas from the second phase of the Shah Deniz field but the Commission does not know if a corresponding supply contract has already been concluded.
4. The Southern Gas Corridor is precisely about reducing the possibility of energy dependence on any transit country by means of a dedicated pipeline system with a robust legal framework.

⁽¹⁾ Decision No 1364/2006/EC of 6 September 2006 laying down guidelines for trans-European energy networks and repealing Decision 96/391/EC and Decision No 1229/2003/EC.

(Deutsche Fassung)

Anfrage zur schriftlichen Beantwortung E-005443/12
an die Kommission
Andreas Mölzer (NI)
(30. Mai 2012)

Betreff: Visafreiheit — Anstieg der Zahl von Asylwerbern

Menschen, die illegal in die EU einwandern, nutzen nicht nur die durchlässige griechisch-türkische Grenze oder versuchen ihr Glück über die Arabellion-Staaten Tunesien und Ägypten, vielfach werden auch legale Migrationskanäle missbraucht. Wie die Erfahrungen mit dem Balkan zeigen, wird die Visafreiheit nicht nur für Reisen in die EU genutzt, sondern setzt einen regelrechten Asyltourismus in Gang. Beispielsweise verzeichnete Deutschland einen Anstieg der Zahl serbischer Asylwerber um 700 %.

1. Sollte die Visafreiheit für die Türkei kommen, ist wohl eine weitere Welle von Scheinasylanten zu erwarten. Was wird in diesem Zusammenhang EU-weit unternommen?
2. Welche Maßnahmen werden auf EU-Ebene ergriffen, um einen mit der Visafreiheit einhergehenden Tourismus von Scheinasylanten zu unterbinden?
3. Wie steht die Kommission zur türkischen Forderung, hinsichtlich der Visafreiheit „gleich und fair wie andere EU-Kandidaten“ behandelt zu werden?

Antwort von Frau Malmström im Namen der Kommission
(19. Juli 2012)

Die Kommission beabsichtigt, auf den Antrag der Türkei auf Aufhebung der Visumpflicht für ihre Bürger gemäß dem Konzept zu reagieren, das der Rat der Europäischen Union in seinen Schlussfolgerungen vom 21. Juni 2012 „über die Entwicklung der Zusammenarbeit mit der Türkei im Bereich Justiz und Inneres“ angenommen hat. Die Kommission geht davon aus, dass die EU mit diesem Ansatz in der Lage sein sollte, die von dem Herrn Parlamentsabgeordneten in seiner Anfrage beschriebenen Phänomene zu verhindern.

Hinsichtlich des allgemeinen Risikos eines Missbrauchs der Visumbefreiung wird darauf hingewiesen, dass die Kommission im Mai 2011 einen Vorschlag für eine Änderung der Verordnung des Rates (EG) Nr. 539/2001 vorgelegt hat, der unter anderem einen Mechanismus zur Aussetzung der Visumbefreiung vorsah. Dieser Mechanismus ermöglicht die schnelle, befristete Aufhebung der Befreiung von der Visumpflicht für ein in der Positivliste geführtes Drittland in Notlagen, in denen eine dringliche Reaktion erforderlich ist, um Schwierigkeiten von Mitgliedstaaten zu beheben. Als ein Kriterium für die Auslösung dieses Mechanismus hat die Kommission „einen plötzlichen Anstieg der Zahl der Asylanträge von Staatsangehörigen eines in Anhang II aufgeführten Drittlandes, für die die Anerkennungsrate bei Asylanträgen im vorangehenden Sechsmonatszeitraum weniger als 3 % betrug, um mindestens 50 % im Vergleich zu diesem Sechsmonatszeitraum“ vorgeschlagen. Dieser Vorschlag wird derzeit noch im Europäischen Parlament beraten, um so bald wie möglich eine Einigung in erster Lesung zu erreichen.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-005443/12
to the Commission
Andreas Mölzer (NI)
(30 May 2012)**

Subject: Visa-free travel — increase in the number of asylum-seekers

People who enter the EU illegally not only use the permeable Greek-Turkish border, or try their luck by crossing from the Arab Revolution countries Tunisia and Egypt, but often also abuse legal migration channels. As experience with the Balkans has shown, visa-free travel is not just used for travel to the EU, but is now also encouraging a genuine industry in asylum tourism. Germany, for example, has recorded a 700% increase in the number of Serbian asylum-seekers.

1. If visa-free travel is also offered to Turkey, we can expect a further wave of bogus asylum-seekers. What steps are being taken on an EU-wide basis in this context?
2. What action is being taken at EU level to prevent this kind of bogus asylum-seeker tourism in connection with visa-free travel?
3. What is the Commission's position in relation to Turkey's demand for 'equal and fair treatment with other EU candidates' in respect of visa-free travel?

**Answer given by Ms Malmström on behalf of the Commission
(19 July 2012)**

The Commission intends to address Turkey's request to have visa obligations for its citizens lifted in coherence with the approach indicated by the Council of the European Union through its conclusions adopted on 21 June 2012 'on developing cooperation with Turkey in the areas of Justice and Home Affairs'. By following this approach, the Commission expects that the EU should be able to prevent the phenomena described by the Honourable Member in his question.

As regards the risks of misuse of the visa-free regime in general, attention is drawn to the fact that in May 2011 the Commission put forward a proposal for modification of Council Regulation (EC) No 539/2001 which provided, *inter alia*, for a visa suspension mechanism. This mechanism allows the rapid, temporary suspension of the visa waiver for a third country on the positive list in case of an emergency situation, where an urgent response needs to be given to solve the difficulties faced by Member States. Amongst the triggering criteria for this mechanism, the Commission proposed 'a sudden increase of at least 50%, over a six month period, in comparison with the previous six month period, in the number of asylum applications from the nationals of a third country listed in Annex II for which the recognition rate of asylum applications was less than 3% over that previous six month period'. This proposal is still being discussed with the European Parliament with the aim of reaching a first reading agreement as soon as possible.

(Wersja polska)

**Pytanie wymagające odpowiedzi pisemnej E-005444/12
do Komisji (Wiceprzewodniczącej/Wysokiej Przedstawiciel)
Lidia Joanna Geringer de Oedenberg (S&D)
(30 maja 2012 r.)**

Przedmiot: Wiceprzewodnicząca/Wysoka Przedstawiciel – zwrot zamkniętej strefy Famagusty jej prawowitym mieszkańcom

W dniu 14 lutego 2012 r. Parlament przyjął oświadczenie pisemne w sprawie zwrotu zamkniętej strefy Famagusty jej prawowitym mieszkańcom⁽¹⁾. Oświadczenie to stanowi wyraźny sygnał wskazujący na to, że kwestia Famagusty i jej zwrotu prawowitym mieszkańcom nie zostanie zapomniana.

Jakie działania następcze zamierza podjąć Europejska Służba Działań Zewnętrznych w związku z tym oświadczeniem pisemnym?

**Odpowiedź udzielona przez komisarza Štefana Fülego w imieniu Komisji
(13 lipca 2012 r.)**

Znalezienie porozumienia w sprawie zwrotu zamkniętej strefy Famagusty jej prawowitym właścicielom leży w gestii przywódców obu społeczności w ramach prowadzonych pod auspicjami Narodów Zjednoczonych rozmów dotyczących rozwiązania tego problemu. Komisja podkreśliła przy wielu okazjach pilną potrzebę znalezienia kompleksowego rozwiązania kwestii cypryjskiej. Jest to najszybszy oraz najbardziej bezpośredni sposób rozwiązania problemów związanych z kwestią cypryjską, w tym dotyczących zwrotu zamkniętej strefy Famagusty jej prawowitym właścicielom. Zjednoczenie Cypru i zakończenie tego czterdziestoletniego konfliktu na terytorium Europy leży we wspólnym interesie UE.

⁽¹⁾ Teksty przyjęte, P7_TA(2012)0039.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-005444/12
to the Commission (Vice-President/High Representative)
Lidia Joanna Geringer de Oedenberg (S&D)
(30 May 2012)**

Subject: VP/HR — Return of the sealed-off section of Famagusta to its lawful inhabitants

On 14 February 2012 Parliament adopted a written declaration on the return of the sealed-off section of Famagusta to its lawful inhabitants⁽¹⁾. This declaration sends a clear message that Famagusta, and the right of return of its lawful inhabitants, will not be forgotten.

What follow-up action does the European External Action Service intend to take on this written declaration?

**Answer given by Mr Füle on behalf of the Commission
(13 July 2012)**

It is for the leaders of the two communities, in the framework of the settlement talks under UN auspices, to find an agreement on the return of property in Famagusta to its lawful owners. The Commission stressed on several occasions the urgent need to reach a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus issue. This is the quickest and most direct way to solving the problems related to the Cyprus issue including the return of property in Famagusta to its legitimate owners. It is in the common EU interest to see the reunification of Cyprus and to bring an end to this 40-year-old conflict on European soil.

⁽¹⁾ Texts adopted, P7_TA(2012)0039.

(Versión española)

**Pregunta con solicitud de respuesta escrita E-005445/12
a la Comisión
Ramon Tremosa i Balcells (ALDE)
(30 de mayo de 2012)**

Asunto: Consecuencias de la falsedad en las cuentas bancarias

Se ha hecho público que el banco español BFA, matriz de Bankia, ha tenido pérdidas en 2011 por valor de más de 7 000 millones en el año 2011. Esta cifra contrasta sobremanera con las ganancias anunciadas en el pasado mes de febrero, con el visto bueno del Banco de España, que se han confirmado falsas.

Esta falsedad en la exposición de la realidad del balance para el año 2011 significa un gran perjuicio para la entidad, que más allá de un problema de solvencia, tiene también un grave problema de confianza de cara a los mercados y la sociedad en general.

El auditor de BFA Deloitte conocía ya estas pérdidas desde el mes de noviembre del año pasado y, según parece, fueron los altos ejecutivos de Bankia-BFA quienes impidieron su publicación.

— ¿Piensa la Comisión proponer una directiva marco, con el fin de asegurar que la falsedad en las cuentas tenga consecuencias jurídicas y/o judiciales para los implicados?

— ¿Qué consecuencias cree la Comisión que puede haber tenido esta falsedad en las cuentas de BFA y Bankia para el conjunto del sistema bancario español y para la confianza del país a nivel internacional?

**Respuesta del Sr. Barnier en nombre de la Comisión
(23 de julio de 2012)**

La Comisión no está en condiciones de comentar las cifras presentadas por el BFA. No obstante, según la información publicada, el auditor de las cuentas de Bankia, Deloitte, se ha negado a firmar los estados financieros correspondientes a 2011.

De acuerdo con la legislación nacional y de la UE vigente, el Consejo de Administración es responsable de la elaboración y la publicación de los estados financieros, que en la mayoría de los casos se someten a auditoría. Los auditores tienen que aportar una garantía positiva de que los estados financieros se han presentado de conformidad con los requisitos de contabilidad pertinentes. Tanto por lo que respecta a la dirección como a las empresas de auditoría, la legislación nacional y europea vigente prevé sanciones adecuadas en caso de que se compruebe que la información transmitida es incorrecta u objeto de fraude.

En noviembre de 2011, la Comisión adoptó una propuesta global para modificar los requisitos de las auditorías legales, en particular con el fin de mejorar la calidad y la transparencia de las auditorías y de aclarar la responsabilidad y la obligación de rendir cuentas de los auditores. Esta propuesta está siendo actualmente examinada por los colegisladores, con vistas a la adopción de un acuerdo previsto para 2013.

Además, la Comisión está considerando adoptar un plan de acción sobre derecho de sociedades y gobierno corporativo en el otoño de 2012, con el fin de mejorar, en particular, el papel de los accionistas por lo que respecta a las estrategias de las empresas y a la transmisión de información. Como parte del plan de acción, se analizarán las maneras de mejorar los sistemas de gobierno corporativo de las empresas que cotizan en bolsa, tanto en el sector financiero como en el no financiero, y se propondrán posibles actuaciones.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-005445/12
to the Commission
Ramon Tremosa i Balcells (ALDE)
(30 May 2012)**

Subject: Consequences of false accounting by banks

It has been announced that the Spanish bank BFA, the parent company of Bankia, suffered losses totalling more than EUR 7 000 million in 2011. This figure contrasts sharply with the profits announced in February 2012 — and approved by the Bank of Spain — which have now been confirmed as false.

This falsehood in the 2011 balance sheet statement has seriously damaged the bank, which, in addition to its solvency problems, is also suffering from a serious loss of trust on the markets and by society in general.

BFA's auditor Deloitte knew about the losses in November 2011: however it seems Bankia-BFA's senior executives prevented their publication.

- Does the Commission intend to propose a framework directive to ensure that false accounting has legal and/or judicial consequences for those involved?
- What consequences does the Commission believe that this falsifying of Bankia and BFA accounts may have for the entire Spanish banking system and for confidence in the country internationally?

**Answer given by Mr Barnier on behalf of the Commission
(23 July 2012)**

The Commission is not in a position to comment on the figures presented by BFA. However, according to publicly available information, the auditor of Bankia's accounts, Deloitte, has refused to sign off on the 2011 financial statements.

Under existing national and EC law, the Board of Directors is responsible for the preparation and publication of financial statements, which in most cases are subject to audit. Auditors have to provide positive assurance that the financial statements are presented in conformity with the relevant accounting requirements. For both the management and the audit firms, existing national and European law provides for appropriate sanctions in case the information communicated proves to be incorrect or subject to fraud.

In November 2011, the Commission adopted a comprehensive proposal to modify the requirements for statutory audits in particular with a view to improve the quality and transparency of audits and to clarify the responsibility and accountability of auditors. This proposal is now being examined by the co-legislators, for an agreement foreseen in 2013.

Moreover, the Commission is intending to adopt an action plan on company law and corporate governance in autumn 2012, with the aim of improving in particular the role of shareholders as regards companies' strategies and the flow of information. The Action plan will consider ways of how to improve corporate governance systems for listed companies in the financial and non-financial sector and suggest possible actions.

(Versión española)

**Pregunta con solicitud de respuesta escrita E-005446/12
a la Comisión**

Ramon Tremosa i Balcells (ALDE)

(30 de mayo de 2012)

Asunto: Avales estatales al sector bancario

Debido la situación del sector bancario español, el Gobierno español ha seguido en los últimos años una política de aval público a las emisiones de deuda privada de la banca española. Estos avales se han incrementado mucho en los últimos meses (desde diciembre han aumentado un 35 %) y ya tienen un valor de 133 000 millones de euros. De este incremento reciente, la inmensa mayoría ha ido destinada al Banco Financiero y de Ahorros —la matriz de Bankia (15 000 millones de euros)— y al resto de entidades en las que ha entrado el FROB (Fondo de Reestructuración y Ordenación Bancaria): Catalunya Banc, Banco CAM y Nova Galicia. En lo que va de año 2012, el Estado ha avalado 22 nuevas emisiones de deuda privada bancaria que afectan a 10 entidades. El tipo de interés nominal que se aplica a este tipo de operaciones se sitúa entre el 4 % y el 5 %.

Además, el Gobierno ha ampliado el programa de avales de este año hasta los 196 043 millones de euros, cantidad cercana al 20 % del PIB del Estado español (¹).

1. ¿Tiene conocimiento la Comisión de los datos aquí relatados?
2. ¿Pensa la Comisión que estos avales deberían incluirse en el cálculo del nivel de deuda pública del Estado español?

Respuesta del Sr. Rehn en nombre de la Comisión

(7 de agosto de 2012)

La Comisión aprobó en febrero de 2012 la introducción de un nuevo régimen de avales de deudas (en lo sucesivo denominado «el régimen») por reunir este las condiciones consideradas compatibles con el mercado interior de conformidad con el artículo 107, apartado 3, letra b), del Tratado de Funcionamiento de la Unión Europea. El régimen anterior («el régimen original») y sus cinco prórrogas posteriores fueron aprobados por la Comisión en el período de diciembre de 2008 a mayo de 2011. El régimen original expiró en diciembre de 2011 y se sustituyó por el régimen en enero de 2012, el cual se ha prorrogado hasta el 31 de diciembre de 2012.

Hasta el 31 de diciembre de 2011, los avales estatales al amparo del régimen original ascendieron a aproximadamente 70 000 millones de euros (el 48 % del límite acordado de 147 000 millones de euros). Al amparo del nuevo régimen, se han avalado 33,7 millones de euros (el 33,7 % del presupuesto del régimen), lo que cubre 23 emisiones de deuda de 11 entidades bancarias (a 13 de junio de 2012).

Estos avales constituyen pasivo contingente para el Estado español. Como tales, solo se contabilizan en la deuda y el déficit públicos de España si se recurre a ellos, lo que no ha sucedido hasta ahora.

(¹) <http://www.elconfidencial.com/economia/2012/05/29/la-banca-atrapa-al-estado-con-mas-de-133000-millones-en-avales-publicos-98890/>.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-005446/12
to the Commission**

Ramon Tremosa i Balcells (ALDE)

(30 May 2012)

Subject: State guarantees for the banking sector

Owing to the situation in Spain's banking sector, the Spanish Government has been implementing over the past few years a policy of State guarantees for Spanish banks' private debt issuances. These guarantees have increased greatly in recent months (by 35% since December 2011), and now have a value of EUR 133 000 million. Most of this recent increase in guarantees concerns Banco Financiero y de Ahorros (BFA) — the parent company of Bankia (EUR 15 000 million) — and the other institutions in which the FROB Bank Restructuring Fund has intervened: Catalunya Banc, Banco CAM and Nova Galicia. So far in 2012, the State has guaranteed 22 new banking private debt issuances that affect 10 institutions. This type of operation is subject to a nominal interest rate of between 4% and 5%.

Furthermore, the Government has extended the guarantee programme for this year to EUR 196 043 million, an amount close to 20% of Spain's GDP (¹).

1. Is the Commission aware of the facts reported here?
2. Does it believe that these guarantees should be included in Spain's public debt calculation?

Answer given by Mr Rehn on behalf of the Commission

(7 August 2012)

The Commission approved the introduction of a new debt guarantee scheme ('the Scheme') in February 2012, as it fulfils the conditions considered compatible with the internal market pursuant to Article 107(3)(b) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. The earlier scheme ('the Original Scheme') and its subsequent five prolongations were approved by the Commission in the period of December 2008-May 2011. The Original Scheme expired in December 2011 and was replaced by the Scheme in January 2012, which has been prolonged until 31 December 2012.

Up to 31 December 2011, State guarantees under the Original Scheme amounted to around EUR 70 billion (48% of the agreed ceiling of EUR 147 billion). Under the new Scheme, EUR 33.7 billion (33.7% of the budget of the Scheme) have been guaranteed so far covering 23 debt issuances of 11 banking entities (as of 13 June 2012).

Those guarantees constitute contingent liabilities for the Spanish State. As such, they only enter Spain's public deficit and debt if they are called. So far, that has not been the case.

(¹) <http://www.elconfidencial.com/economia/2012/05/29/la-banca-atrapa-al-estado-con-mas-de-133000-millones-en-avales-publicos-98890/>.

(Nederlandse versie)

Vraag met verzoek om schriftelijk antwoord E-005448/12
aan de Commissie
Ivo Belet (PPE)
(30 mei 2012)

Betreft: Import van Chinese zonnepanelen in de Europese Unie

In de Verenigde Staten heeft het US Department of Commerce onlangs invoerrechten van 31 tot 250 procent opgelegd aan Chinese zonnepanelen. Het Department of Commerce is van mening dat er sprake is van dumping, waarbij Chinese zonnepanelen op de Amerikaanse markt worden gebracht tegen prijzen die ver onder de productiekosten liggen. Dit is het gevolg van de hoge overheidssteun die de Chinese producenten van zonnepanelen van de Chinese overheid ontvangen.

De Europese markt wordt gekenmerkt door een gelijkaardig probleem. Europese producenten dreigen uit de markt te worden geconcurrererd door de gesubsidieerde Chinese zonnepanelen. Het Europees Parlement keurde op woensdag 23 mei een resolutie goed over een mogelijk handelsonevenwicht tussen de EU en China, waarin ze de Europese Unie oproept om handelsbeschermingsinstrumenten — zoals antidumpingsmaatregelen — aan te wenden wanneer China zich schuldig maakt aan illegale handelspraktijken.

In haar antwoord op vraag E-002969/2012 stelde de Commissie dat ze de wettelijke plicht heeft een onderzoek te openen indien ze een klacht ontvangt van de sector en er voldoende bewijsmateriaal beschikbaar is.

In de sector bestaat er echter een zekere terughoudendheid om een klacht in te dienen bij de Europese Commissie. In de Europese koepel van producenten zijn immers ook Chinese bedrijven vertegenwoordigd. Daarnaast hebben een heel aantal Europese bedrijven ook activiteiten in China. Individuele bedrijven vrezen repercussies wanneer ze een klacht zouden indienen.

Daarnaast bestaat er ook twijfel over de kwaliteit van de Chinese zonnepanelen. Zo zouden niet alle panelen in overeenstemming zijn met de Europese normen en standaarden, hoewel ze voorzien zijn van een vals CE keurmerk („Chinese export”).

Gebruikersorganisaties waarschuwen hun klanten dan ook en vragen naar een klachteninstantie voor gedupeerden.

1. Is de Commissie op de hoogte van de mogelijk bedenkelijke kwaliteit van de Chinese zonnepanelen?
2. Welke maatregelen plant de Commissie te ondernemen om een minimale kwaliteit te verzekeren en klachten van gebruikers te behandelen?
3. Is de Commissie bereid om op eigen initiatief een onderzoek te starten naar eventuele illegale handelspraktijken van de Chinese overheid wat de export van zonnepanelen naar de Europese Unie betreft en welke stappen zou ze hiertegen ondernemen indien blijkt dat er wel degelijk sprake is van oneerlijke handel?

Antwoord van de heer De Gucht namens de Commissie
(4 juli 2012)

1. De Commissie beschikt niet over bewijzen van de vermeende kwaliteitsproblemen met in China geproduceerde zonnepanelen.
2. Alle producten die in de EU in de handel worden gebracht, ongeacht of deze zijn ingevoerd of in de EU zijn geproduceerd, moeten aan de toepasselijke wettelijke voorschriften voldoen. Wat de kwestie van de CE-markering betreft, zijn de desbetreffende instanties van elke EU-lidstaat (bijvoorbeeld de douane- of de markttoezichtsautoriteiten) bevoegd voor de handhavingsprocedures.
3. Tot een beslissing is genomen om een onderzoek te openen, bevestigt noch ontket de Commissie dat zij een klacht heeft ontvangen. Dat is volledig in overeenstemming met haar WTO-verplichtingen. De Commissie kan slechts ambtshalve een onderzoek openen wanneer zij over voldoende voorlopig bewijsmateriaal beschikt dat er sprake is van dumping die de producenten in de Unie schade berokkent. Momenteel werd ten aanzien van dit product geen onderzoek geopend (noch ingevolge een klacht, noch ambtshalve).

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-005448/12
to the Commission
Ivo Belet (PPE)
(30 May 2012)**

Subject: Import of Chinese solar panels to the European Union

The US Department of Commerce has recently imposed import duties ranging from 31 to 250% on Chinese solar panels. The Department of Commerce believes that, as Chinese solar panels are sold on the American market at prices far below production costs, this constitutes dumping. This is the result of the large subsidies which Chinese solar panel manufacturers receive from the Chinese Government.

A similar problem is also characteristic of the European market: European manufacturers are in danger of being pushed out of the market by subsidised Chinese solar panels. On Wednesday, 23 May 2012 the European Parliament adopted a resolution on a possible trade imbalance between the EU and China, in which it calls on the European Union to make use of trade protection instruments — such as anti-dumping measures — if China is guilty of engaging in illegal trade practices.

In its answer to Question E-002969/2012 the Commission stated that it was legally obligated to initiate an investigation if it received a complaint from the industry and there was sufficient evidence available.

There is, however, a certain reluctance in the industry to complain to the European Commission. After all, Chinese companies are also represented within the European umbrella organisation for manufacturers. In addition, a good many European companies are also active in China. Individual companies fear repercussions if they were to complain.

There are also doubts as to the quality of Chinese solar panels. Allegedly, not all panels comply with European norms and standards, even though they bear a fake CE hallmark ('Chinese export').

This is why consumer organisations are warning their clients and are calling for a complaints procedure for victims.

1. Is the Commission aware of the possibly dubious quality of Chinese solar panels?
2. What measures is the Commission planning to take to ensure a minimum level of quality and to deal with complaints from consumers?
3. Is the Commission prepared to launch, on its own initiative, an investigation into possible illegal trade practices by the Chinese authorities in connection with the export of solar panels to the European Union, and what steps would it take against such practices if it were revealed that unfair trade was indeed taking place?

**Answer given by Mr De Gucht on behalf of the Commission
(4 July 2012)**

1. The Commission does not have evidence of alleged quality issues of solar panels produced in China.
2. All products put on the market in the EU, whether imported or domestically produced, need to comply with applicable legal requirements. Regarding the question of CE marking, enforcement procedures lie with the Competent Authorities of each EU Member State (e.g. customs or market surveillance authorities).
3. The Commission does not confirm nor deny the receipt of a complaint until a decision is taken to initiate an investigation. This is fully in line with its WTO obligations. The Commission can only initiate an investigation ex officio when it has sufficient *prima facie* evidence of dumping which causes injury to producers in the Union. Currently, no investigation on this product has been launched (neither upon complaint nor ex officio).

(Ελληνική έκδοση)

Ερώτηση με αίτημα γραπτής απάντησης E-005449/12
προς την Επιτροπή
Nikolaos Chountis (GUE/NGL)
(30 Μαΐου 2012)

Θέμα: Μέτρα για την αντιμετώπιση των καταστροφικών συνεπειών της χαλαζόπτωσης στη Θεσσαλία και σε άλλες περιοχές της Ελλάδας

Έντονη χαλαζόπτωση στις 26 και 27 Μαΐου του 2012 προκάλεσε στην περιοχή της Θεσσαλίας τεράστιες καταστροφές σε περισσότερα από 200 000 στρέμματα με καλλιέργειες βαμβακιού, σιτηρών και καλαμποκιού, κηπευτικών και άλλων ειδών, ενώ σοβαρές είναι και οι επιπτώσεις σε καλλιέργειες της Λαμίας, της Πιερίας και του Έβρου.

Με δεδομένη τη σοβαρότητα των ζημιών και τη δύσκολη οικονομική κατάσταση στην οποία έχουν περιέλθει οι παραγωγοί, ερωτάται η Επιτροπή:

1. Έχει λάβει η Επιτροπή επίσημη πληροφόρηση από τις αρμόδιες ελληνικές αρχές σχετικά με τις ανωτέρω καταστροφές;
2. Αν όχι, μπορεί σε συνεργασία με την ελληνική κυβέρνηση να λάβει μέτρα με βάση το μέτρο 126 του προγράμματος αγροτικής ανάπτυξης 2007-2013 «Αποκατάσταση του γεωργικού παραγωγικού δυναμικού που έχει πληγεί από φυσικές καταστροφές»;
3. Εάν δεν επαρκούν τα υφιστάμενα ποσά στο ανωτέρω μέτρο, τι άλλες δυνατότητες χρηματοδότησης υπάρχουν;

Απάντηση του κ. Cioloș εξ ονόματος της Επιτροπής
(4 Ιουλίου 2012)

Σύμφωνα με τις διατάξεις του άρθρου 20 στοιχείο β) σημείο vi) του κανονισμού (ΕΚ) αριθ. 1698/2005 του Συμβουλίου (¹) χορηγείται στήριξη για την αποκατάσταση του γεωργικού παραγωγικού δυναμικού που έχει πληγεί από φυσικές καταστροφές και την ανάληψη κατάλληλων δράσεων πρόληψης.

Στο τρέχον ελληνικό Πρόγραμμα Αγροτικής Ανάπτυξης (ΠΑΑ) 2007-2013, η διάταξη του εν λόγω άρθρου υλοποιείται μέσω του Άξονα 1 «Βελτίωση της ανταγωνιστικότητας του τομέα της γεωργίας και της δασοκομίας» και του Μέτρου 126 που επικεντρώνεται σε φυσικές καταστροφές, όπως σεισμοί, χιονοστιβάδες, κατολισθήσεις και πλημμύρες.

Όπως αναφέρεται στον κανονισμό (ΕΚ) αριθ. 1974/2006 της Επιτροπής (²) είναι επιλέξιμες οι ζημιές που αφορούν αποκλειστικά το κόστος των επενδύσεων και όχι την πιθανή απώλεια εισοδήματος ή την απώλεια παραγωγής. Στις περιπτώσεις αποκατάστασης του γεωργικού δυναμικού που έχει πληγεί από φυσικές καταστροφές σύμφωνα με το άρθρο 20 στοιχείο β) σημείο vi) του κανονισμού (ΕΚ) αριθ. 1698/2005, οι δαπάνες για την αγορά ζώων μπορεί να είναι επιλέξιμες.

Σύμφωνα με τις κείμενες διατάξεις του ελληνικού ΠΑΑ 2007-2013 δεν υπάρχει ανάγκη υποβολής ειδικού αιτήματος για χρηματοδότηση από την ΕΕ.

Εάν η Ελλάδα επιθυμεί να αποζημιώσει τους γεωργούς για απώλειες εισοδήματος που προκλήθηκαν από ζημιές στην παραγωγή, υπάρχει δυνατότητα χορήγησης εδνικής στήριξης. Προηγουμένως, η Ελλάδα οφείλει να προβεί σε κοινοποίηση η οποία πρέπει να εγκριθεί από την Επιτροπή. Η Ελλάδα έχει επίσης τη δυνατότητα να χορηγήσει ενίσχυση που υπάγεται σε απαλλαγή κατά κατηγορία, εάν οι ενισχύσεις προορίζονται για ΜΜΕ, σύμφωνα με τις διατάξεις του κανονισμού (ΕΚ) αριθ. 1857/2006 της Επιτροπής (³), ή ενίσχυση ήσσονος σημασίας (που δεν θεωρείται κρατική ενίσχυση), σύμφωνα με τις διατάξεις του κανονισμού (ΕΚ) αριθ. 1535/2007 της Επιτροπής (⁴) (7 500 ευρώ ανά δικαιούχο σε περίοδο τριών οικονομικών ετών, εντός των ορίων ενός εδνικού ανώτατου ποσού, το οποίο προσδιορίζεται στο παράρτημα του κανονισμού για την Ελλάδα, το ανώτατο αυτό όριο ανέρχεται σε 75 382 500 ευρώ). Μέχρι στιγμής, οι ελληνικές αρχές δεν έχουν υποβάλει στην Επιτροπή σχετικές πληροφορίες ή σχετικό αίτημα.

(¹) EE L 277 της 21.10.2005, σ. 1-40.

(²) EE L 368 της 23.12.2006, σ. 15-73.

(³) EE L 358 της 16.12.2006, σ. 3-21.

(⁴) EE L 337 της 21.12.2007, σ. 35.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-005449/12
to the Commission**
Nikolaos Chountis (GUE/NGL)
(30 May 2012)

Subject: Measures to address the catastrophic effects of the hailstorms in Thessaly and other regions in Greece

Heavy hailstorms on 26 and 27 May 2012 have caused catastrophic damage to over 20 000 hectares of cotton, wheat and corn crops and horticultural and other produce in the Thessaly region. Crops in Lamia, Pieria and Evros have also been seriously affected.

Given the extent of the damage and the difficult economic situation this has caused for producers, will the Commission say:

1. Has it been formally informed of the above disasters by the competent Greek authorities?
2. If not, can it take action, in cooperation with the Greek Government, under Measure 126 of the 2007-2013 Rural Development Programme — Restoring agricultural production potential damaged by natural disasters?
3. If existing funding is not sufficient under the above Measure, what other funding is available?

Answer given by Mr Cioloş on behalf of the Commission
(4 July 2012)

According to the provisions of Article 20(b)(vi) of Council Regulation (EC) No 1698/2005 (¹) support shall be granted for restoring agricultural production potential damaged by natural disasters and introducing appropriate prevention actions.

In the current Greek Rural Development Programme (RDP) 2007-2013 this provision is addressed under Axis 1 'Improving the competitiveness of the agricultural and forestry sector' and Measure 126 which focuses on natural disasters such as earthquakes, avalanches, landslides and floods.

As indicated in the Commission Regulation (EC) No 1974/2006 (²) eligible damages refer exclusively to investment costs and not the potential loss of income or loss of production. In cases of restoration of agricultural potential damaged by natural disasters pursuant to Article 20(b)(vi) of Regulation (EC) No 1698/2005, expenditure for the purchase of animals may be eligible.

Given the existing provisions in the Greek RDP 2007-2013 there is no need to proceed to a special request for EU funding.

If Greece wishes to compensate farmers for losses of income brought about by damages to production, the possibility exists to grant a national support. Before doing so, Greece must lodge a notification to be approved by the Commission. Greece has also the possibility to grant aid that is block-exempted, if aids are earmarked for SMEs, in compliance with the provisions of Commission Regulation (EC) No 1857/2006 (³), or is a *de minimis* aid (which is not considered as a state aid), in compliance with the provisions of Commission Regulation (EC) No 1535/2007 (⁴) (EUR 7 500 per beneficiary over a period of three fiscal years, within the limits of a national ceiling established in the annex to the regulation; for Greece, that ceiling is EUR 75 382 500). No information or request has been submitted so far by the Greek authorities to the Commission.

(¹) OJ L 277, 21.10.2005, p. 1-40.
(²) OJ L 368, 23.12.2006, p. 15-73.
(³) OJ L 358, 16.12.2006, p. 3-21.
(⁴) OJ L 337, 21.12.2007, p. 35.

(Versione italiana)

**Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-005451/12
alla Commissione
Mario Borghezio (EFD)
(30 maggio 2012)**

Oggetto: Conseguenze sui mercati europei della nuova bolla dei derivati USA

La JP Morgan Chase ha ammesso una voragine di 3 miliardi — dati in crescita — nel suo bilancio legata a speculazioni sui credit default swaps (Cds). Su questo tracollo sta indagando anche l'FBI, oltre alla Federal Reserve e alla SEC, nonostante Jamie Dimon, attuale presidente della JP Morgan Chase, ritenga la normativa attuale sui derivati efficace e sufficiente. Il problema alla base è che una banca depositi, quale la JP Morgan Chase, continui ad attuare grosse operazioni speculative, ritenendosi «too big to fail» e quindi implicitamente contando sul fatto che il governo centrale non le permetterà di fallire.

L'instabilità che incombe sull'intero sistema del credito è molto pericolosa: attualmente, sarebbero in circolazione 650 trilioni di dollari in titoli derivati a rischio.

1. Quali azioni la Commissione intende intraprendere per tutelare i cittadini europei dalle conseguenze dei problemi di questo istituto finanziario?
2. Ha essa effettuato rilevamenti su quale sia l'ammontare di derivati a rischio attualmente in circolazione in Europa?
3. Ritiene doverosa una modifica alla regolamentazione che preveda l'eliminazione di tutti i titoli derivati?
4. Ritiene opportuno intraprendere azioni affinché le banche per i depositi non attuino attività speculative?

Risposta di Michel Barnier a nome della Commissione
(23 luglio 2012)

L'accordo politico relativo al regolamento sugli strumenti derivati OTC, le controparti centrali e i repertori di dati sulle negoziazioni (regolamento EMIR) è stato raggiunto nel marzo 2012 ⁽¹⁾. La proposta è pienamente in linea con gli impegni assunti in sede di G20 per una maggiore trasparenza e sicurezza nel mercato dei derivati OTC. In ottobre 2011 la Commissione ha inoltre adottato delle proposte legislative per la revisione della direttiva relativa ai mercati degli strumenti finanziari (MiFID) ⁽²⁾ e della direttiva sugli abusi di mercato (MAD) ⁽³⁾, che consolideranno ulteriormente il quadro giuridico della negoziazione di derivati. Tali proposte stabiliscono requisiti organizzativi e di trasparenza per le sedi di negoziazione di derivati standardizzati e sufficientemente liquidi ed estendono ai derivati OTC i divieti relativi alla manipolazione del mercato. Altre misure (ad es. l'introduzione di un sistema di limiti per le posizioni) rispondono invece a preoccupazioni relative ai mercati dei derivati su merci. Le proposte rafforzano inoltre il governo societario e la gestione del rischio degli enti finanziari. Va inoltre rilevato che i contratti derivati, pur prestandosi a usi speculatorivi, svolgono anche funzioni importanti per l'economia reale, in particolare in quanto consentono alle imprese di proteggersi contro i rischi connessi alle attività commerciali ⁽⁴⁾.

Il regolamento EMIR sarà applicabile dal 1º gennaio 2013. Le proposte di revisione della MiFID e della MAD sono attualmente discusse in sede di Parlamento e di Consiglio. Il Consiglio europeo ha evidenziato l'urgenza di adottare tali testi. Una volta che i nuovi atti legislativi saranno entrati in vigore, la Commissione continuerà a seguirne l'applicazione e se del caso adotterà ulteriori misure. Tutte le proposte della Commissione sono accompagnate da una valutazione d'impatto che contiene dati corrispondenti allo *status quo* al momento dell'elaborazione. I dati statistici della Banca dei regolamenti internazionali (BRI) sulle dimensioni dei mercati dei derivati vengono regolarmente aggiornati.

⁽¹⁾ <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:52010PC0484:IT:PDF>.

⁽²⁾ <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2011:0652:FIN:IT:PDF> e

⁽³⁾ <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2011:0656:FIN:IT:PDF>.

⁽⁴⁾ Ad es. le fluttuazioni dei tassi di cambio, il prezzo del carburante o delle merci.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-005451/12
to the Commission
Mario Borghezio (EFD)
(30 May 2012)**

Subject: Consequences for European markets of the new US derivatives bubble

JP Morgan Chase has admitted to a USD 3 billion gap — and rising — in its balance sheet, linked to credit default swap speculation. The meltdown is being investigated by the FBI, as well as the Federal Reserve and the SEC. This is despite the fact that Jamie Dimon, JP Morgan Chase's current CEO, considers the existing regulation of derivatives to be effective and sufficient. The underlying problem is that even an investment bank like JP Morgan Chase can continue to carry out large speculative transactions, considering itself to be 'too big to fail', and implicitly counting on the fact that the central government will not allow it to fail.

The instability looming over the whole credit system is very dangerous: currently USD 650 trillion in at-risk derivatives are in circulation.

1. What action does the Commission intend to take to protect European citizens from the consequences of this financial institution's problems?
2. Has it carried out an investigation into the amount of at-risk derivatives in circulation in Europe?
3. Does it consider that an amendment to the regulation to provide for the abolishment of all derivatives is now due?
4. Does it consider it appropriate to take action to prevent investment banks from engaging in speculative activities?

**Answer given by Mr Barnier on behalf of the Commission
(23 July 2012)**

Political agreement on the regulation on OTC derivatives, central counterparties and trade repositories (EMIR) was reached in March 2012⁽¹⁾. The proposal is fully in line with G20-commitments calling for more transparency and safety in the OTC-derivatives market. Moreover, the Commission adopted on October 2011 legislative proposals for the review of the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID)⁽²⁾ and the Market Abuse Directive (MAD)⁽³⁾ that will further strengthen the legal framework for the trading of derivatives. These proposals require standardised and sufficiently liquid derivatives to be traded on organised transparent venues and extend the scope of the market manipulation prohibitions to OTC derivatives. Further measures (e.g. a position limits regime) address concerns arising from commodity derivatives markets. The proposals also strengthen corporate governance and risk management in financial institutions. It shall be noted that derivative contracts may be used for speculative purposes but also fulfil important functions for the real economy, notably allowing companies to hedge against risks linked to their commercial activities⁽⁴⁾.

EMIR will be applicable as of 1 January 2013. The proposals revising MiFID and MAD are currently being negotiated in the Parliament and in the Council. The European Council has underlined the need of a swift adoption of these texts. Once the new legislation is in force, the Commission will of course continue to monitor their application and take further measures, as necessary. All Commission proposals are accompanied by impact assessments, including data reflecting the situation at that point of time. Statistics of the Bank for International settlements (BIS) periodically update the size of OTC derivatives markets.

⁽¹⁾ <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:52010PC0484:EN:NOT>.

⁽²⁾ <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2011:0652:FIN:EN:PDF> and <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2011:0656:FIN:EN:PDF>.

⁽³⁾ <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2011:0651:FIN:EN:PDF>.

⁽⁴⁾ E.g. fluctuation in exchange rates, fuel prices or commodity prices.

(Ελληνική έκδοση)

Ερώτηση με αίτημα γραπτής απάντησης E-005452/12
προς την Επιτροπή
Maria Eleni Koppa (S&D)
(30 Μαΐου 2012)

Θέμα: Ανέγερση αγάλματος του Βασιλιά Φίλιππου στην ΠΓΔΜ

Αδιαφορώντας για τις αλλεπάλληλες εκκλήσεις της ΕΕ και άλλων φορέων της διεθνούς κοινότητας για συνεργασία και έμπρακτη καλή γειτονία, η κυβέρνηση της ΠΓΔΜ προέβη σε ακόμα μια συμβολική προκλητική ενέργεια. Στις 22 Μαΐου 2012, μόλις μία μέρα μετά την ολοκλήρωση της Συνόδου Κορυφής του NATO στο Σικάγο και τις προτροπές για εξεύρεση λύσης στο θέμα της ονομασίας, τοποθετήθηκε άγαλμα του Φίλιππου Β', ύψους 29 μέτρων, σε κεντρική πλατεία των Σκοπίων.

'Οπως έγινε και στην περίπτωση του αγάλματος του Μεγάλου Αλεξάνδρου που βρίσκεται στην ίδια πλατεία (βλ. σχετική ερώτηση: E-006512/2011), οι αρχές απέφυγαν προσχηματικά να δώσουν το όνομα του Φίλιππου στο νέο άγαλμα και το τιτλοφόρησαν απλώς «Πολεμιστή». Είναι ωστόσο πασιφανές ότι η κίνηση αυτή αποτελεί ένα ακόμα παράδειγμα της εκτεταμένης στρατηγικής οικειοποίησης μέρους της ελληνικής ιστορίας.

Σε αυτό το πλαίσιο, άξια σχολιασμού είναι επίσης η μετονομασία σχεδόν 300 οδών της πόλης των Σκοπίων, που πλέον φέρουν ονόματα προσωπικοτήτων της αρχαίας ελληνικής ιστορίας αλλά και ονόματα πόλεων από την Βόρεια Ελλάδα, που στα σχολικά εγχειρίδια της ΠΓΔΜ αποκαλείται «Μακεδονία του Αιγαίου». Η κίνηση αυτή, υπό την αιγίδα του Υπουργείου Εσωτερικών της ΠΓΔΜ, έχει ήδη προκαλέσει αντιδράσεις από την αλβανική κοινότητα της χώρας, που επισημαίνει πως μπορεί να επηρεάσει περαιτέρω αρνητικά τις σχέσεις των δύο εθνοτήτων που ήδη βρίσκονται σε τεταμένο επίπεδο.

Λαμβάνοντας υπόψη ότι και το Ευρωπαϊκό Κοινοβούλιο, στις τελευταίες εκδόσεις προόδου για την ΠΓΔΜ, έχει σημειώσει με ανησυχία τη χρήση ιστορικών επιχειρημάτων, συμπεριλαμβανομένου του φαινόμενου της «αρχαιοποίησης», προειδοποιώντας ότι ενέχει τον κίνδυνο όξυνσης των εντάσεων με τους γείτονες και δημιουργίας νέων εσωτερικών διχασμών, ερωτάται η Ευρωπαϊκή Επιτροπή:

1. Σκοπεύει να θέσει άμεσα και με πιο επιτακτικό τρόπο το ζήτημα στις αρμόδιες αρχές και προσωπικά στον Πρωθυπουργό της χώρας, στο πλαίσιο του ενταξιακού διαλόγου υψηλού επιπέδου που εγκανιάστηκε πρόσφατα;
2. Σκοπεύει να ενημερώσει το Ευρωκοινοβούλιο και το ευρύτερο κοινό για αυτά τα περιστατικά και την αντίδραση της ηγεσίας της χώρας σε αυτά τα διαβήματα;

Απάντηση του κ. File εξ ονόματος της Επιτροπής
(16 Ιουλίου 2012)

Η Επιτροπή είναι ενήμερη για τα περιστατικά στα οποία αναφέρεται το Αξιότιμο Μέλος και παρακολουθεί από κοντά τις εξελίξεις. Η Επιτροπή έχει επανειλημμένα τονίσει ότι πρέπει να αποφεύγονται ενέργειες και δηλώσεις που θα μπορούσαν να έχουν αρνητικές συνέπειες στις σχέσεις καλής γειτονίας.

Η Επιτροπή απευθύνει διαρκώς έκκληση και στις δύο κυβερνήσεις να προχωρήσουν σε διάλογο και να καλλιεργήσουν καλές διμερείς σχέσεις. Είναι σημαντικό κάθε διμερής διαφωνία να επιλύεται μέσω διαλόγου μεταξύ των μερών σε εποικοδομητικό, ευρωπαϊκό πνεύμα. Οι σχέσεις καλής γειτονίας αποτελούν βασικό μέρος της προσχώρησης της χώρας στην Ευρωπαϊκή Ένωση.

Ο ενταξιακός διάλογος υψηλού επιπέδου επικεντρώνεται σε πέντε βασικούς τομείς: προστασία της ελευθερίας έκφρασης στα μέσα ενημέρωσης· ενίσχυση του κράτους δικαίου· μεταρρύθμιση της δημόσιας διοίκησης· βελτίωση της εκλογικής διαδικασίας και ανάπτυξη της οικονομίας της αγοράς. Ο διάλογος έχει στόχο να βοηθήσει τη χώρα στην προσπάθειά της να ανταποκριθεί στα ευρωπαϊκά πρότυπα μέσω της ενίσχυσης του νομικού πλαισίου και της εξασφάλισης της πλήρους εφαρμογής του.

Η αξιολόγηση του κατά πόσον η χώρα πληροί ή όχι τα πολιτικά κριτήρια ότι κοινοποιηθεί στην προσεχή έκθεση προόδου τον Οκτώβριο 2012.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-005452/12
to the Commission
Maria Eleni Koppa (S&D)
(30 May 2012)**

Subject: King Philip statue in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM)

The government of FYROM has carried out another symbolic and provocative act, despite repeated appeals from the EU and other international community organisations for cooperation and practical good neighbourly relations. On 22 May 2012, just one day after the NATO Summit in Chicago and the exhortations to find a solution to the country's name issue, a 29-metre-tall statue of Philip II of Macedon was erected in a central square of Skopje.

As with the statue of Alexander the Great, located in the same square (see related Question E-006512/2011), the authorities avoided actually using Philip's name on the new statue, preferring to give it the simple title *Warrior*.

Nevertheless, it is clear that this act is yet another example of the extensive strategic appropriation of part of Greek history.

In this context, it is worth noting the name changes of almost 300 streets in Skopje, which are now named after well-known Ancient Greek figures and towns in northern Greece (now called 'Aegean Macedonia' in school textbooks in FYROM). This act, sponsored by FYROM's Ministry of the Interior, has provoked a reaction from the country's Albanian community, which stresses that already tense relations between the two ethnic groups could be further exacerbated.

Given that the European Parliament, in its recent progress reports on FYROM, has noted with concern the deployment of historical arguments, including the phenomenon of 'antiquisation', and has warned that this is liable to increase tension with neighbours and create new internal divisions, will the Commission say:

1. Does it intend to raise this issue with the competent authorities, and personally with the Prime Minister of FYROM immediately and urgently, as part of the high-level discussions on accession which began recently?
2. Does it intend to update the European Parliament and the general public on these incidents and report on how the country's leaders have responded?

**Answer given by Mr Füle on behalf of the Commission
(16 July 2012)**

The Commission is aware of the events referred by the Honourable Member and has been following the developments closely. The Commission has repeatedly stated that actions and statements that could negatively impact on good neighbourly relations should be avoided.

The Commission has been consistently calling on both governments to engage in dialogue and to foster good bilateral relations. It is important that any bilateral disagreements are addressed through dialogue between the parties in a constructive, European spirit. Good neighbourly relations form an essential part of the country's accession to the European Union.

The High Level Accession Dialogue focuses on five key areas: protecting freedom of expression in the media; strengthening the rule of law; reforming public administration; improving the election process; and developing the market economy. The Dialogue aims at helping the country meet European standards by strengthening the legal framework and ensuring its full implementation.

The assessment of the country's fulfilment of the political criteria will be delivered in the upcoming Progress Report in October 2012.

(българска версия)

Въпрос с искане за писмен отговор Е-005453/12
до Комисията
Мария Неделчева (PPE)
(30 май 2012 г.)

Относно: Неправомерното пръскане на селскостопанска продукция с отровни препарати, допринасящи за смъртността на пчелите

Пчелите имат изключително важно значение за запазване на биоразнообразието. 84 % от растителните видове и 76 % от производството на храни в Европа са зависими от пчелното опрашване. Европейското пчеларство, обаче, е изправено пред редица затруднения и проблеми, като най-сериозният от тях е свързан със загубата на пчелни семейства. Според българските пчелари през последната година смъртността на пчелите е изключително висока.

До голяма степен това е свързано с неправомерното пръскане с некачествени и силно отровни препарати на селскостопанските култури и овошките.

На 23. май Европейският орган за безопасност на храните публикува своето становище за това как следва да се оценява рисъкът от пестицидите за пчелите. Според доклада на ЕОБХ въвеждането на системните пестициди в началото на 90-те години представлява заплаха за пчелите, която съществуващите тестове не могат да оценят адекватно.

1. В този контекст каква е политиката на ЕС по отношение на неправомерното пръскане на селскостопанските култури с отровни препарати?
2. Какви мерки е предприела ЕК това да не засяга пчеларския сектор и да не допринася за смъртността на пчелите?
3. Съществува ли в рамките на ЕС законодателство, което да регламентира пръскането с препарати, и предвижда ли се неговата промяна, така че подобни лоши практики да бъдат предотвратени?
4. Ще бъде ли спрямо използването на системни пестициди, докато те не бъдат напълно и отново оценени?

Отговор, даден от г-н Дали от името на Комисията
(25 юли 2012 г.)

1. Продуктите за растителна защита могат да бъдат пусканы на пазара и употребявани само при условие, че са разрешени на национално равнище. Държавите членки са задължени да приложат тази разпоредба на тяхна територия и да предотвратяват всяка незаконосъобразна употреба. Комисията засега не е получила информация за употребата на незаконни продукти в България, които биха могли да причиняват смъртност при пчелите.

2. Комисията е приела редица мерки, свързани със здравето на пчелите, и по-конкретно във връзка с пестицидите. Комисията приканва уважаемия член на Парламента да се запознае с нейния отговор на предишни писмени въпроси Е-363/11, Е-3326/11 и Е-11166/11⁽¹⁾. По-специално, както е посочено в отговора на въпрос Е-363/11, по проект BEE DOC⁽²⁾ се провежда разследване на многобройните фактори, които могат да причинят здравословни проблеми при пчелите. В проекта се изследват различните комбинации от паразити, патогени, вируси и хронично сублетално излагане на пестициди, включително неоникотиноиди.

3. В Регламент (ЕО) № 1107/2009⁽³⁾ вече са установени ясни и строги разпоредби за разрешаването и условията на употреба на продуктите за растителна защита.

4. Комисията неотдавна започна пълен преглед на неоникотиноидните инсектициди. На този етап не се предвижда да се предприемат мерки за тяхното одобрение преди окончателното приключване на прегледа.

⁽¹⁾ <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/QP-WEB/application/home.do?language=BG>.

⁽²⁾ <http://www.bee-doc.eu>.

⁽³⁾ OBL 309, 24.11.2009 г.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-005453/12
to the Commission
Mariya Nedelcheva (PPE)
(30 May 2012)**

Subject: Toxic preparations unlawfully sprayed on agricultural crops, contributing to bee mortality

Bees play an extremely important role in biodiversity preservation. 84% of plant species and 76% of food production in Europe depend on bee pollination. European apiculture, however, faces a number of problems, the most serious being bee colony losses. Over the past year bee mortality has been particularly high, according to Bulgarian beekeepers.

This has been largely due to low-quality and very toxic preparations unlawfully sprayed on agricultural crops and orchards.

On 23 May, the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) published its opinion on how the risk from pesticides to bees should be assessed. According to the EFSA report, systemic pesticides introduced in the early 1990s pose a serious threat to bees that existing tests cannot adequately assess.

1. What is EU policy regarding agricultural crops unlawfully sprayed with toxic preparations?
2. What measures has the EU taken for this not to affect the beekeeping sector and avoid bee mortality?
3. Does EU legislation exist to regulate the spraying of toxic preparations, and will it be amended to prevent such poor practices?
4. Will the use of systemic pesticides be suspended until they are fully reassessed?

**Answer given by Mr Dalli on behalf of the Commission
(25 July 2012)**

1. Plant protection products can only be placed on the market and used on the condition that they are authorised at national level. It is the obligation of Member States to enforce this provision on their territory and to avoid any illegal use. The Commission has so far not received any information on the use of illegal products in Bulgaria that cause bee mortality.
2. The Commission has implemented several measures as regards bee health and more specifically as regards pesticides. The Commission would refer the honourable Member to its answers to previous Written Questions E-363/11, E-3326/11 and E-11166/11⁽¹⁾. In particular, as mentioned in the reply to Question E-363/11, the BEE DOC project⁽²⁾ is investigating the multiple factors that may play a role in the current health problems affecting bees. The project is exploring different combinations of parasites, pathogens, viruses and chronic, sub-lethal exposure to pesticides including neo-nicotinoids.
3. Regulation (EC) No 1107/2009⁽³⁾ already set clear and strict provisions for the authorisation and for the conditions of use of plant protection products.
4. The Commission has recently launched a full review of neonicotinoid insecticides. At this stage, it is not envisaged to take measures on their approval before the review is finalised.

⁽¹⁾ <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/QP-WEB>.

⁽²⁾ <http://www.bee-doc.eu>.

⁽³⁾ OJ L 309, 24.11.2009.

(Versión española)

**Pregunta con solicitud de respuesta escrita E-005455/12
a la Comisión
Francisco Sosa Wagner (NI)
(30 de mayo de 2012)**

Asunto: Restricciones a la libertad de circulación de capitales

Uno de los principios básicos de la Unión Europea es la libre circulación de capitales. Sin embargo, existen constantes quejas de ciudadanos europeos y de organizaciones de consumidores que denuncian las restricciones y dificultades para realizar operaciones financieras tan sencillas como la apertura de una cuenta corriente en un país miembro de la Unión Europea distinto al de su residencia habitual. Es más, se ha resaltado que diversos bancos ingleses desvían las peticiones a la «banca internacional» que se asienta en los denominados paraísos fiscales.

Si bien es verdad que la salida de capitales constituye un riesgo para un país europeo que esté atravesando dificultades, no es menos cierto que la libre circulación de capitales representa un importante instrumento de fortalecimiento de la unión económica, al multiplicar y estrechar los lazos entre los ciudadanos europeos, por lo que puede resultar ventajoso facilitar esa circulación monetaria.

1. ¿Ha realizado la Comisión algún estudio sobre la correcta aplicación de la Directiva 88/361/CEE de 24 de junio de 1988 relativa a la libre circulación de capitales?
2. ¿Iniciará la Comisión alguna investigación sobre las restricciones impuestas por las entidades financieras a la apertura de cuentas corrientes de ciudadanos europeos no residentes en el país en el que está domiciliado el banco?
3. ¿Qué opinión le merece a la Comisión el asesoramiento sobre las inversiones en los «paraísos fiscales»?

**Respuesta del Sr. Barnier en nombre de la Comisión
(13 de julio de 2012)**

1. La Directiva 88/361/CEE del Consejo ha sido sustituida por el Derecho primario, y en particular por el Tratado de Maastricht. Las normas correspondientes figuran actualmente en los artículos 63 a 66 del TFUE⁽¹⁾.

Las disposiciones del Tratado relativas a los movimientos de capitales son aplicables directamente. Con este fin, la Comisión ha publicado orientaciones en una Comunicación sobre determinados aspectos jurídicos de las inversiones dentro de la UE y ha iniciado dos estudios dirigidos a los Estados miembros. La Comisión supervisa regularmente la situación de los Estados miembros en relación con la libre circulación de capitales.

2. A la Comisión le preocupan los problemas que los ciudadanos de la UE puedan encontrar al intentar abrir una cuenta bancaria en otro Estado miembro. A raíz de dos consultas públicas, la Comisión adoptó en julio de 2011 una Recomendación para animar a los Estados miembros a garantizar la accesibilidad a los servicios bancarios básicos, con independencia del lugar de la UE en el que resida el cliente.

Actualmente, los servicios de la Comisión están evaluando si las medidas adoptadas por los Estados miembros son suficientes para seguir la Recomendación de la Comisión. Por otra parte, con objeto de evaluar los problemas que puedan persistir en el contexto de las cuentas bancarias, los servicios de la Comisión han realizado una nueva consulta pública⁽²⁾ acerca de una serie de cuestiones, tales como los problemas relacionados con la accesibilidad a una cuenta bancaria, la comparación y presentación de las comisiones bancarias y el cambio de cuenta bancaria. Sobre esta base, la Comisión está evaluando actualmente si se requieren nuevas acciones con objeto de respaldar el derecho de los consumidores a los servicios de pago básicos.

3. La Comisión no está en condiciones de presentar observaciones acerca del asesoramiento sobre las inversiones en los «paraísos fiscales». De forma general, cabe señalar que las medidas de la UE relativas al reforzamiento de la buena gobernanza en materia tributaria dentro de la UE y respecto de terceros países están destinadas a evitar la evasión fiscal.

⁽¹⁾ El régimen ha sido confirmado en los artículos 63 a 66 del TFUE.

⁽²⁾ Entre marzo y mediados de junio de 2012.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-005455/12
to the Commission
Francisco Sosa Wagner (NI)
(30 May 2012)**

Subject: Restrictions on free movement of capital

One of the basic principles of the European Union is the free movement of capital. However, there are constant complaints from European citizens and consumer organisations about restrictions and difficulties in making such simple financial transactions as opening a current account in an EU Member State other than the one in which they normally reside. Moreover, attention has been called to the fact that many British banks divert these requests to 'international banking', based in so-called tax havens.

While it is true that a European country in difficulty runs the risk of capital flight, it is also true that free movement of capital is an important instrument for strengthening economic union, as it multiplies and strengthens ties between European citizens. It may therefore be advantageous to facilitate this circulation of money.

1. Has the Commission made any study of the correct application of Council Directive 88/361/EEC of 24 June 1988, concerning the free movement of capital?
2. Will the Commission start an investigation into the constraints imposed by financial institutions on the opening of current accounts by non-resident EU citizens?
3. What is the Commission's opinion of advice given on 'tax haven' investments?

**Answer given by Mr Barnier on behalf of the Commission
(13 July 2012)**

1. The content of Council Directive 88/361/EEC has been superseded by primary law as per the Maastricht Treaty. The corresponding rules are now in Articles 63-66 TFEU (¹).

The Treaty provisions on capital movements are directly applicable. To this end, the Commission has issued guidance in a communication on certain legal aspects concerning intra-EU investment and launched two surveys addressed to the Member States. The Commission regularly monitors the situation in Member States with respect to the free movement of capital.

2. The Commission is concerned about problems that EU citizens may face when trying to open an account in another Member State. Following two public consultations, the Commission adopted a recommendation in July 2011, encouraging Member States to ensure accessibility of basic banking services regardless of the customer's place of residence in the EU.

Currently, the Commission services are assessing whether the national measures adopted by the Member States are sufficient to meet the Commission Recommendation. Moreover, in order to assess any remaining problems in the context of bank accounts, the Commission services have carried out a new public consultation (²) on a number of issues, including problems relating to access to bank accounts, the comparison and presentation of bank account fees and the switching of accounts. On this basis, the Commission is now assessing whether further action is needed in order to enhance consumers' right to basic payment services.

3. The Commission is not in a position to comment on commercial advice offered on tax havens. As a general remark, EU policy measures relating to the enhancement of good governance in tax matters within the EU and towards third countries is designed to address tax avoidance issues.

(¹) The regime has been confirmed in Articles 63-66 of the TFEU.
(²) Between March and mid-June 2012.

(Versión española)

**Pregunta con solicitud de respuesta escrita E-005456/12
a la Comisión
Francisco Sosa Wagner (NI)
(30 de mayo de 2012)**

Asunto: Insuficiencia de los análisis de residuos tóxicos en Marruecos

El informe que aprobó el Parlamento Europeo sobre el Acuerdo UE-Marruecos, relativo a las medidas recíprocas de liberalización del comercio de productos agrícolas y productos de la pesca, insistía en la necesidad de que se satisficieran las correspondientes normas sanitarias, fitosanitarias y ambientales para evitar que se incumpliera la normativa europea sobre la protección de los consumidores, el cuidado ambiental y la competencia empresarial.

Ante las informaciones de algunos medios según las cuales los institutos que analizan los residuos en Marruecos no disponen de los medios suficientes para advertir la contaminación de algunas sustancias tóxicas,

1. ¿Ha comprobado la Comisión el rigor de los análisis de residuos que se realizan en Marruecos?
2. ¿Es consciente la Comisión del riesgo de permitir la importación de productos alimentarios sin unas mínimas garantías para los consumidores?
3. ¿Qué medidas adoptará la Comisión para garantizar el correcto cumplimiento de la normativa europea sobre seguridad alimentaria de los alimentos importados?

**Respuesta del Sr. Dalli en nombre de la Comisión
(9 de agosto de 2012)**

Existe todo un arsenal legislativo para garantizar que los alimentos sean seguros y saludables y que los alimentos importados en la Unión respeten las normas de seguridad de la UE. Los Reglamentos (CE) nº 178/2002⁽¹⁾ y (CE) nº 882/2004⁽²⁾ establecen el marco legislativo general y los principales instrumentos para alcanzar estos objetivos.

Por lo que respecta, en particular, a los productos originarios de terceros países, existe una lista de piensos y alimentos sujetos a controles más intensos antes de su entrada en la UE, y dicha lista se actualiza con regularidad en función de los datos y la información sobre riesgos para la salud existentes o emergentes [anexo I del Reglamento (CE) nº 669/2009⁽³⁾].

Los datos y la información disponibles en la actualidad, incluidos los registros de notificaciones del Sistema de Alerta Rápida para Alimentos y Piensos (RASFF), no señalan que deban incluirse en la lista alimentos procedentes de Marruecos debido a niveles inaceptables de residuos.

Por lo que respecta, en concreto, a los residuos de plaguicidas, la última inspección llevada a cabo por la Comisión en Marruecos (2011) concluye que los programas oficiales de control de las exportaciones y los autocontroles efectuados por las empresas alimentarias marroquíes garantizan generalmente que los alimentos exportados a la UE cumplen los límites legales de esta última⁽⁴⁾.

Por otra parte, la Comisión está en contacto con las autoridades marroquíes para obtener garantías sobre el seguimiento que debe darse a algunos casos que han ocurrido de incumplimiento de estos límites.

La Comisión confía en que los mencionados instrumentos y acciones y los controles efectuados por las autoridades de los Estados miembros permitan la identificación de posibles deficiencias y la adopción de las medidas correctoras y las sanciones adecuadas en caso necesario.

⁽¹⁾ Reglamento (CE) nº 178/2002 del Parlamento Europeo y del Consejo, de 28 de enero de 2002, por el que se establecen los principios y los requisitos generales de la legislación alimentaria, se crea la Autoridad Europea de Seguridad Alimentaria y se fijan procedimientos relativos a la seguridad alimentaria (DO L 31 de 1.2.2002, p. 1).

⁽²⁾ Reglamento (CE) nº 882/2004 del Parlamento Europeo y del Consejo, de 29 de abril de 2004, sobre los controles oficiales efectuados para garantizar la verificación del cumplimiento de la legislación en materia de piensos y alimentos y la normativa sobre salud animal y bienestar de los animales (DO L 165 de 30.4.2004, p. 1).

⁽³⁾ Reglamento (CE) nº 669/2009 de la Comisión, de 24 de julio de 2009, por el que se aplica el Reglamento (CE) nº 882/2004 del Parlamento Europeo y del Consejo en lo que respecta a la intensificación de los controles oficiales de las importaciones de determinados piensos y alimentos de origen no animal y se modifica la Decisión 2006/504/CE (DO L 194 de 25.7.2009, p. 11).

⁽⁴⁾ MR 2011-6027, http://ec.europa.eu/food/fvo/rep_details_en.cfm?rep_id=2637#.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-005456/12
to the Commission
Francisco Sosa Wagner (NI)
(30 May 2012)**

Subject: Inadequate analysis of toxic residues in Morocco

The report approved by the European Parliament on the agreement between the EU and Morocco concerning reciprocal liberalisation measures on agricultural products and fishery products stressed the need to satisfy the corresponding standards on health, plant health and the environment in order to prevent breaches of European legislation on consumer protection, environmental care and business competition.

In view of some media reports, according to which the institutes responsible for analysing pesticide residues in Morocco lack the resources to detect contamination by certain toxic substances:

1. Has the Commission verified the rigor of residue monitoring being carried out in Morocco?
2. Is it aware of the risk of allowing imports of food products without minimum guarantees for consumers?
3. What measures will it adopt to ensure correct implementation of European food safety standards for imported food?

**Answer given by Mr Dalli on behalf of the Commission
(9 August 2012)**

There is a comprehensive body of legislation to ensure that food is safe and wholesome, and that food imported into the Union complies with EU safety standards. Regulation (EC) No 178/2002 (¹) and Regulation (EC) No 882/2004 (²) provide the general legislative framework and the main tools to achieve these objectives.

As to products originating in third countries in particular, a list of food and feed which require an increased level of controls prior to their introduction into the EU is in place and regularly updated on the basis of data and information on existing or emerging risks for health (Annex I to Regulation (EC) 669/2009 (³)).

Data and information available to date, including records of notifications to the Rapid Alert System for Food and Feed Food (RASFF) have not called for the listing of food from Morocco due to unacceptable levels of residues.

As for pesticides' residues in particular, the latest audit carried out by the Commission in Morocco (2011) indicates that official export control programmes and auto-controls carried out by Moroccan food businesses generally provide assurance that food exported to the EU complies with EU legal limits (⁴).

On the other hand, the Commission is in contact with the Moroccan authorities to seek reassurances as to the appropriate follow-up to be given to a number of non-compliances with such limits which have occurred.

The Commission is confident that the tools and actions above, and the controls carried out by Member States' competent authorities allow the identification of possible shortcomings and the adoption of appropriate remedial action and penalties where needed.

(¹) Regulation (EC) No 178/2002 of the Parliament and of the Council of 28 January 2002 laying down the general principles and requirements of food law, establishing the European Food Safety Authority and laying down procedures in matters of food safety (OJ L 31, 1.2.2002, p. 1).

(²) Regulation (EC) No 882/2004 of the Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on official controls performed to ensure the verification of compliance with feed and food law, animal health and animal welfare rules (OJ L 165, 30.4.2004, p. 1).

(³) Commission Regulation (EC) No 669/2009 of 24 July 2009 implementing Regulation (EC) No 882/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council as regards the increased level of official controls on imports of certain feed and food of non-animal origin and amending Decision 2006/504/EC (OJ L 194, 25.7.2009, p. 11).

(⁴) MR 2011-6027, http://ec.europa.eu/food/fvo/rep_details_en.cfm?rep_id=2637#.

(Deutsche Fassung)

**Anfrage zur schriftlichen Beantwortung E-005457/12
an die Kommission
Martin Ehrenhauser (NI)
(30. Mai 2012)**

Betreff: Horizon 2020 und der Bereich Sicherheit

Die Kommission hat in ihrer Mitteilung KOM(2011)0808 vom 30. November 2011 das Rahmenprogramm für Forschung und Innovation — Horizon 2020 vorgestellt.

Als Einzelziel wird darin die „Förderung integrativer, innovativer und sicherer Gesellschaften“ festgelegt.

Im derzeitig laufenden Rahmenforschungsprogramm FP7 gibt es ein eigenes Sicherheitsforschungsprogramm (FP-7 Security), welches gegenwärtig 184 Projekte umfasst. Für diesen Bereich sind 4 % des Gesamtbudgets des FP7 vorgesehen, was 1 400 Mio. EUR entspricht.

— Von welchem Haushaltsansatz geht die Kommission derzeit für einen vergleichbaren Forschungsbereich im neuen Rahmenforschungsprogramm aus?

**Antwort von Herrn Tajani im Namen der Kommission
(17. Juli 2012)**

Die Kommission teilt dem Herrn Abgeordneten mit, dass sie den Bereich Sicherheitsforschung im Rahmen der gesellschaftlichen Herausforderung „Integrative, innovative und sichere Gesellschaften“ in ihren Vorschlag für das neue Forschungsrahmenprogramm „Horizont 2020“ aufgenommen hat. Für diese Herausforderung, die drei verschiedene Bereiche umfasst, sind im Haushalt insgesamt Mittel in Höhe von EUR 4,317 Milliarden vorgesehen; EUR 138 Millionen davon sind für das Europäische Innovations- und Technologieinstitut (EIT) veranschlagt.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-005457/12

to the Commission

Martin Ehrenhauser (NI)

(30 May 2012)

Subject: Horizon 2020 and the security sector

In its communication COM(2011) 0808 of 30 November 2011, the Commission presented Horizon 2020 — The framework Programme for Research and Innovation.

One of the objectives identified in the communication is the promotion of 'inclusive, innovative and secure societies'.

The current Framework Research Programme FP7 contains a separate security research programme (FP7 Security) that encompasses 184 projects. Of the entire FP7 budget, 4% is earmarked for this sector, representing a figure of EUR 1.4 billion.

— What budget does the Commission currently expect a similar research area will have in the new Framework Research Programme?

Answer given by Mr Tajani on behalf of the Commission

(17 July 2012)

The Commission would like to inform the Honourable Member that the area of security research is integrated in the Commission proposal for the next framework programme for research 'Horizon 2020' under the societal challenge 'Inclusive, innovative and secure societies'. The overall budget for this challenge, which covers three different areas, amounts to EUR 4 317 million of which EUR 138 million for the European Institute of Innovation and Technology (EIT).

(Versione italiana)

**Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-005458/12
alla Commissione**

Paolo Bartolozzi (PPE), Niccolò Rinaldi (ALDE), Claudio Morganti (EFD) e Carlo Casini (PPE)
(30 maggio 2012)

Oggetto: Valore limite del boro

La qualità dell'acqua potabile è disciplinata dalla direttiva 98/83/CE concernente la qualità delle acque destinate al consumo umano, che fissa i parametri microbiologici, chimici e organolettici per assicurarne la qualità e la sicurezza.

I parametri stabiliti dalla direttiva 98/83/CE hanno avuto un significativo impatto sulla distribuzione di acqua potabile in alcune regioni d'Italia, causando spesso la non conformità con i parametri stabiliti per alcune sostanze normalmente presenti nelle falde acquifere italiane.

Nel 2010, per alcuni comuni, l'Italia ha fatto domanda per una terza deroga rispetto ai parametri massimi dell'arsenico, del fluoruro e del boro. Tra i territori interessati vi sono la Val di Cornia e l'Isola d'Elba.

Facendo seguito a tale richiesta, la Commissione europea ha adottato una serie di deroghe. Nello specifico, per i comuni delle sopraindicate zone, vige una deroga temporanea che fissa, fino al 31.12.2012, a 3 ppm il valore limite per il boro, rispetto al limite di 1 ppm attualmente stabilito dalla direttiva 98/83/CE.

Secondo quanto dichiarato dall'Organizzazione Mondiale della Sanità, tuttavia, sarebbe condivisibile un parametro di partenza già più elevato per il boro, che ne fisserebbe il valore limite a 2,4 ppm.

Al fine di assicurare un tempestivo adeguamento normativo, i gestori del servizio idrico nei sovraccitati territori hanno messo in atto cospicui investimenti per l'uso di nuove tecnologie atte a raggiungere il limite della direttiva. Tuttavia, i costi di gestione finalizzati al rispetto del parametro di 1 ppm sono estremamente elevati e molto più ingenti di quelli che deriverebbero da una gestione finalizzata al rispetto di un parametro più alto, come ad esempio quello indicato dall'Organizzazione Mondiale della Sanità (2,4 ppm).

1. Ritiene possibile la Commissione, alla luce degli approfondimenti scientifici che hanno dato luogo alle disposizioni stabilite dall'Organizzazione Mondiale della Sanità e anche alla luce dell'attuale contingenza economica, prendere in considerazione una nuova definizione del valore del limite attualmente fissato per il boro dalla direttiva 98/83/CE?

2. Reputa essa inoltre che tale nuovo valore, se ritenuto opportuno, potrebbe eventualmente essere allineato gradatamente, in un periodo di almeno 5 anni, al valore attuale della direttiva 98/83/CE (1,0 ppm)?

Risposta di Janez Potočnik a nome della Commissione
(25 luglio 2012)

Nel caso specifico della deroga chiesta dall'Italia in relazione al boro, il Comitato scientifico dei rischi sanitari ed ambientali (CSRSA) ha già espresso il proprio parere, sostenendo che, a norma della direttiva 98/83/CE⁽¹⁾ concernente la qualità delle acque destinate al consumo umano, un valore parametrico di 3 mg/l per il boro può essere temporaneamente accettato (per un periodo massimo di tre anni) per gli adulti, ma può costituire un pericolo per la salute dei bambini sotto i tre anni di età.

Su questa base, la Commissione ha concesso deroghe temporanee ad alcuni comuni, purché venissero rispettate determinate condizioni, tra cui quella che la deroga non vale per l'acqua potabile destinata ai bambini di età inferiore a tre anni.

Per il momento la Commissione non intende rivedere la direttiva sull'acqua potabile. La Commissione continuerà a monitorare gli sviluppi delle conoscenze scientifiche e tecniche per quanto riguarda i rischi connessi al boro.

⁽¹⁾ http://ec.europa.eu/health/scientific_committees/environmental_risks/docs/scher_o_120.pdf

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-005458/12
to the Commission**

Paolo Bartolozzi (PPE), Niccolò Rinaldi (ALDE), Claudio Morganti (EFD) and Carlo Casini (PPE)

(30 May 2012)

Subject: Boron limits

Drinking water quality is governed by Directive 98/83/EC on the quality of water intended for human consumption, which establishes microbiological, chemical and organoleptic parameters to ensure water quality and safety.

The parameters established by Directive 98/83/EC have had a significant impact on the distribution of drinking water in certain regions of Italy, often causing non-compliance with the established parameters for certain substances usually present in Italian groundwater aquifers.

In 2010, for certain municipalities, Italy requested a third derogation to the maximum parameters for arsenic, fluoride and boron. Among the areas concerned are the Val di Cornia and Elba.

Following this request, the European Commission adopted a series of derogations. Specifically, for municipalities in the abovementioned areas, a temporary derogation applies which sets the limit for boron at 3 ppm until 31 December 2012, compared to the current limit of 1 ppm established by Directive 98/83/EC.

However, according to a World Health Organisation statement, a higher starting parameter for boron would be acceptable. This would set the limit at 2.4 ppm.

In order to ensure timely regulatory compliance, the water management services in the abovementioned areas have made a significant investment in the use of new technologies to achieve the limits in the directive. However, the operating costs involved in achieving compliance with the 1 ppm parameter are extremely high and much more significant than those which would deliver a higher parameter, such as that indicated by the World Health Organisation (2.4 ppm) for example.

1. Does the Commission believe it possible, in view of the scientific investigation which gave rise to the provisions established by the World Health Organisation and also in view of the current economic climate, to consider a new definition of the limits currently set for boron by Directive 98/83/EC?

2. Does it also believe that this new value, if considered appropriate, could eventually be aligned over a period of at least five years, with the current value of Directive 98/83/EC (1.0 ppm)?

**Answer given by Mr Potočnik on behalf of the Commission
(25 July 2012)**

In the specific case of the derogation requested by Italy in relation to boron, the Scientific Committee on Health and Environmental Risks (SCHER) has already given its opinion that under Directive 98/83/EC⁽¹⁾ on the quality of water intended for human consumption, a parametric value of 3 mg/l for boron can be accepted on a temporary basis (up to three years) for adults, but may pose a health risk for children below three years old.

On this basis, the Commission has granted temporary derogations for certain municipalities provided a number of conditions are met, including that the derogation does not apply to the drinking water provided to children under the age of three.

For the time being, the Commission does not intend to revise the Drinking Water Directive. The Commission will continue to monitor developments in scientific and technical understanding of the risks associated with boron.

⁽¹⁾ http://ec.europa.eu/health/scientific_committees/environmental_risks/docs/scher_o_120.pdf

(Versão portuguesa)

Pergunta com pedido de resposta escrita E-005459/12

à Comissão

Marisa Matias (GUE/NGL) e Alda Sousa (GUE/NGL)

(30 de maio de 2012)

Assunto: Aumento das emissões de gases de estufa na UE em 2010

A Agência Europeia do Ambiente divulgou hoje que as emissões de gases de estufa aumentaram 2,4 % (111 milhões de toneladas de CO₂) em 2010 na UE. A agência relata que uma maior atividade industrial durante 2010 levou a um maior consumo de energia e de emissões relacionadas com esses setores cobertos pelo Regime Comunitário de Licenças de Emissão da União Europeia (EU ETS).

O EU ETS, mesmo em plena crise económica, mostra-se incapaz de reduzir as emissões de gases de estufa. A Comissão considera rever o sistema de entrega gratuita de licenças de emissões e a sua comercialização? Face ao fracasso consolidado do EU ETS, a Comissão pondera abandonar o mercado de carbono?

Resposta dada por Connie Hedegaard em nome da Comissão

(27 de julho de 2012)

O aumento das emissões de gases com efeito de estufa em 2010 deve-se essencialmente à retoma económica da UE nesse ano. Contudo, em 2011, o regime comunitário de licenças de emissão da União Europeia (ETS) desceu mais de 2 % abaixo do nível de 2010, apesar de o PIB ter crescido em 1,5 %.

Em princípio, o ETS teve o desempenho previsto nos últimos anos, incluindo os de maior e menor atividade industrial. O ETS não existe para diminuir as emissões anuais, mas para garantir a diminuição das emissões dos setores participantes ao longo de um certo tempo, de modo a garantir o cumprimento dos limites estabelecidos. O preço do carbono reflete o saldo da procura e oferta de licenças e deveria constituir um incentivo económico para a indústria investir em tecnologias energéticas hipocarbónicas, pois, não sendo assim, os objetivos ETS pós-2020 serão mais onerosos do que necessário. Um limite médio mais baixo de emissões na UE no período de comercialização de 2013/2020 garantirá a redução de emissões pretendida com o ETS da UE. Durante este período de transação, a recessão provocou reduções imprevistas que contribuíram para um excesso de licenças ETS da UE. Todavia, o objetivo ambiental do ETS, definido antes do referido período de transação, não se ressentiu desse facto.

A Comissão está atualmente a rever o funcionamento do ETS da UE e, a seu tempo, irá apresentar um relatório ao Parlamento e ao Conselho, no âmbito do artigo 10.º, n.º 5, da Diretiva⁽¹⁾. Esta é também a oportunidade para incluir uma revisão do perfil dos leilões. No que respeita ao método de concessão de licenças, a atribuição livre continua a considerar-se necessária para evitar o risco de «fuga de carbono».

⁽¹⁾ Diretiva 2003/87/CE do Parlamento Europeu e do Conselho, de 13 de Outubro de 2003, relativa à criação de um regime de comércio de licenças de emissão de gases com efeito de estufa na Comunidade e que altera a Diretiva 96/61/CE do Conselho (JO L 275 de 25.10.2003, p. 140).

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-005459/12
to the Commission**
Marisa Matias (GUE/NGL) and Alda Sousa (GUE/NGL)
(30 May 2012)

Subject: Increase in greenhouse gas emissions in the EU in 2010

The European Environment Agency today announced that greenhouse gas emissions increased by 2.4% (111 million tonnes of CO₂) in the EU in 2010. The agency reports that increased industrial activity in 2010 led to higher energy consumption and emissions related to those sectors covered by the EU Emissions Trading System (EU ETS).

The EU ETS, even in the midst of an economic crisis, seems unable to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Will the Commission review the allocation of free emission allowances and their trading? Given the overall failure of the EU ETS, will the Commission consider abandoning the carbon market?

Answer given by Mrs Hedegaard on behalf of the Commission
(27 July 2012)

The increase in European greenhouse gas emissions, for 2010 is largely due to EU's economic recovery in 2010. However, in 2011, EU Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) emissions declined by more than 2% below the 2010 level despite GDP growth at a level of 1.5%.

In principle the ETS has performed as expected during recent years, which included years of higher and lower industrial activity. The role of the ETS is not to provide for an annual decrease of emissions but to ascertain that over a period, emissions from participating sectors decrease, so as to ensure compliance with the emissions cap. The carbon price is a reflection of the demand and supply balance of allowances and should also provide an economic incentive for industry to invest in low-carbon technologies, as otherwise achievement of ETS targets beyond 2020 would be more costly than necessary. A lower average EU-wide emissions cap for the trading period 2013 to 2020 will ensure that the EU ETS will deliver the desired emission reductions. During this trading period the recession has given rise to emission reductions beyond what was foreseen which contributed to a growing surplus of allowances in the EU ETS. This however has not put at risk the environmental objective of the ETS set out before this trading period.

The Commission is currently reviewing the functioning of the EU ETS and will be submitting in due course a report to the Parliament and the Council under Article 10(5) of the directive (¹). This also offers an opportunity to include a review of the auction time profile. As regards the method of allocation of allowances, free allocation is still considered necessary to address the risk of carbon leakage.

¹) Directive 2003/87/EC of the Parliament and of the Council of 13 October 2003 establishing a scheme for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading within the Community and amending Council Directive 96/61/EC OJ L 275, 25.10.2003 and OJ L 140, 5.6.2009.

(Versão portuguesa)

**Pergunta com pedido de resposta escrita E-005460/12
à Comissão**

Marisa Matias (GUE/NGL) e Alda Sousa (GUE/NGL)

(30 de maio de 2012)

Assunto: Uso de clorpirifos na União Europeia

O clorpirifos é um dos inseticidas mais utilizados na UE, estando a sua utilização autorizada em 21 dos 27 Estados-Membros, onde é vendido em diferentes formulações sob vários nomes comerciais. A sua introdução foi autorizada em 2006, ao abrigo da Diretiva 91/414/CEE (entretanto substituída pela Regulamento (CE) n.º 1107/2009), no pressuposto de que mais informação iria ser apresentada depois.

Estudos científicos independentes têm demonstrado que o pesticida clorpirifos, mesmo em quantidades reduzidas, é nocivo para a saúde humana, para as espécies não-alvo e para o ecossistema.

1. A Comissão dispõe de dados sobre a quantidade de produtos contendo clorpirifos vendidos por ano na UE e em cada Estado-Membro?
2. Existindo um regime de aprovação para a introdução de pesticidas, porque é que a Comissão continua a aprovar produtos mediante a necessidade de informação confirmatória posterior, ao invés de aplicar o princípio da precaução? A admissão de incertezas do impacto de um pesticida na saúde humana e animal e no ecossistema não deveria ser suficiente para aplicar o princípio de precaução?
3. Face às evidências científicas, a Comissão vai retirar o clorpirifos do mercado europeu?

Resposta dada por John Dalli em nome da Comissão

(14 de agosto de 2012)

1. O Regulamento (CE) n.º 1185/2009⁽¹⁾, relativo às estatísticas sobre pesticidas entrou em vigor no final de 2009 e prevê que os Estados-Membros recolham estatísticas sobre as vendas e a utilização pelo teor da substância ativa. Porém, os primeiros dados sobre vendas estarão disponíveis no início de 2013.

2. A possibilidade de apresentar informações confirmatórias no procedimento de aprovação de uma substância ativa está prevista no Regulamento (CE) n.º 1107/2009⁽²⁾. Este regulamento baseia-se no princípio da precaução (ver artigo 1.º). Por conseguinte, a possibilidade de aprovar uma substância ativa, sob reserva de apresentação de informações confirmatórias e o princípio da precaução não são contraditórios. Sempre que a Comissão aprova uma substância ativa e, ao mesmo tempo, exige a apresentação de certas informações confirmatórias, não atua contra o princípio da precaução.

3. A Comissão está atualmente a considerar a possibilidade de solicitar à Autoridade Europeia para a Segurança dos Alimentos (AES) uma revisão da avaliação dos riscos toxicológicos realizados em clorpirifos, que foi aprovada pela Diretiva 2005/72/CE⁽³⁾, após a disponibilização de estudos recentes.

⁽¹⁾ JO L 324 de 10.12.2009.

⁽²⁾ JO L 309 de 24.11.2009.

⁽³⁾ JO L 279 de 22.10.2005.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-005460/12
to the Commission**
Marisa Matias (GUE/NGL) and Alda Sousa (GUE/NGL)
(30 May 2012)

Subject: Use of chlorpyrifos in the EU

Chlorpyrifos is one of the most widely used insecticides in the EU. Its use is authorised in 21 of the 27 Member States, where it is sold in different formulations under a variety of trade names. Its introduction was authorised in 2006 under Council Directive 91/414/EEC (later replaced by Regulation (EC) No 1107/2009), on the understanding that more information would be provided later.

Independent scientific studies have shown that, even in small quantities, chlorpyrifos is harmful to human health, non-target species and the ecosystem.

1. Does the Commission have information on how many products containing chlorpyrifos are sold each year in the EU and in each Member State?
2. With an approval system for the introduction of pesticides already in place, why does the Commission continue to approve products that later require confirmatory information instead of applying the precautionary principle? Does uncertainty about a pesticide's impact on human and animal health and on the ecosystem not justify the application of the precautionary principle?
3. Given the scientific evidence, will the Commission withdraw chlorpyrifos from the EU market?

Answer given by Mr Dalli on behalf of the Commission
(14 August 2012)

1. Regulation 1185/2009 (¹) concerning statistics on pesticides entered into force at the end of 2009 and provides for Member States to collect statistics on sales and use at active substance level. However, first data on sales will be available at the beginning of 2013.
2. The possibility to submit confirmatory information in the process of approval of an active substance is laid down in Regulation 1107/2009 (²). That regulation is based on the precautionary principle (see Article 1 thereof). Hence, the possibility to approve an active substance subject to the submission of confirmatory information and the precautionary principle are not contradictory. When the Commission approves an active substance and, at the same time, requires the submission of certain confirmatory information, it does not act against the precautionary principle.
3. The Commission is currently considering asking the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) for a review of the toxicological risk assessment carried out on chlorpyrifos, which was approved by Commission Directive 2005/72/EC (³), following the availability of most recent studies.

(¹) OJ L 324, 10.12.2009.
(²) OJ L 309, 24.11.2009.
(³) OJ L 279, 22.10.2005.

(Versiunea în limba română)

**Întrebarea cu solicitare de răspuns scris E-005461/12
adresată Comisiei
Vasilica Viorica Dăncilă (S&D)
(30 mai 2012)**

Subiect: Observator peisaje

Schimbările demografice din ultimele decenii și cererea crescândă de spații de locuit au determinat, în multe regiuni ale Uniunii Europene, extinderea zonelor urbane către mediul rural, în zone care se bazează cu precădere pe cultivarea pământului.

O serie de asemenea zone s-au confruntat cu probleme la capitolul degradării peisajelor și coeziunea acestuia cu zonele de locuit.

În ce măsură Comisia are în vedere crearea unui observator al peisajelor, pe care autoritățile locale și regionale să îl poată consulta la inițierea și dezvoltarea de proiecte de acest gen, inclusiv în cadrul unor proiecte de locuințe în zone transfrontaliere, și, mai ales, prin lansarea unui site de bune practici ce pot fi folosite de alți actori locali?

**Răspuns dat de dl Potočnik în numele Comisiei
(10 iulie 2012)**

Proiectele rezidențiale și de dezvoltare urbană, de tipul celor descrise de distinsul membru, fac obiectul unor evaluări ale impactului asupra mediului, în temeiul Directivei 2011/92/UE⁽¹⁾. Aceste evaluări au loc atunci când stabilesc autoritățile competente din statele membre, în funcție de efectele proiectelor asupra mediului și de criteriile prevăzute în anexa III la directivă. Printre aceste criterii se numără, *inter alia*, utilizarea terenului existent și capacitatea de absorbție a mediului natural, acordându-se în același timp o atenție deosebită peisajelor cu valoare istorică, culturală sau arheologică. În cadrul evaluărilor impactului asupra mediului se furnizează descrierea aspectelor de mediu susceptibile de a fi afectate semnificativ de proiectul propus, printre care și peisajele și relațiile dintre diferite alte elemente, care trebuie să facă obiectul unor consultări publice.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-005461/12

to the Commission

Vasilica Viorica Dăncilă (S&D)

(30 May 2012)

Subject: Landscape observatory

In many regions of the European Union, demographic changes in recent decades and growth in demand for housing have resulted in the expansion of urban areas into mainly agricultural areas.

A number of such areas have faced problems regarding the degradation of the landscape and its cohesion with residential areas.

To what extent is the Commission considering the creation of a landscape observatory that local and regional authorities can consult on the initiation and development of such projects (including housing projects in cross-border areas) and, in particular, the setting up a website of best practices that can be used by other local players?

Answer given by Mr Potočnik on behalf of the Commission

(10 July 2012)

Housing and urban development projects, like those described by the Honourable Member, are subject to an environmental impact assessment (EIA) on the basis of the EIA Directive 2011/92/EU⁽¹⁾, when the competent authorities of the Member States so determine, on the basis of their environmental effects and criteria provided in Annex III of this directive. These criteria include, *inter alia*, the existing land use and the absorption capacity of the natural environment, also paying particular attention to landscapes of historical, cultural or archaeological significance. When an EIA is carried out, the description of environmental aspects likely to be significantly affected by the proposed project, including *inter alia* landscape as well as inter-relationship with other aspects, has to be provided and submitted to public consultation.

(Versiunea în limba română)

**Întrebarea cu solicitare de răspuns scris E-005462/12
adresată Comisiei
Vasilica Viorica Dăncilă (S&D)
(30 mai 2012)**

Subiect: Transport substanțe periculoase

La nivelul Uniunii Europene, au loc anual un număr semnificativ de accidente rutiere în care sunt implicate mijloace de transport de substanțe inflamabile și periculoase. Acest gen de accidente implică eforturi importante la nivel local și regional, atât din punct de vedere logistic, cât și uman, mai ales în ceea ce privește echipele de pompieri și cele de intervenție rapidă.

1. Are Comisia în vedere măsuri de îmbunătățire a legislației referitoare la normele de securitate pentru transportul substanțelor inflamabile și periculoase și introducerea de noi restricții la circulația vehiculelor de acest gen pe străzile și autostrăzile europene?
2. În ce fel poate sprijini Comisia eforturile autorităților de prevenire și combatere a efectelor acestor accidente, inclusiv când asemenea evenimente au loc în apropierea frontierelor sau pe marile artere rutiere?

**Răspuns dat de dl Kallas în numele Comisiei
(9 iulie 2012)**

1. Comisia consideră că prin dispozițiile Directivei 2008/68/CE privind transportul interior de mărfuri periculoase⁽¹⁾ se asigură transportul de mărfuri periculoase în condiții de siguranță și că există o procedură eficace pentru modificarea acestor dispoziții în mod prompt atunci când este necesar.
2. În ceea ce privește combaterea efectelor accidentelor, Comisia reamintește că mecanismul comunitar de protecție civilă⁽²⁾ facilitează cooperarea în intervențiile de protecție civilă în situații de urgență majoră care necesită intervenție imediată.

⁽¹⁾ JO L 260, 30.9.2008, p. 13.
⁽²⁾ Decizia 2001/792/CE a Consiliului din 23 octombrie 2001 de instituire a unui mecanism comunitar de favorizare a unei cooperări consolidate în cadrul intervențiilor de urgență care tin de protecția civilă, JO L 297, 15.11.2001, p. 7.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-005462/12
to the Commission**
Vasilica Viorica Dăncilă (S&D)
(30 May 2012)

Subject: Transport of dangerous substances

At European Union level, a significant number of road accidents take place every year involving the transport of flammable and dangerous substances, requiring considerable efforts in response at local and regional level, both from a logistic and human point of view, especially for firefighters and rapid response teams.

1. Is the Commission considering measures to improve legislation on safety standards for the transport of flammable and dangerous substances and to introduce new restrictions on the circulation of this type of vehicle on European roads and motorways?
2. In what ways can the Commission support the efforts of the authorities to prevent and combat the effects of these accidents, especially where they occur near borders or on major arterial roads?

Answer given by Mr Kallas on behalf of the Commission
(9 July 2012)

1. The Commission considers that the provisions of Directive 2008/68/EC on the inland transport of dangerous goods (¹) ensure safety during the transport of dangerous goods and that there is an effective procedure for amending these provisions promptly when necessary.
2. As regards combatting the effects of accidents the Commission recalls that the Community Mechanism for Civil Protection (²) facilitates cooperation in civil protection assistance interventions in the event of major emergencies requiring urgent response actions.

(¹) OJ L 260, 30.9.2008, p. 13.

(²) Council Decision 2001/792/EC of 23 October 2001 establishing a Community mechanism to facilitate reinforced cooperation in civil protection assistance interventions, OJ L 297, 15.11.2001, p. 7.

(Nederlandse versie)

**Vraag met verzoek om schriftelijk antwoord E-005463/12
aan de Commissie
Kathleen Van Brempt (S&D)
(30 mei 2012)**

Betreft: Bescherming van de bruinvvis

Alle soorten walvisachtigen zijn opgenomen in bijlage IV bij Richtlijn 92/43/EEG („habitatrichtlijn“) en dienen bijgevolg strikt beschermd te worden. Deze strikte bescherming betekent dat de lidstaten maatregelen moeten nemen om het opzettelijk vangen of doden te verbieden (art. 12 Richtlijn 92/43/EEG). In het arrest van 18 mei 2006 Commissie/Spanje stelt het Hof (punt 71) dat sprake is van opzet „indien degene die de handeling heeft verricht de vangst of dood van een specimen van een beschermd diersoort heeft gewild, althans de mogelijkheid van die vangst of dood heeft aanvaard“.

De bruinvvis wordt bovendien aangemerkt als soort van communautair belang door opname in bijlage II van dezelfde richtlijn.

Sinds 2003 circuleert er briefwisseling (inbreukprocedure 2003/2081(INI)) tussen de Commissie en de Belgische instanties, waarin verduidelijking wordt gevraagd over methoden die in de visserij worden gebruikt en dit met het oog op het vermijden van eventuele schade aan of bijvangsten van walvisachtigen zoals bruinvvis. Zo is er sprake van een dossier uit 2006 waarbij sterfte van bruinvissen voor de Belgische kust wordt gekoppeld aan recreatieve visserij met warrelnetten tengevolge waarvan de Commissie België in aanmaningsbrieven opriep om deze praktijken aan te pakken.

De Belgische instanties hebben sindsdien een aantal stappen gezet. Zo werd er onder meer als reactie op de aanmaningen een wetgevend initiatief genomen in de vorm van een soortenbesluit (in Vlaanderen).

1. Is de Commissie van oordeel dat Vlaanderen daarmee aan de vereisten van de habitatrichtlijn voldoet of wordt er van Vlaanderen verwacht dat het wetgevend initiatief van een soortenbesluit gevolgd wordt door een specifiek soortbeschermingsplan met doelstellingen en maatregelen?
2. Is er wat dat betreft een deadline waaraan Vlaanderen moet voldoen?
3. Welke maatregelen moet een eventueel soortbeschermingsplan volgens de Commissie minimaal inhouden?

**Antwoord van de heer Potočnik namens de Commissie
(10 juli 2012)**

De Commissie bevestigt dat het accidenteel doden van bruinvissen bij de recreatieve visserij in de Vlaamse kustwateren het onderwerp was van een briefwisseling tussen de Commissie en België in het kader van inbreukprocedure 2003/2081. In 2009 heeft de Commissie deze inbreukprocedure afgesloten nadat zij in kennis was gesteld van de aanneming door de Vlaamse regering van een nieuw Soortenbesluit. Daarbij ging de Commissie ervan uit dat dit besluit zo nodig de basis zou vormen voor specifieke maatregelen ter bescherming van de bruinvvis. Uit een brief van de Belgische instanties die de Commissie in 2009 ontving, blijkt dat de Vlaamse regering het Agentschap voor Natuur en Bos (ANB) en het Instituut voor Natuur- en Bosonderzoek (INBO) heeft belast met de voorbereiding van de uitvoering van het besluit, onder andere door monitoring van de accidentele bijvangst van bruinvissen. Voorts werd in deze brief gesteld dat op korte termijn specifieke beschermingsmaatregelen konden worden genomen indien zulks nodig werd geacht.

De Commissie heeft geen nadere instructies gegeven wat betreft de termijn waarbinnen dergelijke maatregelen moesten worden genomen, noch wat betreft de minimale inhoud van de uit te werken plannen of maatregelen. Wel is duidelijk dat indien de mortaliteit van bruinvissen ten gevolge van accidentele vangst niet-verwaarloosbaar blijft, zo snel mogelijk alle vereiste maatregelen moeten worden getroffen om verdere accidentele sterfte te vermijden.

De Commissie zal de Belgische instanties vragen de situatie toe te lichten.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-005463/12
to the Commission**
Kathleen Van Brempt (S&D)
(30 May 2012)

Subject: Protection of the harbour porpoise

All cetacean species are listed in Annex IV to Directive 92/43/EEC ('Habitats Directive') and should therefore be afforded strict protection. This means that the Member States should take measures to prohibit their deliberate capture or killing (Article 12 Directive 92/43/EEC). In its ruling of 18 May 2006 *Commission v Spain*, the Court of Justice states (in paragraph 71) that a deliberate action has taken place if 'the perpetrator of the act intended the capture or killing of a specimen belonging to a protected animal species or, at the very least, accepted the possibility of such capture or killing'.

The harbour porpoise [*Phocoena phocoena*] is also considered to be a species of Community interest through its inclusion in Annex II to the same directive.

An exchange of letters has been ongoing since 2003 (infringement procedure 2003/2081(INI)) between the Commission and the Belgian courts, in which clarification is sought regarding methods used in fisheries, with a view to avoiding any potential harming or unintended catching of cetaceans such as harbour porpoises. There is a dossier from 2006 in which the death of harbour porpoises off the Belgian coast is associated with recreational fishing with gillnets, as a result of which the Commission called on Belgium in letters of formal notice to address these practices.

The Belgian courts have since taken a number of measures. Thus, for example, in reaction to these formal notice letters, a legislative initiative was adopted in the form of a protected species ruling ['soortenbesluit'] (in Flanders).

1. Does the Commission consider that by having adopted this ruling Flanders now meets the criteria of the Habitats Directive, or is Flanders expected to follow up the legislative initiative of a protected species ruling with a specific species protection plan containing objectives and measures?
2. Is there a deadline which Flanders must meet in this regard?
3. What minimum measures, according to the Commission, should any species protection plan contain?

Answer given by Mr Potočnik on behalf of the Commission
(10 July 2012)

The Commission confirms that the accidental killing of harbour porpoises by recreational fisheries in Flemish coastal waters was subject to an exchange of letters between the Commission and Belgium, within the frame of the infringement procedure 2003/2081. In 2009, the Commission closed the infringement procedure after having been informed about the adoption of a new Species Protection Decree (Soortenbesluit) by the Flemish Government, and based on the understanding that that decree would provide the basis for specific measures aimed at protecting the harbour porpoise, should this be necessary. According to a letter from the Belgian authorities which the Commission received in 2009, the Flemish Government had charged the Agency for Nature and Forest (ANB) and the Institute for Nature and Forest (INBO) to prepare the implementation of that Decree, including through the monitoring of accidental by-catches of harbour porpoises. Furthermore, according to that letter, specific conservation measures could be taken at short notice, if deemed necessary.

The Commission has not issued instructions with regard to the deadline by which such measures should be taken or with regard to the minimum content of the plans or measures to be taken, but it is clear that if accidental killing of harbour porpoises still occurs on a non-negligible scale, all measures required to avoid further accidental killing must be taken as soon as possible.

The Commission will ask the Belgian authorities to explain the situation.

(Nederlandse versie)

**Vraag met verzoek om schriftelijk antwoord E-005464/12
aan de Commissie
Kathleen Van Brempt (S&D)
(30 mei 2012)**

Betreft: Verbod op plastic zakjes

Vorige week raakte bekend dat de stad Los Angeles een verbod goedkeurde op het gebruik van plastic zakjes. Het stadsbestuur wil daarmee de jaarlijkse consumptie naar schatting 2,7 miljard zakjes aan banden leggen. Eerder deden San Francisco en Washington DC hetzelfde, en met de beslissing van LA staat de teller in Californië al op 48 steden met een verbod op plastic zakjes.

1. Overweegt de Commissie een dergelijke invoering van een algemeen verbod op plastic zakjes? Wordt er wat dat betreft aan haalbaarheidsonderzoek gedaan?
2. Zo ja, welke elementen worden daarbij bekeken?
3. Ziet de Commissie een verbod op plastic zakjes als een mogelijk wapen in de strijd tegen de problematiek van de zogenaamde „plastic soup“ in onze wereldzeeën?

**Antwoord van de heer Potočnik namens de Commissie
(5 juli 2012)**

De Commissie beoordeelt momenteel diverse opties om het gebruik van plastic draagtasjes te reduceren. Overeenkomstig de vaste praktijk bij de Commissie worden alle mogelijke kosten en baten van deze opties (d.w.z. op ecologisch, economisch en sociaal gebied) grondig afgewogen bij deze beoordeling. Ook het probleem van zwerf vuil op zee wordt dus in aanmerking genomen.

Een besluit over een mogelijk initiatief van de Commissie en de reikwijdte daarvan wordt genomen zodra dit beoordelingsproces is afgerond.

Voorts zal de Commissie weldra een veelomvattender reflectieproces op gang brengen door een groenboek over plastic afval in het milieu uit te brengen. Dit groenboek moet helpen een strategisch antwoord te vinden op de behoefte aan een milieuverantwoord en hulpbronnen efficiënt gebruik van plastic, inclusief tijdens de eindfase van de levenscyclus ervan.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-005464/12
to the Commission
Kathleen Van Brempt (S&D)
(30 May 2012)**

Subject: Ban on plastic bags

It emerged last week that the Los Angeles city council adopted a ban on the use of plastic bags in a bid to contain the estimated annual consumption of 2.7 billion bags, thereby following the example set by San Francisco and Washington D.C. and bringing the number of Californian cities currently banning plastic bags to 48.

1. Is the Commission considering the introduction of a similar general ban on plastic bags? Is a feasibility study being conducted in this regard?
2. If so, what issues is it focusing on?
3. Does the Commission see a ban on plastic bags as a possible weapon in the struggle against the problem of the so-called 'plastic soup' in the world's seas?

**Answer given by Mr Potočnik on behalf of the Commission
(5 July 2012)**

The Commission is currently assessing various options to reduce the use of plastic carrier bags. In accordance with standard Commission practice, all potential costs and benefits of these options (i.e. environmental, economic and social) are being comprehensively considered in this assessment; this includes the issue of marine litter.

A decision on a possible Commission initiative and its scope will be taken upon completion of this assessment process.

In addition, the Commission will soon launch a more holistic reflection process by issuing a Green Paper on plastic waste in the environment. This paper should help find a strategic response to the environmentally responsible and resource efficient use of plastic including its end of life phase.

(Dansk udgave)

**Forespørgsel til skriftlig besvarelse P-005465/12
til Kommissionen
Bendt Bendtsen (PPE)
(31. maj 2012)**

Om: Aldersdiskrimination

Er det efter Kommissionen opfattelse i overensstemmelse med EU-retten, at en medlemsstat indfører en særlig afgift på lønindtægter for personer over 65 år?

EU-Domstolen har tidligere afgjort, at forskelsbehandling på grund af alder er et ledende princip i EU-retten (se sag 144/4 — Mangold mod Helm).

**Svar afgivet på Kommissionens vegne af Viviane Reding
(3. juli 2012)**

På EU-plan finder bestemmelserne om aldersdiskrimination i direktiv 2000/78/EF af 27. november 2000 om generelle rammebestemmelser om ligebehandling med hensyn til beskæftigelse og erhverv kun anvendelse i forbindelse med beskæftigelse og erhverv. Direktivet forbinder forskelsbehandling på grund af alder i forbindelse med adgang til beskæftigelse samt arbejdsvilkår. Det afhænger af de nærmere skatteregler, hvorvidt en national skattelovgivning muligvis er omfattet af direktivet.

Selv hvis dette er tilfældet, tillader direktivet ulige behandling på grund af alder, hvis forskelsbehandlingen er objektivt begrundet i et legitimt formål, og hvis midlerne til at opfylde det pågældende formål er hensigtsmæssige og nødvendige. Den pågældende nationale lov vil skulle undersøges for at se, om effekten af at gøre den mindre attraktiv for personer over 65 år kan retfærdiggøres inden for rammerne af den nationale beskæftigelsespolitik, og om midlerne til at opfylde dette formål er hensigtsmæssige og nødvendige.

(English version)

**Question for written answer P-005465/12
to the Commission
Bendt Bendtsen (PPE)
(31 May 2012)**

Subject: Age discrimination

Does the Commission consider it consistent with EC law for a Member State to introduce a special tax on employment income for persons above the age of 65?

The European Court of Justice has previously ruled that non-discrimination on grounds of age is a guiding principle in EC law (see Case 144/04 — *Mangold v Helm*).

**Answer given by Mrs Reding on behalf of the Commission
(3 July 2012)**

At EU level, the provisions on age discrimination set out in Directive 2000/78/EC of 27 November 2000 establishing a general framework for equal treatment in employment and occupation only apply to employment and occupation. The directive prohibits discrimination on the ground of age in relation to access to employment and in relation to working conditions. It would depend on the details of the rules of taxation whether national tax law could potentially fall within the scope of that directive.

Even if this was the case, the directive allows differences of treatment on grounds of age if they are objectively and reasonable justified by a legitimate aim and if the means of achieving that aim are appropriate and necessary. The respective national law would have to be analysed in order to see whether the effect of making it less attractive for people over the age of 65 can be justified in the context of national employment policy and whether the means of achieving that aim are appropriate and necessary.

(Versión española)

**Pregunta con solicitud de respuesta escrita P-005466/12
a la Comisión
Raül Romeva i Rueda (Verts/ALE)
(31 de mayo de 2012)**

Asunto: Suspensión de la financiación del proyecto Cubomed del programa LIFE

Cubomed es el nombre con el que se ha identificado el proyecto del programa LIFE 08 NAT/E/000064 cuyo título completo es «Desarrollo y demostración de métodos de erradicación y control de una especie invasora, *Carybdea marsupialis* (cuboza), en el Mediterráneo español». Durante el verano de 2008 en las playas de Denia (Alicante) se produjeron 3 500 picaduras de medusas, así como en Santa Pola (5 000 picaduras en 2009 y 2010), y 1 033 en la playa Cabahal (2011). El proyecto Cubomed desarrolla un método y una técnica para la detección y cuantificación de *Carybdea marsupialis* para reducir su población y su tasa de crecimiento, además de aclarar las características ambientales y ecológicas que pueden conducir a las poblaciones de esta cubo medusa a desarrollar un crecimiento exponencial. La financiación del proyecto era de un 48,33 % a cargo de la Comisión Europea (programa LIFE), un 44 % a cargo del Ministerio de medio ambiente y medio rural y marino (Dirección General de sostenibilidad de la costa y del mar) y un 6 % de la Consejería de medio ambiente de la Generalitat Valenciana.

El Gobierno español ha declarado recientemente, como ya hizo en 2011 y se retractó, que se desentiende de la cofinanciación de este proyecto debido a los recortes presupuestarios. Esto significa, de nuevo, el incumplimiento de la obligación del Estado miembro de financiar como mínimo el 50 % del proyecto como está establecido en el Reglamento (CE) nº 614/2007 del Parlamento Europeo y del Consejo. El 7 de febrero de 2011 ya fue presentada a la Comisión una pregunta parlamentaria (E-000880/2011) denunciando esta suspensión de financiación por parte del Gobierno español. La Comisión respondió a esta pregunta (E-000880/2011) que «la Comisión continuará supervisando de cerca la situación y hará todo lo posible para que este proyecto se lleve a término con éxito».

— De acuerdo con las bases del instrumento financiero del programa LIFE para el medio ambiente, ¿considera la Comisión que el Ministerio de medio ambiente y medio rural y marino puede suspender la financiación de un proyecto cofinanciado?

— ¿Piensa la Comisión adoptar medidas de acuerdo con el principio de subsidiariedad establecido en el artículo 5 del Tratado para garantizar el cumplimiento del compromiso de financiación del Ministerio de medio ambiente y medio rural y marino en el proyecto?

**Respuesta del Sr. Potočnik en nombre de la Comisión
(6 de julio de 2012)**

La Comisión confirma que, en su calidad de cofinanciador, el Ministerio de Agricultura, Alimentación y Medio Ambiente puede retirarse de un proyecto LIFE. De producirse tal circunstancia, corresponde a la Comisión evaluar la viabilidad del proyecto.

La Comisión no puede adoptar medidas coercitivas para que el Ministerio de Agricultura, Alimentación y Medio Ambiente cumpla su compromiso. No obstante, ha mantenido contactos con el citado Ministerio para manifestarle su contrariedad por la suspensión de la financiación. Como ya indicó en su respuesta a la pregunta escrita E-880/11⁽¹⁾ de Syed Kamall, la Comisión considera de suma importancia este proyecto y está en contacto con el beneficiario y coordinador del proyecto para tratar de hallar soluciones a fin de que pueda llevarse a cabo a pesar de la retirada de la financiación del Ministerio.

⁽¹⁾ <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/QP-WEB/home.jsp>

(English version)

**Question for written answer P-005466/12
to the Commission**
Raül Romeva i Rueda (Verts/ALE)
(31 May 2012)

Subject: Suspension of funding for the CUBOMED project of the LIFE programme

CUBOMED is the name used to refer to the LIFE programme project 08 NAT/E/000064, the full title of which is 'Development and demonstration of methods to eradicate and control the invasive species *Carybdea marsupialis* (Cubozoa) in the Spanish Mediterranean'. During the summer of 2008, 3 500 people were stung by jellyfish on the beaches of Denia (Alicante); 5 000 were stung in Santa Pola in 2009 and 2010; and 1 033 on the Cabañal beach (Valencia) in 2011. The CUBOMED project is developing a method and means of detecting and quantifying the *Carybdea marsupialis* box jellyfish, in order to reduce its numbers and growth rate and establish the environmental and ecological factors that can lead to its proliferation. The project was funded as follows: 48.33% by the European Commission (LIFE programme), 44% by the Spanish Ministry of Environment and Rural and Marine Affairs (Directorate General of coastal and ocean sustainability) and 6% by the Environment Department of the Valencian Government.

The Spanish Government recently declared — as it did in 2011, and then retracted — that, due to budget cuts, it will no longer take responsibility for co-financing this project. This means that Spain is once again reneging on its obligation to fund at least 50% of the project, as set out in Regulation (EC) No 614/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council. A parliamentary question (E-000880/2011) was put to the Commission on 7 February 2011, reporting this suspension of funding by the Spanish Government. In its response, the Commission stated that it 'will continue to closely monitor the situation and do all we can to ensure the project is successfully implemented'.

— Does the Commission consider that the Spanish Ministry of Environment and Rural and Marine Affairs is entitled, under the terms of the LIFE environmental programme's financial instrument to suspend funding of a co-financed project?

— Does the Commission intend to adopt measures, in line with the principle of subsidiarity established in Article 5 of the EC Treaty, to ensure that the Spanish Ministry of Environment and Rural and Marine Affairs upholds its commitment to fund the project?

Answer given by Mr Potočnik on behalf of the Commission
(6 July 2012)

The Commission confirms that as a co-financer of the Project the Spanish Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Environment may withdraw from a LIFE Project. It is the Commission's role to evaluate the feasibility of the project if such an event occurs.

The Commission cannot take coercive measures on the Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Environment to uphold its commitment. However, the Commission is currently in contact with the Ministry to express its dissatisfaction with its withdrawal. As indicated in its answer to Written Question E-880/11⁽¹⁾ by Syed Kamall, the Commission considers this project of the utmost importance. The Commission is in close contact with the coordinating beneficiary to find possible solutions to ensure this important project is successfully implemented despite the withdrawal of the Ministry's contribution.

⁽¹⁾ <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/QP-WEB/home.jsp>

(Versione italiana)

**Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta P-005467/12
alla Commissione
Cristiana Muscardini (PPE)
(31 maggio 2012)**

Oggetto: Terremoto in Emilia Romagna e Lombardia

Le scosse di terremoto che si susseguono in Emilia Romagna e nel sud-est della Lombardia non solo sconvolgono il territorio e la vita delle comunità locali, ma bloccano l'attività economica e distruggono posti di lavoro. La popolazione è coraggiosa e reagisce alacremente al sisma per il ritorno ad una vita normale, in case e in luoghi di lavoro sicuri. Ma i disagi sono enormi e i danni, per ora, incalcolabili. Le imprese distrutte sconcertano le famiglie, non solo per le vittime e per i posti di lavoro perduti, ma soprattutto per il timore che l'arresto dell'attività economica si prolunghi nel tempo e rappresenti un buco nero tanto per i padri che per i giovani che s'affacciano al mercato del lavoro. Tutti concordano nel ritenere che la priorità debba essere data alla ricostruzione delle strutture produttive distrutte e alla messa in sicurezza di quelle danneggiate. Sarà il primo passo per ridare fiducia ad una popolazione volonterosa di riprendere una vita normale.

Tenuto conto della particolare situazione, può la Commissione rispondere ai seguenti quesiti:

1. I fondi previsti per le calamità naturali e per lo sviluppo regionale sono disponibili anche per le zone colpite dell'Emilia Romagna e della Lombardia?
2. Non ritiene che la BEI possa intervenire per sostenere le banche che in loco fornirebbero denaro a costo zero alle imprese colpite dal sisma?
3. Non pensa che, date le enormi spese preventivate per la ricostruzione e la rimessa in funzione dell'economia, e considerata l'eccezionalità straordinaria della situazione, possano essere concesse deroghe rispetto agli impegni sui vincoli di bilancio stabiliti con il governo italiano?
4. Non considera opportuno il sostegno al ministero italiano dell'Ambiente, che ha espresso l'intenzione di rivedere e attualizzare la mappa nazionale del rischio sismico, come da tempo ho chiesto anche per il territorio europeo?

**Risposta di Johannes Hahn a nome della Commissione
(6 luglio 2012)**

1. e 3. La Commissione rinvia l'onorevole deputata alla propria risposta cumulativa alle interrogazioni scritte P-005437/12, P-005438/12, P-005439/12 e P-005450/12⁽¹⁾.

2. Immediatamente dopo il tragico evento la Banca europea per gli investimenti (BEI) ha offerto il suo sostegno alle autorità italiane. La BEI non ha la possibilità di fornire prestiti a tasso zero. Tuttavia, la BEI possiede una grande esperienza nell'erogazione di finanziamenti per investimenti alle autorità locali, alle piccole e medie imprese e ad altre aziende per il tramite di banche intermediarie in tutti gli Stati membri. Attualmente, la BEI sta esaminando le opzioni per accelerare i propri interventi nelle regioni colpite dal terremoto. Le banche intermediarie hanno il compito di trasmettere ai loro mutuatari i benefici del finanziamento BEI con rating AAA sui mercati internazionali.

4. Per il tramite del meccanismo di protezione civile dell'Unione europea la Commissione sostiene l'azione degli Stati membri nell'intero ciclo di un'emergenza, comprese le valutazioni del rischio effettuate a livello nazionale. Il sostegno è fornito nell'ambito di un programma di finanziamento di progetti e di scambio di esperti. Il 20 dicembre 2011 la Commissione ha adottato una proposta di decisione del Parlamento europeo e del Consiglio su un meccanismo unionale di protezione civile⁽²⁾. Tale proposta è attualmente in discussione dinanzi al Parlamento europeo e al Consiglio e intende organizzare uno scambio sistematico tra gli Stati membri di piani di gestione dei rischi basati sulle valutazioni nazionali del rischio nonché fornire un sostegno da parte della Commissione.

⁽¹⁾ <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/QP-WEB/home.jsp>

⁽²⁾ (COM(2011)934; http://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/about/COM_2011_proposal-decision-CPMechanism_it.pdf).

(English version)

**Question for written answer P-005467/12
to the Commission
Cristiana Muscardini (PPE)
(31 May 2012)**

Subject: Earthquake in Emilia-Romagna and Lombardy

The continuing aftershocks in Emilia-Romagna and southeast Lombardy are not only disrupting the area and the life of local communities, but are also interrupting economic activity and destroying jobs. The local people are being brave and have reacted quickly to the earthquake to try and return to a normal life at home and at work. Nonetheless, there is enormous hardship and the scale of the damage is currently incalculable. The destruction of businesses is disconcerting for families, not only because of the victims and jobs lost, but above all because of the concern that business will not resume for some time to come and that this will become a black hole for both parents and their children about to enter the employment market. Everyone agrees that the priority must be to reconstruct destroyed manufacturing facilities and to make safe those that have been damaged. This will be the first step towards restoring the confidence of a population eager to resume a normal life.

Taking this particular situation into account, can the Commission answer the following:

1. Are the funds set aside for natural disasters and regional development also available to the affected areas of Emilia-Romagna and Lombardy?
2. Does it not agree that the European Investment Bank (EIB) should intervene to support local banks in providing zero-interest finance to businesses affected by the earthquake?
3. Does it not think, given the huge expense envisaged for rebuilding and restarting the economy, and in view of the exceptional nature of the situation, that exemptions might be granted with regard to the budgetary constraint commitments agreed with the Italian Government?
4. Will it not offer support to the Italian Ministry of the Environment, which has stated its intention to review and update the national seismic hazard map, as I have been requesting for some time for the whole of Europe?

**Answer given by Mr Hahn on behalf of the Commission
(6 July 2012)**

1 and 3. The Commission would refer the Honourable Member to its joint answer to written questions P-005437/12, P-005438/12, P-005439/12 and P-005450/12 (¹).

2. Immediately after the tragic event, the European Investment Bank (EIB) offered its support to the Italian authorities. The EIB has no possibility to provide zero-interest loans. However, the EIB has significant experience in providing investment financing to local authorities, small and medium-sized enterprises and other business through intermediary banks in all Member States. Currently, the EIB is examining options to accelerate its action in the regions affected by the earthquake. The intermediary banks undertake to pass on to their borrowers the benefits of the EIB's AAA-rated funding on the international markets.

4. Through the European Civil Protection Mechanism, the Commission supports Member State action in the whole emergency cycle, including national risk assessments. Support is provided through project financing and an exchange of experts programme. On 20 December 2011, the Commission adopted a Proposal for a decision of the European Parliament and of the Council on a Union Civil Protection Mechanism (²) This proposal is currently under discussion with the Parliament and the Council and aims to organise a systematic exchange of Member State risk management plans, which are based on national risk assessments, and provide Commission support.

(¹) <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/QP-WEB/home.jsp>

(²) (COM(2011)934; http://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/about/COM_2011_proposal-decision-CPMechanism_en.pdf).

(Nederlandse versie)

Vraag met verzoek om schriftelijk antwoord E-005468/12
aan de Commissie
Auke Zijlstra (NI)
(31 mei 2012)

Betreft: Europees onderzoeksbevel — Tijd om de balans op te maken

1. Kan de Commissie aangeven hoe vaak — en door welke uitvaardigende in welke uitvoerende lidstaat — het Europees onderzoeksbevel reeds is uitgevoerd? Welke gepleegde feiten betrof het?
2. Is de Commissie van mening dat het een slechte zaak is dat met het Europees onderzoeksbevel de mogelijkheden voor de uitvoerende lidstaat om de tenuitvoerlegging of de erkenning van een bevel van de uitvaardigende lidstaat beperkt? Is de Commissie van mening dat de soevereiniteit van de uitvoerende lidstaat daarmee wordt aangetast?
3. Is de Commissie van mening dat het ongewenst is dat ambtenaren van de uitvaardigende lidstaat in de uitvoerende lidstaat bij de tenuitvoerlegging van het Europees onderzoeksbevel kunnen assisteren?
4. Is de Commissie van mening dat het Europees onderzoeksbevel — voordat dit wordt uitgevoerd — allereerst door een rechter (in de uitvoerende lidstaat) moet worden getoetst?
5. Het Europees onderzoeksbevel is gebaseerd op het principe van wederzijdse erkenning; dat impliceert de gelijkheid van de rechtsstelsels van alle lidstaten. Is de Commissie van mening dat er met de uitvoering van het recht is in voornamelijk de Oost-Europese landen iets mis is — vooral in verband met de hoge mate van corruptie aldaar — en dat het dientengevolge ontrechting is om van de gelijkheid van de rechtsstelsels van alle lidstaten uit te gaan?
6. Het Angelsaksische rechtssysteem van Engeland is wezenlijk anders dan de overige Napoleontische rechtssystemen in Europa. Hoe verhoudt zich dat in de praktijk? Hoe worden de problemen die voortkomen uit de verschillen tussen de rechtssystemen ondervangen?
7. Is de Commissie van mening dat het Europees onderzoeksbevel een stap dichter bij het „Europees strafrecht“ is? Wat vindt de Commissie daarvan? Is de Commissie van mening dat de soevereiniteit van de lidstaten daarmee wordt aangetast?
8. Kan de Commissie het Europees onderzoeksbevel en de werking ervan in z'n algemeenheid evalueren? Is de Commissie er (on)tevreden mee en waarom?

Antwoord van mevrouw Reding namens de Commissie
(5 juli 2012)

Het initiatief voor een richtlijn van het Europees Parlement en de Raad betreffende het Europees onderzoeksbevel in strafzaken is in april 2010 door zeven lidstaten aan de Raad voorgelegd⁽¹⁾. Op 24 augustus 2010 heeft de Commissie haar advies over dit initiatief uitgebracht⁽²⁾. Momenteel wordt er door de medewetgevers over onderhandeld.

Tijdens een bijeenkomst op 13 en 14 december 2011 kwam de Raad tot een algemene oriëntatie over de tekst van de ontwerprichtlijn. Na een oriënterende stemming in de Commissie burgerlijke vrijheden, justitie en binnenlandse zaken (LIBE), vond op 5 juni 2012 een eerste triloog plaats. De aanname van het Europees onderzoeksbevel volgt de procedure van artikel 294, lid 15, VWEU met betrekking tot wetgevende initiatieven van lidstaten. In juni 2012 heeft de Conferentie van voorzitters van het Europees Parlement besloten dat het Europees Parlement zijn samenwerking met de Raad voor vijf dossiers opschort, waaronder het initiatief van de lidstaten voor een Europees onderzoeksbevel.

⁽¹⁾ PB C 165 van 24.6.2010, blz. 22-39.

⁽²⁾ http://ec.europa.eu/justice/news/intro/doc/comment_2010_08_24_en.pdf

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-005468/12
to the Commission
Auke Zijlstra (NI)
(31 May 2012)**

Subject: European investigation order — time to take stock

1. Can the Commission indicate how often — and through which issuing body in which executing Member State — the European investigation order has already been executed? What were the crimes investigated?
2. Is the Commission of the opinion that it is a poor state of affairs that a Member State executing an investigation order has limited rights to refuse to execute recognise an order from an issuing Member State? Is the Commission of the opinion that the sovereignty of the executing Member State is affected by this?
3. Is the Commission of the opinion that it is undesirable that civil servants and officials of the issuing Member State can assist with the execution of a European investigation order in the executing Member State?
4. Is the Commission of the opinion that the European investigation order should first be reviewed by a court (in the executing Member State) before it is executed?
5. The European investigation order is based on the principle of mutual recognition; this implies equality of the legal systems of all Member States. Is the Commission of the opinion that there are problems with the execution of the law in the Eastern European countries — particularly in connection with the high rate of corruption there — and that, as a consequence, it is unjustified to assume that all the legal systems of the Member States are equal?
6. England's legal system is substantially different from other legal systems throughout Europe which are based on the Napoleonic system. What practical implications does this have? How are problems that arise through differences in the legal systems overcome?
7. Is the Commission of the opinion that the European investigation order represents a step closer to a system of 'European criminal law'? What does the Commission think of this? Is the Commission of the opinion that it affects the sovereignty of Member States?
8. Can the Commission evaluate the European investigation order and its operation in general? Is the Commission satisfied/dissatisfied with it, and why?

**Answer given by Mrs Reding on behalf of the Commission
(5 July 2012)**

The initiative for a directive of the European Parliament and the Council regarding the European Investigation Order in criminal matters (hereafter 'the EIO') was presented to the Council by seven Member States in April 2010 (¹). The Commission issued its opinion on this initiative on 24 August 2010 (²). The instrument is presently being negotiated by the co-legislators.

At a meeting on 13 and 14 December 2011, the Council reached a general approach on the text of the draft Directive. Following an orientation vote in LIBE, a first Trilogue took place on 5 June 2012. The adoption of the EIO follows the procedure set out in Article 294(15) TFEU dealing with legislative initiatives from Member States. In June 2012, the Conference of Presidents of the European Parliament decided that the European Parliament would suspend its cooperation with the Council on five dossiers including on the Member States' initiative for an EIO.

(¹) OJ C 165, 24.6.2010, p. 22-39.

(²) http://ec.europa.eu/justice/news/intro/doc/comment_2010_08_24_en.pdf

(Nederlandse versie)

Vraag met verzoek om schriftelijk antwoord E-005470/12
aan de Commissie
Auke Zijlstra (NI)
(31 mei 2012)

Betreft: Europees arrestatiebevel — Tijd om de balans op te maken

1. Kan de Commissie aangeven hoe vaak — en door welke uitvaardigende in welke uitvoerende lidstaat — het Europees arrestatiebevel reeds is uitgevoerd? Welke gepleegde feiten betrof het?
2. Kan de Commissie aangeven hoe vaak een Europees arrestatiebevel is uitgevaardigd waarbij de toetsing van dubbele strafbaarheid niet noodzakelijk was en het een gepleegd feit betrof dat in de uitvaardigende wél maar in de uitvoerende lidstaat niet strafbaar was? Om welke gepleegde feiten ging het hier? Is de Commissie van mening dat een lidstaat de mogelijkheid zou moeten hebben iemand pas aan te houden en/of naar een andere lidstaat uit te leveren voor een gepleegd feit dat op z'n minst in eerstgenoemde lidstaat strafbaar is?
3. Is de Commissie van mening dat het Europees arrestatiebevel een stap dichter bij het „Europees strafrecht“ is? Wat vindt de Commissie daarvan? Is de Commissie van mening dat de soevereiniteit van de lidstaten daarmee wordt aangetast? Is de Commissie van mening dat elke lidstaat zélf moet kunnen beslissen wanneer hij iemand aanhoudt en/of naar een andere lidstaat uitlevert?
4. Kan de Commissie verklaren waarom het Europees arrestatiebevel door de Midden- en Oost-Europese lidstaten relatief vaak wordt uitgevaardigd? Is de Commissie van mening dat deze landen het Europees arrestatiebevel in zekere zin misbruiken? Wordt het Europees arrestatiebevel door deze landen werkelijk gebruikt waarvoor het oorspronkelijk bedoeld is?
5. Hoe vaak volgde er, na uitvoering van een Europees arrestatiebevel, vrijspraak? Hoe lang duurde de gemiddelde opsluiting? Hoe lang duurde de langste opsluiting? Verschilt dit significant per land?
6. Kan de Commissie het Europees arrestatiebevel en de werking ervan in z'n algemeenheid evalueren? Is de Commissie er (on)tevreden mee en waarom?

Antwoord van mevrouw Reding namens de Commissie
(5 juli 2012)

Statistische gegevens betreffende het Europees aanhoudingsbevel (EAB) op EU-niveau voor de jaren 2005 tot en met 2010 zijn te vinden in documenten van de Raad (¹), die een samenvatting bevatten van de antwoorden op een in 2005 opgestelde vragenlijst inzake kwantitatieve informatie over het EAB (²). Er wordt gewerkt aan een nieuwe vragenlijst die tot betere kwantitatieve gegevens over de werking van het EAB moet leiden.

Een gedetailleerde algemene evaluatie van het EAB is beschikbaar in het in april 2011 opgestelde derde uitvoeringsverslag (³). Zoals uiteengezet in het verslag, verbint de Commissie zich ertoe het EAB-systeem te verbeteren door middel van andere maatregelen, zoals wetgeving inzake procedurele rechten (die in voorbereiding is) en richtsnoeren voor beroepsbeoefenaars. Met betrekking tot het excessieve gebruik van het EAB door de lidstaten voor minder ernstige strafbare feiten, heeft de Commissie benadrukt dat een evenredigheidstoets dient te worden verricht wanneer een EAB wordt uitgevaardigd. De Commissie drong er bij de lidstaten op aan om ervoor te zorgen dat beroepsbeoefenaars het gewijzigde EAB-handboek (⁴) gebruiken als leidraad voor de wijze waarop een evenredigheidstoets moet worden verricht.

⁽¹⁾ Raadsdocumenten 9005/5/06 COPEN 52; 11371/5/07 COPEN 106; 10330/2/08 COPEN 116; 9743/4/09 COPEN 87; 7551/7/10 COPEN 64; 9120/2/11 COPEN 83.

⁽²⁾ Raadsdocument 8111/05 COPEN 75.

⁽³⁾ COM(2011) 175 definitief en SEC(2011) 430 definitief. Verslag van de Commissie aan het Europees Parlement en de Raad over de uitvoering sinds 2007 van het kaderbesluit van de Raad van 13 juni 2002 betreffende het Europees aanhoudingsbevel en de procedures van overlevering tussen lidstaten.

⁽⁴⁾ 17195/10 COPEN 275 van de Raad.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-005470/12
to the Commission
Auke Zijlstra (NI)
(31 May 2012)

Subject: European arrest warrant — time to take stock

1. Can the Commission indicate how often — and in which executing Member State at the request of which issuing Member State — the European arrest warrant has been executed? What were the crimes committed?
2. Can the Commission indicate how often an European arrest warrant has been issued in which verification of double criminality was not necessary and where the offence in question was a criminal offence in the issuing Member State but was not a criminal offence in the executing Member State? What were the offences? Is the Commission of the opinion that a Member State should have the option of not detaining and/or extraditing someone to another Member State unless the person is accused of having committed an offence that is at least a criminal offence in the former Member State?
3. Is the Commission of the opinion that the European arrest warrant represents a step closer to a system of 'European criminal law'? What does the Commission think of this? Is the Commission of the opinion that this affects the sovereignty of Member States? Is the Commission of the opinion that each Member State should be able to decide for itself when to detain someone and/or extradite someone to another Member State?
4. Can the Commission clarify why the European arrest warrant is issued relatively often by Central and Eastern-European Member States? Is the Commission of the opinion that these countries abuse the European arrest warrant to some extent? Is the European arrest warrant being used by these countries for its original intended purpose?
5. How often did acquittal follow the execution of a European arrest warrant? How long did the average detention last? How long did the longest detention last? Does this differ significantly per country?
6. Can the Commission evaluate the European arrest warrant and its operation in general? Is the Commission satisfied/dissatisfied with it, and why?

Answer given by Mrs Reding on behalf of the Commission
(5 July 2012)

Statistical data in respect of the European arrest warrant (EAW) at EU level is available for the years 2005 to 2010 in Council documents ⁽¹⁾, which collate the replies to a questionnaire on quantitative information on the EAW developed in 2005 ⁽²⁾. Work is ongoing in the development of a new questionnaire aimed at improving the quantitative data on the operation of the EAW.

A detailed general assessment of the EAW is available in the Commission's third implementation report issued in April 2011 ⁽³⁾. As set out in the report the Commission is committed to improving the EAW system through other measures such as procedural rights legislation, which is in train, and guidelines to practitioners. To this end, in relation to the overuse of the EAW in minor cases by Member States, the Commission has stressed that a proportionality test should be applied when an EAW is issued. The Commission urged Member States to take steps to ensure that practitioners use the amended EAW handbook ⁽⁴⁾ as the guideline for the manner in which a proportionality test should be applied.

⁽¹⁾ Council Documents 9005/5/06 COPEN 52; 11371/5/07 COPEN 106; 10330/2/08 COPEN 116; 9743/4/09 COPEN 87; 7551/7/10 COPEN 64; 9120/2/11 COPEN 83.

⁽²⁾ Council document 8111/05 COPEN 75.

⁽³⁾ COM(2011) 175 final and SEC(2011) 430 final Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the implementation since 2007 of the Council Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 on the European arrest warrant and the surrender procedures between Member States.

⁽⁴⁾ Council 17195/10 COPEN 275.

(Nederlandse versie)

Vraag met verzoek om schriftelijk antwoord E-005471/12
aan de Commissie
Auke Zijlstra (NI)
(31 mei 2012)

Betreft: Britse regering wil grens sluiten voor Grieken

De Britse regering werkt aan plannen om economische vluchtelingen uit Griekenland te weren, mocht de Griekse economie geheel in elkaar storten. Minister van Binnenlandse Zaken Theresa May heeft gezegd dat het vrije verkeer van personen wat de Britten betreft niet opgaat bij een dergelijke calamiteit. Voor onderdanen van andere PIGS-landen geldt hetzelfde.

1. Is de Commissie bekend met het bericht „Britse regering: grens sluiten voor Grieken“⁽¹⁾?
2. Wat vindt de Commissie ervan dat de Britse regering de grens wil sluiten voor economische vluchtelingen uit Griekenland? Is de Commissie met de PVV van mening dat dit volledig terecht en een logisch gevolg van de in Griekenland ontstane situatie is? Zo neen, waarom niet?
3. Zijn er maatregelen voorzienbaar om bij dergelijke calamiteiten te handelen als bijvoorbeeld de Britse regering voornemens is? Zo neen, waarom niet?

Antwoord van mevrouw Reding namens de Commissie
(6 juli 2012)

Het recht zich vrij op het grondgebied van de lidstaten te verplaatsen en er vrij te verblijven, is een grondrecht dat voortvloeit uit het burgerschap van de Unie en het recht dat de EU-burgers het meest koesteren. De Commissie is vastbesloten om dit elementair individueel recht van de EU-burgers te waarborgen.

De EU-regels over vrij verkeer vormen een goed evenwicht tussen de bescherming van de rechtmatige belangen van de EU-burgers en die van de lidstaten. De lidstaten mogen het vrije verkeer en verblijf van EU-burgers en hun familieleden niet beperken om economische redenen of algemene preventieve redenen. Zij mogen bijvoorbeeld de toegang tot hun grondgebied niet om deze redenen verbieden of beperken.

Het recht op verblijf van EU-burgers en hun familieleden is echter niet onvoorwaardelijk. Het EU-recht staat de lidstaten van ontvangst toe te voorkomen dat EU-burgers een onredelijke belasting voor de openbare financiën worden. EU-burgers die niet aan de in het EU-recht vastgestelde voorwaarden voldoen, kunnen worden verwijderd. In alle gevallen moet een besluit om een EU-burger te verwijderen, echter alle waarborgen eerbiedigen waarin Richtlijn 2004/38/EG voorziet. Verwijdering van EU-burgers is alleen geval per geval mogelijk, met eerbieding van het evenredigheidsbeginsel en uitsluitend op basis van de persoonlijke situatie van de betrokkenen.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-005471/12
to the Commission
Auke Zijlstra (NI)
(31 May 2012)**

Subject: British Government wishes to close its border to Greeks

The British Government plans to bar economic refugees from Greece, should the Greek economy collapse completely. The British Home Secretary, Theresa May, has said that as far as the British are concerned, the free movement of persons will not apply in such an emergency. The same applies to nationals of other PIGS countries.

1. Is the Commission familiar with the report 'British Government: shutting the border on Greeks'? (¹)
2. How does the Commission feel about the British Government closing the border to Greek economic refugees? Does the Commission agree with the Dutch Freedom Party (PVV) that this is completely justified and a logical consequence of the situation in Greece? If not, why not?
3. Are there examples of foreseeable measures in similar emergencies to act as the British Government intends? If not, why not?

**Answer given by Mrs Reding on behalf of the Commission
(6 July 2012)**

The right to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States is a fundamental right attached to Union Citizenship and the right EU citizens cherish the most. The Commission is firmly committed to safeguarding this core individual right of EU citizens.

EU rules on free movement strike a fair balance between the protection of legitimate interests of EU citizens and that of Member States. Member States may not restrict the freedom of movement and residence of EU citizens and their family members on economic grounds or on general preventive grounds. For example, they may not deny or restrict entry on their territory on those grounds.

However, the right of residence of EU citizens and their family members is not unconditional. EC law allows the host Member States to prevent EU citizens from becoming an unreasonable burden on their public finances. Where the EU citizens do not meet the conditions laid down in EC law, they can be removed. However, in all cases, a decision to remove an EU citizen must respect the safeguards provided for by Directive 2004/38/EC. Expulsion of EU citizens is only possible on a case by case basis, respecting the principle of proportionality and based exclusively on the personal situation of the individuals concerned.

(¹) De Volkskrant 29 May 2012, page 4.

(Nederlandse versie)

Vraag met verzoek om schriftelijk antwoord E-005472/12
aan de Commissie
Auke Zijlstra (NI)
(31 mei 2012)

Betreft: Gemeenschappelijk Europees asiel- en immigratiebeleid

In artikel 79, eerste lid, VWEU staat geschreven: „De Unie ontwikkelt een gemeenschappelijk immigratiebeleid, dat erop gericht is in alle stadia te zorgen voor een efficiënt beheer van de migratiestromen, een billijke behandeling van onderdanen van derde landen die legaal op het grondgebied van de lidstaten verblijven, en een preventie en intensievere bestrijding van illegale immigratie en mensenhandel.”

1. Kan de Commissie de balans opmaken betreffende het opzetten van een gemeenschappelijk Europees asiel- en immigratiebeleid? Concreet: in hoeverre is dat thans gevorderd en wat vindt de Commissie daarvan?
2. Welke voor- en nadelen heeft het gemeenschappelijk Europees asiel- en immigratiebeleid tot dusver? In hoeverre heeft het positieve gevolgen gehad? In hoeverre heeft het bijgedragen aan het terugdringen van illegale immigratie naar de EU — bijvoorbeeld in het licht van de massale illegale immigratiestromen vanuit Noord-Afrika? Kan de Commissie dit met cijfers onderbouwen?
3. Elke lidstaat is (maatschappelijk) anders; elke lidstaat heeft met eigen asiel en immigratiezaken en de daaraan verbonden problemen te kampen. Is de Commissie tot de conclusie gekomen dat asielbeleid op Europees niveau niet werkt? Zo neen, waarom niet?
4. Er is gesteld dat tien lidstaten het grootste gedeelte van de asielzoekers in de EU opnemen; kan de Commissie aangeven of dit klopt? Is de Commissie voornemens ervoor te zorgen dat ook de lidstaten die nog geen tot relatief weinig asielzoekers hebben opgenomen, zoals Slowakije en Roemenië, dit in het vervolg gaan doen? Zo neen, waarom niet? Zo ja, hoe gaat de Commissie dat doen?

Antwoord van mevrouw Malmström namens de Commissie
(5 juli 2012)

1. De Commissie stelt een jaarverslag over immigratie en asiel op waarin de vooruitgang die op dit gebied is geboekt, wordt geëvalueerd. Het geachte Parlementslid wordt verzocht het recentste verslag (¹) door te nemen. Hierin wordt een vooruitblikkende analyse van het EU-migratiebeleid aangeboden, gebaseerd op ontwikkelingen uit 2011.
2. In het jaarverslag wordt ook op deze aspecten ingegaan en worden statistieken verstrekt over (onder meer) het aantal mensen dat na de Arabische lente naar de EU is gereisd. „Het EU-optreden inzake de migratiendruk — een strategische reactie” (²), dat in april 2012 door de JBZ-Raad is goedgekeurd, formuleert de prioriteiten van de EU om illegale migratie het best aan te pakken. Het geachte Parlementslid wordt ook verwezen naar de antwoorden op vragen E-004189/2012 en E-002316/2012 (³).
3. Lidstaten moeten samenwerken om gemeenschappelijke oplossingen te vinden die hoge beschermingsnormen voor asielzoekers en vluchtelingen garanderen. Procedures moeten in de hele EU eerlijk en doeltreffend zijn en ondoordringbaar voor misbruik. Hoewel de evaluaties tonen dat er reeds enige vooruitgang is geboekt, heeft de Commissie toch meerdere voorstellen ingediend om de huidige normen verder te verbeteren en eerlijke en efficiënte asielstelsels te verkrijgen. Als medewetgever is het Europees Parlement volledig betrokken bij de onderhandelingen over deze voorstellen.
4. In 2011 hebben tien lidstaten 90 % van alle asielverzoeken gekregen. Het jaarverslag geeft hiervan een compleet overzicht. Eerder heeft de Commissie reeds haar beleid (⁴) voor een betere verdeling van verantwoordelijkheid tussen de lidstaten via een versterkte solidariteit binnen de EU uiteengezet.

(¹) COM(2012) 250 en het begeleidende werkdocument van de diensten van de Commissie (2012) 139.
(²) Document 8714/1/12 van de Raad.
(³) <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/QP-WEB/application/home.do?language=NL>.
(⁴) COM(2011) 835.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-005472/12
to the Commission
Auke Zijlstra (NI)
(31 May 2012)**

Subject: Joint European asylum and immigration policy

Article 79(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union stipulates: 'The Union shall develop a common immigration policy aimed at ensuring, at all stages, the efficient management of migration flows, fair treatment of third-country nationals residing legally in Member States, and the prevention of, and enhanced measures to combat, illegal immigration and trafficking in human beings.'

1. Can the Commission say to what extent a common European asylum and immigration policy has been established, indicating progress made to date and its own assessment thereof?
2. What advantages and disadvantages has the common European asylum and immigration policy had to date? To what extent have the results been positive? To what extent has the policy helped curtail illegal immigration into the EU — following the massive streams of illegal immigrants from Northern Africa for example? Can the Commission support this with figures?
3. Given that each Member State is (socially) distinct, having to deal with its own asylum and immigration issues and related problems, has the Commission concluded that asylum policy is failing to work at European level? If not, why not?
4. Can the Commission confirm that the task of accommodating asylum-seekers in the EU is principally incumbent on ten Member States alone? Does it intend to ensure that Member States that still have accepted few or no asylum-seekers, such as Slovakia and Romania, will do so in the future? If not, why not? If so, what action will it take to achieve do this?

**Answer given by Ms Malmström on behalf of the Commission
(5 July 2012)**

1. The Commission produces an Annual Report on Immigration and Asylum reviewing the progress made in this respect. The Honourable Member is invited to peruse the latest report ⁽¹⁾, which gives a forward-looking analysis of EU migration policy based on 2011 developments.
2. The annual report also addresses these aspects and provides statistics on *inter alia* the numbers travelling to the EU following the Arab Spring. The *EU Action on Migratory Pressures — A Strategic Response* ⁽²⁾ agreed by the JHA Council in April 2012 sets out priorities for the EU to best tackle irregular migration. The Honourable Member is also referred to our replies to E-004189/2012 and E-002316/2012 ⁽³⁾.
3. Member States need to work together to find common solutions that guarantee high standards of protection for asylum-seekers and refugees. Procedures must be fair and effective throughout the EU and impervious to misuse. Whilst the evaluations showed that some progress had been made, nevertheless the Commission made several proposals to further improve the current standards and achieve asylum systems which are fair and efficient. As co-legislator, the European Parliament is fully involved in the negotiations on these proposals.
4. In 2011, ten Member States received 90% of all EU asylum applications and the annual report gives a complete overview. The Commission has previously set out its policy ⁽⁴⁾ for sharing responsibility between Member States via enhanced intra-EU solidarity.

⁽¹⁾ COM(2012) 250 plus its accompanying factual report SWD(2012) 139.
⁽²⁾ Council Doc 8714/1/12.
⁽³⁾ <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/QP-WEB>.
⁽⁴⁾ COM(2011)835.

(Nederlandse versie)

**Vraag met verzoek om schriftelijk antwoord E-005473/12
aan de Commissie
Auke Zijlstra (NI)
(31 mei 2012)**

Betreft: Amsterdamse buurtregisseur bevestigt problematiek Midden- en Oost-Europeanen (vervolgvraag)

Op 23 mei 2012 heeft Eurocommissaris Reding namens de Europese Commissie antwoord gegeven op schriftelijke vraag E-003423/2012. In deze vraag werd de Commissie gewezen op een column van John Beerman, buurtregisseur in Amsterdam, een man uit de praktijk die geconfronteerd wordt met de negatieve gevolgen van het opengrenzenbeleid. In zijn column schrijft hij: „De nieuwelingen [Midden- en Oost-Europeanen] aan het firmament der grootstedelijke criminaliteit laten namelijk een brandend spoor van ellende achter zich. Als zij weggaan. [...] De nuchtere waarheid toont zich in cijfers. De laatste 1 800 verdachten in onze regio waren als volgt verdeeld: Pools 317, Roemeens 253, Litouws 206, Bulgaars 55, Nederlands 226, waarvan deels met een dubbele nationaliteit. Van deze 1 800 personen hadden er slechts 117 een vast adres in Nederland.”

In haar antwoord schrijft de Commissie: „De Commissie is niet bekend met persknipsels die door individuele buurtregisseurs worden geschreven in de lidstaten, ook niet met de column waar het geachte Parlementslid naar verwijst. De Commissie is niet in staat om zich uit te spreken over de cijfers die in diezelfde column worden vermeld.”

Ik wijs de Commissie erop dat een buurtregisseur een politieambtenaar is die naar Nederlandse traditie door het afleggen van de ambtseed heeft gezworen zijn ambt nauwgezet te vervullen.

1. Als de Commissie alsnog bereid de column van John Beerman te lezen (¹)?
2. Herkent de Commissie ook negatieve gevolgen van de opengrenzenpolitiek? Zo ja, welke?
3. Is de Commissie ertoe bereid de negatieve gevolgen van het opengrenzenbeleid objectief te onderzoeken — bijvoorbeeld aan de hand van de in de column van John Beerman aangehaalde cijfers? Is de Commissie alsnog ertoe bereid zich in dezen uit te spreken?

**Antwoord van mevrouw Reding namens de Commissie
(6 juli 2012)**

De Commissie wenst haar verklaring te herhalen die zij heeft gegeven in haar antwoord op schriftelijke vraag nr. E-003423/2012 (²).

(¹) <http://www.geenstijl.nl/archives/images/agentjohn.html>
(²) <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/QP-WEB>.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-005473/12
to the Commission
Auke Zijlstra (NI)
(31 May 2012)**

Subject: Amsterdam neighbourhood police officer confirms problems with Central and Eastern Europeans (follow-up question)

On 23 May 2012, member of the European Commission Reding responded on behalf of the European Commission to Written Question E-003423/2012. In the original question, the Commission's attention was drawn to a column by John Beerman, neighbourhood police officer in Amsterdam, a man in a real-life situation who is confronted with the open-borders policy's negative consequences. In his column, Beerman writes: 'The newcomers [Central and Eastern Europeans] to the world of metropolitan crime leave a burning trail of misery behind them. That is, if indeed they do leave. [...] The harsh truth shows itself in the figures. The breakdown of the latest 1 800 criminal suspects in our region was as follows: 317 Poles, 253 Romanians, 206 Lithuanians, 55 Bulgarians and 226 Dutch citizens, some with dual nationality. Of these 1 800 people, only 117 had a permanent address in the Netherlands.'

The Commission's answer states: 'The Commission is not familiar with press clippings written by individual police officers in the Member States, including the column referred to by the Honourable Member. The Commission is not in a position to comment on the figures mentioned in the said column.'

I would like to point out to the Commission that the neighbourhood police officer is a police officer, who, thanks to the Dutch tradition of taking an oath, has sworn an oath of office to meticulously carry out his job.

1. Is the Commission finally prepared to read John Beerman's column ⁽¹⁾?
2. Does the Commission also recognise negative consequences of the open-borders policy? If so, which ones?
3. Is the Commission prepared to objectively investigate the negative consequences of the open-border policy — for example using the figures provided in John Beerman's column? Is the Commission finally prepared to make a statement with regard to these?

**Answer given by Mme Reding on behalf of the Commission
(6 July 2012)**

The Commission would like to reiterate the statement it made in its reply to Written Question E-003423/2012 ⁽²⁾.

⁽¹⁾ <http://www.geenstijl.nl/archives/images/agentjohn.html>
⁽²⁾ <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/QP-WEB>.

(Versiunea în limba română)

Întrebarea cu solicitare de răspuns scris E-005475/12
adresată Comisiei
Vasilica Viorica Dăncilă (S&D)
(31 mai 2012)

Subiect: Cercetare în agricultură

Programul Orizont 2020 reunește pentru prima dată, în același program, fondurile Uniunii Europene destinate cercetării și inovării. Având în vedere că cea de-a treia axă a acestui program abordează în mod specific aspectele legate de agricultură, la nivelul Uniunii ar trebui să se depună eforturi deosebite pentru a se asigura faptul că agricultorii și organizațiile lor reprezentative participă la activități legate de schimbul de cunoștințe în domeniul și că au un rol important în ceea ce privește stabilirea priorităților de cercetare. Cercetătorii trebuie să primească stimulente pentru a participa la activități legate de schimbul de cunoștințe, chiar dacă acestea se referă la activități de cercetare care au loc deja.

Abordarea la nivelul Uniunii este, de asemenea, necesară pentru a asigura coerenta în soluționarea acestor provocări pentru toate sectoarele și în strânsă corelare cu politicile relevante ale Uniunii. Coordonarea cercetării și inovării la nivelul Uniunii stimulează și contribuie la accelerarea schimbărilor necesare în întreaga Uniune.

— În aceste condiții, cum intenționează Comisia să sprijine activitățile legate de schimbul de cunoștințe, astfel încât părerile agricultorilor cu privire la prioritățile de cercetare să fie ascultate?

— Ce măsuri are în vedere Comisia pentru a stimula oamenii de știință din agricultură să desfășoare activități de cercetare noi?

Răspuns dat de dna Geoghegan-Quinn în numele Comisiei
(9 iulie 2012)

Activitățile legate de schimbul de cunoștințe dintre agricultori și cercetători sunt componente importante atât ale politicii europene de cercetare, cât și ale politiciei agricole comune (PAC). Se așteaptă ca participarea actorilor relevanți, folosind expertiza specifică a fiecărei categorii de parteneri (oameni de știință, agricultori, consilieri etc.), să maximizeze relevanța acțiunilor de cercetare.

Programul Orizont 2020 subliniază necesitatea de a „facilita schimbul de cunoștințe, activitățile demonstrative, inovarea și diseminarea”. Intenția Comisiei este de a pune în aplicare aceste obiective în programele de lucru ale Orizont 2020.

Comitetul permanent privind cercetarea agricolă (SCAR) va oferi consultanță în privința modalităților de facilitare a schimbului de cunoștințe⁽¹⁾. Mandatul grupului de lucru în colaborare „Cunoștințe agricole și sisteme de inovare” din cadrul SCAR a fost reînnoit.

Punerea în aplicare a parteneriatului european pentru inovare intitulat „Productivitatea și durabilitatea agriculturii”⁽²⁾ se va face „prin intermediul grupurilor operaționale, care vor fi actorii principali, cu implicarea fermierilor, a oamenilor de știință, a consilierilor, a întreprinderilor etc.”. Rețeaua parteneriatului european pentru inovare va interconecta acțiunile referitoare la inovare, va asigura un flux de informații eficient și va sprijini schimbul de bune practici, contribuind la transmiterea către Orizont 2020 a nevoilor de cercetare și inovare din sectorul agricol.

Ultima cerere de propuneri din domeniul cercetării din cel de-al șaptelea program-cadru pentru cercetare și dezvoltare tehnologică (FP7, 2007-2013) vizează cercetarea referitoare la producția primară și are un buget indicativ de 125 de milioane de EUR, având ca tematică instrumentele de eliminare a decalajului existent în materie de inovare între cercetare și practicele agricole. Publicarea cererii de propuneri este prevăzută la 10 iulie 2012, termenul limită de depunere a propunerilor fiind 5 februarie 2013.

⁽¹⁾ Raportul recent: http://ec.europa.eu/research/agriculture/scar/pdf/akis_web.pdf
⁽²⁾ COM(2012)79final.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-005475/12
to the Commission**
Vasilica Viorica Dăncilă (S&D)
(31 May 2012)

Subject: Research in agriculture

The Horizon 2020 programme brings together all EU research and innovation funding under a single programme for the first time. Given that the third axis of this programme addresses specifically issues relating to agriculture, the EU should make special efforts to ensure that farmers and their representative organisations engage in knowledge exchange activities in the field and play an important role in setting up research priorities. Researchers should be given incentives to engage in knowledge exchange activities, even if they relate to research already taking place.

An approach at EU level is also necessary to ensure consistency in meeting these challenges for all sectors and in close correlation with the relevant EU policies. Coordinating research and innovation at EU level stimulates and contributes to accelerating the changes required throughout the Union.

- In these circumstances, how does the Commission intend to support knowledge exchange activities so that farmers' views on research priorities are heard?
- What measures is the Commission considering to stimulate agricultural scientists to carry out new research?

Answer given by Ms Geoghegan-Quinn on behalf of the Commission
(9 July 2012)

Knowledge exchange activities between farmers and researchers are important components of both, the EU research policy and the common agricultural policy (CAP). The participation of relevant actors using the specific expertise of each category of partners (scientists, farmers, advisers, etc.) is expected to maximise the relevance of research actions.

Horizon 2020 emphasises the need to 'facilitate knowledge exchange, demonstration, innovation and dissemination'. It is the intention of the Commission to implement these objectives in the work programmes of Horizon 2020.

The Standing Committee on Agricultural Research (SCAR) will advise how to facilitate knowledge exchange⁽¹⁾. The mandate of the SCAR 'Agricultural Knowledge and Innovation Systems' Collaborative Working group was renewed.

The implementation of the European Innovation Partnership (EIP) 'Agricultural Productivity and Sustainability'⁽²⁾ will be channelled 'through operational groups as key acting entities, involving actors such as farmers, scientists, advisors, enterprises etc.'. The EIP Network will interlink innovation-related actions, ensure an effective flow of information and support exchange on best practice, contributing to convey to Horizon 2020 the research and innovation needs of the farming sector.

The last call for research proposals in the Seventh Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development (FP7, 2007-2013) is covering primary production related research with an indicative budget of EUR 125 million. It foresees a topic for tools to close the innovation gap between research and farming practice. The call publication is foreseen for 10 July 2012 with a deadline for submission of proposals of 5 February 2013.

⁽¹⁾ recent report: http://ec.europa.eu/research/agriculture/scar/pdf/akis_web.pdf
⁽²⁾ COM(2012)79final.

(Nederlandse versie)

**Vraag met verzoek om schriftelijk antwoord E-005476/12
aan de Commissie
Auke Zijlstra (NI)
(31 mei 2012)**

Betreft: Verdachte Chinese microchips

1. Is de Commissie bekend met het bestaan van in China gefabriceerde computerchips met een nieuwe scanmethode⁽¹⁾? In deze chips is een speciale code ingebouwd waarmee kwaadwillenden de chip kunnen manipuleren. Daarmee is elk apparaat waarin de chip is ingebouwd gevoelig voor diefstal van intellectueel eigendom, fraude of erger. Deze chips zijn niet met normale antivirusprogramma's te ontdekken omdat de meeste van deze programma's alleen de software op een computer controleren en niet controleren op hardwareniveau.
2. Onderkent de Commissie het gevaar van het gebruik van dergelijke chips in Europese producten?
3. Zo nee, waarom niet?
4. Welke maatregelen heeft de Commissie genomen om te voorkomen dat dergelijke chips worden gebruikt in Europese producten?
5. Hoe gaat de Commissie voorkomen dat dergelijke chips worden gebruikt in producten die onderdelen vormen van Europese strategisch cruciale bedrijven zoals communicatie-, veiligheids- en energiebedrijven?
6. Welk actie heeft de Commissie ondernomen bij de Chinese autoriteiten om aan te geven dat het fabriceren van dergelijke chips voor de Commissie onacceptabel is?
7. Welke gevolgen heeft de productie van dergelijke chips voor de EU-handelsbetrekkingen met China?
8. Welke compensatie kunnen afnemers van dergelijke chips verwachten voor de schade die zij lijden door het gebruik van de chips?

**Antwoord van mevrouw Kroes namens de Commissie
(5 juli 2012)**

De Commissie is op de hoogte van de mogelijke veiligheidsrisico's van het gebruik van hardware- en softwarecomponenten van niet-betrouwbare bronnen. Het gaat om een bekend probleem waarvan het belang almaal toeneemt, niet enkel voor militaire systemen, zoals wordt vermeld in het artikel waarnaar het geachte Parlementslid verwijst, maar ook voor andere cruciale infrastructuur.

In de bredere context van de „veiligheid van de ICT-bedrijfsketen” heeft de Commissie met de lidstaten en de particuliere sector samengewerkt aan de veiligheidsaspecten van computeronderdelen. In dit verband heeft zij ENISA verzocht bestaande praktijken en kwesties die relevant zijn voor de veiligheid van de ICT-bedrijfsketen te onderzoeken; de resultaten van dat onderzoek worden binnenkort verwacht. Bovendien heeft zij in het raamwerk van het thema ICT van het zevende kaderprogramma enkele onderzoeksprojecten met betrekking tot Trojaanse paarden op hardwareniveau opgezet.

Ook in het kader van de ophanden zijnde Europese Strategie voor cybersicuriteit zullen veiligheidsaspecten van de ICT-bedrijfsketen aan bod komen. In dit verband zal de Commissie de behoefté nagaan aan specifieke maatregelen ter bevordering van een hoger veiligheidsniveau, met name door het gebruik van internationale normen en praktijken voor risicobeheer, IT-veiligheid, veiligheidscertificatie en -controles te stimuleren.

Op militair gebied en op andere gebieden met betrekking tot nationale veiligheid, zoals die welke het geachte Parlementslid noemt, zijn de bevoegdheid en de taken van de EU beperkt. In het kader van hun prerogatieven inzake nationale veiligheid bepalen de lidstaten wat zij als passende veiligheidsvereisten beschouwen.

⁽¹⁾ <http://nos.nl/artikel/377595-achterdeurtjes-in-chinese-chips.html>

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-005476/12
to the Commission
Auke Zijlstra (NI)
(31 May 2012)**

Subject: Suspicious Chinese microchips

1. Is the Commission aware of the existence of computer chips manufactured in China using a new scan method (1)? A special code built into the chips makes it possible for persons of malicious intent to manipulate them, with the result that any appliance in which the chip is installed becomes vulnerable to crimes involving theft of intellectual property, fraud or worse. Normal anti-virus programmes cannot detect these chips, because most only check computer software, not the hardware.
2. Does the Commission acknowledge the dangers inherent in the use of such chips in European products?
3. If not, why not?
4. What steps has the Commission taken to prevent such chips being used in European products?
5. How will the Commission prevent such chips from being used in products of strategic importance, such as those employed by communications, security and energy firms?
6. What representations has the Commission made to the Chinese authorities to put across to them that the manufacture of such chips is unacceptable?
7. What implications does the manufacture of such chips have for EU-China trade relations?
8. What compensation can purchasers of such chips expect for any damage incurred as a result of their use?

**Answer given by Ms Kroes on behalf of the Commission
(5 July 2012)**

The Commission is aware of the potential security risks of deploying computer hardware and software components from non-trustworthy sources. This is a well-known issue which becomes ever more important not only for military systems, as referred to in the article quoted by the Honourable Member, but also for other critical infrastructures.

The Commission has been working with Member States and the private sector on security aspects of computer parts in the broader context of 'ICT supply chain security'. In this context, it has requested ENISA to analyse existing practices and issues relevant to ICT supply chain security, and results are expected soon. Moreover, it has launched some research projects regarding hardware trojans under the ICT theme of the 7th Framework Programme.

Additionally, aspects of ICT supply chain security will be addressed by the forthcoming European Strategy for Cyber Security. In this respect, the Commission will examine the need for specific measures to promote a higher level of security, in particular by leveraging the use of international standards and practices for risk management, IT security, security certification and audits.

However, in the military domain and other areas where national security is involved, such as those highlighted by the Honourable Member, the competence and responsibilities of the EU are limited. As part of their national security prerogatives, Member States define what they consider to be appropriate security requirements.

(1) <http://nos.nl/artikel/377595-achterdeurtjes-in-chinese-chips.html>

(Versiunea în limba română)

Întrebarea cu solicitare de răspuns scris E-005477/12
adresată Comisiei
Vasilica Viorica Dăncilă (S&D)
(31 mai 2012)

Subiect: Bunăstarea copilului din mediul rural

Studiul „Bunăstarea copilului din mediul rural”, prezentat de World Vision România, arată că aproape două treimi dintre adulții interviewați au afirmat că își tratează copiii acasă, fără a-i duce la medic atunci când sunt bolnavi, iar dintre cei care merg la medic, două treimi apelează la doctorul din orașul apropiat și numai o treime la medicul din comună.

În rândul familiilor sărace, proporția celor care își tratează copiii la medic este și mai scăzută. Dincolo de limitările inerente indicatorilor folosiți, faptul că peste jumătate dintre copiii bolnavi sunt tratați fără a fi văzuți de medic, în familiile rurale, este îngrijorător din perspectiva dreptului copilului la o îngrijire medicală de calitate.

1. Dispune Comisia de date privind situații similare și în alte state membre ale Uniunii Europene?
2. Poate oferi Comisia recomandări pentru contracararea acestei situații?

Răspuns dat de dl Dalli în numele Comisiei
(9 iulie 2012)

1. În 2009, în cadrul anchetei anuale pentru Statistica privind veniturile, incluziunea socială și condițiile de trai, Eurostat a colectat date, de la gospodăriile cu copii, în legătură cu nevoile nesatisfăcute ale copiilor de a fi consultați de un medic generalist sau de un medic specialist, precum și de un stomatolog. Sunt disponibile date pentru 18 state membre⁽¹⁾, defalcate în funcție de nivelul de sărăcie și de densitatea populației. Datele arată că nevoile nesatisfăcute de consultare a unui medic generalist variază între 0,1% și 10,5% între statele membre și că procentul este de 7,2% pentru România. Rata nevoii nesatisfăcute de a consulta un medic generalist crește la 12,5% în zonele puțin populate (7,8% în cazul României), la 20,7% pentru cei care trăiesc în condiții de mare sărăcie (11,8% în cazul României) și respectiv la 30,3% în cazul celor mai săraci (9,9% în cazul României).
2. Conform articolului 168 referitor la sănătatea publică din Tratatul de funcționare a Uniunii Europene, organizarea și prestarea de servicii de sănătate și de îngrijire medicală ține de responsabilitatea statelor membre. Prin urmare, Comisia nu are competența de a interveni în problema copiilor tratați fără a fi fost consultați de un medic în zonele rurale din România.

⁽¹⁾ http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/income_social_inclusion_living_conditions/data/ad_hoc_modules (variabilele HD250 și HD260).

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-005477/12
to the Commission**
Vasilica Viorica Dăncilă (S&D)
(31 May 2012)

Subject: Child welfare in rural areas

In the 'Child welfare in rural areas' study presented by World Vision Romania, nearly two thirds of the adults interviewed claim that they treat their children themselves when they fall ill, without taking them to a doctor. Of those who do go to a doctor, two thirds call the doctor from a nearby town while only one third call the local doctor.

Among poor families, the proportion of children treated by a doctor is even lower. Although there are inherent limitations in the indicators used, it is still alarming, from the perspective of a child's right to quality medical care, that more than half of sick children in rural families are treated without being seen by a doctor.

1. Does the Commission have statistics at its disposal on similar situations in other EU Member States?
2. Can the Commission make recommendations on how to tackle this situation?

Answer given by Mr Dalli on behalf of the Commission
(9 July 2012)

1. In 2009, as part of the annual survey for Statistics on income, social inclusion and living conditions, Eurostat gathered data from households with children about children's unmet needs for consulting a general practitioner (GP) or a specialist and a dentist. Data broken down by level of material deprivation and population density is available for 18 Member States (¹). It shows that the unmet needs for consulting a GP vary from 0.1% to 10.5% between Member States, and the percentage is 7.2% for Romania. The rate of unmet need for meeting a GP widens to 12.5% in thinly-populated areas (Romania: 7.8%), to 20.7% for the severely materially deprived (Romania: 11.8%) and 30.3% amongst the poorest (Romania: 9.9%).

2. According to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Article 168 on Public Health, Member States are responsible for the organisation and delivery of health services and medical care. The Commission therefore has no competence to intervene on the issue of children treated without being seen by a doctor in rural areas in Romania.

¹) http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/income_social_inclusion_living_conditions/data/ad_hoc_modules (variables HD250 and HD260).

(Version française)

Question avec demande de réponse écrite E-005479/12
à la Commission
Christine De Veyrac (PPE)
(31 mai 2012)

Objet: Candidats à l'adhésion et capacité d'intégration de l'Union

Alors que la Croatie devrait prochainement devenir le 28^e État membre de l'Union européenne, l'adhésion au projet communautaire fait toujours l'objet de nombreuses candidatures, parmi lesquelles figurent notamment la Serbie, le Monténégro, l'ancienne République yougoslave de Macédoine ou encore l'Islande. Les négociations avec ce dernier pays semblent d'ailleurs avancer rapidement, avec déjà 15 chapitres ouverts dont 10 clos.

Le Conseil européen avait à ce titre établi en 1993 à Copenhague, s'agissant de l'élargissement, que l'Union devait être à même d'intégrer de nouveaux États, sans pour autant mettre en danger l'élan du processus d'intégration. En 2006, la Commission avait explicité la notion de «capacité d'intégration», qui repose notamment sur l'examen de trois composantes: l'impact de l'adhésion sur le fonctionnement institutionnel de l'Union, sur les politiques qu'elle mène et enfin, sur son budget.

La crise économique et politique majeure que traverse actuellement l'Europe vient alors poser avec une acuité particulière la question de la capacité d'intégration de l'Union. L'élargissement ne saurait en effet se faire aux dépens de la stabilité de nos sociétés et de nos économies, dont bénéficient l'ensemble des pays membres et candidats.

1. Dans quelle mesure cette capacité d'intégration, en termes budgétaires notamment, est-elle et sera-t-elle examinée et prise en compte dans l'éventuelle ouverture et la conduite de nouvelles négociations avec les pays candidats?
2. La Commission dispose-t-elle d'informations pertinentes permettant d'évaluer les conséquences de l'éventuelle adhésion des différents pays candidats?

Réponse donnée par M. Füle au nom de la Commission
(13 juillet 2012)

Conformément aux conclusions du Conseil européen relatives au consensus renouvelé sur l'élargissement, de décembre 2006, la Commission fournit, lorsqu'elle l'estime nécessaire, des évaluations d'impact sur des domaines de politique clefs, dans le cadre de son avis sur la candidature d'un pays ainsi qu'au cours des négociations d'adhésion.

Depuis 2006, la Commission a émis des avis sur les candidatures d'adhésion à l'Union européenne de l'Islande, de l'Albanie, du Monténégro (2010) et de la Serbie (2011). Outre le fait de fournir une analyse des capacités de chaque pays à remplir les critères d'adhésion, ces avis déterminent également des domaines politiques clefs susceptibles d'exiger une attention particulière dans l'éventualité d'une adhésion de chaque pays. Ils fournissent aussi des estimations initiales d'impact en ce qui concerne les politiques et les secteurs en question.

Des négociations d'adhésion sont actuellement en cours avec la Turquie et l'Islande. Les négociations avec la Croatie se sont achevées en juin 2011. Au cours de ces négociations, des études d'impact ont été menées, par exemple, sur la libre circulation des travailleurs ainsi que dans le domaine des transports. En ce qui concerne l'impact budgétaire de l'adhésion de la Croatie, la Commission a adopté une communication [COM(2009)595 final] sur une enveloppe financière pour les négociations d'adhésion avec la Croatie. Cette communication a servi de base au Conseil pour débattre et, par la suite, mener à bien les discussions sur les principaux aspects financiers de l'adhésion de la Croatie à l'Union européenne, notamment dans les domaines de l'agriculture, de la politique régionale et des dispositions financières et budgétaires.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-005479/12
to the Commission
Christine De Veyrac (PPE)
(31 May 2012)**

Subject: Candidate countries and the Union's capacity for integration

While Croatia should soon become the 28th Member State of the European Union, there are still quite a number of candidates for membership, including, in particular, Serbia, Montenegro, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Iceland. Negotiations with Iceland appear to be advancing rapidly, with 15 chapters having been opened already, of which 10 have been closed.

In Copenhagen in 1993, the European Council established, in this regard, that the European Union should be capable of integrating these new states, without putting the impetus for integration in danger. In 2006, the Commission explained the concept of the 'capacity for integration', which is based on an examination of three elements in particular: the impact of membership on the institutional functioning of the Union, on its policies and on its budget.

The current major political and economic crisis across Europe raises the question of the Union's capacity for integration with particular acuity. Enlargement should not be achieved at the expense of the stability of the societies and economies from which all Member States and candidate countries benefit.

1. To what extent is this capacity for integration, particularly in budgetary terms, being examined and taken into account — or will it be examined and taken into account — in opening and conducting new negotiations with candidate countries?
2. Does the Commission have relevant information available to it that would facilitate an evaluation of the consequences of membership of the various candidate countries?

**Answer given by Mr Füle on behalf of the Commission
(13 July 2012)**

In line with the European Council conclusions of December 2006 on the renewed consensus on enlargement, the Commission provides impact assessments, where appropriate, on key policy areas in the context of the Commission's Opinion on a country's application for membership and in the course of accession negotiations.

Since 2006, the Commission has issued Opinions on applications for EU membership of Iceland, Albania and Montenegro (2010) and of Serbia (2011). In addition to providing an analysis of each country's capacity to meet the membership criteria, these Opinions also identify key policy areas likely to require particular attention in the event of each country's accession and provide initial impact estimates with regard to the policies and sectors concerned.

Accession negotiations are currently ongoing with Turkey and Iceland. Negotiations with Croatia were concluded in June 2011. In the course of these negotiations, for example, impact studies were carried out on the free movement of workers and in the area of transport. As regards the budgetary impact of Croatia's accession, the Commission adopted a communication (COM(2009) 595 final) on a financial package for the accession negotiations with Croatia. This communication served as a basis for the Council to debate and, subsequently, to conclude discussions on the main financial aspects of the accession of Croatia to the EU, in particular in the fields of agriculture, regional policy, and financial and budgetary provisions.

(Versão portuguesa)

Pergunta com pedido de resposta escrita E-005481/12
à Comissão
João Ferreira (GUE/NGL) e Inês Cristina Zuber (GUE/NGL)
(31 de maio de 2012)

Assunto: Recomendações de política económica da Comissão Europeia relativas a Portugal

A Comissão Europeia divulgou hoje recomendações de política económica relativas a Portugal. Nessas recomendações reconhece-se que a situação do emprego se deteriorou significativamente nos últimos meses, e que a mesma se vai agravar ainda mais ao longo deste ano. Esta situação dramática é indissociável do conteúdo do programa UE-FMI em curso no país. Sublinhe-se que programas com conteúdo idêntico, na Grécia e na Irlanda, tiveram e estão a ter idênticos resultados: desemprego em níveis históricos, pobreza e emigração.

É neste cenário que a Comissão inclui nas recomendações relativas a Portugal, agora divulgadas, a redução dos custos do trabalho e a redução da duração máxima dos subsídios de desemprego.

Recorde-se que há poucas semanas, na apresentação do chamado «pacote do emprego», a Comissão Europeia anunciou propostas ou intenções como «estabelecer salários dignos e sustentáveis e evitar situações em que as pessoas vivem perpetuamente de salários baixos» ou «reduzir a insegurança no emprego».

Assim, perguntamos à Comissão:

1. Tendo em conta que os salários portugueses já são dos mais baixos da UE, à luz das presentes recomendações, o que entende a Comissão por «estabelecer salários dignos e sustentáveis e evitar situações em que as pessoas vivem perpetuamente de salários baixos»?
2. De entre os milhões de portugueses em situação de pobreza, sabe quantos deles têm um emprego? Ou seja, sabe quantos portugueses foram arrastados para uma situação de pobreza vítimas de baixos salários?
3. Sabe qual a percentagem do rendimento nacional que cabe aos salários em Portugal? Sabe que essa percentagem tem vindo a evoluir de forma desfavorável aos salários nos últimos anos, sendo já hoje inferior a 50 %?
4. Tem conhecimento dos dados relativos ao desemprego de longa duração e à sua evolução? Como justifica, à luz desses dados, a proposta de redução da duração máxima dos subsídios de desemprego, privando os trabalhadores desempregados de prestações às quais têm direito porque para elas descontaram enquanto trabalharam?

Resposta dada por Olli Rehn em nome da Comissão
(27 de julho de 2012)

O «pacote do emprego»⁽¹⁾ promove a concessão de benefícios laborais cuidadosamente concebidos e de salário mínimo com o objetivo de evitar a pobreza dos trabalhadores e as armadilhas dos salários baixos, encorajando as pessoas a aceitarem trabalhos de qualidade declarados, por um lado, e, por outro, garantindo que os custos do trabalho se alinhem pela evolução da produtividade.

A percentagem de trabalhadores em risco de pobreza em Portugal era de 9,7 % em 2010, um tanto inferior aos 10,3 % de 2009 e aos 11,8 % de 2008. A persistência de baixos salários em Portugal reflete um modelo económico historicamente baseado numa estrutura de baixos salários e baixos níveis de produtividade.

A taxa de desemprego em Portugal tem vindo a aumentar desde o princípio deste século. Em 2000 era de 4,5 %; aumentou continuamente até aos 8,9 % em 2007 e chegou aos 12,9 % em 2011. O aumento do desemprego em Portugal é, pois, um fenómeno de longo prazo que tem as suas raízes em fatores de natureza estrutural que precisam de ser combatidos por políticas estruturais adequadas, como previsto pelo programa de ajustamento económico do Governo.

A percentagem do PIB português atribuível ao trabalho assalariado ascendeu a 50,2 % em 2011, segundo as estimativas, o que compara com os 48,9 % da zona euro⁽²⁾.

⁽¹⁾ Acompanhado por nove documentos de trabalho dos serviços da Comissão,
http://ec.europa.eu/commission_2010-2014/andor/headlines/news/2012/04/20120418_en.htm.

⁽²⁾ Fonte: base de dados AMECO.

O desemprego de longa duração em percentagem da força laboral é superior, em Portugal, à média da zona euro desde 2006. Em 2011 essa percentagem era de 6,2 %, enquanto na zona euro era de 4,6 % (¹). A decisão do Governo português de reduzir a duração máxima dos subsídios de desemprego baseia-se em investigação empírica que mostra que os países onde essa duração máxima é elevada tendem a apresentar taxas elevadas de desemprego de longa duração. Mesmo após essa redução, para um grupo grande de assalariados a duração máxima em Portugal continua a ser superior à de outros Estados-Membros da UE.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-005481/12
to the Commission**

João Ferreira (GUE/NGL) and Inês Cristina Zuber (GUE/NGL)

(31 May 2012)

Subject: The Commission's economic policy recommendations for Portugal

Today, the Commission unveiled its economic policy recommendations for Portugal, recognising the employment situation has deteriorated significantly in recent months and will continue to worsen throughout the year. This drastic situation is directly linked to the EU-IMF programme implemented in the country. Identical programmes in Greece and Ireland have had and are having identical results: record levels of unemployment, poverty and emigration.

Against this backdrop, the Commission's recommendations for Portugal include the reduction of labour costs and a reduction in the maximum period of unemployment benefits.

A few weeks ago, in tabling its 'employment package', the Commission announced proposals that include 'establishing decent and sustainable wages and avoiding low-wage traps' and 'reducing job insecurity'.

We would therefore ask the Commission:

1. In view of these recommendations, and given that Portuguese salaries are already among the lowest in the EU, what does it mean by 'establishing decent and sustainable wages and avoiding low-wage traps'?
2. Of the millions of Portuguese living in poverty, does the Commission know how many of them have a job? Does it know how many Portuguese workers are living in poverty because of low wages?
3. Does it know the percentage of Portugal's GDP accruing to wages? Does it know that this percentage has been falling in recent years, and that it is now under 50%?
4. Is it aware of data on long-term unemployment and its development? In view of this data, how does it justify the proposed reduction in the maximum period of unemployment benefits, depriving unemployed workers of benefits they are entitled to and have earned over the course of their working lives?

**Answer given by Mr Rehn on behalf of the Commission
(27 July 2012)**

The Employment Package ⁽¹⁾ promotes carefully designed in-work benefits and minimum wages with a view to avoiding in-work poverty and low wage traps and encouraging people to engage in declared quality jobs, on the one hand, while at the same time ensuring that labour costs are in line with productivity developments, on the other.

The in-work at-risk-of poverty rate in Portugal was 9.7% in 2010, somewhat down from 10.3% in 2009 and 11.8% in 2008. The persistence of low wages in Portugal reflects an economic model historically based on a low-salary structure and low levels of productivity.

The unemployment rate in Portugal has been on the rise since the beginning of this century. It stood at 4.5% in 2000, rose continuously to 8.9% in 2007 and reached 12.9% in 2011. The rise in unemployment in Portugal is thus a long-term phenomenon and rooted in factors of structural nature which need to be tackled by appropriate structural policies, as envisaged by the Economic Adjustment Programme of the government.

The percentage of Portugal's GDP accruing to wage earners amounted to an estimated 50.2% in 2011, which compares with 48.9% in the euro area ⁽²⁾.

⁽¹⁾ accompanied by nine Staff Working Documents,
http://ec.europa.eu/commission_2010-2014/andor/headlines/news/2012/04/20120418_en.htm

⁽²⁾ source: AMECO database.

Long-term unemployment as a percentage of the labour force in Portugal has been above the euro area average since 2006. In 2011, it stood at 6.2%, compared to 4.6% in the euro area (³). The Portuguese government's decision to reduce the maximum period of unemployment benefits is warranted by empirical research showing that countries where this maximum period is high tend to have high rates of long-term unemployment. Even after this reduction, for a large group of wage earners the maximum period in Portugal remains above that of other EU Member States.

(³) source: Eurostat.

(Versión española)

**Pregunta con solicitud de respuesta escrita E-005482/12
a la Comisión
Raül Romeva i Rueda (Verts/ALE)
(31 de mayo de 2012)**

Asunto: Proyecto de urbanización en la playa de Valdevaqueros

El Ayuntamiento de Tarifa (Cádiz) ha aprobado el Plan SL1 que incluye la construcción de 350 viviendas y 1 400 plazas hoteleras en el entorno de la playa de Valdevaqueros, una de las últimas playas vírgenes del litoral español, cuyo sistema de dunas es único y se encuentra en excelente estado de conservación.

El paraje afectado por el proyecto de urbanización se encuentra entre dos espacios naturales protegidos catalogados por la Junta de Andalucía en la Red Natura 2000: el Parque Natural de los Alcornocales (ES0000049) y el Parque Natural del Estrecho (ES0000337), en pleno corredor migratorio del Estrecho de Gibraltar. Por otra parte, podría verse afectada una importante colonia de cría de murciélagos (*Myotis blythii*), también catalogada (ES6120022).

1. ¿Conoce la Comisión el plan de urbanización de Valdevaqueros?
2. ¿Ha estudiado si el proyecto urbanístico cumple con la normativa europea de protección de espacios naturales?
3. ¿Ha estudiado su inclusión en la Red Natura 2000?

**Respuesta del Sr. Potočník en nombre de la Comisión
(5 de julio de 2012)**

La Comisión no conoce el plan de urbanización de Valdevaqueros y no puede por tanto determinar si el proyecto cumple o no la normativa de la UE en materia de protección de zonas naturales.

La Comisión considera que la red española de Zonas de Especial Protección ofrece suficiente protección a todas las especies de aves contempladas en el anexo I de la Directiva de Aves⁽¹⁾. En lo que atañe a la Directiva de Hábitats⁽²⁾ y a la protección de las especies y tipos de hábitats que revisten interés para la Unión, la Comisión no ha detectado en la región biogeográfica mediterránea ninguna insuficiencia que afecte a los territorios de Andalucía.

⁽¹⁾ Directiva 2009/147/CE del Parlamento Europeo y del Consejo, de 30 de noviembre de 2009, relativa a la conservación de las aves silvestres (DO L 20 de 26.1.2010, p. 7), que codifica la Directiva 79/409/CEE del Consejo, de 2 de abril de 1979, relativa a la conservación de las aves silvestres (DO L 103 de 25.4.1979, p. 1).

⁽²⁾ Directiva 92/43/CEE del Consejo, de 21 de mayo de 1992, relativa a la conservación de los hábitats naturales y de la fauna y flora silvestres (DO L 206 de 22.7.1992, p. 7).

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-005482/12
to the Commission**
Raül Romeva i Rueda (Verts/ALE)
(31 May 2012)

Subject: Proposed urbanisation at Valdevaqueros Beach

Tarifa Town Council (Cádiz province) has approved Plan SL1, which includes building 350 homes and 1 400 hotel spaces in the area of Valdevaqueros Beach. This is one of the last unspoiled beaches on the Spanish coast, with a unique system of dunes and in excellent condition.

The site affected by the proposed urbanisation project is located between two protected nature reserves, which are listed in the Natura 2000 network by the Government of Andalusia: Los Alcornocales Natural Park (ES0000049) and El Estrecho Natural Park (ES0000337), on the Strait of Gibraltar migration corridor. This urbanisation project could also affect an important breeding colony of bats (*Myotis blythii*), which is also listed (ES6120022).

1. Is the Commission aware of the Valdevaqueros urbanisation plan?
2. Has the Commission studied whether the urbanisation project complies with European legislation on the protection of natural areas?
3. Has it considered including this area in the Natura 2000 network?

Answer given by Mr Potočnik on behalf of the Commission
(5 July 2012)

The Commission is not aware of the Valdevaqueros urbanization plan. Therefore it is not possible to determine whether this project complies with the EU legislation regarding the protection of natural areas.

The Commission considers that the Special Protection Areas network in Spain provides sufficient protection to all species of birds listed in Annex I to the Birds Directive⁽¹⁾. Concerning the Habitats Directive⁽²⁾ and the protection of species and habitat types of Union interest, the Commission has not identified any insufficiency in the Mediterranean biogeographical region concerning the territories of the region of Andalucía.

⁽¹⁾ Directive 2009/147/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 November 2009 on the conservation of wild birds (OJ L 20/7, 26.1.2010) that codifies the Council Directive 79/409/EEC of 2 April 1979 on the conservation of wild birds (OJ L 103, 25.4.1979).

⁽²⁾ Council Directive 92/43/EEC, of 21 May 1992, on the protection of natural habitats and wild fauna and flora. OJ L 206, 22.7.1992.

(Versione italiana)

**Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta P-005483/12
alla Commissione
Andrea Zanoni (ALDE)
(31 maggio 2012)**

Oggetto: Latte materno contaminato da sostanze pericolose come la diossina e i policlorobifenili

Fra le tante forme di inquinamento che oggi minacciano la nostra salute, una delle più allarmanti è l'inquinamento del latte materno, seriamente minacciato dalle sostanze tossiche che sono ormai stabilmente presenti nei nostri corpi e che, sia durante la vita intrauterina che poi con l'allattamento al seno, vengono trasmesse al bambino in «cocktail», dalle conseguenze imprevedibili⁽¹⁾. Parliamo di diossine, policlorobifenili (PCB), metalli pesanti, pesticidi e altri composti chimici che provengono da insediamenti industriali, inceneritori, cementifici, oltre che da prodotti di uso quotidiano, spesso insospettabili. In Italia il 19 marzo 2012 è stata lanciata la «Campagna nazionale per la difesa del latte materno dai contaminanti ambientali».

I promotori della campagna⁽²⁾ ricordano che il latte materno è un bene di valore inestimabile e rappresenta ben più di un mero alimento; infatti i bambini allattati al seno, oltre a essere meno soggetti a malattie, reagiscono meglio anche in caso di ambiente inquinato. Il latte materno è quindi una sorta di «antidoto» all'esposizione agli agenti tossici, ma è altresì un indicatore attendibile dello stato dell'ambiente in cui vive la madre. Esso rappresenta un mezzo «ideale» per valutare l'esposizione delle popolazioni a inquinanti ambientali, come le diossine e i PCB che, essendo lipofili e bioaccumulabili, si concentrano nella sua componente grassa, tant'è che i casi di maggiore contaminazione sono stati riscontrati proprio in prossimità di impianti inquinanti. L'OMS raccomanda il biomonitoraggio del latte materno⁽³⁾, che è eseguito in numerosi Paesi dell'UE (fra cui Belgio, Finlandia, Paesi Bassi, Repubblica Ceca, Slovacchia, Ungheria...) ma non in Italia, dove manca quindi un'adeguata conoscenza dei livelli di diossine e PCB e del loro andamento nel tempo. L'Italia è anche l'unico paese europeo a non avere mai ratificato — pur avendola sottoscritta — la Convenzione di Stoccolma⁽⁴⁾, che mira a limitare l'inquinamento causato da inquinanti organici persistenti (POP). La situazione italiana potrebbe peggiorare, visto il proliferare di inceneritori di rifiuti e soprattutto di impianti a biomasse, per i quali la legislazione nazionale prevede una semplificazione degli iter autorizzativi, senza l'adozione di adeguati impianti di abbattimento e monitoraggio per questi inquinanti.

— Alla luce di quanto esposto, non intende la Commissione promuovere il biomonitoraggio del latte materno e approfondire la questione dell'allarmante contaminazione dello stesso?

— Non ritiene la Commissione opportuno impegnarsi in direzione di una normativa che contempli i rischi dell'effetto cocktail, valutando globalmente l'impatto delle varie sostanze nocive e prevedendo dei limiti a tutela della nostra salute?

**Risposta di John Dalli a nome della Commissione
(3 luglio 2012)**

La Commissione concorda quanto al fatto che il biomonitoraggio umano, compreso il biomonitoraggio del latte materno, è uno strumento efficace per valutare l'esposizione umana alle sostanze ambientali e, in certi casi, ai loro rischi potenziali per la salute. Esso è considerato un elemento importante nell'ambito di una strategia per la valutazione sanitaria di impatto ambientale.

Per meglio comprendere le correlazioni tra le fonti di inquinanti e gli effetti sanitari lo sviluppo di una strategia coerente di biomonitoraggio in Europa è stata una delle azioni definite nel piano d'azione europeo per l'ambiente e la salute 2004-2010⁽⁵⁾. Quest'azione è stata implementata attraverso il finanziamento, ad opera dell'UE, di diversi progetti di ricerca (ad esempio COPHES⁽⁶⁾).

⁽¹⁾ Lo studio «Save the Man» (2011) della Società Svedese per la conservazione della Natura ha evidenziato i gravi rischi del cosiddetto «effetto cocktail», cioè l'esposizione simultanea a più sostanze nocive.

⁽²⁾ ISDE — Associazione Medici per l'Ambiente, IBFAN Italia, MAMI — Movimento Allattamento Materno Italiano, ACP — Associazione Culturale Pediatri, Minerva p.e.l.t.i. onlus, PeaceLink, Gruppo Allattando a Faenza, Mamme per la Salute e l'Ambiente onlus — Venafro, ANDRIA associazione scientifica.

⁽³⁾ Organizzazione Mondiale della Sanità, Fourth WHO-Coordinated Survey of Human Milk for Persistent Organic Pollutants in Cooperation with UNEP (2007).

⁽⁴⁾ Convenzione sugli inquinanti organici persistenti — Decisione 2006/507/CE del Consiglio, del 14.10.2004.

⁽⁵⁾ COM(2004)0416 definitivo Volume I e Volume II «Allegati al piano d'azione europeo per l'ambiente e la salute 2004-2010».

⁽⁶⁾ COPHES è un programma di ricerca UE finanziato dal Settimo programma quadro dell'Unione europea nell'ambito del quale i ricercatori e le parti interessate di 35 istituzioni in 27 paesi europei hanno costituito un consorzio per il biomonitoraggio umano su scala europea (Consortium to perform human biomonitoring on a European Scale — COPHES).

Oltre che sugli studi di biomonitoraggio eseguiti in Italia si attira l'attenzione sul progetto, finanziato dall'UE, «WOMENBIOPOP» — correlare l'ambiente e la salute: uno studio di biomonitoraggio umano basato sui singoli paesi in tema di inquinanti organici persistenti nelle donne in età riproduttiva (7).

Nella comunicazione della Commissione al Consiglio del 31 maggio 2012 sugli effetti combinati delle sostanze chimiche — miscele chimiche (8), la Commissione si impegna ad avviare un nuovo processo per assicurare che i rischi legati alle miscele chimiche siano adeguatamente compresi e valutati. Nell'ambito della nuova strategia la Commissione identificherà le misure prioritarie da valutarsi e assicurerà che i diversi filoni della legislazione UE assicurino una costante valutazione dei rischi legati a tali miscele prioritarie.

(7) Per ulteriori informazioni su questo progetto si rinvia a <http://www.iss.it/biop/>.

(8) COM(2012)252 definitivo — <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2012:0252:FIN:IT:PDF>.

(English version)

**Question for written answer P-005483/12
to the Commission
Andrea Zanoni (ALDE)
(31 May 2012)**

Subject: Breastmilk contaminated by hazardous substances such as dioxins and polychlorinated biphenyls

Among the many forms of pollution that threaten our health today, one of the most alarming is the contamination of breastmilk, seriously endangered by the toxic substances which are now permanently present in our bodies and which, both during life in the womb and then during breastfeeding, are passed on to the baby in 'cocktails' with unforeseeable consequences⁽¹⁾. I am referring to dioxins, polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs), heavy metals, pesticides and other chemical compounds deriving from industrial facilities, incinerators and cement works, as well as from often unsuspected everyday products. On 19 March 2012, Italy launched its national campaign for the protection of breastmilk from environmental contaminants.

The campaign's promoters⁽²⁾ point out that breastmilk is of inestimable value and far more than just a food. Children who are breast-fed are not only less prone to illness, but also have stronger resistance in a polluted environment. Breastmilk is therefore a sort of 'antidote' to exposure to toxic agents, and also a reliable indicator of the state of the environment in which the mother lives. It is an ideal means of assessing population exposure to environmental pollutants, such as dioxins and PCBs, which are lipophilic and bioaccumulative and therefore become concentrated in the fatty component of the milk, to the extent that the cases of highest contamination have been found precisely in the vicinity of polluting facilities. The WHO recommends biomonitoring of breastmilk⁽³⁾, which is performed in many EU countries (including Belgium, Finland, the Netherlands, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, etc.) but not in Italy, where there is consequently a lack of adequate knowledge of dioxin and PCB levels and their trends over time. Italy is the only country in Europe that has never ratified — despite having signed — the Stockholm Convention⁽⁴⁾, which aims to limit the pollution caused by persistent organic pollutants (POPs). The Italian situation could deteriorate, given the proliferation of waste incinerators and especially of biomass plants, for which national legislation provides simplified authorisation procedures, without the adoption of adequate abatement and monitoring systems for these pollutants.

— In view of the above, does the Commission not intend to promote biomonitoring of breastmilk and investigate the alarming question of its contamination?

— Does the Commission not consider it appropriate to move in the direction of legislation that addresses the risks of the cocktail effect, making an overall assessment of the impact of the various harmful substances and establishing limits to protect our health?

**Answer given by Mr Dalli on behalf of the Commission
(3 July 2012)**

The Commission agrees that human biomonitoring, including biomonitoring of breast milk, is an effective tool to assess human exposure to environmental substances and in some cases their potential health risks. It is seen as an important element in a strategy for environmental health impact assessment.

In order to better understand the links between sources of pollutants and health effects, the development of a coherent approach to biomonitoring in Europe was one of the actions defined in the European Environment and Health Action Plan 2004-2010⁽⁵⁾. This action was implemented through the funding by the EU of several research projects (e.g. COPHES⁽⁶⁾).

⁽¹⁾ The 'Save the Man' (2011) study undertaken by the Swedish Society for the Conservation of Nature highlighted the serious effects of the 'cocktail effect', meaning the simultaneous exposure to several toxic substances.

⁽²⁾ ISDE — International Society of Doctors for the Environment; IBFAN Italia; MAMI (Italian breast-feeding movement); ACP (cultural association of paediatricians; Minerva p.e.l.t.i. ONLUS charity; PeaceLink; Faenza's Gruppo Allattando; Mamme per la Salute e l'Ambiente ONLUS charity of Venafro; ANDRIA scientific association.

⁽³⁾ World Health Organisation, Fourth WHO-Coordinated Survey of Human Milk for Persistent Organic Pollutants in Cooperation with UNEP (2007).

⁽⁴⁾ Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants (Council Decision 2006/507/EC, 14.10.2004).

⁽⁵⁾ COM(2004) 0416 Volume I final and Volume II 'Annexes to the European Environment and Health Action Plan 2004-2010'.

⁽⁶⁾ COPHES is an EU research programme funded by the European Union's Seventh Framework Programme and in which European scientists and stakeholders from 35 institutions in 27 countries formed a Consortium to Perform Human biomonitoring on a European Scale (COPHES).

Besides other biomonitoring studies performed in Italy, the attention is drawn to the EU-funded project 'WOMENBIOPOP' — Linking Environment and Health: a country based Human Biomonitoring Study on Persistent Organic Pollutants in Women of Reproductive Age⁽⁷⁾.

In the communication from the Commission to the Council of 31 May 2012 on 'Combination effects of chemicals — chemical mixtures'⁽⁸⁾, the Commission engages to launch a new process to ensure that risks associated with chemical mixtures are properly understood and assessed. Under the new approach, the Commission will identify priority mixtures to be assessed and ensure that the different strands of EU legislation deliver consistent risk assessments for such priority mixtures.

(7) More information on this project can be found on <http://www.iss.it/biop/>.

(8) COM(2012) 252 final — <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2012:0252:FIN:EN:PDF>.

(Deutsche Fassung)

**Anfrage zur schriftlichen Beantwortung P-005484/12
an die Kommission (Vizepräsidentin/Hohe Vertreterin)
Franziska Katharina Brantner (Verts/ALE)**
(31. Mai 2012)

Betreff: VP/HR — Maßnahmen der Republik Zypern in Bezug auf EU-Sanktionen gegen Syrien — die Antwort der Vizepräsidentin/Hohen Vertreterin vom 7. Mai 2012

In ihrer Antwort auf meine Anfrage P-002870/2012 schreibt die Vizepräsidentin/Hohe Vertreterin in Punkt 1), dass die Kommission die verfügbaren Fakten geprüft und sie anhand der entsprechenden Vorschriften beurteilt habe und auf Grundlage dieser Beurteilung zu ihrer Schlussfolgerung gelangt sei. Außerdem habe die Kommission Zypern direkt auf dieses Thema angesprochen. Zypern habe die Kommission über Maßnahmen im Hinblick auf den Umgang mit ähnlichen Situationen informiert. Ferner schreibt die Vizepräsidentin/Hohe Vertreterin in Punkt 2), dass die Kommission weiterhin die einheitliche, konsistente und effektive Umsetzung der vom Rat beschlossenen restriktiven Maßnahmen durch Mitgliedstaaten unterstützen und überwachen werde. Vor diesem Hintergrund ergeben sich die folgenden Fragen:

1. Hat die Vizepräsidentin/Hohe Vertreterin die von der Gruppe der Referenten für Außenbeziehungen des Rates (RELEX/Sanktionen) dargelegten Sachverhalte geprüft? Oder die der Gruppe „Ausfuhr konventioneller Waffen“ des Rates (COARM)? Wenn ja, welches Gremium/Referat der Kommission ist für die Prüfung und Überwachung der Umsetzung von EU-Waffenembargos zuständig? Und arbeitet dieses Gremium/Referat der Kommission mit den Gruppen RELEX/Sanktionen und COARM zusammen? Welche Funktion kommt ihnen im Hinblick auf die Überwachung und Umsetzung von EU-Waffenembargos genau zu?

In Punkt 1) teilt die Vizepräsidentin/Hohe Vertreterin mit, dass Zypern die Kommission über Maßnahmen im Hinblick auf den künftigen Umgang mit ähnlichen Situationen informiert habe. Es ergeben sich folgende Fragen:

2. Hat Zypern eine schriftliche Erklärung abgegeben?
3. Entsprechen die von Zypern gegenüber der Kommission vorgelegten Informationen der Erklärung, die der Vertreter Zyperns kürzlich bei einer Sitzung von COARM verlesen hat?
4. Wenn Zypern eine schriftliche Erklärung vorgelegt hat, ist diese Erklärung öffentlich zugänglich bzw. beabsichtigt die Kommission, sie zugänglich zu machen, um über den Sachverhalt Aufschluss zu geben?

Antwort von Frau Catherine Ashton — Hohe Vertreterin/Vizepräsidentin im Namen der Kommission
(30. Juli 2012)

Die Gruppe der Referenten für Außenbeziehungen/Sanktionen befasst sich mit Aspekten der Umsetzung von Sanktionen im Allgemeinen, wohingegen sich die Gruppe „Ausfuhr konventioneller Waffen“ (COARM) mit Fragen in Bezug auf die Ausfuhr von Waffen beschäftigt. Beide Gruppen sind keine Überwachungsgremien, sondern Foren, in denen Aspekte der Anwendung von Sanktionen zur Sprache gebracht werden können, wie es bei der Umsetzung des Waffenembargos gegen Syrien der Fall war. Die Kommission nimmt im Rahmen ihrer institutionellen Zuständigkeiten für die Umsetzung von Sanktionen aktiv an diesen Foren teil. Hierzu ist anzumerken, dass das Waffenembargo gegen Syrien nicht mit einer Verordnung auf der Grundlage des Vertrags über die Arbeitsweise der Europäischen Union umgesetzt wurde, sondern mit Maßnahmen nach dem innerstaatlichen Recht der Mitgliedstaaten.

Für weitere Informationen zu den nationalen Positionen in den Arbeitsgruppen des Rates wird die Frau Abgeordnete auf die zyprischen Behörden verwiesen.

(English version)

**Question for written answer P-005484/12
to the Commission (Vice-President/High Representative)
Franziska Katharina Brantner (Verts/ALE)
(31 May 2012)**

Subject: VP/HR — Actions of the Republic of Cyprus on EU sanctions against Syria — the Vice-President/High Representative's response of 7 May 2012

In response to my Question P-002870/2012, the Vice-President/High Representative writes in point 1): 'the Commission has examined the available facts and have assessed them in relation to the relevant provisions (...) On the basis of this assessment, the Commission considers (...) The Commission has also raised the issue directly with Cyprus. Cyprus informed the Commission about the measures taken in view of handling similar situations'. The Vice-President/High Representative also writes in point 2): 'the Commission will continue to support and monitor the uniform, consistent and effective implementation by Member States of restrictive measures decided by the Council'. Given this background, the following questions arise:

1. Has the Vice-President/High Representative examined the facts provided by the Council Working Party of Foreign Relations Counsellors (RELEX/Sanctions)? Or the Council Working Party on Conventional Arms Exports (COARM)? If so, which is the relevant Commission body/unit assessing and monitoring the implementation of EU arms embargoes? And does this Commission body/unit cooperate with the RELEX/Sanctions and COARM working parties? What are their precise roles with regard to monitoring and implementation of EU arms embargoes?

In point 1) the Vice-President/High Representative states that 'Cyprus informed the Commission about the measures taken in view of handling similar situations in the future'. The following questions arise:

2. Has Cyprus presented a written statement?
3. Is the information that Cyprus has provided to the Commission the same statement the Cypriot representative read at a recent COARM meeting?
4. If Cyprus has presented a written statement, is this statement publicly available or does the Commission plan to make it available in order to shed light on the case?

**Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission
(30 July 2012)**

The RELEX sanctions working group discusses implementation aspects of sanctions in general, whereas COARM discusses issues concerning the exports of arms. These are not monitoring bodies, but fora where, amongst other things, aspects of the implementation of sanctions can be raised, such as has been the case for the implementation of the arms embargo on Syria. The Commission actively participates in these fora as part of its institutional responsibilities related to sanctions implementation. It should be noted that the arms embargo to Syria has not been implemented by a regulation based on the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union; rather, this has been done by way of measures under the national law of Member States.

The Honourable Member is referred to the Cypriot authorities for further details about national positions taken in Council Working Groups.

(Versión española)

**Pregunta con solicitud de respuesta escrita E-005485/12
a la Comisión
Antolín Sánchez Presedo (S&D)
(31 de mayo de 2012)**

Asunto: AVE Galicia-Norte de Portugal

En enero de 2007 la XXII Cumbre Hispano-Portuguesa confirmaba 2013 como la fecha de terminación de la línea de AVE entre Vigo y Oporto, un proyecto prioritario para la cohesión del noroeste atlántico, que uniría entre sí y con el resto de la Península Ibérica a Galicia y el Norte de Portugal, dos regiones periféricas europeas del objetivo 1.

A principios del año en curso, la Dirección General de Movilidad y Transportes indicaba —en declaraciones recogidas por la prensa gallega el 19 de enero— que la Comisión Europea revisaría durante el verano los proyectos financiados a través de la Red Europea de Transportes para invertir los fondos no utilizados en nuevas propuestas a llevar a cabo antes de finales de 2015.

Se decía entonces que España y Portugal disponían de cinco meses para tratar de mantener viva la posibilidad de mejorar la conexión ferroviaria entre Galicia y el norte de Portugal, dando oficiosamente por descartado el uso de los 214 millones de euros previstos para el proyecto de AVE Vigo-Oporto, que quedaría en suspenso hasta el 2020, y apostando por la mejora de la actual vía ferroviaria entre Vigo y Oporto.

1. ¿Queda finalmente descartado el proyecto de AVE entre Galicia y el norte de Portugal dentro de las actuales previsiones presupuestarias para la Red Europea de Transportes?
2. ¿Se confirma la pérdida de los 214 millones de euros previstos para este proyecto?
3. ¿Han presentado España y/o Portugal algún tipo de proyecto alternativo?
4. ¿En qué consiste esta actuación y qué fondos comunitarios le han sido destinados? ¿Cuál es la cofinanciación nacional prevista en España y en Portugal?

**Respuesta del Sr. Kallas en nombre de la Comisión
(17 de julio de 2012)**

1. Actualmente, la Comisión y los Estados miembros están debatiendo acerca de la liberación parcial o total de los créditos de la dotación de las redes transeuropeas de transporte relativos a la sección transfronteriza de la línea de alta velocidad entre Oporto y Vigo.
2. Por consiguiente, es demasiado pronto para confirmar la liberación de la totalidad o una parte del importe comprometido del proyecto para su puesta a disposición de nuevas convocatorias de proyectos.
3. Hasta la fecha, la Comisión ha recibido una propuesta de reasignar una parte del importe de la dotación de las redes transeuropeas de transporte dentro del proyecto, y la está evaluando.
4. El proyecto mencionado por Su Señoría consiste en estudios y obras para la realización de la sección transfronteriza Ponte de Lima-Vigo de la línea de alta velocidad Oporto-Vigo en doble vía. Alrededor de 244 millones de euros de los fondos de la línea presupuestaria relativa a las redes transeuropeas de transporte se han asignado al proyecto, que tiene un coste total estimado de 957 millones de euros; la parte restante se financia directamente con los presupuestos nacionales, o con el presupuesto de los administradores de infraestructuras o préstamos del BEI.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-005485/12
to the Commission
Antolín Sánchez Presedo (S&D)
(31 May 2012)**

Subject: Galicia-North Portugal AVE (High-Speed Train)

In January 2007, the 22nd Spanish-Portuguese Summit confirmed 2013 as the date of completion of the AVE high-speed line between Vigo and Porto. This priority project for Northwest Atlantic cohesion would connect the rest of the Iberian Peninsula with Galicia and North Portugal, two European peripheral regions within Objective 1.

At the beginning of this year, the Directorate General for Mobility and Transport said — in statements reported by the Galician press on 19 January — that in the summer the European Commission will review projects funded through the European Transport Network in order to invest unused funds in new proposals to be implemented before the end of 2015.

Spain and Portugal would then have five months to try to keep alive the possibility of improving the rail link between Galicia and northern Portugal, informally ruling out use of the EUR 214 million planned for the Vigo-Porto high-speed rail project — which would be suspended until 2020 — and opting to improve the current railway line between Vigo and Porto.

1. Is the AVE high-speed train project between Galicia and northern Portugal finally excluded from current budget forecasts for the European Transport Network?
2. Is the loss of the EUR 214 million earmarked for this project confirmed?
3. Have Spain and/or Portugal presented any alternative project?
4. What does this action comprise and what Community funds have been allocated to it? What national co-financing is planned in Spain and Portugal?

**Answer given by Mr Kallas on behalf of the Commission
(17 July 2012)**

1. Discussion is ongoing between the Commission and the Member States on the partial or total de-commitment of the TEN-T allocation to the Cross-border section of the High-Speed line between Oporto and Vigo.
2. Accordingly, it is too early to confirm that all or part of the amount committed to the project is de-committed to be made available through new calls for projects.
3. So far the Commission has received a proposal to re-allocate part of the TEN-T amount within the project which is being appraised by the Commission.
4. The project quoted by the Honourable Member consists in studies and works for the implementation of the cross-border section Ponte de Lima-Vigo of the Oporto-Vigo high-speed line in double track. Around EUR 244 million of funding from the TEN-T Budget line have been allocated to the project which has an estimated total cost of around EUR 957 million; the remaining part is allocated by the national budgets directly, or through the infrastructure managers' budget or EIB loans.

(Versione italiana)

**Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-005486/12
alla Commissione (Vicepresidente/Alto Rappresentante)**

Mario Mauro (PPE)

(31 maggio 2012)

Oggetto: VP/HR — Bielorussia: difensore dei diritti umani condannato

In Bielorussia il regime di Aleksandr Lukašenko continua a distinguersi per la sua illiberale tenacia persecutoria e oppressiva. Dopo la repressione che si è abbattuta sugli avversari sulla scia delle elezioni presidenziali del dicembre 2010, è venuto il momento della condanna per Ales Bialiatski, Vicepresidente della Federazione internazionale dei diritti umani e presidente dell'associazione indipendente Viasna (Primavera), che monitora e denuncia le attività del regime di Minsk contro i gruppi di opposizione.

L'imputazione a suo carico è di frode fiscale con l'accusa di «occultamento di reddito su larga scala» riguardo all'utilizzo di conti bancari personali in Lituania e Polonia per sostenere il lavoro del Centro per i diritti umani Viasna in Bielorussia, di cui è presidente.

Ci sono state però una serie di violazioni procedurali che rivelano la natura politica del processo, in quanto le prove presentate dall'accusa non sono state autenticate, mentre alcuni documenti sono stati presentati come provenienti da informatori anonimi, in violazione delle procedure giuridiche bielorusse. Ales Bialiatski, nel suo discorso tenuto dopo la condanna, ha affermato che il suo processo e la persecuzione dei difensori dei diritti umani in Bielorussia violano la costituzione del paese e gli obblighi che la Bielorussia ha sottoscritto ratificando le convenzioni internazionali sui diritti umani.

Dal 2003 l'Associazione Viasna non è più riconosciuta dalle autorità bielorusse ed è stata ripetutamente respinta ogni sua richiesta di registrazione. Dal 2005 in Bielorussia agire in nome di un'organizzazione non registrata è diventato un reato punibile con una pena da sei mesi a un anno di carcere.

Si interroga il Vicepresidente/Alto Rappresentante per sapere:

1. È informata di quanto sta accadendo in questo paese?
2. Quali politiche intende adottare per garantire lo svolgimento di un effettivo e imparziale processo nel rispetto delle convenzioni internazionali sui diritti umani al fine di raggiungere la verità?

Risposta dell'Alta Rappresentante/Vicepresidente Catherine Ashton a nome della Commissione
(13 luglio 2012)

1. La Commissione europea e l'Alta Rappresentante seguono con attenzione gli sviluppi della situazione in Bielorussia, preoccupate per la persistente mancanza di rispetto per i diritti dell'uomo, lo Stato di diritto e i principi democratici, e per le vessazioni nei confronti di rappresentanti della società civile e membri dell'opposizione politica.

L'Unione europea ha espresso in numerose occasioni le sue preoccupazioni per la situazione in Bielorussia. Nel secondo semestre del 2011 l'Alta Rappresentante/Vicepresidente Ashton e il suo portavoce hanno rilasciato quattro dichiarazioni circa la detenzione e la condanna per motivi politici del difensore dei diritti umani Ales Byalyatski. Anche il Consiglio «Affari esteri» del 28 marzo 2012 ha fatto riferimento alla detenzione di Byalyatski per motivi politici, chiedendo il rilascio immediato e la riabilitazione di quest'ultimo come pure di tutti gli altri prigionieri politici. A fronte del deteriorarsi della situazione e della persistente esistenza di prigionieri politici in Bielorussia, il Consiglio ha rafforzato in più occasioni le misure restrittive contro il paese.

2. L'UE continuerà a chiedere il rilascio immediato e incondizionato e la riabilitazione di Byalyatski e di tutti i rimanenti prigionieri politici. A tal fine, l'Alta Rappresentante/Vicepresidente continuerà a sollevare la questione pubblicamente e in occasione dei contatti con le autorità bielorusse. In più, come dichiarato nelle conclusioni del Consiglio «Affari esteri» del 28 marzo 2012, le misure restrittive dell'UE nei confronti della Bielorussia rimangono aperte e sono costantemente riesaminate.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-005486/12
to the Commission (Vice-President/High Representative)
Mario Mauro (PPE)
(31 May 2012)**

Subject: VP/HR — Belarus: conviction of human-rights champion

In Belarus, the Aleksandr Lukashenko regime continues to be conspicuous for its persistently illiberal and oppressive policies. The repressive treatment meted out to its opponents in the aftermath of the December 2010 presidential election is now followed by the conviction of Ales Bialiatski, Vice-President of the International Federation for Human Rights and President of the independent Viasna ('Spring') association, which monitors and reports on the Minsk regime's activities against opposition groups.

Bialiatski has been charged with tax fraud and 'large-scale concealment of earnings' concerning the use of personal bank accounts in Lithuania and Poland to support the work of the Viasna Human Rights Centre, of which he is President, in Belarus.

There has been, however, a series of procedural infringements that betray the political nature of this trial. The evidence submitted by the prosecution was not authenticated, while some documents were submitted as originating from anonymous informers, in violation of Belarusian judicial procedure. Speaking after the sentencing, Ales Bialiatski stated that his trial and the persecution of human rights champions in Belarus represent breaches of the country's constitution and the obligations to which Belarus signed up when it ratified the international conventions on human rights.

The Viasna Association has not been recognised by the Belarus authorities since 2003, and all requests to register it have been repeatedly rejected. Since 2005 in Belarus, acting on behalf of an unregistered organisation is an offence punishable by six to 12 months' imprisonment.

Will the Vice-President /High Representative indicate:

1. Whether she is aware of what is happening in Belarus?
2. What policies she intends to adopt to ensure a free and fair trial in line with the international conventions on human rights and to establish the truth?

**Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission
(13 July 2012)**

1. The European Commission and the High Representative are closely following developments in Belarus and are concerned about the continued lack of respect for human rights, the rule of law and democratic principles, and of the ongoing harassment of representatives of civil society and the political opposition.

The EU has at numerous occasions expressed its concern about the situation in Belarus. During the second half of 2011, HR/VP Ashton and her spokesperson issued four declarations referring to the issue of the detention and sentencing on political grounds of human rights defender Ales Byalyatski. Similarly, the Foreign Affairs Council on 28 March 2012 referred to the imprisonment on political grounds of Mr Byalyatski and called for his and all other political prisoners' immediate release and rehabilitation. Against the background of the deterioration of the situation in Belarus and the continued existence of political prisoners, the Council has at repeated occasions strengthened its restrictive measures against Belarus.

2. The EU will continue to seek the immediate and unconditional release and rehabilitation of Byalyatski and all other remaining political prisoners. To this end, the HR/VP will continue to raise the issue publicly and in contacts with the Belarusian authorities. In addition, as highlighted by the conclusions of the 28 March 2012 Foreign Affairs Council, the EU's restrictive measures against Belarus remain open and under constant review.

(Versione italiana)

**Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-005487/12
alla Commissione
Mara Bizzotto (EFD)
(31 maggio 2012)**

Oggetto: Missione EU Navfor Atalanta e pirateria

Nel dicembre 2008 ha avuto inizio l'operazione Atalanta a sostegno delle risoluzioni del Consiglio di sicurezza delle Nazioni Unite sulla pirateria e sulla base della politica di sicurezza e difesa comune (PSDC), al fine di contrastare la pirateria e scortare le navi cargo incaricate del trasporto di aiuti alimentari verso la Somalia nell'ambito del Programma alimentare dell'ONU.

Il 15 maggio scorso è stato inoltre autorizzato il primo attacco aereo sulle coste somale con obiettivo le basi dei pirati utilizzate per ormeggiare le imbarcazioni da cui partono gli assalti.

1. Può la Commissione fornire dati circa i costi dell'operazione, sia gli stanziamenti previstisi i costi sostenuti finora, e l'eventuale finanziamento proveniente direttamente dagli Stati membri che vi partecipano?
2. Come valuta la Commissione l'andamento della missione?
3. Dato che il termine della missione è previsto per il dicembre 2014, ritiene la Commissione che sia necessario prevedere un'ulteriore estensione di essa e un eventuale potenziamento in termini di risorse e mezzi al fine di contrastare maggiormente le azioni di pirateria?

**Risposta dell'Alta Rappresentante/Vicepresidente Catherine Ashton a nome della Commissione
(13 agosto 2012)**

Ai sensi dell'articolo 41 del trattato sull'Unione europea, le spese derivanti da operazioni che hanno implicazioni nel settore militare o della difesa sono a carico degli Stati membri (esclusa la Danimarca) secondo un criterio di ripartizione basato sul prodotto nazionale lordo. I «costi comuni» di un'operazione sono finanziati conformemente al meccanismo ATHENA⁽¹⁾. L'operazione Atalanta ha comportato i seguenti «costi comuni»:

- 8,8 milioni di EUR per il 2010;
- 7,720 milioni di EUR per il 2011;
- 8 milioni di EUR per il 2012 (bilancio previsionale).

L'operazione UE-NAVFOR Atalanta è la componente militare dell'approccio dell'UE nonché uno dei suoi strumenti più visibili. Dal dicembre 2008 ha scortato con successo in Somalia oltre 160 navi del Programma alimentare mondiale, che hanno consegnato quasi 1 miliardo di tonnellate di cibo, ha protetto 126 spedizioni dell'Amisom dirette a Mogadiscio e ha sventato un numero considerevole di azioni di gruppi di pirati (circa 150).

Tale operazione ha inoltre dato origine a un incredibile intervento internazionale di lotta contro la pirateria, che vede unite l'Organizzazione del Trattato dell'Atlantico del Nord (NATO), la coalizione *Combine Maritime Force* (CMF) guidata dagli Stati Uniti, l'India, la Cina, la Russia e altri paesi attivi nella regione, compresa la stessa Somalia. Al successo della cooperazione internazionale contribuiscono anche agenzie internazionali quali l'Organizzazione marittima internazionale, Interpol ed Europol.

L'eventuale proroga della durata della missione oltre dicembre 2014 deve essere decisa dagli Stati membri sulla base di una revisione strategica dell'operazione Atalanta da effettuarsi su richiesta.

⁽¹⁾ GUL 343 del 23.12.2011.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-005487/12
to the Commission
Mara Bizzotto (EFD)
(31 May 2012)**

Subject: EU Navfor Atalanta mission and piracy

December 2008 saw the launch of Operation Atalanta in support of the United Nations Security Council resolutions on piracy, based on the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), to combat piracy and to escort cargo ships carrying food aid to Somalia under the UN Food Programme.

On 15 May 2012, the first air attack on the Somali coast was authorised, targeting the bases where pirates moor the vessels that they use in their raids.

1. Can the Commission provide data on the costs of this operation, both in terms of the earmarked budget and the money spent thus far, and on any funding provided directly by the Member States involved in it?
2. How does the Commission view the progress of this mission?
3. Given that the mission is scheduled to end in December 2014, does the Commission believe that a further extension will be required and that additional resources and equipment will be needed in order to step up the fight against piracy?

**Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission
(13 August 2012)**

Pursuant to Article 41 of the Treaty on European Union, expenditure arising from operations with military or defence implications are charged to the Member States (with the exception of Denmark) in accordance with the gross national product scale. The 'common costs' of an operation are financed in accordance with the Athena Mechanism (¹). The 'common costs' of Operation Atalanta were respectively:

- EUR 8,8 million for 2010;
- EUR 7,720 million for 2011;
- EUR 8 million for 2012 (previsional budget).

EUNAVFOR Operation Atalanta is the military side of the EU's approach and one of its most visible instruments. Since December 2008, Atalanta has succeeded in escorting more than 160 World Food Programme vessels to Somalia, delivering nearly 1 billion tonnes of food, in protecting 126 Amisom shipments to Mogadishu and in disrupting an important number of Pirate Action Groups (around 150).

Furthermore, Operation Atalanta has generated an incredible international effort in the fight against piracy bringing together the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), the US led coalition Combine Maritime Force (CMF), India, China, Russia and other countries who have deployed in the region including Somalia itself. International agencies such as the International Maritime Organisation, Interpol and Europol are also contributing to the success of interantional cooperation.

Any extension of the mission beyond December 2014 is a decision to be taken by Member States on the basis of a strategic review of Operation Atalanta that will be conducted on request.

(¹) OJ L 343, 23.12.2011.

(Versione italiana)

**Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-005488/12
alla Commissione
Mara Bizzotto (EFD)
(31 maggio 2012)**

Oggetto: Utilizzo del Fondo europeo di sviluppo regionale nel periodo 2007-2013

Il Fondo europeo di sviluppo regionale (FESR) è stato creato al fine di ridurre e livellare le differenze di sviluppo fra le regioni europee, in modo da consentire a quelle meno favorite di colmare il ritardo accumulato.

1. Può la Commissione indicare i dati riguardanti l'utilizzo del FESR negli Stati membri per il periodo 2007-2013?
2. Sono stati sollevati problemi di accesso al Fondo da parte degli Stati membri?
3. Quale percentuale dei fondi a disposizione per il periodo 2007-2013 non verrà usata e come sarà essa reimpiegata?
4. Quali iniziative intende porre in essere la Commissione per snellire la procedura di accesso al FESR in modo da permettere un suo utilizzo sempre più prossimo al 100 %?

**Risposta di Johannes Hahn a nome della Commissione
(17 luglio 2012)**

1. I pagamenti effettuati⁽¹⁾ dal Fondo europeo di sviluppo regionale (FESR) agli Stati membri vanno dal 21 % per la Romania e dal 26 % per la Bulgaria al 51 % per l'Irlanda e la Spagna, con una media del 39 % (cfr. l'allegato, trasmesso direttamente all'onorevole parlamentare e al segretariato del Parlamento). Ciò è in linea con quanto ci si attendeva considerati i profili di impegno stabiliti all'inizio del periodo — la Spagna e l'Irlanda hanno uno status «transitorio» e pertanto profili di impegno decrescenti verso la fine del periodo, mentre la Romania e la Bulgaria hanno profili di impegno crescenti.

2. Diversi Stati membri si situano attualmente al di sotto del tasso medio complessivo di assorbimento a causa di un'implementazione lenta e di ritardi nella selezione e nella stipula di contratti relativi ai progetti. La Commissione continua a operare a stretto contatto con essi per assicurare un acceleramento dell'assorbimento. Nessuno Stato membro ha sollevato problemi particolari in relazione all'accesso al FESR.

3. Sulla base delle informazioni attualmente disponibili la Commissione si attende che i finanziamenti per il periodo 2007-2013 saranno usati appieno. La regola del disimpegno automatico (in base alla quale i finanziamenti devono essere certificati entro due anni dalla data dell'impegno del bilancio UE) ha implicato sinora il disimpegno di fondi FESR per un valore di 20 milioni di euro. Ciò corrisponde allo 0,0001 % degli stanziamenti FESR nel periodo 2007-2013.

4. Per assicurare efficaci investimenti del FESR negli Stati membri la Commissione, per il periodo di programmazione 2014-2020, ha proposto uno snellimento delle regole. Per evitare ritardi nell'implementazione gli Stati membri saranno sollecitati a preparare tempestivamente i programmi e disporre di piani d'attuazione maturi per i grandi progetti. Le condizioni tematiche ex-ante assicureranno l'uso efficace ed efficiente dei finanziamenti dell'UE. La sostituzione del requisito di valutazione di conformità con un sistema nazionale di accreditamento contribuirà all'avvio tempestivo dei programmi a livello nazionale.

⁽¹⁾ Situazione al 19 giugno 2012.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-005488/12
to the Commission
Mara Bizzotto (EFD)
(31 May 2012)**

Subject: Use of the European Regional Development Fund in the 2007-2013 period

The European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) was set up to reduce and level out the developmental differences between European regions, in order to enable the relatively disadvantaged ones to make up for lost time.

1. Can the Commission provide statistics on the use of the ERDF in the Member States for the period 2007-2013?
2. Have the Member States raised any problems with regard to accessing the Fund?
3. What percentage of the funds available for 2007-2013 will not be used, and how will this money be re-employed?
4. What steps does the Commission intend to take to streamline the procedure for accessing the ERDF, so that it can be used at levels increasingly closer to 100% capacity?

**Answer given by Mr Hahn on behalf of the Commission
(17 July 2012)**

1. The payments made⁽¹⁾ from the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) to Member States span from 21% to Romania and 26% to Bulgaria to 51% to Ireland and Spain, with an average of 39% (see the annex, which sent directly to the Honourable Member and to Parliament's Secretariat). This is in line with expectations, given the commitment profiles established at the beginning of the period — Spain and Ireland have 'transitional' status, and therefore commitment profiles which decrease towards the end of the period, whereas Romania and Bulgaria have commitment profiles which increase.
2. A number of Member States are currently below the overall average rate of absorption, due to slow implementation and delays in selecting and contracting projects. The Commission continues to work closely with them to ensure that absorption accelerates. No Member State has raised any particular problem in relation to access ERDF.
3. On the basis of available information to date, the Commission expects that 2007-2013 funding will be fully used. The automatic decommitment rule (where funds have to be certified within 2 years from the commitment date of the EU budget) has so far implied ERDF decommitment of EUR 20 million. This equates to 0.0001% of 2007-2013 ERDF allocations.
4. In order to ensure efficient ERDF investments in Member States, the Commission, for the 2014-2020 programming period, has proposed streamlined rules. To avoid implementation delays, Member States would be required for a timely preparation of programmes and mature pipelines of major projects. *Ex-ante* thematic conditionalities would ensure the effective and efficient use of EU Funds. The replacement of the compliance assessment requirement with a national accreditation system would contribute to timely launch of programmes at national level.

⁽¹⁾ It was the situation as at 19 June 2012.

(Versione italiana)

**Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-005489/12
alla Commissione
Mara Bizzotto (EFD)
(31 maggio 2012)**

Oggetto: Utilizzo dei Fondi strutturali europei

Nel 2013 scade il periodo utile per l'investimento dei Fondi strutturali europei. Dall'ultima relazione della Ragioneria dello Stato risulta che per il periodo 2007-2013 a favore dell'Italia sono stati stanziati 59,4 miliardi di EUR, dei quali sono stati spesi solo 12 miliardi.

1. Può la Commissione indicare l'ammontare complessivo dei Fondi strutturali europei effettivamente erogati a favore dell'Italia per il periodo 2007-2013?
2. Può la Commissione indicare quale percentuale di essi è stata finora utilmente impiegata dall'Italia?
3. Con riferimento al Fondo europeo di sviluppo regionale (FESR) può fornire i dati di utilizzo riguardanti la regione Veneto e le altre regioni italiane?

**Risposta di Johannes Hahn a nome della Commissione
(19 luglio 2012)**

Per il periodo 2007-2013 sono stati stanziati a favore dell'Italia 28,7 miliardi di euro dei Fondi strutturali. Comprendendo il cofinanziamento nazionale, il volume totale del finanziamento disponibile ammonta a 60,1 miliardi di euro. Questi fondi vanno investiti entro il dicembre 2015.

Alla data del 1^o giugno 2012, la Commissione ha versato all'Italia 7 miliardi di euro dei Fondi strutturali per il periodo 2007-2013. Tutte le somme sono state utilmente impiegate, dato che i finanziamenti dei Fondi strutturali sono erogati come rimborsi di somme già spese per la realizzazione di progetti.

Per informazioni sui livelli di spesa dei programmi regionali italiani si veda:
www.rgs.mef.gov.it/VERSIONE-I/Attivit--i/Rapporti-f/Il-monitoraggio/

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-005489/12
to the Commission
Mara Bizzotto (EFD)
(31 May 2012)**

Subject: Use of European Structural Funds

The deadline for investing the European Structural Funds falls in 2013. The latest report from the Italian Department of General Accounts indicates that, for the period 2007-2013, Italy has been allocated EUR 59.4 billion, of which only EUR 12 billion have been spent.

1. Can the Commission state the total amount actually paid to Italy from the European Structural Funds for the period 2007-2013?
2. Can the Commission state the percentage of this money that Italy has put to effective use?
3. Is data available on the use of money from the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) by the Veneto region and by the other Italian regions?

**Answer given by Mr Hahn on behalf of the Commission
(19 July 2012)**

Italy has been allocated EUR 28.7 billion of structural funding for the 2007-2013 period. Including national co-financing, the total volume of funding available is EUR 60.1 billion. The deadline for investing this funding is December 2015.

As of 1 June 2012, the Commission has paid Italy EUR 7 billion from the Structural Funds for 2007-2013. All of these payments has been put to effective use, as the Structural Funds work on a reimbursement basis, with Italy reclaiming funding it has already spent on actual projects.

Information relating to spending levels of all Italian regional programmes is available at the following address:
www.rgs.mef.gov.it/VERSIONE-I/Attivit--i/Rapporti-f/Il-monitoraggio/

(Versión española)

**Pregunta con solicitud de respuesta escrita P-005490/12
a la Comisión
María Muñiz De Urquiza (S&D)
(31 de mayo de 2012)**

Asunto: Exención del IBI a la Iglesia Católica en España — posible infracción de las normas comunitarias

En el año 2009, la Comisaria Kroes afirmaba en la respuesta a la pregunta escrita P-1628/2009 que «las autoridades españolas propusieron modificar la Orden española de 5 de junio de 2001 para eliminar cualquier posible incompatibilidad entre las normas de exención fiscal del ICIO (Impuesto sobre construcciones, instalaciones y obras) y la legislación europea sobre ayudas estatales».

¿Podría confirmar la Comisión si ha hecho algún seguimiento del desarrollo de su inicial requerimiento?

En España existe otro impuesto, el IBI (Impuesto sobre Bienes Inmuebles), cuya gestión comparten la Administración del Estado y los ayuntamientos, que grava el valor de titularidad dominical u otros derechos reales que recaigan sobre bienes inmuebles.

¿Se ha planteado la Comisión que la exención del IBI a los inmuebles de la Iglesia Católica que no están destinados en exclusiva a cuestiones religiosas podría incumplir el artículo 107 del TFEU?

El artículo 107 señala expresamente en qué casos las ayudas del Estado son compatibles con el mercado interior o no lo son.

¿Considera la Comisión que la exención del IBI a la Iglesia Católica en España, propietaria de inmuebles en los que desarrolla actividades distintas a la pastoral y religiosa, puede constituir una de las excepciones recogidas en el artículo 107 como ayudas compatibles?

¿Considera la Comisión que la exención del pago del IBI a la Iglesia Católica, aunque proceda de un acuerdo internacional anterior a la entrada de España en la EU, es compatible con las normas de ayudas públicas? En todo caso ¿no cree la Comisión que sería de aplicación la segunda parte del artículo 351 del TFEU, donde se señala que los Estados deben solucionar cualquier eventual incompatibilidad entre los acuerdos internacionales de los que son firmantes y los Tratados de la UE?

¿Cree la Comisión que puede considerarse un precedente aplicable a España el caso de Italia donde, por incompatibilidad con la normativa sobre el mercado interior, está previsto el fin de las exenciones tributarias que benefician a la Iglesia Católica por el uso no religioso de sus inmuebles?

**Respuesta del Sr. Almunia en nombre de la Comisión
(10 de julio de 2012)**

Su Señoría se refiere a la respuesta de la Comisión a la pregunta escrita P-1628/09⁽¹⁾ relativa a la exención del impuesto ICIO⁽²⁾ en favor de la Iglesia católica de España.

En el contexto del procedimiento relativo a esta ayuda estatal existente, las autoridades españolas propusieron limitar el alcance de la exención del ICIO a los bienes inmuebles exentos de la Contribución Territorial Urbana (CTU). Esta última exención procede del artículo IV (1) (A) del Acuerdo de 3 de enero de 1979 entre el Estado español y la Santa Sede, que especifica los inmuebles exentos de la CTU.

Por carta de junio de 2010, las autoridades españolas informaron a la Comisión de que la legislación pertinente⁽³⁾ había sido modificada e indicaron que la antigua CTU sería sustituida por el IBI⁽⁴⁾. Sobre la base de esta información, la Comisión consideró que las autoridades españolas habían aplicado las medidas necesarias y archivaron el procedimiento.

⁽¹⁾ <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/QP-WEB>.

⁽²⁾ Impuesto sobre Construcciones, Instalaciones y Obras.

⁽³⁾ La Orden Española de 5 de junio de 2001 fue modificada por la Orden Española EHA/2814/2009 de 15 de octubre de 2009.

⁽⁴⁾ Impuesto sobre Bienes Inmuebles.

La Comisión no ha realizado evaluación alguna del IBI. No obstante, como establece la legislación española⁽⁵⁾, la exención del IBI en favor de la Iglesia católica española también procede del artículo IV (1) (A) del Acuerdo de 3 de enero de 1979 antes mencionado, que ya fue analizado en el contexto del procedimiento relativo al ICIO. En la fase actual, la Comisión considera que esta situación no parece plantear problemas específicos en cuanto a su cumplimiento de la normativa sobre ayudas estatales.

En lo que respecta a la investigación sobre ayudas estatales realizada por la Comisión en relación con la exención del impuesto municipal concedida por Italia a los bienes inmuebles utilizados por entidades sin ánimo de lucro para fines específicos⁽⁶⁾, la Comisión recuerda a Su Señoría que todavía no se ha tomado una decisión final.

⁽⁵⁾ Véase la Orden EHA/2814/2009 de 15 de octubre de 2009.

⁽⁶⁾ Decisión de la Comisión de 12 de octubre de 2010 (SG/26/2010).

(English version)

**Question for written answer P-005490/12
to the Commission**
María Muñiz De Urquiza (S&D)
(31 May 2012)

Subject: Exemption from property tax for the Catholic Church in Spain — possible breach of EU rules

In 2009, in answer to Written Question P-1628/2009, Commissioner Kroes stated that 'The Spanish authorities suggested amending the Spanish Orden of 5 June 2001 to eliminate any possible incompatibility between the ICIO tax exemption [Spanish tax on construction, installation and repairs] and state aid rules'.

Can the Commission confirm whether it has monitored developments following its initial request?

Property tax, known as IBI (*Impuesto sobre Bienes Inmuebles*), is also applied in Spain, as a tax on the value of private ownership and other property rights for which national and local authorities have shared responsibility.

Has the Commission looked at the possibility that the exemption from property tax of Catholic Church buildings not exclusively used for religious purposes could contravene Article 107 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU)?

Article 107 specifically lists the cases in which state aid is considered compatible with the internal market.

Does the Commission consider the Catholic Church's exemption from property tax in Spain, where it owns buildings which are used for purposes neither pastoral nor religious, to be an exception constituting compatible aid, as laid down in Article 107?

Does the Commission believe that the exemption from property tax enjoyed by the Catholic Church in Spain, although deriving from an international agreement concluded prior to Spain joining the EU, is compatible with state aid rules? Does the Commission believe that Article 351(2) of the TFEU — stating that where such agreements are not compatible with the Treaties, the Member State or States concerned shall take all appropriate steps to eliminate the incompatibilities established — is applicable?

In Italy, tax exemptions applied to buildings owned by the Catholic Church and used for non-religious purposes are to be scrapped due to incompatibility with internal market rules. Does the Commission believe that this sets a precedent for Spain?

Answer given by Mr Almunia on behalf of the Commission
(10 July 2012)

The Honourable Member refers to the Commission's reply to Written Question P-1628/09⁽¹⁾ relating to the ICIO⁽²⁾ tax exemption in favour of the Catholic Church in Spain.

In the context of the procedure regarding this existing state aid, the Spanish authorities proposed to limit the scope of the ICIO exemption to real estate exempted from the Contribución Territorial Urbana (CTU). This last exemption derives from Article IV(1)(A) of the Agreement of 3 January 1979, between the Spanish State and the Holy See, which lays down the requirements of CTU-exempt real estate.

By letter in June 2010, the Spanish authorities informed the Commission that the relevant legislation⁽³⁾ had been amended, and indicating that the former CTU was replaced by the IBI⁽⁴⁾. On the basis of this information, the Commission considered that the Spanish authorities had implemented the necessary measures and closed the procedure.

The Commission has not carried out any assessment of the IBI. Nonetheless, as stated in the Spanish legislation⁽⁵⁾, the IBI exemption for the Spanish Catholic Church also derives from Article IV(1)(A) of the abovementioned Agreement of 3 January 1979, which was already analysed in the context of the ICIO procedure. At this stage, the Commission considers that this situation does not seem to raise specific concerns as regards its compliance with state aid rules.

⁽¹⁾ <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/QP-WEB>.

⁽²⁾ Tax on Construction, Installation and Repairs.

⁽³⁾ The Spanish Order of 5 June 2001, was modified by Spanish order EHA/2814/2009 of 15 October 2009.

⁽⁴⁾ Impuesto sobre Bienes Inmuebles, a real estate tax.

⁽⁵⁾ See Order EHA/2814/2009 of 15 October 2009.

As regards the state aid investigation carried out by the Commission concerning the municipal tax exemption granted by Italy to real estate used by non-commercial entities for specific purposes (6), the Commission reminds the Honourable Member that no final decision has been adopted yet.

(6) Commission decision of 12 October 2010 (case C 26/2010).

(Versione italiana)

**Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-005492/12
alla Commissione (Vicepresidente/Alto Rappresentante)
Fiorello Provera (EFD)
(31 maggio 2012)**

Oggetto: VP/HR — Risultati elettorali in Algeria

Il 10 maggio 2012 si sono svolte in Algeria le elezioni parlamentari, che hanno visto il partito al potere nel paese, il Fronte di liberazione nazionale, ottenere 220 seggi, ovvero quasi la metà del parlamento. Molti algerini hanno criticato tali risultati. Il presidente del Fronte islamico di giustizia e sviluppo del paese, Abdallah Djaballah, ha affermato che tali risultati hanno chiuso la porta al cambiamento attraverso le urne e l'opzione tunisina è l'unica via rimasta per coloro che credono nel cambiamento. Il suo partito è riuscito a ottenere solo sette dei 462 seggi dell'assemblea nazionale. In seguito alle elezioni, egli ha sostenuto che una rivolta d'ispirazione tunisina è l'unica alternativa rimasta e che le elezioni erano fraudolente: «Queste elezioni sono una farsa. Non accettiamo questi risultati ... creano una situazione di insicurezza e instabilità». L'affluenza alle urne in tutta l'Algeria è stata scarsa e nella capitale, Algeri, si è aggirata intorno al 30 %, anche se il New York Times riporta che la percentuale si avvicinava più al 20 %. L'UE e l'Unione Africana hanno inviato in Algeria osservatori elettorali, autorizzati a monitorare la procedura di voto; tuttavia, secondo il quotidiano con sede a Dubai, *Gulfnews*, questi ultimi non avrebbero avuto il permesso di consultare le liste elettorali.

Il 26 maggio l'agenzia Reuters ha riferito che sessanta deputati islamici di partiti diversi hanno abbandonato il parlamento, in segno di protesta contro le elezioni che essi sostengono siano state manipolate dal gruppo dirigente. Tali deputati appartengono alla coalizione islamica o «Alleanza verde». Non è chiaro se essi boicottteranno definitivamente il parlamento. L'agenzia Reuters ha inoltre citato un esperto di politica islamica, secondo il quale la rabbia per il risultato delle elezioni potrebbe conferire ai partiti islamici quello slancio che non avevano prima delle stesse.

Il 12 maggio l'Alto Rappresentante e il commissario Štefan Füle hanno rilasciato una dichiarazione congiunta: «Consideriamo queste elezioni un passo avanti nel processo di riforma iniziato in Algeria ad aprile del 2011, che si concluderà con una revisione della costituzione entro la fine dell'anno allo scopo di consolidare la democrazia e lo Stato di diritto in linea con le aspettative legittime del popolo algerino. L'assemblea eletta di recente sarà chiamata a svolgere un ruolo importante in tale processo».

1. Può il Vicepresidente/Alto Rappresentante fornire informazioni in merito alla posizione dell'UE riguardo alle procedure di voto algerine?
2. Alla luce di alcune notizie dei media, ritiene il Vicepresidente/Alto Rappresentante che vi siano motivi per credere che una rivolta d'ispirazione tunisina possa avvenire in Algeria?
3. Sussistono dubbi in merito alla trasparenza delle elezioni algerine, considerando che il ministro dell'Interno del paese ha negato agli osservatori dell'UE il libero accesso alle liste elettorali?

**Risposta dell'Alta Rappresentante/Vicepresidente Catherine Ashton a nome della Commissione
(27 luglio 2012)**

1. L'UE ha inviato per la prima volta una missione di osservazione elettorale (EUEOM) in Algeria per le elezioni legislative del 10 maggio. Il 12 maggio 2012 la missione, guidata dall'eurodeputato José Ignacio Salafranca, ha presentato una dichiarazione preliminare che, pur riconoscendo gli sviluppi positivi nel processo elettorale, evidenzia alcuni settori in cui sono possibili miglioramenti.

Raccomandazioni più dettagliate saranno presentate in una relazione finale che sarà resa disponibile dopo il completamento dei lavori della EUEOM.

Le operazioni elettorali si sono svolte in un clima pacifico e ordinato e si sono registrati solo incidenti minori. Una maggiore affluenza a livello nazionale (42,9 % in media rispetto al 35,6 % del 2007) e un sostanziale aumento del numero di donne elette (da 30 nel 2007 a 145 nel 2012, secondo i risultati preliminari) sono elementi degni di nota.

Queste elezioni costituiscono un passo avanti nel processo di riforma iniziato nell'aprile 2011 con le riforme legislative e che porterà alla revisione della Costituzione. La nuova assemblea eletta sarà chiamata a svolgere un ruolo importante in tale processo.

2. L'Alta Rappresentante/Vicepresidente non intende rilasciare commenti sulle notizie riportate dai media. In questo momento ciò che conta è che le autorità algerine proseguano il profondo processo di riforma avviato dal Presidente Bouteflika nell'aprile 2011.

3. La dichiarazione preliminare dell'EUEOM rileva che il processo elettorale è stato caratterizzato da alcuni progressi per quanto riguarda la trasparenza e l'introduzione di nuovi meccanismi di controllo, ma che sono necessari ulteriori sforzi per aumentare la fiducia dei cittadini in tale processo.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-005492/12
to the Commission (Vice-President/High Representative)
Fiorello Provera (EFD)
(31 May 2012)**

Subject: VP/HR — Election results in Algeria

On 10 May 2012, Algeria held parliamentary elections in which the country's ruling party, the National Liberation Front, secured 220 seats, almost half of the parliament. Many Algerians have criticised the results. The leader of the country's Islamist Front for Justice and Development, Abdallah Djaballah, said that 'these results closed the door on change by the ballot box and the Tunisian option is all that's left for those who believe in change'. His party only managed to obtain seven seats out of 462 in the national assembly. Following the elections, he has said that a Tunisian-style revolt is the only option left and that the elections were fraudulent: 'These elections are a farce. We do not recognise these results... they create a situation of insecurity and instability'. The turnout across Algeria was low, and in the capital, Algiers, it was around 30%, although according to the *New York Times*, the figure was closer to 20%. The EU and the African Union sent election observers to Algeria, who were allowed to monitor the voting process, although according to the Dubai-based newspaper *Gulfnews* they were not allowed to consult polling lists.

On 26 May, Reuters reported that 60 Islamist deputies from a number of parties staged a walkout from the parliament, in protest at what they say was a rigged election by the ruling elite. They were from the Islamist coalition or 'Green Alliance'. It is unclear whether they will boycott the parliament for good. Reuters also quoted one specialist on Islamist politics as saying that anger over the election could give the Islamist parties a momentum they lacked before the election.

On 12 May, the High Representative and Commissioner Štefan Füle issued a joint statement in which they said: 'We consider these elections to be a step forward in the reform process which started in April 2011 in Algeria, expected to be concluded by a revision of the Constitution later this year to consolidate democracy and the rule of law in line with the legitimate expectations of the Algerian people. The newly elected Assembly will be called to play an important role in this process.'

1. Could the VP/HR provide information on the EU's position with regard to Algeria's voting processes?
2. In light of some media reports, does the VP/HR think there are grounds to believe that a Tunisian-style revolt is likely to take place in Algeria?
3. Is there any doubt as to the transparency of Algeria's elections, given that the country's Interior Ministry refused to give the EU election observers free access to the national electoral roll?

**Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission
(27 July 2012)**

1. For the first time in Algeria, the EU deployed an Election Observation Mission (EU EOM) for the legislative elections on 10 May. The mission, headed by MEP José Ignacio Salafranca, issued a preliminary statement on 12 May 2012 acknowledging positive developments in the electoral process while underlining some areas where improvements can be made.

More detailed recommendations will be outlined in a final report which will be made available upon completion of the work of the EU EOM.

Electoral operations took place in a peaceful and orderly atmosphere. Only minor incidents were recorded. The increased turn out at national level (42.9% as an average against 35.6% in 2007) and a substantial increase in the number of elected women (from 30 in 2007 to 145 in 2012 according to preliminary results) is noteworthy.

These elections mark a step forward in the reform process which started in April 2011 with legislative reforms and which will lead to the review of the Constitution. The newly elected Assembly will be called to play an important role in this process.

2. The HR/VP does not wish to comment on such media reports. What is important now is that the authorities in Algiers take forward the wider process of reform launched by President Bouteflika in April 2011.

3. The EU EOM preliminary statement noted that the electoral process was characterised by some progress regarding transparency and the introduction of new control mechanisms but that further progress is needed to increase citizens' confidence in the process.

(Versione italiana)

**Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-005493/12
alla Commissione (Vicepresidente/Alto Rappresentante)
Fiorello Provera (EFD)
(31 maggio 2012)**

Oggetto: VP/HR — Membro della Guardia rivoluzionaria iraniana ne ammette la presenza in Siria

A fine maggio un luogotenente delle forze speciali Quds, una milizia appartenente alla Guardia rivoluzionaria della repubblica islamica dell'Iran, ha ammesso la partecipazione di tale esercito a operazioni militari in Siria, dichiarando che la milizia ha ricoperto un ruolo «fisico e non fisico» in Siria. Le dichiarazioni di Esmail Ghani erano reperibili nel sito ISNA, l'agenzia di stampa semiufficiale del governo iraniano, prima che fossero rimosse.

Le forze speciali Quds sono state istituite per svolgere operazioni all'estero in nome della Repubblica islamica e sostengono organizzazioni terroristiche come Hezbollah.

In reazione al recente massacro avvenuto nella città di Houla, nel quale forze fedeli ad Assad hanno ucciso oltre 100 persone e ne hanno ferito 300, molti membri del corpo diplomatico di stanza in Europa sono stati espulsi. Il regime siriano ha negato il suo coinvolgimento, eppure il luogotenente delle forze iraniane ha affermato che la presenza iraniana ha impedito un massacro di maggiori dimensioni, sostenendo che se la Repubblica islamica dell'Iran non fosse stata presente in Siria, il numero delle vittime civili sarebbe stato ben più elevato.

Secondo il luogotenente inoltre, a dispetto di tutti i difetti del governo siriano, la «geografia della resistenza» siriana e la pressione di Israele e Stati Uniti significano che il regime di Assad non dovrebbe cadere.

Il portavoce del ministro degli Esteri iraniano, Ramin Mehmanparsat, ha accusato Israele di essere all'origine dei problemi, reagendo a una serie di attentati avvenuti in Siria.

Quel che è certo è che l'ammissione del luogotenente è il primo passo verso la rivelazione ufficiale della presenza della Repubblica islamica dell'Iran in Siria. In precedenza, la collaborazione tra i due paesi era stata confermata dalla conclusione, nel 2009, di un patto di cooperazione nel settore della difesa. Ad aprile, un quotidiano del Kuwait, *al-Seyassah*, ha riferito che un ufficiale disertore dell'aviazione siriana aveva rivelato l'esistenza di documenti che comprovavano l'arrivo in Siria d'ingenti quantità di armi iraniane. Secondo il quotidiano, gruppi di dissidenti siriani a Istanbul sostengono che agenti iraniani stabiliti in uno stato del Golfo Persico hanno venduto ai servizi di sicurezza siriani una banca dati di codici precisi per decifrare le comunicazioni satellitari utilizzate da dissidenti e disertori siriani. A marzo il governo degli Stati Uniti ha accusato il luogotenente Ghani di essere coinvolto nella spedizione di armi in Siria.

1. Può il Vicepresidente/Alto Rappresentante far sapere qual è la sua posizione in merito alla notizia concernente l'ammissione del coinvolgimento iraniano in Siria?
2. Alla luce dell'espulsione di esponenti del corpo diplomatico siriano da molti Stati membri dell'UE, è il Vicepresidente/Alto Rappresentante disposto a valutare l'opportunità di un'espulsione immediata dei membri del corpo diplomatico siriano dall'UE?
3. È il Vicepresidente/Alto Rappresentante a conoscenza di relazioni provenienti dal Kuwait concernenti il coinvolgimento attivo di ufficiali iraniani nella repressione delle forze anti-Assad in Siria?
4. È il Vicepresidente/Alto Rappresentante disposto a indagare su tali accuse?

**Risposta dell'Alta Rappresentante/Vicepresidente Catherine Ashton a nome della Commissione
(2 agosto 2012)**

L'AR/VP è a conoscenza di fonti d'informazione comprovate secondo le quali l'Iran sta inviando armi, inclusi velivoli senza pilota, al governo siriano e fornisce intelligence sulle truppe ribelli. Per quanto riguarda la questione di una presunta presenza di forze speciali iraniane in Siria, l'AR/VP si aspetta che l'Iran svolga un ruolo costruttivo nell'area al fine di contribuire alla stabilità regionale. Il SEAE continuerà a seguire gli ulteriori sviluppi della situazione.

Attualmente l'AR/VP non intende proporre all'UE l'espulsione dei membri del corpo diplomatico siriano, in quanto ciò potrebbe mettere in pericolo la presenza diplomatica dell'UE in Siria, fondamentale per garantire il coordinamento tra gli Stati membri, monitorare la situazione sul posto e fornire sostegno alla popolazione siriana. L'AR/VP ribadisce l'impegno a mantenere operativa la delegazione dell'UE a Damasco finché le condizioni di sicurezza lo permetteranno.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-005493/12
to the Commission (Vice-President/High Representative)
Fiorello Provera (EFD)
(31 May 2012)**

Subject: VP/HR — Member of Iran's Revolutionary Guards admits to presence in Syria

In late May, a deputy commander of the elite Quds Force militia of the Islamic Republic of Iran's Revolutionary Guards admitted that it was involved in military operations inside Syria. Esmail Ghani said that the militia had played both a 'physical and non-physical' role in Syria. Mr Ghani's comments were made on the semi-official government news site ISNA, before they were removed.

The Quds Force was set up to launch operations abroad on behalf of the Islamic Republic. It supports terrorist organisations such as Hezbollah.

In reaction to the recent massacre in the town of Houla, in which forces loyal to Assad killed over 100 people and injured 300, many Syrian diplomats in Europe were expelled. The regime has denied its involvement, yet Ghani said that Iran's presence had prevented even more bloodshed: 'If the Islamic Republic were not present in Syria, the killing of civilians would be greater'.

He went further to say that, 'despite all the drawbacks of the Syrian Government', Syria's 'geography of resistance' and pressure from Israel and America meant that the Assad regime should not fall.

Iran's Foreign Ministry spokesman Ramin Mehmanparsat has blamed Israel as being 'the root of the problems'. This is in reaction to a number of bomb blasts that have taken place across Syria.

What is certain is that Mr Ghani's admission is the first instance of an Iranian official publicly disclosing the Islamic Republic's presence in Syria. Hitherto, cooperation between the two countries had been confirmed by the conclusion of a defence cooperation pact in 2009. In April, a Kuwaiti newspaper called *al-Seyassah* reported that a defected Syrian air force officer had disclosed the existence of documents recording the arrival of large quantities of Iranian weapons to Syria. According to the newspaper, dissident Syrian groups based in Istanbul stated that Iranian agents living in a Persian Gulf state had sold Syrian security services a database of accurate codes to decrypt satellite communications used by Syrian dissidents and defectors. In March, the US Government accused Mr Ghani of helping to ship weapons to Syria.

1. What is the position of the Vice-President/High Representative with regard to the news about the admission of Iranian involvement inside Syria?
2. In light of the expulsion of Syrian diplomats across many EU Member States, is the VP/HR prepared to consider an outright expulsion of Syrian diplomats from the EU?
3. Is the VP/HR aware of reports from Kuwait regarding the active involvement of Iranian officials in stifling anti-Assad forces in Syria?
4. Is the VP/HR prepared to investigate these claims?

**Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission
(2 August 2012)**

The HR/VP is aware of substantiated reports according to which Iran is supplying weapons to the Syrian government, including unmanned aerial vehicles, and provides intelligence on rebel troops. As far as the issue of an alleged presence of Iranian Special Forces in Syria is concerned, the HR/VP expects Iran to play a constructive role in the region in order to contribute to regional stability. The EEAS will continue to monitor the further development of this issue.

At present, the HR/VP does not have the intention to propose the withdrawal of the Syrian ambassador's accreditation to the EU. Such a situation might endanger the EU's diplomatic presence in Syria, which is essential to ensure coordination among Member States, monitor the situation on the ground and support the Syrian people. The HR/VP remains committed to keeping the EU Delegation in Damascus open as long as security conditions permit.

(Versione italiana)

**Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-005494/12
alla Commissione
Oreste Rossi (EFD)
(31 maggio 2012)**

Oggetto: Farmaco intelligente per combattere il mieloma multiplo

Il mieloma multiplo è un tumore che colpisce le plasmacellule ed è tipico dell'età avanzata. Si tratta di un tumore del sangue che ha origine nel midollo osseo ed è caratterizzato da una quantità eccessiva di plasmacellule. Oggi per combattere questa malattia, medici e ricercatori stanno sperimentando un nuovo farmaco intelligente, che potrebbe garantire un netto miglioramento della qualità della vita dei pazienti.

Questo farmaco intelligente è il lenalidomide, noto inizialmente come «CC-5013», ed è un medicinale derivato dal talidomide. Si tratta di un agente immunomodulante che interferisce sull'attività del sistema immunitario, favorisce l'apoptosi delle cellule tumorali, inibisce il microambiente che sostiene lo sviluppo e la sopravvivenza delle cellule tumorali attraverso un effetto antiangiogenico e, come accennato in precedenza, modifica l'attività del sistema immunitario stimolando alcune cellule ad attaccare.

Il lenalidomide, somministrabile per via orale, si è dimostrato efficace per contrastare la crescita tumorale e limitare al tempo stesso gli effetti collaterali come la perdita dei capelli, mentre i controlli ambulatoriali sono ridotti a una frequenza settimanale o mensile. L'efficacia dei trattamenti risulta superiore a quella della terapia in uso fino ad oggi e, inoltre, è in grado di contenere gli effetti distruttivi delle terapie invasive e di migliorare la tollerabilità di una terapia anti cancro.

Osservando i risultati ottenuti da questa importante ricerca e considerando che combattere oggi il cancro è di vitale importanza, sia per la salvaguardia sia per il miglioramento delle condizioni di salute di numerosi pazienti, chiedo alla Commissione se intenda approfondire la ricerca e la diffusione di informazioni sui farmaci intelligenti, sempre più in uso tra gli esperti del settore.

**Risposta di Máire Geoghegan-Quinn a nome della Commissione
(9 agosto 2012)**

La Commissione è al corrente dei recenti sforzi applicati alla ricerca sul lenalidomide per la cura del mieloma multiplo, al quale si riferisce l'onorevole parlamentare ⁽¹⁾ ⁽²⁾.

La ricerca dedicata a nuovi approcci terapeutici al mieloma multiplo ha beneficiato di finanziamenti trasversali al Settimo programma quadro di ricerca e sviluppo tecnologico (7°PQ, 2007-2013). A tutt'oggi 25 milioni di EUR sono stati destinati alla ricerca di frontiera e traslazionale sulla comprensione, la diagnosi e il trattamento del mieloma multiplo e di altre neoplasie ematologiche in settori quali, ad esempio: influenza sulle interazioni fra cellule mielomatose e midollo osseo, trapianto di cellule staminali, messa a punto di farmaci, farmacoresistenza, messa a punto di sperimentazioni cliniche per migliorare le terapie del mieloma multiplo.

La Commissione divulgava attivamente i risultati dei finanziamenti nel quadro del 7°PQ attraverso il Servizio comunitario di informazione in materia di ricerca e sviluppo (CORDIS) ⁽³⁾ e sostiene una politica di libero accesso ⁽⁴⁾.

Altre possibilità di ricerca collaborativa sul mieloma multiplo sono reperibili nel documento orientativo elaborato in connessione con il programma di lavoro sulla ricerca sanitaria 2013 del 7°PQ, la cui pubblicazione ufficiale è fissata per il luglio 2012 ⁽⁵⁾.

⁽¹⁾ <http://www.pharmgkb.org/drug/PA162363968>.

⁽²⁾ Tre prove a dimostrazione dei benefici del lenalidomide figurano nel N Engl J Med. 2012; 366(19).

⁽³⁾ http://cordis.europa.eu/results/home_it.html

⁽⁴⁾ <http://ec.europa.eu/research/science-society/index.cfm?fuseaction=public.topic&id=1294&lang=1>.

⁽⁵⁾ ftp://ftp.cordis.europa.eu/pub/fp7/docs/wp/cooperation/health/a-wp-201301_en.pdf

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-005494/12
to the Commission
Oreste Rossi (EFD)
(31 May 2012)**

Subject: Intelligent drug to combat multiple myeloma

Multiple myeloma is a cancer affecting the blood cells, typically occurring in later life. It is a blood cancer that originates in the bone marrow and is characterised by an excess of plasma cells. To combat this disease, doctors and researchers are currently experimenting with a new intelligent drug that could significantly improve a patient's quality of life.

This intelligent drug is lenalidomide, initially known as CC-5013, a thalidomide derivative. It is classified as an immunomodulatory agent, which modifies the immune system's activity; triggers apoptosis in cancerous cells; inhibits the micro-environment that supports cancer cells' development and survival with an anti-angiogenic effect; and, as already mentioned, modifies the immune system's activity by stimulating certain cells to attack.

Lenalidomide can be administered orally. It has been proven effective in impeding tumour growth and simultaneously limiting side-effects such as hair loss. Outpatient visits are reduced to weekly or monthly. The drug is more effective than current treatments, and it can also contain invasive therapies' destructive effects and improve the cancer treatment experience.

In view of the results from this important research, and considering that the fight against cancer is vitally important, both to protect and improve many patients' health, does the Commission intend to step up research and information dissemination on intelligent drugs, which are increasingly used by experts in the field?

**Answer given by Ms Geoghegan-Quinn on behalf of the Commission
(9 August 2012)**

The Commission is aware of recent efforts undertaken on lenalidomide for the alleviation of multiple myeloma as mentioned by the Honourable Member ⁽¹⁾ ⁽²⁾.

Research on new therapeutic approaches for multiple myeloma has been funded across the Seventh Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development (FP7, 2007-2013). So far, EUR 25 million has been devoted to frontier and translational research on the understanding, diagnosis and treatment of multiple myeloma and other haematological cancers. Areas addressed include for instance influencing interactions between myeloma cells and the bone marrow, stem cell transplantation, drug discovery, drug resistance and the design of clinical trials to improve multiple myeloma therapies.

The Commission is actively disseminating results funded under FP7 via its Community Research and Development Information Service (CORDIS) ⁽³⁾ and maintains an open access policy ⁽⁴⁾.

Further opportunities for collaborative research on multiple myeloma may be found in the orientation paper in connection with the FP7 2013 Health Research Work Programme, which will be officially published in July 2012 ⁽⁵⁾.

⁽¹⁾ <http://www.pharmgkb.org/drug/PA162363968>.
⁽²⁾ Three trials demonstrating benefit of lenalidomide are described in N Engl J Med. 2012; 366(19).
⁽³⁾ http://cordis.europa.eu/results/home_en.html
⁽⁴⁾ <http://ec.europa.eu/research/science-society/index.cfm?fuseaction=public.topic&id=1294&lang=1>.
⁽⁵⁾ ftp://ftp.cordis.europa.eu/pub/fp7/docs/wp/cooperation/health/a-wp-201301_en.pdf

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