(1)

Ved Kommissionens gennemførelsesforordning (EU) nr. 170/2013 (2) fastsættes overgangsforanstaltninger for sukker som følge af Kroatiens tiltrædelse af Unionen. Kapitel II, afdeling 2, i forordningen omhandler fastsættelse og fjernelse af overskudsmængder af sukker, der forefindes i Kroatien på datoen for tiltrædelsen. Der angives navnlig tidsfrister for fastsættelsen af overskudsmængder af sukker, fjernelsen af disse og bevis for fjernelsen, der skal fremlægges af de identificerede erhvervsdrivende i Kroatien. Endvidere fastsættes de referenceperioder, der skal anvendes til beregning af de afgifter, som Kroatien skal betale, hvis overskudsmængderne ikke fjernes.

(2)

Ved Kommissionens gennemførelsesforordning (EU) nr. 1345/2014 (3) fastsættes overskudsmængderne af sukker, som blev oplagret i Kroatien forud for landets tiltrædelse, og som skal fjernes fra EU-markedet for Kroatiens regning i overensstemmelse med tidsfristerne i gennemførelsesforordning (EU) nr. 170/2013 som ændret ved Kommissionens gennemførelsesforordning (EU) nr. 968/2014 (4).

(3)

Ved brev af 19. maj 2015 meddelte Kroatien Kommissionen, at landet ikke sætter spørgsmålstegn ved forpligtelsen til at fjerne de overskudsmængder af sukker, som Kommissionen har fastsat, fra markedet inden den 30. september 2015, men at Kroatien har haft uforudsete proceduremæssige vanskeligheder i forbindelse med gennemførelsen af forpligtelsen til at tvinge de involverede erhvervsdrivende til at fjerne disse overskudsmængder, og der er brug for ekstra tid til at løse disse vanskeligheder. Det er derfor passende at forlænge fristerne i gennemførelsesforordning (EU) nr. 170/2013 med seks måneder.

(4)

Gennemførelsesforordning (EU) nr. 170/2013 bør derfor ændres.

(5)

Foranstaltningerne i denne forordning er i overensstemmelse med udtalelse fra Forvaltningskomitéen for den Fælles Markedsordning for Landbrugsprodukter —

1)

I artikel 9, stk. 1, ændres »30. september 2015« til »31. marts 2016«.

2)

I artikel 10 foretages følgende ændringer:

3)

I artikel 11 foretages følgende ændringer:

4)

I artikel 12 foretages følgende ændringer:

(1)

Forordning (EF) nr. 1831/2003 indeholder bestemmelser om godkendelse af fodertilsætningsstoffer og om grundlaget og procedurerne for udstedelse af en sådan godkendelse.

(2)

Der er i overensstemmelse med artikel 7 i forordning (EF) nr. 1831/2003 indgivet en ansøgning om godkendelse af DL-methionyl-DL-methionin som et tilsætningsstof til foder. Ansøgningen var vedlagt de oplysninger og dokumenter, der kræves i henhold til artikel 7, stk. 3, i forordning (EF) nr. 1831/2003.

(3)

Ansøgningen vedrører godkendelse af DL-methionyl-DL-methionin som fodertilsætningsstof til alle arter af akvatiske dyr til klassificering i tilsætningsstofkategorien »tilsætningsstoffer med ernæringsmæssige egenskaber«.

(4)

Den Europæiske Fødevaresikkerhedsautoritet (i det følgende benævnt »autoriteten«) konkluderede i sin udtalelse af 27. januar 2015 (2), at DL-methionyl-DL-methionin på de foreslåede anvendelsesbetingelser ikke har skadelige virkninger på dyrs eller menneskers sundhed eller på miljøet, og at det kan betragtes som en effektiv kilde til aminosyren L-methionin hos fisk og krebsdyr. Autoriteten mener ikke, at der er behov for særlige krav om overvågning efter markedsføringen. Den har også gennemgået den rapport om metoden til analyse af fodertilsætningsstoffet i foder, der blev forelagt af det ved forordning (EF) nr. 1831/2003 oprettede referencelaboratorium.

(5)

Vurderingen af DL-methionyl-DL-methionin viser, at betingelserne for godkendelse, jf. artikel 5 i forordning (EF) nr. 1831/2003, er opfyldt. Derfor bør anvendelsen af stoffet godkendes som anført i bilaget til nærværende forordning.

(6)

Foranstaltningerne i denne forordning er i overensstemmelse med udtalelse fra Den Stående Komité for Planter, Dyr, Fødevarer og Foder —

(1)

Ved gennemførelsesforordning (EU) nr. 543/2011 fastsættes der på basis af resultatet af de multilaterale handelsforhandlinger under Uruguayrunden kriterier for Kommissionens fastsættelse af faste importværdier for tredjelande for de produkter og perioder, der er anført i del A i bilag XVI til nævnte forordning.

(2)

Der beregnes hver arbejdsdag en fast importværdi i henhold til artikel 136, stk. 1, i gennemførelsesforordning (EU) nr. 543/2011 under hensyntagen til varierende daglige data. Derfor bør nærværende forordning træde i kraft på dagen for offentliggørelsen i Den Europæiske Unions Tidende —

(1)

Article 126 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (‘TFEU’) establishes that Member States are to avoid excessive government deficits and sets out the excessive deficit procedure to that effect. The Stability and Growth Pact, which in its corrective arm implements the excessive deficit procedure, provides the framework supporting government policies for a prompt return to sound budgetary positions taking account of the economic situation.

(2)

On 27 April 2009, the Council decided, in accordance with Article 104(6) of the Treaty establishing the European Community that an excessive deficit existed in Greece.

(3)

On 10 May 2010, the Council adopted Decision 2010/320/EU (1) addressed to Greece under Article 126(9) and Article 136 TFEU with a view to reinforcing and deepening the fiscal surveillance and giving notice to take measures for the deficit reduction judged necessary to remedy the situation of excessive deficit at the latest by the deadline of 2014. The Council established 2014 as the deadline for correcting the situation of excessive deficit, and annual targets for the government deficit.

(4)

Council Decision No 2010/320/EU was substantially amended several times. Since further amendments were to be made, it was recast, on 12 July 2011, by Council Decision 2011/734/EU of 12 July 2011 addressed to Greece with a view to reinforcing and deepening fiscal surveillance and giving notice to Greece to take measures for the deficit reduction judged necessary to remedy the situation of excessive deficit (2) in the interest of clarity. Subsequently, that Decision was significantly amended several times between 8 July 2011 and December 2012 (3).

(5)

The very severe deterioration of the financial situation of Greece has led euro area Member States to decide to provide it stability support, with a view to safeguarding the financial stability of the euro area as a whole, in conjunction with multilateral assistance provided by the International Monetary Fund. From May 2010 to June 2015, support provided by the euro area Member States took the form of both a bilateral Greek Loan Facility and a loan from the European Financial Stability Facility (‘EFSF’). The lenders' support was accompanied by extensive policy conditionality, including the respect by Greece of Council Decision 2011/734/EU and subsequent amendments thereto.

(6)

On 8 July 2015, Greece requested financial assistance from the European Stability Mechanism (‘ESM’) in the form of a three-year loan, and on 12 July 2015 an agreement in principle was reached on the provision of a loan of the amount of up to EUR 86 000 million to Greece. On 17 July, the ESM Board of Governors entrusted the European Commission, in liaison with the European Central Bank, and with the International Monetary Fund, with the task of negotiating a Memorandum of Understanding (‘MoU’) detailing the policy conditionality for a financial assistance facility covering the period 2015-2018 in accordance with Article 13(3) of the ESM Treaty.

(7)

In accordance with Regulation (EU) No 472/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 May 2013 on the strengthening of economic and budgetary surveillance of Member States in the euro area experiencing or threatened with serious difficulties with respect to their financial stability (4), and in particular Article 7 thereof, a Member State requesting financial assistance from the ESM must prepare a macroeconomic adjustment programme (‘the Programme’) for approval by the Council. Such a programme should ensure the adoption of a set of reforms needed to improve the sustainability of public finances and the regulatory environment.

(8)

The Programme prepared by Greece was approved by Council Implementing Decision (EU) 2015/1411 (5).

(9)

Article 10(2)(b) of Regulation (EU) No 472/2013 also establishes that, in case a Member State subject to a macroeconomic adjustment programme under Article 7 of that Regulation is also subject to a decision under 126(9) TFEU for the correction of its excessive deficit, the annual budgetary targets in its macroeconomic adjustment programme shall be integrated into the decision to give notice under Article 5(1) of Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 of 7 July 1997 on speeding up and clarifying the implementation of the excessive deficit procedure (6); in addition, the measures conducive to those targets in the macroeconomic adjustment programme shall also be integrated into the decision to give notice in accordance with Article 5(1) of Regulation (EC) No 1467/97. Article 10(2)(a) of Regulation (EU) No 472/2013 further establishes that the Member State shall be exempt from submitting reports under Article 5(1) of Regulation (EC) No 1467/97. Finally, Article 10(2)(c) of Regulation (EU) No 472/2013 establishes that the monitoring shall be undertaken as provided for by Article 7(4) of that Regulation and the Member State shall be exempt from monitoring under Article 10(1) and Article 10a of Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 and from monitoring underlying any decision under Article 6(2) of that Regulation.

(10)

Economic activity in Greece is currently projected to be much weaker than was expected when the latest amendment to Council Decision 2011/734/EU was adopted in December 2012. Both real and nominal GDP are expected to be at much lower levels in 2015 and 2016 than was expected in the 2015 Spring Forecast of the Commission, due to policy uncertainty, lack of implementation of reforms, a shortfall in government revenues, bank holidays, and the imposition of capital controls. The Commission updated its forecast for GDP growth in August 2015, as needed to underpin the negotiations for the MoU required for an ESM programme. According to this forecast, real GDP in 2015-2016 is projected to contract by 2,3 % and 1,3 % respectively, (against a positive growth of 0,5 % and 2,9 % in the 2015 Spring Forecast for the corresponding years), before growing by 2,7 % in 2017 and 3,1 % in 2018. This marked worsening of the economic scenario in 2015-2016 implies a corresponding deterioration of the outlook for public finances given unchanged policies.

(11)

Greece is estimated to have improved its structural deficit by 16 percentage points of GDP from a 15,2 % deficit in 2009 to an estimated 1 % surplus in 2014, thus ensuring an improvement in the structural balance in 2009-2014, which is significantly larger than the requirement of at least 10 percentage points of GDP over the period recommended by the Council. In 2014, the general government deficit reached 3,5 % of GDP, clearly within the 4,5 % of GDP government deficit (ESA2010 basis) ceiling for 2014 established by the Council Decision. However, the primary balance outturn of 0,4 % of GDP was substantially weaker than expected and undershot the target set at 1,5 % of GDP due to a combination of factors including the reversal in the economic cycle and the related negative impact on budget revenues, the relaxation of fiscal policy and increased economic uncertainty. The weakening macroeconomic environment accompanied with expiring temporary fiscal measures in 2015 have, however, made it impossible to achieve the primary balance target of 3 % of GDP in 2015 envisaged in the latest amendment to Decision 2011/734/EU adopted in December 2012. The fiscal targets have, therefore, been revised down substantially, taking into account the macroeconomic circumstances and the current fiscal situation, to avoid overtightening fiscal policy in the short term.

(12)

Greece will accordingly pursue a new fiscal path, premised on primary surplus targets of – 0,25, 0,5, 1,75, and 3,5 % of GDP in 2015, 2016, 2017 and 2018 and beyond, respectively. The trajectory of the fiscal targets is consistent with the expected growth rates of the Greek economy as it recovers from its deepest recorded recession. The revised path means that the general government budget deficit will fall below 3 % of GDP in 2017.

(13)

Under the Commission services' update of the forecast for nominal GDP growth, the primary general government balance is projected to attain a deficit of EUR 7 631 million (4,4 % of GDP) in 2015, a deficit of EUR 6 166 million (3,6 % of GDP) in 2016, a deficit of EUR 4 089 million (2,3 % of GDP) in 2017 and a deficit of EUR 753 million (0,4 % of GDP) in 2018.

(14)

The budget for 2016 to be adopted by the Greek parliament forms part of the Medium-Term Fiscal Strategy (MTFS) 2016-2019, with the aim to deliver a sizeable and front-loaded fiscal consolidation bringing savings of more than EUR 6 900 million, close to 4 % of GDP.

(15)

The failure to complete the final EFSF programme review, the missed debt service payments, the expiration of the EFSF programme and the introduction of capital controls have created new circumstances that have led to a further strong deterioration in debt sustainability. This is due to lower growth estimates, a downward revision of the primary surplus targets, a downward revision of privatisation receipts, a strong deterioration in the financing needs of the banking sector following the imposition of capital controls, the need for a higher clearance of arrears following the liquidity shortage experienced by the sovereign and valuation effects due to the depreciation of the euro with respect to the SDR. As a result of these developments debt-to-GDP is expected to reach 198,3 % in 2016, before decreasing to 169,3 % in 2020, 154,5 % in 2022 and 115,9 % in 2030 in the baseline scenario.

(16)

Taking into account those developments, the adjustment path towards the correction of the excessive deficit needs to be updated. The commitment undertaken by Greece concerns not only the fiscal consolidation measures, but also those measures needed to enhance the growth-friendly nature and to minimise any negative social impact.

(17)

Each measure required by Council Implementing Decision (EU) 2015/1411 is instrumental in achieving the required budgetary adjustment. Some measures have a direct impact on the budgetary situation of Greece while the others are structural measures that will result in improved fiscal governance and a sounder budgetary situation in the medium term.

(18)

In light of the above considerations, it appears necessary to revise the previous annual budgetary targets and the measures conducive to those targets. The new annual budgetary targets and measures conducive to those targets are those contained in Council Implementing Decision (EU) 2015/1411,

(1)

Article 136(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (‘TFEU’) foresees the possibility of adopting measures specific to Member States whose currency is the euro in order to ensure the proper functioning of economic and monetary union.

(2)

Since 2010, Greece has been granted financial assistance by the Member States and the International Monetary Fund (‘IMF’). A first Economic Adjustment Programme for Greece was been agreed on 2 May 2010: the euro area Member States agreed to provide bilateral loans, pooled by the European Commission, for a total amount of EUR 80 000 million to be disbursed over the period May 2010 through June 2013 and the IMF committing additional EUR 30 000 million under a stand-by arrangement. The Second Economic Adjustment Programme for Greece was approved on 14 March 2012. The euro area Member States and the IMF committed the undisbursed amounts of the first programme plus an additional EUR 130 000 million for the years 2012-2014. Whereas the financing of the first programme was based on bilateral loans, it was agreed that — on the side of euro area Member States — the second programme would be financed by the European Financial Stability Facility (‘EFSF’), which had been fully operational since August 2010. In total, the second programme foresaw financial assistance of EUR 164 500 million until the end of 2014 (the period was later extended until the end of June 2015). Of that sum, the euro area commitment amounts to EUR 144 700 million to be provided via the EFSF, while the IMF contributed EUR 19 800 million, as part of a four-year EUR 28 000 million arrangement under the Extended Fund Facility for Greece that the IMF approved in March 2012.

(3)

On 8 July 2015, in view of the ongoing severe economic and financial disturbance, the Greek authorities requested financial assistance from the European Stability Mechanism (‘ESM’) in order to ensure a properly-functioning Greek banking system, to meet Greece's debt obligations, to support the return of Greece's economy to sustainable growth and safeguard financial stability of the euro area and of its Member States.

(4)

Pursuant to Article 13(1) of the ESM Treaty, and to form the basis for a decision of the ESM Board of Governors, in line with Article 13(2) thereof, whether to grant, in principle, stability support to Greece in the form of a loan, on 8 July 2015 the Chairperson of the ESM Board of Governors entrusted the European Commission, in liaison with the European Central Bank (‘ECB’), with assessing the existence of a risk to the financial stability of the euro area as a whole or its Member States; assessing, together with the IMF, whether public debt is sustainable; and estimating the actual or potential financing needs of Greece.

(5)

In compliance with Article 13 of the ESM Treaty, the European Commission, in liaison with the ECB, and with input from IMF staff, completed those assessments on 10 July 2015, concluding that conditions for the financial support for Greece, to be provided in the form of an ESM loan, are in place. The financing needs were estimated to be up to EUR 86 000 million.

(6)

On 17 July 2015, Greece was granted EUR 7 160 million short-term financial assistance under the European Financial Stabilisation Mechanism (‘EFSM’), by Council Implementing Decision (EU) 2015/1181 (2), for facing July 2015 repayment obligations and settling its arrears to the IMF. The assistance was disbursed in one instalment on 20 July 2015, and was linked to economic policy conditionality. The ESM assistance will be used, inter alia, to repay that short-term EFSM bridge loan.

(7)

On 16 July 2015, the ESM Board of Governors invited the Commission, in liaison with the ECB, the ESM, the Greek authorities, and, where appropriate, the IMF, to agree on a macroeconomic adjustment programme for Greece. The programme was prepared in accordance with the procedure provided for under Article 7(1) of Regulation (EU) No 472/2013. On 11 August 2015, those institutions reached an agreement at technical level on a macroeconomic adjustment programme (the ‘Programme’) with the Greek Government. The Programme submitted by Greece to the Commission and the Council aims at ensuring the adoption of a set of reforms needed to improve the sustainability of public finances, as well as to ensure financial stability and to promote growth, employment, and social fairness.

(8)

Following that agreement, Greece should adopt a comprehensive policy package, to be implemented in a three-year macroeconomic adjustment programme which would span from the third quarter of 2015 to the third quarter of 2018.

(9)

The comprehensive policy package, to be laid down in an ESM Memorandum of Understanding on Specific Economic Policy Conditionality (the ‘Memorandum of Understanding’), should aim at restoring financial market confidence, re-establishing sound macroeconomic balances and enabling the economy to return to sustainable growth. It should be structured on four pillars: restoring fiscal sustainability, safeguarding financial stability, enhancing competitiveness and growth, and modernising the state and the public administration.

(10)

The Commission services updated their forecast for nominal GDP growth in August 2015, as needed to underpin the negotiations for the ESM programme. Under this forecast, which centres around a nominal GDP growth rate of – 3,2 % in 2015, – 0,7 % in 2016, 3,4 % in 2017, 4,1 % in 2018 and 4,2 % in 2019, the debt-to-GDP ratio would amount to 196,3 % in 2015, 200,9 % in 2016, 198,6 % in 2017, 190,7 % in 2018 and 182,3 % in 2019. The debt-to-GDP ratio would therefore increase until 2016 and move to a declining path thereafter, reaching an estimated 174,5 % in 2020, with debt dynamics affected by several below-the-line operations. Under the Commission services' update of the forecast for nominal GDP growth, the primary general government balance is projected to attain a deficit of EUR 7 631 million (4,4 % of GDP) in 2015, a deficit of EUR 6 166 million (3,6 % of GDP) in 2016, a deficit of EUR 4 089 million (2,3 % of GDP) in 2017 and a deficit of EUR 753 million (0,4 % of GDP) in 2018.

(11)

The authorities will pursue a new fiscal path premised on primary surplus targets of – 0,25, 0,5, 1,75, and 3,5 % of GDP in 2015, 2016, 2017 and 2018 and beyond, respectively. The trajectory of the fiscal targets is consistent with expected growth rates of the Greek economy as it recovers from its deepest recorded recession.

(12)

Enhancing the long-term resilience of the Greek banking sector is critical to restoring financial stability in Greece and to preserving financial stability in the euro area as a whole. To preserve the liquidity of the Greek banking sector, temporary administrative measures were imposed, including capital controls.

(13)

The implementation of comprehensive and ambitious reforms in financial, fiscal and structural areas should safeguard the medium-term sustainability of the Greek public debt.

(14)

The Commission, in liaison with the ECB and, where appropriate, the IMF, should verify at regular intervals the rigorous implementation of Greece's Programme through missions and regular reporting, on a quarterly basis, by the Greek authorities.

(15)

Throughout the implementation of Greece's comprehensive policy package, the Commission should provide additional policy advice and technical assistance in specific areas.

(16)

The Greek authorities should involve, in accordance with current national rules and practices, the social partners and civil society organisations in the preparation, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of the Programme.

(17)

Any form of financial assistance received by Greece to help it implement the policies under its Programme should be in line with the legal requirements and policies of the Union, in particular the Union's economic governance framework. Any intervention in support of financial institutions should be carried out in accordance with the Union's rules on competition. The Commission should ensure that any measures laid down in a Memorandum of Understanding in the context of requested ESM financial assistance are fully consistent with this Decision,

(1)

Ved aftalens artikel 15.1 oprettes et Handelsudvalg, som bl.a. har til opgave at sikre, at aftalen fungerer efter hensigten, og overvåge arbejdet i alle specialiserede udvalg.

(2)

I overensstemmelse med aftalens artikel 15.2 blev de specialiserede udvalg nedsat under Handelsudvalget. Udvalget for Handel med Varer er en af disse specialiserede udvalg, jf. artikel 2.16 i aftalen.

(3)

I henhold til punkt 2 i tillæg 2-A-1 til aftalen kan Korea anvende et auktionssystem med henblik på at forvalte og gennemføre de toldkontingenter, som Korea anvender på visse varer med oprindelse i Den Europæiske Union, på grundlag af aftalen. Reglerne for auktionssystemet skal fastsættes af parterne ved fælles overenskomst efter beslutning i Udvalget for Handel med Varer.

(4)

I henhold til punkt 3 i tillæg 2-A-1 til aftalen kan Korea anvende en licensordning til at forvalte og gennemføre visse toldkontingenter. Parterne skal inden for rammerne af Udvalget for Handel med Varer aftale de generelle retningslinjer og procedurer for licensordningen, herunder kravene, der skal opfyldes for at være berettiget til toldkontingenter, og alle ændringer hertil —