52005DC0703

[pic] | KOMMISSIONEN FOR DE EUROPÆISKE FÆLLESSKABER |

Bruxelles, den 22.12.2005

KOM(2005) 703 endelig

MEDDELELSE FRA KOMMISSIONEN

"Yderligere retningslinjer vedrørende tildelingsplaner for handelsperioden 2008-2012 under EU-emissionshandelsordningen"

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MEDDELELSE FRA KOMMISSIONEN

"Yderligere retningslinjer vedrørende tildelingsplaner for handelsperioden 2008-2012 under EU-emissionshandelsordningen" (EØS-relevant tekst)

1. INDLEDNING

1. Denne meddelelse skal vejlede medlemsstaterne, når de udformer deres nationale tildelingsplaner for 2. handelsperiode (2008-2012). Den er ikke en del af den igangværende revision af direktivet om handel med emissionskvoter[1] (herefter "direktivet"), ifølge hvilket Kommissionen skal fremlægge en rapport for Europa-Parlamentet og Rådet i juni 2006 sammen med eventuelle forslag til, hvordan EU's emissionshandelsordning kan komme til at fungere bedre. Under arbejdet med revisionen tager Kommissionen imod input fra interesserede parter om en lang række spørgsmål vedrørende emissionshandelsordningens funktion og virkninger.

2. Nærværende retningslinjer supplerer Kommissionens retningslinjer af 7. januar 2004[2] om anvendelse af kriterierne i direktivets bilag III. Det foregående vejledningsdokument indeholder først og fremmest en teknisk analyse af, hvordan de forskellige kriterier i bilag III skal fortolkes og spiller sammen, og en redegørelse for, hvilken rolle Kommissionen tillægger dem i sin vurdering af tildelingsplanerne. Nogle af de centrale punkter i det første vejledningsdokument er sammenfattet i bilag 3.

3. Kommissionen anser det for nødvendigt at give yderligere vejledning, således at erfaringerne fra første tildelingsfase bliver udnyttet til fulde. Kommissionen har konstateret, at kriterierne i direktivets bilag III er så generelle, at der er for rigeligt spillerum ved anvendelsen af dem, og er enig med medlemsstaterne og en del interesserede parter i, at der er behov for yderligere vejledning[3], således at tildelingsplanerne i 2. handelsperiode bliver mere ensartede.

4. Generelt lægger medlemsstaterne og interessenterne også vægt på, at de gerne vil have harmoniseret tildelingsreglerne yderligere. Kommissionen anser det for nødvendigt at opnå større ensartethed i 2. handelsperiode i det omfang, det er muligt, under hensyntagen til, at ikke alle medlemsstaterne er kommet deres individuelle Kyoto-mål lige meget nærmere. Desuden er yderligere harmonisering efter 2012 ønskeligt. Det ser Kommissionen nærmere på i forbindelse med den strategiske revurdering af EU's emissionshandelsordning. Med udgangspunkt i denne revurdering vil Kommissionen fremkomme med forslag til, hvordan ordningen kan komme til at fungere bedre, samtidig med at stabiliteten i lovgivningen bevares.

5. Kommissionen henstiller kraftigt til medlemsstaterne, at de arbejder henimod enklere planer for 2. handelsperiode. Enkle tildelingsplaner betyder, at interessenterne meget lettere kan forstå instrumentet, og at man opnår større klarhed og forudsigelighed. Medlemsstaterne bør tilstræbe så enkle nationale tildelingsplaner som muligt i 2. runde, især hvad angår tildelingsmetoder og regler for nytilkomne og ved lukninger. Medlemsstaterne bør foretage en kritisk vurdering af, om reglerne i den første runde af nationale tildelingsplaner var nødvendige og effektive, og kun beholde dem, der anses for absolut uundværlige.

6. For at gøre planerne endnu mere gennemsigtige har Kommissionen udarbejdet et sæt tabeller, der på standardiseret måde sammenfatter nogle af grundoplysningerne i en national tildelingsplan; tabellerne er vedlagt[4]. Kommissionen betragter disse tabeller som en integrerende del af 2. runde af nationale tildelingsplaner og forventer, at medlemsstaterne benytter dem. Kommissionen opfordrer også kraftigt medlemsstaterne til at benytte den fælles model[5], der blev udarbejdet til de første tildelingsplaner, og garanterer ligesom i første runde, at alle planer bliver vurderet på et ensartet grundlag.

2. SAMMENFATNING AF ERFARINGERNE FRA TILDELINGSPLANERNE I FØRSTE RUNDE (2005-2007) OG GENERELLE KORREKTIONER I ANDEN RUNDE (2008-2012).

7. Første runde af tildelingsprocessen varede ca. 15 måneder, nemlig fra den 31. marts 2004, der var sidste frist for forelæggelse af planerne, til den 20. juni 2005, hvor Kommissionen traf sin sidste afgørelse. Det var meget længere end forudset i direktivet. Godkendelsesprocessen strakte sig langt ind i den første handelsperiode, som begyndte den 1. januar 2005. Forsinket forelæggelse, godkendelse og national færdiggørelse af nogle planer skabte usikkerhed ikke blot for myndigheder og erhvervsliv i de pågældende lande, men også for alle aktørerne på det europæiske marked for kvoter. Det fremhæver, hvor vigtigt det er, at der rettidigt forelægges færdige nationale tildelingsplaner i anden tildelingsrunde. Efter Kommissionens opfattelse løber tremånedersperioden i artikel 9, stk. 3, først fra det tidspunkt, hvor der er forelagt en færdig national tildelingsplan. Kommissionen minder derfor medlemsstaterne om, at deres frist udløber den 30. juni 2006, således at 2. tildelingsproces, inklusive den derpå følgende endelige nationale afgørelse om tildeling, kan afsluttes i god tid inden 2. handelsperiode begynder den 1. januar 2008. Kommissionen accepterer ikke ændringer i de nationale tildelingsplaner, der forelægges efter den 31. december 2006, der er den i direktivets artikel 11, stk. 2, fastsatte frist, bortset fra ændringer, som følger af en kommissionsafgørelse om en national tildelingsplan.

8. Kommissionen er klar over, at der var meget at lære i første runde, og indtog en pragmatisk holdning til vurdering af tildelingsplanerne i denne runde. Nedenfor er det i nogle punkter sammenfattet, hvad der karakteriserede den første tildelingsproces og førte til konvergens mellem medlemsstaterne, hvad angår valg og metoder (der er yderligere oplysninger i bilag 4):

- Hvis Kyoto-målene skal opfyldes på omkostningseffektiv måde, kræves der større brug af handel med kvoter.

- Tildelingerne har generelt været mere restriktive for elproducenterne end andre, der er omfattet af ordningen.

- Medlemsstater, hvis aktuelle emissioner ligger et godt stykke over deres Kyoto-mål, agter at købe Kyoto-enheder i betydeligt omfang.

- Det er afgørende for kvotemarkedets udvikling, at der ikke foretages efterfølgende justeringer.

- Nogle af tildelingsplanerne er mere komplekse end nødvendigt og ikke tilstrækkelig gennemsigtige.

3. YDERLIGERE RETNINGSLINJER OM BESTEMTE SPØRGSMÅL I FORBINDELSE MED ANDEN PERIODE AF DE NATIONALE TILDELINGSPLANER

3.1. Nærmere opfyldelsen af Kyoto-målene

9. Kommissionen har i sin statusrapport[6] af 2005 en bedømmelse af, hvor meget medlemsstaterne er kommet nærmere Kyoto-målene. En sammenligning af de faktiske 2003-emissioner med de tilladte emissioner i perioden 2008-2012 viser, at ikke så få af medlemsstaterne er et godt stykke fra målet, nogle af dem meget langt. Som det ser ud i dag, er især Belgien, Danmark, Tyskland, Spanien, Irland, Italien, Luxembourg, Nederlandene, Østrig, Portugal, Slovenien og Finland ikke nået tilstrækkelig langt med at opfylde deres Kyoto-mål. I disse medlemsstater må der i anden handelsperiode gøres mere for at opfylde Kyoto-målene, men det betyder ikke, at der ikke i de øvrige medlemsstater også er behov for yderligere foranstaltninger. Da det forekommer usandsynligt, at det manglende kan indhentes alene ved at kræve emissionsreduktioner i den sektor, der ikke er kvotebelagt, eller ved køb af Kyoto-enheder, bør EU-emissionshandelsordningen benyttes i højere grad til at udnytte alle emissionshandelsmuligheder fuldt ud.

3.2. Fastsættelse af nationale lofter

10. Ifølge kriterium nr. 3 i bilag III (kriterierne i direktivets bilag III er opregnet i dette dokuments bilag 2) skal mængden af kvoter være i overensstemmelse med det potentiale, herunder det teknologiske potentiale, som de kvotebelagte anlæg har med hensyn til at reducere emissionerne. Det betyder, at det økonomiske og det tekniske potentiale for nedsættelse af emissionerne tilsammen sætter en øvre grænse for det nationale loft.

11. To af de vigtigste faktorer, der påvirker emissionerne, er den økonomiske vækst (BNP – større vækst giver højere emissioner) og kulstofintensiteten (emissioner pr. enhed BNP – lavere kulstofintensitet giver lavere emissioner). Principielt gælder det, at jo hurtigere en økonomi vokser, desto hurtigere bliver der indført ny teknologi og desto hurtigere fornys kapitalapparatet, hvorved produktiviteten og kulstofintensiteten forbedres. I de europæiske økonomier er den tertiære sektors andel stigende samtidig med, at det går tilbage i den sekundære sektor, hvilket skubber yderligere i samme retning. Endvidere vil indførelse af EU-emissionshandelsordningen og én kulstofpris over hele EU i denne sektor fremme et yderligere fald i kulstofintensiteten.

12. Tidligere (i perioden mellem 1990 og 2000) var der et fald i kulstofintensiteten, der var mindst lige så stort som den økonomiske vækst, hvilket betød, at emissionerne af drivhusgasser var konstante eller faldende. Nedenstående tabel viser, at denne tendens ventes at fortsætte i indeværende årti (2000-2010). Det bør understreges, at der i skønnene for 2000-2010 ikke er taget højde for virkningerne af første fase af EU-emissionshandelsordningen, og at det faktiske fald i kulstofintensiteten i perioden derfor formentlig er undervurderet.

Tabel A – Tidligere og forventet udvikling i BNP og kulstofintensitet[7]

BNP, årlig procentvis ændring | Kulstofintensitet*, årlig procentvis forbedring | Samlet procentvis årlig nettovirkning for udviklingen i emissionerne |

Faktisk udvikling 1990-2000 |

EU25 | 2.0 | 2.3 | -0.3 |

EU15 | 2.0 | 1.9 | 0.1 |

Nye medlemsstater | 1.7 | 3.9 | -2.2 |

Forventet udvikling 2000-2010 |

EU25 | 2.5 | 2.2 | 0.3 |

EU15 | 2.4 | 2.1 | 0.3 |

Nye medlemsstater | 3.8 | 3.6 | 0.2 |

Anm: * Kulstofintensiteten udtrykker sammenhængen mellem CO2-emissioner og BNP.

13. I analysen af det økonomiske og tekniske potentiale for nedbringelse af emissionerne ser Kommissionen på både den årlige BNP-vækstrate og det relative fald i kulstofintensiteten. Disse to faktorer fører tilsammen til den årlige sats for emissionsreduktionspotentialet. Med udgangspunkt i de faktiske emissioner i et givet år (f.eks. 2003) og ud fra den antagelse, at sektoren med emissionshandel står for en konstant andel af emissionerne i forhold til hele økonomien og har et tilsvarende potentiale for emissionsreduktion, kan der beregnes et indikativt loft, der opfylder kriterium 3 i bilag III.

14. Loftet i første fase er derfor udgangspunkt for fastsættelse af den samlede mængde i anden fase både på EU-plan og nationalt plan. Som følge af kriterium nr. 1 er nogle af medlemsstaterne nødt til at sænke loftet i den første periode for at opfylde Kyoto-målet. Andre medlemsstater må videreføre loftet fra første fase for at få planen til at svare til emissionsreduktionspotentialet (kriterium 3). På tilsvarende måde må det årlige EU-gennemsnitsloft i emissionshandelsordningens anden fase blive lavere end loftet i første fase.

15. For en række medlemsstater er der en betydelig afstand mellem deres faktiske 2003-emissioner og deres tilladte emissioner ifølge Kyoto-målet. De mangler tilsammen 296,5 mio. ton CO2-ækvivalenter. Dette tal repræsenterer de ekstraemissioner, som disse medlemsstater stadig skal nedbringe ved hjælp af de instrumenter, de har til rådighed til at sikre opfyldelse af Kyoto-målene.

16. Medlemsstater, der ikke har nået deres Kyoto-mål, bør tilstræbe en afbalanceret kombination af (i) lavere tildelinger i anden fase, (ii) gennemførelse af yderligere foranstaltninger i den ikke-kvotebelagte sektor og eventuelt (iii) køb af Kyoto-tilgodehavender fra statens side. En afbalanceret kombination gør det lettere at gennemføre reduktionerne i praksis, og det er økonomisk mere effektivt.

17. Tabellen i bilag 1 viser emissionshandelssektorens andel udtrykt som tildelingen i første fase, sammenholdt med de faktiske 2003-emissioner. På EU-plan er andelen ca. 45%. Hvis sektoren med emissionshandel skulle bidrage med en forholdsmæssig andel af reduktionen i de medlemsstater, der har et efterslæb at indhente, måtte den samlede tildeling i EU-25 være ca. 6% lavere end i første periode, nemlig en gennemsnitlig årlig tildeling på 2,063 mia. kvoter. En nedsættelse på mindre end 6% vil kræve en større indsats i den ikke-kvotebelagte sektor, hvis Kyoto-målene skal opfyldes.

3.3. Virkeliggørelse af statslige planer om køb af Kyoto-enheder

18. I betragtning af, hvordan markedet for Kyoto-enheder er, og hvor begrænset udbuddet af Kyoto-enheder er, har de medlemsstater, der agter at købe Kyoto-enheder, betydelige problemer med at realisere disse køb i fuldt omfang. Når en medlemsstat beslutter sig for at købe Kyoto-enheder med offentlige midler, lettes presset for nedbringelse af de indenlandske emissioner (i lige så høj grad som når virksomheder køber kvoter i henhold til koblingsdirektivet).

19. Af førnævnte årsager er virkeliggørelse af statslige planer om køb af Kyoto-enheder afgørende for, at en national tildelingsplan er i overensstemmelse med kriterium nr. 1 i bilag III. Det var derfor et vigtigt element allerede ved vurderingen af planerne for den første periode. En række medlemsstater har ikke fuldført alle de påregnede indkøb i første periodes nationale tildelingsplan, og nogle lofter er følgelig blevet sat ned. Alle de medlemsstater, der som forudsætning har, at staten køber Kyoto-enheder, må derfor i højere grad virkeliggøre deres intentioner og vise, at det går fremad med disse køb, selv om disse køb allerede var anført i den nationale tildelingsplan under første runde. Kommissionens vurdering kommer til at bygge på de kumulative kriterier, der er skitseret i bilag 5, og disse aspekter vil bliver vurderet meget nøje. Hvis en medlemsstat ikke opfylder samtlige kriterier tilfredsstillende, vil Kommissionen kræve en forholdsmæssig nedsættelse af det foreslåede loft.

3.4. Virkeliggørelse af andre politikker og foranstaltninger

20. For at en national tildelingsplan kan opfylde kriterium 1 i direktivets bilag III , er det afgørende, at virkningerne af yderligere politikker og foranstaltninger, der er gennemført, slår igennem. I de nationale tildelingsplaner i første periode opregnede medlemsstaterne en række igangværende og yderligere politikker og foranstaltninger. Alle de medlemsstater, der forudsætter gennemførte og yderligere politikker og foranstaltninger, må konkretisere virkningerne af dem og påvise, at de nærmer sig gennemførelse eller vedtagelse, selv om disse politikker og foranstaltninger allerede var anført i den nationale tildelingsplan under første runde[8]. Kommissionens vurdering kommer til at bygge på de kumulative kriterier, der er skitseret i bilag 6, og disse aspekter vil bliver vurderet meget nøje. Hvis en medlemsstat ikke opfylder samtlige kriterier tilfredsstillende, vil Kommissionen kræve en forholdsmæssig nedsættelse af det foreslåede loft.

3.5. Vejledning om kriterium nr. 12 – begrænsning af driftsledernes brug af JI og CDM

21. Kriterium nr. 12 i direktivets bilag III som ændret ved koblingsdirektivet[9], lyder således: "Planen specificerer den maksimale mængde CER og ERU, der må benyttes af driftslederne i fællesskabsordningen, som en procentsats af tildelingen af kvoter til hvert anlæg. Procentsatsen skal være i overensstemmelse med medlemsstatens supplerende forpligtelser efter Kyoto-protokollen og beslutninger vedtaget i henhold til UNFCCC eller Kyoto-protokollen."

22. Kriterium 12 er obligatorisk i den forstand, at det af den nationale tildelingsplan skal fremgå, hvor stor en mængde CER og ERU driftslederne må benytte inden for EU-emissionshandelsordningen til at opfylde kravene.

23. Ifølge kriterium 12 skal den fastsatte procentsats være i overensstemmelse med medlemsstatens supplerende forpligtelser efter Kyoto-protokollen og beslutninger vedtaget i henhold til UNFCCC eller Kyoto-protokollen. Ifølge Marrakech-aftalerne skal mekanismerne supplere nationale foranstaltninger [10] . Hverken i Kyoto-protokollen eller UNFCCC eller de dertil knyttede beslutninger er der en kvantitativ definition af supplementets størrelse[11]. Der bør ligeledes bemærkes, at der på Kyoto-partskonferencen i Montreal blev truffet flere vigtige beslutninger, som kan fremme brugen af CDM, og det kan EU-emissionshandelen også bidrage til.

24. Suppleringskravet gælder for alle en medlemsstats udledninger af drivhusgasser tilsammen og ikke for de enkelte sektorer hver for sig. Derfor må påtænkte statslige indkøb af Kyoto-enheder tages med i betragtning, når det skal vurderes, om kravet er opfyldt.

25. Efter Kommissionens opfattelse kan medlemsstaterne frit vælge, om de vil anvende grænsen for det enkelte anlæg eller kollektivt for alle anlæg. Af hensyn til fleksibiliteten henstilles det til medlemsstaterne, at de anvender grænsen for hele handelsperioden og kollektivt for alle anlæg.

3.6. Spørgsmål vedrørende nytilkomne og lukninger

26. Efter Kommissionens opfattelse er det for tidligt at drage konklusioner og udpege bedste praksis, hvad angår nytilkomne og lukninger. Der er nærmere herom i bilag 7.

3.7. Yderligere retningslinjer for tildeling på sektor- og anlægsniveau

27. Når medlemsstaterne fastsætter tildelinger på anlægsniveau i anden fase, anser Kommissionen det for påkrævet, at de ikke forlader sig på emissioner eller andre data fra første fase. Ellers vil anlæg, der aktivt har reduceret emissionerne i første handelsperiode, blive urimeligt forfordelt ved at få en mindre andel af tildelingerne i anden fase end anlæg, der ikke har reduceret emissionerne i løbet af første periode.

28. Når tildelingen ikke bygger på emissioner og andre data fra første fase, bliver en tidlig indsats passende anerkendt, og man undgår at oprette en reserve for tidlig indsats eller andet, hvormed der kan tages hensyn til en tidlig indsats.

29. Kommissionen finder, at man for at mindske kompleksiteten og den administrative indsats mest muligt ikke bør opretholde særbestemmelser på anlægsniveau om procesemissioner.

30. Som allerede nævnt kan der ikke lægges vægt nok på betydningen af, at de nationale tildelingsplaners anden fase bliver enklere end den første. Enklere tildelingsregler på sektor- og anlægsniveau gør tildelingsprocessen klarere og reducerer omkostningerne, især for de små og mellemstore virksomheder, der er omfattet af ordningen.

3.8. Yderligere retningslinjer for andre tildelingsaspekter

31. Benchmarking på EU-plan er ikke en metode, der er tilstrækkelig afprøvet til at kunne benyttes i anden fase. Men medlemsstaterne vil muligvis med fordel kunne benytte national benchmarking ved tildeling på anlægsniveau i visse sektorer og for nytilkomne, f.eks. i elsektoren. Kommissionen vil ved revisionen se nærmere på erfaringerne med sådanne anvendelser. Kommissionen er interesseret i at vide, om det er muligt at holde styr på de yderligere datamængder, der er brug for til benchmarking, og om medlemsstaterne finder, at den ekstra administrative indsats er umagen værd.

32. Kommissionen fremhæver, at medlemsstaterne kan sætte kvoter på auktion inden for 10%-grænsen i direktivets artikel 10 i anden handelsperiode. Større brug af auktion vil give medlemsstaterne og Kommissionen mulighed for at indhente flere erfaringer med denne tildelingsmetode og få praktiske erfaringer til rådighed til den strategiske revurdering. Kommissionen minder medlemsstaterne om, at auktionsprovenuet bl.a. kan gå til at dække ordningens administrationsomkostninger og statslige køb af Kyoto-enheder. Hvis medlemsstaterne vælger at sætte kvoter på auktion, opfordrer Kommissionen dem til at give nærmere oplysninger om auktionens forløb i god tid, helst i den nationale tildelingsplan, især om de forventede tidspunkter og mængder.

33. Hvad angår høring af offentligheden i artikel 9, stk. 1, artikel 11, stk. 2, og kriterium nr. 9 i bilag III i direktivet, forventer Kommissionen, at medlemsstaterne opstiller et hensigtsmæssigt tidsforløb, således at høring af offentligheden om anden fase af den nationale tildelingsplan bliver mere effektiv. Medlemsstaterne bør tilstræbe at have afsluttet høringen af offentligheden i henhold til artikel 11, stk. 2, og kriterium nr. 9 i bilag III så betids, at fristen den 31. december 2006 kan overholdes. Eftersom der ikke er så stærkt tidspres under forberedelsen af anden handelsperiode som under første fase, har Kommissionen fuld tiltro til, at medlemsstaterne sørger for at opfylde dette krav hver på deres måde.

4. FORTOLKNING AF, HVAD DIREKTIVETS BILAG I OMFATTER

4.1. Energiproducerende anlæg

34. Om fortolkningen af "energiproducerende anlæg" i direktivets bilag I har Kommissionen konstateret, at nogle af medlemsstaterne baserede den første nationale tildelingsplan på en fortolkning, hvor alle anlæg, der opfyldte kapacitetskravet, var omfattet, uanset om forbrændingsprocessen tjener til uafhængig energiproduktion eller indgår i en anden produktionsproces. Andre medlemsstater benyttede forskellige snævrere fortolkninger, idet nogle eller alle energiproducerende processer, der indgår i en anden produktionsproces, blev holdt udenfor.

35. Kommissionen finder denne situation meget utilfredsstillende. Anskuet fra det indre markeds synsvinkel må man ved anvendelsen af et direktiv undgå, at en og samme anlægstype er omfattet i nogle medlemsstater, men ikke i andre. At energiproducerende anlæg fortolkes og omfattes ensartet i samtlige medlemsstater under anden handelsperiode er afgørende for at undgå en betydelig konkurrenceforvridning i det indre marked.

36. Kommissionen anser fortolkningen af energiproducerende anlæg i bilag 8 for at være den korrekte. Kommissionen er klar over, at nogle medlemsstater bliver nødt til at medregne en del flere anlæg, bl.a. større anlæg med betydelig emissioner og nogle ganske små anlæg. På baggrund af det følgende kapitel erkender Kommissionen dog, at det er uhensigtsmæssigt at medregne processer til supplerende energiproduktion, der typisk finder sted i små anlæg. For at opnå større ensartethed i anden handelsperiode bør alle medlemsstaterne derfor under alle omstændigheder også inddrage energiproduktionsprocesser ved krakningsanlæg, carbon black-produktion, gasafbrænding[12], smelteovne[13] og integrerede stålværker[14], som typisk finder sted i store anlæg og indebærer betydelige emissioner. Kommissionen forbeholder sig ret til at tage alle nødvendige skridt til at undgå betydelige konkurrenceforvridninger. Der er i bilag 8 nærmere oplysninger om Kommissionens fortolkning af "energiproducerende anlæg".

4.2. De mindste anlæg

37. Medlemsstaterne og de interesserede parter er skeptiske over for, at de mindste anlæg er omfattet af direktivet, idet det navnlig hævdes, at de mindste anlæg har større omkostninger end fordele ved at deltage i ordningen. Kommissionen er klar over, at nogle af de mindre anlægs fordele og omkostninger ved deltagelsen bør undersøges nøjere ved revisionen af EU-emissionshandelsordningen i medfør af direktivets artikel 30.

38. Kommissionen understreger, at nogle af de omkostninger, som de mindste anlæg har ved deltagelsen, er engangsudgifter op til den første handelsperiode, og de kommer ikke til at optræde i fremtiden. Hvad angår de løbende omkostninger, der først og fremmest udgøres af årlige udgifter til overvågning, rapportering og verifikation af emissioner, er Kommissionen særlig opmærksom på at opnå alle tænkelige omkostningsbesparelser for de mindste anlæg ved sin løbende revision af retningslinjerne for overvågning og rapportering. Kommissionen sigter efter, at de reviderede retningslinjer skal træde i kraft den 1. januar 2008, samtidig med at anden handelsperiode begynder.

39. Desuden gentager Kommissionen, hvor vigtigt det er at benytte enkle tildelingsregler i anden handelsperiode af hensyn til de mindste anlæg og derudover at se på, hvilke andre aspekter end overvågning og tildeling der kan mindske disse anlægs omkostninger ved deltagelsen. Kommissionen er overbevist om, at dette vil give en yderligere forbedring af forholdet mellem de fordele og omkostninger, sådanne anlæg har ved at deltage i EU-emissionshandelsordningen.

40. Kommissionen opfordrer medlemsstaterne til at se nærmere på de fleksibilitetsmuligheder, der er opregnet i bilag 9, når de lægger anden fase af deres nationale tildelingsplaner fast. Kommissionen agter i forbindelse med revisionen at se mere indgående på direktivets anvendelsesområde, for så vidt angår de mindste anlæg, herunder muligheden af at foreslå en ændring af direktivet, således at nogle af de små anlæg udgår af EU-emissionshandelsordningen i løbet af anden handelsperiode. I den forbindelse overvejer Kommissionen, at energiproduktion under en vis grænse, f.eks. 3 MW, ikke skal medregnes under den såkaldte sammenregningsregel. Kommissionen er også ved at se på muligheden af at lade den del af sammenregningsregelen udgå, som siger, at kapaciteten af aktiviteter, der gennemføres af samme driftsleder på samme område, skal lægges sammen.

ANNEX

Annex 1: Background data

Member State | 2003 national greenhouse gas emissions | Allowed emissions annual average 2008-12 under Kyoto Protocol | ETS share[15] | First phase cap annual average 2005-07 according to Commission decisions[16] |

Austria | 91.6 | 68.3 | 36.0% | 33.0 |

Belgium | 147.7 | 135.8 | 42.6% | 62.9 |

Cyprus | 9.2 | n.a. | 62.0% | 5.7 |

Czech Republic | 145.4 | 176.8 | 67.1% | 97.6 |

Denmark | 74.0 | 55.0 | 45.3% | 33.5 |

Estonia | 21.4 | 40.0 | 88.6% | 19.0 |

Finland | 85.5 | 70.4 | 53.2% | 45.5 |

France | 557.2 | 568.0 | 28.1% | 156.5 |

Germany | 1017.5 | 986.1 | 49.0% | 499.0 |

Greece | 137.6 | 139.6 | 54.1% | 74.4 |

Hungary | 83.2 | 114.3 | 37.6% | 31.3 |

Ireland | 67.6 | 61.0 | 33.0% | 22.3 |

Italy | 569.8 | 477.2 | 40.8% | 232.5 |

Latvia | 10.5 | 23.3 | 43.4% | 4.6 |

Lithuania | 17.2 | 46.9 | 71.2% | 12.3 |

Luxembourg | 11.3 | 9.2 | 29.8% | 3.4 |

Malta | 2.9 | n.a. | n.a. | 2.9 |

Netherlands | 214.8 | 200.3 | 44.4% | 95.3 |

Poland | 384.0 | 531.3 | 62.3% | 239.1 |

Portugal | 81.2 | 75.4 | 47.0% | 38.2 |

Slovakia | 51.7 | 66.0 | 59.0% | 30.5 |

Slovenia | 19.8 | 18.8 | 44.3% | 8.8 |

Spain | 402.3 | 329.0 | 43.4% | 174.4 |

Sweden | 70.6 | 75.2 | 32.5% | 22.9 |

UK | 651.1 | 657.4 | 37.7% | 245.3 |

Total | 2190.8 |

Note: All emission figures are in million tonnes CO2 equivalent.

Annex 2: Criteria for national allocation plans referred to in Articles 9, 22 and 30 of Annex III of the Directive

1. The total quantity of allowances to be allocated for the relevant period shall be consistent with the Member State's obligation to limit its emissions pursuant to Decision 2002/358/EC and the Kyoto Protocol, taking into account, on the one hand, the proportion of overall emissions that these allowances represent in comparison with emissions from sources not covered by this Directive and, on the other hand, national energy policies, and should be consistent with the national climate change programme. The total quantity of allowances to be allocated shall not be more than is likely to be needed for the strict application of the criteria of this Annex. Prior to 2008, the quantity shall be consistent with a path towards achieving or over-achieving each Member State's target under Decision 2002/358/EC and the Kyoto Protocol. |

2. The total quantity of allowances to be allocated shall be consistent with assessments of actual and projected progress towards fulfilling the Member States' contributions to the Community's commitments made pursuant to Decision 93/389/EEC. |

3. Quantities of allowances to be allocated shall be consistent with the potential, including the technological potential, of activities covered by this scheme to reduce emissions. Member States may base their distribution of allowances on average emissions of greenhouse gases by product in each activity and achievable progress in each activity. |

4. The plan shall be consistent with other Community legislative and policy instruments. Account should be taken of unavoidable increases in emissions resulting from new legislative requirements. |

5. The plan shall not discriminate between companies or sectors in such a way as to unduly favour certain undertakings or activities in accordance with the requirements of the Treaty, in particular Articles 87 and 88 thereof. |

6. The plan shall contain information on the manner in which new entrants will be able to begin participating in the Community scheme in the Member State concerned. |

7. The plan may accommodate early action and shall contain information on the manner in which early action is taken into account. Benchmarks derived from reference documents concerning the best available technologies may be employed by Member States in developing their National Allocation Plans, and these benchmarks can incorporate an element of accommodating early action. |

8. The plan shall contain information on the manner in which clean technology, including energy efficient technologies, are taken into account. |

9. The plan shall include provisions for comments to be expressed by the public, and contain information on the arrangements by which due account will be taken of these comments before a decision on the allocation of allowances is taken. |

10. The plan shall contain a list of the installations covered by this Directive with the quantities of allowances intended to be allocated to each. |

11. The plan may contain information on the manner in which the existence of competition from countries or entities outside the Union will be taken into account. |

12. The plan shall specify the maximum amount of CERs and ERUs which may be used by operators in the Community scheme as a percentage of the allocation of the allowances to each installation. The percentage shall be consistent with the Member State’s supplementarity obligations under the Kyoto Protocol and decisions adopted pursuant to the UNFCCC or the Kyoto Protocol. |

Annex 3: Key messages from the first allocation guidance document

In January 2004, the Commission provided guidance to assist Member States in the preparation of the national allocation plans[17]. The guidance contained in that document on the implementation of the then eleven[18] criteria in Annex III to the Directive remainsrelevant for the second trading period 2008-2012. The Commission therefore wishes to reiterate the main elements.

Criterion (1) – Kyoto commitments The Commission understands “likely to be needed” as forward-looking and linked to the projected emissions of covered installations as a whole, given that this criterion refers to the total quantity of allowances to be allocated. The Commission understands the reference to the “strict application of the criteria in this annex” to comprise the criteria with a mandatory character or containing mandatory elements - i.e. criteria 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5. In order to satisfy this requirement and fulfil all mandatory criteria and elements, a Member State should not allocate more than is needed, or warranted, by the most constraining of these criteria. It follows that any application of the optional elements of Annex III may not lead to an increase in the total quantity of allowances. |

Criterion (2) – Assessments of emissions developments Pursuant to Decision 280/2004/EC concerning a mechanism for monitoring Community greenhouse gas emissions and for implementing the Kyoto Protocol , the Commission undertakes an annual assessment of each Member State’s actual emissions and projected emissions for the period 2008-2012, in total and by sector and by gas. Criterion 2 requires the total quantity of allowances to be allocated to be consistent with these assessments. Consistency will be deemed as ensured, if the total quantity of allowances to be allocated to covered installations is not more than would be necessary taking into account actual emissions and projected emissions contained in those assessments. |

Criterion (3) – Potential to reduce emissions A Member State should determine the total quantity of allowances resulting from the application of criterion 3 by comparing the potential of activities covered by the scheme to reduce emissions with the potential of activities not covered. The criterion will be deemed as fulfilled if the allocation reflects the relative differences in the potential between the total covered and non-covered activities. |

Criterion (4) – Consistency with other legislation Criterion 4 concerns the relationship between allocations under Directive 2003/87/EC and other Community legislative and policy instruments. Consistency between allowance allocations and other legislation is introduced as a requirement in order to ensure that the allocation does not contravene the provisions of other legislation. In principle, no allowances should be allocated in cases where other legislation implies that covered emissions had or will have to be reduced even without the introduction of the emissions trading scheme. Similarly, consistency implies that if other legislation results in increased emissions or limits the scope for decreasing emissions covered by the Directive account should be taken of this increase. |

Criterion (6) – New entrants Under criterion 6, the national allocation plan should contain information on the manner in which new entrants will be able to begin participating in the emissions trading scheme in a Member State. The guidance proposes three ways in which new entrants can begin participating in the emissions trading scheme: by buying allowances in the market, by buying them in an auction, or by receiving them for free from a reserve set aside by the Member State. Having new entrants buy allowances in the market or in an auction is in accordance with the principle of equal treatment. |

Criterion (10) – List of installations This criterion will be deemed as fulfilled, if a Member State has respected its obligation to list all the installations covered by the Directive. A Member State has to indicate the total quantity of allowances intended to be allocated to each installation. |

Annex 4: Summary of experience gained from allocation plans for the first phase (2005-2007) and general lessons for the second phase (2008-2012)

1. More use of emissions trading is necessary to meet the Kyoto targets cost-effectively. Some Member States rely to a large degree on reductions in the non-trading sectors or on government purchase of Kyoto unit credits in the pursuit of their Kyoto targets. The intended government purchase of Kyoto units and the foreseen reduction efforts in the non-trading sectors have served in the first allocation phase as buffers resulting in moderate use of emission trading. In some Member States too much of the reduction effort may have been shifted to the non-trading sectors. Maintaining this imbalance would make Kyoto compliance more costly than necessary. Given that emissions trading is the most cost-effective instrument at hand, it should be used more in the second allocation round and beyond.

2. Allocations have in general been more restrictive for power generators than other sectors covered by the scheme. In most Member States, the allocation to the power generating sector, in relation to projected needs, has been more restrictive, i.e. more environmentally ambitious, than the allocations to the other sectors covered by the scheme.

3. Member States experiencing considerable excess in actual emissions with respect to their Kyoto targets intend to purchase a substantial amount of Kyoto units. Eight Member States announced in the first phase national allocation plans their intention to purchase with government funds in total some 500 to 600 million Kyoto units. Given the general outlook for Joint Implementation (JI) and Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), the envisaged volume will be very challenging to realise. Furthermore, the Linking Directive will add private-sector demand to government demand for such credits. The Commission considers it as a matter of priority to improve the functioning of these mechanisms.

4. The non-acceptance of ex-post adjustments is essential for the allowance market development. The Commission did not approve the so-called ex-post adjustments envisaged by a number of Member States for the first trading period. This plays a vital role in the development of an efficient and liquid allowance market. The good functioning of the allowance market depends crucially on a stable and predictable allocation for the entire trading period in order to create stable incentives for installations to reduce emissions. For compliance purposes, companies can use the full flexibility of the scheme, be it via the allowance market or via company-internal transfers across borders.

5. Some allocation plans are more complex than necessary and not sufficiently transparent. In the first national allocation plans, some Member States created a complex set of special allocation rules: all Member States provided for a new entrants reserve and most also for some kind of administrative provision in the case of closure of an installation (i.e. no further allocation of allowances for the remainder of the ongoing trading period once an installation is closed). The design of new entrants and closure rules differs in detail. This contributes to a high degree of complexity and intransparency in the internal market and may result in unnecessary distortions of competition. Member States should consider simplifying all rules which they have added themselves and which are not essential for the functioning of the scheme. Simpler rules will help make national allocations plans more transparent.

Annex 5: Information requested to assess substantiation of intended government purchase of Kyoto units

Member States must substantiate the intended government purchase of Kyoto units and are requested to provide the following information in the national allocation plan:

(1) indicate the amount of Kyoto units planned to be purchased for compliance with the Kyoto target and any changes in this amount compared to the first national allocation plan;

(2) indicate the type of Kyoto units planned to be purchased, along with their respective projected or contracted purchase price;

(3) demonstrate the existence of relevant national legislation and budget allocations;

(4) provide information on the progress to date in realising the planned purchases, in particular the quantity of Kyoto units for which emission reduction purchase contracts have been signed at the time of notification of the second national allocation plan;

(5) indicate the envisaged time schedule of still to be effected purchases;

(6) outline the administrative arrangements put in place for realising the planned purchases, such as national programmes or purchase tenders for purchasing Kyoto units;

(7) indicate details about the contributions of multilateral or private carbon purchase funds and the expected delivery of credits;

(8) demonstrate the existence of contingency measures applicable in the event that planned purchases and signed purchase agreements result in the delivery of a lower than expected amount of Kyoto units.

Annex 6: Information requested to assess substantiation of other policies and measures

Member States must substantiate the effects of implemented and additional policies and measures and are requested to provide the following information in the national allocation plan:

(1) indicate the implemented policies and measures it considers as significant in sectors not covered by the EU ETS. For sectoral framework policies implemented (e.g. rural development plan, waste management plan) the plan has to provide the individual measures included that are considered to lead to greenhouse gas emission reductions. For cross-sectoral policies and measures, the plan has to indicate in which way those measures affect emissions in the trading and non-trading sectors. The information provided has to include the year in which the implementation showed full effect;

(2) indicate additional policies and measures not yet implemented at the time of notification which the Member State considers as significant. The plan has to present information on the status of planning or adoption of relevant legislation, agreements, incentive programmes, etc. and has to address the period for which full additional reduction effects are expected;

(3) indicate the approximate level of current greenhouse gas emissions represented by the activity targeted by each policy or measure and include quantified annual emissions reductions for the period 2008 to 2012 for the policies and measures indicated under the two preceding bullets. If no quantitative estimation of effects is available, the plan should explain why this information could not be provided and should include additional information why the policy or measure is considered to provide significant emission reduction effects;

(4) provide assumptions and methodologies used for the quantification of the effects of indicated policies and measures and provide references to sources for this information;

(5) present quantitative indicators to demonstrate the effectiveness of the policy or measure under the first requirement;

(6) indicate how policies and measures presented under the first two requirements are reflected in the greenhouse gas emissions projections presented in the plan;

(7) indicate any developments and trends of the activities targeted by the policies and measures provided under the first two requirements that could potentially counteract the reduction effects, e.g. increased production capacities or growing trends in consumption patterns;

(8) indicate any overlapping effects among important measures (e.g. effects of cross-sectoral measures and sectoral measures on the same activity) and how such double-counting effects have been eliminated in the estimation of quantitative reduction effects.

Annex 7: Issues related to new entrants and closures

1. The Commission notes that in the first trading period all Member States have set aside allowances for new entrants in a reserve and most adopted some form of closure provisions. The Commission did not raise objections to these administrative provisions and rules to the extent that they were not tantamount to ex-post adjustments.

2. The Commission notes further a multitude of detailed provisions governing new entrants reserves and closures, including transfer rule arrangements, adopted by Member States in the first allocation phase. This contributes to a high degree of complexity and intransparency in the internal market and may result in distortions of competition. At this stage, there is however insufficient practical experience with regard to the practical application of these rules.

3. For this reason, the Commission considers it premature to draw conclusions and identify best practice. In the case of new entrants’ reserves and closure and transfer provisions being maintained in the second trading period, the Commission recommends Member States ensure in particular that the new entrants reserve not be replenished upon exhaustion, that allowances not allocated to closed installations be cancelled or auctioned, and that there be no allocation at projected needs to new installations.

4. In the review report in June 2006[19], the Commission will consider alternative options (including the set-up of an EU-level new entrant reserve accompanied by EU-wide administrative rules on closure and cross-border transfer) to achieve further harmonisation with respect to new entrants and closure provisions.

Annex 8: Definition of combustion installation

1. The Commission considers the interpretation including all combustion processes, i.e oxidation of fuels, fulfilling the specified capacity to be the correct interpretation of Annex I of the Directive, for the following notable reasons:

2. Firstly, the term “combustion” is used in a wide range of Community legislation including not only the Emissions Trading Directive and the IPPC-Directive, but also the LCP-Directive[20] and the Sulphur in Liquid Fuels-Directive[21]. The meaning of combustion in the context of the Emissions Trading Directive has to be interpreted within the framework of other Community legislation where definitions are included.

3. The Sulphur in Liquid Fuels-Directive in its Article 2(5) and the LCP-Directive in its Article 2(7) define ‘combustion plant’ as “any technical apparatus in which fuels are oxidised in order to use the heat thus generated”. The LCP-Directive lists in the same Article a range of combustion plants which are specifically excluded from the scope of the LCP-Directive. The Emissions Trading Directive does not provide for such exclusion.[22]

4. Given that the Emissions Trading Directive makes no similar specific exclusions, the types of combustion installations excluded by Article 2(7) of the LCP-Directive are included within the scope of the Emissions Trading Directive where the threshold is met or exceeded.

5. Further guidance in support of this conclusion comes from Annex I of the Emissions Trading Directive itself. Annex I specifically excludes municipal and hazardous waste incineration facilities from the scope of the scheme. The combustion of e.g. hazardous waste is clearly an integrated part of the normal process undertaken by hazardous waste incinerators. If, in the absence of this specific exclusion, the Directive were to be interpreted as not applying to such installations where combustion takes place as an integrated part of the installation’s processes, municipal and hazardous waste installations would not need to have been specifically excluded as they would in any case have fallen outside its scope. Their specific exclusion is further confirmation that it is the presence of a combustion process with a rated thermal input exceeding 20MW that determines the Directive’s coverage of stationary combustion installations.

6. It is also commonly accepted that the term “combustion installation” for the purposes of the IPPC-Directive covers not just the power generation industry but also other industries where fuels are burned. Thus the heading “Energy industries” in the context of the IPPC Directive does not imply a narrow restriction of coverage of the term “combustion installations” to combustion processes that produce energy independently, but rather also includes combustion processes taking place as an integrated part of another production process. The heading “Energy activities” used in the Emissions Trading Directive, if anything, would be broader, so at least the same conclusion would apply. This therefore provides additional support for the argument that “combustion installations” in the Emissions Trading Directive not only covers combustion installations that are part of the energy industry, but also combustion installations in other industry sectors, including sectors that are not explicitly listed in its Annex I.

7. It is well-established that industries can fall under more than one activity category of the IPPC-Directive. Integrated steel works for example carry out several Annex I activities, and refineries include combustion installations of more than 50MW. Considering the similarities between the IPPC-Directive and the Emissions Trading Directive, there is no reason to take a different approach to the interpretation of the latter in this respect. In particular, a different approach cannot be justified by the separate listing of the steel and cement industries, given that both produce substantial CO2 emissions from (chemical) processes in addition to their emissions from combustion.

8. In the light of the above points, any installation, which includes one or more piece of stationary technical apparatus in which a combustion process takes place and that together on the same site and under the responsibility of the same operator has a rated thermal input exceeding 20MW, is therefore subject to the Emissions Trading Directive. This includes apparatus where the heat is used in another piece of apparatus, through a medium such as electricity or steam, and apparatus where the heat resulting from combustion is used directly within that apparatus, for example, for melting, drying, flares or units providing heat input to chemical reactors. The purpose to which the product of an activity is put should not be a determining characteristic as to whether or not an installation is subject to the Directive, as this would introduce subjectivity into its scope. Energy produced by combustion may be in the form of electricity, heat, hot water or steam, and the distance between the production of energy and its eventual use is not relevant for competent authorities to decide whether or not an installation is subject to the Emissions Trading Directive.

Annex 9: Interpretation issues related to the smallest installations

1. The Commission draws Member States’ attention to the fact that the so-called aggregation clause[23] contained in the second paragraph of Annex I of the Directive should be interpreted carefully so as to not cover certain small installations, without prejudice to the interpretation of such or similar wording in other Community legislation. In particular, the wording “under the same subheading” contained in this clause should be understood in the sense that a single activity falling simultaneously under several subheadings, e.g. both under “energy activities” and under a specific sectoral activity covered by Annex I of the Directive, such as “mineral industry”, is considered under the more specific sectoral subheading. Multiple activities of the same type should then be aggregated on the basis of that specific sectoral subheading, and not on the basis of all of the different possible activity descriptions that could apply. There is no basis for aggregating activities that fall under a different subheading, even though they may be part of the same installation.

2. Furthermore, flexibility at the discretion of Member States comes also from the wording “and/or” in the provision governing the manufacture of ceramic products in Annex I of the Directive. If Member States want to use this flexibility the Commission notes that this provision can be interpreted in a restrictive way so as to require the simultaneous presence of all mentioned sub-elements for the second trading period, again without prejudice to the interpretation of such or similar wording in other Community legislation. In this context, the Commission draws the attention of Member States to the Declaration of the Council and the Commission of 4 September 1996[24] supporting an interpretation of the same wording contained in Annex I of the IPPC-Directive, that it is up to Member States to decide as to whether one of the two criteria or both criteria need to be fulfilled at the same time.

Annex 10: Set of NAP common format summary tables

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Explanatory comments on NAP Common Format summary tables

Note: Grey fields are filled in automatically when using the Excel spreadsheets.

Table I: NAP summary table – target calculation

General description:

The purpose of this table is to provide an overview of key data relevant for NAP assessment. The gap (row C) between the Kyoto target (row A) and actual greenhouse gas emissions in 2003 (row B) is presented with necessary corresponding reduction measures (quantified in the fourth column of rows F-H, and totalled in row I). The gap is also expressed as the difference between the Kyoto target (row A) and the projected annual average total greenhouse gas emissions from 2008-2012 (row D). This figure is indicated in row E.

Specific remarks:

The second column makes a cross-reference to other data tables.

The fourth column refers to emissions or effects on emissions from measures recorded in the third column.

All rows with the exception of rows B and C contain annual averages relating to the second trading period 2008 to 2012.

Table IIa: NAP Summary table – Basic data

General description:

Table IIa gives an overview of historic and expected trends in various factors crucial to the calculation of a Member State’s potential to reduce emissions: namely, real GDP (row A), greenhouse gas emissions (row B) and carbon intensity (row C).

All three factors are expressed both in absolute numbers and in a trend index, with 2003 being the base year (2003=100).

Specific remarks:

In order to have a complete picture, the Commission invites Member States to provide annual data from 1990 to 2012. While re-stating some date in the public domain, Table IIa is of added value as an integral part of the NAP ensuring transparency and easy access to this information for stakeholders and other Member States.

Member States are required to indicate the sources of the information used, separately per year where relevant.

For the period 2008 to 2012, the Commission prefers annual data to better understand the development of these figures over time. In case a Member State can justify why such annual data are not available, the Commission would also accept the submission of only annual averages for the period 2008 to 2012, to be indicated in the respective column.

Table IIb: NAP Summary table – Basic data on electricity sector

General description:

Table IIb indicates the basic data for the electricity sector. The purpose is to obtain a comprehensive picture of total domestic electricity production (row A), imports (row B) and exports (row C), the electricity trade balance (row D, constituting the difference between rows B and C) as well as the shares of different fuels (gas, oil, coal, nuclear energy, and renewable energy) in total domestic electricity production (rows E-I).

Specific remarks:

Imports and exports (rows B and C) need to be disaggregated into the most important countries to/from which the export/import takes place, as well as a row with the remainder to other countries, and the total figure. These figures will allow the Commission to cross-check the plausibility of indications by individual Member States of their respective exports and imports, which would naturally need to be compatible with each other.

Member States are required to indicate the sources of the information used (separately per year where relevant) and are encouraged to provide annual data also for the period 2008 to 2012.

If a Member State can justify why such annual data are not available, the Commission requires explanation and at least the submission of data for a recent year and annual averages for the period 2008 to 2012. Similarly, Member States should provide data on the fuel mix as accurately as possible.

Naturally, the future fuel mix will depend on estimates, amongst others, of the allowance price. Member States are requested to indicate their respective estimates in the explanations in the NAP and also in Table X.

Member States should introduce also the target pursuant to Directive 2001/77/EC in Table 2b for the year 2010.

Table III: NAP Summary table – Recent and projected greenhouse gas emissions per common reporting format sector (without taking into account additional policies and measures in Table VI)

General description:

Table III relates recent and projected greenhouse gas emissions per common reporting format sector, as further specified by the numbers for the respective sub-sectors in the second column. Where indicated, the emissions should be indicated for total greenhouse gases and CO2 in the EU ETS.

The Commission recognises the technical difficulty to complete this table but stresses the importance of bringing together the categories in the UNFCCC-based common reporting format with the categories under EU ETS reporting.

Specific remarks:

The second column indicates the sub-sectoral reference under the Common Reporting Format (CRF).

The Commission recognises that some Member States may not have all the data available to complete Table III. If a Member State can justify why such annual or sectoral data is not available, the Commission requires at least the submission of data for a recent year and annual averages for the period 2008 to 2012 for as many sectors as possible, as well as aggregate figures (total and total in ETS).

CO2 emissions in the ETS sector depend on estimates, amongst others, on the allowance price. Member States are requested to indicate their respective estimates in the explanations in the NAP and also in Table X.

Table IV: NAP Summary table – Recent and projected CO 2 emissions in sectors covered by the EU emissions trading scheme

General description:

Table IV looks more specifically at the recent and projected CO2 emissions by installation or sector covered by the EU ETS, relating them to the activities mentioned in Annex I of the Directive. Certain activities have been aggregated where separate information is likely not to be available or necessary for the Commission’s assessment.

Specific remarks:

Emissions from combustion installations shall be calculated without emissions from installations also covered under the specific sectors of Annex I of the Directive being indicated in rows B-J. As a matter of example, where a combustion installation is also covered by the category “installations for the production of cement clinker …” under the subheading “mineral industry” of Annex I of the Directive, emissions from that installation should fall under the entry “cement producing installations” in row E of Table IV, and should be omitted from row A “combustion installations”. Moreover, emissions from these combustion installations shall be disaggregated into the most important activities to be identified by each Member State, including flaring, integrated steelworks, crackers and furnaces.

For the period 2008 to 2012, the Commission prefers annual data to better understand the development of all sectors. Where a Member State can justify the absence of such annual data for certain sectors, the Commission requires at least the submission of data for a recent year and annual averages for the period 2008 to 2012 in as many sectors as possible. If a Member State can show this to be appropriate, certain sectors may be (dis-)aggregated; in particular coke ovens (row C) with metal ore roasting, sintering, pig iron and steel producing installations (row D). Where such data are not available on an annual basis, the Commission requires a justification and at least the submission of data for a recent year as well as annual averages for the period 2008 to 2012 for as many sectors as possible, as well as aggregate figures (total and total in ETS).

The amount entered in row J, column XI correlates to Table III, row O, last column. The amount entered in row K, column XI correlates to Table III, row N, last column.

Table V: NAP Summary table – Proposed allocation in relation to first period allocation (without additional policies and measures) in the sectors covered by the EU emissions trading scheme

General description:

For installations or sectors covered by the EU ETS, Table V indicates 2003 and 2004 actual emissions (columns i and ii) as well as the proposed second period allocation in relation to first trading period allocation (columns iii and iv). Column v indicates the proposed second period allocation as a percentage of the first period allocation. The same sectoral specification is used as in Table IV.

Specific remarks:

Emissions from combustion installations shall be calculated without emissions from installations covered also under the specific sectors of Annex I of the Directive being indicated in rows B-J. As a matter of example, where a combustion installation is also covered by the category “installations for the production of cement clinker …” under the subheading “mineral industry” of Annex I of the Directive, emissions from that installation should fall under the entry “cement producing installations” in row E of Table IV, and should be omitted from row A “combustion installations”. Moreover, emissions from these combustion installations shall be disaggregated into the most important activities to be identified by each Member State, including flaring, integrated steelworks, crackers and furnaces.

For the period 2008 to 2012, the Commission prefers annual data to better understand the development of all sectors. Where a Member State can justify why such annual data is not available for all sectors, the Commission requires at least the submission of data for a recent year and annual averages for the period 2008 to 2012 in as many sectors as possible, as well as aggregate figures (total and total in ETS). If a Member State can show it to be appropriate, certain sectors may be (dis-)aggregated; in particular coke ovens (row C) with metal ore roasting, sintering, pig iron and steel producing installations (row D).

Table VI: NAP Summary table – Reductions expected by policies and measures other than the EU emissions trading scheme and which have not been taken into account for the "with measures" projection presented in Table III (Mt CO 2 eq)

General description:

Table VI gives account of greenhouse gas emissions reductions expected by policies and measures other than the EU ETS, which have not been taken into account for the “with measures” projection presented in Table III.

It classifies such measures into three categories: “under implementation” (columns i-iii), “adopted” (columns iv-vi), and “planned” (columns vii-ix).

“Under implementation” means that the implementation is ongoing, and that the measure is not taken into account for the "with measures" projections presented in Table III.

“Adopted” means that the measure has been adopted by the final instance at the relevant local, regional or national level, but it is not yet implemented.

“Planned” means that the measure is at least mentioned in a formal government document, but not adopted.

Each of these three categories is again subdivided into three columns: the expected average annual reduction (2008-12), on the one hand, in ETS sectors (columns i, iv and vii), and, on the other hand, in non-ETS sectors (columns ii, v and viii). The third sub-column (iii, vi and ix, respectively) indicates the year, in which the full or a substantial part of the effects of the respective measure can be expected (not necessarily the first year of implementation).

The rows shall contain the measures to be specified in the second column.

Specific remarks:

The Commission recognises that for some measures the disaggregation of the expected reductions into those occurring outside and inside the ETS presents a technical difficulty. It is however an important element for the Commission’s assessment.

Table VII: NAP Summary table – Government’s planned use of Kyoto units (Mt CO 2 eq) and status of implementation

General description:

Table VII gives a detailed overview on the government’s planned use of Kyoto units and the status of their implementation.

It subdivides the Kyoto units into ERUs from JI projects, CERs from CDM projects, and AAUs and other units from international emissions trading. The last column indicates the total of the three types combined.

The status of implementation is presented in the rows, as follows.

Rows A and B indicate the sum across the various degrees of implementation, with row A giving the total amount in the period 2008 to 2012 and row B the annual average in that period per type of Kyoto unit and as a total. The total annual average across all three forms of Kyoto units is equal to row H of Table I.

Row C indicates the most advanced degree of implementation, i.e. the quantity of units already paid for.

Row D gives a lesser degree of implementation, which is the quantity of units contracted, but yet unpaid (delivery pending start of UN ITL). Units partially paid for should be proportionally distributed between rows C and D.

Row E relates to the quantity with the lowest degree of implementation, i.e. the units neither bought nor contracted by the date of notification (Row E = Row A – Row C – Row D).

Rows F and G give additional information on the full budget appropriated to the first commitment period (2008-12), both the one currently available for 2006 (row F) and the one committed up to 2012 (row G).

Row H indicates the implied future price of Kyoto units, which is the sum of rows F and G, divided by the total planned purchase in row A.

Specific remarks:

The Commission prefers Member States to specify the breakdown into ERUs, CERs, and AAUs and others. In case a Member State can justify why such a breakdown is not feasible, the Commission requires at least the submission of separate figures for ERUs and CERs on the one hand and AAUs and others on the other hand.

Table VIII: NAP Summary table – Details on new entrants, closures and auctioning

Table VIII contains various questions relating to important information on new entrants, auctioning and closures. The questions should be self-explanatory.

Table IX: NAP Summary table – Further details on new entrants

Table IX asks for further details on a selected new entrant, e.g. a power plant with a rated thermal input of 100 MW.

In one scenario (second column) the fuel used is coal, while in the other (third column) it is gas.

Member States are then requested to fill in row 4 (forecast number of operating hours/year in the period 2008 to 2012), where such a forecast is relevant for the allocation under the new entrants rule of the Member State, and row 5 (annual allowance allocation in 2008 to 2012).

This information will allow the Commission to better assess the standards used in the allocation to new entrants and at the same time provide for more transparency.

Table X: NAP Summary table – Important assumptions on annual averages

In Table X, Member States are requested to quantify for the years 2005-12 their key assumptions on annual average figures underlying the establishment of the NAP, in particular for:

- the EU allowance price (in Euro);

- the price for crude oil (Brent);

- the price for natural gas;

- the coal price; and

- the exchange rate (for those Member States outside the Euro-zone).

Member States should use and specify common market standards for fuel prices, including the currency used. They should indicate in detail sources of data and methodologies. This information is necessary in order to ensure comparability of data and transparency.

Member States are invited to indicate further assumptions considered important and useful for the Commission’s assessment.

[1] Europa-Parlamentets og Rådets direktiv 2003/87/EF af 13. oktober 2003 om en ordning for handel med kvoter for drivhusgasemissioner i Fællesskabet og om ændring af Rådets direktiv 96/61/EF,EUT L 275 af 25.10.2003, s. 32, ændret ved Europa-Parlamentets og Rådets direktiv 2004/101/EF af 27. oktober 2004 om ændring af direktiv 2003/87/EF om en ordning for handel med kvoter for drivhusgasemissioner i Fællesskabet, for så vidt angår Kyoto-protokollens projektmekanismer,EUT L 338 af 13.11.2004, s. 18.

[2] KOM(2003) 830 endelig.

[3] Den 1. december 2005 opfordrede Rådet Kommissionen til at gøre sit yderste for at give vejledning tidligt nok til udarbejdelsen af medlemsstaternes 2. nationale tildelingsplan.

[4] Se bilag 10.

[5] KOM(2003) 830 endelig, s. 25-29.

[6] Rapport fra Kommissionen om graden af opfyldelsen af EU's Kyoto-mål af 15. december 2005, KOM(2005) 655.

[7] Kilde: Europa-Kommissionen, generaldirektoratet for energi og transport, tendenser inden for energi og transport i Europa frem til 2030, appendiks 2, januar 2003, se netsted (kun på engelsk): http://europa.eu.int/comm/dgs/energy_transport/figures/trends_2030/index_en.htm

[8] I denne henseende lægger Kommissionen vægt på, at tildelingsplanerne er i fuld overensstemmelse med medlemsstaternes forpligtelser i medfør af direktiv 2001/77/EF om fremme af elektricitet produceret fra vedvarende energikilder inden for det indre marked for elektricitet, EFT L 283 af 27.10.2001, s. 33.

[9] Europa-Parlamentets og Rådets direktiv 2004/101/EF af 27. oktober 2004 om ændring af direktiv 2003/87/EF om en ordning for handel med kvoter for drivhusgasemissioner i Fællesskabet, for så vidt angår Kyoto-protokollens projektmekanismer, EUT L 338 af 13.11.2004, s. 18.

[10] Beslutning 15/CP.7, art. 1.

[11] I Kommissionens forslag til koblingsdirektivet var der en sådan kvantitativ definition(KOM(2003) 403).

[12] Inkl. offshore.

[13] Inkl. stenuld.

[14] Inkl. valseværker, genopvarmningsanlæg, glødningsovne og bejdsning.

[15] The ETS share is calculated as the first period cap divided by 2003 national greenhouse gas emissions.

[16] These figures do not account for changes to the number of installations subsequent to the respective Commission decision (e.g. opt-ins or opt-outs of installations).

[17] Commission Communication COM (2003) 830 final, 7.1.2004.

[18] Directive 2004/156/EC (“the Linking Directive”) added a criterion 12 to Annex III to Directive 2003/87/EC.

[19] As provided for by Article 30(2) of the Directive

[20] Directive 2001/80/EC on the limitation of emissions of certain pollutants into the air from large combustion plants, OJ L 309, 27.11.2001, p. 1.

[21] Directive 1999/32/EC relating to a reduction in the sulphur content of certain liquid fuels, OJ L 121, 11.05.1999, p. 13.

[22] Certain activities that are specifically excluded by the LCP-Directive are also excluded from the Emissions Trading Directive, such as “(h) any technical apparatus used in the propulsion of a vehicle, ship or aircraft” because the Emissions Trading Directive only applies to stationary technical units (Article 3(e)). The Emissions Trading Directive therefore covers neither transportation in general nor greenhouse gas emissions arising from traffic on the site of an installation.

[23] “2. The threshold values given below generally refer to production capacities or outputs. Where one operator carries out several activities falling under the same subheading in the same installation or on the same site, the capacities of such activities are added together.”

[24] Council Declaration of 4 September 1996 on Directive 96/61/EC of the Council on Integrated Pollution Prevention and Control, 9388/96, Interinstitutional dossier No. 00/0526 (SYN)