Provisional text

ORDER OF THE COURT (First Chamber)

17 July 2024 (*)

(Reference for a preliminary ruling – Urgent preliminary ruling procedure – Judicial cooperation in criminal matters – Recognition of judgments imposing custodial sentences or measures involving deprivation of liberty for the purpose of their enforcement in another Member State – Framework Decision 2008/909/JHA – Article 53(2) of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice – Article 267 TFEU – Concept of ‘court or tribunal’ – Reassessment at the request of the minister – Manifest inadmissibility of the request for a preliminary ruling)

In Case C‑235/24 PPU [Niesker], (i) 

REQUEST for a preliminary ruling under Article 267 TFEU from the Specialised Chamber of the Gerechtshof Arnhem-Leeuwarden (Court of Appeal, Arnhem-Leeuwarden, Netherlands), made by decision of 29 March 2024, received at the Court on 2 April 2024, in the proceedings

S.A.H.

other party to the proceedings:

Openbaar Ministerie,

THE COURT (First Chamber),

composed of A. Arabadjiev, President of the Chamber, T. von Danwitz (Rapporteur), P.G. Xuereb, A. Kumin and I. Ziemele, Judges,

Advocate General: M. Campos Sánchez-Bordona,

Registrar: A. Calot Escobar,

having regard to the written procedure,

after considering the observations submitted on behalf of:

–        S.A.H., by T. de Boer and F. Dölle, advocaten,

–        the Openbaar Ministerie, by A.K. Kooij, H.J. Lambers and V. Smink,

–        the Netherlands Government, by M.K. Bulterman and A. Hanje, acting as Agents,

–        the European Commission, by H. Leupold, F. van Schaik and J. Vondung, acting as Agents,

having decided, after hearing the Advocate General, to proceed to judgment by reasoned order in accordance with Article 53(2) of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice,

makes the following

Order

1        This request for a preliminary ruling concerns the interpretation of Article 267 TFEU, Articles 6, 8 and 9 of Council Framework Decision 2008/909/JHA of 27 November 2008 on the application of the principle of mutual recognition to judgments in criminal matters imposing custodial sentences or measures involving deprivation of liberty for the purpose of their enforcement in the European Union (OJ 2008 L 327, p. 27), and Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (‘the Charter’).

2        The request has been made in proceedings for reassessment, at the request of the Minister van Veiligheid en Justitie (Minister for Security and Justice, Netherlands) (‘the Minister’), of a ruling by the Specialised Chamber of the Gerechtshof Arnhem-Leeuwarden (Court of Appeal, Arnhem-Leeuwarden, Netherlands) (‘the Specialised Chamber’) of 18 January 2019, concerning recognition, enforcement and adaptation in the Netherlands of a custodial sentence imposed on S.A.H. in Sweden.

 Legal framework

 European Union law

3        Article 6 of Framework Decision 2008/909, entitled ‘Opinion and notification of the sentenced person’, provides:

‘1.      Without prejudice to paragraph 2, a judgment together with a certificate may be forwarded to the executing State for the purpose of its recognition and enforcement of the sentence only with the consent of the sentenced person in accordance with the law of the issuing State.

2.      The consent of the sentenced person shall not be required where the judgment together with the certificate is forwarded:

…

(c)      to the Member State to which the sentenced person has fled or otherwise returned in view of the criminal proceedings pending against him or her in the issuing State or following the conviction in that issuing State.

3.      In all cases where the sentenced person is still in the issuing State, he or she shall be given an opportunity to state his or her opinion orally or in writing. Where the issuing State considers it necessary in view of the sentenced person’s age or his or her physical or mental condition, that opportunity shall be given to his or her legal representative.

The opinion of the sentenced person shall be taken into account when deciding the issue of forwarding the judgement together with the certificate. Where the person has availed himself or herself of the opportunity provided in this paragraph, the opinion of the sentenced person shall be forwarded to the executing State, in particular with a view to Article 4(4). If the sentenced person stated his or her opinion orally, the issuing State shall ensure that the written record of such statement is available to executing State.

4.      The competent authority of the issuing State shall inform the sentenced person, in a language which he or she understands, that it has decided to forward the judgment together with the certificate by using the standard form of the notification set out in Annex II. When the sentenced person is in the executing State at the time of that decision, that form shall be transmitted to the executing State which shall inform the sentenced person accordingly.

…’

4        Article 8 of that framework decision, entitled ‘Recognition of the judgment and enforcement of the sentence’, provides:

‘1.      The competent authority of the executing State shall recognise a judgment which has been forwarded in accordance with Article 4 and following the procedure under Article 5, and shall forthwith take all the necessary measures for the enforcement of the sentence, unless it decides to invoke one of the grounds for non-recognition and non-enforcement provided for in Article 9.

2.      Where the sentence is incompatible with the law of the executing State in terms of its duration, the competent authority of the executing State may decide to adapt the sentence only where that sentence exceeds the maximum penalty provided for similar offences under its national law. The adapted sentence shall not be less than the maximum penalty provided for similar offences under the law of the executing State.

3.      Where the sentence is incompatible with the law of the executing State in terms of its nature, the competent authority of the executing State may adapt it to the punishment or measure provided for under its own law for similar offences. Such a punishment or measure shall correspond as closely as possible to the sentence imposed in the issuing State and therefore the sentence shall not be converted into a pecuniary punishment.

4.      The adapted sentence shall not aggravate the sentence passed in the issuing State in terms of its nature or duration.’

5        According to Article 9 of that framework decision, entitled ‘Grounds for non-recognition and non-enforcement’:

‘1.      The competent authority of the executing State may refuse to recognise the judgment and enforce the sentence, if:

…

(k)      the sentence imposed includes a measure of psychiatric or health care or another measure involving deprivation of liberty, which, notwithstanding Article 8(3), cannot be executed by the executing State in accordance with its legal or health care system;

…’

 Netherlands law

6        The Wet wederzijdse erkenning en tenuitvoerlegging vrijheidsbenemende en voorwaardelijke sancties (Law on the mutual recognition and enforcement of custodial and suspended sentences) of 12 July 2012 (Stb. 2012, No 333), which transposes Framework Decision 2008/909 into Netherlands law, in the version applicable in the dispute in the main proceedings (‘the WETS’), provides in Article 2:11:

‘1.      The Minister shall forward the judicial decision and the certificate to the Advocate General attached to the Prosecutor’s Office for the district, unless he considers at the outset that there are grounds for refusing to recognise the judicial decision.

2.      The Advocate General shall immediately present the judicial decision and the certificate to the [Specialised Chamber] referred to in Article 67 of the Wet op de rechterlijke organisatie [(Law on the organisation of the judiciary)]. He shall submit to it any observations he may wish to make on the abovementioned documents no later than fourteen days after the date on which he has lodged the documents.

3.      The [Specialised Chamber] shall decide:

a.      whether there are grounds for refusing to recognise the judicial decision under Article 2:13(1);

b.      whether the custodial sentence to be enforced was imposed for an act that was also punishable under Netherlands law and, if so, what act;

c.      how the custodial sentence passed is to be adapted in accordance with paragraph 4 or paragraph 5.

4.      If the term of the custodial sentence passed is higher than the maximum term of the penalty that may be imposed under Netherlands law for the offence concerned, the term of the custodial sentence shall be reduced to that maximum term.

5.      If the nature of the custodial sentence passed is incompatible with Netherlands law, that sentence shall be replaced by a penalty or measure provided for by Netherlands law that corresponds as closely as possible to the custodial sentence passed in the issuing Member State.

6.      The adaptation provided for in paragraph 4 or paragraph 5 shall under no circumstances result in aggravation of the custodial sentence passed.

7.      Within six weeks of the date on which it receives the judicial decision and the certificate, the [Specialised Chamber] shall forward to the Minister the reasoned ruling in writing which it has made under paragraph 3.’

7        Article 2:12 of the WETS provides:

‘1.      The Minister shall decide whether to recognise the judicial decision, taking into account the ruling of the [Specialised Chamber].

…’

8        Article 2:13 of that law provides:

‘1.      Recognition of the judicial decision shall be refused where:

…

i.      the sentence passed concerns a measure involving deprivation of liberty in the area of healthcare that cannot be enforced in accordance with Netherlands law or within the framework of the Netherlands legal system relating to healthcare.

2.      Recognition of the decision shall not be refused on the basis of paragraph 1(a), (b), (e) and (i) so long as the competent authority of the issuing Member State has not had an opportunity to provide information in that regard.’

9        Article 2:14 of that law provides:

‘1.      Recognition of the judicial decision may be refused where:

a.      the act in respect of which the custodial sentence was imposed:

1°.      is deemed to have been committed in whole or in part on Netherlands territory or outside the Netherlands on board a Netherlands vessel or aircraft; or

2°.      was committed outside the territory of the issuing Member State, where under Netherlands law no proceeding could be brought if the act had been committed outside the Netherlands;

b.      at the time the judicial decision is received less than six months of the custodial sentence passed remain to be served.

2.      Recognition of the decision shall not be refused on the basis of paragraph 1(a) where the competent authority of the issuing Member State has not had an opportunity to provide information in that regard.’

10      Article 67 of the Law on the organisation of the judiciary reads as follows:

‘1.      The college responsible for administration of the Gerechtshof Arnhem-Leeuwarden [(Court of Appeal, Arnhem-Leeuwarden)] shall set up a collegiate chamber … The composition of that chamber shall be determined by the college responsible for administration.

2.      That chamber shall also be responsible for the tasks entrusted to it … in [Article] 2:11(3) and [Article] 2:27 … of the [WETS]. …’

 The dispute in the main proceedings and the questions referred

11      S.A.H., an Iraqi national, has been living in the Netherlands since 1996 and was granted a permanent residence permit there in 2001.

12      In a judgment of 26 February 2015, the Göta hovrätt (Göta Court of Appeal, Jönköping, Sweden) convicted him of illegal possession of weapons, illegal threats, harassment and grievous bodily harm. That court ruled that S.A.H. could not be held liable for those criminal acts due to a disorder affecting his mental faculties and imposed on him a measure involving deprivation of liberty, namely a forensic psychiatric treatment for an unspecified duration with a special examination upon discharge.

13      The person concerned having applied for the transfer of the enforcement of that measure to the Netherlands, the Swedish authorities requested the Minister to recognise and enforce that judgment, and subsequently forwarded to him the judgment and the certificate mentioned in Article 4 of Framework Decision 2008/909.

14      In accordance with Article 2:11 of the WETS, those documents were sent to the Specialised Chamber, which on 18 January 2019 ruled inter alia that the measure involving deprivation of liberty imposed on S.A.H. should be adapted and converted to a hospital order with an obligation to receive treatment provided by the public authorities, without setting a maximum duration.

15      On 18 February 2019, the Minister, being the competent authority for the purposes of Framework Decision 2008/909, recognised the decision of 26 February 2015 with due consideration for the Specialised Chamber’s ruling of 18 January 2019. The measure involving deprivation of liberty was converted into a hospital order and the person concerned was placed in a forensic psychiatric centre in the Netherlands.

16      On 6 August 2020, the Staatssecretaris van Justitie en Veiligheid (State Secretary for Justice and Security, Netherlands) issued an order revoking S.A.H.’s residence permit with retrospective effect to 29 August 2014 and declared him to be an undesirable alien.

17      S.A.H. challenged the lawfulness of the recognition decision of 18 February 2019 in civil proceedings, arguing amongst other things that the proceedings that resulted in the ruling of 18 January 2019 did not satisfy the requirements of Article 47 of the Charter. In its judgment of 5 September 2023, the Gerechtshof Den Haag (Court of Appeal, The Hague, Netherlands) upheld the claim and ordered the Minister to reassess his decision.

18      In a letter dated 15 September 2023, the Minister requested the Specialised Chamber to carry out a reassessment in proceedings that satisfied those requirements.

19      Following that request, the Specialised Chamber convened an informal meeting on 12 January 2024, to which S.A.H.’s lawyers and representatives of the prosecution service were invited.

20      The Specialised Chamber outlined the procedure it conducted in that respect as follows: the Minister asked it, through the Advocate General, to give a ruling confined to whether or not there are grounds for refusal of compulsory recognition under the WETS, whether the acts are punishable in the Netherlands and whether the custodial sentence or measure involving deprivation of liberty passed in another Member State needs to be adapted. It adds that there is no possibility of bringing an appeal against the Minister’s decision. Nevertheless, an application for reassessment could be made to that chamber at the request of the Minister, following either a complaint by the sentenced person addressed to the latter, or civil proceedings initiated by that person, as in the present case.

21      In that context, the Specialised Chamber questions, first of all, whether it can be regarded as a ‘court or tribunal’ within the meaning of Article 267 TFEU which is competent to make a reference to the Court for a preliminary ruling. In that regard, it states that it had considered up until now that that was not the case and that the evaluation report on the Netherlands of 2 December 2022, drafted in the context of the 9th round of mutual evaluations on mutual recognition [of] legal instruments in the field of deprivation or restriction of liberty, coordinated by the Council of the European Union (13190/1/22 REV 1), reached the same conclusion. However, it is apparent from the history of the national legislation at issue in the main proceedings that the Netherlands legislature wanted a judicial ruling on the legal questions addressed in Article 8(2) to (4) and Article 9 of Framework Decision 2008/909.

22      In addition, the Specialised Chamber considers that the question whether its procedure can be classified as inter partes is decisive, and states that it is established by law, is permanent, applies rules of law, is independent and takes into account any arguments of the sentenced person that are submitted to it. Moreover, although its rulings are limited to a number of points, they are nonetheless binding.

23      The Specialised Chamber then questions whether its legal ruling on the basis of Article 2:11 of the WETS falls within the scope of EU law or is one of the situations governed by that law and, if so, whether the possibility of seeking a reassessment in the context of a written procedure, as has been developed in practice, meets the requirements of Article 47 of the Charter. Lastly, it seeks clarification regarding possibilities for the adaptation of a measure involving deprivation of liberty permitted under Framework Decision 2008/909.

24      In those circumstances, the Specialised Chamber decided to stay the proceedings and to refer the following questions to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling:

‘(1)      Should the term “court or tribunal”, as referred to in Article 267 TFEU in conjunction with Article 8(2) to (4) and Article 9 of Framework Decision [2008/909], be interpreted as meaning that it also covers a designated [ordinary] court, other than the competent authority referred to in Article 8(1) of [that] framework decision, that rules in written proceedings exclusively on the legal questions referred to in Article 8(2) to (4) and Article 9 of [that] framework decision, in principle without any submissions from the sentenced person?

(2)      Should Article 47 of the Charter be interpreted as meaning that, when, in recognition proceedings under Framework Decision [2008/909], the assessment of the aspects referred to in Article 8(2) to (4) and Article 9 of that framework decision is entrusted to a specifically designated [ordinary] court in the executing State, in addition to the opportunity for the sentenced person to state his or her opinion in the issuing State on the basis of Article 6(3) of [that] framework decision, there should also be an effective remedy for the sentenced person in the executing State?

In the event that this question is answered in the affirmative:

(3)      In the light of Framework Decision [2008/909], should Article 47 of the Charter be interpreted as meaning that, as regards the effective remedy in the executing State, it is sufficient to give the sentenced person the opportunity to submit written observations, either prior to the court ruling and the recognition decision or after the recognition decision has been taken, in the form of a reassessment of the original ruling?

and

(4)      In the light of Framework Decision [2008/909], should Article 47 of the Charter be interpreted as meaning that a sentenced person who does not have sufficient financial resources and requires legal aid to ensure effective access to justice should be provided with such legal aid in the executing State, even if this is not provided for by law?

(5)      Should the criterion set out in Article 8(3) of Framework Decision [2008/909] be interpreted as meaning that, if the punishment or measure is adapted because, in terms of its nature, it is incompatible with the law of the executing State, it is necessary to assess which measure would in all likelihood have been imposed by the court in the executing State if the trial had been conducted in the executing State, or should an assessment be carried out, requesting additional information as necessary, to examine how the measure is actually implemented in the issuing State?

(6)      How and to what extent should the executing State take into account developments and information subsequent to the recognition decision in the event of a possible reassessment of the prohibition on aggravating the sentence under Article 8(4) of Framework Decision [2008/909]?’

 The urgent procedure

25      The Specialised Chamber has requested that the present reference for a preliminary ruling be dealt with under the urgent preliminary ruling procedure provided for in the first paragraph of Article 23a of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union and Article 107 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice.

26      In support of its application, that chamber argued that S.A.H. was deprived of his liberty and that the response to the questions referred could result in that deprivation of liberty being ended.

27      In that regard, it should be noted, first of all, that this reference concerns the interpretation of Framework Decision 2008/909, which comes within Title V of Part Three of the FEU Treaty, covering the area of freedom, security and justice. Consequently, the reference may be dealt with under the urgent preliminary ruling procedure.

28      Secondly, as regards the condition relating to urgency, that condition is satisfied, in particular, where the person concerned in the main proceedings is currently deprived of his or her liberty and when his or her continued detention turns on the outcome of the dispute in the main proceedings, and that the situation of the person concerned must be assessed as it stood at the time when consideration was given to whether the reference for a preliminary ruling should be dealt with under the urgent procedure (judgment of 8 December 2022, CJ (Decision to postpone surrender due to criminal prosecution), C‑492/22 PPU, EU:C:2022:964, paragraph 46 and the case-law cited).

29      In the present case, it is apparent from the request for a preliminary ruling that the person concerned is actually deprived of his liberty since he has been placed in a forensic psychiatric centre in the Netherlands. Moreover, the Specialised Chamber has stated that the response to the questions referred relating to the requirements under EU law that may apply to the situation at issue in the main proceedings could result in that deprivation of liberty being ended, since the measure involving deprivation of liberty passed on the person concerned in Sweden could, in particular, be converted into a measure not involving deprivation of liberty in the Netherlands.

30      In those circumstances, the First Chamber of the Court decided on 22 April 2024, on a proposal from the Judge-Rapporteur, having heard the Advocate General, to grant the request of the Specialised Chamber to deal with the present reference under the urgent preliminary ruling procedure.

 Admissibility of the request for a preliminary ruling

31      Under Article 53(2) of its Rules of Procedure, where the reference for a preliminary ruling is manifestly inadmissible, the Court may, after hearing the Advocate General, at any time decide to give a decision by reasoned order without taking further steps in the proceedings.

32      It is appropriate to apply that provision in the present case.

33      It should be noted that the procedure provided for by Article 267 TFEU is a means of cooperation between the Court of Justice and national courts, by which the Court provides the national courts with the points of interpretation of European Union law which they need in order to decide the disputes before them (judgment of 9 March 2010, ERG and Others, C‑378/08, EU:C:2010:126, paragraph 72, and order of 9 January 2024, Bravchev, C‑338/23, EU:C:2024:4, paragraph 18).

34      It follows that, in order to be entitled to make a reference to the Court in preliminary ruling proceedings, the body making the reference must be capable of being classified as a ‘court or tribunal’ within the meaning of Article 267 TFEU, which it is for the Court to determine on the basis of the request for a preliminary ruling (judgment of 7 May 2024, NADA and Others, C‑115/22, EU:C:2024:384, paragraph 34 and the case-law cited).

35      According to settled case-law, in order to determine whether the body in question that is making a reference is a ‘court or tribunal’ within the meaning of Article 267 TFEU, which is a question governed by EU law alone, the Court takes account of a number of factors, such as, inter alia, whether the body is established by law, whether it is permanent, whether its jurisdiction is compulsory, whether its procedure is inter partes, whether it applies rules of law and whether it is independent (judgment of 7 May 2024, NADA and Others, C‑115/22, EU:C:2024:384, paragraph 35 and the case-law cited).

36      It is also clear from settled case-law that a national court may refer a question to the Court only if there is a case pending before it and if it is called upon to give judgment in proceedings intended to lead to a decision of a judicial nature (judgment of 3 May 2022, CityRail, C‑453/20, EU:C:2022:341, paragraph 42 and the case-law cited).

37      Therefore, it is appropriate to determine whether a body may refer a case to the Court on the basis of criteria relating both to the constitution of that body and to its function. In that regard, a national body may be classified as a ‘court or tribunal’, within the meaning of Article 267 TFEU, when it is performing judicial functions, but not when exercising other functions, inter alia functions of an administrative nature (judgment of 3 May 2022, CityRail, C‑453/20, EU:C:2022:341, paragraph 43 and the case-law cited).

38      It follows that, in order to establish whether a national body, entrusted by law with different categories of function, must be classified as a ‘court or tribunal’ within the meaning of Article 267 TFEU, it is necessary to ascertain the specific nature of the functions which it exercises in the particular legal context in which it is called upon to make a reference to the Court (judgment of 3 May 2022, CityRail, C‑453/20, EU:C:2022:341, paragraph 44 and the case-law cited).

39      Moreover, when the referring body exercises administrative authority, without at the same time being called on to decide a dispute, it cannot be regarded as exercising a judicial function (see, to that effect, judgment of 27 April 2006, Standesamt Stadt Niebüll, C‑96/04, EU:C:2006:254, paragraph 14 and the case-law cited).

40      In the present case, in the light of the information contained in the documents submitted to the Court, in particular the provisions of the Law on the organisation of the judiciary and the WETS, the Specialised Chamber appears to fulfil the relevant criteria for classifying a referring body as a ‘court or tribunal’ within the meaning of Article 267 TFEU, as regards whether it is established by law, whether it is permanent, whether it applies rules of law and whether it is independent.

41      As regards the other relevant criteria in that regard, in the first place the question whether the Specialised Chamber exercises a judicial function in the procedure at issue in the main proceedings, it is clear from that information that, in accordance with Articles 2:11 and 2:12 of the WETS, the Minister has applied to the Specialised Chamber for a ruling on the specified legal questions set out in Article 2:11(3) which that chamber takes into account in order to decide whether to recognise a judicial decision coming from another Member State, as is expressly stated in the wording of Article 2:12.

42      As the Netherlands Government confirmed in its written observations, while the Minister is bound to follow the ruling on those questions, he nonetheless has his own discretion and the power whether or not to adopt the decision to recognise the judgment of the issuing State. The Minister may in fact decide not to involve the Specialised Chamber in his decision in accordance with Article 2:11 of the WETS where he considers from the outset that grounds for refusal are applicable. Moreover, the Minister also examines the grounds for refusal of recognition provided for in Article 2:14 of the WETS and, consequently, may consider that there is a ground for refusal to recognise the judgment even though the Specialised Chamber held that there was none. Furthermore, as regards guarantees that the Minister will actually follow the Specialised Chamber’s ruling, it should be noted that the evaluation report on the Netherlands, referred to in paragraph 21 of the present order, stated that that ruling was not ‘technically’ binding for the Minister.

43      Secondly, as regards the existence of a ‘dispute’ pending before the Specialised Chamber, it should be noted that application is made to the Specialised Chamber under Article 2:11 of the WETS not on the initiative of the sentenced person, but on that of the Minister.

44      Moreover, it is clear from the information before the Court that a sentenced person cannot challenge before the Specialised Chamber a decision taken by the Minister. Only the latter may submit an application for reassessment to that chamber. In that regard, the Specialised Chamber stated that it was unaware whether the Minister selects which complaints he forwards to it for reassessment.

45      It should also be pointed out that the ruling of the Specialised Chamber is not delivered in public or notified to the sentenced person; the latter is informed only of the Minister’s decision.

46      As regards, thirdly, whether the procedure at issue in the main proceedings is inter partes in nature, while the Specialised Chamber has stated that in practice it took into account the sentenced person’s written observations which were forwarded to it by the Minister, or directly by that person, the possibility for the latter to take part in the procedure and to submit observations, whether in writing or orally, is not established by the WETS, whereas, under that law, the Advocate General attached to the Prosecutor’s Office does have that possibility.

47      Clearly therefore, first, the Specialised Chamber’s ruling is made in a procedure that is not inter partes and is not designed to resolve a dispute. Secondly, that ruling does not have the form, description or content of a judgment delivered in the exercise of a judicial function but is part of the procedure for the adoption of the Minister’s administrative decisions.

48      In any event, it is apparent from the information contained in the request for a preliminary ruling and from the observations of the parties that a sentenced person may challenge a decision of the Minister in a civil court, on the basis of the latter’s residual jurisdiction, by requesting that court, which, as is established, has the nature of a ‘court or tribunal’ within the meaning of Article 267 TFEU in the context of those proceedings, to reassess or adapt that decision.

49      In the light of all those considerations, in the context of the procedure referred to in Article 2:11 of the WETS, the Specialised Chamber is clearly not required to deliver a judicial decision and, consequently, is not a ‘court or tribunal’ within the meaning of Article 267 TFEU.

50      It follows from all the foregoing that the present request for a preliminary ruling is manifestly inadmissible.

 Costs

51      Since these proceedings are, for the parties to the main proceedings, a step in the action pending before the referring body, the decision on costs is a matter for the latter. Costs incurred in submitting observations to the Court, other than the costs of those parties, are not recoverable.

On those grounds, the Court (First Chamber) hereby orders:

The request for a preliminary ruling from the Specialised Chamber of the Gerechtshof Arnhem-Leeuwarden (Court of Appeal, Arnhem-Leeuwarden, Netherlands), made by decision of 29 March 2024, is manifestly inadmissible.

[Signatures]

*      Language of the case: Dutch.

i      The name of the present case is a fictitious name. It does not correspond to the real name of any party to the proceedings.