(10)

Following the Agency’s analysis of information resulting from ramp inspections carried out on the aircraft of Union air carriers, as well as standardisation inspections carried out by the Agency, and complemented with information stemming from specific inspections and audits carried out by national aviation authorities, Member States took certain corrective and enforcement measures, and informed the Commission and the EU Air Safety Committee about those measures.

(11)

Member States reiterated their readiness to act, as necessary, in the event that pertinent safety information indicates imminent safety risks resulting from non-compliance by Union air carriers with relevant safety standards.

(12)

Air carriers certified in Algeria have never been included in Annex A or B to Regulation (EC) No 474/2006.

(13)

AIR EXPRESS ALGERIA applied for a TCO authorisation on 2 June 2025. The Agency assessed AIR EXPRESS ALGERIA’s TCO application in accordance with the requirements set out in Commission Regulation (EU) No 452/2014.

(14)

The Agency, in conducting its assessment, raised concerns regarding the lack of ability by AIR EXPRESS ALGERIA to respond to identified safety deficiencies. Notably, it found that AIR EXPRESS ALGERIA failed to produce verifiable evidence that it is maintaining a flight crew training programme.

(15)

On 19 December 2025, the Agency informed AIR EXPRESS ALGERIA of its negative decision, on safety grounds, to the air carrier’s TCO application process.

(16)

By letter dated 4 March 2026, the Commission informed AIR EXPRESS ALGERIA, as well as the National Civil Aviation Agency of Algeria (Agence Nationale de l’Aviation Civile - ‘ANAC Algeria’), that in view of the negative outcome, on safety grounds, of AIR EXPRESS ALGERIA’s TCO application process, including the air carrier’s inability to produce an acceptable Corrective Action Plan (‘CAP’), the case of AIR EXPRESS ALGERIA had been placed on the agenda of the EU Air Safety Committee meeting to be held between 19 and 21 May 2026. Both AIR EXPRESS ALGERIA and ANAC Algeria would be given the opportunity of being heard by that EU Air Safety Committee in accordance with Article 7 of Regulation (EC) No 2111/2005.

(17)

During the hearing, that took place on 19 May 2026, ANAC Algeria provided an overview of ongoing developments in Algeria concerning civil aviation oversight, highlighting that since July 2023 it has assumed the roles and responsibilities of its predecessor, the Directorate of Aeronautics and Meteorology, which previously acted as the civil aviation authority. Certain oversight activities are, however, carried out by the entity VERITAL, in accordance with a delegated mandate under the supervision and responsibility of ANAC Algeria.

(18)

As a financially autonomous body, ANAC Algeria has committed to reinforcing its oversight capacity to enhance aviation safety and regulatory compliance. This commitment has a direct link with the results of the International Civil Aviation Organization (‘ICAO’) Universal Safety Oversight Audit Programme (‘USOAP’) audit conducted in February 2025. The audit revealed serious deficiencies in Algeria’s compliance with obligations relating to the issuance of licences, certificates, authorisations, and approvals, surveillance requirements, and the resolution of safety concerns.

(19)

ANAC Algeria confirmed that the current level of implementation of the CAPs, submitted to and agreed by ICAO, addressing the identified deficiencies in the operations, personnel licensing, and airworthiness domains, is reported at 12%. It further stated that progress in these areas must be accompanied by the recruitment of appropriately qualified technical personnel, as well as additional administrative staff.

(20)

With specific regard to AIR EXPRESS ALGERIA, ANAC Algeria acknowledged a convergence between certain deficiencies identified by the Agency during its TCO application process and those detected by ANAC Algeria through its own 2025 safety oversight activities. Having done so, ANAC Algeria failed to specify, during the hearing, the nature of the identified deficiencies and the corrective actions undertaken. It was further confirmed by ANAC Algeria, that AIR EXPRESS ALGERIA had submitted its TCO authorisation application despite non-compliances that had yet to be resolved.

(21)

Given the systemic weaknesses identified by the Agency in AIR EXPRESS ALGERIA, ANAC Algeria indicated that it had decided to place the air carrier under intensified surveillance. While it pointed to an increase in the number of inspections as evidence of this heightened oversight, it did not demonstrate how these inspections had been qualitatively improved, particularly in light of pre-existing, significant deficiencies as highlighted by ICAO.

(22)

In its concluding remarks, ANAC Algeria stated that all deficiencies identified by the Agency during the TCO application process had been fully resolved, with the exception of the finding requiring the establishment of a compliance monitoring department, scheduled for completion by September 2026. This statement was subsequently contradicted by AIR EXPRESS ALGERIA during its own hearing, where the air carrier indicated that the corrective actions for the identified findings would not be completed until the end of 2026, thus shedding further doubt on ANAC Algeria’s situational awareness and oversight capacity.

(23)

For its hearing, AIR EXPRESS ALGERIA started by indicating that it did not challenge any of the findings made by the Agency during its TCO application process. It then provided the EU Air Safety Committee with an overview of the actions undertaken to support a comprehensive and systematic approach to addressing the findings raised by the Agency, notably as regards the significant non-compliance on maintaining a flight crew training programme.

(24)

Despite repeated inquiries during the hearing regarding the actions undertaken to rectify the significant safety deficiency found concerning the flight crew training programme, AIR EXPRESS ALGERIA failed to provide adequate clarification on the missing training syllabus, the absence of flight training records, and the missing training plan to ensure that all flight crew members receive timely training in accordance with the revised syllabus. Consequently, AIR EXPRESS ALGERIA has failed to demonstrate that, at this stage, all pilots operating flights are fully qualified in accordance with international safety standards.

(25)

In addition, when the Agency rejected the TCO application in December 2025, eight other findings remained unresolved because AIR EXPRESS ALGERIA’s CAP relied on a deficient root cause analysis. During the hearing, the airline could not demonstrate that it had revised the root cause analysis, and that its corrective and preventive actions were robust enough to prevent the recurrence of the safety deficiencies.

(26)

Of particular note was the revelation that several medical evacuation flights to the EU were erroneously conducted under General Aviation rules, despite falling within the scope of Commercial Air Transport regulations, thus requiring a TCO authorisation.

(27)

This expansion into international operations, and the need to comply with international safety standards, represents a critical factor that must be fully integrated into the air carrier’s operations plans. It also underscores the need for a civil aviation authority with robust capabilities to ensure sustained compliance with international safety standards, a requirement that, to date, has not been sufficiently demonstrated, as evidenced by the findings of the 2025 ICAO USOAP audit concerning ANAC Algeria.

(28)

AIR EXPRESS ALGERIA concluded by stating that its objective is to resolve all deficiencies raised by the Agency by the end of 2026. However, the delayed implementation of critical measures, such as the establishment of a compliance monitoring department, continues to expose the air carrier to the safety deficiencies that led to the Agency’s rejection of the TCO application.

(29)

In accordance with the common criteria set out in the Annex to Regulation (EC) No 2111/2005, it is therefore assessed that the list of air carriers which are subject to an operating ban within the Union should be amended to include the air carrier AIR EXPRESS ALGERIA in Annex A to Regulation (EC) No 474/2006.

(30)

Member States should continue verifying the effective compliance of air carriers certified in Algeria with international safety standards through prioritisation of ramp inspections of those air carriers, pursuant to Regulation (EU) No 965/2012.

(31)

Further action should be taken by the Commission as necessary, in accordance with Regulation (EC) No 2111/2005, if any relevant safety information reveals imminent safety risks resulting from non-compliance with international safety standards.

(32)

In November 2008, all air carriers certified in Angola were included in Annex A to Regulation (EC) No 474/2006 by Commission Regulation (EC) No 1131/2008 (6). In April 2019, by Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/618 (7), TAAG Angola Airlines was removed from Annex B to Regulation (EC) No 474/2006 and Heli Malongo from Annex A to Regulation (EC) No 474/2006.

(33)

In November 2024 TAAG Angola Airlines was placed under intensified surveillance by the Agency in accordance with point ART.215(d) of Annex 2 to Regulation (EU) No 452/2014, following serious unresolved compliance issues in the areas of operations, airworthiness, safety management system and compliance system, identified through continuous monitoring activities by the Agency.

(34)

Following the on-site audit conducted by the Agency in April 2025, which identified 16 findings across all domains, the intensified surveillance of TAAG Angola Airlines was extended.

(35)

On 11 March 2026, as part of the Commission's continuous monitoring activities regarding the overall safety situation in Angola, including the safety oversight capacity and capabilities of the National Civil Aviation Agency of Angola (Autoridade Nacional da Aviação Civil - ‘ANAC Angola’), a technical meeting took place between the Commission, the Agency, Member States and ANAC Angola.

(36)

This meeting was convened in response to persistent difficulties encountered by the Commission in obtaining complete and accurate information necessary to assess ANAC Angola’s civil aviation oversight capacity and capability. Although four formal letters were transmitted to ANAC Angola between June and December 2025, its responses remained incomplete up to the date of the meeting, failing to provide the full set of requested documentation or adequate clarification on critical issues, notably the status of Air Operator Certificates (‘AOC’) issued by ANAC Angola. The meeting thus served to clarify the rationale behind the Commission’s information requests and to obtain additional details from ANAC Angola.

(37)

While ANAC Angola reported enhanced oversight activities, including the use of the Civil Aviation Safety Oversight Reporting and Tracking management software and the establishment of a dedicated monitoring team for TAAG Angola Airlines, the evidence presented during the meeting demonstrated only partial progress. Certain improvements were noted, particularly in the structural framework for oversight. However, key elements such as the systematic identification of non-compliances and the effectiveness of corrective actions remained insufficiently substantiated.

(38)

ANAC Angola provided a comprehensive presentation of the improvements already implemented and planned across its regulatory system, aligned with its Comprehensive Safety Oversight Enhancement Project Master Plan. This strategic initiative aims to fully modernise ANAC Angola’s regulatory and oversight framework. ANAC Angola further informed the Commission that its oversight system will be subject to an ICAO Coordinated Validation Mission (‘ICVM’) in October 2026.

(39)

While ANAC Angola’s focus on long-term structural measures constitutes a positive step towards systemic improvement, it has yet to fully address the urgent need for immediate mitigation actions, particularly concerning TAAG Angola Airlines. To strengthen transparency, ANAC Angola committed, during the meeting, to providing the Commission with regular progress reports, encompassing both short-term corrective actions and medium- to long-term structural measures.

(40)

As part of the intensified surveillance of TAAG Angola Airlines, the Agency conducted a second on-site audit from 22 to 24 April 2026. While this audit enabled the closure of the pre-existing systemic, and significant non-compliance, it identified 12 new non-compliances. Given the number and nature of these findings, the Agency concluded that it was not yet possible to terminate the intensified surveillance.

(41)

In accordance with the common criteria set out in the Annex to Regulation (EC) No 2111/2005, the Commission considers that at this time there are no grounds for amending the list of air carriers which are subject to an operating ban within the Union with respect to air carriers certified in Angola.

(42)

Member States should continue verifying the effective compliance of air carriers certified in Angola with international safety standards through prioritisation of ramp inspections of those air carriers, pursuant to Regulation (EU) No 965/2012.

(43)

Further action by the Commission should be taken as necessary, in accordance with Regulation (EC) No 2111/2005, if any relevant safety information reveals imminent safety risks resulting from non-compliance with international safety standards.

(44)

In June 2020, all air carriers certified in Armenia were included in Annex A to Regulation (EC) No 474/2006, by Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2020/736 (8).

(45)

In the framework of the continuous monitoring activities carried out under Regulation (EC) No 2111/2005, a Union on-site assessment visit was conducted in Armenia in September 2025 in order to assess the progress made by the Civil Aviation Committee of Armenia (‘CAC’) in addressing the safety deficiencies that led to the inclusion of all air carriers certified in Armenia in Annex A to Regulation (EC) No 474/2006.

(46)

Following the Union on-site assessment visit in September 2025, Armenia has demonstrated progress in strengthening its aviation safety oversight framework, including through the adoption of secondary legislation and organisational arrangements within the CAC supporting effective safety oversight activities. In response to the observations raised during that visit, the CAC submitted a CAP, which it further presented during the hearing before the EU Air Safety Committee in November 2025.

(47)

The updates provided by the CAC reflected continued engagement and commitment to address the identified deficiencies. However, the assessment of the CAP confirmed that significant systemic shortcomings remain, in particular in terms of flight operations oversight, inspector qualification, root cause analysis, and the effective implementation of corrective measures.

(48)

On 6 March 2026, the CAC submitted an updated CAP to the Commission, the assessment of which has shown an overall improvement in their structure, consistency, and linkage between the observations made during the on-site assessment visit, the root causes, and the proposed corrective actions. While the vast majority of the proposed corrective actions could be accepted, a number of issues remained to be addressed in order to ensure full clarity and traceability of the proposed measures. The outcome of that assessment was communicated to the CAC, which is currently continuing the implementation of the corrective actions.

(49)

Subject to demonstrable, satisfactory progress, a technical meeting will be organised to review the state of implementation, and to consider whether the organisation of a new targeted Union on-site assessment visit in the third quarter of 2026 is warranted, with particular focus on the air operations domain.

(50)

In accordance with the common criteria set out in the Annex to Regulation (EC) No 2111/2005, the Commission considers that at this time there are no grounds for amending the list of air carriers which are subject to an operating ban within the Union with respect to air carriers certified in Armenia.

(51)

Member States should continue verifying the effective compliance of air carriers certified in Armenia with international safety standards through prioritisation of ramp inspections of those air carriers, pursuant to Regulation (EU) No 965/2012.

(52)

In October 2006, air carriers certified in Kyrgyzstan were included in Annex A to Regulation (EC) No 474/2006, by Commission Regulation (EC) No 1543/2006 (9).

(53)

In the context of ongoing exchanges between the Commission and the State Civil Aviation Agency under the Cabinet of Ministers of the Kyrgyz Republic (‘SCAA’), and notably the results of the Technical Meeting organised in October 2025, the SCAA submitted in February 2026 the information requested by the Commission at the occasion of that Technical Meeting. The information provided included supporting evidence on progress achieved in the implementation of the new Kyrgyz Air Code certification requirements, the recertification of national air carriers, and the application of the amended national legal framework.

(54)

Following the assessment of the information provided, the Commission concluded that sufficient progress had been achieved in the relevant safety oversight areas, in particular with regard to the implementation of the new certification requirements and the strengthening of oversight capacity, to proceed with the organisation of a Union on-site assessment visit.

(55)

A comprehensive Union on-site assessment visit to Kyrgyzstan was therefore conducted from 23 to 27 March 2026, notably to assess the effective implementation of the new legal framework, the recertification of air carriers, and the sustainability of the safety oversight improvements achieved by the SCAA. Particular attention was also given to the SCAA’s ability to ensure effective oversight of air carriers certified in Kyrgyzstan. Furthermore, the assessment visit included sample visits to two air carriers certified by the SCAA, namely AeroStan Air Company LLC (‘AeroStan’) and Avia Traffic Company (‘Avia Traffic’).

(56)

The assessment confirmed that the SCAA has continued to enhance its aviation safety oversight system, and has made significant progress in the implementation of the revised Kyrgyz Air Code and the associated secondary aviation legislation. The legal framework was found to provide an acceptable basis for certification and oversight activities, and demonstrated a clear effort by the Kyrgyz authorities to align the national aviation system with international safety standards.

(57)

The assessment further confirmed that the SCAA has actively managed the transition towards the new regulatory framework, including through the recertification of air carriers, the revision of operational approvals, and the adaptation of associated oversight procedures. The SCAA demonstrated ownership of the reform process and a proactive approach to developing oversight capabilities in all relevant domains.

(58)

The SCAA has established a functioning organisational structure and has continued efforts to improve staffing and technical competence within the authority. In particular, the assessment noted the recruitment of a new generation of inspectors and the development of internal procedures for workforce planning, qualification and training of technical personnel. While the overall system was found to be functioning and generally coherent, certain technical areas would benefit from further consolidation, notably regarding the practical implementation of recurrent training programmes, document control arrangements, and the continued standardisation of oversight procedures across operational departments.

(59)

The assessment also confirmed that the SCAA has continued to develop its internal compliance and safety oversight functions. In particular, dedicated structures for compliance and safety oversight have been established, supported by internal audit programmes, occurrence reporting processes, and the progressive implementation of risk-based oversight principles. The assessment further noted the development of inspector competencies and training activities related to the evaluation of Safety Management Systems implemented by certified organisations.

(60)

In the area of flight operations, the SCAA has established appropriate certification and surveillance procedures, including elements of risk-based oversight and recertification activities under the revised legal framework. The assessment confirmed that the Flight Operations Department is actively implementing the new oversight framework, and has developed a broad set of procedures and oversight tools. At the same time, opportunities for further improvement were identified, notably regarding the continued standardisation of inspector guidance and checklists, the consistency of findings management and surveillance planning, as well as the qualification and familiarisation arrangements for Flight Operations Inspectors conducting in-flight inspections on different aircraft types.

(61)

In the area of personnel licensing, the assessment confirmed that the SCAA has established the necessary regulatory framework, licensing procedures, and oversight activities for relevant approved training organisations and aviation personnel. The SCAA has continued the recertification of existing training organisations and developed a comprehensive set of procedures and checklists supporting licensing, examination and oversight activities. The assessment also noted continued efforts to develop inspector competencies and recurrent training activities, together with the gradual modernisation of record-keeping processes within the Personnel Licensing Department.

(62)

In the area of airworthiness, the SCAA demonstrated a structured oversight system supported by established procedures for certification, surveillance and inspector qualification. The assessment nevertheless identified shortcomings in the implementation of certain surveillance activities, particularly in the area of Non-Destructive Testing (‘NDT’) oversight within approved maintenance organisations. At the same time, the assessment confirmed that the Airworthiness Department continues to develop its internal procedures, oversight activities, and organisational framework under the revised regulatory framework.

(63)

Overall, the assessment confirmed that Kyrgyzstan has achieved significant progress in enhancing its civil aviation oversight system and in implementing the revised regulatory framework. The SCAA demonstrated a cooperative and proactive approach throughout the assessment visit and showed commitment to addressing the observations identified during the assessment. While further practical consolidation of recently introduced procedures and oversight arrangements remains necessary, the progress achieved by the SCAA represents a significant achievement towards ensuring the sustainability and effectiveness of aviation safety oversight in Kyrgyzstan.

(64)

The Union assessment team carried out an on-site visit at AeroStan on 25 and 26 March 2026.

(65)

AeroStan has established Safety Management and Compliance Monitoring Systems, supported by dedicated software tools and structured internal procedures. The assessment confirmed regular management involvement in safety activities and the existence of functioning safety reporting, flight data monitoring, and internal review processes. Overall, the systems demonstrated a satisfactory level of implementation and operational integration. Certain observations were nevertheless identified regarding the application of risk assessment processes, hazard identification, and the management of corrective actions.

(66)

The assessment further confirmed that AeroStan has established operational and continuing airworthiness systems appropriate to the nature and scope of its operations. Operational documentation, training systems, and maintenance arrangements were found to be effectively implemented and controlled. While observations were made regarding the consistency of certain operational and maintenance training records, documentation updates and the application of some internal procedures, the assessment confirmed that the air carrier maintained a satisfactory level of operational control and organisational oversight.

(67)

The Union assessment team carried out an on-site visit at Avia Traffic on 25 March 2026.

(68)

Avia Traffic has established the principal organisational, operational and safety management elements required under the applicable regulatory framework. The assessment confirmed the existence of structured operational procedures, compliance monitoring activities, and safety reporting processes, supported by clearly established organisational responsibilities. Overall, the systems reviewed demonstrated a satisfactory level of implementation. A number of observations were made regarding the application of risk assessment and hazard identification processes, operational documentation control, and internal oversight activities.

(69)

The assessment confirmed that Avia Traffic has established operational control, training and continuing airworthiness systems commensurate to the nature and scope of its operations. The maintenance organisation, hangar facilities and technical support functions were found to be generally satisfactory and supported by competent technical personnel. While certain observations were made regarding the implementation and consistency of selected operational and maintenance procedures, as well as associated record-keeping processes, the overall systems reviewed during the assessment were found to be functioning satisfactorily.

(70)

The SCAA was heard by the EU Air Safety Committee on 20 May 2026. During the hearing, the Kyrgyz delegation presented the reform process undertaken in civil aviation oversight since 2022. That process was supported at the highest political level, notably through Presidential Decree No. UP-158 on the improvement of the civil aviation management system and the development of air transport services. The SCAA also described the restructuring of the authority, including the strengthening of its organisational structure, the recruitment of additional, qualified technical personnel, and the establishment of dedicated compliance and safety oversight functions.

(71)

The SCAA further presented the revision of the national legal and regulatory framework, including the adoption in October 2025 of amendments to the Kyrgyz Air Code and the comprehensive revision of aviation regulations aligned with international safety standards. The SCAA also described the introduction of risk-based oversight principles and the strengthening of occurrence reporting systems modelled on the principles of Regulation (EU) No 376/2014 (10). The SCAA further presented ongoing measures related to the implementation of modernised digital oversight and document management systems aimed at improving regulatory traceability, oversight efficiency, and safety data analysis capabilities.

(72)

The SCAA informed the EU Air Safety Committee of the increase in the institutional and financial resources allocated to aviation oversight, including enhanced State financial support and the establishment of a new long-term financial model.

(73)

The Kyrgyz delegation also described the comprehensive recertification process carried out between December 2025 and February 2026 under the revised Kyrgyz Air Code, and the newly introduced certification requirements. The SCAA explained that all air carriers certified in Kyrgyzstan underwent a full reassessment of their operational, organisational, and safety oversight compliance. As a result of that process, the number of active AOCs was reduced from 21 to 8, with only those air carriers considered capable of meeting the applicable regulatory and safety requirements remaining certified.

(74)

A detailed overview was provided of the corrective actions implemented following the Union on-site assessment visit of March 2026. The SCAA explained that all observations identified during the assessment had undergone a thorough root cause analysis, the results of which were incorporated in dedicated CAPs. The SCAA reported that, at the time of the hearing, 19 observations out of 23 and 7 recommendations out of 12 identified during the assessment had already been closed, while the remaining items were at an advanced stage of implementation.

(75)

The EU Air Safety Committee took note of the corrective measures implemented in the Legislation, Organisation, Personnel Licensing, Operations and Airworthiness domains. Those measures included strengthened inspector training and qualification programmes, revised oversight procedures and checklists, and an enhanced findings management system. The EU Air Safety Committee also took note of the reinforced oversight activities in specialised technical areas, such as NDT activities within approved maintenance organisations.

(76)

The SCAA also informed the EU Air Safety Committee of the actions taken in respect of the two air carriers visited during the Union on-site assessment visit. The Kyrgyz delegation explained that the observations addressed to the air carriers had been formally classified and integrated into the SCAA’s risk-based oversight system. The CAPs submitted by both air carriers had been reviewed and accepted by the authority. The SCAA further reported that the implementation of the associated corrective measures remained under active monitoring through targeted surveillance activities and follow-up inspections.

(77)

The EU Air Safety Committee, while noting the comprehensive and detailed nature of the presentation provided, acknowledged the progress achieved by Kyrgyzstan in strengthening its civil aviation oversight system and the constructive cooperation demonstrated by the SCAA throughout the assessment and hearing process.

(78)

On the basis of all information available, including the results of the Union on-site assessment visit and the hearing before the EU Air Safety Committee, it is considered that Kyrgyzstan has achieved substantial progress in addressing the safety concerns which led to the inclusion of all air carriers certified in Kyrgyzstan in Annex A to Regulation (EC) No 474/2006.

(79)

The EU Air Safety Committee, however, considers that certain areas require further consolidation and monitoring in order to ensure the long-term sustainability and consistent implementation of the newly introduced oversight framework. In particular, the EU Air Safety Committee considers that close monitoring of the safety situation and future developments in Kyrgyzstan should be the subject of regular reporting before each meeting of the EU Air Safety Committee.

(80)

The Commission also highlighted the need for continued governmental support and for stability in the leadership of the SCAA as important elements for ensuring the continued effective functioning of the authority.

(81)

In accordance with the common criteria set out in the Annex to Regulation (EC) No 2111/2005, the Commission considers that there are sufficient grounds for amending the list of air carriers subject to an operating ban within the Union set out in Annex A to Regulation (EC) No 474/2006 by removing all air carriers certified in Kyrgyzstan.

(82)

Member States should continue verifying the effective compliance of air carriers certified in Kyrgyzstan with international safety standards through prioritisation of ramp inspections of those air carriers, pursuant to Regulation (EU) No 965/2012.

(83)

Further action by the Commission should be taken as necessary, in accordance with Regulation (EC) No 2111/2005, if any relevant safety information reveals imminent safety risks resulting from non-compliance with international safety standards.

(84)

In December 2014, air carriers from Libya were included in Annex A to Regulation (EC) No 474/2006, by Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 1318/2014 (11).

(85)

In June 2025, as part of its continuous monitoring of the overall safety situation in Libya, the Commission requested the Libya Civil Aviation Authority (‘LYCAA’) to provide information on its ability to ensure effective safety oversight of air carriers certified in Libya. The LYCAA submitted that information in December 2025.

(86)

Following the assessment of the information provided, a meeting took place on 7 May 2026 between the Commission, the Agency and the LYCAA. The meeting allowed the Commission to communicate the preliminary results of the assessment of the information submitted by the LYCAA, and to seek clarification regarding information missing from the documentation provided in December 2025.

(87)

The Commission presented the main deficiencies identified in the information submitted by the LYCAA, in particular regarding the implementation of surveillance activities and the effectiveness of safety oversight. Insufficient evidence was provided concerning oversight activities conducted between 2023 and 2025, including findings management and corrective actions follow-up. Concerns were also identified regarding certain operational approvals and the low level of occurrence reporting.

(88)

The Commission furthermore identified shortcomings regarding staffing, inspector qualifications, competency management, and technical training programmes. Additional concerns were noted in the area of airworthiness oversight, including the limited evidence of surveillance activities related to continuing airworthiness and maintenance organisations. Overall, the assessment suggested the existence of potential systemic deficiencies impacting the effectiveness of the LYCAA aviation safety oversight system.

(89)

The Commission informed the LYCAA that the full results of the assessment would be communicated in writing, together with a request for additional information and supporting documentation. Following the receipt and assessment of that information, the Commission intends to organise a further technical meeting with the LYCAA to discuss the next steps in the framework of the ongoing monitoring activities under Regulation (EC) No 2111/2005.

(90)

Currently there is, however, insufficient substantiated evidence to confirm that LYCAA has effectively resolved all the safety deficiencies that led to the operating ban imposed by Implementing Regulation (EU) No 1318/2014.

(91)

In accordance with the common criteria set out in the Annex to Regulation (EC) No 2111/2005, the Commission considers that at this time there are no grounds for amending the list of air carriers which are subject to an operating ban within the Union with respect to air carriers certified in Libya.

(92)

Member States should continue verifying the effective compliance of air carriers certified in Libya with international safety standards through prioritisation of ramp inspections of those air carriers, pursuant to Regulation (EU) No 965/2012.

(93)

Regulation (EC) No 474/2006 should therefore be amended accordingly.

(94)

Articles 5 and 6 of Regulation (EC) No 2111/2005 recognise the need for decisions to be taken swiftly and, where appropriate, urgently, given the safety implications. It is therefore essential, for the protection of sensitive information and the traveling public, that any decisions in the context of updating the list of air carriers which are subject to an operating ban or restriction within the Union apply immediately after their adoption.

(95)

The measures provided for in this Regulation are in accordance with the opinion of the EU Air Safety Committee,