Provisional text

JUDGMENT OF THE COURT (First Chamber)

11 June 2026 (*)

( Reference for a preliminary ruling – Area of freedom, security and justice – Judicial cooperation in criminal matters – Fight against corruption involving officials of Member States of the European Union – Passive corruption – Exclusion of evidence obtained in a flawed manner – Exculpatory evidence – Second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU – First and second paragraphs of Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union – Effective judicial protection – Right to an effective remedy – Directive 2012/13/EU – Right to information in criminal proceedings – Article 7(2) and (3) – Right of access to the materials of the case – Article 51(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights – National legislation not implementing Union law – Lack of jurisdiction – Article 267 TFEU – Need for interpretation of EU law to enable the referring court to give judgment – None – Inadmissibility )

In Case C‑342/25 [Stogenchev], (i)

REQUEST for a preliminary ruling under Article 267 TFEU from the Sofiyski gradski sad (Sofia City Court, Bulgaria), made by decision of 20 May 2025, received at the Court on 20 May 2025, in the criminal proceedings against

DS,

KW,

THE COURT (First Chamber),

composed of F. Biltgen, President of the Chamber, I. Ziemele, A. Kumin, S. Gervasoni and M. Bošnjak (Rapporteur), Judges,

Advocate General: R. Norkus,

Registrar: A. Calot Escobar,

having regard to the written procedure,

after considering the observations submitted on behalf of:

–        the European Commission, by P.J.O. Van Nuffel, M. Wasmeier and I. Zaloguin, acting as Agents,

having decided, after hearing the Advocate General, to proceed to judgment without an Opinion,

gives the following

Judgment

1        This request for a preliminary ruling concerns the interpretation of the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU, the first and second paragraphs of Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (‘the Charter’), and Article 7(2) and (3) of Directive 2012/13/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2012 on the right to information in criminal proceedings (OJ 2012 L 142, p. 1).

2        The request has been made in the context of criminal proceedings brought against DS and KW for passive bribery.

 Legal context

 European Union law

 The Convention against Corruption

3        The Convention drawn up on the basis of Article K.3(2)(c) of the Treaty on European Union on the fight against corruption involving officials of the European Communities or officials of Member States of the European Union (OJ 1997 C 195, p. 2) (‘the Convention against Corruption’), which entered into force on 28 September 2005, provides, in Article 2, entitled ‘Passive corruption’:

‘1.      For the purposes of this Convention, the deliberate action of an official, who, directly or through an intermediary, requests or receives advantages of any kind whatsoever, for himself or for a third party, or accepts a promise of such an advantage, to act or refrain from acting in accordance with his duty or in the exercise of his functions in breach of his official duties shall constitute passive corruption.

2.      Each Member State shall take the necessary measures to ensure that conduct of the type referred to in paragraph 1 is made a criminal offence.’

4        Article 5(1) of that convention provides:

‘Each Member State shall take the necessary measures to ensure that the conduct referred to in Articles 2 and 3, and participating in and instigating the conduct in question, is punishable by effective, proportionate and dissuasive criminal penalties, including, at least in serious cases, penalties involving deprivation of liberty which can give rise to extradition.’

 Directive 2012/13

5        Recitals 9, 10 and 14 of Directive 2012/13 state:

‘(9)      Article 82(2) [TFEU] provides for the establishment of minimum rules applicable in the Member States so as to facilitate mutual recognition of judgments and judicial decisions and police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters having a cross-border dimension. That Article refers to “the rights of individuals in criminal procedure” as one of the areas in which minimum rules may be established.

(10)      Common minimum rules should lead to increased confidence in the criminal justice systems of all Member States, which, in turn, should lead to more efficient judicial cooperation in a climate of mutual trust. Such common minimum rules should be established in the field of information in criminal proceedings.

…

(14)      This Directive … lays down common minimum standards to be applied in the field of information about rights and about the accusation to be given to persons suspected or accused of having committed a criminal offence, with a view to enhancing mutual trust among Member States. This Directive builds on the rights laid down in the Charter, and in particular Articles 6, 47 and 48 thereof, by building upon Articles 5 and 6 [of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, signed in Rome on 4 November 1950] as interpreted by the European Court of Human Rights. …’

6        Under Article 2(1) of that directive:

‘This Directive applies from the time persons are made aware by the competent authorities of a Member State that they are suspected or accused of having committed a criminal offence until the conclusion of the proceedings, which is understood to mean the final determination of the question whether the suspect or accused person has committed the criminal offence, including, where applicable, sentencing and the resolution of any appeal.’

7        Article 7(2) and (3) of that directive provides:

‘2.      Member States shall ensure that access is granted at least to all material evidence in the possession of the competent authorities, whether for or against suspects or accused persons, to those persons or their lawyers in order to safeguard the fairness of the proceedings and to prepare the defence.

3.      Without prejudice to paragraph 1, access to the materials referred to in paragraph 2 shall be granted in due time to allow the effective exercise of the rights of the defence and at the latest upon submission of the merits of the accusation to the judgment of a court. Where further material evidence comes into the possession of the competent authorities, access shall be granted to it in due time to allow for it to be considered.’

 Bulgarian law

 The Bulgarian Constitution

8        Article 121 of the Konstitutsia na Republika Bulgaria (Constitution of the Republic of Bulgaria) (‘the Bulgarian Constitution’) provides:

‘1.      The courts and tribunals shall ensure equality and respect for the principle of adversarial justice between the parties to judicial proceedings.

2.      Judicial proceedings shall ensure that the truth is ascertained.

…’

9        Article 122 of the Bulgarian Constitution provides:

‘1.      Citizens and legal persons shall have the right to defend themselves at every stage of the proceedings.

2.      The detailed rules governing the exercise of the rights of the defence shall be determined by law.’

 Criminal Code

10      Under Article 301(1) of the Nakazatelen kodeks (Criminal Code), in the version applicable to the main proceedings:

‘Any official who requests or accepts a gift or an advantage of any kind to which he or she is not entitled, or accepts an offer or the promise of a gift or an advantage, to act or refrain from acting in accordance with his or her duty, or for having acted or refrained from acting in that manner, shall be punished for bribery by deprivation of liberty for up to six years and a fine of up to [5 000 leva (BGN) (approximately EUR 2 550].’

11      Article 302 of the Criminal Code is worded as follows:

‘For bribery committed:

1.      … by a police officer or a police investigator,

2.      by means of extortion through abuse of office,

…

the penalty shall be:

(a)      in the cases referred to in Article 301(1) and (2), deprivation of liberty of 3 to 10 years, a fine up to [20 000 BGN (approximately EUR 10 200)], and a suspension of the rights referred to in Article 37(1)(6) and (7).

…’

 Code of Criminal Procedure

12      Article 29(2) of the Nakazatelno-protsesualen kodeks (Code of Criminal Procedure), in the version applicable to the case in the main proceedings, provides:

‘No judge or juror may participate in a court formation where that person may, by reason of other circumstances, be perceived as biased or as having a direct or indirect interest in the outcome of the case.’

13      Article 105 of that code is worded as follows:

‘1.      The means of proof shall serve as reproduction in the criminal proceedings of evidence or of other means of proof.

2.      Means of proof which have not been obtained or prepared in accordance with the rules laid down in this Code shall be inadmissible.’

14      Article 292 of that code provides:

‘The parties participating in the closing arguments may rely only on evidence which was gathered and verified in the course of the judicial investigation in accordance with the detailed rules provided for in this Code.’

 The main proceedings and the questions referred for a preliminary ruling

15      In the context of criminal proceedings, the Sofiyski gradski sad (Sofia City Court, Bulgaria), which is the referring court, is examining an indictment filed against two police officers, DS and KW, who are accused of having committed, by way of extortion through abuse of office, the offence of passive bribery.

16      That court takes the view that the judicial authorisation of special investigative measures employed in the course of the investigation targeting DS and KW and the searches and seizures carried out in the course of that investigation are procedurally flawed, as no statement of reasons was provided for the searches, and the seizures were carried out without prior judicial authorisation.

17      Under Article 105(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the means of proof obtained in a flawed manner are to be excluded from the case file. It follows from that that, in accordance with Article 292 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, not even the defence may rely on those means of proof for the benefit of the defendants as regards the facts of which they are accused. Only the means of proof obtained in accordance with the rules of procedure, that is to say, primarily witness testimony in support of the prosecution, may be taken into consideration.

18      However, the referring court states that the procedural irregularities found do not have any impact on the reliability of the evidence at issue, which is entirely in favour of the defendants in the main proceedings.

19      On 27 May 2024, taking the view that Article 105(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure could be in contravention of the Bulgarian Constitution in so far as that provision does not contribute to ascertaining the truth and prevents the defendants from effectively exercising their rights of the defence, the referring court made an application to the Konstitutsionen sad (Constitutional Court, Bulgaria) seeking a declaration that Article 105(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure is incompatible with the Bulgarian Constitution.

20      On 27 June 2024 the Konstitutsionen sad (Constitutional Court) dismissed that application as inadmissible. According to the referring court, the reasons stated in that regard are based on the premiss that the systematic exclusion of evidence obtained in a flawed manner, as laid down in Article 105(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, is necessarily in favour of defendants.

21      The referring court held a hearing during which it informed the defendants in the main proceedings and their lawyers of the procedural irregularities committed in obtaining the evidence at issue, following which the taking of evidence was concluded. During the closing arguments, those lawyers requested that the defendants be acquitted of the charges against them, using as the basis for their line of argument the exculpatory evidence, which was flawed due to procedural irregularities.

22      According to the referring court, that line of argument is well founded and the evidence at issue, which, as that court specifies, it has not yet excluded, is essential for supporting that line of argument. In the light of that finding, that court again applied to the Konstitutsionen sad (Constitutional Court), on 27 February 2025, for a declaration that Article 105(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure is unconstitutional; that court dismissed that application by order of 8 May 2025.

23      The referring court has doubts as to the compatibility with EU law of the interpretation of Article 122(1) of the Bulgarian Constitution adopted by the Konstitutsionen sad (Constitutional Court), which, according to the referring court, leads to Article 105(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure having as its sole consequence in practice that the legal interests of the defendants are adversely affected, by depriving them of the possibility to defend themselves by relying on exculpatory evidence.

24      In that regard, in the light of Article 5 of the Convention against Corruption, procedural rules cannot, according to that court, stand in the way of effective, proportionate and dissuasive penalties and the exercise of the fundamental right to defend oneself against criminal allegations.

25      Moreover, according to the referring court, it follows from the judgment of 17 January 2019, Dzivev and Others (C‑310/16, EU:C:2019:30, paragraph 33), that criminal proceedings instigated for VAT offences amount to an implementation of Union law, within the meaning of Article 51(1) of the Charter. According to that court, the same should apply to the offences referred to in the Convention against Corruption.

26      In those circumstances, the legislation at issue in the main proceedings should, in order to comply with the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU and the first and second paragraphs of Article 47 of the Charter, guarantee defendants respect for the right to effective judicial protection, the right to a fair trial and the rights of the defence. In that regard, only the need to ensure fairness of the proceedings by providing the defence with an effective opportunity to understand the relevance of the evidence could justify the exclusion of evidence obtained in a flawed manner.

27      Furthermore, the referring court is uncertain whether Article 7(2) and (3) of Directive 2012/13, which confers on suspects and accused persons the right to have access to the materials of the case, entails the right to be informed about any possible exclusion of certain evidence obtained in a flawed manner.

28      In that regard, that court states that the moment at which the lawfulness of the taking of evidence must be verified is not clearly determined by national law. That court is of the view that such an assessment must be carried out before the judgment closing the proceedings and in such a way as to allow the parties to state their views on that matter. That said, the referring court is uncertain as to whether it should refuse to hear the case on the ground that it has lost its impartiality by informing the parties that certain evidence was obtained in a flawed manner.

29      In those circumstances the Sofiyski gradski sad (Sofia City Court) decided to stay the proceedings and to refer the following questions to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling:

‘(1)      Is an interpretation of a constitutional provision which confers on [a defendant] a right to [defend him or herself] in court proceedings (Article 122(1) of the [Bulgarian Constitution]) to the effect that:

–        the right to [defend him or herself] against an infringement of […] privacy … committed in the taking of evidence is expressed in the [exclusion of] the evidence concerned; and

–        the right to [defend him or herself] against [the charges brought] is also expressed in the [exclusion of] that evidence,

compatible with the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU and the first and second paragraphs of Article 47 of the Charter, where the [infringement of the] privacy of the [defendants is the least serious possible]; the infringement has not affected the reliability of the evidence obtained; that evidence is exclusively exculpatory and is essential to supporting the [defendants’] plea of innocence; the [defendants], having been duly informed of the infringement committed in the taking of that evidence, expressly state, after consulting their defence counsel, that they wish to [rely on that] evidence?

(2)      Is an interpretation of national law to the effect that the court, on finding that the use of certain evidence may [be excluded] on account of breaches of procedure committed while that evidence was being taken, or [must be excluded] on account of such breaches, [is to inform] the [defendants] thereof so that they can prepare their defence accordingly, compatible with Article 7(2) and (3) of Directive 2012/13 and the second paragraph of Article 47 of the Charter?’

 Jurisdiction of the Court

30      As a preliminary point it should be recalled that, according to settled case-law, it is for the Court itself to examine the circumstances in which cases are referred to it by the national court in order to assess whether it has jurisdiction or whether the request submitted to it is admissible (judgment of 11 July 2024, Hann-Invest and Others, C‑554/21, C‑622/21 and C‑727/21, EU:C:2024:594, paragraph 29 and the case-law cited).

31      It should also be recalled that, in the context of a request for a preliminary ruling under Article 267 TFEU, the Court may interpret EU law only within the limits of the powers conferred upon it (judgment of 11 July 2024, Hann-Invest and Others, C‑554/21, C‑622/21 and C‑727/21, EU:C:2024:594, paragraph 30 and the case-law cited).

32      In the present case, by its questions, the referring court seeks from the Court of Justice an interpretation, inter alia, of the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU and the first and second paragraphs of Article 47 of the Charter, regarding the procedural treatment it must give to evidence that has been obtained in a flawed manner in the course of criminal proceedings brought for passive bribery.

33      In that regard, in the first place, under the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU, Member States are to provide remedies sufficient to ensure effective legal protection for individual parties in the fields covered by Union law. It is therefore for the Member States to establish a system of legal remedies and procedures ensuring effective judicial review in those fields (judgment of 11 July 2024, Hann-Invest and Others, C‑554/21, C‑622/21 and C‑727/21, EU:C:2024:594, paragraph 34 and the case-law cited).

34      As regards the scope ratione materiae of the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU, that provision refers to ‘the fields covered by Union law’, irrespective of whether the Member States are implementing Union law (judgment of 11 July 2024, Hann-Invest and Others, C‑554/21, C‑622/21 and C‑727/21, EU:C:2024:594, paragraph 35 and the case-law cited).

35      Accordingly, that provision is intended, inter alia, to apply to any national body which can rule, as a court or tribunal, on questions concerning the interpretation or application of EU law and which therefore fall within the fields covered by that law (judgment of 11 July 2024, Hann-Invest and Others, C‑554/21, C‑622/21 and C‑727/21, EU:C:2024:594, paragraph 36 and the case-law cited).

36      In the present case, the referring court must rule on the criminal liability of two police officers who have been charged with passive bribery. That criminal offence is laid down in Article 301(1) and Article 302 of the Criminal Code, in accordance with Article 2 of the Convention against Corruption, with the result that the dispute in the main proceedings falls within a field covered by EU law. Consequently, that court must meet the requirements of effective judicial protection arising from the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU.

37      Therefore, the Court has jurisdiction to interpret the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU in the present case.

38      In the second place, as regards the first and second paragraphs of Article 47 of the Charter, it should be borne in mind that the scope of the Charter, in so far as the action of the Member States is concerned, is defined in Article 51(1) thereof, according to which the provisions of the Charter are addressed to the Member States ‘when they are implementing Union law’. That provision confirms the Court’s case-law, which states that the fundamental rights guaranteed in the legal order of the European Union are applicable in all situations governed by EU law, but not outside such situations (judgment of 26 February 2026, Commission v Hungary (Right to provide media services on a radio frequency), C‑92/23, EU:C:2026:108, paragraph 95 and the case-law cited).

39      The concept of ‘implementation of Union law’, within the meaning of Article 51(1) of the Charter, presupposes a degree of connection between an act of EU law and the national measure at issue above and beyond the matters covered being closely related or one of those matters having an indirect impact on the other (judgment of 29 July 2024, protectus, C‑185/23, EU:C:2024:657, paragraph 42 and the case-law cited).

40      Accordingly, in order to determine whether a national measure involves ‘implementing Union law’ within the meaning of Article 51(1) of the Charter, it is necessary to determine, inter alia, whether that national legislation is intended to implement a provision of EU law; the nature of the legislation at issue and whether it pursues objectives other than those covered by EU law, even if it is capable of indirectly affecting EU law; and also whether there are specific rules of EU law on the matter or rules which are capable of affecting it (judgment of 29 July 2024, protectus, C‑185/23, EU:C:2024:657, paragraph 43 and the case-law cited).

41      In that regard, the Court has already found that fundamental EU rights could not be applied in relation to national legislation because the provisions of EU law regarding the area concerned did not impose any specific obligation on Member States with regard to the situation at issue (see, to that effect, judgments of 6 March 2014, Siragusa, C‑206/13, EU:C:2014:126, paragraph 26, and of 10 July 2014, Julián Hernández and Others, C‑198/13, EU:C:2014:2055, paragraph 35).

42      In the present case, the referring court is of the view, in essence, that the first and second paragraphs of Article 47 of the Charter are applicable to the situation at issue in the main proceedings as, in the main proceedings, the relevant national provisions involve the implementation of the Convention against Corruption and of Article 7(2) and (3) of Directive 2012/13.

43      First, as concerns the rules of substantive criminal law set out in the Convention against Corruption, it must be borne in mind that the Court has already held that the relationship between, on the one hand, the provisions of substantive criminal law of the European Union set out in Council Framework Decision 2004/757/JHA of 25 October 2004 laying down minimum provisions on the constituent elements of criminal acts and penalties in the field of illicit drug trafficking (OJ 2004 L 335, p. 8) and in Council Framework Decision 2008/841/JHA of 24 October 2008 on the fight against organised crime (OJ 2008 L 300, p. 42) and, on the other hand, the provisions of Bulgarian criminal procedural law governing the agreement for settlement of a case, does not go above and beyond the fact of the former provisions being closely related to, or having an indirect impact on, the latter provisions, with the result that a degree of connection, within the meaning of the case-law referred to in paragraph 39 of the present judgment, cannot be established between them (see, to that effect, judgment of 28 November 2024, PT (Agreement concluded between the prosecutor and the perpetrator of an offence), C‑432/22, EU:C:2024:987, paragraph 40).

44      The same applies to the relationship between, on the one hand, the provisions of substantive criminal law of the European Union set out in the Convention against Corruption, which, notably, in Article 2(1), defines the offence of passive corruption and, in Article 5(1), read in conjunction with Article 2(1), lays down the requirements in relation to the penalties for that offence and, on the other hand, the national general rules of criminal procedure on the inadmissibility of evidence obtained in a flawed manner or the consequences of such inadmissibility.

45      That convention does not impose any specific obligation on the Member States regarding the admissibility of evidence.

46      That finding is not called into question by the judgment of 17 January 2019, Dzivev and Others (C‑310/16, EU:C:2019:30, paragraph 33), cited by the referring court, in which the Court interpreted the Charter in response to a question for a preliminary ruling concerning the compatibility with the Charter of the Bulgarian legislation on admissibility of evidence, which had been raised in the context of criminal proceedings instigated for VAT offences.

47      In that judgment, the Court considered that the Charter applied to the case in the main proceedings, taking into account the specific nature of the offences at issue, in particular inasmuch as they would necessarily affect the financial interests of the European Union and their prosecution ensured the effectiveness of the legal regime on VAT, which is harmonised at EU level (see, to that effect, judgment of 17 January 2019, Dzivev and Others, C‑310/16, EU:C:2019:30, paragraphs 25 to 28). However, that analysis cannot be applied to the situation at issue in the main proceedings, which concerns proceedings brought for the offence of passive bribery.

48      Moreover, it should be noted that the fact that the Convention against Corruption is transposed by national provisions of substantive criminal law, thereby making the offence of passive corruption a criminal offence, cannot render the Charter applicable to all aspects of criminal proceedings instigated against a person suspected of passive corruption.

49      In the light of the foregoing, the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure which the referring court is called upon to apply, in particular Article 105(2) of that code, are not an ‘implementation’ of the provisions of the Convention against Corruption within the meaning of Article 51(1) of the Charter.

50      Second, as concerns Article 7(2) and (3) of Directive 2012/13, it should be observed, first of all, that the wording of that provision makes no reference to either the inadmissibility of certain evidence or the information suspects or accused persons are to be given regarding the evidence to which they have access.

51      Next, recitals 9, 10 and 14 of that directive indicate that the directive is concerned solely with laying down common minimum rules, which suggests that that directive does not provide for an exhaustive harmonisation of the rules on criminal procedure. In the light of that limited scope of the harmonisation carried out by that directive, the issues which are not governed by it fall within the scope of national law (see, by analogy, judgment of 1 August 2025, Dimnev, C‑404/24, EU:C:2025:595, paragraph 27 and the case-law cited).

52      It follows from the foregoing considerations that Article 7(2) and (3) of Directive 2012/13 does not govern the matters concerning the admissibility of evidence and, accordingly, does not impose any specific obligation with regard to a situation such as that at issue in the main proceedings.

53      Therefore, it cannot be found that the national provisions at issue in the main proceedings are an implementation of Article 7(2) and (3) of Directive 2012/13.

54      In the light of all the foregoing considerations, the Court does not have jurisdiction to answer the questions referred in so far as they concern the interpretation of the first and second paragraphs of Article 47 of the Charter.

 Admissibility of the request for a preliminary ruling

55      According to settled case-law, questions on the interpretation of EU law referred by a national court in the factual and legislative context which that court is responsible for defining, and the accuracy of which is not a matter for the Court to determine, enjoy a presumption of relevance. The Court may refuse to rule on a question referred by a national court only where it is quite obvious that the interpretation of EU law that is sought bears no relation to the actual facts of the main action or its purpose, where the problem is hypothetical, or where the Court does not have before it the factual or legal material necessary to give a useful answer to the questions submitted to it (judgment of 17 March 2026, Županijsko državno odvjetništvo, C‑8/24, EU:C:2026:210, paragraph 55 and the case-law cited).

56      It is also settled case-law that the procedure provided for in Article 267 TFEU is an instrument of cooperation between the Court of Justice and the national courts, by means of which the Court provides the national courts with the points of interpretation of EU law which they need in order to decide the disputes before them. The justification for a reference for a preliminary ruling is not that it enables advisory opinions on general or hypothetical questions to be delivered but rather that it is necessary for the effective resolution of a dispute (judgment of 11 July 2024, Hann-Invest and Others, C‑554/21, C‑622/21 and C‑727/21, EU:C:2024:594, paragraph 39 and the case-law cited).

57      As is apparent from the actual wording of Article 267 TFEU, the question referred for a preliminary ruling must be ‘necessary’ to enable the referring court to ‘give judgment’ in the case before it (judgment of 11 July 2024, Hann-Invest and Others, C‑554/21, C‑622/21 and C‑727/21, EU:C:2024:594, paragraphh 40 and the case-law cited).

58      In the preliminary ruling procedure established by that provision, there must therefore be a connecting factor between the dispute in the main proceedings and the provisions of EU law whose interpretation is sought, by virtue of which that interpretation is objectively required for the decision to be taken by the referring court (judgment of 9 January 2024, G. and Others (Appointment of judges to the ordinary courts in Poland), C‑181/21 and C‑269/21, EU:C:2024:1, paragraph 65 and the case-law cited).

59      In the present case, the first question referred for a preliminary ruling concerns, in essence, whether the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU must be interpreted as precluding national legislation pursuant to which criminal courts must exclude in all circumstances evidence that has been obtained in a flawed manner, that is, even where that evidence is in favour of the defendant.

60      Under that provision, Member States are to provide remedies sufficient to ensure effective legal protection in the fields covered by Union law.

61      That provision requires every Member State to ensure that the bodies which are called upon, as ‘courts or tribunals’ within the meaning of EU law, to rule on questions relating to the application or interpretation of EU law and which thus come within its judicial system in the fields covered by EU law, meet the requirements of effective judicial protection (judgment of 4 September 2025, AW ‘T’, C‑225/22, EU:C:2025:649, paragraph 47 and the case-law cited).

62      The referring court has doubts as to whether Article 105(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure is in conformity with that provision, inasmuch as Article 105(2) requires that court to exclude evidence that has been obtained in a flawed manner, including where that evidence could be relied upon as exculpatory evidence for the defence of the defendant.

63      That said, it must be held, first, that it is not apparent from the request for a preliminary ruling that the dispute in the main proceedings is substantively connected to EU law, in particular to the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU, to which the first question relates, and that the referring court would therefore be required to apply that law, and, in particular, the Convention against Corruption, or that provision, in order to decide on the merits of the case in the main proceedings (see, by analogy, judgment of 26 March 2020, Miasto Łowicz and Prokurator Generalny, C‑558/18 and C‑563/18, EU:C:2020:234, paragraph 49).

64      Even though the facts at issue in the main proceedings could amount to the criminal offence of passive corruption, as defined in that convention, the referring court nevertheless is called upon to rule on the basis of Bulgarian criminal law, and that court does not provide any indication that the interpretation of that convention, or of the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU, is objectively required for the decision to be taken by the referring court on the merits in the context of the main proceedings.

65      Second, the referring court also does not identify, when elaborating on the reasons for the need for an answer to the first question referred for a preliminary ruling, any procedural provisions of EU law which it would be required to apply in order to deliver its judgment (see, by analogy, judgment of 26 March 2020, Miasto Łowicz and Prokurator Generalny, C‑558/18 and C‑563/18, EU:C:2020:234, paragraph 50).

66      Third, an answer by the Court to that question does not appear capable of providing the referring court with an interpretation of EU law which would allow it to resolve procedural questions of national law before being able to rule on the merits of the case before it (see, by analogy, judgment of 26 March 2020, Miasto Łowicz and Prokurator Generalny, C‑558/18 and C‑563/18, EU:C:2020:234, paragraph 51).

67      In the present case, the referring court, which has jurisdiction to assess the criminal liability of the defendants in the main proceedings, is in a position to carry out that assessment on the basis of, in particular, its appraisal of the probative value of the evidence.

68      Consequently, the interpretation sought of the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU is not objectively required for the decision to be taken by the referring court. It follows that the first question is inadmissible.

69      By the second question referred for a preliminary ruling, the referring court asks, in essence, whether Article 7(2) and (3) of Directive 2012/13 precludes national legislation under which criminal courts must inform defendants where they find that certain evidence that has been included in the case file was obtained in a flawed manner, with the result that that evidence must be excluded under national law.

70      In that regard, it is clear from Article 2(1) of that directive that Article 7(2) and (3) thereof is applicable to the main proceedings.

71      That said, it is apparent from the request for a preliminary ruling that, first, in accordance with Article 7(2) of that directive, the defendants in the main proceedings were given access to the material evidence, whether in favour or against them, held by the competent authorities, and that, second, the defendants prepared their defence knowing that certain evidence had been obtained in a flawed manner, a circumstance which, under Bulgarian legislation, leads to the inadmissibility of that evidence.

72      It is also apparent from the request for a preliminary ruling that the referring court has no doubt as to the compatibility with Article 7(2) and (3) of that directive of its interpretation of the Bulgarian legislation, according to which the matter of the admissibility of evidence must be decided before the judgment closing the proceedings, and that the doubts of that court concern the question as to whether that interpretation is consistent with the requirement of impartiality deriving from the second paragraph of Article 47 of the Charter. However, the Court of Justice does not have jurisdiction to interpret Article 47 of the Charter in the present case, as is clear from paragraph 54 of the present judgment.

73      It follows that the second question is inadmissible since the interpretation of Article 7(2) and (3) of Directive 2012/13 sought bears no relation to the actual facts of the dispute in the main proceedings.

74      In the light of all of the foregoing, the Court does not have jurisdiction to answer the questions put by the referring court in so far as they concern the interpretation of Article 47 of the Charter, and the request for a preliminary ruling is inadmissible as to the remainder.

 Costs

75      Since these proceedings are, for the parties to the main proceedings, a step in the action pending before the referring court, the decision on costs is a matter for that court. Costs incurred in submitting observations to the Court, other than the costs of those parties, are not recoverable.

On those grounds, the Court (First Chamber) hereby rules:

1.      The Court of Justice does not have jurisdiction to answer the questions referred for a preliminary ruling by the Sofiyski gradski sad (Sofia City Court, Bulgaria), by decision of 20 May 2025, in so far as they concern the interpretation of the first and second paragraphs of Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.

2.      The request for a preliminary ruling from the Sofiyski gradski sad (Sofia City Court, Bulgaria), made by decision of 20 May 2025, is inadmissible as to the remainder.

[Signatures]

*      Language of the case: Bulgarian.

i      The name of the present case is a fictitious name. It does not correspond to the real name of any party to the proceedings.