EUROPEAN COMMISSION

Brussels, 27.2.2026

COM(2026) 97 final

2026/0060(NLE)

Proposal for a

COUNCIL RECOMMENDATION

on a European Union framework for science diplomacy

EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM

1.CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL

Reasons for and objectives of the proposal

In an age of geostrategic rivalries and growing global competition in science and technology, in particular with respect to disruptive technologies, research and innovation (R&I) has become a critical asset, translating into power, competitiveness and geopolitical influence. This is clearly reflected in the Letta 1 , Draghi 2 , Heitor 3 and Niinistö 4 reports. As a result, R&I is increasingly relevant for diplomacy, with science diplomacy emerging as an important policy instrument in the pursuit of the strategic interests of the European Union (‘the Union’).

Science diplomacy fosters dialogue with the Union’s friends and partners, as well as its adversaries if necessary, and can support a strong and independent Union through the deployment of the Union’s R&I assets. Through initiatives such as ‘Choose Europe for Science’ 5 and the EU’s association policy to the Horizon Europe programme, the Union has taken important steps in capitalising on its R&I strengths to build a strong and independent Europe, while implementing the necessary safeguards in terms of economic and research security 6 .

The increasing importance of science diplomacy is demonstrated by the fact that
20 Member States have created the position of chief science adviser or science/tech diplomacy envoy and/or related units in their ministries of foreign affairs 7 , many of these posts were created in the past three years. Several Member States have developed national science and/or tech diplomacy strategies 8 , or are currently developing such strategies 9 , underscoring the need for a coherent Union approach on the matter. A first step in this direction was the establishment of the EU Science Diplomacy Alliance in 2021 10 .

Many countries and regional organisations around the world are strategically investing in science diplomacy 11 . In 2025, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO) hosted the first Global Ministerial Dialogue on Science Diplomacy and announced the launch of a global framework for science diplomacy 12 . It is therefore necessary that the Union adopts its own coordinated framework for science diplomacy to ensure leadership in this rapidly evolving field. The proposal for a Council recommendation presents the vision on the contours of such a framework.

The main objective of this Council recommendation is to provide a shared vision, common narrative and pragmatic code of conduct in the field of science diplomacy, notably in support of:

1.defending the Union’s democratic values, strategic interests and technological and data sovereignty,

2.strengthening the Union’s competitive position as one of the leading global science and technology actors,

3.maximising the deployment of the Union’s R&I potential for the pursuit of peace and a rules-based international order, and

4.reinforcing the Union’s commitment to managing global goods and commons sustainably, fighting the triple planetary crisis of climate change, biodiversity loss and pollution, and contributing to the achievement of the United Nations 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development 13  and the Sustainable Development Goals.

Another objective is to foster coherence and optimise resources, both at Union and Member State level. To achieve this, the recommendation provides for Union coordination and guidance to Member States and relevant stakeholders on strategic, operational, and enabling actions, taking their specific situations into account.

The proposed Council recommendation also represents a significant step towards advancing and fulfilling the international dimension of the European Research Area (ERA).

The recommendation will allow for flexibility in terms of implementation and adaptability to rapidly changing geopolitical circumstances with science implications.

Consistency with existing policy provisions in the policy area

The Global Approach to Research and Innovation adopted by the Commission in May 2021 14 stipulates that ‘a stronger focus on science and technology in the EU’s foreign and security policies in terms of ‘Science Diplomacy’ would help the EU to project soft power and pursue its economic interests and values more effectively, meeting demand and interest from partner countries and playing to the EU’s strengths as a research and innovation powerhouse.’ In its conclusions on the Global Approach to Research and Innovation adopted in September 2021 15 , the Council of the EU highlighted the importance of integrating the Global Approach into the EU’s external action and called on the Commission and the European External Action Service to develop a European Science Diplomacy Agenda.

At the informal meeting of the Competitiveness Council (Research) in July 2023, EU research ministers underlined the importance of Union science diplomacy action and supported the development of an ambitious European Union framework for science diplomacy. In addition, the ERA Forum Subgroup on the Global Approach to Research and Innovation issued an opinion paper in 2025, in which it expressed its support for the development of a Council recommendation 16 .

The proposed European Union framework for science diplomacy is included as a specific outcome in the ERA Policy Agenda 2025-2027, adopted by the Council in May 2025 17 . It is underpinned by already existing Union science diplomacy-related instruments, such as the possibility for non-EU countries to participate in the activities of the Horizon Europe programme, including as associated countries 18 .

Consistency with other Union policies

Article 21(3) of the Treaty on the European Union (TEU) requires that the Union ensure consistency between the different areas of its external action and between these and its other policies. Consistency in the sense of Article 21(3) of the TEU refers to the interlinkages between Union policies insofar as they are relevant to the Union’s external relations. This proposal recognises the interconnections between the common foreign and security policy (CFSP) and Union R&I policies. These include both the direct use of science to support the CFSP, for example by providing scientific evidence to underpin foreign and security policy choices and the indirect use of science for diplomacy, for example by associating a strategic partner country to Horizon Europe or deploying a science attaché to the EU delegation in that country as part of a broader engagement strategy. Likewise, the CFSP impacts R&I policies, both directly, e.g. by imposing restrictions on engagement with certain partners, and indirectly, e.g. by lending diplomatic support to enable the establishment of an international research infrastructure or of an international science-policy engagement body. The proposal pursues the objective of coherence by pointing to those interlinkages and making concrete recommendations through strategic, operational and enabling actions.

Currently there is no single Union policy document targeting science diplomacy in a comprehensive manner, despite an increasing number of policy documents referring implicitly or explicitly to the role of science, technology and innovation in foreign and security policy 19 . Science plays a key role in underpinning a large number of sectoral diplomacies 20  which would benefit from a coherent approach to science diplomacy. For instance, while the International Digital Strategy and the instruments contained therein remains the responsible framework for artificial intelligence in relations with third countries, including for AI research related aspects, a European Union framework for science diplomacy will reinforce Union action in this field.

The proposal is also consistent with the Global Gateway strategy, which has education and research as one of its constituting pillars, and is aligned with the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument (NDICI). It is worth pointing out in this context that no country has joined the EU in the past 30 years, without having been associated to the R&I framework programmes beforehand.

Complementing the Council recommendation on enhancing research security adopted in 2024 21 , the proposed Council recommendation on a European Union framework for science diplomacy contributes also to the European economic security strategy 22 and the Joint Communication ‘Strengthening EU Economic Security’ 23 by promoting the Union’s competitiveness and supporting partnerships with likeminded countries.

2.LEGAL BASIS, SUBSIDIARITY AND PROPORTIONALITY

Legal basis

The initiative falls under the ‘research and technological development’ policy area, where the Union and its Members States share competences in line with Article 4(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). The proposed Council recommendation is based on Article 182(5) in conjunction with Article 292 of the TFEU.

Article 182(5) of the TFEU opens up the possibility of complementing the activities planned in the multiannual framework programme by allowing the European Parliament and the Council, acting in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure and after consulting the Economic and Social Committee, to decide on the necessary measures for implementing the European Research Area.

Article 292 of the TFEU provides the legal basis for the Council to adopt recommendations based on a proposal from the Commission.

The initiative does not propose any extension of EU regulatory power or binding commitments on Member States. It is for the Member States to decide, based on their national circumstances, how they implement this Council recommendation.

Subsidiarity (for non-exclusive competence)

The present proposal conforms with the principle of subsidiarity as provided for in Article 5(3) of the TEU.

In fact, subsidiarity is a precondition for the present proposal, given the shared competences between the Union and Member States in the area of research and innovation policy, as well as the competence of Member States in foreign and security policy, which needs to be fully respected.

As national governments develop their own foreign and security policy, they are also best placed to engage with universities and other higher education institutions, research-performing organisations and research funders.

Given the increasing frequence of foreign interference and its potential impact on economic and research security, EU-level cooperation and coordination is needed to ensure the proper functioning of the European Research Area and to reduce disparities between Member States in the use of science diplomacy.

Several Member States have adopted national science diplomacy strategies without formal Union coordination, while others are still at an early stage of science diplomacy engagement. The proposed Council recommendation will provide a coherent framework, allowing for an optimisation of resources without being too prescriptive.

The proposal aims to ensure ownership and buy-in by the Member States, enabling them to coordinate their science diplomacy activities at Union level. At the same time, the choice of a Council recommendation ensures a softer approach, in line with the shared comptences in the R&I domain.

Proportionality

The present proposal conforms with the principle of proportionality as provided for in Article 5(4) of the TEU. Neither the content nor the form of the proposed Council recommendation exceeds what is necessary to achieve the objective of a shared vision, common narrative and pragmatic code of conduct across the Union in the area of science diplomacy.

Choice of instrument

Requested by the Member States, the proposed Council recommendation provides guidance on strategic, operational and enabling actions in science diplomacy. The choice of the instrument ensures that all Member States are actively involved and committed at political level.

A Council recommendation as the instrument of choice in this area is particularly suited, as it allows for sufficient flexibility within the framework it sets out, considering that Member States depart from different starting points with respect to their use of science diplomacy as a policy instrument.

3.RESULTS OF EX POST EVALUATIONS, STAKEHOLDER CONSULTATIONS AND IMPACT ASSESSMENTS

Ex post evaluations/fitness checks of existing legislation

Stakeholder consultations

The proposed Council recommendation builds on the expert report ‘A European Framework for Science Diplomacy – Recommendations of the EU Science Diplomacy Working Groups’, which was published by the Commission in February 2025, being the result of a year-long consultation process that involved 130 science and diplomacy experts from across the EU and beyond 24 .

The development of the proposal was also informed by a call for evidence, which was open for public feedback on the ‘Have your say’ webpage from 6 October to 3 November 2025. The Commission received 50 contributions, including from major players in the European R&I landscape 25 . 

The main results of the call for evidence can be summarised as follows:

Respondents overwhelmingly supported the idea of a Council recommendation on a European Union framework for science diplomacy. According to their responses, such a recommendation should provide Union coordination and guidance to Member States, but also to universities, research-performing organisations, research infrastructures and funding agencies. It should help to foster coherence and optimise resources, both at Union and Member State level. It should not add bureaucracy or create new institutions but rather provide a shared vision, a basis for a common narrative and a code of conduct, while allowing flexibility for Member States. The framework needs to be dynamic and adaptable to changing geopolitical circumstances and build on lessons learned from past experiences. It was stressed that the breaking of diplomatic relations should not automatically lead to the breaking of scientific relations. Respondents also mentioned the importance of ‘intra-EU’ science diplomacy and enlargement aspects. It was suggested that Member States develop science diplomacy roadmaps; actions should be monitored and reviewed. Major challenges that were identified include the complexity of the European science diplomacy landscape, the competence of Member States in foreign and security policy and the existing “science diplomacy patchwork” in the EU.

Particular support was expressed for using science diplomacy to promote values like academic freedom and freedom of scientific research, open science/open access and research integrity; foster peace and multilateralism; help build trust including with non-likeminded countries; and support competitiveness and effectiveness of European leadership in standardisation at global level. Respondents also stated the need to balance competition and cooperation as well as openness and restrictedness (linked to research security); identify thematic priorities for science diplomacy with preference for high impact domains and areas (for example, data sovereignty, Ocean, Mediterranean); use science diplomacy to engage with low-income countries including by tackling asymmetries in R&I and advancing the Sustainable Development Goals; foster science for policy, evidence-informed policymaking and technology foresight, capitalising on artificial intelligence (AI) tools; engage with international organisations and non-state actors like business (including scientific publishers) and philanthropy; create science diplomacy platforms; foster science diplomacy training and capacity-building (for example by training researchers involved in EU projects and science-policy fellowships); open new career paths; provide funding opportunities for science diplomacy (including in the Horizon Europe programme); fully involve the social sciences and humanities; strengthen the role of research and technology infrastructures in science diplomacy; engage with diaspora and alumni networks as well as researchers at risk; and strengthen R&I in embassies.

In addition to the call for evidence, major stakeholders, such as the EU Science Diplomacy Alliance and the EU Ministries of Foreign Affairs Science Diplomacy and Advice Network were consulted in a targeted manner.

Collection and use of expertise

In addition to the expert report mentioned above and the input received during the consultation process, the proposal is underpinned by collected expertise, including:

·the results of three Horizon 2020-funded science diplomacy projects (S4D4C 26 , EL-CSID 27 and InsSciDE 28 );

·a large number of science diplomacy publications and reports produced by an active community of scholars and practitioners in the last decade, including: Tools for an EU science diplomacy (2017) 29 , EU science diplomacy in a contested space of multi-level governance: Ambitions, constraints and options for action (2020) 30 , Calling for a Systemic Change: Towards a European Union Science Diplomacy for Addressing Global Challenges (2021) 31 , Leveraging Science Diplomacy in an Era of Geo-Economic Rivalry: Towards a European strategy (2022) 32 , Strengthening science diplomacy in and for Europe through Horizon Europe (2024) 33 , Science diplomacy in an era of disruption (2025) 34 ;

·the work of the Science Diplomacy Task Force of the Council’s former Strategic Forum for International S&T Cooperation (SFIC) 35 Strategic forum for international scientific and technological cooperation (SFIC);

·the Opinion of the ERA Forum Subgroup on the Global Approach to Research and Innovation (2025) 36 ;

·the proceedings of the 1st and 2nd European Science Diplomacy Conferences, which took place in December 2023 and December 2025 respectively 37 ; and dedicated science diplomacy meetings and workshops with stakeholders inside and outside Europe.

Impact assessment

An impact assessment has not been carried out given the non-binding legal nature of the proposed instrument and the fact that the proposed activities are complementary to Member States’ initiatives.

The impact of the Council recommendation largely depends on the engagement and the readiness of Member States and stakeholders to act. The fact that several Member States already have national science diplomacy strategies in place or are currently developing them, indicates that the Council recommendation will thrive on fertile ground.

Provided that the Council adopts the proposal and Member States commit to implement the proposed actions with the support of the stakeholders, the proposal would indeed help the EU to ‘project soft power and pursue its economic interests and values more effectively, meeting demand and interest from partner countries and playing to the EU’s strengths as a research and innovation powerhouse’, as stipulated in the Global Approach to Research and Innovation, most notably by facilitating the development of a coherent approach to science diplomacy by Member States.

Regulatory fitness and simplification

The proposal is not linked to the Commission’s REFIT legislative simplification programme. Nonetheless, every effort is made to make efficient use of scarce resources, including by using existing ERA governance structures. A specific aim of the proposal is the optimisation of resources, for example, by seeking synergies between the approximately 500 science, technology and innovation counsellors currently deployed in EU delegations and Member State embassies in non-EU countries.

Fundamental rights

A key objective of Union science diplomacy action is to promote principles and values in international R&I cooperation worldwide, such as academic freedom and freedom of scientific research, ethics and research integrity, diversity, equality and inclusion, open science and open data, and evidence-informed policymaking. In addition, Union science diplomacy aims at using R&I to strengthen peace and a rules-based international order as well as the protection of global public goods and commons.

4.BUDGETARY IMPLICATIONS

This proposal will be resource-neutral for the European External Action Service and will not require additional resources from the Union budget beyond and above what is already planned in Horizon Europe and other Union programmes such as NDICI. While research funding at Union and national level needs to remain focused on priority research areas, the measures in this Council recommendation are expected to mobilise and leverage existing sources of funding at Union, national and sector level.

5.OTHER ELEMENTS

Implementation plans and monitoring, evaluation and reporting arrangements

The development of a European Union framework for science diplomacy is mentioned as an outcome in the ERA Policy Agenda 2025-2027, adopted by the Council in May 2025. To support Member States and stakeholders as they implement this Council recommendation, full use will be made of the existing ERA governance structures. In particular, the follow-up to the Council recommendation will be monitored by the ERA Forum Subgroup on the Global Approach to Research and Innovation. Commission reporting will rely on the already existing biennial reporting on the Global Approach to Research and Innovation.

Explanatory documents (for directives)

Detailed explanation of the specific provisions of the proposal

After introducing the issue at stake and the political background of the proposal in the recitals, its scope is explained. The first aim of the recommendation is to lay the groundwork for a shared vision, common narrative and pragmatic code of conduct in the field of science diplomacy, in support of:

1.defending the Union’s democratic values, strategic interests and technological and data sovereignty,

2.strengthening the Union’s competitive position as one of the leading global science and technology actors,

3.maximising the deployment of the Union’s R&I potential for the pursuit of peace and a rules-based international order, and

4.reinforcing the Union’s commitment to managing global goods and commons sustainably, fighting the triple planetary crisis of climate change, biodiversity loss and pollution, and contributing to the achievement of the United Nations 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the Sustainable Development Goals.

Definitions for the purposes of the recommendation of the terms ‘science’, ‘diplomacy’ and ‘science diplomacy’ are proposed. It is clarified that no part of the recommendation impinges on the competence of Member States in foreign and security policy or the autonomy of scientific institutions. This is followed by a paragraph setting out the principles and values on which Union science diplomacy should be based.

The second objective of the recommendation is to foster coherence and optimise resources, both at Union and Member State level in the area of science diplomacy. Accordingly, the second section provides recommendations to Member States on strategic, operational and enabling actions taking their specific situations into account as well as a number of – already planned – supporting actions and initiatives of the Commission. The final section specifies how the follow-up to the recommendation is facilitated.

2026/0060 (NLE)

Proposal for a

COUNCIL RECOMMENDATION

on a European Union framework for science diplomacy

THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,

Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and in particular Article 292, in conjunction with Article 182, paragraph 5 thereof,

Having regard to the proposal from the European Commission,

Whereas:

(1)Science is a global public good, expanding the frontiers of knowledge and developing solutions for the benefit of humankind through fundamental and applied research, both in the public and private sector. 

(2)The universal language of science has the ability to connect and inspire people and nations. 

(3)Science has always been a driver of European integration and contributes to shaping European identity based on shared principles and values.

(4)Science is a core element of the Union’s soft power and contributes to enhancing the Union’s relations with other nations, even when diplomatic relations are difficult.

(5)It is necessary to keep the international science system both open and secure.

(6)Research and innovation is at the heart of the Union’s competitiveness.

(7)Horizon Europe is the world’s largest multilateral research and innovation programme, being open for participation through association by trusted partner countries in the Union’s neighbourhood and beyond as well as for the participation of researchers worldwide.

(8)The ‘Choose Europe for Science’ initiative 38 is enhancing the attractiveness of the Union for researchers from all over the world, in particular through the grants of the European Research Council (ERC) 39 and the Marie Skłodowska Curie Actions (MSCA) 40 . 

(9)The use of artificial intelligence (AI) in science as a transformative force creates unprecedented opportunities as well as risks, for example related to data governance, model sharing, access to computing and scientific integrity.

(10)There is increased global competition due to the development and deployment of groundbreaking technologies such as AI which have profound impacts on people’s lives.

(11)The Union is faced with a geopolitical environment characterised by increasing hostility towards international cooperation, multilateralism, the rule of law and science itself.

(12)State and non-state actors exercise increasing pressure on global goods and commons, including on spaces beyond national jurisdiction.

(13)Progress has been slow, or even negative, in achieving the United Nations 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development 41 and the Sustainable Development Goals and the resolution of the triple planetary crisis of climate change, biodiversity loss and pollution, requiring joint efforts between nations informed by scientific evidence.

(14)The Union and its Member States are the main enablers of global intergovernmental science-policy bodies such as the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) 42 , the Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services (IPBES) 43 , the Intergovernmental Science-Policy Panel on Chemicals, Waste and Pollution (ISP-CWP) 44 and the proposed International Panel for Ocean Sustainability (IPOS) 45 .

(15)Research and innovation provides the evidence needed to underpin international agreements and support policy choices across a wide range of sectoral diplomacies where relevant. 

(16)Foreign and security policy, including the common foreign and security policy (CFSP), impact research and innovation policies, both directly, e.g. by imposing restrictions on engagement with certain international partners and competitors, and indirectly, e.g. by facilitating international cooperation in research and innovation and creating a level playing field. 

(17)As research and innovation translates more than ever into power and geopolitical influence, a strong and independent Union would benefit from better mobilising the Union’s research and innovation assets.

(18)An increasing number of Union policy documents 46 , 47  and major recent reports 48  refer implicitly or explicitly to the role of science, technology and innovation in foreign and security policy.

(19)Science diplomacy can play a vital role in

a)defending the Union’s democratic values, strategic interests and technological and data sovereignty; 

b)strengthening the Union’s competitive position as one of the leading global science and technology actors;  

c)maximising the deployment of the Union’s research and innovation potential for the pursuit of peace and a rules-based international order; and  

d)reinforcing the Union’s commitment to managing global public goods and commons sustainably, fighting the triple planetary crisis of climate change, biodiversity loss and pollution, and contributing to the achievement of the United Nations 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the Sustainable Development Goals. 

(20)The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) is developing a global science diplomacy framework to which the Union should contribute. 

(21)To pursue its interests, the Union should act strategically and in a coordinated manner in terms of science diplomacy vis-à-vis its global partners and competitors, which are investing in their own science diplomacy capacities.

(22)An increasing number of Member States have been developing and adopting national science diplomacy strategies and strengthening the scientific-technological capacities in their diplomatic services at home and abroad.

(23)Given the multitude of ongoing activities, it is necessary to foster coherence and optimise resources in science diplomacy, both at Union and Member States’ level, as well as to provide Union coordination and guidance to Member States and relevant stakeholders, taking their specific situations into account.

(24)Science diplomacy has the potential to contribute to a ‘fifth’ freedom of free movement of research, innovation, knowledge and education 49 and to advancing and achieving the European Research Area (ERA), both internally and externally, with particular emphasis on the enlargement dimension of the Union. 

(25)While the concept of science diplomacy is fairly recent, the Union builds on a strong legacy of initiatives that could be considered science diplomacy, including European research infrastructures like the European Organization for Nuclear Research (CERN) 50 or the European Commission’s Joint Research Centre (JRC) 51 as well as global research infrastructures located in the Union and supported by individual Member States like the Abdus Salam International Centre for Theoretical Physics (ICTP) 52  or the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) 53 . 

(26)A vibrant European community of science diplomacy scholars and practitioners has emerged in recent years, leading, for example, to the creation of the EU Science Diplomacy Alliance 54  and the EU Ministries of Foreign Affairs Science Diplomacy and Advice Network.

(27)Therefore, the Union should establish itself as the global leader in science diplomacy, both to defend its own interests and serve the global public good,

HAS ADOPTED THIS RECOMMENDATION:

DEFINITIONS AND SCOPE

1.For the purposes of this Recommendation:

(1)‘science’ means the systematic study of the structure and behaviour of the physical and social world through observation, experimentation, and the testing of theories against the evidence obtained and is understood here as encompassing natural sciences, technology, engineering, mathematics and medicine as well as social sciences and humanities and covering both fundamental and applied research in the public and private sector;

(2)‘diplomacy’ means the profession, activity, or skill of conducting international relations by state and non-state actors through peaceful means such as dialogue and negotiation, including through representatives abroad;

(3)‘science diplomacy’ means the direct or indirect use of science, scientific evidence and scientific cooperation to support diplomatic objectives at different levels as well as the deployment of diplomacy to support scientific progress.

2.This recommendation does not impinge on the competence of Member States in foreign and security policy or the autonomy and independence of scientific institutions. 

PRINCIPLES AND VALUES OF UNION SCIENCE DIPLOMACY

55 56 57 Union science diplomacy should be rooted in the values on which the Union is founded, as set out in Article 2 of the TEU, and based in particular on the principles and values underpinning international cooperation in research and innovation, as outlined in the Global Approach to Research and Innovation and the Marseille Declaration, most notably academic freedom and freedom of scientific research, scientific excellence, research ethics and integrity, research security, gender equality, diversity and inclusion, open science and open data, and evidence-informed policymaking. 

MEMBER STATE ACTION TO SUPPORT UNION SCIENCE DIPLOMACY

Taking into account the need for optimising resources, both at Union and Member State level, it is recommended that Member States take the following actions:

Strategic actions

3.acknowledge the importance of science diplomacy as a component of their foreign and security policy and its contribution to the common foreign and security policy and common security and defence policy by recognising its potential in relevant foreign and security policy strategies;

4.use science diplomacy action and targeted messaging to position the Union as a global champion of academic freedom, freedom of scientific research and international cooperation in research and innovation, including through the ‘Choose Europe for Science’ initiative;

5.harness science diplomacy for pursuing the interest of the Union’s competitiveness, for example to better position the opportunities offered by partnerships with the Union, including via the Global Gateway strategy 58 , to promote European technologies, to leverage the influence of the Union’s research and innovation and regulatory capacity for the setting of technical standards, and to support the Union’s technology and data sovereignty, including by infrastructure initiatives like GÉANT 59  and independent access to climate, biodiversity, pollution and Earth observation data, where Copernicus can play a significant science diplomacy role 60 ;

6.foster inter- and transdisciplinary dialogues at Union, national and subnational level between the various science diplomacy actors on how to best balance scientific goals with foreign and security policy interests, considering in particular the need to assess the impacts of restrictions on international scientific cooperation, to mitigate economic and research security risks and to consider the potential of science diplomacy to prepare the ground for foreign and security policy action;

7.consider drawing up national roadmaps for interest-driven science diplomacy action, to be updated in regular intervals, based on the identification of thematic and geographic priorities and interests at Union, national and subnational level agreed between the relevant science diplomacy stakeholders and an assessment of mutual interest and opportunities for cooperation between the Union and non-EU countries in specific areas;

8.with due consideration of security concerns related to dual use technologies and other sensitive technologies in areas such as space and defense, identify specific areas in which science diplomacy can be used as a trust-building force for maintaining dialogue with countries which do not share the Union’s values or with which formal dialogue is strained or interrupted, or where scientific support for diplomacy or diplomatic support for science can help foster peace and mutual understanding, including in the area of non-proliferation and the mitigation of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear risks (CBRN), and building on successful examples like the International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor (ITER) 61  or the Synchrotron-light for Experimental Science and Applications in the Middle East (SESAME) 62 ;

9.wherever it can add value to established policy processes, make use of science diplomacy to advance the implementation of the United Nations 2030 Agenda and the Sustainable Development Goals (in particular SDG17: Partnerships for the Goals), to support the development and implementation of international agreements, to address global sustainability challenges, and to sustainably manage global goods and commons in a fragmented geopolitical environment, including spaces beyond national jurisdiction such as the high seas and deep sea, Antarctica, the Earth orbit, the moon and other celestial objects, as well as common goods like the radiospectrum and a dark and quiet sky;

10.promote Union leadership in global science diplomacy by engaging in the global science diplomacy discourse and playing a leading role in the development of a global framework for science diplomacy as promoted by UNESCO, and by strengthening ties or building alliances with trusted partners worldwide to promote science diplomacy guided by the common Union’s and Member States’ interests, based on principles and values in research and innovation, a responsible and ethical use of science, technology and innovation, and an open and secure research environment;

11.position European research and technology infrastructures as strategic assets of the Union’s soft power in science diplomacy 63  and key drivers of the Union’s competitiveness and technological sovereignty, capitalising on their ability to promote the Union’s ambition and convening power, their potential to attract the best talent, their contribution to innovation, standard-setting and the sharing of data, and their role in advancing bilateral and multilateral relations; 

Operational actions

12.where not already in place, consider establishing adequate structures for the coordination of science diplomacy across government and with key stakeholders at different levels, including by the appointment of a national science diplomacy coordinator and by exploring synergies with other sectoral diplomacies, such as climate, green, water, ocean, polar, space, energy and health diplomacy, with particular emphasis on the cross-linkages with tech and digital diplomacy as well as cultural diplomacy; 

13.review the scientific advice and foresight mechanisms of ministries of foreign affairs, including the role of think tanks, to identify capacity gaps and develop recommendations for the improvement of these science-for-policy mechanisms, building on lessons learned from existing science advice mechanisms at global, Union, national and subnational level, thereby supporting wider efforts for promoting the use of scientific evidence in public policymaking, including through the ERA Action on Advancing European Science for Policy 64 ;

14.strengthen the monitoring of groundbreaking developments in research and innovation, such as the increased use of artificial intelligence in science within the framework of the overall Union policy on AI 65 , by assessing their implications for scientific collaboration, research integrity and the Union’s competitiveness, integrating these insights into national science diplomacy strategies, and promoting a human-centric, responsible, transparent and secure use of these technologies at global level;

15.Step up the Union’s engagement in and, where possible, support to science-based international organisations in a coordinated manner, including global intergovernmental science-policy platforms such as the IPCC, IPBES and ISP-CWP, and strengthen the cooperation with non-governmental international organisations active in the field of science diplomacy such as the International Science Council (ISC) 66 and the Geneva Science and Diplomacy Anticipator (GESDA) 67 as well as organisations working on technical standards and conventions such as the European Committees for Standardization and Electrotechnical Standardization (CEN-CENELEC) 68  and the Bureau International des Poids et Mesures (BIPM) 69 ;

16.create networks and synergies between existing science and technology attachés in diplomatic representations of the Union and the Member States worldwide and revisit their roles and required competencies, for example in innovation-related areas, in order to maximise their impact and make better use of existing resources;

17.support the Union’s science diplomacy outreach by taking a strategic approach towards the  scientific diaspora of Member States, assisting in the creation of relevant networks in cooperation with academic exchange services, by making better use of alumni networks of Union mobility schemes such as the Marie Curie Alumni Association 70 and Erasmus Mundus Association 71 and by capitalising on well-established events that promote science-based people-to-people engagement across geopolitical divides such as the Lindau Nobel Laureate meetings 72 or the European Forum Alpbach 73 ;

18.develop a coherent approach towards refugee scholars and researchers at risk with the aim of facilitating their continued contribution to research and innovation, based on the principles and values the Union stands for;

19.build equitable science diplomacy partnerships with low- and middle-income countries that will foster the contribution of local expertise to shared global challenges and provide opportunities for capacity-building and open markets for investment, thereby tackling also asymmetries in research and innovation capacities;

Enabling actions

20.foster linkages between Member States’ diplomatic services on the one hand and universities and other higher education institutions, research-performing organisations, research funders as well as civil society on the other, including with non-state actors whose expertise, international networks, and innovative capacity can unlock new avenues for innovation and strengthen global partnerships beyond traditional channels between government and academia;

21.support the development of positive science diplomacy narratives underpinned by multi- and interdisciplinary research, including social sciences and humanities, and the spreading of these findings through scientific publications and communication with the public, with the aim of enhancing trust in science, strengthening the integrity of the information space and shielding democracy and multilateralism;

22.promote multilingualism in science diplomacy and linguistic diversity in science in line with the G20 Recommendations on Science Engagement 74 ;

23.provide science diplomacy training to scientists and diplomats as well as professionals working at the interface between science and diplomacy in cooperation with relevant stakeholders, including by integrating science diplomacy modules in the curricula of diplomatic academies and the training programmes of diplomats before being posted abroad.

SUPPORTING ACTIONS AT UNION LEVEL

24.To support the implementation of points 3 to 23 of this Recommendation, it is recommended that the European Commission takes the following actions in particular:

a)support a mapping of Union science diplomacy actors, strategies and training offers and of science diplomacy efforts by the Union’s partners and competitors with a view to getting an overview of the existing national frameworks and currently available science diplomacy resources as well as of the global science diplomacy environment in which the Union and its Member States operate;

b)enable a regular exchange between scientists and diplomats through the establishment of a virtual European Science Diplomacy Platform based on a Team Europe approach, which can serve to identify topics for joint science diplomacy action vis-à-vis relevant countries and regions of interest to the Union;

c)establish a coordination mechanism using the existing ERA framework which can be activated ad hoc when a common Union position in the field of research and innovation is needed in response to geopolitical developments such as threats to the Union’s economic security, military aggressions or democratic backsliding;

d)integrate the European Union framework for science diplomacy in the current and future framework programme for research and innovation and other Union programmes by fostering instruments such as the ‘Choose Europe for Science’ initiative, association to and international participation in Horizon Europe, science & technology agreements, Global Gateway projects, the European Open Science Cloud and initiatives targeted at specific geographical regions and topics such as the Partnership for Research and Innovation in the Mediterranean Area (PRIMA) 75 , the AU-EU Innovation Agenda 76 , the Global Health European & Developing Countries Clinical Trials Partnership (EDCTP) 77 , Mission Innovation 78 and the All-Atlantic Ocean Research and Innovation Alliance (AAORIA) 79 .

e)facilitate the establishment of a Mediterranean Science Diplomacy Centre as announced in the Pact for the Mediterranean 80 and strengthen science diplomacy dialogues with key multilateral and international partners such as the African Union (AU), the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC), the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and Central Asia;

f)strengthen the provision of scientific advice to foreign and security policy in particular through the activities of the European Commission’s Joint Research Centre (JRC) and Scientific Advice Mechanism 81  as well as the Union’s decentralised agencies 82 , including by supporting international dialogues in cooperation with international science advice bodies such as the United Nations Secretary-General’s Scientific Advisory Board 83 , the International Network for Governmental Science Advice (INGSA) 84 and the Foreign Ministries Science & Technology Advice Network (FMSTAN) 85 .

IMPLEMENTATION AND REPORTING

It is recommended that Member States implement points 3 to 23 of this Recommendation as soon as practicable.

It is recommended that the Commission monitors the implementation progress of this Recommendation using existing ERA governance structures, in particular the ERA Forum Subgroup on the Global Approach to Research and Innovation, in cooperation with the European External Action Service, and reports to the Council on the progress in the implementation of this Recommendation every two years, as part of its biennial reporting on the Global Approach to Research and Innovation.

Done at Brussels,

(1)    Enrico Letta, Much more than a market – Speed, Security, Solidarity. Empowering the Single Market to deliver a sustainable future and prosperity for all EU Citizens, 2024 ( link ).

(2)    European Commission: European Political Strategy Centre, The future of European competitiveness. Part A, A competitiveness strategy for Europe, Publications Office of the European Union, 2025 ( link ).

(3)    European Commission: Directorate-General for Research and Innovation, Align, act, accelerate – Research, technology and innovation to boost European competitiveness, Publications Office of the European Union, 2024 ( link ).

(4)    Sauli Niinistö, Safer together: Strengthening Europe’s Civilian and Military Preparedness and Readiness, 2024 ( link ). 

(5)    Choose Europe for Science ( link ).

(6)    Commission communication on the European economic security strategy, JOIN(2023) 20 final of 20.6.2023 ( link ), Council recommendation on enhancing research security, C/2024/3510 of 23.5.2024 ( link ), Joint Communication on strenghtening EU Economic Security, (JOIN(2025) 977 final of 3.12.2025 ( link ).

(7)    Examples include Austria, Czechia, Denmark, Estonia, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Lithuania, The Netherlands, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia and Spain.

(8)    Examples include Denmark, France, Germany and Spain.

(9)    Examples include Lithuania and Romania.

(10)    EU Science Diplomacy Alliance ( link ). 

(11)    Examples include Canada, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, India, Japan, Malaysia, Pakistan, Panama, Rwanda, South Africa, Switzerland, United Kingdom, African Union and ASEAN.

(12)    UNESCO Global Ministerial Dialogue on Science Diplomacy ( link ).

(13)    United Nations 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development ( link ).

(14)    Commission communication on the Global Approach to Research and Innovation, COM(2021)252 final of 18.5.2021 ( link ). 

(15)    Council conclusions on the Global Approach to Research and Innovation, 12301/21 RECH 425 of 28.9.2021 ( link ).

(16)    Opinion paper of the ERA Forum Subgroup on the Global Approach to Research and Innovation ( link ). 

(17)    Council recommendation on the European Research Area Policy Agenda 2025-2027, C/2025/3593 of 24.6.2025 ( link ).

(18)    See Articles 16, 22 and 23 of the Horizon Europe Regulation ( link ).

(19)    In addition to the Commission communication on the Global Approach to Research and Innovation, COM(2021) 252 final of 18.5.2021 ( link ) and the related Council conclusions, 12301/21 RECH 425 of 28.9.2021 ( link ), this includes the Council conclusions on climate and energy diplomacy, 5263/21 of 25.1.2021 ( link ); Joint communication on strengthening the EU’s contribution to rules-based multilateralism, JOIN(2021) 3 final of 17.2.2021 ( link ); Joint communication on a stronger EU engagement for a peaceful, sustainable and prosperous Arctic, JOIN(2021) 27 final of 13.10.2021 ( link ); Council conclusions on water in the EU’s external action, 14108/21 of 19.11.2021 ( link ); Commission communication on a European strategy for universities, COM(2022) 16 final of 18.1.2022 ( link ); Council’s Strategic Compass for Security and Defence, 7371/22 of 21.3.2022 ( link ); Council conclusions on principles and values for international cooperation in research and innovation, 10125/22 of 10.6.2022 ( link ); Council conclusions on research infrastructures, 15429/22 of 2.12.2022 ( link ); Council conclusions on EU digital diplomacy, 11406/22 of 18.7.2022 ( link ) and 11088/23 of 26.6.2023 ( link ); Council conclusions on strengthening the role and impact of research and innovation in the policymaking process in the Union, 16450/23 of 8.12.2023 ( link ); Council conclusions on green diplomacy, 7865/24 of 18.3.2024 ( link ); Commission communication on a Competitiveness Compass for the EU, COM(2025) 30 final of 29.1.2025 ( link ); Joint communication on the European Union's strategic approach to the Black Sea region, JOIN(2025) 135 final of 28.5.2025 ( link ); Joint communication on an International Digital Strategy for the European Union, JOIN(2025) 140 final of 5.6.2025 ( link ) and the related Council conclusions, 15315/1/25 REV1 of 20.11.2025 ( link ); Joint communication on the European Ocean Pact, COM/2025/281 final of 5.6.2025 ( link ); Commission communication on a European strategy on research and technology infrastructures, COM(2025) 497 final/2 of 30.9.2025 ( link ); Commission communication on the Apply AI Strategy, COM(2025) 723 final of 8.10.2025 ( link ); Commission communication on a European strategy for artificial intelligence in science, COM(2025) 724 final of 8.10.2025 ( link ); Joint communication on the Pact for the Mediterranean, JOIN(2025) 26 final of 16.10.2025 ( link ).

(20)    Such as climate, green, water, ocean, polar, space, digital, energy and health diplomacy.

(21)    Council recommendation of 23 May 2024 on enhancing research security (OJ C, C/2024/3510, 30.5.2024) ( link ).

(22)    Joint communication on European Economic Security Strategy, JOIN(2023) 20 final of 20.6.2023 ( link ).

(23)    Joint communication on strengthening EU economic security, JOIN(2025) 977 final of 3.12.2025 ( link ).

(24)    European Commission: Directorate-General for Research and Innovation, A European framework for science diplomacy – Recommendations of the EU Science Diplomacy Working Groups, Gjedssø Bertelsen, R.(editor), Bochereau, L.(editor), Chelioti, E.(editor), Dávid, Á.(editor), Gailiūtė-Janušonė, D.(editor), Hartl, M.(editor), Liberatore, A.(editor), Mauduit, J.-C.(editor), Müller, J. M.(editor) and Van Langenhove, L.(editor), Publications Office of the European Union, 2025  ( link ) .  

(25)    Call for evidence on a European framework for science diplomacy ( link ).

(26)    S4D4C ( link ). 

(27)    EL-CSID ( link ). 

(28)    InsSciDE ( link ). 

(29)    European Commission: Directorate-General for Research and Innovation, Institute of European Studies at the Vrije Universiteit Brussel (IES-VUB) and United Nations University Institute on Comparative Regional Integration Studies (UNU-CRIS), Tools for an EU science diplomacy, Publications Office, 2017 ( link ). 

(30)    Rüffin, N., ‘EU science diplomacy in a contested space of multi-level governance: Ambitions, constraints and options for action’, in: Research Policy, Volume 49, Issue 1, February 2020, 103842 ( link ). 

(31)    Melchor, L., Elorza, A. and Lacunza, I., ‘Calling for a Systemic Change: Towards a European Union Science Diplomacy for Addressing Global Challenges’, Version 2.0, S4D4C Policy Report, 2021 ( link ). 

(32)    Fägersten, B., ‘Leveraging Science Diplomacy in an Era of Geo-Economic Rivalry: Towards a European strategy’, UI Report, 1/2022 ( link ). 

(33)    Van Langenhove, L., Shendrikova, D. and Mays, C., ‘Strengthening science diplomacy in and for Europe through Horizon Europe’, European Union Science Diplomacy Alliance Policy Brief, February 2024 ( link ). 

(34)    The Royal Society and American Association for the Advancement of Science (editors), ‘Science diplomacy in an era of disruption’, February 2025 ( link ). 

(35)    Strategic Forum for International S&T Cooperation (SFIC) ( link ). 

(36)    Opinion paper of the ERA Forum Subgroup on the Global Approach to R&I ( link ).  

(37)    European Science Diplomacy Conference ( link ). 

(38)    Choose Europe for Science ( link ). 

(39)    European Research Council (ERC) ( link ).

(40)    Marie Skłodowska-Curie Actions ( link ).

(41)    United Nations 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development ( link ).

(42)    Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) ( link ).

(43)    Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services (IPBES) ( link ).

(44)    Intergovernmental Science-Policy Panel on Chemicals, Waste and Pollution (ISP-CWP) ( link ).

(45)    International Panel for Ocean Sustainability (IPOS) ( link ).

(46)    In addition to the Commission communication on the Global Approach to Research and Innovation, COM(2021) 252 final of 18.5.2021 ( link ) and the related Council conclusions, 12301/21 RECH 425 of 28.9.2021 ( link ), this includes the Council conclusions on climate and energy diplomacy, 5263/21 of 25.1.2021 ( link ); Joint communication on strengthening the EU’s contribution to rules-based multilateralism, JOIN(2021) 3 final of 17.2.2021 ( link ); Joint communication on a stronger EU engagement for a peaceful, sustainable and prosperous Arctic, JOIN(2021) 27 final of 13.10.2021 ( link ); Council conclusions on water in the EU’s external action, 14108/21 of 19.11.2021 ( link ); Commission communication on a European strategy for universities, COM(2022) 16 final of 18.1.2022 ( link ); Council’s Strategic Compass for Security and Defence, 7371/22 of 21.3.2022 ( link ); Council conclusions on principles and values for international cooperation in research and inovation, 10125/22 of 10.6.2022 ( link ); Council conclusions on research infrastructures, 15429/22 of 2.12.2022 ( link ); Council conclusions on EU digital diplomacy, 11406/22 of 18.7.2022 ( link ) and 11088/23 of 26.6.2023 ( link ); Joint communication on European Economic Security strategy, JOIN(2023) 20 final of 20.6.2023 ( link ); Council conclusions on strengthening the role and impact of research and innovation in the policymaking process in the Union, 16450/23 of 8.12.2023 ( link ); Council conclusions on green diplomacy, 7865/24 of 18.3.2024 ( link ); Commission communication on a Competitiveness Compass for the EU, COM(2025) 30 final of 29.1.2025 ( link ); Joint communication on the European Union’s strategic approach to the Black Sea region, JOIN(2025) 135 final of 28.5.2025 ( link ); Joint communication on an International Digital Strategy for the European Union, JOIN(2025) 140 final of 5.6.2025 ( link ) and the related Council conclusions, 15315/1/25 REV1 of 20.11.2025 ( link ); Joint communication on the European Ocean Pact, COM/2025/281 final of 5.6.2025 ( link ); Commission communication on a European strategy on research and technology infrastructures, COM(2025) 497 final/2 of 30.9.2025 ( link ); Commission communication on the Apply AI Strategy, COM(2025) 723 final of 8.10.2025 ( link ); Commission communication on a European strategy for artificial intelligence in science, COM(2025) 724 final of 8.10.2025 ( link ); Joint communication on the Pact for the Mediterranean, JOIN(2025) 26 final of 16.10.2025 ( link ) and Joint communication on strengthening EU economic security, JOIN(2025) 977 final of 3.12.2025 ( link ).

(47)    Council recommendation of 23 May 2024 on enhancing research security (OJ C, C/2024/3510, 30.5.2024) ( link ).

(48)    Enrico Letta, Much more than a market – Speed, Security, Solidarity. Empowering the Single Market to deliver a sustainable future and prosperity for all EU Citizens, 2024 ( link ); European Commission: European Political Strategy Centre, The future of European competitiveness. Part A, A competitiveness strategy for Europe, Publications Office of the European Union, 2025 ( link ); European Commission: Directorate-General for Research and Innovation, Align, act, accelerate – Research, technology and innovation to boost European competitiveness, Publications Office of the European Union, 2024 ( link ); Sauli Niinistö, Safer together: Strengthening Europe’s Civilian and Military Preparedness and Readiness, 2024 ( link ); European Commission: Directorate-General for Research and Innovation, A European framework for science diplomacy – Recommendations of the EU Science Diplomacy Working Groups, Gjedssø Bertelsen, R.(editor), Bochereau, L.(editor), Chelioti, E.(editor), Dávid, Á.(editor), Gailiūtė-Janušonė, D.(editor), Hartl, M.(editor), Liberatore, A.(editor), Mauduit, J.-C.(editor), Müller, J. M.(editor) and Van Langenhove, L.(editor), Publications Office of the European Union, 2025  ( link ) .

(49)    See Enrico Letta, Much more than a market, 2024.

(50)    European Organization for Nuclear Research (CERN) ( link ).

(51)    European Commission Joint Research Centre (JRC) ( link ).

(52)    Abdus Salam International Centre for Theoretical Physics (ICTP) ( link ).

(53)    International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) ( link ).

(54)    EU Science Diplomacy Alliance ( link ).

(55)    Commission communication on the Global Approach to Research and Innovation, COM(2021)252 final of 18.5.2021 ( link ).

(56)    Marseille Declaration on International Cooperation in Research and Innovation (R&I) ( link ).

(57)    With due respect to the protection of personal data.

(58)    Global Gateway strategy ( link ).

(59)    GÉANT ( link ).

(60)    Copernicus: Europe's eyes on Earth ( link ).

(61)    International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor (ITER) ( link ).

(62)    Synchrotron-light for Experimental Science and Applications in the Middle East (SESAME) ( link ).

(63)    Commission communication on a European strategy on research and technology infrastructures, COM(2025) 497 final/2 of 30.9.2025 ( link ).

(64)    In line with the Council conclusions on strengthening the role and impact of research and innovation in the policymaking process in the Union, 16450/23 of 8.12.2023 ( link ).

(65)    Union policy on AI ( link ).

(66)    International Science Council (ISC) ( link ).

(67)    Geneva Science and Diplomacy Anticipator (GESDA) ( link ).

(68)    European Committee for Standardization / European Committee for Electrotechnical Standardization (CEN-CENELEC) ( link )

(69)    Bureau International des Poids et Mesures (BIPM) ( link ).

(70)    Marie Curie Alumni Association ( link ).

(71)    Erasmus Mundus Association ( link ).

(72)    Lindau Nobel Laureate meetings ( link ).

(73)    European Forum Alpbach ( link ).

(74)    G20 Recommendations on Science Engagement ( link ). 

(75)    Partnership for Research and Innovation in the Mediterranean Area (PRIMA) ( link ).

(76)    AU-EU Innovation Agenda ( link ).

(77)    Global Health European & Developing Countries Clinical Trials Partnership (EDCTP) ( link ).

(78)    Mission Innovation ( link ).

(79)    All-Atlantic Ocean Research and Innovation Alliance (AAORIA) ( link ).

(80)    Joint communication on the Pact for the Mediterranean, JOIN(2025) 26 final of 16.10.2025 ( link ).

(81)    Scientific Advice Mechanism ( link ).

(82)    EU Agencies Network on Scientific Advice ( link ).

(83)    United Nations Secretary-General’s Scientific Advisory Board ( link ).

(84)    International Network for Governmental Science Advice (INGSA) ( link ).

(85)    Foreign Ministries Science & Technology Advice Network (FMSTAN) ( link ).