(1)

The Governing Council may adjust the remuneration on all or part of institutions’ holdings of reserves at the Eurosystem central banks. On 11 December 2025, the Governing Council decided to simplify the remuneration of excess reserves under Article 1(1) of Decision (EU) 2019/1743 of the European Central Bank (ECB/2019/31) (1). This recent Governing Council decision concerns only excess reserves held in their reserve accounts at the relevant national central bank (NCB) by institutions that are eligible counterparties in Eurosystem monetary policy operations in accordance with Article 55 of Guideline (EU) 2015/510 of the European Central Bank (ECB/2014/60) (2) (hereinafter ‘eligible counterparties’) and that fulfil the access conditions to the Eurosystem’s deposit facility in accordance with Article 22 of Guideline (EU) 2015/510 (ECB/2014/60). In accordance with the Governing Council decision, these excess reserves should be remunerated at the deposit facility rate not only when this rate is negative, but also when it is zero percent or positive.

(2)

This measure is intended to improve operational and risk efficiencies for both the Eurosystem and the eligible monetary policy counterparties by reducing the operational workload and risk related to daily transfers of funds to the Eurosystem’s deposit facility, reducing the impact of TARGET incidents at the end of the TARGET business day, and addressing a number of issues related to the application of minimum reserve requirements (3). Moreover, the measure will support the smooth functioning of payment systems and instant payments settlement in the context of the increased need for funds available for settlement on the TARGET Instant Payment Settlement (TIPS) platform to settle growing volumes of instant payments following the entry into force of Regulation (EU) 2024/886 of the European Parliament and of the Council (4). Aligning the remuneration of excess reserves with the remuneration rate of the deposit facility is expected to reduce large daily transfers from the current accounts of the eligible counterparties to the Eurosystem’s deposit facility, aimed at benefiting from remuneration at the deposit facility rate.

(3)

The measure concerns only the excess reserves of eligible counterparties that fulfil the access conditions to the deposit facility, as only they may transfer funds to the deposit facility. It is therefore appropriate to differentiate between the remuneration of excess reserves belonging to those counterparties and those belonging to institutions that are not eligible counterparties or do not fulfil the access conditions to the deposit facility. Eurosystem monetary policy operations are available to a broad range of counterparties, provided that they fulfil the eligibility criteria set out in Article 55 of Guideline (EU) 2015/510 (ECB/2014/60). Consequently, to ensure consistency in and the integrity of the Eurosystem counterparty framework, only eligible counterparties that fulfil the access conditions to the deposit facility should benefit from the remuneration of excess reserves at the deposit facility rate.

(4)

Similarly, it is appropriate to differentiate between the remuneration of excess reserves belonging to eligible counterparties that fulfil the access conditions to the deposit facility and those belonging to eligible counterparties that fulfil those conditions but are subject to discretionary measures in accordance with Article 158 of Guideline (EU) 2015/510 (ECB/2014/60), which may not unrestrictedly transfer funds to the deposit facility. Where an eligible counterparty’s access to Eurosystem monetary policy operations, including the deposit facility, has been limited, suspended or excluded, remuneration of deposit facility holdings may only occur up to the limit set out in the discretionary measures, or not at all in the case of suspension or exclusion. In order to maintain this discretionary framework, positive remuneration of deposit facility holdings and excess reserves held in reserve accounts, should be permissible only up to this limit, or not at all in cases of suspensions and exclusions.

(5)

In order to allow sufficient time for the measure to be operationalised and for eligible counterparties to adjust their processes for managing their reserves held at Eurosystem NCBs, this Decision should apply from the beginning of the maintenance period starting on 17 June 2026.

(6)

Therefore, Decision (EU) 2019/1743 (ECB/2019/31) should be amended accordingly,

(1)

Article 1 is amended as follows

(2)

in Article 2(1), the introductory wording is replaced by the following: