(1)

On 20 December 2024, the European Commission (‘the Commission’) initiated an anti-dumping investigation with regard to imports of barium carbonate originating in the People’s Republic of China and India (‘the countries concerned’) on the basis of Article 5 of the basic Regulation. It published a Notice of Initiation in the Official Journal of the European Union (2) (‘the Notice of Initiation’).

(2)

The Commission initiated the investigation following a complaint lodged on 5 November 2024 by Kandelium Group GmbH (‘the complainant’ or ‘Kandelium’). The complaint was made by the Union industry of barium carbonate in the sense of Article 5(4) of the basic Regulation. The complaint contained evidence of dumping and of resulting material injury that was sufficient to justify the initiation of the investigation.

(3)

The Commission made imports of the product concerned subject to registration by Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/482 (3) (‘the registration Regulation’).

(4)

In accordance with Article 19a of the basic Regulation, on 14 July 2025, the Commission provided parties with a summary of the proposed duties and details about the calculation of the dumping margins and the margins adequate to remove the injury to the Union industry. Interested parties were invited to comment on the accuracy of the calculations within three working days. No comments were received.

(5)

On 11 August 2025, the Commission imposed provisional anti-dumping duties on imports of barium carbonate originating in the People’s Republic of China and India by Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/1724 (4) (‘the provisional Regulation’).

(6)

Following the disclosure of the essential facts and considerations on the basis of which a provisional anti-dumping duty was imposed (‘provisional disclosure’), two exporting producers (Guizhou Redstar Developing Co., Ltd. (‘Redstar’) and Hubei Jingshan Chutian Barium Salt Corp. Ltd (‘Chutian’)) as well as the complainant filed written submissions making their views known on the provisional findings within the deadline provided by Article 2(1) of the provisional Regulation.

(7)

The parties were granted an opportunity to be heard. No request for hearing was submitted.

(8)

The Commission continued to seek and verify all the information it deemed necessary for its final findings. When reaching its definitive findings, the Commission considered the comments submitted by interested parties and revised its provisional conclusions when appropriate.

(9)

The Commission informed all interested parties of the essential facts and considerations on the basis of which it intended to impose a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of barium carbonate originating in the People’s Republic of China and India (‘final disclosure’). All parties were granted a period within which they could make comments on the final disclosure.

(10)

Parties were also granted an opportunity to be heard. No request for hearing was submitted.

(11)

No claims were received on initiation. Therefore, the conclusion in recital 6 of the provisional Regulation were confirmed.

(12)

No comments were received on sampling. Therefore, the conclusions in recitals 7 to 14 of the provisional Regulation were confirmed.

(13)

No comments were received on questionnaire replies and verification visits. Therefore, the conclusions in recitals 15 to 18 of the provisional Regulation were confirmed.

(14)

No comments were received on the investigation period and period considered. Therefore, the conclusions in recital 19 of the provisional Regulation were confirmed.

(15)

No comments were received on the product concerned and the like product. Therefore, the conclusions in recitals 20 to 25 of the provisional Regulation were confirmed.

(16)

Following the provisional disclosure, both sampled exporting producers as well as the complainant commented on the provisional dumping findings.

(17)

In the absence of any claims concerning the existence of significant distortions and the choice of a representative country, sections 3.1.2 and 3.1.3 of the provisional Regulation were hereby confirmed.

(18)

The details of the calculation of the normal value were set out in recitals 26 to 130 of the provisional Regulation.

(19)

Following the final disclosure, Redstar argued that there is a large discrepancy between the dumping margins of Chinese and Indian producers, despite similar injury margins. According to Redstar, this indicated that the constructed normal values applied to Chinese producers are not reflecting the accurate market conditions.

(20)

First, as explained in recitals 82 to 84 of the provisional Regulation, the Commission found in the context of this investigation actual evidence of the existence of significant distortions affecting the barium carbonate industry in China. The Commission therefore concluded that it is not appropriate to use domestic prices and costs in China to establish normal value for exporting producers from China. Consequently, the Commission constructed the normal value of Chinese exporting producers on the basis of costs of production and sale reflecting undistorted prices or benchmarks in accordance with Article 2(6a)(a) of the basic Regulation. For India on the other hand there was no claim nor finding of significant distortions. Therefore, normal value for Indian exporting producer was established in accordance with Articles 2(2) to (6) of the basic Regulation. Second, Redstar failed to present any evidence that conditions for applying Article 2(6a)(a) of the basic Regulation for establishing normal value for Chinese exporting producers in this case were not met. Redstar’s claim in this regard was rejected in the provisional Regulation and was not further substantiated following the provisional disclosure nor in response to the final disclosure. The discrepancy in the dumping margins alone does not render the methodology applied to Chinese producers invalid. Redstar’s argument therefore had to be rejected.

(21)

Following the provisional disclosure, one of the sampled exporting producers, Chutian restated its argument summarised at recital 110 of the provisional Regulation, that the prices used as benchmark values for the baryte ore based on Turkish import prices should be replaced by the Indian export prices. As set out in recital 111 of the provisional Regulation, the product mix of Indian baryte ore is not materially different from baryte ore imported into Türkiye therefore rendering the argument that Indian prices and baryte ore types are more representative of the baryte ore used by the Chinese producers than the ore imported into Türkiye ineffective. Moreover, Chutian did not provide any substantive evidence in support of its claims and in any event, the Turkish import prices of baryte ore are convergent with the Indian prices. Chutian’s argument was therefore rejected.

(22)

Moreover, according to Chutian, the Commission should ensure that the baryte ore prices used reflect the value of raw baryte ore, rather than the value of baryte powder. Chutian further suggested that the grade of baryte used in the petroleum industry is higher than that used in the chemical industry and that the price of baryte used in the factors of production (FOP) determination should be based on barium sulfate content. First, contrary to Chutian’s claim, to establish the benchmark value for baryte ore the Commission used solely the replacement cost of raw baryte ore, which is the raw material used by the sampled Chinese exporting producers, and excluded baryte in its powder form. Moreover, Chutian’s claim on the link between the grade of baryte ore/barium sulfate content and the price of the ore was unsubstantiated. Furthermore, Chutian did not demonstrate to which grade and barium sulfate content the baryte ore prices captured by the GTA statistics related. Therefore, Chutian’s arguments were dismissed.

(23)

Furthermore, Chutian argued that Türkiye’s baryte ore imports (over 102 kt) were a much less representative source for the FOP benchmark than the Indian baryte ore exports (over 1 500 kt). The Commission noted that the fact alone that Indian exports were made in higher quantities than imports into Türkiye did not make the Turkish statistics less representative, especially in view of the absolute quantities imported by Türkiye. No other evidence showing that the prices of imports into Türkiye were unrepresentative were put forward. This is all the more valid in the circumstances where Türkiye was identified as the appropriate representative country for the purposes of Article 2(6a)(a) of the basic Regulation, including on the grounds of level of economic development similar to China.

(24)

Chutian further requested in its response to the provisional disclosure that the Commission exclude irregular imports from the baryte ore benchmark calculation for being distortive. More specifically, Chutian requested that imports of raw baryte ore from Morocco, priced higher than imported ground baryte, be excluded. Chutian further argued that another GTA import entry with a very small quantity and significantly higher unit price was to be considered irregular and equally excluded.

(25)

First, the data on import prices of baryte ore in Türkiye are readily available in the GTA at the level of granularity that allowed the Commission to isolate and distinguish the statistics on baryte ore in a raw, unprocessed form, used by the Chinese exporting producers. The Commission also verified that there were sufficient representative and undistorted quantities of these imports so that the resulting final average automatically reduced the impact of the potential abnormal prices at the lower and higher end of the range. Therefore, there is no valid reason to exclude imports of raw baryte ore from Morocco. In the same vein, price benchmarking against other forms of the raw material in question (raw versus powder form) and any resulting differences do not render the benchmark used unsuitable. Moreover, regarding the import of a minor quantity with a manifestly high unit price, any potential exclusion of this entry would not affect the resulting FOP benchmark and hence was considered irrelevant in this case.

(26)

Following the provisional disclosure as well as in response to the final disclosure, another sampled exporter, Redstar argued with reference to Article 2(10) of the basic Regulation that the source data for undistorted values of baryte ore (as well as CO2) were not at the same level with Redstar’s situation. Redstar namely contended that the Commission's use of CIF-based import data artificially inflated the undistorted values since Redstar sourced baryte ore from a nearby mine. Therefore, according to Redstar, excluding the cost of ocean freight, insurance and import duty and making a comparison based at FOB price level better represented a fairer comparison pursuant to Article 2(10) of the basic Regulation.

(27)

First, Redstar’s reference to Article 2(10) of the basic Regulation is misplaced. Article 2(10) refers to the fair comparison between export prices and the normal value, as opposed to the construction of the normal value. Second, the Commission noted that the CIF import prices available in the trade statistics (adjusted for import taxes) are in direct competition with the domestic prices in the representative country and therefore were used as an appropriate benchmark in this case. Hence, Redstar’s argument was rejected.

(28)

Chutian reiterated in its reply to the provisional disclosure the request for adjustment of the CO2 prices to eliminate distortions caused by food grade CO2 and CO2 transported in cylinders. In the same vein, Redstar, argued in its response to the provisional disclosure that the Commission's use of liquid CO2 prices packed in cylinders was not representative of the actual prices paid by Chinese producers, which use tank or truck transportation. Consequently, Redstar requested that the Commission exclude the data for import of the liquid CO2 packed in cylinders and only consider the price of the CO2 packed in tanks.

(29)

The arguments of the exporting producers were discussed and dismissed in recital 114 of the provisional Regulation. Furthermore, Chutian and Redstar failed to demonstrate that the benchmark established for CO2 included (and to what degree) different grades and means of transportation (cylinders or trucks) and to what extent the prices would be different. Chutian’s and Redstar’s arguments were considered to be unsubstantiated and therefore rejected.

(30)

In response to the provisional disclosure, the complainant (Kandelium) reiterated its claims that the establishment of replacement costs for bituminous coal and CO2 should be adjusted to reflect the costs incurred by producers in Türkiye. Kandelium’s claims were dismissed with reference to the recitals 104 and 115 of the provisional Regulation. It was recalled in particular that, where a representative benchmark for a particular input is not available in national or import statistics of the representative country and alternative benchmarks are used, the Commission is no longer determining the price of that input as incurred in the representative country by domestic producers (in this case Türkiye).

(31)

In response to the provisional disclosure, Chutian argued that the Sisecam’s SG&A cost figures used in constructing the normal value should be adjusted to exclude transportation costs, insurance expenses, commission fees and packaging expenses, as these were already reported in the transaction-by-transaction tables for the sales in the Union. First, and notably, the transport costs (considerably more material than any insurance charges, packaging costs or commission fees) have been duly excluded from the SG&A of Sisecam as set out in the Second Note and Annexes Vib and Vic thereof. Second, the Commission noted that the packaging costs were not considered as allowances deducted from the export price in the present case, making Chutian’s argument on this point unfounded. Third and regarding the insurance and commission charges, the publicly available data on Sisecam’s SG&A costs did not allow for an establishment of the purpose of these cost items nor the extent (if any) to which they would relate to the chromium sulphate segment, relevant in this case. Hence no adjustment was made to the SG&A costs on account of these cost items. In conclusion, the SG&A costs for Sisecam, as determined by the Commission were deemed to be reasonable in accordance with Article 2(6a)(a) of the basic Regulation. Therefore, Chutian’s argument had to be dismissed.

(32)

Additionally, Chutian requested that the Commission exclude a number of expenses from the SG&A costs related to chromium sulphate production, as they do not serve as a correct representation of the SG&A costs accrued by the (Chinese) barium carbonate producers. However, the Commission recalled that the aim of Article 2(6a) of the basic Regulation is not to mirror the SG&A costs of the exporting producers of barium carbonate (which are considered to be distorted). Instead, the objective is to identify reasonable and undistorted amounts for SG&A costs. In this case, Sisecam and Alkim, Turkish producers of chromium sulphate (found to be a suitable representative product in the same general category as barium carbonate) were duly identified as representative producers and their SG&A data was used accordingly as a reasonable proxy leading to reasonable amounts for SG&A costs and for profit being used. Chutian’s argument was therefore rejected.

(33)

The details of the calculation of the export price were set out in recital 131 of the provisional Regulation. In the absence of any comments concerning the export price, the conclusion in recital 131 was confirmed.

(34)

In the absence of any claims concerning the fair comparison under Article 2(10) of the basic Regulation, recitals 132 to 135 of the provisional Regulation were hereby confirmed.

(35)

In the absence of any claims concerning the dumping margin calculation, recital 142 of the provisional Regulation was hereby confirmed.

(36)

The definitive dumping margins expressed as a percentage of the cost, insurance and freight (CIF) Union frontier price, duty unpaid, are as follows:

(37)

The Commission received no comments concerning the dumping margin calculations related to India following the provisional disclosure.

(38)

The Commission’s provisional findings set out in in recitals 143 to 159 of the provisional Regulation were therefore confirmed.

(39)

The definitive dumping margins expressed as a percentage of the cost, insurance and freight (CIF) Union frontier price, duty unpaid, are as follows:

(40)

In the absence of any comments with respect to the definition of the Union industry and Union production, the conclusions set out in recitals 160 to 162 of the provisional Regulation were confirmed.

(41)

In the absence of any comments with respect to the Union consumption, the conclusions set out in recitals 163 to 165 of the provisional Regulation were confirmed.

(42)

Following the provisional disclosure, Chutian noted that imports from China decreased over the period considered, contrary to Indian imports which continued to increase, at prices that were consistently lower than the Chinese import prices. Therefore, Chutian argued that this reflects fundamentally different market behaviours and that imports from China should not be cumulated with imports from India and requested the Commission to assess the injury allegedly caused by Chinese exports separately from that caused by Indian exports.

(43)

The Commission disagreed with this comment. Although India increased its market share from [10 %-25 %] in 2021 to [20 %-25 %] in the investigation period, China still managed to maintain its significant market share [40 %-55 %]. Moreover, export prices from both countries significantly undercut Union industry’s prices over the period considered. For these reasons, the Commission considered that the cumulation of Indian and Chinese imports in assessing the injury to the Union industry was correct.

(44)

The Commission confirmed that the conditions for the cumulative assessment of imports under Article 3(4) of the basic Regulation were analysed and were found to be met in recitals 166 to 169 of the provisional Regulation. The interested parties, including Chutian, did not submit any new argument following the imposition of provisional measures which could change this assessment, or which would be relevant under Article 3(4) of the basic Regulation.

(45)

The claim was therefore dismissed.

(46)

Following provisional disclosure, Chutian argued that the negative cash flow of the Union industry was partly due to adjustments in the Union producer’s audited accounts caused by stock revaluation and cost reallocation after a reporting system change. Chutian also claimed that the Commission did not clarify whether these effects were excluded from the injury assessment. Chutian requested the Commission to disclose whether and how these adjustments were excluded, and if not, to exclude them and reassess injury and causality accordingly.

(47)

The Commission clarified in recital 206 of the provisional Regulation that the primary factor driving the cash flow trend during the period considered was the significant decreasing in profitability of the Union industry. This was mostly impacted by the Union industry's inability to adjust prices in response to significant pressure from dumped imports from China and India, preventing it from covering increasing costs. The Commission confirmed that it duly reflected the impact of the accounting adjustments of the Union producer in the figures used for the assessment. If the effect of the change in the reporting system on cash flow was removed from the injury indicator, the decrease in cash flow over the period considered would be even more significant. It is not possible to disclose in more detail the impact of the accounting adjustments because of the business confidential nature of the information. Chutian’s claim was therefore dismissed.

(48)

Chutian also claimed that the investment increase over the period considered was due to a delayed, one-time investment related to Health, Safety, and Environmental (HSE) measures. Chutian argued that this investment was postponed to after the separation between Kandelium and Solvay, and that the related costs were allocated to the years in which this investment occurred. Chutian argued that this reporting could distort the injury assessment, as the impact of overdue investments should be spread over the period when they were supposed to be made, not just the period considered. Chutian requested that the Commission adjust the injury analysis by spreading the HSE investment costs over the appropriate timeframe.

(49)

The Commission considered that allocating the cost of the investment to the period before it occurred would be at odds with international accounting standards and of a speculative nature and the comment was therefore dismissed.

(50)

All claims of interested parties following the provisional Regulation were rejected. The Commission therefore confirmed the conclusions on injury set out in recitals 209 to 212 of the provisional Regulation.

(51)

Following the provisional disclosure, Redstar and Chutian claimed that the increase of production costs of the Union industry during the period considered was due to exceptional circumstances such as the increase of raw material prices and energy costs and should not be attributed to the dumped imports from China. Moreover, Redstar disputed the argument presented by the Commission that dumped imports impeded Kandelium to recover their costs. Redstar reiterated these comments also in response to the final disclosure.

(52)

In particular, Chutian claimed that the injury caused by the increase of labour costs could not be attributed to the Chinese dumped imports. Chutian reiterated that Kandelium’s labour costs increased as an effect of its separation from the Solvay group in 2021. Indeed, before separation, Solvay bore certain horizontal costs, including administration costs. Chutian requested the Commission to disclose whether and how it excluded the effects of such labour cost increases caused by the restructuring of these companies from the injury indicators and requested the Commission to exclude those effects from the undercutting and the underselling margins and reconsider its causality assessment accordingly.

(53)

The Commission found that Kandelium’s labour costs were affected by inflation and the separation of the company as set out in recital 200 of the provisional Regulation. Nevertheless, the Commission found that Chinese dumped imports represented a significant market share during the period concerned (40 %-55 %), whose prices fell by 4 % during the same period. This prevented the Union industry, which was already loss making, from passing on their increased costs to the final customers. Therefore, the Chinese dumped imports at decreasing prices directly contributed to the erosion of the Union industry profitability during the period considered.

(54)

Moreover, the Commission found that after the separation from Solvay, Kandelium started operating as an individual company with its own horizontal and administrative services. As these costs were not considered extraordinary, the Commission did not deduct any of the costs from the underselling calculations nor from the causation analysis.

(55)

Finally, it is not disputed that the energy crisis caused a spike in energy costs and subsequently in the cost of production of barium carbonate in the Union, as set out in recital 196 of the provisional Regulation. However, in the period 2021-2022, despite the increasing production costs and the energy prices reaching their highest levels, the Union producers were able to increase their sales prices to absorb these costs while keeping their sales volumes stable, as in 2022 prices of Chinese and Indian imports were also particularly high. However, in 2023 and in the investigation period, when the upward trend in energy prices had reversed, the profitability of the Union industry sharply decreased to unsustainably low levels. In these years, in a shrinking market, the Union industry was forced to lower its sales prices due to the price pressure exerted by the dumped imports from China and India while losing both sales volume and market share. The Commission therefore dismisses this comment.

(56)

Following final disclosure, Redstar argued that the Commission wrongly attributed to dumped imports an injury that was in fact caused by other, non-import-related factors. Redstar claimed that it was unrealistic to expect a complete pass-on to customers of an exceptional cost increase driven by the energy crisis, inflation, and corporate restructuring.

(57)

Redstar noted that the Union producer already managed to pass on to its customers a large share of its earlier cost increases, as Union sales prices increased proportionally in 2022. Redstar claimed, however, that as the production costs continued to increase by an additional 45 % between 2022 and the IP, it was doubtful whether it was possible for the Union industry to pass on to customers this additional cost increase as they had already increased their prices significantly the year before. Finally, Redstar claimed that the energy crisis, inflation and corporate restructuring were Union-specific factors and did not affect Chinese or Indian exporters, making it unreasonable to expect these exporters to raise their prices in the same way as the Union industry.

(58)

In recital 227 to 237 of the provisional Regulation the Commission analysed the reasons for the increase of the cost of production of the Union industry and concluded that although the rising production costs were in fact due to higher raw material costs, increased energy prices and to certain overdue investments, the increased production costs did not attenuate or break the causal link between dumped imports and the material injury. In fact, the Commission found that dumped imports exerted significant price pressure that prevented the industry from passing on at least part of its increased production costs to the downstream industry to stay profitable. As set out in recital 229 and 230 of the provisional Regulation, in 2022, when Chinese and Indian prices were at the highest level over the period considered, the Union industry was able to increase its sales prices to absorb its rising production costs, which shows that the downstream market was able to take up higher prices in 2022. However, between 2022 and the IP the sales price of Chinese and Indian imports dropped by around 50 %. At the same time, the Union industry, despite a further increase in its production costs, had to even decrease it sales prices in the IP to a level which was around 16 % below its cost of production. This shows that the Union industry was forced to decrease its prices due to the price suppression by dumped imports. Redstar did not provide any new evidence which would put into question the above finding.

(59)

For the reasons above, the Commission dismisses Redstar’s comments and confirms its conclusions on causation.

(60)

All claims of the parties following the provisional Regulation were rejected. The Commission therefore concluded, based on the findings disclosed in the provisional Regulation, that the dumped imports from China and India caused material injury to the Union industry and that the other factors, considered individually or collectively, did not attenuate or break the causal link between the dumped imports and the material injury. The conclusions on causation reached in recitals 233 to 237 of the provisional Regulation were confirmed.

(61)

After provisional disclosure, Chutian pointed out that the Union industry produced barium carbonate via the more expensive calcination process, whereas Chutian used the less expensive pressing process. Chutian requested that the Commission disclose how this difference in production process was factored into the dumping and injury margin calculations.

(62)

The Commission’s calculations of the dumping and injury margin took into account the different production processes because these calculations were based on comparisons of comparable product types based on the Product Control Number (PCN) established in the context of the investigation. For example, the powder product type was compared to the powder product type, the pressed granular product type to the pressed granular product type and the calcined granular product type to calcined granular product type. Hence any differences in product types and in their corresponding cost of production (and thus production processes) were duly accounted for in the calculations. A full disclosure of the dumping and injury margins based on the product types was made by the Commission to the relevant interested parties, including to Chutian at the time of provisional disclosure.

(63)

Following provisional disclosure, Redstar commented that the future costs from environmental and labour commitments included in the target price [20-100] EUR/ton when calculating injury margins must be certain and expected during the anti-dumping measures’ period, according to Article 7(2d) of the Basic Regulation. In other words, the Commission allegedly cannot rely on mere speculation or assumptions when making forward-looking price adjustments.

(64)

Moreover, Redstar considered that the Commission did not sufficiently disclose the relevant information used to calculate the future costs of [20-100] EUR/ton. In particular, the composition and calculation process for such costs, and whether the range of [20-100] EUR/ton was determined based on different PCN and if this was the case, how much cost is assigned to which PCN and why there is such huge difference.

(65)

The Commission confirms that these costs and the underlying assumptions (in particular, the projections of energy consumption, energy prices and pollutant emission prices) were duly verified at the premises of the Union industry. The Union producer estimated the price of emissions in future years in a linear way (assuming a [10-20] EUR increase per year, per certificate). However, as specified in recital 162 of the provisional Regulation, since there is only one producer in the Union, the Commission is not in a position to disclose more detailed information as this information is corporate sensitive information, in order to preserve confidentiality pursuant to Article 19 of the basic Regulation.

(66)

Following definitive disclosure, Redstar argued that the methodology leading to the estimated future cost of [20–100] EUR/ton remained unclear. In particular, Redstar requested clarification on the time horizon of future compliance costs, the meaning of the ‘linear’ increase of [10–20] EUR per emission certificate per year, and whether a weighted-average approach across PCNs was used. Redstar further claimed that Chinese exporting producers were also subject to environmental and labour-compliance requirements and therefore comparing a target price for the Union industry adjusted with future compliance costs with an unadjusted export price based on actual data raised concerns as to whether the comparison could be considered as ‘fair’.

(67)

Under Article 7(2d) of the basic Regulation, future costs which result from multilateral environmental agreements and protocols thereunder to which the Union is a party or from International Labour Organisation (ILO) Conventions, and which the Union industry will incur during the application of the measure, shall be taken into account. In line with the basic Regulation and with the consistent practice of the Commission, the Union industry was requested to report its future compliance costs in the questionnaire reply for the years of the application of the measure and the Commission verified this data on spot. On the basis of the verified data, the Commission calculated the future compliance costs expressed in EUR per tonne for the years 2025 to 2028 by taking the net estimated cost of CO2 emissions for the product under investigation. The price of the emission certificate is based on readily available market data. The same calculated cost per tonne was then added to the target price for all PCNs.

(68)

By contrast, in line with Article 2(8) of the basic Regulation, the export price reflects the actual prices paid or payable for the product when sold for export from the exporting country to the Union. Under the basic Regulation, the export price cannot be adjusted to take into account future compliance costs. On this basis, the Commission rejects Redstar’s claim that the comparison leading to the injury margin calculation described in recital 245 of the provisional Regulation would not be ‘fair’.

(69)

Therefore, the Commission did not adjust the injury elimination level in this regard.

(70)

In the absence of any comments justifying the revision of the injury margins, the final injury elimination level for the cooperating exporting producers and all other companies is as follows:

(71)

As explained in recitals 247 and 248 of the provisional Regulation, the complainant provided the Commission sufficient evidence that there are raw material distortions in China regarding the product under investigation. Therefore, in accordance with Article 7(2a) of the basic Regulation, this investigation examined the alleged distortions to assess whether, if relevant, a duty lower than the margin of dumping would be sufficient to remove injury.

(72)

However, as the margins adequate to remove injury are higher than the dumping margins, the Commission did not find it necessary to address this aspect.

(73)

Following the above assessment, definitive anti-dumping duties should be set as below in accordance with Article 7(2) of the basic Regulation:

(74)

Following the final disclosure, the Spanish national association of frits, glazes and ceramic colours manufacturers (Asociation Nacional de Fabricantes de Firtas, Esmaltes y Colores cerámicos ‘ANFFECC’) reiterated several claims concerning Union interest which they had already submitted during the provisional phase of the investigation without, however, providing any new evidence to support these claims. These claims were summarised and addressed in recitals 273 to 280 of the provisional Regulation. For these reasons and because these comments arrived after the deadline for comments on final disclosure set by the Commission in line with Article 20(5) of the basic Regulation and as ANFFECC did not request an extension of that deadline, the Commission rejected the comments in question.

(75)

The conclusions set out in recitals 250 to 282 of the provisional Regulation were confirmed.

(76)

In view of the conclusions reached with regard to dumping, injury, causation, level of measures and Union interest, and in accordance with Article 9(4) of the basic Regulation, definitive anti-dumping measures should be imposed in order to prevent further injury being caused to the Union industry by the dumped imports of the product concerned.

(77)

On the basis of the above, the definitive anti-dumping duty rates, expressed on the CIF Union border price, customs duty unpaid, should be as follows:

(78)

The individual company anti-dumping duty rates specified in this Regulation were established on the basis of the findings of this investigation. Therefore, they reflect the situation found during this investigation in respect to these companies. These duty rates are thus exclusively applicable to imports of the product under investigation originating in the country concerned and produced by the named legal entities. Imports of the product concerned manufactured by any other company not specifically mentioned in the operative part of this Regulation, including entities related to those specifically mentioned, cannot benefit from these rates and should be subject to the duty rate applicable to ‘all other imports originating in the countries concerned’.

(79)

A company may request the application of these individual anti-dumping duty rates if it changes subsequently the name of its entity. The request must be addressed to the Commission (5). The request must contain all the relevant information enabling to demonstrate that the change does not affect the right of the company to benefit from the duty rate which applies to it. If the change of name of the company does not affect its right to benefit from the duty rate which applies to it, a regulation about the change of name will be published in the Official Journal of the European Union.

(80)

To minimise the risks of circumvention due to the difference in duty rates, special measures are needed to ensure the proper application of the individual anti-dumping duties. The application of individual anti-dumping duties is only applicable upon presentation of a valid commercial invoice to the customs authorities of the Member States. The invoice must conform to the requirements set out in Article 1(3) of this Regulation. Until such invoice is presented, imports should be subject to the anti-dumping duty applicable to ‘all other imports originating in the countries concerned’.

(81)

While presentation of this invoice is necessary for the customs authorities of the Member States to apply the individual rates of anti-dumping duty to imports, it is not the only element to be taken into account by the customs authorities. Indeed, even if presented with an invoice meeting all the requirements set out in Article 1(3) of this Regulation, the customs authorities of Member States should carry out their usual checks and may, like in all other cases, require additional documents (shipping documents, etc.) for the purpose of verifying the accuracy of the particulars contained in the declaration and ensure that the subsequent application of the rate of duty is justified, in compliance with customs law.

(82)

Should the exports by one of the companies benefiting from lower individual duty rates increase significantly in volume, in particular after the imposition of the measures concerned, such an increase in volume could be considered as constituting in itself a change in the pattern of trade due to the imposition of measures within the meaning of Article 13(1) of the basic Regulation. In such circumstances, an anti-circumvention investigation may be initiated, provided that the conditions for doing so are met. This investigation may, inter alia, examine the need for the removal of individual duty rate(s) and the consequent imposition of a country-wide duty.

(83)

To ensure a proper enforcement of the anti-dumping duties, the anti-dumping duty for all other imports originating in the countries concerned should apply not only to the non-cooperating exporting producers in this investigation, but also to the producers which did not have exports to the Union during the investigation period.

(84)

Exporting producers in the PRC that did not export the product concerned to the Union during the investigation period should be able to request the Commission to be made subject to the anti-dumping duty rate for cooperating companies not included in the sample. The Commission should grant such request provided that three conditions are met. The new exporting producer would have to demonstrate that: (i) it did not export the product concerned to the Union during the investigation period; (ii) it is not related to an exporting producer that did so; and (iii) has exported the product concerned thereafter or has entered into an irrevocable contractual obligation to do so in substantial quantities.

(85)

In view of the dumping margins found and given the level of the injury caused to the Union industry, the amounts secured by way of provisional anti-dumping duties imposed by the provisional Regulation, should be definitively collected up to the levels established under the present Regulation.

(86)

As mentioned in section 1.2 above, the Commission made imports of the product under investigation subject to registration.

(87)

During the definitive stage of the investigation, the data collected in the context of the registration was assessed. The Commission analysed whether the criteria under Article 10(4) of the basic Regulation were met for the retroactive collection of definitive duties.

(88)

The Commission’s analysis showed no further substantial rise in imports in addition to the level of imports which caused injury during the investigation period, as prescribed by Article 10(4)(d) of the basic Regulation. For this analysis, the Commission compared the average monthly volume and prices during the investigation period with the monthly average of the period between the end of the investigation period and the month before registration. This comparison showed a decrease of volumes by 9 % with an increase of prices by 11 %. The Commission also compared the average monthly volume and prices during the investigation period with the monthly average of the period between the end of the investigation period and the month during which provisional measures were imposed. This comparison showed an increase of volumes by 9 %, with a decrease of prices by 7 %. At the same time there was no evidence on the file that there is seasonality in the consumption of the product concerned.

(89)

Consequently, the Commission concluded that the conditions for retroactive collection are not met.

(90)

In view of Article 109 of Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509 of the European Parliament and of the Council (6), when an amount is to be reimbursed following a judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union, the interest to be paid should be the rate applied by the European Central Bank to its principal refinancing operations, as published in the C series of the Official Journal of the European Union on the first calendar day of each month.

(91)

The measures provided for in this regulation are in accordance with the opinion of the Committee established by Article 15(1) of Regulation (EU) 2016/1036,