(10)

Following the Agency’s analysis of information resulting from ramp inspections carried out on the aircraft of Union air carriers, as well as standardisation inspections carried out by the Agency, and complemented with information stemming from specific inspections and audits carried out by national aviation authorities, Member States and the Agency, acting as competent authorities, took certain corrective and enforcement measures, and informed the Commission and the EU Air Safety Committee about those measures.

(11)

Member States and the Agency, acting as competent authorities, reiterated their readiness to act, as necessary, in the event that pertinent safety information indicates imminent safety risks resulting from non-compliance by Union air carriers with relevant safety standards.

(12)

In June 2020, all air carriers certified in Armenia were included in Annex A to Regulation (EC) No 474/2006, by Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2020/736 (6).

(13)

On 9 April 2025, as part of its ongoing monitoring activities regarding the overall safety situation in Armenia, including the safety oversight capacity and capabilities of the Civil Aviation Committee of Armenia (‘CAC’), a technical meeting took place involving the Commission, the Agency, Member States and CAC. During the meeting, the Commission informed CAC of the results of its assessment of the Corrective Action Plan (‘CAP’) submitted in December 2024. The CAP had been prepared by CAC in response to the observations from the Union's on-site assessment visit in Armenia in 2020.

(14)

The CAP submitted by CAC is comprehensive and detailed and demonstrates a clear effort to align national aviation oversight with EU regulatory expectations in addressing the 2020 Union on-site assessment visit observations. Positive developments include the formal adoption of several national regulations in line with EU requirements, steps towards implementation of risk-based oversight principles, and the enhancement of training documentation and records for inspectors.

(15)

While the CAP presents a comprehensive approach to dealing with the identified observations, several issues appear to remain unresolved or inadequately supported by evidence, such as the absence of classification of findings, insufficient proof of implementation of oversight plans, and deficiencies in documentation control and translation. Moreover, inconsistencies persist in the quality and completeness of training documentation, licensing procedures, and oversight mechanisms, which need to be assessed through additional on-site evaluations before a final decision on the CAP’s adequacy can be taken.

(16)

In light of the remaining shortcomings and the need for a more thorough assessment of implementation on the ground, the Commission considers that further remote evaluation of the safety situation in Armenia would not provide sufficient additional clarity. Therefore, a Union on-site assessment visit is envisaged for the third quarter of 2025. This visit will aim to verify the effective application of the corrective measures submitted by CAC, including those discussed during the exchanges in 2024 and 2025.

(17)

In accordance with the common criteria set out in the Annex to Regulation (EC) No 2111/2005, the Commission considers that at this time there are no grounds for amending the list of air carriers which are subject to an operating ban within the Union with respect to air carriers certified in Armenia.

(18)

Member States should continue verifying the effective compliance of air carriers certified in Armenia with the relevant international safety standards through prioritisation of ramp inspections of those air carriers, pursuant to Regulation (EU) No 965/2012.

(19)

In December 2015 and November 2023, the air carriers Iraqi Airways and Fly Baghdad were included in Annex A to Regulation (EC) No 474/2006 by Commission Implementing Regulations (EU) 2015/2322 (7) and (EU) 2023/2691 (8), respectively.

(20)

On 23 April 2025, as part of the Commission's continuous monitoring activities regarding the overall safety situation in Iraq, including the safety oversight capacity and capabilities of the Iraq Civil Aviation Authority (‘ICAA’), a technical meeting took place involving the Commission, the Agency, Member States and ICAA. During the meeting, ICAA presented updates on its efforts to enhance its legislative and regulatory framework, as well as its oversight performance.

(21)

ICAA delivered a detailed presentation on its ongoing efforts to enhance aviation safety oversight through legislative amendments, regulatory development, capacity-building initiatives, and institutional reforms. While these efforts are recognised as important steps, they remain in early stages of implementation. Significant concerns persist regarding the timeliness of these measures, the consistency and quality of regulatory outputs, and their alignment with international safety standards.

(22)

Some progress has been made, namely in areas such as personnel recruitment, training initiatives, and the drafting of updated national aviation regulations. Critical reforms, such as the adoption of a revised primary aviation law and the strengthening of the safety oversight system, remain incomplete or lack verifiable outcomes.

(23)

It was therefore jointly acknowledged that conducting a Union on-site assessment visit in September 2025, as previously discussed, would be premature and potentially counterproductive, given the need for further tangible and demonstrable progress across core areas of Iraq’s aviation safety oversight system.

(24)

In accordance with the common criteria set out in the Annex to Regulation (EC) No 2111/2005, the Commission considers that at this time there are no grounds for amending the list of air carriers which are subject to an operating ban within the Union with respect to air carriers from Iraq.

(25)

Member States should continue verifying the effective compliance of air carriers certified in Iraq with the relevant international safety standards through prioritisation of ramp inspections of all those carriers, pursuant to Regulation (EU) No 965/2012.

(26)

Further action by the Commission should be taken as necessary, in accordance with Regulation (EC) No 2111/2005, if any relevant safety information reveals imminent safety risks resulting from non-compliance with the relevant international safety standards.

(27)

In October 2006, air carriers certified in Kyrgyzstan were included in Annex A to Regulation (EC) No 474/2006, by Commission Regulation (EC) No 1543/2006 (9).

(28)

In the context of ongoing exchanges, resulting from renewed contacts between the Commission and the State Civil Aviation Agency under the Cabinet of Ministers of the Kyrgyz Republic (‘SCAA’) since 2023, the Commission launched a technical assistance initiative, implemented by the Agency, within the framework of Regulation (EC) No 2111/2005. That initiative aims to support SCAA efforts to enhance its oversight capacity.

(29)

As part of that initiative, one remote activity and one on-site mission have already been conducted. The on-site mission provided an opportunity to gather firsthand information on how SCAA implements international safety standards. It also provided an opportunity to carry out a Union on-site assessment visit simulation. The simulation provided valuable insights into the organisational and regulatory framework of SCAA, with a determination that the overall structure of SCAA appears adequate for its size and responsibilities, albeit its operational effectiveness should be improved. The management manual, although approved, requires further development and consistency, and the responsibility for investigating serious incidents still needs to be sufficiently determined.

(30)

The simulation also allowed for the identification of gaps in the transposition of ICAO Standards and Recommended Practices, particularly in ICAO Annexes 1, 6, 8, 18 and 19, which hinder full alignment with international safety standards. SCAA has acknowledged those gaps and initiated steps to amend relevant legislation, with several draft amendments undergoing inter-ministerial consultation. Furthermore, SCAA has taken steps to strengthen safety occurrence reporting, as well as staff training through partnerships with international training organisations. It is essential to continue making efforts in those areas in order to further improve aviation safety oversight in Kyrgyzstan.

(31)

On 2 May 2025, as part of the Commission's continuous monitoring activities regarding the overall safety situation in Kyrgyzstan, including the safety oversight capacity and capabilities of SCAA, a technical meeting took place involving the Commission, the Agency, Member States and SCAA. During this meeting, SCAA delivered a detailed presentation outlining its ongoing initiatives to enhance aviation safety oversight, including legislative amendments, regulatory development, capacity-building measures, and institutional reforms.

(32)

SCAA also described its organisational structure and staffing levels, including the development of a manpower calculation system with a direct link to individual training needs.

(33)

SCAA also presented the progress made in aligning their regulations with international safety standards and their implementation across key oversight areas. It furthermore highlighted ongoing work to improve certification processes and enforcement mechanisms.

(34)

SCAA shared a comprehensive action plan aimed at addressing identified regulatory gaps and supporting the development of a safe civil aviation system that is compliant with international safety standards.

(35)

Currently there is, however, insufficient substantiated evidence to confirm that SCAA has effectively resolved all the safety deficiencies that led to the operating ban imposed by Regulation (EC) No 1543/2006.

(36)

In accordance with the common criteria set out in the Annex to Regulation (EC) No 2111/2005, the Commission considers that at this time there are no grounds for amending the list of air carriers which are subject to an operating ban within the Union with respect to air carriers certified in Kyrgyzstan.

(37)

Member States should continue verifying the effective compliance of air carriers certified in Kyrgyzstan with the relevant international safety standards through prioritisation of ramp inspections of those air carriers, pursuant to Regulation (EU) No 965/2012.

(38)

In December 2014, air carriers from Libya were included in Annex A to Regulation (EC) No 474/2006, by Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 1318/2014 (10).

(39)

On 25 March 2025, as part of the Commission's continuous monitoring activities with regard to the overall safety situation in Libya, including the safety oversight capacity and capabilities of the Libya Civil Aviation Authority (‘LYCAA’), a technical meeting was held involving the Commission, the Agency, Member States and LYCAA.

(40)

The Commission presented the outcome of its assessment of the information submitted by LYCAA during 2023 and 2024. The assessment identified significant deficiencies, particularly in relation to staffing levels, consistency of corresponding training, and the effective implementation of oversight activities. The absence of key documentation requested by the Commission was also highlighted. The assessment concluded that substantial further improvements are required in both LYCAA’s regulatory framework and its oversight capacity. During the meeting, the Commission reiterated its expectations regarding the type and quality of documents and data necessary to ensure adequate assessment of the Libyan safety oversight system.

(41)

LYCAA provided an update on administrative and technical initiatives aimed at strengthening safety oversight. The initiatives included revisions to aviation legislation and regulations, an increased frequency of inspections, and the introduction of digital oversight systems. The presentation of the Integrated Oversight Centre (‘IOC’), a digital platform designed to enhance the monitoring and management of aviation safety data, was a central element of those efforts. The digital platform is intended to support regulatory compliance and improve access to relevant safety information and documentation.

(42)

The information and associated materials presented by LYCAA as a demonstration of IOC, including manuals and checklists used in certification and oversight processes, were based on Union regulations and adapted to the national context. LYCAA also presented selected audit results from the re-certification process, with data from IOC displayed in a clear and structured format.

(43)

Nevertheless, it was noted that such documentation had not been shared with the Commission in previous exchanges during 2023 and 2024, despite multiple formal requests. Furthermore, it was noted that IOC’s long-term effectiveness depends on the consistency and quality of its application.

(44)

LYCAA also informed the Commission of the ongoing re-certification process for all Libyan air carriers, covering the period from November 2023 to November 2024. LYCAA reported that over 100 audit missions had been conducted during that period. However, insufficient detail was provided regarding the outcome results of those audits, including the specific findings and any corresponding corrective actions. It was agreed that LYCAA will provide the relevant information and documentation at its earliest convenience.

(45)

Currently there is, however, insufficient substantiated evidence to confirm that LYCAA has effectively resolved all the safety deficiencies that led to the operating ban imposed by Implementing Regulation (EU) No 1318/2014.

(46)

In accordance with the common criteria set out in the Annex to Regulation (EC) No 2111/2005, the Commission considers that at this time there are no grounds for amending the list of air carriers which are subject to an operating ban within the Union with respect to air carriers certified in Libya.

(47)

Member States should continue verifying the effective compliance of air carriers certified in Libya with the relevant international safety standards through prioritisation of ramp inspections of those air carriers, pursuant to Regulation (EU) No 965/2012.

(48)

In July 2010 Blue Wing Airlines was included in Annex A to Regulation (EC) No 474/2006 by Commission Regulation (EU) 590/2010 (11).

(49)

As a follow-up to the EU Air Safety Committee deliberations in November 2024, experts from the Commission, the Agency and Member States conducted a Union on-site assessment visit in Suriname from 24 to 28 February 2025 at the Civil Aviation Safety Authority Suriname (‘CASAS’). The on-site visit included a sample assessment of three air carriers certified by CASAS, namely Blue Wing Airlines, Fly All Ways, and Gum Air.

(50)

The Union on-site assessment visit focused its activities on CASAS in view of its role and responsibility for the safety oversight of the air carriers certified in Suriname. The assessment visit identified major deficiencies in the regulatory civil aviation system regarding compliance with international safety standards, that hamper an effective safety oversight.

(51)

Suriname’s primary Aviation Act has not been amended since its enactment in 2002. Therefore, the problems already identified in 2009 by ICAO are still present, namely the lack of empowerment of CASAS inspection staff to access facilities and documentation, and the lack of separation between judicial and safety investigations of aviation accidents and serious incidents, the latter underpinned by a lack of protection for reporters of safety occurrences.

(52)

Most of the national civil aviation regulations have been updated in 2023 to align them with the latest ICAO amendments. However, CASAS manuals, guides, checklists and all other working procedures for carrying out the oversight have not been updated accordingly. That impacts negatively on compliance with national legislation and therefore also with international safety standards.

(53)

During the visit it was confirmed that CASAS has a systemic weakness in terms of management of resources, namely a lack of procedures and methodology to determine staffing needs, ineffective initial training for inspecting staff, and no recurrent training due to lack of budget. Consequently, the CASAS departments visited were found to be understaffed and their inspecting staff not fully qualified.

(54)

The Union on-site assessment visit furthermore revealed that CASAS has critical deficiencies in terms of how the safety oversight is conducted, including closing findings without root cause analysis and leaving them open for an excessive period of time without taking enforcement action. Consequently, serious non-conformities are repeated.

(55)

Moreover, it is clear from the Union on-site assessment visit that CASAS lacks the quality management function needed to address the deficiencies observed in, and not limited to, the document control system, records keeping, management of findings and level of scrutiny.

(56)

There is neither a safety management function in CASAS to proactively deal with current or emerging safety risks, nor is there a functioning mandatory occurrence reporting system to allow CASAS to identify high risk areas where it needs to increase its oversight.

(57)

Critical concerns were observed regarding the CASAS Flight Operations and Airworthiness departments. Such concerns include the inability of CASAS to comply with its oversight plans within the required time, and an inability to fully achieve the scope of the audits carried out. Evidence was found attesting to an insufficient level of scrutiny on examining technical files before issuing certificates and no identification of the failures to comply with relevant international safety standards by the air carriers.

(58)

The lack of structural funding and the absence of enforcement actions by CASAS are two fundamental factors that significantly hinder CASAS’ ability to exercise effective oversight, carry out comprehensive audits, and respond proactively to current and emerging safety risks, as evidenced by the deficiencies observed during the visits to the air carriers.

(59)

The Union on-site assessment visit of the three air carriers, Blue Wing Airlines, Gum Air and Fly All Ways on respectively 25, 26 and 27 February 2025, revealed the same or similar critical shortcomings in all three, with direct consequences for flight safety and regulatory compliance. This included, but was not limited to, the absence of a functioning Safety Management System (‘SMS’) and Quality Management System (‘QMS’). With regard to the evaluation of the respective flight operations, there was evidence that the same serious non-conformities appeared in all of them, and that despite the fact that CASAS had raised findings in this regard, operations continued without any restriction by either CASAS or the air carriers themselves.

(60)

Moreover, the visit to the three respective airworthiness departments revealed numerous serious problems, such as a lack of training of the personnel in the performance of their duties, unserviceable parts not properly segregated and not held in the quarantine area, calibrated tools with expired calibration certificates, and unidentified tools. Those problems were all repeatedly identified by CASAS over the years without noticeable results.

(61)

The visit to Fly All Ways revealed that there is no Flight Data Monitoring programme implemented, as required by international safety standards for the category of aircraft used by this air carrier.

(62)

The number and nature of the deficiencies identified during the Union on-site assessment visit to the three air carriers pointed to systemic weaknesses both in terms of the carriers’ management systems, as well as CASAS’ ability to assure effective safety oversight. The accumulated evidence points to the lack of the air carriers’ capacity to ensure the safety of operations in a sustainable manner, and to the inability of CASAS to ensure compliance with regulations and to restore safety assurance.

(63)

By letter dated 11 April 2025 the Commission informed CASAS that the case of Suriname had been placed on the agenda of the EU Air Safety Committee meeting to be held from 13 to 15 May 2025, and that CASAS and the air carriers certified in Suriname would be given the opportunity to be heard in accordance with Regulation (EC) No 2111/2005. Blue Wing Airlines and Surinam Airways accepted the invitation to appear before the EU Air Safety Committee.

(64)

CASAS and the two air carriers were heard by the EU Air Safety Committee on 14 May 2025. The CASAS presentation to the EU Air Safety Committee offered an overview of CASAS’ determination of the sources of the deficiencies underpinning some of the identified observations, and the corrective measures and deadlines to address them. The corrective measures presented focussed namely on amendments to the national aviation legislation, implementation of quality and safety management functions, actioning of the required training of technical staff, improvements in the oversight functions, and recruitment plans to fill key managerial positions and additional inspecting staff.

(65)

Underscoring the acknowledgment given by CASAS as to the highly worrying situation that the Union on-site assessment visit found in Suriname, it was highlighted by the EU Air Safety Committee that some of these deficiencies had already been identified in the ICAO Universal Safety Oversight Audit Programme audits of 2009 and 2012, with no progress to address them in the interim. Therefore, concerns remain on whether the proposed measures and target dates presented by CASAS are achievable, despite the expression of willingness and commitment to improve, supported by efforts made by the Government of Suriname to secure additional sources of funding for CASAS.

(66)

This concern was confirmed on several occasions during the hearing when CASAS was unable to provide evidence of concrete and credible measures to address observations, such as the lack of enforcement of CASAS on its air carriers when they repeatedly fail to address the nonconformities raised against them in accordance with the national procedures.

(67)

Significant improvement of the capabilities of CASAS are necessary to address important safety deficiencies, namely in the areas of recruitment, training and qualification of staff, quality and safety management certification activities, and oversight of all of the air carriers certified in Suriname. These shortcomings are evidence that the oversight capacity of CASAS cannot ensure that the operations of all the air carriers certified by it are continuously carried out in accordance with international safety standards.

(68)

Blue Wing Airlines was represented by its commercial representative in Europe and a legal advisor. The intervention made during the hearing focussed on a presentation of the air carrier and its operational network, the carrier’s understanding of the purpose of the Union on-site assessment visit and how it pertained to Blue Wing Airlines, and an overview of the carrier’s own safety assessment and actions taken to address identified issues.

(69)

At no point in the presentation did the representatives from Blue Wing Airlines address the serious shortcomings identified by the EU assessment team, including in the Flight Operations and Maintenance Divisions. Furthermore, when questioned by the EU Air Safety Committee on specific issues related to the identified observations, the air carrier was unable to respond on the substance of the questions.

(70)

Surinam Airways, although not subject to a visit during the Union on-site assessment, accepted the invitation to appear before the EU Air Safety Committee. The air carrier provided a presentation outlining the carrier’s company outline, history, and operational network. A significant part of its presentation was focussed on presenting elements associated with the carrier’s safety compliance activities, both in terms of activities done in association with CASAS, as well as third parties including EASA in the context of its TCO authorisation. The presentation also highlighted planned actions to improve the carrier’s SMS and QMS.

(71)

The EU Air Safety Committee addressed questions to the carrier about its operational arrangements related to its operations to and from EU territories. The carrier was also questioned about its follow-up to CASAS’ finding related to a lack of required training of its maintenance personnel.

(72)

EASA complemented the information provided by the air carrier in terms of findings made during the TCO on-site audit carried out in parallel with the Union on-site assessment visit. This involved findings made in areas which should have been identified by CASAS as part of its oversight activities, and which are similar to those of other airlines visited by the EU team, which is an indication of CASAS’ recurrent problem in the oversight of its air carriers.

(73)

On the basis of all available evidence, including from the Union on-site assessment visit to CASAS and three sampled air carriers, as well as the information provided during the EU Air Safety Committee hearings, it has to be concluded that CASAS’ capacity and capability is not sufficient to assure compliance with international safety standards in terms of effective oversight of any of the air carriers it is responsible for.

(74)

The Commission and the EU Air Safety Committee, while noting the extent of the problems that need to be addressed, acknowledge the efforts made and encourage CASAS to pursue those efforts. They note the importance of the Government of Suriname’s commitment in this regard, and equally conveyed commitment to support and cooperate with CASAS in its efforts.

(75)

In accordance with the common criteria set out in the Annex to Regulation (EC) No 2111/2005, it is therefore assessed that the list of air carriers which are subject to an operating ban within the Union should be amended to include all air carriers certified in Suriname in Annex A to Regulation (EC) No 474/2006.

(76)

Member States should continue verifying the effective compliance of air carriers certified in Suriname with the relevant international safety standards through prioritisation of ramp inspections of those air carriers, pursuant to Regulation (EU) No 965/2012.

(77)

In December 2024, the air carrier Air Tanzania Company Limited was included in Annex A to Regulation (EC) No 474/2006 by Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/3137 (12).

(78)

As a follow-up to the EU Air Safety Committee deliberations in November 2024, experts from the Commission, the Agency and Member States conducted a Union on-site assessment visit in Tanzania from 9 to 13 December 2024 at the Tanzania Civil Aviation Authority (‘TCAA’). The Union on-site assessment visit included a sample assessment of two air carriers certified in Tanzania, namely Precision Air Services PLC (‘Precision Air’ ) and Coastal Travels Limited (‘Coastal Air’ ).

(79)

The Union on-site assessment visit focused its activities on TCAA in view of its role and responsibility for the safety oversight activities of the air carriers certified in Tanzania.

(80)

During the visit, it was identified that TCAA has structural inefficiencies and critical capacity constraints, including the lack of a strategic approach to human resource planning, which has translated into a shortage of qualified and experienced technical personnel in key oversight areas, notably personnel licensing, flight operations, and airworthiness.

(81)

In the area of personnel licensing, the need for staff reinforcements was identified, particularly through the recruitment of personnel with relevant prior experience. Furthermore, a structured and periodic training programme for inspectors should be established and implemented, incorporating advanced modules in quality management, compliance auditing and root cause analysis. It is also essential to develop and apply comprehensive and standardised procedures, checklists and forms for the issuance of licences and ratings.

(82)

In the flight operations domain, TCAA did not demonstrate the existence of an effective and strong system to discharge its regulatory responsibilities in compliance with international safety standards. That was sustained by the fact that the certification processes for air carriers were found to lack sufficient rigour, and oversight activities were inadequately planned and executed, resulting in significant oversight gaps. Furthermore, TCAA lacked an appropriate number of fully qualified inspectors, and the competencies of existing personnel required further development.

(83)

In the area of airworthiness, the procedures applied by TCAA fall short of the international safety standards, resulting in inadequate oversight performance and raising concerns regarding the consistent application of safety requirements. Certificates of Airworthiness have been issued without sufficient assurance that the aircraft in question meet all applicable design and airworthiness criteria.

(84)

The Union assessment team carried out an on-site visit at Precision Air on 11 December 2024.

(85)

The assessment of Precision Air identified several deficiencies in the implementation of its SMS and QMS. In particular, safety objectives were not adequately integrated into the Safety Management Manual (‘SMM’), and the monitoring of Safety Performance Indicators and Safety Performance Targets was insufficient. Flight Data Monitoring further revealed recurrent deviations from Standard Operating Procedures, indicating systemic issues with compliance.

(86)

Whereas the overall structure and functioning of the maintenance and airworthiness organisation were found to be satisfactory, significant gaps in the flight crew training programme were observed, including the absence of complete theoretical instruction and essential modules such as Upset Prevention and Recovery Training.

(87)

The Union assessment team carried out an on-site visit at Coastal Air on 12 December 2024.

(88)

The assessment of Coastal Air’s SMS and QMS identified substantial areas requiring improvement in order to ensure compliance with Tanzanian national legislation and international safety standards.

(89)

During the visit, Coastal Air was unable to demonstrate compliance with its own procedures and manuals, and deficiencies were observed in the documentation, approval and the carrier’s internal compliance monitoring across multiple areas, such as organisational privileges, logs, manuals, records, and training standards.

(90)

The assessment of Coastal Air’s maintenance and continued airworthiness management systems revealed several critical shortcomings with direct implications for flight safety and regulatory compliance. Furthermore, data entry errors in the airworthiness monitoring system resulted in incorrect maintenance scheduling intervals, undermining the reliability and integrity of maintenance tracking.

(91)

The number and nature of the deficiencies identified during the visit pointed to systemic weaknesses in both Coastal Air’s internal compliance monitoring function and TCAA’s oversight activities. Specifically, many of the identified deficiencies should have been detected during the certification process, through regular oversight activities, or through the air carrier’s own safety assurance mechanisms.

(92)

The Union on-site assessment visit revealed that whereas Tanzania has established a legal framework governing civil aviation, the regulatory system faces significant challenges related to legal precision, effective implementation and timely adaptation to the evolving international safety standards, thus resulting in legal and operational misalignments undermining Tanzania’s capacity to fully meet its obligations under the Convention on International Civil Aviation (Chicago Convention). The observations stemming from the Union on-site assessment visit were incorporated in a report submitted to and agreed by TCAA.

(93)

On 30 April 2025, as part of the Commission's ongoing monitoring of the overall safety situation in Tanzania, a technical meeting was held involving the Commission, the Agency, Member States, and TCAA. The meeting served a dual purpose: to review the CAP developed in response to the Union on-site assessment visit, and to brief TCAA on preparations for the upcoming EU Air Safety Committee hearing scheduled for 13 May 2025.

(94)

Various iterations of the CAP were provided prior and subsequent to the technical meeting. The version provided for discussion during the technical meeting demonstrated TCAA’s efforts to address the observations made during the Union on-site assessment visit. However, ensuing discussions identified a number of significant failings with the actions taken by TCAA, notably the failure to carry out thorough root cause analyses to identify and address underlying systemic issues, a lack of adequate documentation to support reported corrective actions, and continued non-compliance with applicable aviation safety requirements.

(95)

Of specific note was TCAA submission relative to the calculation of manpower needs within the flight operations domain, which was deemed unrealistic in terms of estimated hours allocated to key activities, such as the preparation of AOC base inspections or the follow-up of inspection findings. A revised version of CAP provided subsequently showed an apparent improvement in terms of a more realistic determination of numbers of inspectors needed, but still a lacking in terms of analysis regarding associated training needs and the time required for the completion of training before becoming operational.

(96)

The technical meeting confirmed that, while TCAA had made certain progress to address the identified observations, including through immediate technical support activities launched promptly following the Union on-site assessment visit, major deficiencies remained. A number of the actions included in the CAP submitted by TCAA were found to be reactive in nature, lacking meaningful preventive measures. Where such measures were included, they were generally superficial and failed to provide credible assurance in terms of sustainability.

(97)

By letter dated 14 April 2025 the Commission informed TCAA that the case of Tanzania had been placed on the agenda of the EU Air Safety Committee meeting to be held from 13 to 15 May 2025, and that TCAA and the air carriers certified in Tanzania would be given the opportunity to be heard before the EU Air Safety Committee in accordance with Regulation (EC) No 2111/2005.

(98)

In anticipation of the hearing, it was confirmed by TCAA that no air carrier certified in Tanzania would take part. TCAA was heard by the EU Air Safety Committee on 13 May 2025. TCAA’s presentation to the EU Air Safety Committee offered a high-level overview of its progress in developing and implementing a CAP following the Union on-site assessment visit. The presentation was well-structured and covered the major categories of observations and recommendations, providing TCAA’s overview of which observations and recommendations have been closed, are ongoing, or remain open.

(99)

The reported closure rate of findings, as presented by TCAA, was assessed as highly unrealistic, as evidenced by the fact that in several instances observations were considered closed without adequate verification that the full extent of the observation was being met. One example of this related to the lack of qualified staff, which TCAA presented as resolved based solely on plans and timelines for recruitment without taking into account the time required for relevant training and qualification to become operational.

(100)

For a number of other observations TCAA indicated that it has been able to close them. However, upon questioning from the EU Air Safety Committee it was repeatedly demonstrated that this was not the case. When questioned about the Certificate of Airworthiness procedure and checklist that had been revised to comply with ICAO Doc 9760, TCAA’s response was inconclusive and it could not provide clear evidence that the task had been completed. Also, when questioned about the recently adopted risk-based oversight process, specifically with respect to the content and application of air carrier risk profiles, TCAA’s response lacked clarity and failed to demonstrate a sound understanding or effective implementation of risk-based oversight principles.

(101)

The Commission and the EU Air Safety Committee acknowledge the efforts made, both in terms of human and financial resources mobilisation, and encourage TCAA to pursue those efforts. They underline the importance of the Tanzanian Government’s commitment in this regard. They convey a clear commitment to continue to support and cooperate with TCAA in its efforts to enhance its safety oversight capabilities. Regular contacts and progress reports are anticipated as part of the continuous monitoring activity, as well as the organisation of future technical meetings to review progress being made.

(102)

Based on all available evidence, including the Union on-site assessment, it is concluded that TCAA does not have the necessary capacity and capability to effectively oversee aviation activities in Tanzania in line with international safety standards. Deficiencies in personnel management, staff training, quality management, certification processes, and the oversight of air carriers indicate that TCAA is unable to ensure sustained compliance with those standards.

(103)

In accordance with the common criteria set out in the Annex to Regulation (EC) No 2111/2005, it is therefore assessed that the list of air carriers which are subject to an operating ban within the Union should be amended to include all air carriers certified in Tanzania in Annex A to Regulation (EC) No 474/2006.

(104)

Member States should continue verifying the effective compliance of air carriers certified in Tanzania with the relevant international safety standards through prioritisation of ramp inspections of those air carriers, pursuant to Regulation (EU) No 965/2012.

(105)

Regulation (EC) No 474/2006 should therefore be amended accordingly.

(106)

Articles 5 and 6 of Regulation (EC) No 2111/2005 recognise the need for decisions to be taken swiftly and, where appropriate, urgently, given the safety implications. It is therefore essential, for the protection of sensitive information and the traveling public, that any decisions in the context of updating the list of air carriers which are subject to an operating ban or restriction within the Union apply immediately after their adoption.

(107)

The measures provided for in this Regulation are in accordance with the opinion of the EU Air Safety Committee,