(1)

On 26 March 2018, the Commission published a Notice of Initiation of a safeguard investigation concerning imports of 26 steel product categories (2018/C 111/10) (3) in the Official Journal of the European Union. The Commission decided to initiate the investigation in the light of sufficient evidence that imports of those products might cause or threaten to cause serious injury to the Union producers concerned.

(2)

On 28 June, the Commission also published a Notice by which the investigation was extended to two additional product categories (4).

(3)

The information available to the Commission from the steel prior-surveillance mechanism in place (5) and from Union industry sources showed that an increasing trend of imports of these product categories and the prevailing menacing economic and trade conditions, including the situation of the Union steel industry, justified an in-depth examination.

(4)

Furthermore, due to the measures against imports of steel adopted by the United States of America (‘U.S.’) under Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 (‘Section 232’), there was a high risk of further increase of imports resulting from trade diversion.

(5)

These circumstances, in a context of persistent worldwide overcapacities, may jeopardise the Union steel industry, which is still vulnerable to a likely imminent increase of imports and recovering from the damage caused by unfair trade practices, as the substantial number of trade defence measures taken worldwide on steel products in the recent past prove.

(6)

On 11 April 2018, the Commission issued a ‘Note to the File’ containing key import statistics and available injury indicators. In relation to this ‘Note to the File’, the Commission received 41 submissions from third countries, national associations and individual steel companies

(7)

Several interested parties have claimed that the Commission failed to disclose the evidence on which the initiation of the safeguard investigation was based in an adequate and timely manner. It was claimed that by failing to do this, interested parties were not allowed to fully exercise their rights of defence. More precisely, several interested parties claimed that the ‘Note to the File’ made available on 11 April 2018 did not contain data on Union sales, Union exports, Union consumption, or total Union production.

(8)

Contrary to these claims, the ‘Note to the File’ did contain data on Union sales, Union consumption, and total Union production. Furthermore, the Commission considers that, in addition, the main elements and evidence available were adequately summarised both in the Notice of Initiation that was published in the Official Journal of the European Union and the notification of the investigation to the WTO pursuant to Article 12.1(a) of the WTO Safeguard Agreement.

(9)

The Commission therefore considers that it has fulfilled its legal obligations to adequately protect the rights of defence of interested parties. In any event, interested parties still have the opportunity to exercise their rights during the remainder of the investigation.

(10)

In order to obtain the information necessary to carry out an in-depth assessment, the Commission sent questionnaires to known EU producers and to any exporting producer, importer, and user of the products under investigation that so requested within the deadlines stipulated in the Notice of Initiation. These parties, like third countries, were also invited to make any relevant submissions. The Commission has received 222 replies to questionnaires and 74 submissions.

(11)

The Commission initiated the safeguard investigation on 26 steel product categories imported into the EU, and on 28 June its scope was extended by 2 additional product categories by means of a notice amending the Notice of Initiation (6). The 28 product categories (‘the product concerned’ or the ‘product categories concerned’) are all covered by the steel surveillance mechanism introduced by the Commission in May 2016. They are also subject to the US tariff measures under Section 232. The product categories concerned, together with the CN codes under which these products are currently classified, are listed in Annex I.

(12)

In this preliminary assessment, the Commission finds that the 28 product categories produced by the Union producers (hereinafter ‘the like product’ or ‘the like product categories’) are like or directly competing with the product categories concerned. Both the Union-produced and the imported products concerned have the same basic physical, technical and chemical characteristics; they have the same uses, and price and quality information on them is readily available; they are also sold via similar or identical sales channels to customer who purchase or may purchase them from both domestic as well as alternatively from foreign exporters. Accordingly, there is strong competition between the product categories concerned and those produced by the Union producers under the corresponding categories.

(13)

The Commission has also found in this preliminary analysis that there is an important interrelation and strong competition between products classified in different product categories and also between products at different production stages within certain categories as some of the categories contain the main raw or input material to produce other products in other product categories.

(14)

Some examples illustrate this interrelation and competition within and between product categories. For instance, hot rolled wide strips are produced from slabs and rolled into coils or produced flat on quarto mills. By cutting the strip to length, sheets are produced. Narrow strip is produced either directly or by slitting hot-rolled wide strip. Hot rolled flat products are also used in the manufacture of pipes and tubes for the petrochemical industry and cold rolled flat products are subsequently used by welded tube manufacturers. A large part of the hot rolled wide strip that is produced is further processed to produce cold rolled strip, which is thinner and has a superior surface finish. A significant proportion of the cold rolled products are metallically coated, with tin or chrome for the can industry or with zinc (7).

(15)

Many producers in the Union are active in the production of most the above mentioned products. For example, Arcelor Mittal not only produces hot rolled and cold rolled sheets and strips but also coats several steel products and produces plates. Similarly, companies like Voest Alpine and Tata Steel produce hot rolled and cold rolled sheets and strips and also coated steel products made of these products.

(16)

Furthermore, as a consequence, given this level of interrelation, competitive pressure can easily be shifted from one product to the other. For instance, if trade defence measures are imposed on one product, e.g. steel coils, that product may be further transformed in the same country and exported under a different form to avoid the additional measures and still compete with domestic products. It is also not excluded that third countries import some of these products at low cost and transform them before re-exporting them to the Union.

(17)

Because of these interrelations and interconnections, and given the fact that – as will be explained below – the potential trade diversion resulting from the U.S. Section 232 measures applies to all product categories on account that these measures are applied horizontally to all steel products, without distinction of their shape, size of composition, the analysis for the purpose of the provisional determination has been carried out both globally for all 28 product categories, as the product concerned (i.e. steel in various shapes and forms) and also at individual level for each product category (8).

(18)

Most of the Union's producers are members of the European Confederation of the Iron and Steel Industry (‘Eurofer’) or, to the extent the products are pipes and tubes, members of European Steel Tube Association (‘ESTA’). These two industry associations represent more than 95 % of Union steel production. Their members are located in almost all Member States.

(19)

On behalf of their members, these industry associations have informed the Commission that they support the opening of the safeguard investigation, as well as the adoption of measures to also address the trade diversion resulting from the Section 232 measures that seriously disrupts the steel market which has not yet fully recovered from the steel crisis.

(20)

Based on the information from Eurostat, the prior steel surveillance mechanism, as well as information submitted by the Union industry, the Commission has carried out a preliminary analysis of the increase in imports of the products concerned over the period 2013-2017. The Commission has also examined the evolution of imports during the first quarter of 2018 in order to confirm the recent increase in imports.

(21)

The total imports of the products concerned have developed as follows:

(22)

In overall terms, imports of the 28 product categories concerned, taken altogether, increased in absolute terms by 62 % over the period 2013-2017. The increase of imports was especially marked until 2016. Subsequently, imports continued to increase and remained at a very high level.

(23)

Imports for the vast majority of the individual product categories covered by the investigation also showed an increase in absolute terms over the last five years. For example, the imports of the largest categories in terms of imports (product categories 1, 4, and 7) have increased by 45 %, 168 %, and 78 % respectively.

(24)

There was however not an increase for 5 product categories, namely products 10, 11, 19, 24, and 27. The Commission therefore considers that these product categories should at this stage be excluded from the scope of the provisional measures. The Commission, nevertheless, reserves the right to include these 5 product categories in the scope of the definitive measures and to this effect will continue monitoring the imports within these categories. The evolution of imports for each product category is presented in Annex II.

(25)

In addition to the exclusion, at this stage, of the abovementioned product categories, the Commission has also considered the exclusion of certain countries from the scope of the measures in line with the conclusions in recital (121). Accordingly, the Commission has excluded the imports of these product categories from these aforementioned countries from the rest of its preliminary analysis and reviewed the imports' evolution.

(26)

On this basis, the imports of the products concerned by this preliminary determination have developed as follows:

(27)

Imports increased in absolute terms by 68 % during the period 2013-2017, with market shares increasing from 12,1 % to 17,80 %. The most significant increase took place in the period 2013-2016, but imports continued to increase and remained at a high level in 2017.

(28)

The trend of increasing imports continues in 2018. When comparing the first quarter of 2018 with the first quarter of 2017, the overall import increase amounts to 10 %. For 9 product categories, the increase is more than 20 % and for one of those categories (category 13) the increase is more than 100 %. Moreover, this increase took place even before the Section 232 measures entered into force.

(29)

The Commission therefore concludes that there has been a sudden, steep, and significant increase of imports in absolute terms for 23 product categories. In addition, the increase of imports continues in the first quarter of 2018 and it is expected to be even more significant in view of the expected trade diversion from the Section 232 measures.

(30)

The Commission has preliminarily determined that the above-mentioned increase in imports of steel products in the Union has been the result of unforeseen developments that finds its source in a number of factors establishing and aggravating imbalances in the international trade of the products concerned.

(31)

First of all, the nominal global steelmaking capacity has more than doubled since 2000, from a level of 1,05 billion tonnes in 2000 to 2,29 billion tonnes in 2016 and has remained at a very high level in 2017 (2,27 billion tonnes) (9). In addition, actual global steel production in 2016 (1,6 billion tonnes) was still 100 million tonnes higher than global steel demand (1,5 billion tonnes). Consequently, there has been over the last years a major gap between nominal global capacity and production and between production and demand, generating an unprecedented overcapacity in the global steel market which has persisted despite the measures adopted to narrow it. Moreover, looking forward, whereas global production in 2017 increased by more than 5 % due to an economic recovery, global steel demand in 2018 will show only moderate growth with further deceleration predicted for 2019. There was a sign of recovery in 2017, but important risks remain.

(32)

The steel firms continue to be financially vulnerable since, as mentioned above, there are persisting structural imbalances in the steel sector. These imbalances are accentuated by distortive subsidies and government support measures (10). Given the important fixed costs in the steel sector, many steel producers, notably in countries where the State distorts the normal play of market forces, kept capacity utilisation at high rates and flooded third country markets with their products at low prices when they could not be absorbed by domestic consumption. This has resulted in increasing imports in the EU and overall price depression. Import prices have in general undercut Union industry prices in 2017, based on an average price comparison for each product category. Such an average price comparison does not necessarily reflect all the specificities which may have an impact on comparability, but nevertheless gives a good indication of the general price level of imports as compared to Union prices. Undercutting was established for 17 product categories, with ranges between 1,2 % and 23 %.

(33)

Secondly, the above effect has been exacerbated by trade-restrictive practices in third country markets. Indeed, since 2014/2015, in reaction to the above mentioned oversupply of steel and the market-distorting practices, several countries have begun to make greater use of trade policy and trade defence instruments in the steel sector with a view to protecting their domestic producers. Mexico, South Africa, India and Turkey have applied import tariffs' increases ranging from 2,5 % to 40 % for a series of steel products including inter alia: hot rolled and cold rolled steel, flat steel products like strips, and also rebars. These products were typically imported in increasing quantities over the period of investigation. Furthermore, third countries continued throughout 2017 to impose trade restrictive measures: some countries introduced minimum import prices (India), some imposed mandatory national standards for steel (Indonesia) and others imposed local content requirements, including through government procurement (U.S.).

(34)

In addition, recourse to trade defence instruments has steadily increased. Based on WTO statistics, whereas during 2011-2013 on average around 77 steel-related investigations had been initiated per year, during 2015-2016 this average increased to 117. In February 2018, the U.S. had 169 anti-dumping and countervailing duty orders in place on steel, as well as 25 ongoing investigations that could lead to an even more restrictive picture for imports of steel into the U.S. (11) As the U.S. is one of the world's largest steel importing countries – representing around 13,1 % of the world steel imports (in 2016) – the impact of such a large number of trade remedies has been strongly felt globally.

(35)

Third, in the context of the prevailing persistent worldwide overcapacity, the illegal and restrictive U.S. Section 232 measures, given their level and scope, are likely to cause substantial trade diversion of steel products into the Union. The U.S. have calculated that the imposition of a single across-product tariff under the Section 232 measures with almost no country exclusion should decrease imports by approximately 13 million tonnes – corresponding to 7 % of Union consumption (12). The Union market is generally a very attractive market for steel products both in terms of demand and prices. Some of the main exporters to the US are also traditional steel suppliers to the Union and there is no doubt that these countries, as well as others whose exports and production will be affected by the U.S. measures and the foreseeable trade diversion cascade, will redirect their exports to the Union. Even a partial diversion of the abovementioned trade flows into the Union will unavoidably result in a new price depression and undercutting on the EU market, bringing price down to levels comparable to those of 2016, with significant negative consequences on the profitability of the Union steel industry. It should finally be noted that the additional import increase which is liable to further deteriorate the economic situation of the Union steel industry might especially originate from countries currently not subject to anti-dumping/countervailing duty measures.

(36)

Consequently, the abovementioned unforeseen developments have lead and will further lead to a clear increase of steel imports into the Union.

(37)

In order to formulate its preliminary determination as to whether there is evidence of serious injury or threat of serious injury to the Union industry for the product concerned under assessment, the Commission, in line with Article 9 of Regulation 2015/478 and Article 6 of Regulation 2015/755, has examined the trends of consumption, production, capacity utilisation, sales, market share, prices, profitability, stocks, Return On Capital Employed (ROCE), cash flow and employment for the product concerned for the years 2013 to 2017 (pending the collection of 2018 data).

(38)

This analysis has been carried out globally and also individually for the 23 product categories showing an increase of import volumes (‘the products/product categories under assessment’). As explained in Section II above, the Commission considers such a global and comprehensive analysis adequate in this investigation, given the interrelation, interconnection, and the level of competition between the different products from a demand and supply point of view.

(39)

When looking at the overall situation, the Union consumption, sales of Union producers and the corresponding market share developed as follows:

(40)

The consumption of the products under assessment increased consistently every year during the period 2013-2017, and by 15 % overall. The sales of Union producers also increased, but to a much lesser extent than Union consumption, i.e. by 7 % only. Consequently, the Union producers could not benefit from the increasing Union demand and lost market shares, going from 86,8 % to 80,9 %. It should be recalled that during the same period imports increased by 68 %.

(41)

On the basis of the questionnaire replies received from the Union producers, production and production capacity developed as follows:

(42)

Production capacity increased by 3 % during the period 2013-2017, but less than the production level which increased by 9 %. As a result, the capacity utilisation rate increased from 72 % to 76 %.

(43)

The stocks held by the cooperating companies increased overall by 20 % in the period 2013-2017.

(44)

Unit sales prices, profitability and cash flow of the Union producers developed as follows:

(45)

In the period 2013-2016 there was a significant price depression on the Union market: Unit sales prices decreased by 15 %. It should be recalled that imports also increased significantly during this period. The average unit sales price recovered however in 2017 and reached a level comparable to 2013. Profitability overall remained at a very low level during the period 2013-2016. Despite a significant decrease in prices, the Union industry could nevertheless reduce its cost of production in 2016 to such an extent that it managed to make a small level of profit of 2,2 %. The situation temporarily recovered in 2017. Sales prices increased by almost 20 % between 2016 and 2017 and reached their 2013 level. The Union industry achieved a level of profit of 6,2 % since cost of production (raw material), even if increasing, remained lower than in 2013. The overall cash flow position of the Union industry increased by approximately 60 %.

(46)

In terms of employment, over the 5-year period, the Union producers of the product categories under assessment lost almost 10 000 jobs.

(47)

In addition to the global analysis of the situation for the product concerned overall, which the Commission considers to be the appropriate standpoint for the appraisal of the necessity of safeguard measures in this investigation, the Commission has also assessed the situation at the level of the individual product categories in order to confirm the above trends at a disaggregated level.

(48)

When looking at individual product categories, the situation is more contrasted but generally shows the same trends. The economic indicators are provided individually and by product categories in Annex III.

(49)

The Union consumption for all but two product categories increased in the last five years. While this increase remained modest for some individual products, with a minimum increase of 2 %, it was much more marked for others, with a maximum increase of 169 %.

(50)

Sales volumes were generally stable in the period 2013-2017 or, in some cases, slightly increased but, except for three product categories, they did not increase as much as EU consumption. As a result, there was a decrease of market shares over the five year period for all but 3 products.

(51)

Production levels generally increased for 18 out of 23 of the individual products, as well as capacity utilisation rates.

(52)

In terms of prices, there was a significant price decrease for each product (except for one product that was subject to anti-dumping duties in the form of a minimum import price) in the period 2013-2016. Prices recovered in 2017, given a general recovery of the steel market but also as a consequence of the various trade defence measures taken against unfair pricing behaviour and subsidised imports. For 16 products the price level remained lower in 2017 than in 2013. It should be noted that average import price levels were almost systematically lower than Union prices for all years, and for all product categories.

(53)

As far as profit is concerned, all product categories were sold at a loss or at a much reduced profit until 2016. Only 7 products could recover to a level of profit above 6 % in 2017. These products are significant in terms of EU production volume and six of them are currently subject to (recent) anti-dumping or countervailing duty measures. Note that these measures concern only some countries of origin. All other products remained either loss making (3 products) or only close to break-even (13 products). It is considered that the level profit below 6 % is insufficient to cover the investments needed to sustain the activity, as, in the majority of the recent investigations, the Commission has used a level of around 8 % profit as a sufficient profit level in this sector in order to cover investments. As for cash flow, for half of the products the cash flow deteriorated in 2013-2017 and for 6 products the cash flow was even negative in 2017. The return on capital employed (ROCE) remained low in the period 2013-2016, but subsequently improved for a large majority of the product categories, even though for 5 products the ROCE was still negative in 2017.

(54)

In terms of stocks, the stocks increased for 17 product categories. Only the stocks of 5 product categories decreased and for one product category it remained at the same level during the period.

(55)

The above analysis corroborates that the situation of the Union steel industry deteriorated significantly in the period 2013-2016. This materialised by a decrease in market shares, and by a significant price depression which prevented the industry from benefiting from lower raw material costs. These trends existed both at a global and individual product level. The situation partially recovered in 2017. While many product categories are still below a level of sustainable profit, some have improved, most likely as a result of the recent imposition of anti-dumping and anti-subsidy measures. Globally, and for individual product categories, it is therefore considered that the Union industry is still in a fragile situation and vulnerable to further increase in imports, in particular if imports from countries subject to trade defence measures are replaced by other imports diverted from the U.S. market as a result of the Section 232 action.

(56)

This is, for example, typically the case for product categories 1, 2 and 4, which are important in terms of Union demand but also because these product categories (in particular categories 1 and 2) are used as raw material to produce other steel products. For product categories 1, 2 and 4, the financial situation was negative in 2016, but became positive in 2017 following the imposition of anti-dumping and anti-subsidy measures against a number of countries like, amongst others, China and Russia. Imports from these countries have however been recently and partially replaced by imports from India, Korea and Turkey, the two latter being also significant supplier to the U.S. In the first quarter of 2018, i.e. before the imposition of the measures in the U.S., Union imports have already increased for product category 1 as compared to the first quarter 2017, and this increase is mainly due to imports from Turkey.

(57)

It is likely that a further increase in steel imports in the Union would prevent the Union industry, which has not yet fully recovered, to benefit from the positive effect of the recent trade defence measures.

(58)

In its Steel Communication of March 2016 (13), the Commission concluded that the Union steel industry was facing a number of serious challenges, fuelled by global overcapacity, a dramatic increase of global exports, and an unprecedented wave of unfair trading practices.

(59)

In parallel, in order to remedy the injury caused by unfair trade imports, the Union has imposed a number of anti-dumping and anti-subsidy measures against imports of steel products. In total, there are currently no less than 19 anti-dumping or anti-subsidy measures against the unfairly traded imports of 14 product categories under investigation from various countries. During the period under investigation, i.e. 2013-2017, 13 new investigations determined that the EU steel industry suffered (or in one case was threatened to suffer) from material injury caused by unfair trade practices.

(60)

As noted in recital (55), the Union industry is still in a fragile situation and vulnerable to a further increase in imports. The recent U.S. decision not to exclude EU exports from the scope of Section 232 measures will likely reduce the Union producers' ability to export their products to the U.S. and make their situation even more vulnerable.

(61)

Steel imports have increased significantly, remaining at high levels in 2017. The further increase of imports in 2018 – in particular from those countries or exporters not subject to trade defence measures – is likely to prevent the industry from a full recovery and from benefiting from these measures. The Union steel industry is indeed considered to be still vulnerable to further increases of imports.

(62)

In the absence of provisional safeguard measures, it is likely that the situation will develop into actual serious injury in the foreseeable future.

(63)

In this context, pursuant to Article 9(2) of Regulation 2015/478 and Article 6(3) of Regulation 2015/755, the Commission has examined the rate of increase of the exports to the Union and the likelihood that available capacity is used to export into the Union.

(64)

First, as concluded above, imports into the Union increased substantially in the period 2013-2017, i.e. by 68 % globally. While the increase was especially marked until 2016, imports continued to increase in the subsequent period, albeit at a slower pace. As highlighted in recitals (37) and (82) regarding critical circumstances – imports increased again significantly, by almost 10 %, in the first quarter of 2018. The rate of increase of imports is therefore significant.

(65)

Second, in a situation of global overcapacity in various countries, it is expected that the restrictive U.S. Section 232 measures, given their level and scope, are likely to cause trade diversion of steel products in the Union.

(66)

The U.S. have announced their intention to decrease imports by approximately 13 million tonnes and, as a result, have imposed in March 2018 an additional import duty of 25 % against imports of a very large number of steel products. The volume of steel that will no longer be exported to the U.S. will unavoidably be diverted to other third countries.

(67)

Some of the main exporters to the US are also traditional steel suppliers to the Union. It is more than likely that these countries, as well as others, will to a large extent be willing to redirect their exports to the Union. The Union market is indeed generally an attractive market for steel products both in terms of demand and prices. In fact, the EU is, after China, but before the U.S., one of the main markets for steel, where demand has increased in the last years and prices have also now recovered.

(68)

In this context, a significant increase of supply on the Union market caused by an influx of imports will result in a general downward price pressure, resulting in price levels comparable to 2016 with significant negative consequences on the profitability of the Union steel industry.

(69)

Under these circumstances, and based on the above, it is preliminary concluded that, although the Union steel industry has partially recovered for some product categories in 2017, notably due to trade defence measures, for the bulk of product categories under assessment the financial situation is still well below sustainable levels, which makes the Union industry still vulnerable to another surge of imports. Accordingly, the Commission concludes that the Union steel industry is in a situation of threat of serious injury for the 23 product categories under assessment.

(70)

The Commission has made a preliminary determination that there is a causal link between increased imports of the product under assessment on the one hand and a threat of serious injury on the other hand, on the following basis.

(71)

It is first recalled that the products produced by the Union producers are like or directly competing with the products concerned. They have the same basic characteristics, the same uses and are sold via similar or identical sales channels and strongly compete on price.

(72)

As explained in Sections IV and VI, the Union producers have suffered in terms of loss of market share and significant price pressure resulting in a negative or unsustainable level of profit. For some products, even if the producers have recovered, serious injury appears to be imminent.

(73)

In the period 2013-2017, imports of the product concerned increased significantly and took away Union market shares based on lower than EU producers' price levels. Indeed, the market share of imports, overall, grew from 12,2 % to 17,6 % and import prices remained almost systematically lower than the Union sales prices for each individual product.

(74)

The causal link between the increased imports and the situation of the Union producers was especially marked in the period 2013-2016, when low priced imports peaked (+ 62 %) and EU producers' prices fell by 15 %. For category 13, the decrease in prices amounted even to 20 % whereas for categories 1 and 3 they were 19 % and 18 % respectively. As a result, Union producers of the like products were either in a loss making situation or just close to break even. In the year 2017, imports remained at a high level and continued to undercut prices, despite a general price increase. EU prices recovered, but not sufficiently for a number of products which were still sold at a loss or reduced profit.

(75)

Even if profit recovered for some product categories, their situation is still vulnerable. Indeed, based on previous years' developments, these product categories are particularly sensitive to price pressure, and any further increase of imports at low prices would have a significant negative impact on their situation.

(76)

In this context, it is considered that the restrictive measures taken by the U.S. pursuant to Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act, given their level and scope, are likely to cause imminent serious injury to Union producers.

(77)

The Commission therefore provisionally concludes that, in relation to the 23 product categories under assessment, there is a causal link between the increase in imports, the pressure on the Union steel market price and the threat of serious injury suffered by Union producers.

(78)

To ensure that the serious injury is not attributable to factors other than the increase in imports, the Commission has carried out a preliminary analysis to determine whether the other factors may have contributed to the serious injury suffered by the Union producers.

(79)

The global overcapacity was found to have played a role in the sense that it boosted cheap imports into the Union. Consumption for the steel products concerned increased and could therefore not weaken the causal link.

(80)

The Commission also considered the attribution of serious injury due to imports of the products concerned from members of the European Economic Area (EEA). As a result of the EEA Agreement between the Union and its Member States, on the one hand, and members of the EEA (Norway, Iceland, and Liechtenstein), on the other hand, the Union has established a close economic integration with the markets of EEA countries, as well as the industries of the products concerned. The industry in those markets is mature and saturated, due to which it is considered that the exclusion of products originating in the members of the EEA from the safeguard measures will have little (if no) impact on the import levels of the products. Indeed, and while the imports from these countries have indeed contributed for some product categories to an increase in imports (overall imports from these countries show an increase of approximately 9 %), the share of those imports in the total imports is limited (EEA share in imports is about 1,5 %, with a corresponding market share of 0,3 % in total). In addition, EEA members are traditionally minor suppliers of the product concerned to the U.S., which means that the risk of trade diversion has preliminarily been determined to also be limited. Having, therefore, regard to the traditionally minor supplies to the U.S., the maturity of the industry in EEA markets, and the related limited risk of trade diversion stemming therefrom, the Commission considers that imports of the products concerned from EEA members may only have very marginally, if at all contributed to the threat of serious injury.

(81)

Consequently, the Commission has not identified other factors that would weaken the causal link between the increase in imports and the serious injury to the Union producers. Nevertheless, a more detailed examination of all other factors that have or may have contributed to the injury will be undertaken in the remainder of the investigation.

(82)

As indicated above, Union steel producers are globally in a situation of threat of injury and serious injury is clearly imminent. For some individual product categories, there are already indications pointing towards serious injury. A further increase of imports will likely have significant adverse effects on the economic situation of the industry overall.

(83)

The Commission has examined whether critical circumstances exist in which delay would cause damage which it would be difficult to repair. In particular it was examined whether imports have continued to increase in the most recent period.

(84)

Based on a comparison between imports of steel products in the first quarter 2018 and the first quarter 2017, it appears that for 18 of the 23 product categories imports increased by 26 %. This increase of imports is significantly more important than that experienced in the period 2016-2017, which was around 2 %.

(85)

The 25 % tariffs under Section 232 on steel products were introduced on 23 March 2018. It is at this stage not possible to assess the full effect of the U.S. measures in terms of trade diversion. The increase of imports into the Union in the first quarter 2018 could however be seen as an anticipation of their effects and, therefore, give a good indication of what could be the potential future development of Union imports after the US measures have been imposed.

(86)

On 30 May 2018, the U.S. also decided that Section 232 measures should be enforced against the Union, Mexico and Canada. The Commission considers that this is a further critical element since it would not only restrict Union exports but also increase the risk of trade diversion from the other two important steel producing countries.

(87)

Given the vulnerable situation of the industry, and in view of the most recent increase of imports, a further oversupply of steel products on the Union market, and the resulting pressure on prices, will undoubtedly have serious consequences on the situation of the Union producers.

(88)

Therefore, the Commission considers that, on account of the real risk of trade diversion and the further restriction of imports to the U.S. of important steel producing countries, there are critical circumstances by which any delay in the adoption of provisional safeguard measures would cause damage which would be difficult to repair. The Commission therefore concludes that provisional safeguard measures should be adopted without delay.

(89)

In accordance with Article 16 of Regulation 2015/478, it has been examined whether, despite the provisional finding of threat of serious injury, compelling reasons exist for concluding that it is not in the Union interest to adopt provisional measures in this particular case. The analysis of the Union interest was based on an appraisal of all the various interests involved, including those of the Union producers, importers, and users.

(90)

The Union industry is composed of around 40 producers, located in many different Member States of the Union, and employing directly more than 180 000 people in relation to the 25 products concerned in the period 2013-2017. It has been established that the Union industry faces a threat of serious injury caused by an increase of imports. It is recalled that the Union industry has not benefited from an increase in consumption and that the economic situation of the Union industry remains fragile and vulnerable to further increase of imports. The strategic importance of the steel industry has long been recognised (14). It is in the Union interest to have a healthy and competitive steel industry. It is clear that if no measures are taken, both the prices and the market share of the Union producers will further decrease resulting in reduced production, increased financial losses and loss of employment, both in the steel industry and in related industries. Imposing provisional safeguard measures will temporary remedy the serious injury and facilitate the adjustment by the Union industry.

(91)

Users and importers, in general, seek the lowest possible price for steel, and it is clear that, without measures, prices would be lower. However, it is also in their interests to have a competitive and viable Union steel industry, able to meet their future needs.

(92)

In this context, several interested parties to the investigation have claimed that it would not be in the interest of the Union to impose provisional safeguard measures. They claim that measures would almost certainly result in a supply shortage and would therefore place that Union industry in a stronger negotiating position to exert pressure on prices. They further argued that the sources of supply are already limited by the imposition of anti-dumping and anti-subsidy measures and that products which are not available from Union producers or not available sufficiently or with the proper technical specifications must be excluded from safeguard measures.

(93)

In order to strike the right balance between the various legitimate interests and since the threat of serious injury is mainly linked in this case to the existence of trade diversion, the Commission considers that the form of the safeguard measures should preserve historical import levels, and that only imports in excess of this level should be subjected to them. In this respect, a system of Tariff Rate Quotas under which no obstacle is raised against traditional trade flows guarantees that the safeguard measures are in line with the Union interest. Such a form of measure would prevent the negative effects of trade diversion for the Union industry, while at the same time preserve traditional trade supply sources and effective competition in the steel market.

(94)

In these circumstances, the Commission considers that the risk that the adopted measure triggers a supply shortage or a price increase is not material. Similarly, the claim that certain specific product categories must be excluded from safeguard measures as they are not available from Union producers or not available sufficiently or with the proper technical specifications should be rejected since traditional trade flows will be guaranteed.

(95)

Therefore, on balance, the Commission provisionally concludes that the Union interest requires the adoption of provisional safeguard measures under the specific form of a tariff increase which will be applied beyond traditional trade flows on a product category basis.

(96)

It was preliminary concluded that the Union steel industry is in a situation of threat of serious injury for the 23 product categories under assessment and that this situation is likely to develop into actual serious injury in the foreseeable future. Given the critical circumstances, it is considered that provisional safeguard measures should be taken in order to prevent damage to the EU steel industry which would be difficult to repair before the conclusion of the current investigation.

(97)

For the selection of the appropriate form of measure, the Commission considered the three following elements. First, serious injury to the global Union steel industry is likely to materialise due to the diversion of steel exports to the US to the EU as a consequence of the Section 232 measures. Second, it is considered that the openness of the Union market should be preserved and the traditional flow of imports should be maintained. Indeed, it is basically the excess of imports above these traditional trade flows that are considered to be the main threat for the situation of the steel industry. Finally, in conformity with Article 7(2) of Regulation (EU) 2015/478 and the Union's international obligations, in particular Article 6 of the WTO Agreement on Safeguards, the provisional measures should take the form of tariff measures.

(98)

On that basis the Commission considers that, as mentioned in recital (93), the provisional safeguard measures should take the form of a system of tariff rate quotas in excess of which an additional duty will be paid. To ensure access to the Union market to all traditional suppliers, such tariff rate quotas should be based on the average of the annual level of imports in the years 2015, 2016, and 2017. As the tariff rate quotas will be in operation for 200 calendar days, the quotas should be set at a corresponding pro-rata level to the annual figure.

(99)

The additional above-quota duty rate should be fixed at a level which is consistent with the aim of preventing serious injury to the Union industry. Given the conclusions on threat of serious injury and the fact that serious injury did not occur yet in overall terms, the Commission considers that calculating an injury margin on the basis of the constructed average non-injurious price per tonne of the Union industry's products in the most recent period does not seem to be appropriate.

(100)

Under these circumstances, the Commission rather considers it more appropriate to take a forward-looking approach to assessing the level of the duty necessary to deter imports in excess of traditional trade flows from materialising and producing serious injury to the Union industry once the level of the quota has been reached.

(101)

In this respect, the Union industry has submitted two complementary methods to calculate a sufficiently deterring tariff, which the Commission finds adequate for such purpose: the first is a partial equilibrium model of the Union market for steel, whereas the second calculates contribution margins for steel products.

(102)

A partial equilibrium model is a set of demand and supply equations focusing on one part of the economy and applying the ceteris paribus assumption to the rest of the economy. It also assumes that the macroeconomic impacts of the scenario that is analysed are not large enough to influence macroeconomic aggregates such as the overall wage level in an economy.

(103)

The model proposed by the Union industry is based on publically available code that is programmed and solved in a spreadsheet-software. Partial equilibrium models more broadly are a standard tool for trade policy analysis by investigating authorities, including the Commission.

(104)

The model, as most others, applies the so-called Armington assumption that products from different origins are imperfect substitutes. The model looks at the Union market only using a supply function each for Union domestic supply, import supply by countries subject to safeguards and import supply by countries exempted from safeguards. Finally, it employs an Union demand function that responds to the overall price level to determine demand for steel at the aggregate level and distributes this according to relative prices to the three mentioned sources of supply. This latter process is governed by the so-called Armington Elasticities, i.e. economic parameters representing the elasticity of substitution between products from different countries of origin that differ between product types and markets.

(105)

The data for the model comes from Eurofer and Eurostat. The Armington Elasticities, as well as the supply and demand elasticities come from established sources such as the U.S. ITC and the Global Trade Analysis Project (‘GTAP’). The Armington Elasticity is set at 3,75, the demand elasticity is set at – 0,5 and the three supply elasticities are set at 4 in accordance with these sources.

(106)

Being a one-country-model certain explicit and implicit assumptions need to be made, notably concerning the U.S. steel market and the impact of the measures imposed by invoking Section 232.

(107)

First, it is assumed that these measures will succeed in excluding from the U.S. market the current exports of countries subjected to Section 232 measures. In the next step, the proportion of these excluded exports that will be diverted towards the EU market for each producer country currently exporting to the U.S. is calculated according to a methodology under which four different criteria are considered and weighted: distance to the Union, availability in the relevant region of countries capable of absorbing diverted exports, existence of countries in the region with significant overcapacity, and the existence in the country of trade defence measures in place. According to this calculation, 72 % of current US imports of steel will be diverted to the EU market, which corresponds to 55 % of total Union imports of steel in 2017. It is further assumed that these additional imports will displace Union production of the same amount.

(108)

The model is specified with the above mentioned parameters and the market data corrected for the assumptions made in the two previous recitals. The model is then solved with experiments of various magnitudes of a Union out-of-quota safeguard tariff. The results of the model predict that a tariff of 25 % would allow import levels that are about 19 % higher than in the reference period of 2015-2017. A tariff of 32 % would still allow 10 % more imports than in the reference period. A tariff of 41 % would, on the other hand, suppress imports to their 2015-2017 level.

(109)

The results of the macroeconomic trade model are complemented with a series of microeconomic simulations of typical contribution margins for 12 different product categories under assessment. The assumption behind the analysis is that in case of falling prices, producers would continue to fully utilize their capacities and export to the Union as long as variable costs are covered. The margin between the sales price and variable costs is termed the contribution margin. In other words, a producer would continue producing as long as the contribution margin is non-negative. The analysis establishes for each of the twelve product categories under assessment the Union landed price at which the contribution margin for exporters to the EU would be entirely exhausted. The spread between this price and the non-injurious domestic price on the Union market should then be the out-of-quota tariff necessary to guarantee a non-injurious price level on the Union market.

(110)

The analysis uses a basket of raw material prices based on Metal Bulleting public indices, variable cost of Chinese firms from the CRU database and assumed freight costs of $60/tonne between China and the EU, which is stated to be a conservative estimate. It concludes that contribution margins and thus the necessary deterrent out-of-quota tariffs should be in the range of 19-45 %, with a median of 34 %, which would essentially confirm the order of magnitude of the out-of-quota tariff identified by the partial equilibrium model.

(111)

On the basis of the above, the Commission has preliminary established that a provisional 25 % out-of-quota tariff would be sufficient to prevent serious injury from occurring. This lower tariff than the 32 % resulting from the model for ensuring a traditional trade plus 10 % import flow increase represents a cautious approach, having regard to the Union interest, and pending comments from interested parties after the adoption of the provisional measures and a closer study of the evolution of imports before the imposition of definitive measures.

(112)

The best way of ensuring optimal use of the tariff quotas is to allocate them in the chronological order of the dates on which declarations of release for free circulation are accepted, as provided for in Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2015/2447 (15). Equal and continuous access to the quotas should be ensured for all Union importers. This method of administration calls for close cooperation between the Member States and the Commission.

(113)

The eligibility of imported goods from developing countries to be excluded from the tariff quotas is dependent on the origin of the goods. The criteria for determining non-preferential origin currently in force in the Union should therefore be applied.

(114)

For the purpose of the provisional measures, in order to permit traditional trade flows to continue, a specific quota will be determined for each of the product categories on which this Regulation imposes provisional measures, irrespectively of their country of origin. The remainder of the investigation will determine whether an allocation of quota by exporting country is desirable in order to ensure traditional trade flows from these countries and having regard to the impact of the provisional measures. In particular, the Commission will have to consider the potential effect of the anti-dumping and anti-subsidy measures currently in force on the allocation and usage of a per-country quota.

(115)

Once the determined free-of-duty quota is reached, the safeguard measures will apply.

(116)

Several interested parties claimed that the combination of the already imposed anti-dumping and countervailing measures on many product categories with the safeguard measures on those same imports would place an undesirably onerous burden on certain exporting producers seeking to export to the EU, which may have the effect of denying them access to the Union market.

(117)

Indeed, for 12 steel product categories covered by the current provisional safeguard measures, some countries of origin are currently subject to anti-dumping and countervailing duties. It is therefore necessary to consider whether the cumulation of these measures with the safeguard measures would not lead to a greater effect than desirable (16). In order to avoid the imposition of ‘double remedies’, whenever the tariff quota is exceeded, the level of the existing anti-dumping and countervailing will be suspended or reduced to ensure that the combined effect of these measures does not exceed the highest level of the safeguard or anti-dumping/countervailing duties in place.

(118)

The provisional measures should apply for 200 calendar days from the date on which this Regulation enters into force.

(119)

In accordance with Article 18 of Regulation 2015/478 and the international obligations of the Union, the provisional measures should not apply to any product originating in a developing country as long as its share of imports of that product into the Union does not exceed 3 %, provided that developing country members of the WTO with less than a 3 % import share, collectively account for not more than 9 % of total Union imports of the product concerned.

(120)

The preliminary determination made by the Commission shows that the product categories concerned originating in certain developing countries meet the requirements to benefit from the abovementioned derogation. Annex IV (List of products originating in developing countries to which the provisional measures apply) specifies the developing countries for the purposes of this Regulation. It also indicates for each of the 23 product categories the developing countries to which the provisional measures apply. The Commission considers it appropriate at this stage to calculate the volume of imports from developing countries on the basis of each product category since the tariff rate quota is also established by reference to traditional trade flows from each category individually. This is without prejudice as to future decisions regarding whether a country can be considered as a developing country.

(121)

As set out in recital (80) above, on account of the close integration of markets with EEA members, the overall figures of imports from these countries, and the low risk of trade diversion, the Commission considers that the products under assessment originating in Norway, Iceland, and Liechtenstein should be excluded from the application of this Regulation,