(1)

Regulation (EU) 2018/1806 of the European Parliament and of the Council (2) lists the third countries whose nationals are to be in possession of a visa when crossing the external borders of the Member States (the ‘visa requirement’) and those whose nationals are exempt from the visa requirement for stays of no more than 90 days in any 180-day period (the ‘visa exemption’).

(2)

Visa-free travel brings significant benefits to the Union and third countries alike. Economic, social and cultural relations with third countries create prosperity and promote internationally the open and free nature of the Union as an area of freedom, security and justice. The Union’s common visa policy, in that regard, is a cornerstone of its engagement with third countries. At the same time, the evolving geopolitical context has brought new challenges linked to visa-free travel. In order to address those new challenges and a wider range of irregular migration, public policy and security risks arising from the third countries listed in Annex II to Regulation (EU) 2018/1806 (‘visa-exempt third countries’), the mechanism for the temporary suspension of the visa exemption for the nationals of a visa-exempt third country (the ‘suspension mechanism’) should be strengthened and made more efficient.

(3)

The use of the suspension mechanism should be facilitated, in particular, by broadening the possible grounds for triggering it, adapting the relevant thresholds and procedures and strengthening the Commission’s monitoring and reporting obligations.

(4)

The Union has concluded a number of short-stay visa waiver agreements with visa-exempt third countries and might conclude further such agreements in the future. Where the suspension mechanism is triggered with regard to a third country with which the Union has concluded such an agreement, it should be applied without prejudice to the relevant provisions on the grounds for suspension and the procedures set out in the agreement concerned. Accordingly, in order for the suspension of the visa exemption under Union law to take effect in compliance with the Union’s international obligations, the application of the relevant agreement must be suspended in parallel by means of a Council decision.

(5)

Due to a need to ensure an immediate and appropriate response to hybrid threats that is in line with Union law and the Union’s international obligations, it should be possible to trigger the suspension mechanism where there are risks or threats to the public policy or internal security of Member States arising from hybrid threats such as situations of state sponsored instrumentalisation of migrants, as referred to in Regulation (EU) 2024/1359 of the European Parliament and of the Council (3), which aim to destabilise or undermine society and key institutions.

(6)

It is essential to be able to fully trust the travel, identity and breeder documents issued by visa-exempt third countries. It is also essential that such documents cannot be easily falsified or counterfeited. As deficiencies of a systemic nature in the document security law or procedures of visa-exempt third countries could lead to risks or threats to the public policy or internal security of Member States, it should be possible to trigger the suspension mechanism on that ground.

(7)

Investor citizenship schemes operated by visa-exempt third countries enable third-country nationals who would otherwise be subject to the visa requirement to travel visa free to the Union. Under an investor citizenship scheme, citizenship is granted to a person in return for pre-determined payments or investments without that person having any genuine link to the third country concerned. While the Union respects the right of sovereign countries to decide on their own naturalisation procedures, visa-exempt third countries should be deterred from using visa-free access to the Union as a tool for leveraging individual investment in return for citizenship. In addition, a lack of comprehensive security checks, vetting procedures and due diligence by such third countries with regard to investor citizenship schemes poses several serious security risks for Union citizens, such as those stemming from money laundering and corruption. To prevent visa-free access to the Union being used for that purpose, it should be possible to suspend the visa exemption for a third country which chooses to operate investor citizenship schemes under which citizenship is granted to a person without that person having any genuine link to that third country.

(8)

A visa policy of a visa-exempt third country that is not aligned with the visa policy of the Union as regards the list of visa-exempt third countries could result in irregular migration to the Union, in particular where the third country concerned is in close geographic proximity to the Union. Therefore, it should be possible to trigger the suspension mechanism where, following an assessment, the Commission concludes that such non-alignment of a third country’s visa policy could lead to a substantial increase in the number of nationals of other third countries who arrive legally on the territory of that third country and then irregularly enter the territory of the Member States.

(9)

Regulation (EU) 2018/1806 determines the third countries whose nationals are subject to, or exempt from, the visa requirement. Some of the criteria used to assess the appropriateness of granting a visa exemption are reflected in the grounds for suspension in other provisions of that Regulation, thereby ensuring a link between the criteria for granting a visa exemption and the grounds for suspension. The suspension mechanism as revised by this Regulation should therefore also provide for the possibility of suspending the visa exemption where there is a deterioration in the Union’s external relations with a visa-exempt third country caused by serious breaches of the principles set out in the Charter of the United Nations, grave violations of fundamental freedoms or of the obligations deriving from international human rights law or international humanitarian law, serious breaches of international law and international legal standards, non-compliance with international court decisions and rulings or hostile acts carried out against the Union or Member States with the aim of destabilising or undermining society or institutions which are key for the public policy and internal security of the Union or Member States. Such hostile acts could result from foreign interference in political processes, economic coercion, cyber operations, economic espionage or the sabotage of critical infrastructure. Moreover, given that the external relations of the Union will be affected as a whole, it should be the exclusive prerogative of the Commission to trigger the suspension mechanism, after consulting the Member States, on the ground of a deterioration in the Union’s external relations with a visa-exempt third country. Additionally, where the Commission considers suspending the visa exemption on that ground, it should take into account, in its assessment, the potential impact of the suspension on the nationals of the third country concerned.

(10)

Short-stay visa waiver agreements concluded with visa-exempt third countries might include grounds for suspension which are different to those set out in the suspension mechanism. Consequently, it should also be possible to trigger the suspension mechanism on the basis of those grounds. However, the use of the grounds for suspension set out in short-stay visa waiver agreements should be limited to the scope of application of those agreements.

(11)

The Commission should assess, on a case-by-case basis, the thresholds for triggering the suspension mechanism in the event of a substantial increase in the number of nationals of a visa-exempt third country refused entry to the Member State’s territory or found to be staying in the Member State’s territory without a right to do so, in the number of asylum applications from the nationals of a visa-exempt third country for which the recognition rate is low or in the number of serious criminal offences linked to the nationals of a visa-exempt third country. In particular, the Commission should be able to assess whether, in the cases notified by Member States or on the basis of its own analysis, there are specific circumstances which would justify the application of lower or higher thresholds than those indicated in the relevant provisions of Regulation (EU) 2018/1806. In its assessment, the Commission should take into account, inter alia, the number of unauthorised crossings of the external borders of the Member States, the number of unfounded asylum applications or the number of criminal offences linked to the nationals of a visa-exempt third country in proportion to the number and size of Member States affected and the impact of those numbers on the overall migratory situation, the functioning of asylum systems or the internal security of the Member States affected. The Commission should also take into account actions taken by the third country concerned to remedy the situation. The Commission should thoroughly assess the necessity, proportionality and consequences of a suspension of the visa exemption before adopting the relevant legal act.

(12)

For the purpose of notifying the Commission of circumstances that might amount to a ground for suspension, Member States should be able to take into account reference periods longer than two months in order to identify not only sudden changes in the relevant situation, but also longer-term trends, up to 12 months, that might justify the triggering of the suspension mechanism.

(13)

Whenever it considers it necessary, or at the request of the European Parliament or the Council, the Commission should report to the European Parliament and to the Council on the outcome of its systematic monitoring of the visa exemption in relation to all visa-exempt third countries, on the basis, inter alia, of data from Union information systems, such as the Entry/Exit System, established by Regulation (EU) 2017/2226 of the European Parliament and of the Council (4), and the European Travel Information and Authorisation System, established by Regulation (EU) 2018/1240 of the European Parliament and of the Council (5), and from Union bodies, offices and agencies. Such reports should focus on those visa-exempt third countries which, according to the Commission’s analysis, no longer meet the criteria for granting a visa exemption under Regulation (EU) 2018/1806 that are relevant for the grounds for suspension or on those visa-exempt third countries which present specific problems that, if not addressed, could lead to a triggering of the suspension mechanism. In particular, it is appropriate that the Commission consider reporting on third countries which have been newly listed in Annex II to Regulation (EU) 2018/1806 without engaging in a visa liberalisation dialogue with the Union, where it considers it necessary and, in particular, in the first years following the entry into force of the legal act providing for the visa exemption for such a third country.

(14)

Where the suspension mechanism is triggered on the grounds that a visa-exempt third country with which a visa liberalisation dialogue has been successfully concluded has not complied with the specific requirements on external relations or fundamental rights which were used to assess the appropriateness of granting its nationals a visa exemption or on the grounds that there has been a deterioration in the Union’s external relations with that visa-exempt third country, the Commission should favour a targeted approach. Under such an approach, the Commission should apply the suspension first and foremost to individuals holding positions of responsibility, such as members of that third country’s official delegations, members of that third country’s local, regional and national governments, members of that third country’s parliaments or high-ranking public or military officials of that third country, thereby minimising adverse consequences for the general population of that third country. The Commission should continuously monitor whether the triggering of the suspension mechanism has achieved the intended result and regularly report thereon to the European Parliament and to the Council.

(15)

Where a decision to temporarily suspend the visa exemption has been taken on the grounds that a visa-exempt third country with which a visa liberalisation dialogue has been successfully concluded has not complied with the specific requirements on external relations or fundamental rights which were used to assess the appropriateness of granting a visa exemption or on the grounds that there has been a deterioration in the Union’s external relations with that visa-exempt third country, and that decision targets categories of nationals of that third country in positions of responsibility, the Member States should take all necessary steps not to provide for exceptions from the temporary visa requirement for the entire duration of the temporary suspension.

(16)

Where the Commission considers suspending a visa exemption on the basis of its own analysis or following a notification by a Member State, it should take into account, in its assessment, the impact of the suspension on civil society in the third country concerned, in particular where the human rights situation in that third country has deteriorated.

(17)

Where a decision to temporarily suspend the visa exemption for a third country has been taken, there should be an adequate timeframe for an enhanced dialogue between the Commission and the third country concerned, which aims to remedy the circumstances that led to the suspension. For that purpose, the duration of a temporary suspension, adopted by means of an implementing act, should be 12 months, with a possibility to extend it by a further 24 months by means of a delegated act. When adopting such a delegated act, it is important that the Commission explain in detail the outcome of the enhanced dialogue with the third country concerned, the measures adopted by that third country and by the Member States concerned and the reasons for considering that the circumstances leading to the temporary suspension have not been remedied. Where no solution is found before the end of the period of application of the delegated act and the Commission presents a legislative proposal to transfer the reference to the third country concerned from Annex II to Annex I of Regulation (EU) 2018/1806, the Commission should adopt a delegated act extending the temporary suspension until the entry into force of the adopted legislative proposal. However, that extension should not be longer than 24 months.

(18)

Where an implementing act temporarily suspending the visa exemption for nationals of a third country is adopted on the grounds that that third country, whose nationals have been exempted from the visa requirement as a result of the successful conclusion of a visa liberalisation dialogue, has not complied with the specific requirements on external relations or fundamental rights which were used to assess the appropriateness of granting its nationals a visa exemption or on the grounds that there has been a deterioration in the Union’s external relations with that third country, and those circumstances persist, the Commission should be able to decide that the delegated act extending the suspension applies only to certain categories of third-country nationals, taking into account the specific circumstances of the case and the principle of proportionality. Where no solution is found before the end of the period of application of that delegated act, the Commission should reassess the situation and should be able to decide to further extend the suspension by means of a further delegated act applying to designated categories of third-country nationals.

(19)

Where duly justified by the urgency of the matter, for example to prevent a mass influx of third-country nationals arriving irregularly in the territory of the Member States or a serious damage to the public policy or internal security of Member States, the chair of the committee established pursuant to Regulation (EU) 2018/1806 to assist the Commission should consider shortening the time period for convening a meeting of the committee and making use of the written procedure as provided for by Regulation (EU) No 182/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council (6) as that would make it possible for that committee to deliver its opinion faster than would otherwise be the case.

(20)

A temporary suspension of the visa exemption should be lifted whenever the circumstances that led to it are remedied before the end of the period of the suspension. To that end, the Commission should adopt an implementing act before the end of the period of suspension where that period is set out in an implementing act or a delegated act before the end of the period of suspension where that period is set out in a delegated act.

(21)

This Regulation constitutes a development of the provisions of the Schengen acquis in which Ireland does not take part, in accordance with Council Decision 2002/192/EC (7); Ireland is therefore not taking part in the adoption of this Regulation and is not bound by it or subject to its application.

(22)

As regards Iceland and Norway, this Regulation constitutes a development of the provisions of the Schengen acquis within the meaning of the Agreement concluded by the Council of the European Union and the Republic of Iceland and the Kingdom of Norway concerning the latters’ association with the implementation, application and development of the Schengen acquis (8), which fall within the area referred to in Article 1, points B and C, of Council Decision 1999/437/EC (9).

(23)

As regards Switzerland, this Regulation constitutes a development of the provisions of the Schengen acquis within the meaning of the Agreement between the European Union, the European Community and the Swiss Confederation on the Swiss Confederation’s association with the implementation, application and development of the Schengen acquis (10), which fall within the area referred to in Article 1, points B and C, of Decision 1999/437/EC, read in conjunction with Article 3 of Council Decision 2008/146/EC (11).

(24)

As regards Liechtenstein, this Regulation constitutes a development of the provisions of the Schengen acquis within the meaning of the Protocol between the European Union, the European Community, the Swiss Confederation and the Principality of Liechtenstein on the accession of the Principality of Liechtenstein to the Agreement between the European Union, the European Community and the Swiss Confederation on the Swiss Confederation’s association with the implementation, application and development of the Schengen acquis (12), which fall within the area referred to in Article 1, points B and C, of Decision 1999/437/EC, read in conjunction with Article 3 of Council Decision 2011/350/EU (13).

(25)

As regards Cyprus, this Regulation constitutes an act building upon, or otherwise relating to, the Schengen acquis within the meaning of Article 3(1) of the 2003 Act of Accession,

(1)

Article 8 is replaced by the following:

(2)

the following articles are inserted:

(*1)  Regulation (EU) 2019/1896 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 November 2019 on the European Border and Coast Guard and repealing Regulations (EU) No 1052/2013 and (EU) 2016/1624 (OJ L 295, 14.11.2019, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2019/1896/oj)."

(*2)  Regulation (EU) 2021/2303 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 December 2021 on the European Union Agency for Asylum and repealing Regulation (EU) No 439/2010 (OJ L 468, 30.12.2021, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/2303/oj)."

(*3)  Regulation (EU) 2016/794 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 May 2016 on the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation (Europol) and replacing and repealing Council Decisions 2009/371/JHA, 2009/934/JHA, 2009/935/JHA, 2009/936/JHA and 2009/968/JHA (OJ L 135, 24.5.2016, p. 53, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2016/794/oj).’;"

(3)

Article 10 is amended as follows: