(1)

Past crises, especially the early days of the COVID-19 crisis, have shown that the free movement of goods, persons and services in the internal market and its supply chains can be severely affected. That can have consequences on cross-border trade between Member States, thus creating obstacles to the proper functioning of the internal market. Furthermore, during those crises, appropriate crisis management tools and coordination mechanisms were either lacking, did not cover all aspects of the internal market or did not allow for a timely and effective response to such crises.

(2)

In the early phase of the COVID-19 crisis, Member States introduced barriers to free movement in the internal market as well as diverging measures regarding the supply of goods and services that were of critical importance or were indispensable for responding to the crisis, which were not always justified. Ad-hoc measures taken by the Commission in order to re-establish the functioning of the internal market, based on the existing rules, were not sufficient. The Union was not sufficiently prepared to ensure efficient manufacturing, procurement and distribution of crisis-relevant non-medical goods, such as personal protective equipment. Measures to ensure the availability of crisis-relevant non-medical goods during the COVID-19 crisis were necessarily reactive. The COVID-19 crisis also revealed insufficient information sharing and an insufficient overview of manufacturing capacities across the Union, as well as vulnerabilities related to intra-Union and global supply chains.

(3)

Furthermore, uncoordinated measures restricting the free movement of persons had a particular impact on sectors that rely on mobile workers, including workers in border regions, who played an essential role in the internal market during the COVID-19 crisis.

(4)

It was possible for the Council, through the Integrated Political Crisis Response (IPCR) arrangements, to exchange information and coordinate certain actions with regard to the COVID-19 crisis, while Member States acted independently in other situations. However, actions by the Commission were delayed by several weeks due to the lack of Union-wide contingency planning measures and a lack of clarity as to which national authority should be contacted to find rapid solutions to the impact of the crisis on the internal market. In addition, it became clear that uncoordinated restrictive actions taken by the Member States would further aggravate the impact of the crisis on the internal market. It emerged that there is a need for arrangements between the Member States and Union institutions, bodies, offices and agencies as regards contingency planning, technical level coordination and cooperation, and information exchange. Additionally, it became clear that the lack of effective coordination between Member States exacerbated the shortages of goods and created more obstacles to the free movement of services and persons.

(5)

Representative organisations of economic operators claimed that economic operators did not have sufficient information on the restrictions to free movement or crisis-response measures introduced by the Member States during the COVID-19 crisis. That was due, inter alia, to a lack of transparency from authorities of the Member States, to economic operators not knowing where to obtain such information, to language constraints and to the administrative burden implied in making repeated inquiries in all Member States, especially in a constantly changing regulatory environment. That lack of information prevented economic operators from making informed business decisions regarding the extent to which they could exercise their right to free movement or continue cross-border business operations during that crisis. It is necessary to improve the availability of information regarding national and Union-level restrictions on free movement and crisis response measures.

(6)

Despite the initial lack of coordination, the internal market rules played a key role in mitigating the negative impact of the COVID-19 crisis and in ensuring a swift recovery of the Union economy, namely by precluding unjustified and disproportionate national restrictions contained in the unilateral responses by the Member States and by providing a strong incentive to find common solutions, thus promoting solidarity.

(7)

Events linked to the COVID-19 crisis have highlighted the need for the Union to take a coordinated approach and be better prepared for possible future crises, especially considering the continuing effects of climate change which result in natural disasters, as well as global economic and geopolitical instabilities. Other crises which might require a quicker response to prevent barriers to free movement in the internal market and to avoid severe disruptions to supply chains that are indispensable in the maintenance of activities in the internal market include, for example, forest fires, earthquakes or large-scale cyber attacks. The fact that such crises constitute exceptional and sudden events of extraordinary nature and scale implies that such events are reasonably unexpected. As it is not known what kind of crises could arise next and have a severe impact on the internal market and its supply chains in the future, it is necessary to provide for an instrument that would apply in the event of a wide range of crises having an impact on the internal market.

(8)

The impact of a crisis on the internal market can hinder the functioning of the internal market in two ways. It can give rise to obstacles to free movement or it can cause disruptions to supply chains. Disruptions to supply chains can exacerbate shortages of goods and services in the internal market and hinder production, which leads to additional barriers to trade and to the distortion of competition between Member States and between private operators, thereby disrupting the proper functioning of the internal market. Disruptions to supply chains can also lead to the emergence or likely emergence of diverging national measures to address those supply chain issues, leading to the activation of an internal market emergency mode. This Regulation should address these types of impacts on the internal market and introduce measures to avoid obstacles to free movement or supply chain disruptions that create shortages of crisis-relevant goods or services.

(9)

In order to avoid an unnecessary administrative burden on Member States, incidents reported by means of the ad hoc alerts for early warning referred to in this Regulation should be defined in such a manner that they exclude events that have a negligible foreseeable consequence on the free movement of goods, services and persons, including workers, or on the supply chains of goods and services that are indispensable to the maintenance of vital societal functions or economic activities in the internal market.

(10)

In order to ensure that the framework of measures laid down by this Regulation is able to deploy its full effect in the context of the internal market vigilance and the internal market emergency modes, the Commission should be empowered to set out detailed arrangements regarding crisis preparedness, cooperation, exchange of information and crisis communication. Those detailed arrangements, taking the form of a contingency framework, should set out the specific technical and operational aspects of the mechanisms for exchanging information between the Commission and the Member States. Furthermore, it should lay down arrangements for operational coordination between the Commission and the Member States regarding crisis communication. In this context, a dedicated inventory of all the competent authorities of the respective Member States involved in the implementation of the framework laid down by this Regulation should be set up on the basis of the information communicated by the Member States. That inventory should indicate, in particular, the roles and responsibilities assigned to the competent authorities of their respective Member States during the internal market vigilance and emergency modes in accordance with national law. The arrangements between the Commission and the Member States should also cover the secure exchange of information concerning consultation of the economic operators and social partners with respect to their respective initiatives and actions to mitigate and respond to the effects of a potential crisis.

(11)

The measures set out in this Regulation should be deployed in a coherent, transparent, efficient, proportionate and timely manner, having due regard to the need to maintain vital societal functions, including public security, public safety, public order or public health. This Regulation should not affect the competence of the Member States with respect to, for example, national policies of public health and should be without prejudice to the responsibility of the Member States to safeguard national security and their power to safeguard other essential state functions, including ensuring the territorial integrity of the state and maintaining law and order. This Regulation should therefore be without prejudice to matters related to national security and defence.

(12)

This Regulation provides the necessary means to ensure, during times of crisis, the continued functioning of the internal market, of the businesses that operate in the internal market and its strategic supply chains, including the free movement of goods, services and persons, including workers, and the availability of crisis-relevant goods or services to citizens, businesses and public authorities. In addition, this Regulation establishes a forum for appropriate coordination, cooperation and exchange of information. Furthermore, it provides the means for the timely accessibility and availability of the information needed for a targeted response and adequate market behaviour by businesses and citizens during a crisis.

(13)

Where possible, this Regulation should allow for anticipation of events and crises by allowing the Union to continue building on ongoing analysis concerning critically important sectors of the internal market economy.

(14)

By reinforcing the resilience and preparedness of Union industry with regard to critical raw materials, Regulation (EU) 2024/1252 of the European Parliament and of the Council (4) complements this Regulation, which allows the Commission, during an internal market vigilance mode or internal market emergency mode, to activate targeted measures when a threat to or a disruption to the supply of goods of critical importance emerges, including with regard to critical raw materials.

(15)

This Regulation should not duplicate the existing framework for medicinal products, medical devices or other medical countermeasures under the EU Health Security Framework, including Regulations (EU) 2022/123 (5), (EU) 2022/2370 (6) and (EU) 2022/2371 (7) of the European Parliament and of the Council and Council Regulation (EU) 2022/2372 (8) regarding crisis preparedness and response in the area of health. The EU Health Security Framework should take precedence over this Regulation as regards supply chain disruptions and shortages of medicinal products, medical devices or other medical countermeasures where the conditions of that framework are met. Therefore, medicinal products, medical devices or other medical countermeasures within the meaning of Regulations (EU) 2022/2371 and (EU) 2022/2372 should, where they have been included in the list adopted pursuant to Article 7(1) of Regulation (EU) 2022/2372, be excluded from the scope of this Regulation, except in relation to the provisions relating to the free movement of goods, services and persons, including workers, during an internal market emergency, and in particular those designed to re-establish and facilitate free movement.

(16)

This Regulation should complement the IPCR arrangements operated by the Council under Council Decision 2014/415/EU (9) as regards the Council’s work on the impact on the internal market of cross-sectoral crises that require decision-making in relation to contingency planning and the implementation of vigilance and emergency measures. This Regulation should be without prejudice to the IPCR arrangements operated by the Council under Council Implementing Decision (EU) 2018/1993 (10).

(17)

This Regulation should be without prejudice to the Union Civil Protection Mechanism (UCPM). This Regulation should complement the UCPM and should support it, where necessary, as regards the availability of critical goods and the free movement of civil protection workers, including their equipment, for crises that fall under the remit of the UCPM.

(18)

This Regulation should be without prejudice to Regulation (EU) 2016/399 of the European Parliament and of the Council (11), including its general framework for the temporary introduction or prolongation of internal border controls and the notification system for the temporary reintroduction of internal border controls.

(19)

This Regulation should be without prejudice to the provisions of Regulation (EC) No 178/2002 of the European Parliament and of the Council (12) on crisis management, as set out in Articles 55 to 57 thereof, implemented by Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2019/300 (13).

(20)

This Regulation should be without prejudice to the European Food Security Crisis preparedness and response Mechanism. Nevertheless, food products should be governed by the free movement provisions of this Regulation, including those concerning restrictions to the right to free movement. The measures concerning food products can also be reviewed as regards their compliance with any other relevant provisions of Union law.

(21)

This Regulation should be without prejudice to the ability of the Commission to enter into consultations or to cooperate, on behalf of the Union, with relevant authorities of countries outside the Union, in accordance with Union law, with particular attention paid to developing countries, with a view to seeking cooperative solutions to avoid disruptions to supply chains, in compliance with international obligations. This may involve, where appropriate, coordination in relevant international fora.

(22)

One of the challenges identified during the COVID-19 crisis was the lack of a network for ensuring preparedness and information sharing between the Member States, on the one hand, and between the Member States and the Commission, on the other hand. Therefore, the achievement of the objectives pursued by this Regulation should be supported by a governance mechanism. At Union level, this Regulation should establish an Internal Market Emergency and Resilience Board (the ‘Board’), composed of representatives of the Member States and chaired by the Commission, to facilitate cooperation, exchange of information and the smooth, effective and harmonised implementation of this Regulation. The Board should provide advice to and assist the Commission on specific questions, including the consistent implementation of this Regulation, facilitating cooperation among Member States, and it should analyse and discuss relevant topics relating to imminent or ongoing crises.

(23)

The Commission should chair the Board and provide its secretariat. Each Member State should appoint a representative and an alternate representative. The Chair should invite a representative from the European Parliament as a permanent observer. In order to receive relevant advice on the activities of the Board and allow appropriate participation of experts, the Chair should be able to invite experts to take part, as observers, in the work of the Board and to attend specific meetings, on an ad-hoc basis, where such attendance is relevant considering the agenda of the meeting. With a view to ensuring a coherent and coordinated Union response to various crises which might have an impact on the functioning of the internal market, the Chair should also invite representatives of other crisis-relevant bodies at Union level as observers to the relevant meetings of the Board. With a view to promoting international cooperation, the Chair should invite representatives of international organisations and countries outside the Union to take part in relevant meetings of the Board in accordance with the relevant bilateral or international agreements. The Chair should be able to invite observers to contribute to the discussions with relevant expertise, information and insights, but observers should not take part in the formulation of opinions, recommendations or advice of the Board.

(24)

The Board should have specific tasks in the context of the contingency framework, the internal market vigilance mode and the internal market emergency mode. Those tasks include the exchange of views and the provision of advice to the Commission with respect to the assessment of the criteria which are to be taken into consideration when activating the different modes as well as with respect to the assessment of whether the specific preconditions for the deployment of concrete response measures are met. The Commission should take the utmost account of opinions, recommendations or reports adopted by the Board.

(25)

In the interest of guaranteeing the confidentiality of the information received pursuant to this Regulation, the Board is encouraged to provide in its rules of procedure that its members and observers are not to disclose trade and business secrets and other sensitive and confidential information acquired or generated in application of this Regulation and are to respect professional secrecy obligations equivalent to those applicable to members of staff of the Commission.

(26)

In order to ensure greater transparency, accountability and coordination, particularly in times of crises, the competent committee of the European Parliament should be able to invite the Chair of the Board to appear before that committee. The European Parliament should be informed as soon as possible of any Council implementing acts proposed or adopted. The Commission should take into account elements arising from the views expressed through the emergency and resilience dialogue carried out under this Regulation, including the relevant resolutions of the European Parliament.

(27)

Furthermore, in order to enhance involvement of key stakeholders, in particular representatives of economic operators, social partners, researchers and civil society, the Commission should set up a stakeholder platform to facilitate and encourage voluntary response to internal market emergencies.

(28)

To ensure effective coordination and information exchange in the context of the contingency framework, as well as in the context of the internal market vigilance and emergency modes, Member States should designate a central liaison office responsible for contact with the Union-level liaison office designated by the Commission and with the central liaison offices of other Member States. The central liaison offices should work as a focal point as regards contacts with relevant competent authorities of the Member States, compiling information from those authorities, including, where relevant, authorities at regional and local level. The central liaison offices should also be responsible for coordination and information exchange. It should be possible for Member States to designate an authority that already exists as their central liaison office. Such liaison offices should also transmit all crisis-relevant information to the single points of contact in the Member States in real time where possible.

(29)

This Regulation should be without prejudice to the possibility of the Commission to assess whether it is appropriate to impose restrictions on exports of goods in line with the international rights and obligations of the Union under Regulation (EU) 2015/479 of the European Parliament and of the Council (14).

(30)

This Regulation should be without prejudice to measures taken pursuant to Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council (15).

(31)

This Regulation applies without prejudice to and is complementary with Directive (EU) 2022/2557 of the European Parliament and of the Council (16), which lays down harmonised minimum rules to ensure that services essential for the maintenance of vital societal functions or economic activities are provided in an unobstructed manner in the internal market, to enhance the resilience of critical entities providing such services, and to improve cross-border cooperation between competent authorities.

(32)

With the objective of being better prepared for and more resilient during potential future crises which could have a severe negative impact on the free movement of goods, services and persons, including workers, or cause disruptions to the supply chains of goods and services in the internal market, the Commission should encourage and facilitate economic operators in drawing up voluntary crisis protocols. Economic operators should remain free to decide whether to take part in such voluntary crisis protocols. Participation in such voluntary crisis protocols should not give rise to a disproportionate administrative burden. The voluntary crisis protocols should set out the specific parameters of the disruptions that are expected, as well as an allocation of the specific roles of each participant, a description of the mechanisms of activation of such protocols and the associated actions. Relevant stakeholders, including authorities of the Member States, Union bodies, offices and agencies and civil society organisations or other relevant organisations may also be involved in the drawing up of such voluntary crisis protocols. In determining the parameters of the disruptions to be considered, economic operators should be able to build on their past experiences in relation to restrictions on free movement and supply chain disruptions caused by various crises.

(33)

With the view to drawing from the experience of past crises, the Commission should develop and make available training programmes and materials for public and private stakeholders, including economic operators. Participation in such training programmes and in simulations should remain voluntary.

(34)

As part of crisis preparedness, this Regulation should allow for anticipation of events and crises for which it would be possible to carry out stress tests and simulations, building on ongoing analysis concerning critically important sectors of the internal market economy and the Union’s continuous foresight work. In particular, the Commission should develop scenarios and parameters in specific sectors that capture the particular risks associated with a crisis. In order to ensure the crisis preparedness of all actors, it is necessary to set out rules on stress tests, which should be conducted at least every two years. In this context, the Commission should facilitate and encourage the development of strategies for emergency preparedness, including strategies for crisis communication and exchanging information about applicable restrictions in challenging circumstances. The identification of the specific focus sectors should be based on existing indicator-based tools which monitor the development of supply chains in the Union with a view to identifying potential distress, taking into account relevant specific criteria such as trade flows, demand and supply, concentration of supply, Union and global production and production capacities at different stages of the value chain and the interdependencies between economic operators.

(35)

It should be possible to exchange information relating to ad hoc alerts for early warning through the network created between the central liaison offices of the Member States and the Union-level liaison office. Such ad hoc alerts for early warning should be notified to the Commission in cases of significant incidents in order to allow the Union to better follow the development of a potential, imminent or ongoing crisis, thus ensuring a better level of preparedness should the crisis emerge or develop.

(36)

In order to account for the exceptional nature of and potential far-reaching consequences for the functioning of the internal market during the internal market vigilance mode or during the internal market emergency mode, implementing powers should exceptionally be conferred on the Council for the activation of the internal market vigilance mode or the internal market emergency mode pursuant to Article 291(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). The Council implementing act for the activation of the internal market vigilance mode should contain elements which are intrinsically linked to the assessment of the fulfilment of the preconditions justifying the activation, namely an assessment of the potential impact of the relevant crisis on the free movement of goods, services and persons, including workers, in the internal market and on its supply chains, a list of the goods and services of critical importance which are indispensable to the maintenance of vital societal functions or economic activities in the internal market and the vigilance measures to be taken. Furthermore, where the activation of the internal market emergency mode also requires the adoption of a list of crisis-relevant goods or of crisis-relevant services, or of both, that list should be adopted at the same time as the internal market emergency mode is activated and should therefore be intrinsically linked to that activation. For that reason, implementing powers should also be conferred on the Council for the adoption of that list of crisis-relevant goods or crisis-relevant services and any update thereto. It should be possible to extend the internal market vigilance mode or internal market emergency mode through a Council implementing act on a proposal from the Commission. If it transpires that there is no need for either of the modes to be active, then the respective mode should be deactivated.

(37)

To ensure that the Board receives appropriate information about a potential internal market emergency, it is necessary to provide for monitoring. Such monitoring should concern supply chains of goods and services of critical importance for which the internal market vigilance mode has been activated and the free movement of persons who are involved in the production and supply of such goods and services. Monitoring of the supply chains of goods and services of critical importance should be carried out by the competent authorities of the Member States on the basis of requests for the voluntary provision of information about factors impacting the availability of the selected goods and services of critical importance, such as production capacity, availability of the necessary workforce, stocks, suppliers’ limitations, possibilities for diversification and substitution, demand conditions and bottlenecks. The request for the voluntary provision of information in the context of such monitoring should be addressed to all actors along the relevant supply chain of goods and services of critical importance and other relevant stakeholders established in the territory of the Member States. Collecting information about disruptions to free movement from the relevant economic operators along the supply chains of goods and services of critical importance is particularly important because the lack of an appropriate workforce is one of the prevailing causes of disruptions to supply chains. The monitoring, by authorities of the Member States, of disruptions to the free movement of persons involved in the production and supply of goods and services should be understood broadly, covering workers, service providers, business representatives and other persons involved in research, development and placing goods on the market. Competent authorities of the Member States should provide the information gathered to the Commission and the Board via the central liaison offices. That information should enable the Board to advise the Commission on the necessity of activation of the internal market emergency mode.

(38)

For national measures which are not harmonised under this Regulation and which affect, when adopted and applied in response to an internal market emergency, the free movement of goods or persons, or the freedom to provide services during internal market emergencies, Member States should ensure that such measures fully comply with the TFEU and other provisions of Union law such as Regulation (EU) No 492/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council (17), and Directives 2004/38/EC (18), 2005/36/EC (19), 2006/123/EC (20) and (EU) 2015/1535 (21) of the European Parliament and of the Council. If Member States adopt such measures, they should be justified and respect the principles of proportionality and non-discrimination in accordance with Union law.Furthermore, in line with those principles, such measures should not create an unnecessary administrative burden and Member States should take all possible measures to limit any administrative burden caused by measures adopted in response to an internal market emergency. In addition, any such measures should adequately take into account the situation of border regions and outermost regions, especially for cross-border workers. Member States should remove measures taken to respond to an internal market emergency that restrict free movement as soon as they are no longer necessary. In general, national measures restricting free movement which are not harmonised under this Regulation would be in principle no longer justified or proportionate when the internal market emergency mode is deactivated and should therefore be removed.

(39)

This Regulation should not be construed as authorising or justifying restrictions to the free movement of goods, services and persons contrary to the TFEU or other provisions of Union law. For example, the fact that some restrictions are explicitly prohibited during an internal market emergency mode should not be construed as justifying such restrictions outside that mode or as justifying other possible restrictions incompatible with Union law that are not explicitly prohibited by this Regulation.

(40)

Article 21 TFEU lays down the right of Union citizens to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States, subject to the limitations and conditions laid down in the Treaties and the measures adopted to give them effect. The detailed conditions and limitations regarding that right are laid down in Directive 2004/38/EC. That Directive sets out the general principles applicable to those limitations and the grounds that can be used to justify such measures. Those grounds are public policy, public security or public health. In that context, restrictions to the freedom of movement can be justified if they are proportionate and non-discriminatory. This Regulation is not intended to provide for additional grounds for the limitation of the right to free movement of persons beyond those provided for in Chapter VI of Directive 2004/38/EC.

(41)

Measures for facilitating the free movement of persons and any other measures affecting the free movement of persons provided under this Regulation are based on Article 21 TFEU and complement Directive 2004/38/EC during internal market emergencies. Such measures should not result in authorising or justifying restrictions to free movement contrary to the Treaties or other Union law.

(42)

Article 45 TFEU lays down the right to free movement of workers, subject to the limitations and conditions laid down in the Treaties and the measures adopted to give them effect. Article 46 TFEU is the legal basis for the adoption of measures required to bring about freedom of movement for workers, as defined in Article 45 TFEU. This Regulation contains provisions which complement existing measures in order to further strengthen the free movement of persons, increase transparency and provide administrative assistance during internal market emergencies. Such measures include setting up and making single points of contact available to workers and their representatives in the Member States and at Union level during the internal market vigilance and emergency modes in accordance with this Regulation.

(43)

It is appropriate to prohibit certain national measures that restrict free movement or the freedom to provide services and that should not be imposed during, or in response to, an internal market emergency, because they are manifestly disproportionate. Therefore, any such measures taken by Member States should be assessed in light of those harmonising provisions and not the TFEU or other Union law.

(44)

In particular, Member States should refrain from introducing measures that constitute discrimination based on nationality or, in the case of companies, the location of their registered office, central administration or principal place of business.

(45)

Member States should refrain from introducing measures that make it impossible for beneficiaries of the right to free movement to return to their Member State of residence should they find themselves in another Member State at the outbreak of a crisis.

(46)

Member States should refrain from taking measures that make it impossible for beneficiaries of the right to free movement to travel to other Member States for imperative family reasons, when such travel remains permitted within the Member State adopting the measure in the same circumstances.

(47)

This Regulation should not prevent Member States from allowing their nationals and residents to return to their territory during internal market emergencies. To facilitate such travel, other Member States should allow such nationals and residents to exit their territory to travel to the Member State of nationality or residence, or to transit through their territory in order to reach the Member State of nationality or residence.

(48)

Restrictions to free movement, including in the form of administrative requirements and procedures such as declaration, registration or authorisation procedures, are prohibited, unless they comply with Union law. When justified and proportionate administrative requirements and procedures have been adopted in accordance with Union law, Member States should, during an internal market emergency, prioritise facilitating compliance with such requirements and processing such procedures for persons involved in the production or supply of crisis-relevant goods or crisis-relevant services. To that end and when necessary to do so in order to facilitate the free movement of such providers or certain categories thereof, the Commission should put in place arrangements, including digital tools and templates.

(49)

This Regulation lays down obligations with a view to ensuring transparency in relation to national measures adopted during an internal market emergency mode that restrict the right to free movement of persons. Any such restrictions should comply with Union law, in particular Directive 2004/38/EC. Those obligations should be without prejudice to any existing information or notification obligations that continue to apply. The free movement of persons is of paramount importance for the proper functioning of the internal market. Experience from the COVID-19 crisis shows that restrictions to that right to free movement can have spill-over effects on all other fundamental freedoms. Lack of information on crisis-related restrictions to the free movement of persons can cause Union citizens and economic operators additional difficulties in managing their activities during a crisis. Currently, there is no applicable transparency system in force that could provide Union citizens and economic operators with information on restrictions to the free movement of persons. Member States should communicate to the Commission and to other Member States the text of the national legislative or regulatory provisions introducing restrictions on the exercise of the right to free movement of persons in response to a crisis, as well as the modifications thereof, without delay after their adoption. That text should be accompanied by the reasons for such measures, including reasons demonstrating that the measures are justified and proportionate, as well as any underlying scientific or other data supporting their adoption, the scope of such measures, the dates of adoption and application, and the duration of those measures. To ensure that Union citizens and economic operators can obtain reliable information regarding restrictions to free movement, Member States should provide the public with clear, comprehensive and timely information explaining such measures, in particular their scope, date of adoption and application and duration, as soon as possible. That information should also be provided to the Commission. On that basis, the Commission should publish the relevant information on a dedicated website available in all official languages of the institutions of the Union.

(50)

In order to ensure that the specific internal market emergency measures provided for in this Regulation are used only when indispensable for responding to a particular internal market emergency, such measures should require activation by means of Commission implementing acts indicating the reasons for such activation and the crisis-relevant goods or crisis-relevant services that such measures apply to.

(51)

Furthermore, in order to ensure the proportionality of those implementing acts and to ensure due respect for the role of economic operators in crisis management, the Commission should only resort to the activation of the internal market emergency response measures after an internal market emergency mode has been activated by the Council and if economic operators are not able to provide a solution on a voluntary basis within a reasonable timeframe (‘two-tier activation’). The need for the activation of internal market emergency response measures should be justified in each such implementing act, and in relation to all particular aspects of a crisis.

(52)

To enable precise assessments of whether the deployment of specific internal market emergency response measures would allow for the reduction of the severe shortages of crisis-relevant goods or crisis-relevant services or the imminent threat thereof in an internal market emergency, the Commission should be able to request information from the relevant economic operators in supply chains of crisis-relevant goods and services. Such information requests should, where appropriate, concern: production capacities and stocks of crisis-relevant goods in production facilities located both in the Union and in countries outside the Union which those economic operators operate, contract with or purchase supplies from; the schedule or an estimation of the expected production output for the following three months for each production facility located in the Union and in countries outside the Union which those economic operators operate or contract with; and details of any relevant disruptions to or shortages in supply chains. To ensure full involvement of the Member State where the economic operator has its production facility, the Commission should forward, without delay, a copy of the information request to that Member State and, if the competent authority of that Member State so requests, the Commission should share the information it has acquired with that Member State through secure means.

(53)

Information requests to economic operators should be used by the Commission only where the information which is necessary for responding adequately to the internal market emergency, such as information necessary for procurement by the Commission on behalf of or in the name of the Member States or estimating the production capacities of manufacturers of crisis-relevant goods the supply chains of which have been disrupted, is not yet available to the Commission and cannot be obtained from publicly available sources or as a result of information provided voluntarily. When making a request for information by means of an implementing act, the Commission should ensure that the benefit for the public interest outweighs the possible inconveniences that the economic operators concerned may sustain. The Commission should take into consideration the burden that such a request for information could represent, in particular for micro-, small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), and should set the time limit for reply accordingly. When the processing of a request for information by an economic operator has the potential to significantly disrupt its operations, that economic operator should be allowed to refuse to supply the information requested. The economic operator should be obliged to provide to the Commission the reasons for any refusal to supply the information requested. Such reasons should include, in particular, the risk of liability for breach of contractual non-disclosure obligations based on contracts governed by the law of a country outside the Union or the risk of disclosing information related to national security in the case of goods with possible uses in the context of national security, which could include national reserves.

(54)

The maximum time limit for an economic operator to reply to a request for information should be 20 working days. The specific individual time limit should be set on a case-by-case basis and could, in certain circumstances, be shorter. The economic operator should be allowed to request a one-time extension to the time limit which could, subject to the explicit agreement of the Commission, extend the overall time limit beyond 20 working days. It should be provided that any request for an extension of the time limit by the economic operator be submitted to the Commission in accordance with the communication arrangements specified within the individual decision. It should also be provided that, until the Commission has responded to the request for an extension, the initial time limit be regarded as fully applicable.

(55)

The activation of the internal market emergency mode, where needed, should also enable the triggering of the application of certain crisis response procedures which introduce adjustments to the rules governing the design, manufacture, conformity assessment and the placing on the market of goods subject to Union harmonised rules as well as to certain rules governing the goods subject to the Union’s general product safety framework. Those crisis response procedures should enable products designated as crisis-relevant goods to be placed swiftly on the market in an emergency context. In the case of harmonised products, the conformity assessment bodies should prioritise the conformity assessment of crisis-relevant goods over any other ongoing applications for other products. Where there are undue delays in the conformity assessment procedures of crisis-relevant goods, the competent authorities of the Member States should be able to issue authorisations for such goods which have not undergone the applicable conformity assessment procedures to be placed on their respective market, provided that they comply with the applicable safety requirements. Such authorisations should be valid only in the territory of the issuing Member State until their validity is extended to the territory of the Union by means of a Commission implementing act. The validity of such authorisations that derogate from conformity assessment procedures should be limited to the duration of the internal market emergency mode. In addition, with a view to facilitating the increase in supply of harmonised and non-harmonised crisis-relevant goods, certain flexibilities should be introduced with respect to the mechanisms of presumption of conformity and presumption of conformity with the general safety requirement, respectively. In the context of an internal market emergency, the manufacturers of crisis-relevant goods should also be able to rely on national and international standards which provide an equivalent level of protection to the European standards the references of which have been published in the Official Journal of the European Union. With respect to the harmonised crisis-relevant goods alone, in cases where such European standards do not exist or compliance with them is rendered excessively difficult as a result of the disruptions to the internal market, the Commission should be able to issue common specifications providing a presumption of conformity in order to provide ready-to-use technical solutions to the manufacturers.

(56)

The introduction of these crisis-relevant adjustments to the relevant sectorial Union rules requires targeted adjustments to the following 16 acts: Directives 2000/14/EC (22), 2006/42/EC (23), 2010/35/EU (24), 2014/29/EU (25), 2014/30/EU (26), 2014/33/EU (27), 2014/34/EU (28), 2014/35/EU (29), 2014/53/EU (30), 2014/68/EU (31) of the European Parliament and of the Council and Regulations (EU) 2016/424 (32), (EU) 2016/425 (33), (EU) 2016/426 (34), (EU) No 305/2011 (35), (EU) 2023/988 (36) and (EU) 2023/1230 (37) of the European Parliament and of the Council. The amendments laying down emergency procedures in each of the respective acts should only become applicable when they are specifically activated. The activation of the emergency procedures under each respective act should be conditional on the activation of the internal market emergency mode under this Regulation and should be limited to products designated as crisis-relevant goods and limited in time to the duration of the internal market emergency mode.

(57)

In cases where there are substantial risks to the functioning of the internal market or in cases of severe and persistent shortages or an exceptionally high demand for crisis-relevant goods, measures at Union level aiming to ensure the availability of crisis-relevant goods, such as priority-rated requests, could prove to be indispensable in ensuring the proper-functioning of the internal market and its supply chains.

(58)

As an instrument of last resort in ensuring the maintenance of vital societal functions or economic activities in the internal market where the production or supply of certain crisis-relevant goods could not be achieved by other measures, the Commission should be able to address requests to economic operators established in the Union to produce or supply certain crisis-relevant goods. When issuing a request, the Commission should take into account the possible negative impact on competition in the internal market and the risk of exacerbating market distortions. Furthermore, the choice of the recipients and beneficiaries of the requests should not be discriminatory.

(59)

The priority-rated request should be based on objective, factual, measurable and substantiated data. Such requests should have regard for the legitimate interests of the economic operators and the cost and effort required for any change in the production sequence. The priority-rated request should clearly specify that the choice to accept or refuse the request remains entirely with the economic operator. Where the economic operator chooses to refuse the priority-rated request, the economic operator is also free to decide whether to provide an explicit rejection and whether to provide a justification when informing the Commission of its rejection.

(60)

When accepted, the obligation to perform the priority-rated request should take precedence over any performance obligation under private or public law. Each priority-rated request should be placed at a fair and reasonable price. It should be possible to carry out the calculation of such price on the basis of average market prices over recent years, subject to reasons being given for any increase or decrease, for example taking into account inflation or input costs. In light of the importance of ensuring the supply of crisis-relevant goods, which are indispensable to the maintenance of vital societal functions or economic activities in the internal market, compliance with the obligation to perform a priority-rated request should not entail liability to third parties for damages that may result from any breach of contractual obligations governed by the law of a Member State, to the extent that the breach of contractual obligations was necessary for compliance with the mandated prioritisation. Economic operators potentially within the scope of a priority-rated request should be allowed to provide, in the conditions of their commercial contracts, for the possible consequences of a priority-rated request. Without prejudice to the applicability of other provisions, the liability for defective products, provided for by Council Directive 85/374/EEC (38), should not be affected by that liability exemption.

(61)

Where the economic operator has expressly accepted a priority-rated request and the Commission has adopted an implementing act following such an acceptance, the economic operator should comply with all the conditions of that implementing act. Non-compliance by the economic operator with the conditions laid down in the implementing act should result in a loss of the benefit of a waiver of contractual liability. When the non-compliance is intentional or attributable to gross negligence, the economic operator may also be subject to a fine, subject to the proportionality principle. It should not be possible to impose fines on economic operators which have not expressly accepted a priority-rated request.

(62)

Where the Commission is informed by one or more Member States of shortages of crisis-relevant goods and services or a risk thereof, the Commission should be able to recommend that the Member States take measures aiming to ensure the swift increase of the availability of crisis-relevant goods and services. The Commission should consider the impact of the measures envisaged on the economic operators concerned. Such recommendations may include measures aiming to facilitate the expansion, repurposing or establishment of new production capacities for crisis-relevant goods or new capacities related to crisis-relevant service activities as well as aiming to accelerate the relevant and applicable approval, authorisation and registration procedures.

(63)

Where the Commission is informed by one or more Member States of shortages of crisis-relevant goods or crisis-relevant services, the Commission should transmit that information to all competent authorities of the Member States and streamline the coordination of the response. Furthermore, to ensure the availability of certain crisis-relevant goods or crisis-relevant services during an internal market emergency and with a view to ending the internal market emergency, the Commission should be able to recommend that the Member States distribute those goods or services, having due regard to the principles of solidarity, necessity and proportionality. The Commission should help to coordinate that distribution.

(64)

In addition to the possibility for joint procurement between the Commission and one or more Member States, and as provided for in Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509 of the European Parliament and of the Council (39) (the ‘Financial Regulation’), one or more Member States should also be able to request the Commission to launch a procurement on their behalf or in their name for the purchasing of goods and services of critical importance or of crisis-relevant goods and services, in order to leverage the purchasing power and negotiating position of the Commission during the internal market vigilance mode or the internal market emergency mode. Such procurement should cover the acquisition by the contracting authority or contracting entity, by means of a contract, of crisis-relevant works, supplies or services and the acquisition or rental of land, buildings or other immovable property from economic operators chosen by that contracting authority or contracting entity for the purpose of responding to the crisis. The Commission should be able to conduct the relevant procurement procedure on behalf of Member States or in their name based on an agreement between the parties, or act as a wholesaler, by buying, stocking and reselling or donating supplies and services, including rental of land, buildings or other immovable property, to the participating Member States or partner organisations it has selected.

(65)

It became clear during the COVID-19 crisis that the Commission should be able to procure crisis-relevant goods and services jointly with European Free Trade Association (EFTA) States and countries outside the Union, such as the European microstates. Any joint procurement procedures launched for the acquisition of crisis-relevant goods and services or goods and services of critical importance should not negatively affect the functioning of the internal market and should not constitute discrimination or a restriction of trade, nor should such procurement procedures cause distortion of competition or have any direct financial impact on the budget of the countries that do not participate in the joint procurement procedure. It is also essential to ensure that Member States coordinate their actions with the support of the Commission and the Board prior to launching procedures for the procurement of crisis-relevant goods and services. During the contingency phase, Member States should put in place a system which would allow for the identification of the contracting authorities and contracting entities subject to Directives 2014/24/EU (40) and 2014/25/EU (41) of the European Parliament and of the Council that are procuring the crisis-relevant goods and services during emergencies. Member States should be able to rely on the central liaison offices for collection and transmission of information about ongoing and intended procurement by the contracting authorities and contracting entities in their territory for the purposes of compliance with the coordination clause under this Regulation.

(66)

The agreement governing the Commission’s procurement on behalf of or in the name of one or more Member States or joint procurement between the Commission and one or more Member States should, where appropriate, provide for an exclusivity clause, under which participating Member States commit to not procuring the crisis-relevant goods or crisis-relevant services in question through other channels and to not running parallel negotiations. Where such an exclusivity clause is provided for, it should stipulate that, where Member States have additional procurement needs and such procurement does not undermine the ongoing joint procurement or procurement on behalf of or in the name of the Member States according to the assessment of the Commission, it is possible for the participating Member States to launch their own procurement procedure. For the purposes of the joint procurement, EFTA States and Union candidate countries, as well as the Principality of Andorra, the Principality of Monaco, the Republic of San Marino and the Vatican City State should be considered participating Member States in case they decide to participate in the joint procurement. The purpose of the exclusivity clause is to ensure that the ongoing joint procurement or procurement on behalf of or in the name of the Member States is not undermined. De minimis procurement does not affect such procurement, and therefore Member States’ contracting authorities and contracting entities should be permitted to launch a procurement procedure which falls below the thresholds of Directives 2014/24/EU and 2014/25/EU. In addition, given that procurement from an economic operator that is not participating in the ongoing tender does not undermine the ongoing procurement, the exclusivity clause laid down in this Regulation should not apply to that kind of procurement. Where a Member State decides to participate in joint procurement or procurement on behalf of or in the name of Member States for acquiring crisis-relevant goods and services, it should be able to use the central liaison offices provided for in this Regulation to inform all contracting authorities and contracting entities in its territory of the ongoing procurement that triggers the application of the exclusivity clause.

(67)

Transparency is a core principle of effective public procurement that improves competition, increases efficiency and creates a level playing field. The European Parliament should be informed about procedures concerning joint procurements under this Regulation and, upon request, be granted access to the contracts concluded as a result of those procedures, subject to the adequate protection of secrecy and protection of any personal data, the national security of the Member States and commercially sensitive information, including business secrets.

(68)

It is necessary to provide information holders with safeguards that the information that they have provided as a result of the application of this Regulation is processed and used respecting the principles of necessity and proportionality. Information received via monitoring, information requests and priority rated requests should therefore only be used by Union institutions, bodies, offices or agencies and their staff, authorities of the Member States and their staff, or any individuals, including the members and observers of the Board, for the purpose for which such information was requested.

(69)

Given that the Board acts as an advisory body to the Commission, it should respect the Commission’s principles, standards and rules for protecting classified information and sensitive non-classified information including, inter alia, provisions for processing and storage of such information as set out in Commission Decisions (EU, Euratom) 2015/443 (42) and (EU, Euratom) 2015/444 (43). Members of staff of the Commission and other Union institutions and bodies that have access to the classified information and sensitive non-classified information relating to the work of the Board should be bound by the confidentiality requirements under Article 339 TFEU, even after their duties have ceased.

(70)

Where the activities to be carried out pursuant to this Regulation involve the processing of personal data, such processing should comply with the relevant Union legislation on personal data protection, namely Regulations (EU) 2016/679 (44) and (EU) 2018/1725 (45) of the European Parliament and of the Council.

(71)

It is necessary to lay down rules on digital tools in order to ensure preparedness for responding to possible future emergencies in a timely and efficient manner to guarantee the continued functioning of the internal market, the free movement of goods, services and persons in times of crisis and the availability of crisis-relevant goods and services to citizens, businesses and public authorities. This Regulation should also set out rules for digital tools ensuring prioritisation and acceleration of authorisation, registration or declaration procedures to facilitate the free movement of persons and the secure transmission and exchange of information. The Commission and the Member States should reuse or expand to the extent possible their existing digital tools. Where this is not possible, the Commission and the Member States should establish, where necessary and justified, new digital tools. The Commission should set out the technical aspects of such tools or infrastructures by means of implementing acts.

(72)

In order to ensure uniform conditions for the implementation of this Regulation, implementing powers should be conferred on the Commission as regards specifications of the contingency framework regarding preparedness, cooperation, exchange of information and crisis communication for the internal market vigilance and emergency modes. Moreover, implementing powers should be conferred on the Commission as regards the possibility to adopt mitigation measures, namely administrative arrangements, digital tools and templates, facilitating the free movement of persons. Moreover, implementing powers should be conferred on the Commission as regards activation of specific emergency response measures at the time of an internal market emergency mode, to allow for a rapid and coordinated response. In addition, implementing powers should be conferred on the Commission as regards the establishment of technical aspects of specific digital tools supporting the objectives of this Regulation. Those powers should be exercised in accordance with Regulation (EU) No 182/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council (46).

(73)

The Commission should adopt immediately applicable implementing acts where, in duly justified cases relating to the impacts of the crisis on the internal market, imperative grounds of urgency so require.

(74)

This Regulation respects fundamental rights and observes the principles recognised in particular by the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (the ‘Charter’). In particular, it respects the right to privacy of the economic operators enshrined in Article 7 of the Charter, the right to data protection set out in Article 8 of the Charter, the freedom to conduct business and the freedom of contract, which are protected by Article 16 of the Charter, the right to property, protected by Article 17 of the Charter, the right to collective bargaining and the right to take collective action protected by Article 28 of the Charter and the right to an effective judicial remedy and to a fair trial as provided for in Article 47 of the Charter.

(75)

This Regulation should not affect the autonomy of the social partners as recognised by the TFEU.

(76)

This Regulation should not be interpreted as affecting the right to environmental protection, the right to collective bargaining and the right to take collective action in accordance with the Charter, including the right of workers and employers to take collective action to defend their interests, including strike action, and the right or freedom to strike or to take other action covered by the specific industrial relation systems in Member States in accordance with national law or practice.

(77)

Other Union legal acts, such as those providing for obligations on economic operators to make data available to public sector bodies, do not affect this Regulation. Therefore, where other Union legal acts also contain provisions on information requests by the Commission which have the same purpose as those provided for under this Regulation, after the internal market emergency mode has been activated by the Council, only the relevant provisions of this Regulation relating to information requests should apply.

(78)

The Union remains fully committed to international solidarity and strongly supports the principle that any measures deemed necessary taken under this Regulation, including those necessary to prevent or relieve critical shortages, are implemented in a manner that is targeted, transparent, proportionate, temporary and consistent with World Trade Organization obligations.

(79)

The Union framework should include interregional elements to establish coherent, multi-sectoral, cross-border internal market contingency, vigilance and emergency response measures, considering, in particular, the resources, capacities and vulnerabilities across neighbouring regions, in particular border regions.

(80)

The Commission should carry out a regular evaluation of the functioning and effectiveness of this Regulation and submit a report to the European Parliament and the Council, including an evaluation of the work of the Board, stress tests, training and crisis protocols, the criteria for the activation of the internal market vigilance mode and the internal market emergency mode as well as the use of digital tools. Furthermore, reports should be submitted by four months after the deactivation of the internal market vigilance mode or the internal market emergency mode, as applicable. Those reports should include an evaluation of the measures implemented under this Regulation in relation to the crisis that led to the activation of that mode, in particular on the effectiveness of those measures. Those reports could suggest any improvements if necessary, and be accompanied, where appropriate, by relevant legislative proposals.

(81)

Council Regulation (EC) No 2679/98 (47) provides for a mechanism for bilateral discussions and notification of obstacles to the functioning of the internal market. In order to avoid the duplication of rules where the internal market emergency mode has been activated, that Regulation should be amended accordingly. Regulation (EC) No 2679/98 should not in any way affect the exercise of fundamental rights as recognised at Union level and in the Member States, including the right or freedom to strike or to take other action covered by the specific industrial relations systems in Member States, in accordance with national law or practice. It should also be without prejudice to the right to negotiate, to conclude collective agreements and to take collective action in accordance with national law or practice.

(82)

Since the objective of this Regulation, namely to ensure the smooth and undisrupted functioning of the internal market by putting in place contingency, vigilance and emergency measures across the internal market in order to facilitate the coordination of the response measures in the event of a crisis, cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States but can rather, by reason of the scale or effects of the action, be better achieved at Union level, the Union may adopt measures in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity as set out in Article 5 of the Treaty on European Union. In accordance with the principle of proportionality as set out in that Article, this Regulation does not go beyond what is necessary in order to achieve that objective,