1.   This Regulation shall apply to interconnection points. It may also apply to entry points from and exit points to third countries, subject to the decision of the relevant national regulatory authority. This Regulation shall not apply to exit points to end consumers and distribution networks, entry points from ‘liquefied natural gas’ (LNG) terminals and production facilities, and entry points from or exit points to storage facilities.

2.   The standardised capacity allocation mechanisms set up in accordance with this Regulation shall include an auction procedure for relevant interconnection points within the Union and the standard capacity products to be offered and allocated. Where incremental capacity is offered, alternative allocation mechanisms may also be used, subject to the conditions set out in Article 30(2).

3.   This Regulation shall apply to all technical and interruptible capacity at interconnection points as well as to additional capacity in the meaning of point 2.2.1 of Annex I of Regulation (EC) No 715/2009 and to incremental capacity. This Regulation shall not apply to interconnection points between Member States where one of these Member States holds a derogation on the basis of Article 49 of Directive 2009/73/EC.

4.   Where an alternative capacity allocation mechanism according to Article 30 is applied, Article 8(1) to (7), Articles 11 to 18, Article 19(2) and Article 37 shall not be applicable to the offer levels, unless decided otherwise by the relevant national regulatory authorities.

5.   Where implicit capacity allocation methods are applied, national regulatory authorities may decide not to apply Articles 8 to 37.

6.   In order to prevent foreclosure of downstream supply markets, national regulatory authorities may, after consulting network users, decide to take proportionate measures to limit up-front bidding for capacity by any single network user at interconnection points within a Member State.

1.   Transmission system operators shall coordinate the implementation of standard communication procedures, coordinated information systems and compatible electronic on-line communications, such as shared data exchange formats and protocols, as well as agree principles as to how this data is treated.

2.   Standard communication procedures shall include, in particular, those relating to network users' access to the transmission system operators' auction system or a relevant booking platform and the review of auction information provided. The timing and content of the data to be exchanged shall be compliant with the provisions set out in Chapter III.

3.   The standard communication procedures adopted by transmission systems operators shall include an implementation plan and duration of applicability, which shall be in line with the development of booking platform(s) as set out in Article 37. Transmission systems operators shall ensure confidentiality of commercially sensitive information.

1.   The maximum technical capacity shall be made available to network users, taking into account system integrity, safety and efficient network operation.

2.   Where the optimisation of technical capacity causes costs to the transmission system operators, particularly costs that unevenly impact transmission system operators on either side of an interconnection point, transmission system operators shall be allowed to recover such efficiently incurred costs via the regulatory framework established by the relevant regulatory authorities in accordance with Article 13 of Regulation (EC) No 715/2009 and Article 42 of Directive 2009/73/EC. Article 8(1) of the Regulation (EC) No 713/2009 shall apply.

3.   Where appropriate, national regulatory authorities shall consult network users on the applied calculation method and joint approach.

4.   Changes in the amount of bundled capacity offered at interconnection points as a result of the process pursuant to paragraph 1 shall be included in the report of the Agency published pursuant to point 2.2.1(2) of Annex I to Regulation (EC) No 715/2009.

1.   Adjacent transmission system operators shall exchange nomination, re-nomination, matching and confirmation information at relevant interconnection points on a regular basis.

2.   Adjacent transmission system operators shall exchange information about the maintenance of their individual transmission network in order to contribute to the decision making process with regard to the technical use of interconnection points. The procedures to exchange data between transmission system operators shall be integrated in their respective interconnection agreement.

1.   Auctions shall be used for the allocation of capacity at interconnection points, except where the alternative allocation methodology pursuant to Article 30 is applied.

2.   At all interconnection points the same auction design shall apply. The relevant auction processes shall start simultaneously for all concerned interconnection points. Each auction process, relating to a single standard capacity product, shall allocate capacity independently of every other auction process except where incremental capacity is offered or where, subject to the agreement of the directly involved transmission system operators and the approval of relevant national regulatory authorities, competing capacity is allocated. The national regulatory authority of any adjacent and affected Member State may provide a position which shall be considered by the relevant national regulatory authority. In case incremental capacity is offered, the independent allocation shall not apply to the simultaneous auction processes for the respective offer levels, since these are dependent on each other, as only one offer level can be allocated.

3.   The standard capacity products shall follow a logical order by which products covering yearly capacity shall be offered first, followed by the product with the next shortest duration for use during the same period. The timing of the auctions provided for in Articles 11 to 15 shall be consistent with this principle.

4.   The rules on standard capacity products as set out in Article 9 and auctions as set out in Articles 11 to 15 shall apply to bundled capacity and unbundled capacity at an interconnection point.

5.   For a given auction, the availability of the relevant standard capacity products shall be communicated in accordance with Articles 11 to 15 and according to the auction calendar.

6.   An amount at least equal to 20 % of the existing technical capacity at each interconnection point shall be set aside and offered in accordance with paragraph 7. If the available capacity is less than the proportion of technical capacity to be set aside, the whole of any available capacity shall be set aside. This capacity shall be offered in accordance with point (b) of paragraph 7, while any remaining capacity set aside shall be offered in accordance with point (a) of paragraph 7.

7.   Any capacity set aside pursuant to paragraph 6 shall be offered, subject to the following provisions:

8.   In the case of incremental capacity, an amount at least equal to 10 % of the incremental technical capacity at the concerned interconnection point shall be set aside and offered no earlier than the annual quarterly capacity auction as provided for in Article 12, held in accordance with the auction calendar during the gas year preceding the start of the relevant gas year.

9.   The exact proportion of capacity to be set aside pursuant to paragraphs 6 and 8 shall be subject to a stakeholder consultation, alignment between transmission system operators and approval by national regulatory authorities at each interconnection point. National regulatory authorities shall in particular consider setting aside higher shares of capacity with a shorter duration to avoid foreclosure of downstream supply markets.

10.   Capacity created via non-market based procedures and for which the final investment decision has been taken without prior commitments from network users shall be offered and allocated as available standard capacity products as set out in this Regulation.

1.   Transmission system operators shall offer yearly, quarterly, monthly, daily and within-day standard capacity products.

2.   Yearly standard capacity products shall be the capacity which may be applied for, in a given amount, by a network user for all gas days in a particular gas year (starting on 1 October).

3.   Quarterly standard capacity products shall be the capacity which may be applied for, in a given amount, by a network user for all gas days in a particular quarter (starting on 1 October, 1 January, 1 April or 1 July respectively).

4.   Monthly standard capacity products shall be the capacity which may be applied for, in a given amount, by a network user for all gas days in a particular calendar month (starting on the first day of each month).

5.   Daily standard capacity products shall be the capacity which may be applied for, in a given amount, by a network user for a single gas day.

6.   Within-day standard capacity products shall be the capacity which may be applied for, in a given amount, by a network user from a start time within a particular gas day until the end of the same gas day.

1.   The yearly capacity auctions shall be held once a year.

2.   Capacity for each yearly standard capacity product shall be auctioned through the annual yearly capacity auction using an ascending-clock auction algorithm in accordance with Article 17.

3.   The auction process shall offer capacity at least for the upcoming 5 gas years and for no longer than the upcoming 15 gas years for existing capacity. When offering incremental capacity, the offer levels may be offered in yearly capacity auctions for a maximum of 15 years after the start of operational use.

4.   As from 2018, annual yearly capacity auctions shall start on the first Monday of July each year unless otherwise specified in the auction calendar.

5.   During the annual yearly capacity auction network users shall be able to participate in one or several concurrent auctions in relation to each interconnection point in order to apply for standard capacity products.

6.   The capacity to be offered during the annual yearly capacity auction shall be equal to:

7.   The capacity to be offered may be either bundled capacity or unbundled capacity in accordance with Article 19. This also applies to all other auctions as set out in Articles 12 to 15.

8.   At least 1 month before the auction starts, transmission system operators shall notify network users about the amount of firm capacity to be offered for each year for the upcoming annual yearly capacity auction.

9.   The bidding rounds of each auction shall take place between 8.00 UTC to 17.00 UTC (winter time) or 7.00 UTC to 16.00 UTC (daylight saving) on all relevant gas days. Bidding rounds shall be opened and closed within each gas day, as specified in Article 17(2).

10.   The allocation results of the auction shall be made available, as soon as reasonably possible, and no later than the next business day after the closing of the bidding round, simultaneously to individual network users participating in the respective auction.

In case of incremental capacity, the binding commitments of network users for contracting capacity, including whether the conditions for a repeated auction pursuant to Article 29(3) are met, shall be made available no later than the next business day after the closing of the bidding round, simultaneously to individual network users participating in the respective auction. The results of the economic tests shall be made available no later than 2 business days after the closing of the bidding round, simultaneously to individual network users participating in the respective auction.

11.   Aggregated information on auction results shall be published to the market.

1.   Four annual quarterly capacity auctions shall be held during each gas year.

2.   Capacity for each quarterly standard capacity product shall be auctioned through the annual quarterly capacity auctions using an ascending-clock auction algorithm in accordance with Article 17.

3.   Capacity for quarters of the upcoming gas year shall be auctioned via concurrent auctions for each quarter and in relation to each interconnection point as follows:

For each annual quarterly auction network users shall be able to participate in all of the concurrent auctions.

4.   Each gas year the annual quarterly capacity auctions shall start on the following days, unless otherwise specified in the auction calendar:

5.   The capacity to be offered in all annual quarterly capacity auctions shall be equal to:

6.   Two weeks before the auctions start, transmission system operators shall notify network users about the amount of capacity to be offered for each quarter for the upcoming annual quarterly capacity auction.

7.   The bidding rounds of each auction, shall take place between 8.00 UTC to 17.00 UTC (winter time) or 7.00 UTC to 16.00 UTC (daylight saving) on all relevant gas days. Bidding rounds shall be opened and closed within each gas day, as specified in Article 17(2).

8.   The allocation results of the auction shall be published, as soon as reasonably possible, and no later than the next business day after the closing of the bidding round, simultaneously to individual network users participating in the respective auction.

9.   Aggregated information on the auction results shall be published to the market.

1.   The rolling monthly capacity auction shall be held once a month.

2.   Capacity for each monthly standard capacity product shall be auctioned through the rolling monthly capacity auction using an ascending-clock auction algorithm according to Article 17. Each month, the monthly standard capacity product for the following calendar month shall be auctioned.

3.   During the rolling monthly capacity auction network users shall be able to apply for one monthly standard capacity product.

4.   Rolling monthly capacity auctions shall start on the third Monday of each month for the following monthly standard capacity product unless otherwise specified in the auction calendar.

5.   The capacity to be offered in the rolling monthly capacity auction shall be, each month, equal to:

6.   One week before the auction starts, transmission system operators shall notify network users about the amount of capacity to be offered for the upcoming rolling monthly capacity auction.

7.   The bidding rounds of each auction shall take place between 8.00 UTC to 17.00 UTC (winter time) or 7.00 UTC to 16.00 UTC (daylight saving) on all relevant gas days. Bidding rounds shall be opened and closed within each gas day, as specified in Article 17(2).

8.   The allocation results of the auction shall be published, as soon as reasonably possible, and no later than the next business day after the closing of the bidding round, simultaneously to individual network users participating in the respective auction.

9.   Aggregated information on the auction results shall be published to the market.

1.   The rolling day-ahead capacity auction shall be held once a day.

2.   Every day, a standard capacity product for the following gas day shall be auctioned through the rolling day-ahead capacity auction.

3.   Capacity for each daily standard capacity product shall be auctioned through the rolling day-ahead capacity auction using a uniform price auction algorithm according to Article 18. Each day, the daily standard capacity product for the following gas day shall be auctioned.

4.   During the rolling day-ahead capacity auction network users shall be able to apply for capacity for one daily standard capacity product.

5.   The bidding round shall open every day at 15.30 UTC (winter time) or 14.30 UTC (daylight saving).

6.   A capacity bid for the daily standard capacity product for the rolling day-ahead capacity auction shall be handled as follows: submission, withdrawal or amendment from 15.30 UTC to 16.00 UTC (winter time) or 14.30 UTC to 15.00 UTC (daylight saving).

7.   The capacity to be offered in the rolling day-ahead capacity auction shall be, each day, equal to:

8.   At the time the bidding round opens, transmission system operators shall notify network users about the amount of capacity to be offered for the upcoming rolling day-ahead capacity auction.

9.   The allocation results of the auction shall be published, no later than 30 minutes after the closing of the bidding round, simultaneously to individual network users participating in the respective auction.

10.   Aggregated information on the auction results shall be published to the market.

1.   Subject to capacity being made available, a within-day capacity auction shall be held every hour during gas day using a uniform price auction algorithm in accordance with Article 18.

2.   The first bidding round shall open directly on the next hour bar following the publication of results of the last day-ahead auction (including interruptible capacity if offered) in accordance with Article 14. The first bidding round closes at 1.30 UTC (winter time) or 0.30 UTC (daylight saving) before the gas day. The allocation of successful bids shall be effective from 5.00 UTC (winter time) or 4.00 UTC (daylight saving) on the relevant gas day.

3.   The last bidding round shall close at 0.30 UTC (winter time) or 23.30 UTC (daylight saving) on the relevant gas day.

4.   Network users shall be entitled to place, withdraw or amend bids from the opening of each bidding round until closure of that bidding round.

5.   Each hour on the relevant gas day, capacity effective from the hour + 4 shall be auctioned as within-day capacity.

6.   Each bidding round shall open at the start of every hour on the relevant gas day.

7.   The duration of each bidding round shall be 30 minutes as of the opening of the bidding round.

8.   The capacity to be offered in the within-day capacity auction shall be, each hour, equal to:

9.   Transmission system operators shall publish the available amount of within-day firm capacity on offer, after closure of the last day-ahead auction and in accordance with Article 32(9).

10.   Transmission system operators shall provide network users who bid in the day-ahead auctions with the option to have valid unsuccessful bids automatically entered into the subsequent within-day auction.

11.   The capacity shall be allocated within 30 minutes of the closure of the bidding round provided that the bids are accepted and the transmission system operator runs the allocation process.

12.   The results of the auction shall be made available simultaneously to individual network users.

13.   Aggregated information on the auction results shall be published at least at the end of each day.

1.   If several standard capacity products are offered during an auction, the respective allocation algorithm shall be applied separately for each standard capacity product when it is being allocated. Bids for the different standard capacity products shall be considered independently from each other in the application of the auction algorithm.

2.   For annual yearly, annual quarterly and rolling monthly capacity auctions, an ascending clock auction algorithm, with multiple bidding rounds, as provided for in Article 17, shall be applied.

3.   For rolling day-ahead capacity auctions and within-day capacity auctions, a uniform-price auction algorithm, with a single bidding round, shall be applied in accordance with Article 18.

1.   Ascending clock auctions shall enable network users to place volume bids against escalating prices announced in consecutive bidding rounds, starting at the reserve price P0.

2.   The first bidding round, with an associated price equal to the reserve price P0, shall have a duration of 3 hours. Subsequent bidding rounds shall have a duration of 1 hour. There shall be a period of 1 hour between bidding rounds.

3.   A bid shall specify:

4.   A bid shall be considered valid if it is submitted by a network user and complies with all provisions of this Article.

5.   In order for network users to participate in an auction, it shall be mandatory for network users to place a volume bid in the first bidding round.

6.   Transmission system operators shall provide network users with the option to enter bids automatically against any price step.

7.   Once the relevant bidding round closes, no modification, withdrawal or variation to valid bids shall be accepted. All valid bids shall become binding commitments of a network user to book capacity to the amount requested per announced price, provided the clearing price of the auction is that which is announced in the relevant bidding round.

8.   The volume bid in any bidding round per network user shall be equal or smaller to the capacity offered in a specific auction. The volume bid per network user at a specific price shall be equal to or less than the volume bid placed by this network user in the previous round, except where paragraph 16 applies.

9.   Bids may be freely entered, modified and withdrawn during a bidding round, providing all bids comply with paragraph 8. Valid bids shall remain valid until modified or withdrawn.

10.   A large price step and a small price step shall be defined per interconnection point and per standard capacity product and shall be published in advance of the relevant auction. The small price step shall be set such that an increase by an integer number of small price steps is equal to an increase by a large price step.

11.   The determination of the large price step shall seek to minimise, as far as reasonably possible, the length of the auction process. The determination of the small price step shall seek to minimise, as far as reasonably possible, the level of unsold capacity where the auction closes at a price higher than the reserve price.

12.   If the aggregate demand across all network users is less than or equal to the capacity offered at the end of the first bidding round, the auction shall close.

13.   If the aggregate demand across all network users is greater than the capacity offered at the end of the first bidding round or a subsequent bidding round, a further bidding round shall be opened with a price equal to the price in the previous bidding round, plus the large price step.

14.   If the aggregate demand across all network users is equal to the capacity offered at the end of the second bidding round or a subsequent bidding round, the auction shall close.

15.   If a first-time undersell occurs, a price reduction shall take place and a further bidding round shall be opened. The further bidding round will have a price equal to the price applicable in the bidding round preceding the first-time undersell, plus the small price step. Further bidding rounds with increments of the small price step shall then be opened until the aggregate demand across all network users is less than or equal to the capacity offered, at which point the auction shall close.

16.   The volume bid per network user in all bidding rounds where small price steps are applied shall be equal to or less than the volume bid placed by this network user in the bidding round which preceded the first-time undersell. The volume bid per network user for a specific small price step shall be equal to or smaller than the volume bid placed by this network user in the previous bidding round of small price steps. The volume bid per network user in all bidding rounds where small price steps are applied shall be equal to or greater than the volume bid placed by this network user during the bidding round in which the first-time undersell occurred.

17.   If the aggregate demand across all network users is greater than the capacity offered in the bidding round with a price equal to that which led to the first-time undersell, minus one small price step, the auction shall close. The clearing price shall be the price that led to the first-time undersell and the successful bids shall be those submitted during the original bidding round in which the first-time undersell occurred.

18.   After each bidding round, the demand of all network users in a specific auction shall be published as soon as reasonably possible in an aggregated form.

19.   The price announced for the last bidding round in which the auction closes shall be considered as the clearing price of the specific auction, except cases where paragraph 17 applies.

20.   All network users who have placed valid volume bids at the clearing price shall be allocated the capacity according to their volume bids at the clearing price. Where incremental capacity is offered, the allocation of incremental capacity shall be subject to the outcome of the economic test according to Article 22. Successful network users shall pay the clearing price of the specific auction, which may be a fixed or a floating payable price approach set out in Article 24 of Regulation (EU) 2017/460, and any other possible charges applicable at the time when the capacity allocated to them can be used.

21.   Following every closed auction, the final auction result including the aggregation of allocated capacities and the clearing price shall be published. Successful network users shall be informed about the amount of capacities they are allocated, individual information shall be communicated only to concerned parties. Where incremental capacity is allocated, this paragraph shall only apply to the auction results of the offer level offering the largest amount of capacity that resulted in a positive economic test according to Article 22(3).

22.   If an ascending clock auction has not ended by the scheduled starting point (according to the auction calendar) of the next auction for capacity covering the same period, the first auction shall close and no capacity shall be allocated. The capacity shall be offered in the next relevant auction.

1.   In a uniform-price auction, there is a single bidding round in which the network user bids price as well as quantity.

2.   During the bidding round of a given auction, network users may submit up to 10 bids. Each bid shall be treated independently from other bids. After the closure of the bidding round, remaining bids may not be modified or withdrawn.

3.   A bid shall specify:

4.   The transmission system operator shall rank all bids relating to a given standard capacity product according to their bid price, the highest price ranking first.

5.   All remaining bids at bidding round closing time shall be considered as binding on those network users that are allocated at least the minimum amount of capacity requested in accordance with point (e) of paragraph 3.

6.   Following the ranking of the bids in accordance with paragraph 4, and subject to paragraphs 7 to 10, capacity shall be allocated to the bids in function of their price ranking. All bids for which capacity is allocated shall be considered as successful. After the allocation of capacity, the remaining unallocated capacity shall be reduced by such quantity.

7.   Following the application of paragraph 6 and subject to paragraph 9, where the amount of capacity bid for by a network user exceeds the remaining unallocated capacity (after capacity has been allocated to network users placing higher bids), this network user shall be allocated capacity equal to the remaining unallocated capacity.

8.   Following the application of paragraph 7 and subject to paragraph 9, where each of two or more bids specifies the same bid price, and the amount of relevant capacity remaining applied for in aggregate under such bids exceeds the remaining unallocated amount, the remaining unallocated amount shall be allocated pro rata to the amounts applied for in each such bid.

9.   Where the amount to be allocated in respect of a bid pursuant to paragraphs 6, 7 or 8 is less than the minimum amount of capacity according to point (e) of paragraph 3, the bid shall be considered unsuccessful, and a revised allocation shall be made between remaining equal price bid(s) under paragraph 8, or an allocation shall be made in respect of the next priced bid, pursuant to paragraph 6.

10.   Where the remaining amount to be allocated in respect of any bid pursuant to paragraphs 6, 7, 8 or 9 is equal to zero, no further capacity shall be allocated to the remaining bids. Those bids shall be considered unsuccessful.

11.   The clearing price shall be defined as the price of the lowest successful bid, if the demand exceeds the offer at the reserve price. In all other cases, the clearing price shall be equal to the reserve price. Successful network users shall pay the clearing price of the specific auction, which may be a fixed or floating payable price approach as set out in Article 24 of Regulation (EU) 2017/460 and any other possible charges applicable at the time when the capacity allocated to them can be used.

1.   Before 6 January 2018 ENTSOG shall, after consulting stakeholders, create a catalogue of the main terms and conditions in the transport contract(s) of the transmission system operators for bundled capacity products. ENTSOG shall analyse existing transport contracts, identifying and categorising differences in relation to the main terms and conditions and the reasons for such differences and publish its findings in a report.

2.   On the basis of the report referred to in paragraph 1, ENTSOG, after consulting stakeholders, shall within 6 months after the publication of the report develop and publish a template for the main terms and conditions covering contractual provisions which are not affected by fundamental differences in principles of national law or jurisprudence, for the offer of bundled capacity products.

3.   The Agency, having due regard to the opinions of the national regulatory authorities, shall provide an opinion on the template for the main terms and conditions within a further 3 months. Taking into account the opinion provided by the Agency, ENTSOG shall publish on its website the final template for the main terms and conditions no later than 3 months after receiving the Agency's opinion.

4.   After the publication of the final template for the main terms and conditions, transmission system operators, subject to the approval of national regulatory authority, may apply the terms and conditions set out in the template in the case of newly contracted bundled capacity products.

1.   The network users who are parties to unbundled transport contracts at respective interconnection points, shall aim to reach an agreement on the bundling of the capacity via contractual arrangements (‘bundling arrangement’), in compliance with the provisions set out in Article 19. These network users and transmission system operators shall report to the relevant national regulatory authorities of all bundling arrangements reached by all parties to existing transport contracts.

2.   The transmission system operators who are parties to the existing transport contracts may participate in the discussions regarding the bundling arrangement at any time, upon invitation of the network users who are parties to the existing transport contracts.

3.   As from 1 January 2018, transmission system operators shall offer network users holding mismatched unbundled capacity at one side of an interconnection point a free-of-charge capacity conversion service. Such a capacity conversion service shall apply to annual, quarterly or monthly capacity products for bundled firm capacity at that interconnection point which the network user had to acquire because insufficient unbundled capacity on the other side of the interconnection point was offered by an adjacent transmission system operator. This service shall be offered on a non-discriminatory basis and shall prevent additional charges from being applied to network users for capacity they already hold. In particular, payments for the part of the contracted bundled capacity which network users already hold as mismatched unbundled capacity shall be limited to a possible auction premium. This service shall be based on the conversion model under development by ENTSOG and to be finalised at the latest by 1 October 2017 after consulting stakeholders and the Agency. The implementation may be facilitated by the capacity booking platform(s) referred to in Article 37. The use of this service shall be reported annually to the respective national regulatory authorities.

4.   Where a bundling arrangement is agreed upon between respective network users, the transmission system operators involved at the interconnection point shall be informed by the parties of such intended bundling arrangement without undue delay and the transfer of the concerned capacity shall be implemented. In any case, the bundling arrangement shall be implemented subject to the applicable terms and conditions of existing related transport contracts. Once the bundling arrangement is implemented, the relevant capacity shall be treated as bundled capacity.

5.   In any case, the duration of the bundling arrangements regarding the capacity bundled under the amendment of the existing contracts shall not exceed the duration of the original transport contracts.

6.   All capacity shall be bundled at the earliest opportunity. Existing transport contracts for unbundled capacity cannot be renewed, prolonged or rolled over after their expiration date. Such capacity shall become available capacity as of the expiration date of the transport contracts.

1.   The economic test set out in this Article shall be carried out by the transmission system operator(s) or by the national regulatory authority, as decided by the national regulatory authority, for each offer level of an incremental capacity project after binding commitments of network users for contracting capacity have been obtained by the involved transmission system operators and shall consist of the following parameters:

2.   The outcome of the economic test application shall be:

3.   An incremental capacity project shall be initiated if the economic test has a positive outcome on both sides of an interconnection point for at least one offer level that includes incremental capacity. In case more than one offer level results in a positive outcome of the economic test, the offer level with the largest amount of capacity that resulted in a positive outcome shall be used for proceeding with the incremental capacity project towards commissioning. In case no offer level results in a positive outcome, the specific incremental capacity process shall be terminated.

1.   When applying the economic test referred to in Article 22, the national regulatory authority shall set the level of the f-factor for a given offer level, taking into account the following:

2.   If the economic test has a positive outcome then the investment costs associated with the incremental capacity shall be reflected in an increase in the allowed or target revenue in accordance with the applicable national rules.

1.   In order to facilitate the offer of bundled capacity products, individual economic test parameters of the involved transmission system operators for a given offer level shall be combined into a single economic test.

2.   The single economic test shall consist of the following parameters:

3.   The outcome of the single economic test application shall be positive where all underlying economic tests result in positive outcomes as set out in Article 22(2)(a) taking into account a possible redistribution of revenues according to paragraphs 4 and 5. Otherwise, the outcome of the single economic test application shall be negative.

4.   In case a redistribution of revenues could potentially lead to a decrease in the level of binding commitments of network users for contracting capacity required for a positive single economic test outcome, transmission system operators may submit to the relevant national regulatory authorities for coordinated approvals the mechanisms for a redistribution of revenues from incremental capacity.

5.   A redistribution of revenues may be carried out as follows:

1.   For a given incremental capacity project, the transmission system operator(s) shall submit to the relevant national regulatory authority(-ies) for approval the following information for each offer level:

2.   Following the approval by the relevant national regulatory authority(-ies), the information set out in paragraph 1 shall be published by the involved transmission system operator(s) as set out in Article 28(3).

1.   Immediately after the start of the annual yearly capacity auction at least in each odd-numbered year, transmission system operators shall cooperate in the processes of assessing market demand for incremental capacity and of conducting technical studies for incremental capacity projects for their joint interconnection points. The first demand assessment shall be conducted in 2017 as from the entry into force of this Regulation.

2.   No later than 8 weeks after the start of the annual yearly capacity auction at least in each odd-numbered year, the concerned transmission system operators on each side of an entry-exit system border shall produce common market demand assessment reports, each covering all interconnection points of at least one entry-exit system border. The market assessment report shall evaluate the prospective demand for incremental capacity of all network users pursuant to paragraph 8 and shall state whether an incremental capacity project is initiated.

3.   The market demand assessment report shall be published in one or more official languages of the Member State and to the extent possible in English on the websites of the concerned transmission system operators no later than 16 weeks after the start of the annual yearly capacity auction at least in each odd-numbered year.

4.   ENTSOG shall coordinate and assist the completion of the demand assessment reports including by providing a standard template and publishing the reports on ENTSOG's website.

5.   If demand for incremental capacity is expressed by network users no later than 8 weeks after the start of the annual yearly auction in even-numbered years, the concerned transmission system operators may agree to conduct a market demand assessment also in an even-numbered year, provided that:

6.   Transmission system operators shall consider non-binding demand indications submitted no later than 8 weeks after the start of the annual yearly auction in the ongoing market demand assessment.

7.   Transmission system operators may consider non-binding demand indications submitted after the deadline set out in paragraph 6 in the ongoing market demand assessment, or introduce them into the next market demand assessment.

8.   The non-binding demand indications referred to in paragraphs 6 and 7 shall contain at least the following information:

9.   Network users shall indicate whether their demand is subject to any conditions in relation to points (a) to (d) of paragraph 8.

10.   Transmission system operators shall respond to non-binding demand indications within 16 weeks after the start of the annual yearly auctions, or within 8 weeks of receipt of demand indications in accordance with paragraph 7. The response shall provide at least the following:

11.   A transmission system operator may charge fees for activities resulting from the submission of non-binding demand indications. Such fees shall reflect the administrative costs for submitting demand indications, and shall be subject to approval by the relevant national regulatory authority and published on the transmission system operator's website. Such fees shall be reimbursed to the respective network user if the economic test for at least one offer level that includes incremental capacity at the respective interconnection point is positive.

12.   The market demand assessment report shall take into account all of the following criteria:

13.   The market demand assessment report shall include at least the following:

14.   Transmission system operators and the relevant national regulatory authorities shall publish respective points of contact for incremental capacity projects initiated at the publication of the market demand assessment report and update this information on a regular basis throughout the project.

1.   The day after the publication of the market demand assessment report, the design phase shall start, if the demand assessment report identifies demand for incremental capacity projects.

2.   Transmission system operators active at the respective interconnection point shall conduct technical studies for incremental capacity projects in order to design the incremental capacity project and coordinated offer levels based on technical feasibility and the market demand assessment reports.

3.   No later than 12 weeks after the start of the design phase, the concerned transmission system operators shall conduct a joint public consultation on the draft project proposal in one or more official languages of the Member State and to the extent possible in English for a minimum of 1 month and no longer than 2 months. These operators shall take all reasonable steps to ensure cross-border coordination.

The consultation shall cover at least the following elements:

4.   In the process of designing coordinated offer levels, the transmission system operators shall closely cooperate with the involved national regulatory authorities and coordinate across borders in order to enable offers of incremental capacity as bundled products. The project proposal and design of coordinated offer levels shall take into account the results of the consultation provided for in paragraph 3.

1.   Following the consultation and finalisation of the design phase for an incremental capacity project in accordance with Article 27, the involved transmission system operators shall submit the project proposal for an incremental capacity project to the relevant national regulatory authorities for coordinated approvals. The project proposal shall also be published by the involved transmission system operators in one or more official languages of the Member State and to the extent possible in English and shall include at least the following information:

2.   Within 6 months of receipt of the complete project proposal by the last of the relevant regulatory authorities, those national regulatory authorities shall publish coordinated decisions on the project proposal defined in paragraph 1 in one or more official languages of the Member State and to the extent possible in English. The decisions shall include justifications. National regulatory authorities shall inform each other of the receipt of the project proposal and its completeness in order to determine the start of the 6 months period.

When preparing the national regulatory authority's decision, each national regulatory authority shall consider the views of the other national regulatory authorities involved. In any case national regulatory authorities shall take into account any detrimental effects on competition or the effective functioning of the internal gas market associated with the incremental capacity projects concerned.

If a relevant national regulatory authority objects to the submitted project proposal, it shall inform the other involved national regulatory authorities as soon as possible. In such a situation, all the national regulatory authorities involved shall take all reasonable steps to work together and reach a common agreement.

Where the relevant national regulatory authorities cannot reach an agreement on the proposed alternative allocation mechanism within the 6 months period referred to in the first subparagraph, the Agency shall decide on the alternative allocation mechanism to be implemented, following the process set out in Article 8(1) of Regulation (EC) No 713/2009.

3.   Upon the publication of the decisions of the relevant national regulatory authorities pursuant to paragraph 2 and no later than 2 months before the offer of incremental capacity in the annual yearly capacity auction, the transmission system operators shall publish jointly a notice in one or more official languages of the Member State and to the extent possible in English including the following minimum information

1.   Subject to the completion of the steps provided for in Article 27, the involved transmission system operators shall offer the incremental capacity together with the respective available capacity in the annual yearly capacity auction as standard bundled products in ascending clock auctions according to Article 17 as a default and in accordance with Article 8(8) and (9) and Article 19.

2.   The auctions for the respective offer levels shall be conducted in parallel and independently from each other in accordance with Article 17 and subject to Article 8(2). Only coordinated offer levels shall be auctioned.

3.   In order to minimise potential auction premia and to achieve a positive economic test outcome for the highest possible offer level, a new auction may be initiated once and only if:

If these conditions are met, the new auction may be initiated for the lowest unsuccessful offer level referred in point (b).

4.   If the new auction does not result in a positive economic test outcome, the allocation results of the original auction referred to in point (c) shall prevail in accordance with Articles 17(20) and (21).

1.   An alternative allocation mechanism covers a maximum of 15 years after the start of operational use. If the economic test could not be passed based on the 15 years' bookings, national regulatory authorities may exceptionally extend the time horizon by up to 5 additional years.

2.   An alternative capacity allocation mechanism can be used, subject to national regulatory authorities' approval, where it is reasonable to conclude from the market demand assessment pursuant to Article 26 or the consultation defined in Article 27(3) that the ascending clock auction is not suitable and that the incremental capacity project fulfils both of the following conditions:

3.   In an alternative allocation mechanism network users may submit binding conditional bids for contracting capacity subject to one or more of the following conditions specified by the transmission system operators in the approved project proposal pursuant to Article 28(1):

4.   The alternative allocation mechanism is subject to approvals by the concerned national regulatory authorities according to Article 28(2). The mechanism shall be transparent and non-discriminatory but may allow for the prioritisation of booking duration or bids for higher amounts of capacity for a yearly standard capacity product.

5.   If either booking duration or bids for higher amounts of capacity are prioritised, national regulatory authorities shall decide on setting aside an amount of at least 10 % and up to 20 % of the technical capacity at each interconnection point when applying Article 8(8). Capacity set aside in this manner shall be offered in accordance with Article 8(7).

1.   As from 1 January 2018, transmission system operators may only offer standard capacity products for interruptible capacity of a duration longer than one day if the corresponding monthly, quarterly or yearly standard capacity product for firm capacity was sold at an auction premium, was sold out, or was not offered.

2.   Transmission system operators shall offer a daily capacity product for interruptible capacity in both directions at interconnection points where the respective standard capacity product for firm capacity was sold out day-ahead or was not offered. At unidirectional interconnection points where firm capacity is offered only in one direction, transmission system operators shall offer at least a daily product for interruptible capacity in the other direction.

3.   If interruptible capacity is offered, this shall not be detrimental to the amount of firm capacity on offer. Transmission system operators shall not set aside capacity that can be offered as firm capacity in order to offer it as interruptible capacity.

4.   To the extent interruptible capacity products other than daily products are offered, the same standard capacity products for firm capacity shall also apply for interruptible capacity, in terms of duration of the products.

5.   To the extent interruptible capacity is offered, it shall be allocated via an auction process with the exception of within-day interruptible capacity.

6.   Within-day interruptible capacity shall be allocated by means of an over-nomination procedure.

7.   Within-day interruptible capacity shall only be allocated when firm capacity, whether technical capacity or additional capacity, is sold out.

8.   Where auctions are held for any interruptible products longer than within-day transmission system operators shall, if known, publish the amounts of interruptible capacity on offer before the start of the auction process.

9.   If offered, interruptible capacity shall be allocated by means of a separate auction after firm capacity of equal duration has been allocated, but before the auction of firm capacity with a shorter duration starts, with the exception of within-day interruptible capacity.

10.   If offered, interruptible capacity auctions shall be conducted in accordance with the same design principles and timescales as applied for firm capacity. The exact auction dates to be used for the interruptible capacity auctions shall be detailed within the auction calendar with the exception of within-day interruptible capacity. For the annual yearly, all annual quarterly and all rolling monthly capacity auctions, the transmission system operators shall notify network users about the amount of interruptible capacity to be offered one week before the auction starts. Where an auction of firm capacity has not closed on the scheduled start day for the interruptible auctions, the interruptible auctions shall open no later than the next business day after the closing of the respective auctions of firm capacity. In such cases, any change in the offered amounts shall be notified at least 12 hours before the start of the respective interruptible capacity auction.

1.   Interruptible capacities shall have minimum interruption lead times, which shall be decided jointly by adjacent transmission system operators.

2.   The default minimum interruption lead time for a given gas hour shall be 45 minutes after the start of the re-nomination cycle for that gas hour. Where two transmission system operators wish to shorten the lead time for interruptions, any related agreement entered into between the transmission system operators shall be subject to competent national regulatory authority approval.

1.   The order in which interruptions shall be performed, if the total of nominations exceeds the quantity of gas that can flow at a certain interconnection point, shall be determined based on the contractual time stamp of the respective transport contracts on an interruptible basis. In case of an interruption, transport contract coming into force earlier shall prevail over transport contract coming into force later.

2.   If, after applying the procedure provided for in paragraph 1, two or more nominations are ranked at the same position within the interruption order and the transmission system operator does not interrupt all of them, a pro rata reduction of these specific nominations shall apply.

3.   To accommodate the differences between the various interruptible capacity services within the Union, the adjacent transmission system operators shall implement and coordinate the joint procedures provided for in this Article on an interconnection point by interconnection point basis.

1.   Transmission system operators shall apply this Regulation by offering capacity by means of one or a limited number of joint web-based booking platforms. Transmission system operators can operate such platforms themselves or via an agreed party that, where necessary, acts on behalf of them towards the network users.

2.   Joint booking platforms shall apply the following rules:

3.   Within 6 months from entry into force of this Regulation all transmission system operators shall reach a contractual agreement to use a single booking platform to offer capacity on the two sides of their respective interconnection points or virtual interconnection points. If no agreement is reached by the transmission system operators within that period, the matter shall be referred immediately by the transmission system operators to the respective national regulatory authorities. The national regulatory authorities shall then, within a period of a further 6 months from the date of referral, jointly select the single booking platform for a period not longer than 3 years. If the national regulatory authorities are not able to jointly select a single booking platform within 6 months from the date of referral, Article 8(1) of the Regulation (EC) No 713/2009 shall apply. The Agency shall decide on the booking platform to be used, for a period not longer than 3 years, at the specific interconnection point or virtual interconnection point.

4.   In case the selection of the booking platform at an interconnection point or virtual interconnection point was made either by the national regulatory authorities or by the Agency, the transmission system operators shall reach a contractual agreement on the use of a booking platform at the latest by the end of the period referred to in the last sentence of paragraph 3, for which the selection was made by the national regulatory authorities or the Agency. If no contractual agreement is reached, the procedure set out in paragraph 3 shall be resumed.

5.   The establishment of one or a limited number of joint booking platforms shall facilitate and simplify capacity booking at interconnection points across the Union for the benefit of network users. Where appropriate, ENTSOG and the Agency shall facilitate this process.

6.   For increases in technical capacity, the allocation results shall be published on the booking platform which is used for auctioning existing capacity, and for new capacity created where none currently exists, on a joint booking platform agreed by the relevant transmission system operators.

1.   In order to assist the Agency in its monitoring duties pursuant to Article 9(1) of Regulation (EC) No 715/2009, ENTSOG shall monitor and analyse how transmission system operators have implemented this Regulation in accordance with Article 8(8) and (9) of Regulation (EC) No 715/2009. In particular, ENTSOG shall ensure the completeness and correctness of all relevant information from transmission system operators. ENTSOG shall submit to the Agency that information by 31 March 2019.

2.   Transmission system operators shall submit to ENTSOG all information required by ENTSOG to comply with its obligations pursuant to paragraph 1 by 31 December 2018.

3.   The confidentiality of commercially sensitive information shall be preserved by ENTSOG and the Agency.

4.   Before 6 April 2019, the Agency shall, in the framework of its monitoring tasks, report on the conditionalities stipulated in contracts for standard capacity products for firm capacity, having regard to their effect on efficient network use and the integration of the Union gas markets. The Agency shall be supported in its assessment by the relevant national regulatory authorities and transmission system operators.