Name

Identifying information

Reasons

Date of listing

1.

Mirghani Idriss SULEIMAN

Nationality: Sudanese

Gender: male

Function: Lieutenant General in the SAF;

Director General of Defence Industries System;

Head of Sudanese Army Production Agency

Associated individuals: General Abdelfattah Al-Burhan, Commander-in-Chief of the SAF

Associated entities: Defense Industry System, SMT Engineering; SAF

Lieutenant General Mirghani Idriss Suleiman is an officer of the SAF and Director General of Defense Industry System (DIS), a company sanctioned by the European Union for providing support to actions and policies that threaten the peace, stability and security of Sudan.

DIS is described as Sudan’s largest defence enterprise, generating an estimated USD 2 billion in revenue through hundreds of subsidiaries across various sectors of Sudan’s economy. DIS manufactures a range of small arms, conventional weapons, ammunition and military vehicles for the SAF.

As the Director General of DIS, Mirghani Idriss Suleiman has travelled extensively with General Abdelfattah Al-Burhan, Commander-in-Chief of the SAF, since the beginning of the war, allegedly, to enhance the SAF’s capabilities to fight the RSF on several fronts in Khartoum, Darfur and Kordofan.

Therefore, Mirghani Idriss Suleiman provides support to actions or policies that threaten the peace, stability or security of Sudan.

24.6.2024

2.

EL TAHIR Mohamed EL AWAD EL AMIN

a.k.a.

EL TAHIR Mohamed

EL AWAD EL AMIN

AL-TAHER;

Mohammed AL-AWAD AL-AMIN

Nationality: Sudanese

Gender: male

Function: Lieutenant General, Commander of the Sudanese Air Force since 1 September 2022;

Former Dean of the Sudanese Air Force College; Former Commander of the Khartoum Air Base

Associated individuals: General Abdelfattah Al-Burhan, Supreme Commander of the SAF;

Lieutenant General Yasir al-Atta, Assistant Commander-in-Chief of the SAF;

General Mohamed Osman al-Hussein, Chief of Staff of SAF Land Forces

Associated entities: SAF

El Tahir Mohamed El Awad El Amin is a Lieutenant General in the SAF and Commander of the Sudanese Air Force since 1 September 2022. He is therefore in charge of the operations carried out by the Air Force of the SAF since the outbreak of the conflict between the SAF, the RSF and their allied militias on 15 April 2023, as underscored by his participation in publicly disclosed high-level meetings of senior commanders of the SAF headed by the Commander-in-Chief Abdelfattah Al-Burhan in the General Command of the SAF in Khartoum in May and July 2023.

El Tahir Mohamed El Awad El Amin therefore holds a direct command responsibility in the indiscriminate aerial bombing carried out by the Air Force of the SAF in densely populated residential areas, notably in Khartoum, Omdurman, Nyala (South Darfur) and in North Kordofan, documented by the United Nations Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in Sudan (UNITAMS) in its 31 August 2023 and 13 November 2023 reports to the Secretary-General, by the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights in its 22 February 2024 report and by the United Nations Panel of Experts on Sudan in its 15 January 2024 report.

El Tahir Mohamed El Awad El Amin has thus been engaged directly in the continuation of the Sudanese conflict, which threatens the peace, stability and security of Sudan, and has been involved in planning, directing and committing aerial operations which have resulted in serious human rights violations and violations of international humanitarian law by causing high numbers of civilian casualties, leading to displacement of the civilian population and to the destruction of critical infrastructures, including medical facilities such as the East Nile Hospital in Khartoum in May 2023 and the Babiker Nahar Paediatric Hospital in El-Fasher in May 2024.

24.6.2024

3.

Ali Ahmed KARTI MOHAMED

DOB: 11.3.1953

POB: Hagar Elassal — Sudan

Nationality: Sudanese

Gender: male

Function: Stalwart of the National Congress Party;

Secretary-General of the Sudanese Islamist Movement;

Former Sudanese Minister of Foreign Affairs

ID number: 11822483949

Associated entities:

Sudanese Foreign Ministry;

Sudanese Islamic Movement

Ali Ahmed Karti Mohamed was the Sudanese Minister of Foreign Affairs under the Government of Omar al-Bashir. Following the fall of the al-Bashir regime, Ali Ahmed Karti Mohamed was selected as one of the leaders of the Sudanese Islamist Movement (SIM) and led efforts to derail Sudan’s progress towards a full democratic transition, by undermining the former civilian-led transitional government and the Framework Political Agreement process. This contributed to the conflict between the SAF and RSF, which began on 15 April 2023.

He and other hardline Sudanese Islamists are actively obstructing efforts to reach a ceasefire to end the conflict and they are opposing civilian efforts to restore Sudan’s democratic transition. Ali Ahmed Karti Mohamed is a stalwart of the National Congress Party (NCP), founded by Omar Al-Bashir in 1998. The NCP is the successor organisation to the Brotherhood-affiliated National Islamic Front.

Ali Ahmed Karti Mohamed is currently the Secretary-General of the SIM, a broad alliance of Islamist groups, and is considered to be the man behind the NCP’s resurgence. The Islamist movement has a strong influence on the SAF, police and intelligence services.

Therefore, Ali Ahmed Karti Mohamed engages directly or indirectly in, provides support to, or benefits from, actions or policies that threaten the peace, stability or security of Sudan.

24.6.2024

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5.

Mustafa Ibrahim ABDEL NABI MOHAMED

Nationality: Sudanese

Gender: male

Function: Director of al-Khaleej Bank; majority shareholder of Shield Protective Solutions Co. Ltd. (Sudan); financial adviser to the leader of the RSF

Passport number: B CH 4930920

Associated individuals: Musa Hamdan Dagalo Musa, brother of RSF leader Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo

Associated entities: Al-Khaleej Bank; Shield Protective Solutions Co. Ltd. (Sudan)

Mustafa Ibrahim Abdel Nabi Mohamed is a former senior official of the Sudanese Central Bank who became the RSF’s financial adviser, helping it to manage a web of proxy companies and entities.

A UN Panel of Experts Report on sanctions in Darfur recently referred to a former senior official of the Sudanese Central Bank who is based in Dubai and has become the RSF’s financial adviser without naming him. The report also explains that al Khaleej Bank became instrumental to the RSF’s financing in 2019 when its majority ownership was acquired by individuals and entities associated with the RSF.

Media reports and think-tanks have identified him as Mustafa Ibrahim Abdel Nabi Mohamed. He is a Director of Al Khaleej Bank, a Sudanese bank.

Over 60 % of the shares of Al Khaleej Bank are held by companies associated with the family of Mohammad Hamdan Dagalo (Hemedti), the head of the RSF.

Mustafa Ibrahim Abdel Nabi Mohamed is also the majority shareholder of Shield Protective Solutions Co. Ltd. The other shareholder in this company is one of the brothers of Hemedti, namely Musa Hamdan Dagalo Musa, and this company holds over 14 % of the shareholding in al Khaleej Bank.

As a financial adviser to the RSF and the Dagalo family, Mustafa Ibrahim Abdel Nabi Mohamed is engaging directly or indirectly in providing support to, or benefitting from, actions or policies that threaten the peace, stability or security of Sudan.

24.6.2024

6.

Masar Abdurahman ASEEL

a.k.a.

Massar Abdelrahman ASSIL

Masar Abdelrahman ESEIL

Massar ASSEL

Masar ASIL

Gender: male

Function: Amir of the Mahamid clan in West Darfur;

Member of the Native Administration in West Darfur

Masar Abdurahman Aseel is a prominent tribal leader of the Mahamid clan in West Darfur. The Mahamid clan belongs to the Rizeigat tribe which gathers Arab communities inhabiting Darfur and Chad. He holds the title of Amir and is a member of the Native Administration in West Darfur.

Masar Abdurahman Aseel has facilitated the attacks led by the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and their allied militias against local communities living in El Geneina (West Darfur), especially the Massalit people, since April 2023. In particular, he directly contributed to the recruitment and arming of militias by the RSF and to the coordination between these forces, as is reported by the 15th final report of the United Nations Panel of Experts on Sudan published in January 2024, to carry out their ethnically targeted attacks, notably against the Massalit communities, in West Darfur between late April and early November 2023. Propaganda videos featuring Masar Abdurahman Aseel were published by the RSF in March and in April 2024, demonstrating his warmongering support to the RSF and his role in rallying the troops behind the RSF to join their fight against the SAF since 15 April 2023.

Masar Abdurahman Aseel has therefore engaged directly in, provided support to and benefitted from actions and policies that threaten the peace, stability and security of Sudan. By supporting the seizing of West Darfur by the RSF, Masar Abdurahman Aseel has strengthened his position and influence within the Native Administration of West Darfur, at the expense of other community leaders, notably belonging to the Massalit community, which have been targeted by the RSF and their allied militias.

24.6.2024

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7.

Salah Abdallah Mohamed SALAH

a.k.a.

SALAH GOSH

DOB: 1957

POB: Nuri, Sudan

Nationality: Sudanese

Passport: YSJCYKRYG1U5

Gender: male

Function: former national security advisor of the Republic of Sudan; former Director of the Sudanese National Intelligence and Security Service

Associated individuals: former President of the Republic of Sudan, Omar Al-Bashir; General Abdelfattah Al-Burhan

Associated entities: National Intelligence and Security Service (NISS)

Salah Abdallah Mohamed Salah is the former national security advisor of the Republic of Sudan and the former Director of the Sudanese National Intelligence and Security Service (NISS).

Salah Abdallah Mohamed Salah is responsible for several coups d’état in Sudan – notably those in 2012 and 2019 – and helped in the execution of a coup d’état in 2021. He is widely considered to be Sudan’s spymaster. Due to his expertise as a former security official, he played a role in helping former regime elements to return to power and undermined efforts to establish a civilian government in Sudan.

After the fall of the Al-Bashir regime, Salah Abdallah Mohamed Salah continues to be involved in activities that destabilise peace and stability in the country. Although he is rarely seen in public, he remains active and is considered to be the ‘mastermind’ behind many of the actions carried out by the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the intelligence operations department as part of the ongoing crisis.

Therefore, Salah Abdallah Mohamed Salah is considered to be a leader among the hardliner elements of the former Al-Bashir regime, who is responsible for security and military-related efforts and is embedded in the structures of the SAF. His ideological ties to the former Al-Bashir regime, and in particular to the National Congress Party (NCP) are a strong driver of the narrative that fuels the war against the opposing front, namely the Rapid Support Forces (RSF).

Salah Abdallah Mohamed Salah has therefore been involved in actions that threaten the peace, stability or security of Sudan and in actions undermining the efforts to resume the political transition in Sudan.

16.12.2024

8.

Tijani KARSHOM

a.k.a.

KHARSHOM;

KARSHOUM;

KHARSHOUM;

AL-TIJANI AL-TAHIR KARSHOUM

Nationality: Sudanese

Gender: male

Function: former Deputy Governor (or ‘Wali’ in local parlance) of West Darfur; de facto Governor of West Darfur

Associated individuals: Abdulrahman JUMA BARAKALLAH; Masar Abdurahman ASEEL

Associated entities: Gathering of Sudan Liberation Forces (GSLF)

Tijani Karshom is a leading member of the Mahamid tribe and was Deputy Governor of West Darfur at the time of the massacre of the Massalit tribe in El Geneina, the capital of West Darfur, in June 2023. He is also a member of the Gathering of Sudan Liberation Forces (GSLF), which facilitated the recruitment of militia to fight alongside the Rapid Support Forces (RSF).

Tijani Karshom holds responsibility in the fatal attack on the Governor of West Darfur in El Geneina in June 2023, for having instructed the RSF to prevent civilians trapped in El Geneina from leaving the city, and for having directed two attacks on camps for internally displaced persons. After the El Geneina massacre, he established a committee to collect and bury bodies in mass graves. He has also been involved in efforts to hide bodies after a second massacre, in Ardamatta, West Darfur, in November 2023.

Tijani Karshom is also responsible for having led an attack in El Geneina alongside the RSF and for having directed artillery fire on the Governor of West Darfur’s office in May 2023, a month before the Governor’s assassination.

Tijani Karshom has therefore been involved in actions that threaten the peace, stability and security of Sudan and has been involved in planning, directing or committing acts in West Darfur that constitute serious human rights abuses and violations of international humanitarian law, including killings, rape and other serious forms of sexual and gender-based violence, and abduction.

16.12.2024

9.

Mohamed Ali Ahmed SUBIR

Nationality: Sudanese

Gender: male

Function: Lieutenant General; Director of the Directorate of Military Intelligence (DMI) of the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF)

Associated entities: Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF); Directorate of Military Intelligence (DMI)

Mohamed Ali Ahmed Subir is a Lieutenant General in the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Director of the Directorate of Military Intelligence (DMI) of the SAF. In this capacity, he has been in charge of the operations carried out by the DMI since the outbreak, on 15 April 2023, of the conflict between the SAF, the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and their allied armed groups. This is underscored by his participation in publicly disclosed high-level meetings of senior commanders of the SAF, headed by Commander-in-Chief Abdelfattah Al-Burhan of the General Command of the SAF in Khartoum in May and July 2023.

Mohamed Ali Ahmed Subir therefore holds a command responsibility in the harassment, arbitrary arrest and detention of: human rights defenders; local community activists, including anti-war activists; lawyers; medical professionals; volunteers supporting emergency services; members of political parties and of resistance committees; and people perceived as supporters of the RSF.

Mohamed Ali Ahmed Subir has also been involved in several cases of sexual violence, including rape and rape threats, attributed to the DMI, and in the perpetration by the DMI of acts amounting to torture and other forms of ill-treatment.

Mohamed Ali Ahmed Subir is also responsible for the imposition of significant restrictions by the DMI on aid access and delivery.

Mohamed Ali Ahmed Subir has therefore been directly involved in the perpetration by the DMI of acts that constitute serious human rights violations and violations of international humanitarian law, and is thus responsible for actions that directly undermine efforts to resume the political transition in Sudan.

16.12.2024

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11.

Abu Aqla Mohamed Ahmed KAIKAL

Nationality: Sudanese

Gender: male

Function: Commander of a SAF-affiliated militia

Associated entities: SAF

Abu Aqla Mohamed Ahmed Kaikal is a Sudanese Military Commander who served in the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) in the Jazira state in Sudan until he defected to the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) in October 2024. In December 2023, he was appointed by the RSF as Governor of the Jazira state, after the RSF violently took over that area. The RSF is responsible for attacking cities and humanitarian hubs in the Jazira state, leading to massive displacement of civilians, hunger, shortage of medicines and impediment of humanitarian aid. Jazira state specifically has been a centre of violence committed by the RSF during Kaikal’s governorship. Therefore, Abu Aqla Mohamed Ahmed Kaikal is responsible for actions and policies that threaten the peace, stability and security of Sudan. In addition, he is responsible for directing acts in Sudan that constitute serious human rights violations, and for obstructing the delivery of, access to and distribution of humanitarian assistance in Sudan.

18.7.2025

12.

Hussein BARSHAM

Nationality: Sudanese

Gender: male

Function: Military Field Commander of the RSF

Associated entities: RSF; Misseria tribe

Hussein Barsham is a Military Field Commander of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), an organisation that has been accused by international non-governmental organisations of ethnic cleansing and even genocide against the Masalit tribe and other non-Arab groups in Darfur.

As a Commander, Hussein Barsham has led RSF soldiers in the capture of the Baleela airport from the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), and the capture of localities in the West Kordofan state, such as Meiram. He has played a leading role in RSF operations that have resulted in mass atrocities, including targeted killings, ethnic violence, forced displacement and violence against civilians, particularly in Darfur and other conflict-affected regions of Sudan. Under his command, RSF forces have been involved in mass killings and atrocities. Barsham has been engaged in the fighting in the Kordofan region. He has led attacks on several localities and has been present at the sites of atrocities and mass executions committed by soldiers under his command. Such acts constitute war crimes.

Hussein Barsham is therefore responsible for actions that threaten the peace, stability and security of Sudan. He is also responsible for undermining efforts to resume the political transition in Sudan and for directing or committing acts in Sudan that constitute serious human rights violations or abuses or violations of international humanitarian law.

18.7.2025

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16.

Edris KAFUTI

Nationality: Sudanese

Gender: male

Function: Field Commander of the RSF

Associated entities: RSF

Edris Kafuti is an RSF field commander. He has been identified as a key perpetrator of the atrocities committed by the RSF in El Fasher in October 2025. During that incident, he harassed detained individuals.

Edris Kafuti is therefore responsible for committing acts in Sudan that constitute serious human rights violations or abuses, as well as violations of international humanitarian law. He is also responsible for actions that threaten the peace, stability or security of Sudan.

29.1.2026

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19.

Abu Zaid Talha AL-MISBAH

Nationality: Sudanese

Gender: male

Function: Commander of the Baraa bin Malik Battalion (BBMB)

Associated entities: SAF; Baraa bin Malik Battalion (BBMB)

Abu Zaid Talha Al-Misbah is the Commander of the Baraa bin Malik Battalion (BBMB), an Islamist militia fighting alongside the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) in the conflict between the SAF, the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and their allied armed groups, which has been ongoing since 15 April 2023.

Abu Zaid Talha Al-Misbah took part in the defence of the Armored Corps base in south Khartoum between June and August 2023. He also headed Baraa bin Malik Battalion’s fighters who flooded into the Republican palace in Khartoum in March 2025. Abu Zaid Talha Al-Misbah is therefore participating actively in the war efforts led by the SAF, which are obstructing and undermining efforts to resume the political transition in Sudan.

Abu Zaid Talha Al-Misbah holds command responsibility for the summary executions of civilians carried out by the Baraa bin Malik Battalion in Khartoum North in September 2024 and in Gezirah in January 2025, which constitute serious human rights violations, as documented by, among others, the December 2025 report of the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for Sudan of the Human Rights Council of the United Nations and the February 2025 report of Human Rights Watch.

Abu Zaid Talha Al-Misbah has therefore been directly involved in the perpetration by the Baraa bin Malik Battalion of acts that constitute serious human rights violations, and he is also responsible for undermining efforts to resume the political transition in Sudan.

29.1.2026

20.

Al-Tayyib AL-IMAM JODA

Nationality: Sudanese

Gender: male

Function: Emir of the Nafeidiya clan of the Kawahla tribe from the Sarhan area west of Gezirah

Associated entities: SAF; Sudan Shield Forces; Kawahla tribe; Nafeidiya clan

Al-Tayyib Al-Imam Joda is the Emir of the Nafeidiya clan of the Kawahla tribe from the Sarhan area west of Gezirah State. He was among the community leaders who assisted the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and allied militias, in particular the Sudan Shield Forces, in recruiting and organising the campaign of systematic targeting of Kanabi farming communities in Gezirah and Sennar States, which included mass arrests, mass killings, mass graves and burned villages, notably before and after the recapture of Wad Madani by the SAF and their allies in January 2025.

Al-Tayyib Al-Imam Joda expressed his full support for the Sudan Shield Forces, a paramilitary group allied to the SAF, headed by Abu Aqla Mohamed Kaikal which has committed serious human rights violations in Gezirah State.

Al-Tayyib Al-Imam Joda has repeatedly called for the arming of the civilian population, has recruited combatants on behalf of the SAF and the Sudan Shield Forces, and has incited violence against the Kanabi people by accusing them of siding with the Rapid Support Forces (RSF).

Al-Tayyib Al-Imam Joda has therefore been involved in planning, directing and committing acts in Sudan that constitute serious human rights violations and that directly undermine efforts to resume the political transition in Sudan.

29.1.2026

Name

Identifying information

Reasons

Date of listing

1.

Defense Industries System

a.k.a.:

Military Industry Corporation;

Defense Industries Corporation

Address: Khartoum North, Khartoum 10783

Type of entity: Public entity

Date of registration: 1993

Defense Industries System (DIS), previously known as the Military Industrial Corporation (MIC), is a large Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF)-owned conglomerate which manages a network of military-controlled companies. DIS generates substantial annual revenues, estimated at USD 2 billion in 2020.

DIS manufactures and provides the SAF with a range of military equipment, including weapons, ammunition, aircraft and military vehicles, which are used by the armed forces in the conflict in Sudan.

DIS controls together with SMT Engineering (SMT), through a network of direct and indirect shareholdings, numerous companies of the SAF-controlled GIAD conglomerate, which is also involved in the production of weapons and vehicles for the armed forces, as well as in the provision of services to the SAF, in particular through a partnership between GIAD for Automotive Services and the Corps of Engineers.

The Director-General of DIS has accompanied Commander Al-Burhan during his official visits abroad since April 2023.

Therefore, DIS provides support to SAF actions and policies that threaten the peace, stability and security of Sudan. In addition, DIS is associated with SMT which also provides support to the SAF’s actions and policies that threaten the peace, stability and security of Sudan.

22.1.2024

2.

SMT Engineering

a.k.a.:

Sudan Master Technology;

SMT

Address: SMT Building Madani Road, KM 50 Khartoum, Giad Industrial Complex, Gamhuria Street Khartoum

Type of entity: State Controlled Company

SMT Engineering (SMT) is a Sudan-based company which owns or controls, together with DIS, numerous companies of the SAF-controlled GIAD conglomerate, through a network of direct and indirect shareholdings. SMT is the main shareholder of three GIAD companies in which DIS owns the rest of the shares (GIAD for the automotive and truck industry, GIAD complex for heavy mechanism industries and GIAD metal industries complex). SMT also owns or controls, directly or indirectly, many other companies that are part of the GIAD conglomerate and in which DIS also holds stakes, such as GIAD for Automotive Services.

The GIAD conglomerate is involved in the production of weapons and vehicles for the armed forces, as well as in the provision of services to the SAF, in particular through a partnership between GIAD for Automotive Services and the Corps of Engineers.

DIS is a large SAF-owned conglomerate which provides support for SAF actions and policies that threaten the peace, stability and security of Sudan, in particular through the manufacture and provision of a range of military equipment, including weapons, ammunition, aircraft and military vehicles, which are used by the armed forces in the conflict in Sudan.

Therefore, SMT Engineering provides support for SAF actions and policies that threaten the peace, stability and security of Sudan. It is also associated with DIS, which also provides support for SAF actions and policies that threaten the peace, stability and security of Sudan.

22.1.2024

3.

Zadna International Company for Investment Limited

Address: Doha Street Property 436, Manshia Doha Street, Khartoum, Sudan, 11429

Type of entity: State Controlled Company

Date of registration: 1997

Zadna International Company for Investment Limited (Zadna) is a holding company in agriculture and construction, which is 99 % owned by the SAF controlled Special Fund for the Social Security of the Armed Forces (SFSSAF), formerly known as the Charity Organisation for the Support of the Armed Forces.

The leader of the SAF, Commander Al-Burhan, appointed in October 2021 General El Mirghani Idris Suleiman as Chairman of Zadna, who is one of his friends and Director of DIS.

In May 2023, he also appointed Dr Taha Hussein Yousef as Director-General of Zadna.

The SFSSAF and Zadna are part of the vast network of companies and organisations owned or controlled by the SAF, which are used to sustain the power of the armed forces over the Sudanese economy.

Zadna is a leading company engaged in high-profile international business deals and is one of the top revenue earners in the army’s network of companies. Therefore, it generates substantial revenues for the benefit of the SAF, which enables the armed forces to finance and continue the conflict in Sudan.

Therefore, Zadna International Company for Investment Limited provides support for SAF actions and policies that threaten the peace, stability and security of Sudan.

22.1.2024

4.

Al Junaid Multi Activities Co Ltd

a.k.a.

Ajmac multi activities company;

Al Gunade

Address: Street 3 Khartoum Block 17 Alryad, Sudan

Industrial Area 13, Sharjah, UAE P.O. Box 61401, Sharjah

Type of entity: Limited Company

Date of registration: 2009

Al Junaid Multi Activities Co Ltd (Al Junaid) is a Sudanese holding company controlled by Rapid Support Forces’ (RSF) Commander Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (Hemedti) and his brother, RSF Deputy Commander Abdul Rahim Dagalo. The company is owned by Abdul Rahim Dagalo and his two sons. Hemedti himself is on its board of directors.

Based in Khartoum, Al Junaid operates subsidiaries across multiple economic sectors, including gold mining and trade, and covers a large part of Sudan’s gold industry. The company has mining concessions in Darfur, in particular in the vicinity of Jebel Amer (North Darfur) and in the Singo area (South Darfur), and it also operates beyond that region.

The gold mines of Darfur are under the control of the RSF, including the Jebel Amer site since 2017.

Gold mining and trade through Al Junaid generates a substantial source of revenue for the Dagalo family and the RSF, which enables them to finance and continue the conflict in Sudan.

The RSF is also using Al Junaid’s gold production and exports to secure military support from the United Arab Emirates (UAE), to which most of Sudan’s gold production is smuggled, and from the Wagner Group, including the provision of weapons used by the RSF in the conflict in Sudan.

Therefore, Al Junaid Multi Activities Co Ltd provides support for RSF actions that threaten the peace, stability and security of Sudan.

22.1.2024

5.

Tradive General Trading Co

Address: P.O. Box 86436, Dubai (UAE)

Type of entity: Limited Company

Date of registration: 2018

Tradive General Trading Co (Tradive) is a company based in the UAE whose director and ultimate beneficial owner is RSF Major Algoney Hamdan Dagalo, the youngest brother of Mohammed Hamdan Dagalo (Hemedti).

Tradive is part of the RSF’s commercial network which generates stable revenue for the RSF enabling them to finance and continue the conflict in Sudan. It is used as an RSF front company, channelling substantial sums into and out of the RSF, and enabling the purchase of material to support RSF operations.

For instance, Tradive has purchased vehicles for the RSF, including Toyota Hilux and Land Cruiser pick-up trucks, which are often converted into highly mobile ‘technicals’, which are armed desert vehicles. In the first half of 2019, more than one thousand such vehicles were imported into Sudan from the UAE. These converted vehicles have been used by the RSF for a long time and continue to be used by it in the conflict in Sudan, in particular to patrol the areas under RSF control.

Therefore, Tradive General Trading Co provides support for RSF actions that threaten the peace, stability and security of Sudan.

22.1.2024

6.

GSK ADVANCE COMPANY LTD

Address: Ahmed Khair Street, Khartoum 11111, Sudan

Type of entity: Limited Company

GSK is a Sudan-based information technology and security company, which is 60 % owned by RSF Major Algoney Hamdan Dagalo, the youngest brother of Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (Hemedti).

GSK is part of the RSF’s commercial network which generates stable revenue for the RSF enabling them to finance and continue the conflict in Sudan. It is used by the RSF as a front company, facilitating cash flows into the RSF and being involved in the RSF’s procurement processes.

In addition, since at least 2019, GSK has been working with Aviatrade LLC, a Russia-based military supply company, on the purchase and supply of material and equipment for the benefit of the RSF, including the corresponding training, and on the purchase and supply of unmanned aerial vehicles, monitoring equipment and spare parts. Reconnaissance and weaponised drones are used by the RSF in the conflict in Sudan.

Therefore, GSK Advance Company LTD provides support for RSF actions that threaten the peace, stability and security of Sudan.

22.1.2024

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7.

Alkhaleej Bank Co Ltd

a.k.a.:

Khaleej Bank;

Al Rowad Bank For Development & Investment;

Al Rowad Bank For Development And Investment;

Al-Khaleej Bank;

بنك الخليج

Address: Albaraka Tower, 6th Floor, 1 Al Qasr, Khartoum, Sudan
Website: https://al-khaleejbank.com/alkhaleej/ ►C1  
Type of entity: Financial institution
SWIFT/BIC code: KHJBSDKH and 5040942458
Principal place of business: Khartoum, Sudan  ◄
Associated individuals or entities: Mustafa Ibrahim Abdel Nabi Mohamed, designated by the Union on 24.6.2024; Musa Hamdan Dagalo Musa, brother of RSF Commander Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo; Shield Protective Solutions Co. Ltd. (Sudan)

Alkhaleej Bank Co Ltd (‘Alkhaleej’) plays an essential role in the Rapid Support Forces’ (RSF) efforts to finance its own operations, complicating efforts to stop the fighting in Sudan. Alkhaleej is largely owned by companies linked to family members of RSF Commander Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (Hemedti) and is therefore considered to be controlled by the RSF.

Before and during the war, the RSF has established complex financial networks using profits from its gold business to fund weapons, salaries and media campaigns, and to gain political support. It controls a network of up to 50 companies, including Alkhaleej, which became a key financier and received USD 50 million from Sudan’s Central Bank in March 2023. Furthermore, Alkhaleej has international banking ties that allow the RSF to operate within the global financial system. Hemedti’s network reportedly owns a significant portion of Alkhaleej, with some estimates suggesting majority control.

The RSF’s business activities span multiple sectors, including transport, construction, agriculture and banking, making Hemedti one of Sudan’s wealthiest and most powerful figures. Alkhaleej plays a crucial role in those operations, offering a direct or indirect financial lifeline to the RSF.

As a key financier and facilitator of the RSF and its armed attacks and actions, Alkhaleej Bank Co Ltd is therefore engaging directly or indirectly in providing support to, or benefitting from, actions or policies that threaten the peace, stability or security of Sudan.

18.7.2025

8.

Red Rock Mining Company

a.k.a. Red Rock Ltd

Address: Blok 9, Kafory, Khartoum, Sudan
Telephone: + 249 1203 47711
Website: https://redrockmining.co/contact-us/#
Email: corporate@redrockmining.net
info@redrocksd.com
Type of entity: mining company ►C1  
Date of registration: 1960s
Principal place of business: United Arab Emirates  ◄
Address: Office 320, Emarat Atrium Building, Business Bay, Dubai, United Arab Emirates
Associated individuals or entities: SMT Engineering

Red Rock Mining Company is a mining and exploration company. Its parent company is SMT Engineering (SMT), which is subject to restrictive measures by the Union, the United States and the United Kingdom. SMT is a major joint shareholder, along with the Defense Industries System (DIS), in three companies involved in the production of weapons and vehicles for the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF).

The mining sector is of particular importance for the fuelling of conflict. Mining areas are often linked to war zones and represent strategically important sites to conquer for the conflict parties, increasing competition and tensions. Red Rock Mining Company is present and active in Sudan. It further holds a concession near al Damazin, which was taken over by the SAF in 2012.

Red Rock Mining Company provides funding to the armed groups behind the Sudanese conflict, most prominently to the SAF. Red Rock Mining Company has a 99 % shareholding in Advanced Mining Works, which is part of the multi-sectoral network of corporations and shareholdings headed by the parent company GIAD. GIAD is involved, among others, in the production of weapons and vehicles for SAF, as well as in the provision of services. The GIAD conglomerate is controlled by the SAF via the DIS.

Red Rock Mining Company is therefore an entity providing support to actions or policies that threaten the peace, stability and security of Sudan. It is also associated with designated individuals and entities.

18.7.2025