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COUNCIL DECISION (CFSP) 2017/1775
of 28 September 2017
concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Mali
(OJ L 251, 29.9.2017, p. 23)

Amended by:

		Official Journal		
		No	page	date
► <u>M1</u>	Council Implementing Decision (CFSP) 2019/29 of 9 January 2019	L 8	30	10.1.2019
► <u>M2</u>	Council Implementing Decision (CFSP) 2019/1216 of 17 July 2019	L 192	26	18.7.2019
► <u>M3</u>	Council Implementing Decision (CFSP) 2020/9 of 7 January 2020	L 4 I	7	8.1.2020
► <u>M4</u>	Council Implementing Decision (CFSP) 2020/118 of 27 January 2020	L 22	55	28.1.2020
► <u>M5</u>	Council Decision (CFSP) 2021/2208 of 13 December 2021	L 446	44	14.12.2021
► <u>M6</u>	Council Decision (CFSP) 2022/157 of 4 February 2022	L 25 I	7	4.2.2022
► <u>M7</u>	Council Implementing Decision (CFSP) 2022/2187 of 8 November 2022	L 288	82	9.11.2022
► <u>M8</u>	Council Decision (CFSP) 2022/2440 of 12 December 2022	L 319	68	13.12.2022
► <u>M9</u>	Council Decision (CFSP) 2023/431 of 25 February 2023	L 59 I	434	25.2.2023
► <u>M10</u>	Council Decision (CFSP) 2023/726 of 31 March 2023	L 94	48	3.4.2023
► <u>M11</u>	Council Decision (CFSP) 2023/2799 of 11 December 2023	L 2799	1	12.12.2023
► <u>M12</u>	Council Implementing Decision (CFSP) 2024/215 of 4 January 2024	L 215	1	5.1.2024

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COUNCIL DECISION (CFSP) 2017/1775

of 28 September 2017

concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Mali

Article 1

1. Member States shall take the necessary measures to prevent the entry into, or transit through, their territories of persons designated by the Sanctions Committee as responsible for or complicit in, or having engaged in, directly or indirectly, the following actions or policies that threaten the peace, security, or stability of Mali:

- (a) engaging in hostilities in violation of the Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali (the ‘Agreement’);
- (b) actions taken that obstruct, or that obstruct by prolonged delay, or that threaten the implementation of the Agreement;
- (c) acting for or on behalf of or at the direction of, or otherwise supporting or financing individuals and entities identified in points (a) and (b), including through the proceeds from organised crime, including the production and trafficking of narcotic drugs and their precursors originating in or transiting through Mali, the trafficking in persons and the smuggling of migrants, the smuggling and trafficking of arms as well as the trafficking in cultural property;
- (d) involvement in planning, directing, sponsoring, or conducting attacks against:
 - (i) the various entities referenced in the Agreement, including local, regional and state institutions, joint patrols and the Malian Security and Defence forces;
 - (ii) United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission (MINUSMA) peacekeepers and other UN and associated personnel, including members of the Panel of Experts;
 - (iii) international security presences, including the Force Conjointe des États du G5 Sahel (FC-G5S), European Union Missions and French forces;
- (e) obstructing the delivery of humanitarian assistance to Mali, or access to, or distribution of, humanitarian assistance in Mali;
- (f) planning, directing, or committing acts in Mali that violate international human rights law or international humanitarian law, as applicable, or that constitute human rights abuses or violations, including those involving the targeting of civilians, including women and children, through the commission of acts of violence (including killing, maiming, torture, or rape or other sexual violence), abduction, enforced disappearance, forced displacement, or attacks on schools, hospitals, religious sites, or locations where civilians are seeking refuge;

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- (g) the use or recruitment of children by armed groups or armed forces in violation of applicable international law, in the context of the armed conflict in Mali;
- (h) knowingly facilitating the travel of a listed person in violation of the travel restrictions.

The designated persons referred to in this paragraph are listed in ►**M5** Annex I ◀.

2. Paragraph 1 shall not oblige a Member State to refuse its own nationals entry into its territory.
3. Paragraph 1 shall not apply where entry or transit is necessary for the fulfilment of a judicial process.
4. Paragraph 1 shall not apply where the Sanctions Committee determines, on a case-by-case basis, that:
 - (a) entry or transit is justified on the grounds of humanitarian need, including religious obligation;
 - (b) an exemption would further the objectives of peace and national reconciliation in Mali and stability in the region.
5. In cases where, pursuant to paragraph 3 or 4, a Member State authorises the entry into, or transit through, its territory of persons listed in ►**M5** Annex I ◀, the authorisation shall be limited to the purpose for which it is given and to the persons concerned by the authorisation.

▼M5*Article 1a*

1. Member States shall take the necessary measures to prevent the entry into, or transit through, their territories of natural persons:
 - (a) being responsible for or complicit in, or having engaged in, directly or indirectly in actions or policies that threaten the peace, security, or stability of Mali, such as those actions or policies referred to in Article 1, paragraph 1;
 - (b) obstructing or undermining the successful completion of the political transition of Mali, including by obstructing or undermining the holding of elections or the handover of power to elected authorities; or
 - (c) being associated with natural persons referred to in points (a) or (b).

The designated persons referred to in this paragraph are listed in Annex II.

2. Paragraph 1 shall not oblige a Member State to refuse its own nationals entry into its territory.
3. Paragraph 1 shall be without prejudice to the cases where a Member State is bound by an obligation of international law, namely:
 - (a) as a host country of an international intergovernmental organisation;
 - (b) as a host country to an international conference convened by, or under the auspices of, the United Nations;

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(c) under a multilateral agreement conferring privileges and immunities; or

(d) pursuant to the 1929 Treaty of Conciliation (Lateran Pact) concluded by the Holy See (Vatican City State) and Italy.

4. Paragraph 3 shall also apply in cases where a Member State is host country of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).

5. The Council shall be duly informed in all cases where a Member State grants an exemption pursuant to paragraphs 3 or 4.

6. Member States may grant exemptions from the measures imposed under paragraph 1 where travel is justified on the grounds of urgent humanitarian need, or on grounds of attending intergovernmental meetings or meetings promoted or hosted by the Union, or hosted by a Member State holding the Chairmanship in office of the OSCE, where a political dialogue is conducted that directly promotes the policy objectives of restrictive measures.

7. Member States may also grant exemptions from the measures imposed under paragraph 1 where entry or transit is necessary for the fulfilment of a judicial process.

8. A Member State wishing to grant exemptions referred to in paragraphs 6 or 7 shall notify the Council in writing. The exemption shall be deemed to be granted unless one or more Member States raises an objection in writing within two working days of receiving notification of the proposed exemption. Should one or more Member States raise an objection, the Council, acting by a qualified majority, may decide to grant the proposed exemption.

9. Where, pursuant to paragraphs 3, 4, 6 or 7, a Member State authorises the entry into, or transit through its territory of persons listed in Annex II, the authorisation shall be strictly limited to the purpose for which it is given and to the persons directly concerned thereby.

▼B*Article 2*

1. All funds and economic resources owned or controlled directly or indirectly by persons or entities designated by the Sanctions Committee as responsible for or complicit in, or having engaged in, directly or indirectly, the following actions or policies that threaten the peace, security, or stability of Mali:

(a) engaging in hostilities in violation of the Agreement;

(b) actions taken that obstruct, or that obstruct by prolonged delay, or that threaten the implementation of the Agreement;

(c) acting for or on behalf of or at the direction of, or otherwise supporting or financing individuals and entities identified in points (a) and (b), including through the proceeds from organised crime, including the production and trafficking of narcotic drugs and their precursors originating in or transiting through Mali, the trafficking in persons and the smuggling of migrants, the smuggling and trafficking of arms as well as the trafficking in cultural property;

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- (d) involvement in planning, directing, sponsoring, or conducting attacks against:
 - (i) the various entities referenced in the Agreement, including local, regional and state institutions, joint patrols and the Malian Security and Defence forces;
 - (ii) MINUSMA peacekeepers and other UN and associated personnel, including members of the Panel of experts;
 - (iii) international security presences, including the FC-G5S, European Union Missions and French forces;
- (e) obstructing the delivery of humanitarian assistance to Mali, or access to, or distribution of, humanitarian assistance in Mali;
- (f) planning, directing, or committing acts in Mali that violate international human rights law or international humanitarian law, as applicable, or that constitute human rights abuses or violations, including those involving the targeting of civilians, including women and children, through the commission of acts of violence (including killing, maiming, torture, or rape or other sexual violence), abduction, enforced disappearance, forced displacement, or attacks on schools, hospitals, religious sites, or locations where civilians are seeking refuge;
- (g) the use or recruitment of children by armed groups or armed forces in violation of applicable international law, in the context of the armed conflict in Mali;
- (h) knowingly facilitating the travel of a listed person in violation of the travel restrictions;

or by persons or entities acting on their behalf or at their direction, or entities owned or controlled by them, shall be frozen.

The designated persons or entities referred to in this paragraph are listed in ►**M5** Annex I ◀.

2. No funds or economic resources shall be made available directly or indirectly, to or for the benefit of the persons or entities listed in ►**M5** Annex I ◀.

3. The measures referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2 shall not apply to funds and economic resources which the relevant Member State has determined to be:

- (a) necessary for basic expenses, including payment for foodstuffs, rent or mortgage, medicines and medical treatment, taxes, insurance premiums, and public utility charges;
- (b) intended exclusively for the payment of reasonable professional fees and reimbursement of incurred expenses associated with the provision of legal services; or

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- (c) intended exclusively for the payment of fees or service charges for routine holding or maintenance of frozen funds or economic resources;

after notification by the relevant Member State to the Sanctions Committee of the intention to authorise, where appropriate, access to such funds or economic resources and in the absence of a negative decision by the Sanctions Committee within five working days of such notification.

4. The measures referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2 shall not apply to funds or economic resources which the relevant Member State has determined to be:

- (a) necessary for extraordinary expenses, provided that such determination has been notified by the Member State to the Sanctions Committee and has been approved by the Sanctions Committee;
- (b) the subject of a judicial, administrative or arbitral lien or judgment, in which case the funds and economic resources may be used to satisfy that lien or judgment provided that the lien was entered into or judgment delivered prior to the date on which the person or entity was included in ►**M5** Annex I ◀, the lien or judgment is not for the benefit of a person or entity referred to in paragraph 1 and has been notified by the Member State concerned to the Sanctions Committee.

5. Paragraphs 1 and 2 shall not apply where the Sanctions Committee determines, on a case-by-case basis, that an exemption would further the objectives of peace and national reconciliation in Mali and stability in the region.

6. Paragraph 1 shall not prevent a designated person or entity from making a payment due under a contract entered into prior to the listing of such a person or entity, provided that the relevant Member State has determined that the payment is not directly or indirectly received by a person or entity referred to in paragraph 1 and after notification by the relevant Member State to the Sanctions Committee of the intention to make or receive such payments or to authorise, where appropriate, the unfreezing of funds or economic resources for that purpose, 10 working days prior to such authorisation.

7. Paragraph 2 shall not apply to the addition to frozen accounts of:

- (a) interest or other earnings on those accounts; or
- (b) payments due under contracts, agreements or obligations that were concluded or arose prior to the date on which those accounts became subject to the restrictive measures provided for in this Decision;

provided that any such interest, other earnings and payments continue to be subject to paragraph 1.

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8. Paragraphs 1 and 2 shall not apply to the provision, processing or payment of funds, other financial assets or economic resources or to the provision of goods and services, which are necessary to ensure the timely delivery of humanitarian assistance or to support other activities that support basic human needs where such assistance and other activities are carried out by:

▼ M10

- (a) the United Nations, including its programmes, funds and other entities and bodies, as well as its specialised agencies and related organisations;
- (b) international organisations;
- (c) humanitarian organisations having observer status with the United Nations General Assembly and members of those humanitarian organisations;
- (d) bilaterally or multilaterally funded non-governmental organisations participating in the United Nations Humanitarian Response Plans, Refugee Response Plans, other United Nations appeals or humanitarian clusters coordinated by the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA);
- (e) the employees, grantees, subsidiaries, or implementing partners of the entities mentioned in points (a) to (d) while and to the extent that they are acting in those capacities; or by,
- (f) appropriate other actors as determined by the Sanctions Committee.

▼ M5*Article 2a*

1. All funds and economic resources owned or controlled directly or indirectly by natural or legal persons, entities or bodies:

- (a) being responsible for or complicit in, or having engaged directly or indirectly, in actions or policies that threaten the peace, security, or stability of Mali, such as those actions or policies referred to in Article 2, paragraph 1;
- (b) obstructing or undermining the successful completion of the political transition of Mali, including by obstructing or undermining the holding of elections or the handover of power to elected authorities; or
- (c) being associated with natural or legal persons, entities or bodies referred to in points (a) or (b),

shall be frozen.

The designated natural or legal persons, entities or bodies referred to in this paragraph are listed in Annex II.

2. No funds or economic resources shall be made available directly or indirectly, to or for the benefit of the natural or legal persons, entities or bodies listed in Annex II.

3. By way of derogation from paragraphs 1 and 2, the competent authorities of the Member States may authorise the release of certain frozen funds or economic resources, or the making available of certain funds or economic resources, under such conditions as they deem appropriate, after having determined that the funds or economic resources concerned are:

- (a) necessary to satisfy the basic needs of the natural or legal persons, entities or bodies listed in Annex II and dependent family members of such natural persons, including payments for foodstuffs, rent or mortgage, medicines and medical treatment, taxes, insurance premiums, and public utility charges;

▼ **M5**

- (b) intended exclusively for the payment of reasonable professional fees and the reimbursement of incurred expenses associated with the provision of legal services;
- (c) intended exclusively for the payment of fees or service charges for the routine holding or maintenance of frozen funds or economic resources;
- (d) necessary for extraordinary expenses, provided that the competent authority has notified the competent authorities of the other Member States and the Commission of the grounds on which it considers that a specific authorisation should be granted, at least two weeks prior to the authorisation; or
- (e) to be paid into or from an account of a diplomatic or consular mission or an international organisation enjoying immunities in accordance with international law, insofar as such payments are intended to be used for official purposes of the diplomatic or consular mission or international organisation.

The Member State concerned shall inform the other Member States and the Commission of any authorisation granted under this paragraph within two weeks of the authorisation.

4. By way of derogation from paragraph 1, the competent authorities of the Member States may authorise the release of certain frozen funds or economic resources, or the making available of certain funds or economic resources, provided that the following conditions are met:

- (a) the funds or economic resources are the subject of an arbitral decision rendered prior to the date on which the natural or legal person, entity or body referred to in paragraph 1 was listed in Annex II, or of a judicial or administrative decision rendered in the Union, or a judicial decision enforceable in the Member State concerned, prior to or after that date;
- (b) the funds or economic resources will be used exclusively to satisfy claims secured by such a decision or recognised as valid in such a decision, within the limits set by applicable laws and regulations governing the rights of persons having such claims;
- (c) the decision is not for the benefit of a natural or legal person, entity or body listed in Annex II; and
- (d) recognition of the decision is not contrary to public policy in the Member State concerned.

The Member State concerned shall inform the other Member States and the Commission of any authorisation granted under this paragraph within two weeks of the authorisation.

5. Paragraph 1 shall not prevent a natural or legal person, entity or body listed in Annex II from making a payment due under a contract or agreement entered into, or an obligation that arose, prior to the date on which such natural or legal person, entity or body was listed therein, provided that the Member State concerned has determined that the payment is not, directly or indirectly, received by a natural or legal person, entity or body referred to in paragraph 1.

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6. Paragraph 2 shall not apply to the addition to frozen accounts of:

- (a) interest or other earnings on those accounts;
- (b) payments due under contracts, agreements or obligations that were concluded or arose prior to the date on which those accounts became subject to the measures provided for in paragraphs 1 and 2; or
- (c) payments due under judicial, administrative or arbitral decisions rendered in the Union or enforceable in the Member State concerned;

provided that any such interest, other earnings and payments remain subject to the measures provided for in paragraph 1.

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7. Without prejudice to paragraph 8, by way of derogation from paragraphs 1 and 2, the competent authorities of the Member States may authorise the release of certain frozen funds or economic resources, or the making available of certain funds or economic resources, under such conditions as they deem appropriate, after having determined that the provision of such funds or economic resources is necessary for humanitarian purposes, such as delivering or facilitating the delivery of assistance, including medical supplies, food, or the transfer of humanitarian workers and related assistance or for evacuations from Mali. The Member State concerned shall inform the other Member States and the Commission of any authorisations granted under this Article within two weeks of the authorisation.

8. Paragraphs 1 and 2 shall not apply to the provision, processing or payment of funds, other financial assets or economic resources or to the provision of goods and services, which are necessary to ensure the timely delivery of humanitarian assistance or to support other activities that support basic human needs where such assistance and other activities are carried out by:

- (a) the United Nations, including its programmes, funds and other entities and bodies, as well as its specialised agencies and related organisations;
- (b) international organisations;
- (c) humanitarian organisations having observer status with the United Nations General Assembly and members of those humanitarian organisations;
- (d) bilaterally or multilaterally funded non-governmental organisations participating in the United Nations Humanitarian Response Plans, Refugee Response Plans, other United Nations appeals or humanitarian clusters coordinated by the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA);
- (e) the employees, grantees, subsidiaries, or implementing partners of the entities mentioned in points (a) to (d) while and to the extent that they are acting in those capacities; or by,
- (f) appropriate other actors as determined by the Council.

▼ M5*Article 3*

1. The Council shall establish the list in Annex I and shall amend it in accordance with determinations made by the Security Council or by the Sanctions Committee.
2. The Council, acting by unanimity upon a proposal from a Member State or from the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (the ‘High Representative’), shall establish and amend the list in Annex II.

Article 4

1. Where the Security Council or the Sanctions Committee designates a person or entity, the Council shall include that person or entity in Annex I. The Council shall communicate its decision, including the grounds for listing, to the person or entity concerned, either directly, if the address is known, or through the publication of a notice, providing that person or entity with an opportunity to present observations.
2. The Council shall communicate the decision referred to in Article 3(2), including the grounds for the listing, to the natural or legal person, entity or body concerned, either directly, if the address is known, or through the publication of a notice, providing that natural or legal person, entity or body with an opportunity to present observations.
3. Where observations are submitted, or where substantial new evidence is presented, the Council shall review its decision and inform the person or entity concerned accordingly.

Article 5

1. Annex I shall include the grounds for listing the persons and entities as provided by the Security Council or the Sanctions Committee.
2. Annex I shall also include, where available, information provided by the Security Council or the Sanctions Committee necessary to identify the persons or entities concerned. With regard to persons, such information may include names, including aliases, date and place of birth, nationality, passport and identity card numbers, gender, address if known, and function or profession. With regard to entities, such information may include names, place and date of registration, registration number and place of business.
3. Annex II shall include the grounds for listing the natural and legal persons, entities and bodies referred to therein.
4. Annex II shall also include, where available, the information necessary to identify the natural or legal persons, entities or bodies concerned. With regard to natural persons, such information may include: names and aliases; date and place of birth; nationality; passport and identity card numbers; gender; address, if known; and

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function or profession. With regard to legal persons, entities or bodies, such information may include: names; place and date of registration; registration number; and place of business.

Article 5a

1. The Council and the High Representative shall process personal data in order to carry out their tasks under this Decision, in particular:

- (a) as regards the Council, for preparing and making amendments to Annexes I and II;
- (b) as regards the High Representative, for preparing amendments to Annexes I and II.

2. The Council and the High Representative may process, where applicable, relevant data relating to criminal offences committed by listed natural persons, and to criminal convictions or security measures concerning such persons, only to the extent that such processing is necessary for the preparation of Annexes I and II.

3. For the purposes of this Decision, the Council and the High Representative are designated as ‘controller’ within the meaning of Article 3, point (8) of Regulation (EU) 2018/1725 of the European Parliament and of the Council⁽¹⁾, in order to ensure that the natural persons concerned can exercise their rights under that Regulation.

Article 5b

No claims in connection with any contract or transaction the performance of which has been affected, directly or indirectly, in whole or in part, by the measures imposed under this Decision, including claims for indemnity or any other claim of this type, such as a claim for compensation or a claim under a guarantee, in particular a claim for extension or payment of a bond, guarantee or indemnity, in particular a financial guarantee or financial indemnity, of whatever form, shall be satisfied, if they are made by:

- (a) designated natural or legal persons, entities or bodies listed in Annex II;
- (b) any natural or legal person, entity or body acting through or on behalf of one of the natural or legal persons, entities or bodies referred to in point (a).

Article 6

1. This Decision shall be amended or repealed as appropriate, in accordance with determinations made by the Security Council.

⁽¹⁾ Regulation (EU) 2018/1725 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2018 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data by the Union institutions, bodies, offices and agencies and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Regulation (EC) No 45/2001 and Decision No 1247/2002/EC (OJ L 295, 21.11.2018, p. 39).

▼ M5

2. The measures referred to in Article 1a, paragraph 1, and Article 2a, paragraphs 1 and 2 shall apply until ►**M11** 14 December 2024 ◀ and shall be kept under constant review. They shall be renewed, or amended, as appropriate, if the Council deems that its objectives have not been met.

▼ B*Article 7*

This Decision shall enter into force on the day following that of its publication in the *Official Journal of the European Union*.

▼ M5

ANNEX I

▼ M1

A. List of persons referred to in Article 1(1)

▼ M12

▼ M1

B. List of persons and entities referred to in Article 2(1)

▼ M12

ANNEX II

A. List of natural persons referred to in Article 1a(1)

	Name	Identifying information	Reasons	Date of listing
1.	DIAW, Malick	<p>Place of birth: Ségou</p> <p>Date of birth: 2.12.1979</p> <p>Nationality: Malian</p> <p>Passport number: B0722922 valid until 13.8.2018</p> <p>Gender: male</p> <p>Position: President of the National Transition Council (legislative organ of the political transition of Mali), Colonel</p>	<p>Malick Diaw is a key member of Colonel Assimi Goïta's inner circle. As chief of staff of the third military region of Kati, he was one of the instigators and leaders of the 18 August 2020 coup alongside Colonel-Major Ismaël Wagué, Colonel Assimi Goïta, Colonel Sadio Camara and Colonel Modibo Koné.</p> <p>Malick Diaw is therefore responsible for actions or policies that threaten the peace, security and stability of Mali.</p> <p>Malick Diaw is also a key actor in the context of the political transition of Mali, as President of the National Transition Council (CNT) since December 2020.</p> <p>The CNT failed to deliver in good time on the 'missions' enshrined in the Transition Charter of 1 October 2020 ('Transition Charter') and that should have been completed within 18 months, as illustrated by the CNT's delay in adopting the draft electoral bill. That delay contributed to delaying the organization of the elections and thus the successful completion of the political transition of Mali. In addition, the new electoral bill, as eventually adopted by the CNT on 17 June 2022 and published in the Official Journal of the Republic of Mali on 24 June 2022, allows the Transition President and Vice-President and the members of the Transition Government to be candidates for the presidential and legislative elections, in contradiction with the Transition Charter.</p> <p>The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) adopted individual sanctions against the Transition Authorities (including Malick Diaw) in November 2021 for their delay in organising the elections and the completion of the political transition of Mali. On 3 July 2022, ECOWAS decided to maintain those individual sanctions.</p> <p>Malick Diaw is therefore obstructing and undermining the successful completion of the political transition of Mali.</p>	4.2.2022

	Name	Identifying information	Reasons	Date of listing
2.	WAGUÉ, Ismaël	<p>Place of birth: Bamako</p> <p>Date of birth: 2.3.1975</p> <p>Nationality: Malian</p> <p>Passport number: diplomatic passport AA0193660 valid until 15.2.2023</p> <p>Gender: male</p> <p>Position: Minister for Reconciliation, Colonel-Major</p>	<p>Colonel-Major Ismaël Wagué is a key member of Colonel Assimi Goïta's inner circle and was one of the main actors responsible for the 18 August 2020 coup, alongside Colonel Goïta, Colonel Sadio Camara, Colonel Modibo Koné and Colonel Malick Diaw.</p> <p>On 19 August 2020, he announced that the army had taken power, and he then became spokesperson for the National Committee for the Salvation of the People (<i>Comité national pour le salut du peuple</i>, CNSP).</p> <p>Ismaël Wagué is therefore responsible for actions that threaten the peace, security and stability of Mali.</p> <p>As Minister for Reconciliation in the Transition Government since October 2020, Ismaël Wagué is in charge of the implementation of the Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation in Mali. Through his statement in October 2021 and his perpetual disagreements with the members of the Permanent Strategic Framework (<i>Cadre Stratégique Permanent</i>, CSP), he contributed to the blocking of the Monitoring Committee of the Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation in Mali (<i>Comité de suivi de l'accord</i>, CSA), which led to the suspension of CSA meeting from October 2021 to September 2022. That situation has obstructed the implementation of that Agreement, which is one of the 'missions' of the political transition of Mali, as provided for in Article 2 of the Transition Charter.</p> <p>ECOWAS adopted individual sanctions against the Transition Authorities (including Ismaël Wagué) in November 2021 for their delay in organising the elections and the completion of the political transition of Mali. On 3 July 2022, ECOWAS decided to maintain those individual sanctions.</p> <p>Ismaël Wagué is therefore responsible for actions that threaten the peace, security and stability of Mali, as well as for obstructing and undermining the successful completion of the political transition of Mali.</p>	4.2.2022

▼ M8▼ M11

	Name	Identifying information	Reasons	Date of listing
3.	MAÏGA, Choguel	<p>Place of birth: Tabango, Gao, Mali</p> <p>Date of birth: 31.12.1958</p> <p>Nationality: Malian</p> <p>Passport number: diplomatic passport DA0004473, issued by Mali, Schengen visa issued</p> <p>Gender: male</p> <p>Position: Prime Minister</p>	<p>As Prime Minister since June 2021, Choguel Maïga leads the Transition Government of Mali established following the coup of 24 May 2021.</p> <p>Contrary to the timetable for reform and elections previously agreed with ECOWAS in line with the Transition Charter, he announced in June 2021 the organisation of the National Consultations for Refoundation (<i>Assises nationales de la refondation</i>, ANR) as a pre-reform process and a precondition to the organisation of the elections scheduled for 27 February 2022.</p> <p>As announced by Choguel Maïga himself, the ANR were then postponed several times and the elections delayed. The ANR, which were eventually held in December 2021, were boycotted by multiple stakeholders. On the basis of the final recommendations of the ANR, the Transition Government presented a new timetable providing for the holding of presidential elections in December 2025, thus allowing the Transition Authorities to stay in power for more than five years. Following a revised timetable presented in June 2022, providing for the holding of presidential elections in March 2024, the Transition Government announced on 21 September 2023 a further postponement of the elections.</p> <p>ECOWAS adopted individual sanctions against the Transition Authorities (including Choguel Maïga) in November 2021 for their delay in organising the elections and the completion of the political transition of Mali. ECOWAS underlined that the Transition Authorities have used the need to implement reforms as a pretext to justify the extension of the political transition of Mali and to maintain themselves in power without democratic elections. On 3 July 2022, ECOWAS decided to maintain those individual sanctions.</p> <p>In his position as Prime Minister, Choguel Maïga is directly responsible for postponing the elections foreseen in the Transition Charter, and he is therefore obstructing and undermining the successful completion of the political transition of Mali, in particular by obstructing and undermining the holding of elections and the handover of power to elected authorities.</p>	4.2.2022

▼ M11

	Name	Identifying information	Reasons	Date of listing
4.	MAÏGA, Ibrahim Ikassa	<p>Place of birth: Tondibi, Gao region, Mali</p> <p>Date of birth: 5.2.1971</p> <p>Nationality: Malian</p> <p>Passport number: diplomatic passport issued by Mali</p> <p>Gender: male</p> <p>Position: Minister of Refoundation</p>	<p>Ibrahim Ikassa Maïga is a member of the strategic committee of M5-RFP (<i>Mouvement du 5 juin – Rassemblement des forces patriotiques</i>), which played a key role in the overthrow of President Keita.</p> <p>As Minister of Refoundation since June 2021, Ibrahim Ikassa Maïga was entrusted with planning the National Consultations for Refoundation (<i>Assises nationales de la Refondation</i>, ANR) announced by Prime Minister Choguel Maïga.</p> <p>Contrary to the timetable for reform and elections previously agreed with ECOWAS in line with the Transition Charter, the ANR were announced by the Transition Government as a pre-reform process and a precondition to the organisation of the elections scheduled for 27 February 2022.</p> <p>As announced by Choguel Maïga, the ANR were then postponed several times and the elections delayed. The ANR, which were eventually held in December 2021, were boycotted by multiple stakeholders. On the basis of the final recommendations of the ANR, the Transition Government presented a new timetable providing for the holding of presidential elections in December 2025, thus allowing the Transition Authorities to stay in power for more than five years. Following a revised timetable presented in June 2022, providing for the holding of presidential elections in March 2024, the Transition Government announced on 21 September 2023 a further postponement of the elections.</p> <p>ECOWAS adopted individual sanctions against the Transition Authorities (including Ibrahim Ikassa Maïga) in November 2021 for their delay in organising the elections and the completion of the political transition of Mali. ECOWAS underlined that the Transition Authorities have used the need to implement reforms as a pretext to justify the extension of the political transition of Mali and to maintain themselves in power without democratic elections. On 3 July 2022, ECOWAS decided to maintain those individual sanctions.</p> <p>In his position as Minister of Refoundation, Ibrahim Ikassa Maïga is obstructing and undermining the successful completion of the political transition of Mali, in particular by obstructing and undermining the holding of elections and the handover of power to elected authorities.</p>	4.2.2022

▼ M11

	Name	Identifying information	Reasons	Date of listing

▼ M9

6.	Ivan Aleks- androvitch MASLOV Иван Александрович МАСЛЮБ	Date of birth: 11.7.1982 or 3.1.1980 Place of birth: Arkhangelsk / Chuguevka village, Chuguev district, Primorsky territory Nationality: Russian Gender: male Function: Head of the Wagner Group in Mali Address: Unknown, registered in the town of Shatki, in the Nizhni Novgorod region according to ‘All eyes on Wagner’	Ivan Aleksandrovitch Maslov is the head of the Wagner Group in Mali, whose presence in the country has expanded since late 2021. Wagner’s presence in Mali poses a threat to the peace, security and stability of the country. In particular, Wagner mercenaries have been involved in acts of violence and multiple human rights abuses in Mali, including extra- judicial killings, such as the ‘Moura massacre’ at the end of March 2022. As the local head of the Wagner Group, Ivan Maslov is therefore responsible for the actions of Wagner Group that threaten the peace, security and stability of Mali, in particular involvement in acts of violence and human rights abuses.	25.2.2023
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▼ **M8**

B. List of natural or legal persons, entities or bodies referred to in Article 2a(1)

	Name	Identifying information	Reasons	Date of listing
1.	DIAW, Malick	<p>Place of birth: Ségou</p> <p>Date of birth: 2.12.1979</p> <p>Nationality: Malian</p> <p>Passport number: B0722922 valid until 13.8.2018</p> <p>Gender: male</p> <p>Position: President of the National Transition Council (legislative organ of the political transition of Mali), Colonel</p>	<p>Malick Diaw is a key member of Colonel Assimi Goïta's inner circle. As chief of staff of the third military region of Kati, he was one of the instigators and leaders of the 18 August 2020 coup alongside Colonel-Major Ismaël Wagué, Colonel Assimi Goïta, Colonel Sadio Camara and Colonel Modibo Koné.</p> <p>Malick Diaw is therefore responsible for actions or policies that threaten the peace, security and stability of Mali.</p> <p>Malick Diaw is also a key actor in the context of the political transition of Mali, as President of the National Transition Council (CNT) since December 2020.</p> <p>The CNT failed to deliver in good time on the 'missions' enshrined in the Transition Charter of 1 October 2020 ('Transition Charter') and that should have been completed within 18 months, as illustrated by the CNT's delay in adopting the draft electoral bill. That delay contributed to delaying the organization of the elections and thus the successful completion of the political transition of Mali. In addition, the new electoral bill, as eventually adopted by the CNT on 17 June 2022 and published in the Official Journal of the Republic of Mali on 24 June 2022, allows the Transition President and Vice-President and the members of the Transition Government to be candidates for the presidential and legislative elections, in contradiction with the Transition Charter.</p> <p>The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) adopted individual sanctions against the Transition Authorities (including Malick Diaw) in November 2021 for their delay in organising the elections and the completion of the political transition of Mali. On 3 July 2022, ECOWAS decided to maintain those individual sanctions.</p> <p>Malick Diaw is therefore obstructing and undermining the successful completion of the political transition of Mali.</p>	4.2.2022

▼ M8

	Name	Identifying information	Reasons	Date of listing
2.	WAGUÉ, Ismaël	<p>Place of birth: Bamako</p> <p>Date of birth: 2.3.1975</p> <p>Nationality: Malian</p> <p>Passport number: diplomatic passport AA0193660 valid until 15.2.2023</p> <p>Gender: male</p> <p>Position: Minister for Reconciliation, Colonel-Major</p>	<p>Colonel-Major Ismaël Wagué is a key member of Colonel Assimi Goïta's inner circle and was one of the main actors responsible for the 18 August 2020 coup, alongside Colonel Goïta, Colonel Sadio Camara, Colonel Modibo Koné and Colonel Malick Diaw.</p> <p>On 19 August 2020, he announced that the army had taken power, and he then became spokesperson for the National Committee for the Salvation of the People (<i>Comité national pour le salut du peuple</i>, CNSP).</p> <p>Ismaël Wagué is therefore responsible for actions that threaten the peace, security and stability of Mali.</p> <p>As Minister for Reconciliation in the Transition Government since October 2020, Ismaël Wagué is in charge of the implementation of the Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation in Mali. Through his statement in October 2021 and his perpetual disagreements with the members of the Permanent Strategic Framework (<i>Cadre Stratégique Permanent</i>, CSP), he contributed to the blocking of the Monitoring Committee of the Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation in Mali (<i>Comité de suivi de l'accord</i>, CSA), which led to the suspension of CSA meeting from October 2021 to September 2022. That situation has obstructed the implementation of that Agreement, which is one of the 'missions' of the political transition of Mali, as provided for in Article 2 of the Transition Charter.</p> <p>ECOWAS adopted individual sanctions against the Transition Authorities (including Ismaël Wagué) in November 2021 for their delay in organising the elections and the completion of the political transition of Mali. On 3 July 2022, ECOWAS decided to maintain those individual sanctions.</p> <p>Ismaël Wagué is therefore responsible for actions that threaten the peace, security and stability of Mali, as well as for obstructing and undermining the successful completion of the political transition of Mali.</p>	4.2.2022

▼ M8▼ M11

	Name	Identifying information	Reasons	Date of listing
3.	MAÏGA, Choguel	<p>Place of birth: Tabango, Gao, Mali</p> <p>Date of birth: 31.12.1958</p> <p>Nationality: Malian</p> <p>Passport number: diplomatic passport DA0004473, issued by Mali, Schengen visa issued</p> <p>Gender: male</p> <p>Position: Prime Minister</p>	<p>As Prime Minister since June 2021, Choguel Maïga leads the Transition Government of Mali established following the coup of 24 May 2021.</p> <p>Contrary to the timetable for reform and elections previously agreed with ECOWAS in line with the Transition Charter, he announced in June 2021 the organisation of the National Consultations for Refoundation (<i>Assises nationales de la refondation</i>, ANR) as a pre-reform process and a precondition to the organisation of the elections scheduled for 27 February 2022.</p> <p>As announced by Choguel Maïga himself, the ANR were then postponed several times and the elections delayed. The ANR, which were eventually held in December 2021, were boycotted by multiple stakeholders. On the basis of the final recommendations of the ANR, the Transition Government presented a new timetable providing for the holding of presidential elections in December 2025, thus allowing the Transition Authorities to stay in power for more than five years. Following a revised timetable presented in June 2022, providing for the holding of presidential elections in March 2024, the Transition Government announced on 21 September 2023 a further postponement of the elections.</p> <p>ECOWAS adopted individual sanctions against the Transition Authorities (including Choguel Maïga) in November 2021 for their delay in organising the elections and the completion of the political transition of Mali. ECOWAS underlined that the Transition Authorities have used the need to implement reforms as a pretext to justify the extension of the political transition of Mali and to maintain themselves in power without democratic elections. On 3 July 2022, ECOWAS decided to maintain those individual sanctions.</p> <p>In his position as Prime Minister, Choguel Maïga is directly responsible for postponing the elections foreseen in the Transition Charter, and he is therefore obstructing and undermining the successful completion of the political transition of Mali, in particular by obstructing and undermining the holding of elections and the handover of power to elected authorities.</p>	4.2.2022

▼ **M11**

	Name	Identifying information	Reasons	Date of listing
4.	MAÏGA, Ibrahim Ikassa	<p>Place of birth: Tondibi, Gao region, Mali</p> <p>Date of birth: 5.2.1971</p> <p>Nationality: Malian</p> <p>Passport number: diplomatic passport issued by Mali</p> <p>Gender: male</p> <p>Position: Minister of Refoundation</p>	<p>Ibrahim Ikassa Maïga is a member of the strategic committee of M5-RFP (<i>Mouvement du 5 juin – Rassemblement des forces patriotiques</i>), which played a key role in the overthrow of President Keita.</p> <p>As Minister of Refoundation since June 2021, Ibrahim Ikassa Maïga was entrusted with planning the National Consultations for Refoundation (<i>Assises nationales de la Refondation</i>, ANR) announced by Prime Minister Choguel Maïga.</p> <p>Contrary to the timetable for reform and elections previously agreed with ECOWAS in line with the Transition Charter, the ANR were announced by the Transition Government as a pre-reform process and a precondition to the organisation of the elections scheduled for 27 February 2022.</p> <p>As announced by Choguel Maïga, the ANR were then postponed several times and the elections delayed. The ANR, which were eventually held in December 2021, were boycotted by multiple stakeholders. On the basis of the final recommendations of the ANR, the Transition Government presented a new timetable providing for the holding of presidential elections in December 2025, thus allowing the Transition Authorities to stay in power for more than five years. Following a revised timetable presented in June 2022, providing for the holding of presidential elections in March 2024, the Transition Government announced on 21 September 2023 a further postponement of the elections.</p> <p>ECOWAS adopted individual sanctions against the Transition Authorities (including Ibrahim Ikassa Maïga) in November 2021 for their delay in organising the elections and the completion of the political transition of Mali. ECOWAS underlined that the Transition Authorities have used the need to implement reforms as a pretext to justify the extension of the political transition of Mali and to maintain themselves in power without democratic elections. On 3 July 2022, ECOWAS decided to maintain those individual sanctions.</p> <p>In his position as Minister of Refoundation, Ibrahim Ikassa Maïga is obstructing and undermining the successful completion of the political transition of Mali, in particular by obstructing and undermining the holding of elections and the handover of power to elected authorities.</p>	4.2.2022

▼ M11

	Name	Identifying information	Reasons	Date of listing

▼ M9

6.	Ivan Aleks- androvitch MASLOV Иван Александрович МАСЛЮБ	Date of birth: 11.7.1982 or 3.1.1980 Place of birth: Arkhangelsk / Chuguevka village, Chuguev district, Primorsky territory Nationality: Russian Gender: male Function: Head of the Wagner Group in Mali Address: Unknown, registered in the town of Shatki, in the Nizhni Novgorod region according to ‘All eyes on Wagner’	Ivan Aleksandrovitch Maslov is the head of the Wagner Group in Mali, whose presence in the country has expanded since late 2021. Wagner’s presence in Mali poses a threat to the peace, security and stability of the country. In particular, Wagner mercenaries have been involved in acts of violence and multiple human rights abuses in Mali, including extra- judicial killings, such as the ‘Moura massacre’ at the end of March 2022. As the local head of the Wagner Group, Ivan Maslov is therefore responsible for the actions of Wagner Group that threaten the peace, security and stability of Mali, in particular involvement in acts of violence and human rights abuses.	25.2.2023
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