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Document 02010D0231-20240617

Consolidated text: Council Decision 2010/231/CFSP of 26 April 2010 concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Somalia

ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec/2010/231/2024-06-17

02010D0231 — EN — 17.06.2024 — 022.001


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COUNCIL DECISION 2010/231/CFSP

of 26 April 2010

concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Somalia

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(OJ L 105 27.4.2010, p. 17)

Amended by:

 

 

Official Journal

  No

page

date

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COUNCIL DECISION 2011/635/CFSP of 26 September 2011

  L 249

12

27.9.2011

►M2

COUNCIL DECISION 2012/388/CFSP of 16 July 2012

  L 187

38

17.7.2012

 M3

COUNCIL DECISION 2012/633/CFSP of 15 October 2012

  L 282

47

16.10.2012

►M4

COUNCIL DECISION 2013/201/CFSP of 25 April 2013

  L 116

10

26.4.2013

 M5

COUNCIL DECISION 2013/659/CFSP of 15 November 2013

  L 306

15

16.11.2013

 M6

COUNCIL DECISION 2014/270/CFSP of 12 May 2014

  L 138

106

13.5.2014

 M7

COUNCIL IMPLEMENTING DECISION 2014/729/CFSP of 20 October 2014

  L 301

34

21.10.2014

 M8

COUNCIL DECISION (CFSP) 2015/335 of 2 March 2015

  L 58

77

3.3.2015

►M9

COUNCIL IMPLEMENTING DECISION (CFSP) 2015/337 of 2 March 2015

  L 58

81

3.3.2015

►M10

COUNCIL IMPLEMENTING DECISION (CFSP) 2015/2053 of 16 November 2015

  L 300

27

17.11.2015

►M11

COUNCIL IMPLEMENTING DECISION (CFSP) 2017/398 of 7 March 2017

  L 60

34

8.3.2017

 M12

COUNCIL DECISION (CFSP) 2017/2427 of 21 December 2017

  L 343

78

22.12.2017

►M13

COUNCIL IMPLEMENTING DECISION (CFSP) 2018/417 of 16 March 2018

  L 75

25

19.3.2018

 M14

COUNCIL DECISION (CFSP) 2018/1945 of 10 December 2018

  L 314

61

11.12.2018

►M15

COUNCIL DECISION (CFSP) 2020/170 of 6 February 2020

  L 36

5

7.2.2020

 M16

COUNCIL DECISION (CFSP) 2021/54 of 22 January 2021

  L 23

18

25.1.2021

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COUNCIL IMPLEMENTING DECISION (CFSP) 2021/560 of 6 April 2021

  L 115I

3

6.4.2021

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COUNCIL IMPLEMENTING DECISION (CFSP) 2022/341 of 28 February 2022

  L 56

3

28.2.2022

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COUNCIL DECISION (CFSP) 2023/160 of 23 January 2023

  L 22

22

24.1.2023

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COUNCIL DECISION (CFSP) 2023/338 of 14 February 2023

  L 47

50

15.2.2023

►M21

COUNCIL IMPLEMENTING DECISION (CFSP) 2023/1148 of 12 June 2023

  L 151I

4

12.6.2023

►M22

COUNCIL DECISION (CFSP) 2024/882 of 18 March 2024

  L 882

1

19.3.2024

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COUNCIL IMPLEMENTING DECISION (CFSP) 2024/1729  of 17 June 2024

  L 1729

1

17.6.2024




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COUNCIL DECISION 2010/231/CFSP

of 26 April 2010

concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Somalia



Article 1

1.  
The direct or indirect supply, sale or transfer of arms and related material of all types, including weapons and ammunition, military vehicles and equipment, paramilitary equipment and spare parts for the aforementioned to Somalia by nationals of Member States or from the territories of Member States shall be prohibited whether originating or not in their territories.
2.  
The direct or indirect supply to Somalia of technical advice, financial or other assistance or training related to military activities, including in particular technical training and assistance related to the provision, manufacture, maintenance or use of the items mentioned in paragraph 1, by nationals of Member States or from the territories of the Member States, shall be prohibited.
3.  

Paragraphs 1 and 2 shall not apply to:

(a) 

the supply, sale or transfer of arms or related material of all types, and the direct or indirect supply of technical advice, financial or other assistance or training related to military activities, to the Government of the Federal Republic of Somalia (GFRS), the Somali National Army (SNA), the National Intelligence and Security Agency (NISA), the Somali National Police Force (SNPF) or the Somali Custodial Corps; or,

(b) 

the supply, sale or transfer of arms and related material of all types, and the direct or indirect supply of technical advice, financial or other assistance or training related to military activities, to Somalia’s Federal Member States and regional governments or to licenced private security companies operating in Somalia; the delivery of the items set out in Annexes II and III, and the provision of technical advice, financial or other assistance, or training related to military activities shall be subject to the relevant approval or notification requirements as follows:

(i) 

the supply, sale or transfer of arms and related material of all types set out in Annex II to Somalia’s Federal Member States and regional governments or to licenced private security companies operating in Somalia to provide security for international and commercial premises and personnel in Somalia may be provided in the absence of a negative decision by the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolution 2713 (2023) concerning Al-Shabaab (the ‘Sanctions Committee’) within five working days of receiving a notification from the GFRS;

(ii) 

the supply, sale or transfer of arms and related material of all types set out in Annex III to Somalia’s Federal Member States and regional governments or licenced private security companies operating in Somalia to provide security for international and commercial premises and personnel in Somalia are subject to notification to the Sanctions Committee, for information only, at least five working days in advance by the GFRS;

(c) 

the supply, sale or transfer of arms and related material of all types, or the direct or indirect supply of technical advice, financial or other assistance or training related to military activities, intended solely for the support of or use by United Nations personnel, including the United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM) and the United Nations Support Office in Somalia (UNSOS);

(d) 

the supply, sale or transfer of arms or related material of all types, or the direct or indirect supply of technical advice, financial or other assistance or training related to military activities, intended solely for the support of or use by the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) and its Troop- and Police-Contributing Countries, as well as its strategic partners, who are operating solely under the latest African Union (AU) Strategic Concept of Operations, and in cooperation and coordination with ATMIS;

(e) 

the supply, sale or transfer of arms or related material of all types, or the direct or indirect supply of technical advice, financial or other assistance or training related to military activities, intended solely for the support of or use by: the European Union training and support activities, Türkiye, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland or the United States of America, as well as any other State forces with a status of forces agreement or a memorandum of understanding with the GFRS, provided they inform the Sanctions Committee, for information purposes only, about the existence of such agreements;

(f) 

the supply, sale or transfer of protective clothing, including flak jackets and military helmets, temporarily exported to Somalia by United Nations personnel, representatives of the media, private security contractors or humanitarian and development workers and associated personnel for their personal use only;

(g) 

the supply, sale or transfer of non-lethal military equipment by the Member States, or by international regional or subregional organisations, intended solely for humanitarian or protective use;

(h) 

the entry into Somali ports for temporary visits of vessels carrying weapons or military equipment for defensive purposes, provided that such items remain at all times aboard those vessels.

4.  
It shall be prohibited to supply, resell, transfer, or make available for use any weapons or military equipment, sold or supplied in accordance with Article 1(3), points (a), (b), (c), (d) or (e), to any individual or entity not in the service of the recipient to which it was originally sold or supplied, or to the selling or supplying Member State or international, regional or subregional organisation.

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Article 1a

1.  
The direct or indirect import, purchase or transport of charcoal from Somalia, whether or not such charcoal originated in Somalia, shall be prohibited.

The Union shall take the necessary measures in order to determine the relevant items to be covered by this provision.

2.  
It shall be prohibited to provide, directly or indirectly, financing or financial assistance, as well as insurance and reinsurance, related to the import, purchase or transport of charcoal from Somalia.

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Article 1b

Member States shall exercise vigilance over the direct or indirect supply, sale or transfer to Somalia of items not subject to the measures set out in Article 1(1) and over the direct or indirect supply to Somalia of technical advice, financial and other assistance and training related to military activities related to those items.

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Article 1c

1.  
Subject to Article 1(3), the direct or indirect supply, sale or transfer to Somalia of improvised explosive device components which appear on the EU Common Military List, and are reproduced in Annex IV to this Decision, by nationals of Member States or from the territories of Member States, shall be prohibited whether originating or not in their territories.
2.  
The direct or indirect supply, sale or transfer to Somalia of other improvised explosive device components, as listed in Annex V to this Decision, shall be subject to prior authorisation by the competent authorities of the Member States. They shall not grant such authorisation if there is sufficient evidence to demonstrate that the items will be used, or there is a significant risk they may be used, in the manufacture in Somalia of improvised explosive devices.

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3.  
Member States shall notify the GFRS for its awareness and the Sanctions Committee of the sale, supply or transfer of items referred to in paragraph 2 within 15 working days after the sale, supply or transfer takes place. The notifications shall contain all relevant information, including the purpose of the use of the items, the end user, the technical specifications, the quantity of the items to be shipped and the intended storage location. They shall ensure that the GFRS and the Federal Member States of Somalia are provided with adequate financial and technical assistance to establish appropriate safeguards for the storage and distribution of such materials.
4.  
Member States shall promote the exercise of vigilance by natural and legal persons subject to their jurisdiction as regards the direct or indirect supply, sale or transfer of explosive precursors and materials to Somalia that may be used in the manufacture of improvised explosive devices, other than the items listed in Annexes IV and V to this Decision. Member States shall keep records of transactions of which they are aware regarding suspicious purchases of, or enquiries into, such other items by natural or legal persons in Somalia, and shall share such information with the Federal Government of Somalia, the Sanctions Committee and the Panel of Experts pursuant to resolution 2713 (2023).

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Article 2

1.  

Restrictive measures as provided for in Articles 3, 5(1) and 6(1) and (2) shall be imposed against persons and entities designated by the Sanctions Committee as:

(a) 

engaging in, or providing support for, acts that threaten the peace, security or stability of Somalia, where such acts include, but are not limited to:

(i) 

planning, directing or committing acts involving sexual and gender-based violence;

(ii) 

acts that threaten the peace and reconciliation process in Somalia;

(iii) 

acts that threaten the Federal Government of Somalia or ATMIS by force;

(b) 

having acted in violation of the arms embargo or the arms resale and transfer restrictions or the prohibition against providing related assistance as referred to in Article 1;

(c) 

obstructing the delivery of humanitarian assistance to Somalia, or access to, or distribution of, humanitarian assistance in Somalia;

(d) 

being political or military leaders recruiting or using children in armed conflicts in Somalia in violation of applicable international law;

(e) 

being responsible for violations of applicable international law in Somalia involving the targeting of civilians including children and women in situations of armed conflict, including killing and maiming, sexual and gender-based violence, attacks on schools and hospitals and abduction and forced displacement;

(f) 

being associated with Al-Shabaab, acts and activities indicating that an individual or entity is associated with Al-Shabaab including:

(i) 

participating in the financing, planning, facilitating, preparing, or perpetrating of acts or activities by, in conjunction with, under the name of, on behalf of, or in support of Al-Shabaab;

(ii) 

supplying, selling or transferring arms and related materiel to Al-Shabaab; and

(iii) 

recruiting for, or otherwise supporting acts or activities of Al-Shabaab or any cell, affiliate, splinter group or derivative thereof.

2.  
The relevant persons and entities are listed in Annex I.

▼B

Article 3

Member States shall take the necessary measures to prevent the direct and indirect supply, sale or transfer of weapons and military equipment and the direct or indirect supply of technical assistance or training, financial and other assistance including investment, brokering or other financial services, related to military activities or to the supply, sale, transfer, manufacture, maintenance or use of weapons and military equipment, to persons or entities referred to in Article 2.

Article 4

1.  
Member States shall inspect, in accordance with their national authorities and legislation and consistent with international law, all cargo to and from Somalia in their territory, including at their airports and seaports, if they have information that provides reasonable grounds to believe that the cargo contains items the supply, sale, transfer or export of which is prohibited under Article 3.
2.  
Aircrafts and vessels transporting cargo to and from Somalia shall be subject to the requirement of additional pre-arrival or pre-departure information for all goods brought into or out of a Member State.
3.  
Member States shall, upon discovery, seize and dispose of (either by destroying or rendering inoperable) items the supply, sale, transfer or export of which is prohibited under Article 3.

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Article 4a

Member States may, in accordance with paragraphs 11 to 21 of UNSCR 2182 (2014), inspect, in Somali territorial waters and on the high seas off the coast of Somalia extending to and including the Arabian Sea and Persian Gulf, acting nationally or through voluntary multinational naval partnerships, such as ‘Combined Maritime Forces’, in cooperation with the Federal Government of Somalia, vessels bound to or from Somalia which they have reasonable grounds to believe are:

(a) 

carrying charcoal from Somalia in violation of the charcoal ban;

(b) 

carrying weapons or military equipment to Somalia, directly or indirectly, in violation of the arms embargo on Somalia;

(c) 

carrying weapons or military equipment to individuals or entities designated by the Sanctions Committee;

(d) 

carrying improvised explosive device (IED) components identified in Part I of Annex C to UN Resolution 2662 (2022) in violation of the IED components ban.

▼B

Article 5

1.  
Member States shall take the necessary measures to prevent the entry into, or transit through, their territories of the persons referred to in Article 2.
2.  
Paragraph 1 shall not oblige a Member State to refuse its own nationals entry into its territory.
3.  

Paragraph 1 shall not apply where the Sanctions Committee:

(a) 

determines on a case-by-case basis that such entry or transit is justified on the grounds of humanitarian need, including religious obligation,

(b) 

determines on a case-by-case basis that an exemption would otherwise further the objectives of peace and national reconciliation in Somalia and stability in the region.

4.  
In cases where, pursuant to paragraph 3, a Member State authorises the entry into, or transit through, its territory of persons designated by the Sanctions Committee, the authorisation shall be limited to the purpose for which it is given and to the persons concerned thereby.

Article 6

1.  
All funds and economic resources owned or controlled directly or indirectly by the persons or entities referred to in Article 2 or held by entities owned or controlled directly or indirectly by them or by any persons or entities acting on their behalf or at their direction, as designated by the Sanctions Committee, shall be frozen. The persons and entities concerned are identified in the ►M4  Annex I ◄ .
2.  
No funds or economic resources shall be made available, directly or indirectly, to or for the benefit of the persons or entities referred to in paragraph 1.
3.  

Member States may allow for exemptions from the measures referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2 in respect of funds and economic resources which are:

(a) 

necessary for basic expenses, including payments for foodstuffs, rent or mortgage, medicines and medical treatment, taxes, insurance premiums, and public utility charges;

(b) 

intended exclusively for the payment of reasonable professional fees and reimbursement of incurred expenses associated with the provision of legal services;

(c) 

intended exclusively for the payment of fees or service charges, in accordance with national laws, for routine holding or maintenance of frozen funds and economic resources;

(d) 

necessary for extraordinary expenses, after notification by the Member State concerned to, and approval by, the Sanctions Committee;

(e) 

the subject of a judicial, administrative or arbitral lien or judgment, in which case the funds and economic resources may be used to satisfy that lien or judgment provided that the lien or judgment was entered before designation by the Sanctions Committee of the person or entity concerned, and is not for the benefit of a person or entity referred to in Article 2, after notification by the Member State concerned to the Sanctions Committee.

4.  
The exemptions referred to in paragraph 3(a), (b) and (c) may be made after notification to the Sanctions Committee by the Member State concerned of its intention to authorise, where appropriate, access to such funds and economic resources, and in the absence of a negative decision by the Sanctions Committee within three working days of such notification.
5.  

Paragraph 2 shall not apply to the addition to frozen accounts of:

(a) 

interest or other earnings on those accounts; or

(b) 

payments due under contracts, agreements or obligations that were concluded or arose before the date on which those accounts became subject to restrictive measures,

provided that any such interest, other earnings and payments remain subject to paragraph 1.

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6.  

Paragraphs 1 and 2 shall not apply to the provision, processing or payment of funds, other financial assets or economic resources or to the provision of goods and services which are necessary to ensure the timely delivery of humanitarian assistance or to support other activities that support basic human needs where such assistance and other activities are carried out by:

(a) 

the United Nations, including its programmes, funds and other entities and bodies, as well as its specialised agencies and related organisations;

(b) 

international organisations;

(c) 

Humanitarian organisations having observer status with the United Nations General Assembly and members of those humanitarian organisations;

(d) 

bilaterally or multilaterally funded non-governmental organisations participating in the United Nations Humanitarian Response Plans, Refugee Response Plans, other United Nations appeals or humanitarian clusters coordinated by the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA);

(e) 

the employees, grantees, subsidiaries, or implementing partners of the entities mentioned in points (a) to (d) while and to the extent that they are acting in those capacities; or

(f) 

appropriate other actors as determined by the Sanctions Committee.

▼B

Article 7

The Council shall establish the list contained in the ►M4  Annex I ◄ and amend it in accordance with determinations made by either the Security Council or the Sanctions Committee.

Article 8

1.  
Where the Security Council or the Sanctions Committee lists a person or entity and has provided a statement of reasons for the designation, the Council shall include such person or entity in the ►M4  Annex I ◄ . The Council shall communicate its decision and the statement of reasons to the person or entity concerned, either directly, if the address is known, or through the publication of a notice, providing such person or entity an opportunity to present observations.
2.  
Where observations are submitted, or where substantial new evidence is presented, the Council shall review its decision and inform the person or entity accordingly.

Article 9

The ►M4  Annex I ◄ shall include, where available, information provided by the Security Council or by the Sanctions Committee necessary to identify the persons or entities concerned. With regard to persons, such information may include names including aliases, date and place of birth, nationality, passport and ID card numbers, gender, address, if known and function or profession. With regard to entities such information may include names, place and date of registration, registration number and place of business. The ►M4  Annex I ◄ shall also include the date of designation by the Security Council or by the Sanctions Committee.

Article 10

This Decision shall be reviewed, amended or repealed, as appropriate, in accordance with relevant decisions of the Security Council.

Article 11

Common Position 2009/138/CFSP is hereby repealed.

Article 12

This Decision shall enter into force on the date of its adoption.




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ANNEX I

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LIST OF PERSONS AND ENTITIES REFERRED TO IN ARTICLE 2

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I.    Persons

1. Yasin Ali Baynah (a.k.a. a) Ali, Yasin Baynah, b) Ali, Yassin Mohamed, c) Baynah, Yasin, d) Baynah, Yassin, e) Baynax, Yasiin Cali, f) Beenah, Yasin, g) Beenah, Yassin, h) Beenax, Yasin, i) Beenax, Yassin, j) Benah, Yasin, k) Benah, Yassin, l) Benax, Yassin, m) Beynah, Yasin, n) Binah, Yassin, o) Cali, Yasiin Baynax)

Date of birth: 24 December 1965. Nationality: Somalia. Alt. Nationality: Sweden. Location: Rinkeby, Stockholm, Sweden; Mogadishu, Somalia.

Date of UN designation: 12 April 2010.

Other information: INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/5774673

Yasin Ali Baynah has incited attacks against the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). He has also mobilised support and raised funds on behalf of the Alliance for the Re-Liberation of Somalia and Hisbul Islam, both of which have actively engaged in acts that threaten the peace and security of Somalia, including rejection of the Djibouti Agreement, and attacks on the TFG and AMISOM forces in Mogadishu.

2. Hassan Dahir Aweys (a.k.a. a) Ali, Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys, b) Awes, Hassan Dahir, c) Awes, Shaykh Hassan Dahir, d) Aweyes, Hassen Dahir, e) Aweys, Ahmed Dahir, f) Aweys, Sheikh, g) Aweys, Sheikh Hassan Dahir, h) Dahir, Aweys Hassan, i) Ibrahim, Mohammed Hassan, j) OAIS, Hassan Tahir, k) Uways, Hassan Tahir, l) ‘Hassan, Sheikh’)

Date of birth: 1935. Citizen: Somalia. Nationality: Somalia. Location: Somalia.

Date of UN designation: 12 April 2010.

Other information: INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/5774682

Hassan Dahir Aweys has acted and continues to act as a senior political and ideological leader of a variety of armed opposition groups responsible for repeated violations of the general and complete arms embargo and/or acts that threaten the Djibouti peace agreement, the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) forces. Between June 2006 and September 2007, AWEYSs served as chairman of the central committee of the Islamic Courts Union; in July 2008 he declared himself chairman of the Alliance for the Re-Liberation of Somalia-Asmara wing; and in May 2009 he was named chairman of Hisbul Islam, an alliance of groups opposed to the TFG. In each of these positions, AWEYS's statements and actions have demonstrated an unequivocal and sustained intention to dismantle the TFG and expel AMISOM by force from Somalia.

3. Hassan Abdullah Hersi Al-Turki (a.k.a. a) Al-Turki, Hassan, b) Turki, Hassan, c) Turki, Hassan Abdillahi Hersi, d) Turki, Sheikh Hassan, e) Xirsi, Xasan Cabdilaahi, f) Xirsi, Xasan Cabdulle)

Date of birth: circa 1944. Place of birth: Ogaden Region, Ethiopia. Nationality: Somalia. Location: Somalia.

Date of UN designation: 12 April 2010.

Other information: INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/5774683

Hassan Abdullah Hersi Al-Turki has been a senior leader of an armed militia group since the mid-1990s and had engaged in numerous arms embargo violations. In 2006, al-Turki contributed forces to the Islamic Courts Union take-over of Mogadishu and emerged as a military leader in the group, aligned with al-Shabaab. Since 2006, al-Turki has made territory under his control available for training by various armed opposition groups including al-Shabaab. In September 2007, al-Turki appeared in an al-Jazeera news video showing militia training under his leadership.

4. Ahmed Abdi aw-Mohamed (a.k.a. a) Abu Zubeyr, Muktar Abdirahman, b) Abuzubair, Muktar Abdulrahim, c) Aw Mohammed, Ahmed Abdi, d) Aw-Mohamud, Ahmed Abdi, e) ‘Godane’, f) ‘Godani’, g) ‘Mukhtar, Shaykh’, h) ‘Zubeyr, Abu’)

Date of birth: 10 July 1977. Place of birth: Hargeysa, Somalia. Nationality: Somalia.

Date of UN designation: 12 April 2010.

Other information: INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/5774684

Ahmed Abdi Aw-Mohamed is a senior leader of al-Shabaab and was publically named emir of the organisation in December 2007. He exercises command responsibility for al-Shabaab operations across Somalia. Aw-Mohamed has denounced the Djibouti peace process as a foreign conspiracy, and in a May 2009 audio recording to Somali media, he acknowledged that his forces were engaged in recent fighting in Mogadishu.

▼M1

5. Fuad Mohamed Khalaf (a.k.a. a) Fuad Mohamed Khalif, b) Fuad Mohamed Qalaf, c) Fuad Mohammed Kalaf, d) Fuad Mohamed Kalaf, e) Fuad Mohammed Khalif, f) Fuad Khalaf, g) Fuad Shongale, h) Fuad Shongole, i) Fuad Shangole, j) Fuad Songale, k) Fouad Shongale, l) Fuad Muhammad Khalaf Shongole)

Nationality: Somalia. Location: Mogadishu, Somalia. Alt. Location: Somalia. Date of UN designation: 12 April 2010.

Fuad Mohamed Khalaf has facilitated financial support to al-Shabaab; in May 2008, he held two fundraising events for al-Shabaab at mosques in Kismaayo, Somalia. In April 2008, Khalaf and several other individuals directed vehicle-borne explosive device attacks on Ethiopian bases and Somali Transitional Federal Government elements in Mogadishu, Somalia. In May 2008, Khalaf and a group of fighters attacked and captured a police station in Mogadishu, killing and wounding several soldiers.

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6. Bashir Mohamed Mahamoud (a.k.a. a) Bashir Mohamed Mahmoud, b) Bashir Mahmud Mohammed, c) Bashir Mohamed Mohamud, d) Bashir Mohamed Mohamoud, e) Bashir Yare, f) Bashir Qorgab, g) Gure Gap, h) ‘Abu Muscab’, i) ‘Qorgab’)

Date of birth: a) 1979 b) 1980 c) 1981 d) 1982. Nationality: Somalia. Location: Mogadishu, Somalia.

Date of UN designation: 12 April 2010.

Other information: INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/5774965

Bashir Mohamed Mahamoud is a military commander of al-Shabaab. Mahamoud was also one of approximately ten members on al-Shabaab's leadership council as of late 2008. Mahamoud and an associate were in charge of the 10 June 2009 mortar attack against the Somali Transitional Federal Government in Mogadishu.

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8. Fares Mohammed Mana'a (a.k.a.: a) Faris Mana'a, b) Fares Mohammed Manaa)

Date of birth: 8 February 1965. Place of birth: Sadah, Yemen. Passport No.: 00514146; Place of issue: Sanaa, Yemen. ID Card No.: 1417576; Place of issue: Al-Amana, Yemen; Date of issue: 7 January 1996.

Date of UN designation: 12 April 2010.

Other information: INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/5774972

Fares Mohammed Mana'a has directly or indirectly supplied, sold or transferred to Somalia arms or related material in violation of the arms embargo. Mana'a is a known arms trafficker. In October 2009, the Yemeni government released a blacklist of arms dealers with Mana'a ‘on top’ as part of an effort to stem the flood of weapons in the country, where weapons reportedly outnumber people. ‘Faris Mana'a is a major weapons trafficker, and that's well known’, according to June 2009 reporting by a U.S. journalist who is a commentator on Yemeni affairs, authors a semi-annual country report, and has contributed to Jane's Intelligence Group. In a December 2007 Yemen Times article, he is referenced as ‘Sheikh Fares Mohammed Mana'a, an arms dealer’. In a January 2008 Yemen Times article, he is referred to as ‘Sheikh Faris Mana'a, an arms tradesman’.

As of mid-2008, Yemen continues to serve as a hub for illegal arms shipments to the Horn of Africa, particularly arms shipments by boat to Somalia. There are unconfirmed reports that Faris Mana'a has participated in shipments to Somalia on numerous occasions. In 2004, Mana was involved in weapons contracts from Eastern Europe for weapons allegedly marketed to Somali fighters. Despite the Somalia UN arms embargo since 1992, Mana'a's interest in trafficking arms into Somalia can be traced back at least to 2003. Mana'a made an offer to buy thousands of arms in 2003 from Eastern Europe, and indicated that he planned to sell some of the arms in Somalia.

9. Hassan Mahat Omar (a.k.a.: a) Hassaan Hussein Adam, b) Hassane Mahad Omar, c) Xassaan Xuseen Adan, d) Asan Mahad Cumar, e) Abu Salman, f) Abu Salmaan, g) Sheikh Hassaan Hussein)

Date of birth: 10 April 1979. Place of birth: Garissa, Kenya. Nationality: Possibly Ethiopian. Passport No.: A 1180173 Kenya, expiry 20 August 2017. ID Card No.: 23446085. Location: Nairobi, Kenya. Date of UN designation: 28 July 2011.

Other information: INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/5774975

Hassan Mahat Omar is engaging in acts that threaten the peace, security or stability of Somalia. He is an Imam and one of the leaders of Masjid-ul-Axmar, an informal Al-Shabaab affiliated centre in Nairobi. He is also involved in recruiting new members and soliciting funds for Al-Shabaab, including online at the Al-Shabaab affiliated website alqimmah.net.

In addition, he has issued fatwas calling for attacks against the TFG on an Al-Shabaab chat room site.

10. Omar Hammami (a.k.a.: a) Abu Maansuur Al-Amriki, b) Abu Mansour Al-Amriki, c) Abu Mansuur Al-Amriki, d) Umar Hammami, e) Abu Mansur Al-Amriki)

Date of birth: 6 May 1984. Place of birth: Alabama, United States. Nationality: United States. Also believed to hold Syrian nationality. Passport No.: 403062567 (US). Social Security No: 423-31-3021 (US). Location: Somalia.

Other information: Married to a Somali woman. Lived in Egypt in 2005 and moved to Somalia in 2009. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/5774980

Date of UN designation: 28 July 2011.

Omar Hammami is engaging in acts that threaten the peace, security or stability of Somalia. He is a senior member of Al-Shabaab. He is involved in recruitment, finance and payroll for foreign fighters in Somalia. He is described as an expert in explosives and warfare in general. Since October 2007 he has appeared in television reports and in Al-Shabaab propaganda videos. He has been shown in a video training Al-Shabaab fighters. He has also been shown in videos and on websites calling for more fighters to join Al-Shabaab.

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12. Aboud Rogo Mohammed (aka (a) Aboud Mohammad Rogo, (b) Aboud Seif Rogo, (c) Aboud Mohammed Rogo, (d) Sheikh Aboud Rogo, (e) Aboud Rogo Muhammad, (f) Aboud Rogo Mohamed)

Date of birth: 11 November 1960. Alt. dates of birth: (a) 11 November 1967, (b) 11 November 1969, (c) 1 January 1969. Place of birth: Lamu Island, Kenya.

Date of UN designation: 25 July 2012.

Other information: INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/5775562

Kenya-based extremist Aboud Rogo Mohammed has threatened the peace, security, or stability of Somalia, by providing financial, material, logistical, or technical support to al-Shabaab, an entity listed by the UNSC Committee established pursuant to Resolution 751 (1992) concerning Somalia and Resolution 1907 (2009) concerning Eritrea for engaging in acts that directly or indirectly threaten the peace, security, or stability of Somalia.

Aboud Rogo Mohammed is an extremist Islamic cleric based in Kenya. He continues to exert influence over extremist groups in East Africa as part of his campaign to promote violence throughout East Africa. Aboud Rogo's activities include fundraising for al-Shabaab.

As the main ideological leader of Al Hijra, formerly known as the Muslim Youth Center, Aboud Rogo Mohammed has used the extremist group as a pathway for radicalisation and recruitment of principally Swahili-speaking Africans for carrying out violent militant activity in Somalia. In a series of inspirational lectures between February 2009 and February 2012, Aboud repeatedly called for the violent rejection of the Somali peace process. During these lectures, Rogo repeatedly called for the use of violence against both the United Nations and the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) forces in Somalia, and urged his audiences to travel to Somalia to join al-Shabaab's fight against the Kenyan Government.

Aboud Rogo Mohammed also offers guidance on how Kenyan recruits joining al-Shabaab can evade detection by the Kenyan authorities, and which routes to follow when travelling from Mombasa and/or Lamu to Al-Shabaab strongholds in Somalia, notably Kismayo. He has facilitated the travel to Somalia of numerous Kenyan recruits for al-Shabaab.

In September 2011, Rogo was recruiting individuals in Mombasa, Kenya, for travel into Somalia, presumably to conduct terrorist operations. In September 2008, Rogo held a fundraising meeting in Mombasa to help finance al-Shabaab activities in Somalia.

13. Abubaker Shariff Ahmed (aka (a) Makaburi, (b) Sheikh Abubakar Ahmed, (c) Abubaker Shariff Ahmed, (d) Abu Makaburi Shariff, (e) Abubaker Shariff, (f) Abubakar Ahmed)

Date of birth: 1962. Alt. date of birth: 1967. Place of birth: Kenya. Location: Majengo area, Mombasa, Kenya. Date of UN designation: 23 August 2012.

Other information: INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/5775564

Abubaker Shariff Ahmed is a leading facilitator and recruiter of young Kenyan Muslims for violent militant activity in Somalia, and a close associate of Aboud Rogo. He provides material support to extremist groups in Kenya (and elsewhere in East Africa). Through his frequent trips to Al-Shabaab strongholds in Somalia, including Kismayo, he has been able to maintain strong ties with senior Al-Shabaab members.

Abubaker Shariff Ahmed is also engaged in the mobilisation and management of funding for Al-Shabaab, an entity listed by the UNSC Committee established pursuant to Resolution 751 (1992) concerning Somalia and Resolution 1907 (2009) concerning Eritrea for engaging in acts that directly or indirectly threaten the peace, security, or stability of Somalia.

Abubaker Shariff Ahmed has preached at mosques in Mombasa that young men should travel to Somalia, commit extremist acts, fight for Al-Qaida, and kill US citizens.

Abubaker Shariff Ahmed was arrested in late December 2010 by Kenyan authorities on suspicion of involvement in the bombing of a Nairobi bus terminal. Abubaker Shariff Ahmed is also a leader of a Kenya-based youth organisation in Mombasa with ties to Al-Shabaab.

As of 2010, Abubaker Shariff Ahmed acted as a recruiter and facilitator for Al-Shabaab in the Majengo area of Mombasa, Kenya.

14. Maalim Salman (aka (a) Mu'alim Salman, (b) Mualem Suleiman, (c) Ameer Salman, (d) Ma'alim Suleiman, (e) Maalim Salman Ali, (f) Maalim Selman Ali, (g) Ma'alim Selman, (h) Ma'alin Sulayman)

Date of birth: circa 1979. Place of birth: Nairobi, Kenya. Location: Somalia.

Date of UN designation: 23 September 2014.

Other information: INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/5818613

Maalim Salman was chosen by al-Shabaab leader Ahmed Abdi aw-Mohamed aka Godane to be the head of African foreign fighters for al-Shabaab. He has trained foreign nationals who were seeking to join al-Shabaab as African foreign fighters, and has been involved in operations in Africa targeting tourists, entertainment establishments, and churches.

Although focused mainly on operations outside of Somalia, Salman is known to reside in Somalia and train foreign fighters in Somalia before dispatching them elsewhere. Some of al-Shabaab's foreign fighters also have a presence in Somalia. For example, Salman ordered al-Shabaab foreign fighters to southern Somalia in response to an African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)offensive.

Among other terrorist attacks, al-Shabaab was responsible for the attack on the Westgate shopping mall in Nairobi, Kenya in September 2013, which resulted in the deaths of at least 67 people. More recently, al-Shabaab claimed the August 31, 2014 attack on the National Intelligence and Security Agency prison in Mogadishu, killing three security guards and two civilians, and injuring 15 others.

15. Ahmed Diriye (aka (a) Sheikh Ahmed Umar Abu Ubaidah, (b) Sheikh Omar Abu Ubaidaha, (c) Sheikh Ahmed Umar, (d) Sheikh Mahad Omar Abdikarim, (e) Abu Ubaidah, (f) Abu Diriye)

Date of birth: circa 1972. Place of birth: Somalia. Location: Somalia.

Date of UN designation: 24 September 2014.

Other information: INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/5818614

Ahmed Diriye was appointed as the new emir of Al-Shabaab following the death of the previous leader Ahmed Abdi aw-Mohamed, an individual listed by the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 751 (1992) and 1907 (2009). This was publicly announced in a statement by Al-Shabaab's spokesperson, Sheikh Ali Dheere, released on 6 September 2014. Diriye has been a senior member of Al-Shabaab and as the emir he exercises command responsibility for Al-Shabaab's operations. He will be directly responsible for Al-Shabaab's activities which continue to threaten the peace, security and stability of Somalia. Diriye has since adopted the Arabic name Sheikh Ahmed Umar Abu Ubaidah.

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16. Ahmad Iman Ali (aka: a) Sheikh Ahmed Iman Ali; b) Shaykh Ahmad Iman Ali; c) Ahmed Iman Ali; d) Abu Zinira)

Date of birth: a) Approximately 1973; b) Approximately 1974

Place of birth: Kenya

Nationality: Kenya

Date of UN designation: 8 March 2018

Other information: INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/

Ahmad Iman Ali was listed on 8 March 2018 pursuant to resolution 1844 (2008). Ahmad Iman Ali is a prominent Kenyan Al-Shabaab commander who has served as the group's leader in Kenya since 2012. He is director of the group's Kenyan branch operations and routinely targets Kenyan AMISOM troops in Somalia, such as a January 2016 attack on Kenyan AMISOM troops in El Adde, Somalia. Ali is also responsible for Al-Shabaab propaganda targeting the Kenyan government and civilians, such as a July 2017 video in which he issues threats to Muslims serving in Kenya's security forces. In addition to these activities, Ali has at times also served as an Al-Shabaab recruiter, focusing on poor youth in Nairobi slums, as well as a Shabaab fundraiser who utilizes mosques in an effort to secure resources. His overall goal is to destabilize Kenya by threatening, planning, and executing attacks, and to encourage young Muslims to participate in fighting against Kenyan security forces.

17. Abdifatah Abubakar Abdi (aka: Musa Muhajir)

Date of birth: 15 April 1982

Place of birth: Somalia

Nationality: Somalia

Address: a) Somalia; b) Mombasa, Kenya

Date of UN designation: 08 March 2018

Other information: INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/

Abdifatah Abubakar Abdi was listed on 8 March 2018 pursuant to resolution 1844 (2008). In 2015, Abdifatah Abubakar Abdi was put on the Kenyan government's wanted list of terrorists known or suspected to be members of Al-Shabaab. Kenyan police report that Abdi recruits members for Al-Shabaab who provide support to Al-Shabaab, an entity listed on the United Nations Security Council Somalia and Eritrea sanctions list, inside Somalia and engages in acts that threaten the peace, security, or stability of Somalia. Among these recruits were three women arrested by Kenyan police while attempting to cross into Somalia. Abdi is wanted in connection with the June 2014 attack in Mpeketoni, Kenya that claimed numerous lives, and was believed to be planning further attacks. While Abdi may be focused on operations outside of Somalia, he is known to reside in Somalia and recruit individuals for Al-Shabaab who intend to cross the border between Kenya and Somalia.

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18. Abukar Ali Adan (alias: a) Abukar Ali Aden; b) Ibrahim Afghan; c) Sheikh Abukar)

Designation: Deputy leader of Al-Shabaab

Date of Birth: a) 1972; b) 1971; c) 1973

Date of UN designation: 26 February 2021

Other information:

Listed pursuant to paragraph 8(a) of resolution 1844 (2008) as ‘Engaging in or providing support for acts that threaten the peace, security or stability of Somalia, including acts that threaten the Djibouti Agreement of 18 August 2008 or the political process, or threaten the TFIs or AMISOM by force.’ Abukar Ali Adan is also associated with Al-Qaida affiliates, Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP – QDe.129) and Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM – Qde.014).

19. Maalim Ayman (alias: a) Ma’alim Ayman; b) Mo’alim Ayman; c) Nuh Ibrahim Abdi; d) Ayman Kabo; e) Abdiaziz Dubow Ali)

Designation: Founder and leader of Jaysh Ayman, an al-Shabaab unit conducting attacks and operations in Kenya and Somalia

Date of Birth: a) 1973; b) 1983

Place of Birth: Kenya

Address: a) Kenya/Somalia border; b) Badamadow, Lower Juba Region, Somalia

Date of UN designation: 26 February 2021

Other information:

Listed pursuant to paragraph 8(a) of resolution 1844 (2008) as ‘Engaging in or providing support for acts that threaten the peace, security or stability of Somalia, including acts that threaten the Djibouti Agreement of 18 August 2008 or the political process, or threaten the TFIs or AMISOM by force.’ Maalim Ayman helped with preparations for the 5 January 2020 attack on Camp Simba in Lamu County, Kenya.

20. Mahad Karate (alias: a) Mahad Mohamed Ali Karate; b) Mahad Warsame Qalley Karate; c) Abdirahim Mohamed Warsame)

Date of Birth: Between 1957 and 1962

Place of Birth: Xararadheere, Somalia

Address: Somalia

Date of UN designation: 26 February 2021

Other information:

Listed pursuant to paragraph 8(a) of resolution 1844 (2008) as ‘Engaging in or providing support for acts that threaten the peace, security or stability of Somalia, including acts that threaten the Djibouti Agreement of 18 August 2008 or the political process, or threaten the TFIs or AMISOM by force.’ Mahad Karate played a key role in the Amniyat, the wing of al-Shabaab responsible for the recent attack on Garissa University College in Kenya that resulted in nearly 150 deaths. The Amniyat is al-Shabaab’s intelligence wing, which plays a key role in the execution of suicide attacks and assassinations in Somalia, Kenya, and other countries in the region, and provides logistics and support for al-Shabaab’s terrorist activities.

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21.  Ali Mohamed RAGE (alias: a) Ali Mohammed Rage b) Ali Dheere c) Ali Dhere d) Ali Mohamed Rage Cali Dheer e) Ali Mohamud Rage).

Designation: Spokesperson of Al-Shabaab

Date of Birth: 1966

Place of birth: Somalia

Nationality: Somalia

Address: Somalia

Date of UN designation: 18 February 2022

Other information:

Listed pursuant to paragraph 43(a) of resolution 2093 (2013) as ‘Engaging in or providing support for acts that threaten the peace, security or stability of Somalia, including acts that threaten the peace and reconciliation process in Somalia, or threaten the Federal Government of Somalia or AMISOM by force.’ As a spokesperson for Al-Shabaab, Rage is involved in promulgating and supporting the group’s terrorist activities.

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22.  Abdullahi Osman Mohamed Caddow (alias: a) Cabdullahi Cusman Maxamed Caddow b) Dhagacade c) Faracade d) Injineer Ismaaciil e) Eng. Ismail).

Date of Birth: 1983

Nationality: Somalia

Address: Somalia

Date of UN designation: 26 May 2023

Gender: male

Other information:

INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: https://www.interpol.int/en/How-we-work/Notices/View-UN-Notices-Individuals.

Abdullahi Osman Mohamed Caddow, also known as ‘Eng. Ismail’ is an al-Shabaab senior explosive expert responsible for the overall management of the group’s explosives operations and manufacturing. In doing so, he has engaged in acts which threaten the peace, security, and stability of Somalia. He has joined the media wing of Al-Shabaab, Al-Kataib in 2008 in Mogadishu and later in 2014 became a member of the explosives manufacturing unit in the group operating in many explosive preparation centers in the towns of Jilib, Bu’aale, Saakoow, Salagle, kuunyo-Barrow, and Arabow. He commands a team of 68 Al-Shabaab operatives and smuggles approximately six million USD of explosives manufacturing material yearly.

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23. Abdikadir Mohamed Abdikadir (a.k.a.: a) Abdukadir b) Abdukadir Mohamed Abdukadir c) Abdulkadir d) Abdulkadir Mohamed Abdulkadir e) Ikrima)

Designation: Senior Al-Shabaab leader

Date of Birth: 1985

Nationality: Somalia, Kenya

Address: Somalia

Date of UN designation: 21 May 2024

Gender: male

Other information: Listed pursuant to paragraph 26(b) of resolution 2662 (2022): (i) participating in the financing, planning, facilitating, preparing, or perpetrating of acts or activities by, in conjunction with, under the name of, on behalf of, or in support of Al-Shabaab and (iii) recruiting for, or otherwise supporting acts or activities of Al-Shabaab or any cell, affiliate, splinter group or derivative thereof.

24. Mohamed Mohamud Mire (a.k.a.: Mohamed Mire)

Designation: member of Shura of Al-Shabaab

Date of Birth: a) 1962 b) 1960 c) 1955

Place of birth: Kismayo, Somalia

Nationality: Somalia

Address: a) Jilib, Somalia b) Qunyo Barrow, Somalia

Date of UN designation: 21 May 2024

Gender: male

Other information: Listed pursuant to paragraph 26 of resolution 2662 (2022): (a) having engaged in, or provided support for, acts that threatened the peace, security or stability of Somalia, including acts that threatened the peace and reconciliation process in Somalia, or threatened the Federal Government of Somalia or ATMIS by force; and (b)(i) participating in the financing, planning, facilitating, preparing, or perpetrating of acts or activities by, in conjunction with, under the name of, on behalf of, or in support of Al-Shabaab.

25. Mohamed Omar Mohamed (a.k.a.: a) Ma’d Umurow b) Mohamed Omar Haji c) Mohamed Omar Ma’alin d) Mohamed Haji Omar)

Designation: Leader (Wali) of the Al-Shabaab group in Diinsor

Date of Birth: 1976

Place of birth: Taflow Village, Berdaale District, Bay Region, Somalia

Nationality: Somalia

Address: a) Diinsor District, Bay Region, Somalia b) Buur Hakaba District, Bay Region, Somalia

Date of UN designation: 21 May 2024

Gender: male

Other information: Listed pursuant to paragraph 26(b) of resolution 2662 (2022): (i) participating in the financing, planning, facilitating, preparing, or perpetrating of acts or activities by, in conjunction with, under the name of, on behalf of, or in support of Al-Shabaab; and (iii) recruiting for, or otherwise supporting acts or activities of Al-Shabaab or any cell, affiliate, splinter group or derivative thereof.

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II.    Entities

Al-Shabaab (a.k.a. a) Al-Shabab, b) Shabaab, c) The Youth, d) Mujahidin Al-Shabaab Movement, e) Mujahideen Youth Movement, f) Mujahidin Youth Movement, g) MYM, h) Harakat Shabab Al-Mujahidin, i) Hizbul Shabaab, j) Hisb'ul Shabaab, k) Al-Shabaab Al-Islamiya, l) Youth Wing, m) Al-Shabaab Al-Islaam, n) Al-Shabaab Al-Jihaad, o) The Unity Of Islamic Youth, p) Harakat Al-Shabaab Al-Mujaahidiin, q) Harakatul Shabaab Al Mujaahidiin, r) Mujaahidiin Youth Movement)

Location: Somalia. Date of UN designation: 12 April 2010.

Other information: INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/une/5775567

Al-Shabaab has engaged in acts that directly or indirectly threaten the peace, security, or stability of Somalia, including but not limited to: acts that threaten the Djibouti Agreement of August 18, 2008, or the political process; and, acts that threaten the Transitional Federal Institutions (TFIs), the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), or other international peacekeeping operations related to Somalia.

Al-Shabaab has also obstructed the delivery of humanitarian assistance to Somalia, or access to, or distribution of, humanitarian assistance in Somalia.

According to the statement by the Chairman of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 751 (1992) concerning Somalia to the Security Council delivered on 29 July 2009, both Al-Shabaab and Hisb'ul Islam publicly and repeatedly claimed responsibility for the attacks by forces on the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and AMISOM. Al-Shabaab had also claimed responsibility for the killing of TFG officials, and on 19 July 2009 had raided and shut down the field offices of UNOPS, UNDSS and UNDP in the Bay and Bakool regions, in violation of paragraph (c) of resolution 1844 (2008). Al-Shabaab has also repeatedly obstructed access to, or distribution of, humanitarian assistance in Somalia.

The United Nations Security Council's Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Somalia, dated 20 July 2009, contained the following paragraphs involving the activities of al-Shabaab in Somalia:

Insurgent groups, such as al-Shabaab, are alleged to be extorting money from private companies and recruiting young people to join the fight against the Government in Mogadishu, including child soldiers. Al-Shabaab has confirmed the presence of foreign fighters within its ranks and has stated openly that it is working with al-Qaida in Mogadishu to remove the Government of Somalia. The foreign fighters, many of whom reportedly originate from Pakistan and Afghanistan, appear to be well trained and battle-tested. They have been observed wearing hoods and directing offensive operations against Government forces in Mogadishu and neighbouring regions.

Al-Shabaab has intensified its strategy to coerce and intimidate the Somali population, as reflected in the carefully selected high gain assassinations and arrests of clan elders, several of whom have been murdered. On 19 June 2009, Omar Hashi Aden, the Minister of National Security, was killed in a large-scale suicide car bomb in Beletwyne. Over 30 other people were killed in the attack, which was strongly condemned by the international community and a broad cross-section of Somali society.

According to the December 2008 report from the UN Security Council Somalia Monitoring Group (2008/769), al-Shabaab is responsible for a variety of attacks within Somalia over the last several years, including:

— 
The reported killing and beheading of a Somali driver working for the World Food Programme in September 2008,
— 
The bombing of a market in Puntland that killed 20 and wounded over 100 on 6 February 2008,
— 
A campaign of bombings and targeted killings in Somaliland intended to disrupt the 2006 parliamentary elections,
— 
The murders of several foreign aid workers in 2003 and 2004.

According to reporting, al-Shabaab raided United Nations compounds in Somalia on 20 July 2009, and issued a decree banning three agencies of the United Nations from the al-Shabaab controlled areas of Somalia. Additionally, Somali Transitional Federal Government forces fought al-Shabaab and Hizbul Islam insurgents from 11-12 July 2009 resulting in the deaths of over 60 people. In the fighting on 11 July 2009, al-Shabaab landed four mortars inside Villa Somalia that resulted in the deaths of three African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM) soldiers and injuries to eight others.

According to an article published by the British Broadcasting Corporation on 22 February 2009, al-Shabaab claimed responsibility for a suicide car bomb attack on an African Union military base in Mogadishu. According to the article, the African Union confirmed that 11 African Union peacekeepers were killed and 15 others were hurt.

According to an article published by Reuters on 14 July 2009, al-Shabaab militants made gains in 2009 in guerrilla-style attacks on Somali and African Union forces.

According to an article published by Voice of America on 10 July 2009, al-Shabaab was involved in an attack on Somali government forces in May 2009.

According to an article posted on the website of the Council on Foreign Relations authored on 27 February 2009, al-Shabaab has waged an insurgency against Somalia's transitional government and its Ethiopian supporters since 2006. Al-Shabaab killed eleven Burundian soldiers in the deadliest attack on AU peacekeepers since their deployment and states that al-Shabaab engaged in heavy fighting that killed at least fifteen people in Mogadishu.

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ANNEX II

List of items referred to in article 1(3), point (b)(i)

1. Surface to air missiles, including Man-Portable Air-Defence Systems (MANPADS).

2. Weapons with a calibre greater than 12,7 mm, and components specially designed for them, and associated ammunition. (This does not include shoulder fired anti-tank rocket launchers such as RPGs (rocket-propelled grenades) or LAWs (light anti-tank weapons), recoilless rifles, rifle grenades, or grenade launchers.)

3. Mortars with a calibre greater than 82 mm and associated ammunition.

4. Anti-tank guided weapons, including Anti-tank Guided Missiles (ATGMs) and ammunition and components specially designed for those items.

5. Charges and devices specifically designed or modified for military use; mines and related materiel; and fuses.

6. Weapon sights with a night vision capability, including thermal and infrared, and accessories.

7. Fixed wing, swivel wing, tilt rotor or tilt wing aircraft, specifically designed or modified for military use.

8. ‘Vessels’ and amphibious vehicles specifically designed or modified for military use. (‘Vessel’ includes any ship, surface effect vehicle, vessel of small waterplane area or hydrofoil and the hull or part of the hull of a vessel.)

9. Uncrewed combat aerial vehicles (listed as Category IV in the UN Register of Conventional Arms).




ANNEX III

List of items referred to in article 1(3), point (b)(ii)

1. All types of weapons with a calibre up to 12,7 mm and associated ammunition.

2. Type-7 rocket propelled grenades (RPG-7s), LAWs (light anti-tank weapons) and recoilless rifles, and associated ammunition.

3. Weapon sights.

4. Rotor wing or helicopters specifically designed or modified for military use.

5. Body armour or protective garments, as follows: Hard body armour plates providing ballistic protection equal to or greater than level III (NIJ 0101.06 July 2008) or national equivalents.

6. Ground vehicles specifically designed or modified for military use.

7. Communication equipment specifically designed or modified for military use.




ANNEX IV

List of items referred to in article 1c(1)

1. Tetryl (trinitrophenylmethylnitramine);

2. Nitrocellulose (containing more than 12,5 % nitrogen w/w);

3. Equipment that is both specially designed for military use and specially designed for activating, powering with one-time operational output, discharging or detonating Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs).

4. ‘Technology’‘required’ for the ‘production’ or ‘use’ of the items listed in paragraph 1 and paragraph 3. (The definitions of the terms ‘technology’, ‘required’, ‘production’ and ‘use’ are from the Common Military List of the European Union ( 1 ).)




ANNEX V

List of items referred to in article 1c(2)

1. Equipment and devices, not specified by item 3 in Annex IV, specially designed to initiate explosives by electrical or non-electrical means (e.g. firing sets, detonators, igniters, detonating cord).

2. ‘Technology’‘required’ for the ‘production’ or ‘use’ of the items listed in paragraph 1 and paragraph 3. (The definitions of the terms ‘technology’, ‘required’, ‘production’ and ‘use’ are from the Common Military List of the European Union.)

3. Explosive materials and precursors, as follows, and mixtures containing one or more thereof:

a. 

Nitroglycerin compounded or mixed with the ‘energetic material’ specified by ML8.a or powdered metals specified by ML8.c of the Common Military List of the European Union (except when packaged/prepared in individual medicinal doses);

b. 

Nitric acid;

c. 

Sulphuric acid.



( 1 )  OJ C 98, 15.3.2018, p. 1.

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