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Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee – A challenge for the single market: a European defence policy well balanced with the needs of citizens (own-initiative opinion)

EESC 2025/00634

OJ C, C/2026/4, 16.1.2026, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2026/4/oj (BG, ES, CS, DA, DE, ET, EL, EN, FR, GA, HR, IT, LV, LT, HU, MT, NL, PL, PT, RO, SK, SL, FI, SV)

ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2026/4/oj

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Official Journal
of the European Union

C series

C/2026/4

16.1.2026

Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee

A challenge for the single market: a European defence policy well balanced with the needs of citizens

(own-initiative opinion)

(C/2026/4)

Rapporteur:

Angelo PAGLIARA

Advisor	Simone D'ALESSANDRO (to the rapporteur)
Plenary Assembly decision	23.1.2025
Legal basis	Rule 52(2) of the Rules of Procedure
Section responsible	Single Market, Production and Consumption
Adopted in section	2.9.2025
Adopted at plenary session	18.9.2025
Plenary session No	599
Outcome of vote (for/against/abstentions)	134/0/2

1. Conclusions and recommendations

1.1.

The EESC reiterates that the strengthening of the EU’s defensive capacities must be implemented in accordance with its fundamental values, placing economic, social and territorial cohesion at its core, as provided for in Article 3 TEU. An effective defence policy can only exist if it is embedded in a European project geared towards the well-being of the public.

1.2.

The EESC believes that, from a security perspective, the EU should adopt a common defence policy as part of a shared foreign and security policy, and build a strong European defence pillar, going beyond national models and the resulting fragmented expenditure. The legislative and financial measures that are needed to achieve this should be rolled out as a matter of urgency and within a common framework, also in consideration of the risks that the European countries bordering Russia and Belarus are facing.

1.3.

The EESC calls for an integrated approach to European security, covering not just military needs but also the social, industrial, environmental and health aspects. The EU’s resilience relies on strong public systems and the trust of the public. The well-being of European citizens in today’s geopolitical context cannot be ensured without an adequate level of defence capabilities and societal preparedness. True resilience is built on the capacity to respond to external aggression and on the strength of public systems to protect citizens in all aspects of life.

1.4.

The EESC stresses the urgent need to strengthen the Single Market by overcoming the fragmentation of the defence market by promoting a common European industrial policy that enhances industrial competitiveness while respecting the principles of transparency, efficiency and sustainability. It also calls for specific common funding instruments to be adopted.

1.5.

The EESC recommends that defence investment be geared towards strengthening the European defence technological and industrial base (EDTIB), actively involving the social partners and small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) as key players in local production chains. It is essential to promote skilled employment and prevent harmful dumping or offshoring practices, so as to ensure that the benefits are felt widely across Europe’s production system.

1.6.

The EESC considers it essential to ensure proper coordination between European funding instruments and the EU fiscal framework, by laying down rules that allow strategic investments, including those in the defence sector, to be excluded from deficit calculations, by means of fiscal escape clauses consistent with the EU’s objectives.

1.7.

The EESC calls on the Commission and the Member States to ensure full transparency on the origin, destination and governance of defence funds, so that the increase in spending does not come at the expense of other key EU objectives, public services or health.

1.8.

The EESC would like to see the establishment of an inter-institutional observatory for integrated security (involving the EESC, the CoR, the Commission and the Parliament) to monitor the impact of European defence policies at local level and systematically measure how they are perceived and the extent to which they are trusted by the public.

2. General comments

2.1.

Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 and the geopolitical events of recent months have prompted the European institutions to place the issue of European defence at the top of the political agenda. The war highlighted Europe’s dependence on U.S. support to ensure its defence while exposing gaps in its capacities. At the same time, worrying uncertainty in Transatlantic relations highlighted how the EU is facing a sudden and urgent need to find swift and united responses to a multitude of challenges and potential threats in the military, trade, technology and procurement spheres. In this context, particular attention should be devoted to EU Member States bordering Russia and Belarus, as they are the most directly exposed to immediate crises and hybrid threats.

2.2.

The EU has a history of failed defence integration attempts since the 1954 European Defence Community (EDC). This opinion aims to feed into the European debate. It starts with the premise that the geopolitical context requires decisive action to build a common defence system. The challenge is how to invest in common defence, completing the single market, without compromising social cohesion and investment in the well-being of Europeans and while ensuring compliance with the Treaties.

2.3.

Article 3 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) points out that the Union’s aim is to promote the well-being of its peoples, economic and social cohesion, and balanced and harmonious development of the Member States. From this perspective, European defence policy is expected to integrate these aspects and support the attainment of these objectives, so as to ensure a peaceful and secure life for EU citizens.

2.4.

In the context of this opinion, the EESC builds on many other documents it has already adopted – as well as documents that are currently being drawn up – in the field of defence and security, and in particular on a number of opinions that deal with the subject in depth and in a structured way (1). These opinions set out a comprehensive and coherent picture of the role that defence can play in building European sovereignty that is in line with the values of peace, democracy and social justice.

2.5.

The Union’s ability to enhance its common defence and address geopolitical and industrial challenges is closely linked to action to enhance European integration. The EESC calls on the Commission and the Council to explore all mechanisms set out in the Treaties in order to lose no time in activating a process of institutional reform and move forward with the completion of the integration process.

2.6.

The political debates and divisions within the EU related to the Commission’s recent defence proposals show that the balance between defence spending and social investment is crucial. A Union that is stronger in military terms must also be fairer, more cohesive and more resilient for its people.

3. Specific comments

3.1.

The Draghi report (2) shows that between 2022 and 2023, 78 % of European military spending went to non-EU suppliers and 63 % of that went to the US. This dependence limits the EU’s strategic autonomy, increasing geopolitical risk and exposing European security to the industrial and policy choices of third-party actors. In addition, the fragmentation of procurement among Member States is an obstacle to the creation of a single market for defence, leaving European industry vulnerable to the major global powers and preventing the establishment of the common standards needed for interoperability and industrial efficiency.

3.2.

The lack of coordination in defence procurement distorts the internal market, favours industries outside Europe and limits the growth of production and research inside Europe. According to the Italian Public Accounts Observatory (Osservatorio sui conti pubblici italiani), in 2024 the EU’s total military expenditure was significantly higher than that of Russia in purchasing-power parity (PPP) terms (3). However, the lack of a shared strategy among Member States reduces its overall effectiveness. The fragmentation of production and procurement prevents resources from being used strategically, making the European defence sector less competitive than the more centralised Russian sector. In this regard, the lack of standardisation when it comes to technical requirements and weapon systems is a real obstacle to interoperability, logistical efficiency and cost reduction (in this context, it is equally important to ensure alignment with NATO standards). To reduce this dependency and strengthen the EU’s strategic autonomy, it is necessary first and foremost to accelerate the completion of the single market for defence by harmonising regulations, investing in research and development, improving interoperability between national systems and establishing a stable joint procurement mechanism that allows Member States to prioritise European suppliers, avoiding the scattering of resources.

3.3.

The EU needs a robust defence framework capable of dealing not only with immediate crises but also with long-term challenges. This requires a strong industrial base capable of supporting technological development, guaranteeing strategic autonomy and ensuring that investments have a positive impact on economic growth and employment. Without a clear industrial policy, defence plans may be ineffective. The EESC stresses the need to step up investment in industrial policies, including by establishing a European sovereign fund able to finance common strategic projects.

3.4.

A European defence industry strategy should also involve the EESC and the Committee of the Regions in a structured way, fostering resilient local production chains. The employment potential of industrial restructuring can only translate into stable, quality jobs if relocations and social dumping practices are avoided, ensuring fair and inclusive conditions for all European economic stakeholders.

3.5.

The EESC believes that the legislative and financial measures needed to strengthen European defence should be adopted within an EU framework. A common financing system, based on the coordination of expenditure and the optimisation of resources, would enhance the internal market, avoid waste and maximise the effectiveness of investments, while reducing dependence on non-European suppliers. The latest macroeconomic forecasts suggest that significant structural effects on the economy cannot be generated from defence spending on its own. For this reason, the impact of defence spending must be considered within a broader strategy that includes coordinated public investment in the social and industrial spheres (4).

3.6.

In a decade, military spending in Europe has increased by an average of 50 %, from EUR 145 billion in 2014 to EUR 215 billion in 2023 (5). The EESC emphasises that strengthening the EU’s defence capabilities is also an opportunity to revitalise Europe’s industrial and technological base. Some analyses, including the Draghi Report and the European Commission’s Spring 2025 Economic Forecast, suggest that coordinated increases in defence spending could contribute to GDP growth, job creation and innovation. For example, a simulation using the QUEST model estimates that a gradual increase in defence expenditure by Member States up to 1,5 % of GDP by 2028 could raise EU GDP by about 0,5 % by the end of that period, with a parallel increase of approximately 2 percentage points in the debt-to-GDP ratio. However, the effectiveness of such spending is not automatic: its impact depends heavily on the degree of industrial coordination and the development of an integrated internal defence market. In the absence of a shared strategy, the economic multiplier of defence spending risks remaining low, particularly due to the high share of extra- EU imports, as shown by recent input-output analyses. Common standards, interoperability and joint procurement mechanisms are essential to ensure that defence investments generate lasting benefits and contribute meaningfully to the EU’s strategic autonomy.

3.7.

Investment in the defence sector must be embedded within a strategy aimed at strengthening the EU’s production chains, spurring on innovation and attracting skilled workers. Greater industrial coordination at European level – by means of common standards, interoperability and joint procurement – has the potential to increase the economic multiplier effect of defence spending. Without this coordination, the risk is that the multiplier effect will remain limited due to the high proportion of imports from outside the EU, as demonstrated in recent studies based on input-output analyses (6). Developing an integrated internal market for defence must therefore be a priority in order to support the EU’s strategic autonomy.

3.8.

Data from the latest 2024 Living Conditions Report show an overall deterioration: 19,1 % of European households struggle to make ends meet (compared to 16,8 % in 2020); the share of people at risk of poverty or social exclusion has risen to 16,5 % (up from 14,3 % in 2019); income inequality has increased from 28,7 % to 29,6 %; severe material and social deprivation has continued to increase, rising from 6,7 % to 6,8 %; and the share of households unable to meet unexpected expenses stands at 33,5 % (up from 30,2 % in 2020). Life expectancy fell from 81.3 years in 2019 to 80.1 in 2023 (7). This deterioration is also confirmed by the Parliament’s 2024 Eurobarometer survey, which found that Europeans’ main concerns are rising prices and the cost of living (42 %) and the economic situation (41 %). These data point to a deterioration in social conditions that, if not addressed, could well undermine the very foundations of European security.

3.9.

The bolstering of the European health system should be viewed as a pillar of the European defence system. The latest available reports point to persistent structural weaknesses in national health systems: staff shortages, insufficient infrastructure and unequal access to services (8). The EESC believes that, in the present geopolitical context, the need to ramp up investment in health is incompatible with the current Stability and Growth Pact, which is an obstacle to the pursuit of the EU’s goals of security and social resilience.

3.10.

In times of crisis, support for the institutions from the people of Europe and civil society is crucial. The EESC calls on the Commission to explore the possibility of establishing an inter-institutional observatory comprising the EESC, the CoR, the Commission and the Parliament, with the specific task of monitoring how European decisions are perceived in the Member States and promoting a concept of common European defence that factors in the social, economic and health aspects. Transparency, democratic accountability and civic engagement are essential conditions for building public trust in the European institutions. In the absence of trust, even the most advanced security policies risk losing their effectiveness and legitimacy. The observatory should help to monitor not just the local impact of European defence choices, but also public trust in them and how they are perceived by society.

3.11.

The EESC stresses that European security is based on an integrated approach, where defence capabilities are combined with the strength of the EU’s soft power: cooperation, diplomacy, and the promotion of development and stability. Preserving and strengthening this balance is essential for the EU to play a credible and autonomous role on the global stage.

Brussels, 18 September 2025.

The President

of the European Economic and Social Committee

Oliver RÖPKE

(1) OJ C 100, 16.3.2023, p. 132; OJ C, C/2024/4663, 9.8.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/4663/oj; OJ C, C/2024/4662, 9.8.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/4662/oj; OJ C, C/2025/2013, 30.4.2025, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2025/2013/oj; OJ C, C/2024/2489, 23.4.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/2489/oj; OJ C, C/2024/4056, 12.7.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/4056/oj; OJ C 486, 21.12.2022, p. 168; OJ C, C/2025/5162, 28.10.2025, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2025/5162/oj.

(2) The Draghi report on EU competitiveness.

(3) Facciamo chiarezza: nel 2024 la spesa militare europea eccedeva quella russa del 58 %.

(4) European Commission (2025), The economic impact of higher defence spending, one of the ‘special issues’ in the Spring 2025 Economic Forecast.

(5) Stamegna, M., Bonaiuti, C., Maranzano, P., & Pianta, M. (2024). The economic impact of arms spending in Germany, Italy, and Spain. Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy, 30(4), 393-422.

(6) Stamegna, M., Bonaiuti, C., Maranzano, P., & Pianta, M. (2024). The economic impact of arms spending in Germany, Italy, and Spain. Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy, 30(4), 393-422.

(7) Key figures on European living conditions – 2024 edition.

(8) Key figures on European living conditions – 2024 edition.

ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2026/4/oj

ISSN 1977-091X (electronic edition)

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