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United response to recent Russian violations of the EU Member States' airspace and critical infrastructure

European Parliament resolution of 9 October 2025 on a united response to recent Russian violations of the EU Member States' airspace and critical infrastructure (2025/2901(RSP))

(C/2026/1530)

The European Parliament,

- having regard to the Charter of the United Nations and the fundamental principles of international law,
 - having regard to Articles 42(7) and 24(3) of the Treaty on European Union (TEU),
 - having regard to its previous resolutions on Ukraine and Russia,
 - having regard to the white paper entitled 'White Paper for European Defence – Readiness 2030' and to its resolution of 12 March 2025 thereon ⁽¹⁾,
 - having regard to Council Regulation (EU) 2025/1106 of 27 May 2025 establishing the Security Action for Europe (SAFE) through the Reinforcement of the European Defence Industry Instrument ⁽²⁾,
 - having regard to the Commission proposal of 5 March 2024 for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing the European Defence Industry Programme and a framework of measures to ensure the timely availability and supply of defence products ('EDIP') (COM(2024)0150),
 - having regard to its previous resolutions on Ukraine and on Russia, in particular those adopted since Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 and the annexation of the Crimean Peninsula on 19 February 2014,
 - having regard to the international legal framework for preventing and fighting terrorism, including UN Security Council Resolution 2341 on protection of critical infrastructure against terrorist acts, adopted on 13 February 2017,
 - having regard to the State of the Union address delivered on 10 September 2025 by Commission President Ursula von der Leyen,
 - having regard to the statement of 10 September 2025 by NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte on the violation of Polish airspace by Russian drones,
 - having regard to the speech by Polish Deputy Prime Minister Radosław Sikorski delivered at the UN Security Council emergency session on 22 September 2025,
 - having regard to the statement by the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Kaja Kallas of 22 September 2025 on the violation of Estonian airspace, delivered at the UN Security Council emergency session,
 - having regard to the statement by the North Atlantic Council of 23 September 2025 on recent airspace violations by Russia,
 - having regard to the statement by Commissioner Andrius Kubilius of 26 September 2025 following the high-level videoconference on eastern flank defence cooperation,
 - having regard to the remarks by Council President António Costa on 1 October 2025 at the press conference following the informal meeting of Heads of State or Government,
 - having regard to Rules 136(2) and (4) of its Rules of Procedure,
- A. whereas in recent years, Russia has repeatedly engaged in deliberate acts of hybrid warfare inside Union territory, including cyberattacks, disinformation campaigns and electoral interference, weaponisation of energy, arson attacks, sabotage of critical infrastructure, Global Satellite Navigation Systems (GNSS) (including GPS) jamming and spoofing, as well as in military provocations, including violations of airspace by fighter jets and long-range strike drones, while seeking to spread fear among EU citizens, destabilise the political situation in the Member States and reduce the EU's support for Ukraine;

⁽¹⁾ OJ C, C/2025/3151, 20.6.2025, ELI: <http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2025/3151/oj>

⁽²⁾ OJ L, 2025/1106, 28.5.2025, ELI: <http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2025/1106/oj>.

- B. whereas Russia's intrusions into NATO's and the EU's airspace, which represent a blatant violation of Member States' sovereignty and of international law, have been occurring since the start of the Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine, and have recently reached an unprecedented scale, raising questions about whether Russia is attempting to test NATO's resolve or divert its attention and resources from the war in Ukraine;
- C. whereas on 28 July 2025, a Russian drone carrying explosives entered Lithuanian airspace from Belarus and crashed in its territory at a military polygon; whereas on 4 October 2025, weather balloons used for smuggling entered Lithuanian airspace from Belarus, seriously interfering with the activities of Vilnius International Airport;
- D. whereas on 10 September 2025, over the course of seven hours, approximately 20 Russian drones flew deep into Poland's territory before being shot down by NATO jets or crashing, marking the first direct military engagement between NATO and Russia since the start of the full-scale invasion;
- E. whereas on 19 September 2025, three armed Russian MiG-31 fighter jets violated Estonian airspace for 12 minutes, intruded into the security zone over a Polish drilling platform in the Baltic Sea, disregarded communications from NATO F-35 pilots, and were ultimately escorted back into international airspace;
- F. whereas on 25 September 2025, Hungarian Gripen jets were scrambled from Lithuania to intercept a formation of five Russian fighter jets that were flying near NATO airspace without complying with international flight safety regulations; whereas the aircraft were visually identified west of the Latvian coast before being escorted out of NATO airspace;
- G. whereas since February 2022, Russian drones have entered Romanian airspace 11 times, with several drone fragments falling on Romanian territory on a further 39 occasions; whereas most recently, on 13 September 2025, a Russian Geran drone again violated Romanian airspace and was intercepted by two F-16 fighter aircraft; whereas similar incidents have also occurred in the Republic of Moldova;
- H. whereas Denmark, Sweden, Norway, Lithuania, France, Germany and Belgium experienced coordinated drone incursions over or near civilian and military airports or military facilities, causing temporary airport closures;
- I. whereas the recent series of drone incursions across the Baltic Sea region demonstrates a significant hybrid threat to the safe and effective implementation of the Single European Sky initiative; whereas the incursions have caused damage to infrastructure and economic losses;
- J. whereas drones may have been launched from vessels, including those belonging to the Russian shadow fleet operating in the Baltic Sea to circumvent sanctions;
- K. whereas European leaders considered these incidents to be deliberate provocation orchestrated by Russia, viewing them as part of a pattern of reckless and irresponsible Russian behaviour, while Russia has consistently refused to acknowledge responsibility for such incidents, instead denying all evidence, accusing Member States of fabricating reports, and disseminating disinformation to discredit the EU and its allies as well as falsely putting the blame on Ukraine;
- L. whereas NATO allies, including Poland and Estonia, invoked Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty following these incursions; whereas EU Member States discussed these incursions during meetings of their permanent representatives;
- M. whereas NATO launched the Eastern Sentry military activity to safeguard critical undersea infrastructure in the Baltic Sea, enhance maritime situational awareness in response to Russian sabotage and bolster its air defence posture along the entire eastern flank following the Polish incident, and Finland, Sweden and Denmark participated in the Protective Fence 25 exercise to strengthen defence capability, deterrence and readiness from dispersed formations;
- N. whereas Russia has been waging an illegal, unprovoked and unjustified full-scale war of aggression against Ukraine since 24 February 2022, in a flagrant violation of the UN Charter and of the fundamental principles of international law and international humanitarian law; whereas Russian forces continue to carry out systematic drone and missile attacks on Ukrainian cities, targeting civilians, including by striking ambulances and rescue personnel; whereas the use of drones against clearly identifiable civilian targets, the dissemination of footage of these killings and the posting of explicit threats on social media demonstrate a coordinated state policy aimed at terrorising the population and forcing displacement; whereas during recent attacks, Ukrainian government buildings, as well as the EU mission and the Embassy of Poland, were hit, indicating deliberate targeting by the Kremlin; whereas Russia produces thousands of drones per month and is further scaling up its production capacities;

- O. whereas the security of Ukraine is interlinked with European, transatlantic and global security, and Russia aims to divert NATO's attention and resources away from supporting Ukraine towards defending its own territory;
- P. whereas some NATO countries, including Poland, have warned they are ready to shoot down Russian aircraft entering their territory, while NATO emphasises that decisions on whether to engage intruding aircraft are based on available intelligence regarding the threat posed, including intent and armament;
- Q. whereas the United States' stance on the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine is unpredictable, making the EU and its Member States Ukraine's primary strategic allies and necessitating a stronger, unified European response to defend EU citizens, regional stability and international peace; whereas EU-US cooperation in the area of security and defence remains crucial and should be strengthened; whereas effective deterrence of Russian aggression necessitates robust security guarantees, coordinated collaboratively by the EU and the United States;
- R. whereas air defence systems to provide protection against unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) are based on kinetic action or electronic countermeasures, in particular jammers, to interrupt drone control and/or cause the aircraft to land;
- S. whereas for the protection of the informal meeting of EU Heads of State or Government on 1 and 2 October 2025 in Copenhagen, the Danish authorities prohibited all civilian drone flights in Danish airspace from 29 September to 3 October 2025; whereas several Member States supported Denmark in providing these security measures for the informal meeting;
- T. whereas the statement by Council President António Costa on 1 October 2025 following the informal meeting of Heads of State or Government clearly indicates a willingness to improve interoperability of capabilities as well as strong commitment to the flagship Eastern Flank Watch, including through the capability coalitions coordinated by the respective leading countries, and the EU 'drone wall' initiative, underscoring the EU's and NATO's commitment to collective defence against conventional and hybrid threats and to enhancing the security and stability of the region;
- U. whereas the recent airspace incursions demand a bold response and a comprehensive approach in the upcoming defence readiness roadmap 2030;
- V. whereas the process of building fully fledged multilayered airspace defence should have started after the illegal annexation of Crimea; whereas decisions, financing, procurement and acquisition, and operability take time;
- W. whereas it would be crucial for Bulgaria, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Sweden to have fully fledged EU UAV capability along NATO's eastern flank and in the Baltic Sea and Black Sea regions; whereas such capability would require significant European defence-related investment under the current and the next multiannual financial frameworks (MFF);
- X. whereas there is an urgent need for measures to strengthen the European defence technological and industrial base (EDTIB) to enhance the EU's defence industrial production capacity, strengthen the competitiveness of the European defence industry and secure the supply of defence products;
- Y. whereas continued effort and investment are needed to support technological innovation and research in defence to support the EDTIB and European strategic autonomy;
- 1. Expresses its full solidarity with Moldova as well as with Denmark, Sweden, Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, Finland, Romania, Estonia and all other Member States exposed to Russia's direct threats, military provocations and acts of hybrid warfare; considers that the deliberate disruption, by Russian agents, of the EU's air traffic, targeting Europe's military critical services and infrastructure, and of the functioning of the political institutions of the EU and the Member States using UAVs is escalatory, risks miscalculation, endangers lives, constitutes a serious violation of applicable international norms and poses a serious threat to EU citizens and to peace and security in Europe;
- 2. Encourages any initiative that enables the EU and its Member States to take coordinated, united and proportionate action against all violations of their airspace, including shooting down airborne threats; strongly condemns Russia's reckless and escalatory actions of violating the airspace of EU Member States and NATO allies Poland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Romania, as well as the deliberate drone incursions aimed at critical infrastructure in Denmark, Sweden, and Norway, which are part of Russia's systematic military and hybrid warfare and provocation against the EU and its Member States; declares that Russia bears full and unequivocal responsibility for the actions that took place in Polish, Estonian and Romanian airspace;

3. Welcomes the decisive and proportionate response by NATO forces, including the interception and escorting of Russian fighter jets out of Estonian airspace and the shooting down of Russian drones over Poland; acknowledges the swift and coordinated response of the armed forces of some Member States and NATO partners in safeguarding European skies; fully supports NATO's efforts to reinforce its capabilities and strengthen its deterrence, air defence and collective defence posture along its eastern flank, including through the launch of Operation Eastern Sentry and the development of the full spectrum of measures under this operation;
4. Calls on the Council and the Commission to increase the effectiveness and impact of sanctions on Russia in order to definitively undermine Russia's ability to continue waging its brutal war of aggression against Ukraine and threatening the security of other neighbouring countries; calls for the immediate adoption of a robust 19th sanctions package targeting Russia's primary sources of revenue; calls on the Council, along with its American partners, to maintain and extend its sanctions policy against Russia, and to apply a similar sanctions policy to all enabling states, including Belarus, Iran and North Korea, and to sanction Chinese entities supplying dual-use goods and military items essential for the manufacturing of drones and missiles; calls for targeted sanctions against Russia's shadow fleet and further action against it using the full scale of legal possibilities to halt, obstruct or impede its operations, given its possible involvement in the launch of drones targeting critical infrastructure; calls on the Council to systematically tackle the issue of sanctions circumvention by malicious non-EU entities based in the EU through thorough investigations and tougher penalties for entities that violate sanctions or fail to exercise due diligence in export controls and end-user verification; reiterates that any form of support provided to the aggressor by states such as Iran, North Korea or China must have direct consequences for all other relations with these countries, including trade;
5. Underlines that the EU and its Member States remain firmly committed to the rules-based international order and to all diplomatic efforts aimed at achieving a comprehensive, just and lasting peace for Ukraine, in full respect of its sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity within its internationally recognised borders; calls, in this regard, for the Member States and the EU to closely and effectively coordinate their diplomatic initiatives in multilateral organisations, including the UN, in order to counter Russia's systematic breaches of international law;
6. Calls on the Commission and the Council to develop an action plan of measures preventing and countering the escalation of Russian hybrid warfare against the EU in terrestrial, aerial, maritime and digital domains; points out that frameworks of this kind will provide options for EU retaliatory measures matching the severity and intensity of hostile activities undertaken against the EU; calls on the Member States to review, in coordination with NATO allies, the rules of engagement for all types of threats to ensure they are adequate to respond to the most innovative threats; stresses that the EU must show resolve and signal that any attempt by a non-EU country to violate Member States' sovereignty will immediately face retaliation;
7. Stresses that a range of sabotage and hybrid activities which Russia has undertaken against the EU amount to state-sponsored terrorism, even if they fall under the threshold of armed attack; underscores, therefore, the need to apply the available legal frameworks for combating terrorism to Russia's hostile activities, which violate EU Member States' territorial sovereignty, undermine the integrity of their institutions and directly threaten the safety of the civilian population; calls on the Commission to initiate a procedure to classify Russia as a high-risk third country for money laundering and terrorist financing under Regulation (EU) 2016/1675 ^(*) as one of the measures to limit Russia's capacity to conduct state terrorism;
8. Condemns Russia for deliberate jamming and spoofing GNSS (including GPS) signals in the Baltic and Black Sea regions and other areas, which poses a serious safety risk for civilian aviation and maritime transport; recalls that the Council of the International Civil Aviation Organization demanded that Russia fulfil its international obligations under the Convention on International Civil Aviation and ensure that the disturbances cease immediately; calls on the Council and the Commission to take appropriate measures to exert sufficient pressure on Russia to stop these malign activities and to strengthen the stability of satellite navigation services and their resilience to interference;
9. Calls for revision of the EU's capability planning process; is convinced that the headline goal process should cover not only crisis management but also collective defence, including the full capability spectrum under the national and international capability objectives; considers that the EU should consider capability apportioning requirements for its Member States, reflecting NATO's model; believes that such a process could be carried forward within the framework of a European defence semester; insists on the urgent need to move towards a genuine European Defence Union, complementing NATO, and building on and going further than current frameworks such as that provided in

^(*) Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2016/1675 of 14 July 2016 supplementing Directive (EU) 2015/849 of the European Parliament and of the Council by identifying high-risk third countries with strategic deficiencies (OJ L 254, 20.9.2016, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg_del/2016/1675/oj).

the White Paper for European Defence – Readiness 2030; underlines that only through deeper integration, coordination and the pooling of resources can the EU respond effectively to Russia's escalating threats; reiterates that protecting the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all Member States is a fundamental principle of the EU, and underlines the need for an immediate, firm, united and proportionate response to protect citizens and critical infrastructure;

10. Calls for advances towards a European command-and-control structure that not only manages crises in line with the common security and defence policy (CSDP), but also serves as the equivalent of NATO's Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE); notes that, to avoid duplication, such a structure should complement SHAPE and would provide proper resources to the EU Military Staff (EUMS); stresses the importance of enhanced coordination, including the possible establishment of a permanent interinstitutional Russia crisis cell, tasked with real-time monitoring, rapid information sharing, and swift operational decision-making; believes that the recent incursion into the EU's airspace is a catalyst for rapid and thorough advances in domains such as intelligence sharing, common logistics and the interoperability of security and coordinated procurement; calls for increasingly close cooperation between NATO and the EU to strengthen Europe's defence and deterrence; underlines the need for a strong, precisely defined European pillar within NATO, able to defend its sovereignty, to tackle the Russian threat and act autonomously from, and in complementarity with, NATO;
11. Calls for enhanced coordination, unity and solidarity among Member States, EU institutions and NATO structures, for the monitoring, interception and neutralisation of hostile drones, including through joint training, drills and exercises and the exchange of operational intelligence; stresses the need to set up joint command-and-control centres for any future UAV or counter-UAV initiative; underlines the need to fully integrate any UAV capability into conventional air defence forces and ensure its systems are interoperable with NATO's Integrated Air and Missile Defence architecture; recommends the establishment of structured mechanisms for ongoing knowledge sharing, also in an EU-NATO context, particularly in the rapidly evolving fields of digital defence and cyber capabilities, to streamline joint exercises and interoperability across Member States;
12. Calls for the EU and its Member States to equip authorities with the means to counter drones at critical infrastructure sites such as airports and power plants; notes that such means must be appropriate for the civilian context and follow a model of layered defence with multiple systems that can take down drones kinetically and electronically;
13. Highlights the need to support the Member States along NATO's eastern flank and in the Black Sea region in developing capabilities for intelligence gathering and the detection and tracking of threats originating beyond the EU's external borders, such as hybrid operations, attacks on critical infrastructure, instrumentalised migration or drone incursions, with a view to boosting the EU's situational awareness and capability to effectively anticipate threats; points out that such capabilities should include drone surveillance systems and other technologies allowing for aerial surveillance in EU border regions, as well as for the interception of incoming airborne threats; underlines that an effective, layered reconnaissance and defence system is essential for the protection of citizens and critical infrastructure and for successful deterrence;
14. Calls on the Member States and the European Defence Agency (EDA) to urgently consolidate the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) project entitled Integrated Multi-Layer Air and Missile Defence System (IMLAMD), especially against the threat posed by low-cost UAVs and in line with NATO's Integrated Air and Missile Defence architecture, to detect and intercept all incoming airborne threats from outside the EU, especially along the eastern flank; insists that European investment in long-range precision weapons systems and enhanced air defence is crucial to ensure deterrence, reduce the risk of Russia exploiting vulnerabilities and protect citizens and critical infrastructure; stresses that increased EDF funding rates should apply to projects relating to those capabilities, as is already the case for PESCO projects;
15. Calls on the Commission to work closely with the European Investment Bank Group and the EDA on ensuring a comprehensive approach combining capability development and funding and to adapt its defence and defence industrial policy instruments to ensure that they are fit for purpose; calls on the Member States to significantly increase the staff and budget of the EDA to facilitate adequate and timely capability development and joint procurement, and calls on the EDA to establish a dedicated, flexible budget for UAVs that spans the full capability life cycle; emphasises the urgent need to heavily invest in drones and counter-drone equipment; welcomes the use of the SAFE instrument and the Defence Equity Facility to scale production, secure supply chains and support the participation of small and medium-sized enterprises in the unmanned vehicles sector;

16. Welcomes the EU drone wall initiative, as announced by Commission President von der Leyen, Commissioner Andrius Kubilius and Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security (VP/HR) Kaja Kallas, and the Eastern Flank Watch initiative, noting that the ambitious deadline mentioned by Commissioner Kubilius for its completion requires rapid implementation as part of a broader defence shield along the EU's and NATO's eastern flank in response to repeated Russian airspace violations, while underlining the need to ensure comprehensive coverage of all Member States facing direct security challenges along the southern flank; calls on the Commission, the VP/HR and the Member States, in close coordination with NATO, to accelerate the development of a concrete and operational plan for its swift deployment; calls on the Commission to present a coherent plan at the European Council meeting on 23-24 October 2025; recognises the challenge posed by the high cost of intercepting drones and calls for joint programmes to promote the development of cost-effective counter-UAV capabilities;
17. Calls on the Commission to swiftly process any requests from Member States regarding voluntary adaptation of their national recovery and resilience plans to meet the funding requirements of UAV capability development;
18. Stresses the urgent need for enhanced maritime surveillance and believes that the new operational dimension of hybrid warfare requires the integration of maritime security and counter-UAV strategies, also through enhanced underwater surveillance capabilities; welcomes the launch of NATO-led operations, such as the Baltic Sentry Operation, to protect critical undersea infrastructure and enhance maritime situational awareness; highlights the importance of the EU's Black Sea strategy and of the maritime security hub, aimed at enhancing maritime safety and security;
19. Calls on the Commission to fully engage with the representatives of UAV manufacturers in the Member States, including with manufacturers of dual-use UAVs and satellites;
20. Calls for the supply of raw materials to be strengthened and diversified further, in view of the expansion of UAV manufacturing, and highlights, in this context, the importance of the EU Critical Raw Materials Act ⁽⁴⁾ which serves as a starting point for comprehensive, cohesive and strategic action; stresses the strategic importance of the EU's partnerships with Ukraine, Canada and Latin America;
21. Underlines that UAV technological evolution requires flexibility and rapid upgrades, which need to be facilitated by future EU initiatives; notes that the EU is likely to favour sophisticated, expensive and cutting-edge solutions that often come with major delays; calls for continuous investment in defence innovation and technology to support the EDTIB and close the investment and research gaps in defence technology, noting that planning, research, development, procurement and management of capabilities should be done jointly and through a European lens; highlights the strategic importance of defence-related production and the need to ensure that production output can be rapidly scaled up in times of crisis; calls on the Member States to pursue a regulatory environment and procurement processes that coordinate and integrate the existing European ecosystem with strategic partners;
22. Notes that UAV capabilities require significant acceleration of military mobility capabilities as well as fast cross-border movement of equipment and personnel, particularly focusing on border checks, customs procedures and clearance processes; stresses that credible deterrence requires enhanced, genuine and effective military mobility over all EU corridors, and border protection; calls for the EU institutions to approve the proposed tenfold increase in funding for military mobility in the next MFF and to invest heavily in dual-use infrastructure, particularly in frontline regions; notes, in this regard, the continued need for a military Schengen area to facilitate the efficient movement of defence resources across the EU; takes note of the Commission's proposal for an omnibus on military mobility as a step toward addressing these requirements;
23. Underlines the need for targets for both UAV and counter-UAV development, to ensure comprehensive UAV capabilities; calls on the Commission to propose exemptions from EU environmental legislation for UAV manufacturing facilities;

⁽⁴⁾ Regulation (EU) 2024/1252 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 April 2024 establishing a framework for ensuring a secure and sustainable supply of critical raw materials and amending Regulations (EU) No 168/2013, (EU) 2018/858, (EU) 2018/1724 and (EU) 2019/1020 (OJ L, 2024/1252, 3.5.2024, ELI: <http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1252/oj>).

24. Calls on the Member States and the Commission to fully engage in amending relevant EU and national regulatory frameworks to facilitate any future UAV and counter-UAV capabilities, especially in view of the engagement of armed forces; welcomes all concrete projects to fill capability gaps in the areas of drone and anti-drone warfare and to create a multilayered, deep zone of technologically advanced systems; invites the Member States to consider using the framework of European Defence Projects of Common Interest to set up such projects;
25. Emphasises that Russia's clear provocations are an active strategy of hybrid warfare to sow fear and distrust, and are intended to test and destabilise the societies of EU Member States and NATO allies; stresses, therefore, the importance of societal resilience and preparedness, as highlighted in the recommendations of the Niinistö report on European civilian and military preparedness and readiness; calls on the Commission and the Member States to ensure swift implementation of the European internal security strategy (ProtectEU) and the preparedness strategy to ensure comprehensive readiness and protection against threats posed by Russia's breaches of European airspace and other threats; stresses the need for sufficient EU funding in this respect under the current and next MFFs; recommends the development of comprehensive national civil defence strategies against aerial and missile threats, including UAVs, ensuring preparedness at the national, regional, municipal, community and household levels, and that these strategies emphasise early warning systems for local populations, clear instructions regarding response behaviour, and protected spaces (sheltering);
26. Recalls that, in accordance with Regulation (EU) No 833/2014 ⁽⁵⁾, aircraft registered in Russia or operated by Russian operators are not allowed to fly into the European Union, with limited exceptions; recalls that although no EU airlines currently fly to, from or over the airspace of the Russian Federation, following the downing of Malaysia Airlines Flight 17, a number of carriers from non-EU countries continue to do so despite the war-related risks, and despite paying overflight fees to Russia; stresses that such overflight fees result in an estimated EUR 18 million being paid to Russia yearly from Chinese-operated flights departing from Schiphol Airport alone; recalls that air transport between the EU and China is currently governed by bilateral agreements between the Member States and China; calls on the Commission and the Member States, in the light of the full-scale war of aggression in Ukraine, to re-examine the bilateral agreements and propose measures to stop Russia from benefitting from overflight fees;
27. Emphasises the need for stronger civil-military airspace coordination; stresses, in this context, the need for a holistic approach that also focuses on better equipping police forces and civilian authorities with the means to detect and defend against drones; supports the expansion of joint simulation and interception exercises involving civilian, law enforcement and military organisations to enhance preparedness for multi-domain threats; underlines that such exercises should be conducted regularly to ensure sustained readiness and interoperability;
28. Calls on the Commission and the Member States to jointly develop secure, reliable and resilient systems of communication and information sharing to be used by law enforcement, security agencies and civilian institutions for matters of security, in particular in times of crisis; reiterates the importance of enhancing cybersecurity and strategic communication on risks and protection measures for strengthening collective resilience;
29. Calls on the Member States to activate Article 42(7) TEU where such gross aggressive actions amount to an armed attack or contribute to preparing an imminent attack; urges the EU and its Member States to set out operational procedures and mechanisms for the event that a Member State triggers Article 42(7) TEU;
30. Calls for the EU's eastern border to be reinforced, in the light of the continuous pressure exerted by Russia and Belarus on the EU's external borders through instrumentalised migration, in order to provide swift and flexible support to Member States by addressing any technological and operational gaps when they arise, whether in the air, on land or in water;
31. Calls for defence cooperation with Ukraine to be substantially stepped up, in particular regarding both drone technology and countermeasures, including enhancing industrial cooperation between Member States and Ukraine; calls on the Commission and the Member States and their defence industries to consider supporting, investing in and partnering with the Ukrainian defence industry to make use of the full potential of production capacities in Ukraine, in line with the 'Danish model'; urges the Member States and their defence industries to set up joint ventures and develop partnerships with Ukraine for the joint development of defence products in the EU, particularly in the areas of drones, counter-drone technologies and long-range strike capabilities;

⁽⁵⁾ Council Regulation (EU) No 833/2014 of 31 July 2014 concerning restrictive measures in view of Russia's actions destabilising the situation in Ukraine (OJ L 229, 31.7.2014, p. 1, ELI: <http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2014/833/oj>).

32. Welcomes the announcement by Ukraine's President Volodymyr Zelenskyy that Ukraine will begin foreign production and exporting of proprietary defence technologies to preferred European and NATO partners; acknowledges the significant knowledge and experience that Ukraine has developed in the production of drones and counter-drone technologies and expects the EU and its Member States to learn from this expertise and knowledge, noting the potential contribution of Ukraine's military and industrial know-how accumulated during Russia's invasion; calls on the Commission, together with the EDA, to coordinate the purchase of UAV licenses from Ukraine, to enable willing Member States to produce the UAVs; calls on the Member States to formalise cooperation and set up structures to facilitate the exchange of lessons learned, technical knowledge and best practice, including in the framework of the EU and NATO; calls for EU-NATO cooperation in institutionalising the lessons learned from Ukraine's battlefield experience by integrating the doctrinal and technological innovations in their preparations for modern combat conditions;
 33. Calls for the EDIP legislation to be finalised swiftly and for it to be used, alongside the SAFE instrument, to commit financial resources to learning from Ukraine and to supporting Ukraine in UAV warfare; recognises the ongoing role the Drone Coalition plays in the standardisation of UAVs, its critical aid to Ukraine and its role in ensuring that Member States keep pace with fast-changing requirements on the battlefield;
 34. Reiterates that the recent aggressive actions by Russia must not, and will not, deter the EU and its Member States from their enduring commitment to supporting Ukraine in the exercise of its inherent right to self-defence, recalling that Ukraine's security contributes to that of Europe as a whole; emphasises that assisting Ukraine in strengthening its air defence capabilities is crucial, as engagement in Ukrainian skies reduces the risk of drones reaching EU territory; believes that the outcome of the war and the stance taken by the international community will play a crucial role in influencing future aggressive action by Russia in Europe and beyond; urges all Member States to immediately provide additional military assistance and to engage in joint procurement of additional capabilities for Ukraine, in particular ammunition for air defence; calls for the lifting of restrictions on the use of Western weapons systems delivered to Ukraine against military targets on Russian territory, as these are used for launching attacks on Ukraine's population and critical civilian infrastructure;
 35. Reiterates its call on the Member States, together with their G7 partners, to immediately endorse the Commission proposal to use all frozen Russian assets as a foundation for a substantial grant and loan to Ukraine, with reimbursement contingent on the future payment of war reparations by Russia, as a legally sound and financially significant way to maintain and increase EU support for Ukraine's military needs, including counter-drone defence;
 36. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, the Secretary General of NATO, and the President and Parliament of Ukraine.
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