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EU-Japan relations

European Parliament resolution of 13 December 2023 on EU-Japan relations (2023/2107(INI))

(C/2024/4167)

The European Parliament,

— having regard to joint statement adopted at the 29th EU-Japan summit held on 13 July 2023 in Brussels,

— having regard to the 41st EU-Japan Inter-Parliamentary Meeting held on 12 and 13 July 2023 in Strasbourg,

— having regard to the 19th Japan-EU High Level Dialogue on Environment held on 23 January 2023,

— having regard to the Strategic Partnership Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and Japan, of the other part ([1]),

— having regard to the Agreement between the European Union and Japan for an Economic Partnership ([2]) in force since February 2019,

— having regard to the document entitled 'Towards a Green Alliance to protect our environment, stop climate change and achieve green growth' adopted at the EU-Japan Summit of 27 May 2021,

— having regard to the Strategic Compass for Security and Defence approved by the Council on 21 March 2022,

— having regard to the Japan-EU Digital Partnership Agreement that was launched at the EU-Japan summit held in Tokyo on 12 May 2022,

— having regard to the NATO 2022 Strategic Concept, adopted at the Madrid Summit, on 29 and 30 June 2022,

— having regard to the strategy document entitled 'Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe – A Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign and Security Policy' of June 2016,

— having regard to the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 16 September 2021 entitled 'The EU strategy for cooperation in the Indo-Pacific' (JOIN (2021)0024) and to the Indo-Pacific strategies adopted by several EU Member States,

— having regard to the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 1 December 2021 entitled 'The Global Gateway' (JOIN(2021)0030),

— having regard to the Partnership on Sustainable Connectivity and Quality Infrastructure between the European Union and Japan signed in Brussels on 27 September 2019 during the first Europa Connectivity Forum,

— having regard to the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 20 June 2023 entitled 'On "European Economic Security Strategy"' (JOIN(2023)0020),

— having regard to the EU Global Health Strategy, adopted on 30 November 2022,

([1]) OJ L 216, 24.8.2018, p. 4.
([2]) OJ L 330, 27.12.2018, p. 3.

— having regard to the EU-Japan Memorandum of Cooperation on semiconductors and to the Memorandum of Cooperation to support secure and resilient submarine cable connectivity for secure, resilient and sustainable global connectivity signed on 3 July 2023 in Tokyo at the first Japan-EU Digital Partnership Council meeting,

— having regard to the EU-Japan Administrative Arrangement on Cooperation in Critical Raw Materials Supply Chains agreed on 6 July 2023,

— having regard to the Memorandum of Cooperation on Hydrogen signed by the Commission and Japan on 2 December 2022,

— having regard to the fifth meeting of the Japan-EU Space Policy Dialogue, held in Brussels 17 January 2023, and the signing of the Copernicus Cooperation Arrangement,

— having regard to the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 10 March 2023 on the update of the EU Maritime Security Strategy and its Action Plan 'An enhanced EU Maritime Security Strategy for evolving maritime threats' (JOIN(2023)0008),

— having regard to Council Decision (EU) 2023/362 of 14 February 2023 on the signing, on behalf of the Union, of the Agreement between the European Union and Japan on certain provisions of agreements between Member States of the European Union and Japan for air services ([3]),

— having regard to the Administrative Arrangement between EUNAVFOR ATALANTA and Japan's Defence Deployment Surface Force for Counter-Piracy Enforcement signed on 15 March 2023,

— having regard to the Research Framework Arrangement for cooperation on foresight between the Joint Research Centre (JRC) and the National Institute of Science and Technology Policy (NISTEP) signed on 13 July 2023,

— having regard to the Digital Trade Principles adopted at the third High-Level Economic Dialogue between the EU and Japan held on 27 June 2023,

— having regard to Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2023/1453 of 13 July 2023 repealing Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/1533 imposing special conditions governing the import of feed and food originating in or dispatched from Japan following the accident at the Fukushima nuclear power station ([4]),

— having regard to the Co-Chairs' press release of the EU Indo-Pacific Ministerial Forum held in Stockholm on 13 May 2023,

— having regard to Japan's new plan for a free and open Indo-Pacific ('The Future of the Indo-Pacific') announced in March 2023,

— having regard to Japan's security strategies updated in December 2022 (National Security Strategy, National Defence Strategy, Defence Build-up Programme),

— having regard to Japan's Global Health Strategy, launched in May 2022,

— having regard to the Hiroshima for Global Peace Plan,

— having regard to the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (AOIP), released at the 34th ASEAN Summit, held in June 2019,

— having regard to the G20 Principles for Quality Infrastructure Investment,

— having regard to the G20 Operational Guidelines for Sustainable Financing,

— having regard to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions,

([3]) OJ L 50, 17.2.2023, p. 1.
([4]) OJ L 179, 14.7.2023, p. 90.

— having regard to the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises on Responsible Business Conduct,

— having regard to the G7 Hiroshima Leaders' Communiqué of 20 May 2023, including the Leaders' statements on Ukraine, Vision on Nuclear Disarmament, Economic Resilience and Economic Security, Clean Energy Economy Action Plan, and Action Statement for Resilient Global Food Security,

— having regard to the G7 Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment,

— having regard to the Communiqué adopted by the health ministers of the G7 summit in Nagasaki, adopted on 14 May 2023,

— having regard to the joint statement on a new era of trilateral partnership of 18 August 2023 agreed by Japan, the Republic of Korea and the United States at the trilateral leaders' summit held at Camp David,

— having regard to the report of 25 November 2020 entitled 'NATO 2030: United for a New Era' by the Reflection Group appointed by the Secretary General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO),

— having regard to the Charter of the United Nations,

— having regard to the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) concluded on 10 December 1982 and in force since 16 November 1994,

— having regard to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,

— having regard to the Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework (GBF), adopted by the 15th Conference of Parties (COP15) to the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) on 19 December 2022,

— having regard to the UN General Assembly resolution on aggression against Ukraine adopted on 2 March 2022,

— having regard to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and to the Paris Agreement, which entered into force on 4 November 2016,

— having regard to its resolution of 17 April 2014 containing the European Parliament's recommendation to the Council, the Commission and the European External Action Service on the negotiations of the EU-Japan Strategic Partnership agreement ([5]) (SPA),

— having regard to its resolution of 13 December 2018 on the adequacy of the protection of personal data afforded by Japan ([6]),

— having regard to its resolution of 8 July 2020 on the international and domestic parental abduction of EU children in Japan ([7]),

— having regard to having regard to its resolution of 26 November 2020 on the EU Trade Policy Review ([8]),

— having regard to having regard to its resolution of 21 January 2021 on connectivity and EU-Asia relations ([9]),

— having regard to its resolution of 7 June 2022 on the EU and the security challenges in the Indo-Pacific ([10]),

— having regard to having regard to its resolution of 18 January 2023 on the implementation of the common foreign and security policy – annual report 2022 ([11]),

([5]) OJ C 443, 22.12.2017, p. 49.
([6]) OJ C 388, 13.11.2020, p. 150.
([7]) OJ C 371, 15.9.2021, p. 2.
([8]) OJ C 425, 20.10.2021, p. 155.
([9]) OJ C 456, 10.11.2021, p. 117.
([10]) OJ C 493, 27.12.2022, p. 32.
([11]) OJ C 214, 16.6.2023, p. 26.

— having regard to Rule 54 of its Rules of Procedure,

— having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (A9-0373/2023),

A. whereas the EU and Japan will celebrate 50 years of diplomatic relations in 2024; whereas their representatives have met at the highest level in 29 summits over the decades;

B. whereas Japan is the EU's closest strategic partner in the Indo-Pacific region; whereas both sides share a very broad range of values and goals; whereas global challenges and, in particular, growing tensions in the Indo-Pacific region require an ever closer partnership between the EU and Japan; whereas the EU and Japan seek common approaches at bilateral level and in multilateral forums such as the G7, G20, the UN, the World Trade Organization (WTO), the World Health Organization and the OECD, as well as an alignment as like-minded donors;

C. whereas the EU and Japan have committed to working together and with a wide range of like-minded partners to promote peace, security, the rule of law, environmental and climate responsibility, economic resilience, democratic values and human rights, and to promote the international rules-based order and multilateralism, including freedom of navigation, in an increasingly complex global and regional security landscape; whereas the EU and Japan strive to share responsibility in international relations to foster fair and sustainable development and prosperity, address humanitarian needs, achieve human-centric digitalisation and technology development, tackle the climate and biodiversity crises and enhance health security;

D. whereas the Russian war against Ukraine has demonstrated the need for improving alliances in the Indo-Pacific area and to work more closely with like-minded partners around the world;

E. whereas Japan is an important actor in several forums and dialogue platforms in the Indo-Pacific such as, for example, the East-Asia Summit and the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD);

F. whereas the EU is the leading development cooperation partner, one of the biggest trading partners and the top investor in the Indo-Pacific region; whereas the security of Europe and that of the Indo-Pacific region are closely interlinked;

G. whereas it is of paramount importance for the EU to cooperate with Japan given the Indo-Pacific's growing economic, demographic, and political weight and its geopolitically and geo-economically strategic position; whereas both the EU and Japan are confronted with similar socio-economic challenges; whereas the EU and some of its Member States have been addressing Indo-Pacific issues through their Indo-Pacific strategies; whereas Japan was one of the first countries to adopt an economic security strategy and the Commission published its communication on the European Economic Security Strategy on 20 June 2023;

H. whereas the EU and Japan seek peace and stability throughout the Indo-Pacific, as this is inextricably linked to the peace and stability of the European continent; whereas a free and open Indo-Pacific is therefore a core interest pursued both by Japan and the EU, in particular by promoting a rules-based international order in which all countries adhere to international law and the principle of the peaceful settlement of conflicts; whereas Japan is an important defender of the rules-based international order in the region; whereas both sides oppose any unilateral attempts to change the status quo by force or coercion in the Taiwan Strait and have reaffirmed repeatedly that the acquisition of territory by force is prohibited; whereas both sides believe that conflicts in the South China Sea and the East China Sea should be resolved peacefully on the basis of international law, including UNCLOS, and without any party resorting to coercion against other claimants; whereas UNCLOS sets out the legal framework within which all activities in the oceans and seas must be carried out;

I. whereas Japan adopted new national security and defence strategies in December 2022; whereas, on 19 April 2021, the Council adopted the EU strategy for cooperation in the Indo-Pacific;

J. whereas the EU and Japan hold regular consultations and dialogues on security- and defence-related issues, including on cybersecurity, disinformation and space, while also cooperating on nuclear non-proliferation, nuclear disarmament and crisis management; whereas the EU and Japan have recently launched a strategic dialogue at foreign ministerial level;

K. whereas Japan is a partner of NATO in defending global norms and rules; whereas the NATO-Japan partnership has been further enhanced with the Individually Tailored Partnership Programme for 2023-2026;

L. whereas EUNAVFOR ATALANTA and Japan's Defence Force are cooperating successfully and conduct join naval exercises in the Gulf of Aden and the Arabian Sea; whereas the EU and Japan are exploring cooperation to provide training and capacity building in the areas of maritime security and peacekeeping for partners in Southeast Asia and in Africa, including through the EU's Critical Maritime Routes in the Indian Ocean (CRIMARIO) project;

M. whereas Japan and the EU have jointly condemned the continued defiance of the relevant UN Security Council resolutions on North Korea; whereas the EU has expressed its solidarity with Japan against North Korean provocations;

N. whereas the EU and Japan have both demonstrated reliable support for Ukraine and their condemnation of Russia's brutal, unprovoked and illegal war of aggression; whereas the EU and Japan have committed to maintaining pressure on Russia, including through restrictive measures and to prevent the circumvention of the restrictive measures;

O. whereas China's military build-up, military activities and increasingly assertive foreign policy are causing tensions in the Indo-Pacific region;

P. whereas both the EU and Japan have been confronted with foreign influence operations and disinformation campaigns from authoritarian actors;

Q. whereas the EU and Japan have both committed to climate neutrality by 2050; whereas Japan is a crucial partner for the EU in implementing the Paris Agreement; whereas addressing the dual climate and biodiversity crises necessitates adequate contributions from the EU and Japan to climate finance, including in particular the loss and damage fund;

R. whereas Japan's Prime Minister Shinzo Abe was a special guest at the EU Connectivity Forum in Brussels in September 2019, at which the EU and Japan concluded a Partnership on Sustainable Connectivity and Quality Infrastructure; whereas this partnership was the first of its kind; whereas the EU and Japan have committed to supporting secure and sustainable, trusted connectivity in the context of the Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment; whereas trans-Oceanic submarine cables, including along the Arctic Route, and energy transformation projects as well as investment in resilient supply chains are of particular priority;

S. whereas the digital transformation and global competition for technology have important economic and security dimensions; whereas the EU and Japan have shared interests in cooperation on international standard setting, artificial intelligence (AI), network infrastructure, quantum computing and innovative technologies;

T. whereas a new partnership agreement between the EU and African, Caribbean and Pacific states will enter into force in the near future; whereas this opens up opportunities for closer cooperation between the EU and Japan in their respective engagement with countries in the Indo-Pacific;

U. whereas the International Maritime Organization sets global regulatory standards for the safety, security and environmental performance of international shipping;

V. whereas the EU and Japan are leading donors of global development assistance; whereas the European Investment Bank and the Japan International Cooperation Agency have signed agreements, including on transport, infrastructure investments, microfinance and renewable energy sources;

W. whereas cooperation on scientific, societal, cultural and political issues and the mutual exchange of experience can strengthen the partnership and deliver for citizens on both sides; whereas parliamentary diplomacy and party-to-party relations can play a constructive role in this context;

X. whereas the Japan-EU Digital Partnership was launched at the EU-Japan summit held in Tokyo on 12 May 2022;

Y. whereas the second EU Indo-Pacific Ministerial Forum was held in Stockholm on 13 May 2023;

Z. whereas the 49th G7 summit was held in Hiroshima from 19 to 21 May 2023;

AA. whereas Japan has yet to abolish the death penalty and continues to enforce it;

AB. whereas Japan is not ranked very high in international comparisons of gender parity;

AC. whereas on 19 July 2022, Japan ratified Convention No 105 of the International Labour Organization (ILO) on the abolition of forced labour;

1. Highlights that the EU-Japan relationship is one of exceptionally like-minded partners, built on a solid basis of shared values, democracy, free trade, common goals and mutually compatible interests, making Japan one of the EU's most important and trusted partners globally; strongly emphasises the EU's interest in deepening and broadening this partnership bilaterally and also in plurilateral and multilateral contexts; advocates for a Team Europe approach to the relationship; points out that the EU and Japan together account for almost 25 % of global GDP, the partnership can and should play an important role in helping to shape a peaceful, rules-based, inclusive, just, sustainable and prosperous international order;

2. Acknowledges the fundamental role of the EU-Japan economic partnership agreement and the EU-Japan SPA in the relationship at a time of geopolitical upheaval; encourages both sides to demonstrate the required political will to ratify the SPA, in particular the remaining EU Member States that have not yet done so; calls for the full implementation of both agreements; welcomes the development of an increasingly dense network of bilateral dialogues, consultations, memoranda and agreements with the annual EU-Japan Summit at the centre; welcomes also ever closer relations between Japan and individual EU Member States; underlines the significance of the multilateral trade-policy network and applauds Japan for its leading role in the conclusion of the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) and recommends that the EU seek close cooperation and, where possible, integration therein;

3. Applauds the diplomatic success of the work of the Japanese G7 presidency in 2023; calls on the Commission to focus on the deliverables identified in the G7 Hiroshima Leaders' Communiqué, and welcomes the overall excellent cooperation in the G7, including among other areas, on economic resilience and economic security; points out that the EU, including its agencies and financial institutions, also needs to cooperate very closely with Japan in the G20, the WTO, the UN and its specialised agencies, the UNFCCC, international standardisation organisations and financial institutions and other international formats in the pursuit of peace, maritime security, non-proliferation and the resilience to hybrid threats, as well as of human rights, prosperity, the rule of law and the implementation of the UN Sustainable Development Goals; welcomes the fact that Japan joined the Multi-Party Interim Appeal Arbitration Arrangement (MPIA) in 2023, and expresses its expectation that Japan will work constructively towards a meaningful reform of the WTO and, in that context, its dispute settlement system; calls for the establishment of a regular parliamentary consultation process ahead of multilateral events;

4. Observes with interest Japan's efforts to promote a reliable regional stability architecture guided by the concept of a free and open Indo-Pacific, for instance through its participation in the QUAD, its engagement with Pacific island states or the recent Camp David Agreement with the Republic of Korea and the US; welcomes the important steps taken by the Japanese Government and the Republic of Korea to build a future-oriented relationship, as both countries are critically important like-minded strategic partners of the EU; recognises Japan's grave concerns about the threat posed by North Korea's unlawful ballistic missile programmes and increasing belligerence; supports Japan's well-justified demands in that context, including on the abduction issue, and proposes that the EU Member States should consider a more coordinated approach in the so-called Enforcement Coordination Cell, situated in Yokosuka, Japan; intends to continuously cooperate with Japan in order to oppose China's overly assertive policies towards its neighbours; shares Japan's position that Taiwan is an important partner and a precious friend; reaffirms that peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait is an indispensable element of security and prosperity for the international community; emphasises that a change of the status quo in the Taiwan Strait must only take place by peaceful means and with mutual consent; reiterates its full support for the unity and centrality of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and for the mainstreaming of ASEAN's outlook on the Indo-Pacific (AOIP); underlines the importance of a free and open Indo-Pacific, which is also inclusive, prosperous and secure, as stated in the joint statement of the EU-Japan Summit on 13 July 2023; fully shares, in this context, Japan's high regard for ASEAN and Japan's support in building maritime capacity for neighbouring countries; stresses that the EU needs to build its naval presence and extend joint exercises and port calls to include Japan, in line with the EU strategy for cooperation in the Indo-Pacific and the EU's Strategic Compass; welcomes the fact that some new vice-ministerial formats in the region also include the EU; welcomes Japan's role in Arctic regional cooperation and advocates strong EU-Japan collaboration on Arctic research;

5. Strongly appreciates Japan's robust and unwavering support, including USD 7.6 billion of financial assistance and grant aid for Ukraine in support of its self-defence against Russia's war of aggression, especially through the delivery of transport vehicles, bulletproof vests and mine-clearing equipment; welcomes the fact that on 7 October 2023 the first round of negotiations between Japan and Ukraine on a bilateral agreement on security guarantees began, as provided for in the Joint Declaration of Support for Ukraine; welcomes the fact that Japan has adopted a wide range of sanctions against Russia, including export controls on sensitive technologies, and supports further alignment with EU restrictive measures; agrees with Japan that it is crucially important to promote the alignment of all international actors that support the UN

principles of national sovereignty and territorial integrity in order to facilitate peaceful conflict resolution and to avoid any unilateral attempts to change the status quo by force or coercion; expresses concern that the balance of naval power and the strategic calculus can be adversely affected by Moscow and Beijing teaming up in their territorial disputes with Japan and Southeast Asian countries; expresses the EU's clear commitment to supporting efforts to uphold peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific, particularly in the South China Sea, the East China Sea and the Taiwan Strait, and to promoting a Free and Open Indo-Pacific, and supports ASEAN's AOIP;

6. Calls, as a matter of urgency, for strengthened cooperation with Japan in developing more balanced relations with countries from the Global South; emphasises the importance of implementing necessary climate change policy financing, sustainable and free trade and a fair international energy transition; emphasises the importance of the Global Gateway Initiative and the significance of cooperating with Japan to make sure that the Global Gateway is well coordinated with the G7 Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment; believes that coordinated actions in strategic investments are of high geopolitical importance, through the mobilisation of public and private funds; welcomes the first EU-Japan connectivity projects and the Far North Fiber Project;

7. Takes note of the shift in Japan's national security strategy, including a budget increase to 2 % of GDP; underlines the importance of being vigilant, while at the same time promoting peace and stability and contributing to the de-escalation of tensions; welcomes at the same time all Japanese efforts to stabilise diplomatic relations with China in order to reduce friction; highlights that both the EU and Japan's enhanced defence policy frameworks provide new opportunities for cooperation, including on securing sea lines of communication, combating piracy and terrorism, and upholding freedom of navigation in the region; welcomes Japan's participation in the EUNAVFOR ATALANTA operation military exercise and calls for the finalisation of an ongoing agreement on communication with it; continues to support Japan's engagement for non-proliferation and for a world without nuclear weapons; calls for a comprehensive security partnership between the EU and Japan as the basis for enhanced consultations, common exercises, shared defence research and development and work on joint contingency planning for dangerous crises; welcomes Member States' 2+2 dialogue formats with Japan; welcomes NATO's Individual Tailored Partnership Programme with Japan, but regrets the fact that the opening of a NATO liaison office in Japan has been delayed; proposes the creation of an EU/NATO/AP4 (Japan/Korea/Australia/New Zealand) security dialogue format; encourages the European External Action Service to post a military attaché in Tokyo; supports Japan's participation in EU CSDP operations and would welcome the negotiation of an EU-Japan Framework Participation Agreement; is critical of the fact that the Enhancing Security Cooperation In and With Asia (ESIWA) project is not very substantive; calls for enhanced maritime awareness cooperation on the basis of the CRIMARIO initiative; insists on pursuing the goal of extending the EU's coordinated maritime presence in the North-Western Indian Ocean also to the Pacific; welcomes European participation, through ships and surveillance aircraft from France, the UK and Germany, in the monitoring of UN Security Council sanctions; insists on including non-conventional security issues such as disinformation, cyber, including in particular state-sponsored cyberattacks, space and climate change; calls for closer cooperation and exchange of best practices on monitoring and countering foreign information manipulation and interference, as well as strategic foresight capabilities;

8. Shares the Japanese emphasis on economic security and resilience and welcomes its support for the de-risking paradigm; takes note, in this context, of the G7 Coordination Platform on Economic Coercion; proposes an economic security dialogue in the context of the EU-Japan High Level Economic Dialogue (HLED); points out the huge relevance of international cooperation on the governance and standardisation of digital services and trade in digital goods, including binding international rules, in particular with a view to data security, and in order to create fair competitive opportunities; welcomes, in this context, the EU-Japan Digital Partnership; welcomes the negotiations on data flows under the economic partnership agreement, provided that the 2018 horizontal provisions on cross-border data flows and personal data protection are integrated into the text; remains confident that the reciprocal adequacy under data protection laws is maintained; values the G7 Framework for Collaboration on Digital Technology Standardisation, cooperation with Japan Organization for Metals and Energy Security (JOGMEC) on critical raw materials, the Industrial Policy Dialogue and the Hiroshima AI Process for responsible AI; supports Japan's intention to make democracy more resilient while pushing back manipulative attempts, including hybrid threats, to undermine confidence in democratic institutions; welcomes, in this context, the commitment to the G7 Rapid Response Mechanism as part of a collective effort to strengthen democracy worldwide; supports the resumption of the Trilateral Cooperation for a Global Level Playing Field between the EU, Japan and the US to address subsidies and unfair market conditions, and to include other partners; regrets Japan's reluctance to participate in Horizon Europe; objects to any exclusion of Japan from Horizon Europe, and supports the Council and the Commission in promoting Japan's participation; believes that Japan joining Horizon Europe would be mutually beneficial; emphasises that it is of mutual interest to strengthen cooperation and increase the financing of science, research and

innovation; seeks to further boost strategic cooperation on secure digital connectivity, new technologies and common approaches to digital development on both a bilateral and a multilateral level; stresses the importance of international standard setting based on open and values-driven norms use of technology; seeks a more common approach to technology transfers; wishes to explore closer cooperation on cybersecurity through joint training and information sharing; stresses the strategic importance of submarine telecommunications cables; believes that the Copernicus Cooperation Arrangement, providing free and open access to data from Earth observation satellites and exchanging good practices, is a good example of civilian space cooperation which will benefit the long-term management of natural resources and climate adaptation; notes that cooperation on satellite information and space could be further explored to increase maritime surveillance and information sharing;

9. Regrets the fact that the EU-Japan Green Alliance of 2021 still remains a largely unfulfilled promise; notes that Japan has expressed its continued commitment to enhance mutual environmental ambition at national and multilateral levels in line with the EU-Japan Green Alliance; would welcome a more active role in this regard from the EU-Japan Centre for Industrial Cooperation and the EU-Japan Business Round Table, particularly on recycling; calls for the acceleration of EU-Japan energy cooperation, particularly in the areas of liquefied natural gas, electricity market reform and innovative renewable energy technologies; stresses the need to enhance the EU-Japan dialogue towards energy security, advocating a green transition and reducing dependence on totalitarian regimes for basic supply chains; notes that Japan has committed to releasing Advance Liquid Processing System-treated water from Fukushima only on the basis of scientific standards, transparency and independent supervision; calls for the EU and Japan to support independent international long-term monitoring of the release; hopes for a more proactive Japanese role on loss and damage, as well as climate finance, at the 28th meeting of the Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC (COP28); in this regard, points to the implementation of the Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework, as climate and biodiversity protection are intrinsically linked; recalls the need to cooperate on making progress in the fight against illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing, strengthening global ocean governance and the sustainable use of ocean's resources;

10. Emphasises the importance of bilateral cooperation and people-to-people contacts for sharing best practices on issues such as gender equality and economic opportunities for women, health policy, food security, an ageing society, new cultural developments such as digital culture or green culture, local self-governance, civil society organisation or labour practises; values parliamentary and party-to-party exchanges and advocates the invitation of a high-ranking delegation of the Japanese Parliament to Brussels in 2024 in celebration of the 50th anniversary of EU-Japan diplomatic relations and the fifth anniversary of the EU-Japan Connectivity Agreement; emphasises the human rights dialogue, where the EU and Japan can discuss, for example, the death penalty, which still exists in Japan and which the EU opposes fundamentally, and other human rights issues of mutual interest; values mutual exchange about efforts to eliminate discrimination against Sinti, Buraku or other minorities; calls on the Commission to fund more Japan-related research to foster European Japan competency; proposes the creation of an EU-Japan young leaders forum on global partnership in the pursuit of the Sustainable Development Goals; reiterates its concerns about parental child abduction; welcomes the Japanese Government's Guidelines on Respecting Human Rights in Responsible Supply Chains of 2022; welcomes, in this context, Japan's ratification of ILO Convention No 105 on Forced Labour in 2022; hopes that Japan will ratify major missing conventions and that it can adopt legislation equivalent to the EU's proposed corporate sustainability due diligence directive in 2024; welcomes the communiqué that was adopted by the G7 health ministers on 13 and 14 May 2023 in Nagasaki; underlines that the document recognises the need for research into long COVID and calls for the EU and for Japan to recognise post-acute infection syndromes such as long COVID, post-vac syndrome and myalgic encephalomyelitis/chronic fatigue syndrome as public health crises and to collaborate on research into diagnostics and treatment;

11. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the EU Member States' parliaments, the Government of Japan, the Japanese Parliament and to all organisations and institutions mentioned in this text.