Co-President Milupi announced the replacement of Co-President Michel by Mr Arif.

1. Approval of the minutes of Wednesday, 31 March 2010, morning and afternoon

The minutes were approved.

2. Summary reports from the workshops and Debate on Migration

The following reports from the workshops were presented:

— Mr Jo Leinen on renewable energy and water supply

— Mr Glen Benedict Noel (Grenada) on sustainable tourism

— Ms Mariya Nedelcheva on migration in the region

The presentation of this workshop was followed by a catch-the-eye debate.

Speakers: Gahler, Mato Adrover, Ponga, Assarid Imbarcaouane (Mali), Guerrero Salom, William (Seychelles), Jensen, Hamatoukour (Cameroon), Zimmer and Ould Guelaye (Mauritania).

The rapporteur wound up the debate.

3. Vote on the motions for resolutions included in the reports submitted by the standing committees

The Co-President reminded the Assembly of the voting procedures.

— Financial and economic impact of climate change in ACP countries

Report by Mr Buti Manamela (South Africa) and Frank Engel

Committee on Economic Development, Finance and Trade (ACP-EU/100.642)

A split vote on Recital A was requested by the EPP and the ALDE groups and the recital was adopted.

An oral amendment was presented by Mr Manamela (South Africa) to Amendment 1 and the amendment was adopted.

A separate vote on Articles 10, 13 and 16 was requested and were all rejected.

The amended resolution was adopted.

— Social impact of the global crisis

Report by Mr Hlophe (Swaziland) and Mr López Aguilar

Committee on Social Affairs and the Environment (ACP-EU/100.640)

A split vote on paragraph 6 was requested by the S&D group and the paragraph was adopted.

An oral amendment was presented by Mr Schnellhardt to add a new paragraph 19a and was rejected.

The amended resolution was adopted.

4. Vote on the urgent motions for resolution

— Urgent motion for a resolution on post-disaster reconstruction and rehabilitation in Haiti, and the link between poverty and natural disasters (ACP-EU/100.726/comp)

Three oral amendments were presented by Mr Assarid Imbarcaouane (Mali) to indent 4, paragraph 2b and paragraph 2c respectively and were adopted.

The amended resolution was adopted unanimously.

— Urgent motion for a resolution on supporting the consolidation of peace in Southern Sudan (ACP-EU/100.725)
An oral amendment was presented by Mr Mugambe (Uganda) to Recital B and was adopted.

An oral amendment was presented by Mr Gahler to Recital E and was adopted.

The amended resolution was adopted unanimously.

5. Vote on the draft conclusions on the Regional Strategy Papers

— The conclusions on the Regional Strategy Papers were adopted by acclamation.

6. Declaration

— The declaration on the EU-Latin American Bananas Agreement and its impact on ACP and EU banana producers was adopted by acclamation.

7. Any other business

Mr William (Seychelles) spoke of the forthcoming 5th Regional Meeting in the Seychelles in July 2010.

Ms Malahoo Forte (Jamaica) spoke on the organisation of the Assembly. Co-President Milupi, acting Co-President Arif and Mr Assarid Imbarcaouane (Mali), responded.

8. Date and place of the 20th Session of the ACP-EU Joint Parliamentary Assembly

The 20th session of the JPA would be held from 2 to 5 December 2010 in Kinshasa (Democratic Republic of the Congo).

(The sitting closed at 10.45 a.m.)

Charles MILUPI and
Kader ARIF (acting)
Co-Presidents

Mohamed Ibn CHAMBAS and
Luis Marco AGUIRiano NALDA
Co-Secretaries-General
## ANNEX I

### ALPHABETICAL LIST OF MEMBERS OF THE JOINT PARLIAMENTARY ASSEMBLY

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>ACP Representatives</th>
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### COMMITTEE ON POLITICAL AFFAIRS

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### COMMITTEE ON ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, FINANCE AND TRADE

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ANNEX II

RECORD OF ATTENDANCE AT THE SESSION FROM 29 MARCH TO 1 APRIL IN TENERIFE (SPAIN)

MILUPI (Zambia), Co-President
PINTO (Angola)
BRATHWAITE (Barbados)
FERNANDEZ (Belize)
DAYORI (Benin)
MOTLHALE (Botswana) (VP)
TAPSOBA (Burkina Faso)
MANIRAKIZA (Burundi) (VP)
HAMATOUKOUR (Cameroon) (VP)
ALMADA (Cape Verde)
DARBO (Chad)
IBOVI (Congo, Republic of the) (VP)
KUTEKALA KAAWA (Congo, Democratic Republic of the)
AMON-AGO (Côte d'Ivoire)
SOUBANE (Djibouti)
JIMÉNEZ (Dominican Republic)
SERICHE DOUGAN (Equatorial Guinea)
NAIB (Eritrea)
TOGA (Ethiopia)
ROGOMBE (Gabon)
BALDEH (Gambia)
KUMI (Ghana) (*)
NOEL (Grenada)
RAMOTAR (Guyana) (VP)
BEAUPLAN (Haiti)
MALAHOO FORTE (Jamaica) )
KEMBI-GITURA (Kenya) (*)
TIHEL (Lesotho) (*) (VP)
KOLLIE (Liberia) (VP)
AIPIRA (Malawi)
ASSARID IMBARCAOUANE (Mali) (VP)
OULD GUELAYE (Mauritania)
DEERPALSING (Mauritius)
SITHOLE (Mozambique)
NAMBAHU (Namibia)
ABDULLAHI (Nigeria)

MICHEL, Co-President (  1 ) ( 2 ) ( 3)
ALFONSI
ARIF (VP) (  4 ) ( 5 ) ( 6 )
AYLWARD (for BEARDER)
BAUER
BULLMANN
CALLANAN
CARVALHO
CASTEX
CHRISTENSEN
CZARNECKI (for FORD)
DE SARNEZ (  1 ) ( 2 ) ( 3 )
DURANT
ENGE
ESTARAS FERRAGUT
GAHLER
GERINGER DE OEDENBERG (for MOREIRA)
GOEBBELS (for DE KEYSER)
GOMES (for FERREIRA, Elisa) (  1 ) ( 2 )
GUERRERO SALOM
GURMAI (for TOIA)
HALL (  1 ) ( 2 ) ( 3 )
HANDEL
HAUG
HIGGINS (for KUHN)
HOARAU (VP)
JENSEN
KACZMAREK
KOLLIE (Liberia) (VP)
KORHOLA
LEGUTKO
LEINEN (for ALVES)
LISEK (for DELVAUX)
LULLING (for STRIFFLER)
MANDERS
MARTIN
POLISI (Rwanda) (VP)
JEAN-MARIE (Saint Lucia)
STRAKER (Saint Vincent and the Grenadines) (VP)
PAPALIJI (Samoa)
SALL (Senegal)
WILLIAM (Seychelles)
BUNDU (Sierra Leone)
MA’AHANUA (Solomon Islands) (*)
AWALE (Somalia)
MANAMELA (South Africa)
TAHA (Sudan) (*)
Van GENDEREN (Suriname) (*)
HLOPHE (Swaziland)
MPOROGOMYI (Tanzania) (VP)
KLASSOU (Togo)
VAIPULU (Tonga)
NELESONE (Tuvalu) (VP)
MUGAMBE (Uganda)
TOSUL (Vanuatu)
MWANSA (Zambia)
HLONGWANE (Zambabwe)

MARTÍNEZ MARTÍNEZ
MATO ADROVER (2) (3) (4)
MITCHELL
NEDELCHEVA
NEUSER
NICHOLSON (VP)
OUZKÝ (VP) (1) (2) (3)
PONGA (for CASPARY)
PREDA (for COELHO)
RINALDI (for GOERENS) (2)
RIVASI (VP) (1) (2) (3)
ROITHOVÁ (VP)
RONZULLI (VP)
SARGENTINI (for SCHLYTER) (1) (2) (3)
SCHMIDT
SCHNELLHARDT
SCICLUNA
SENYSZYN
SPERONI
ŠŤASTNÝ (VP)
STURDY
TIROLIEN
WIELAND
WŁOSOWICZ (for HANNAN)
ZANICCHI
ZIMMER
ZWIEFKA (for CASA) (2) (3) (4)

OBSERVERS:

CUBA
MARICHAL

MADAGASCAR
NORBERT-RICHARD (*)

NIGER
GOUKOYE (*)

(*) Country represented by a person other than a Member of Parliament.
(1) Present on 29 March 2010.
(2) Present on 30 March 2010.
(3) Present on 31 March 2010.
(4) Present on 1 April 2010.
Also present:

ANGOLA
ALEXANDRE
KABANGU
MENDES DOS SANTOS
SIMBRÃO da CARVALHO

BURUNDI
BARADANDIKANYA
GAHIMBARE
HARUSHINGINGO
KAVURE
NIYONGERE

CONGO (Republic of the)
BALOU
BOUNKOULOU
MBOYI
MOKA

CONGO (Democratic Republic of the)
BETYNA NGILASE
KAMBAYI
MABAYA GIZI AMINE
NENGA GAMANDA

ETHIOPIA
ABERA
AHMEDIN
GEBRE-CHRISTOS

GHANA
KUMI

HAITI
JOAZILE

MAURITANIA
BILAL
KAMARA
OUED HAMOUL
OUED ZAMEL

MOZAMBIQUE
DOS SANTOS LUCAS

NIGERIA
BARAYA

SAMOA
CHAN TUNG

SENEGAL
DEMBA DIOP
EL WALY DIOP

SIERRA LEONE
BUYA
JUMU
TORTO

SOUTH AFRICA
DAVIDSON
SIBHIDLA
SOOKLAL

SWAZILAND
DLAMINI

UGANDA
DOMBO
KATENGA-APULI
OGWAL ATIM

ZIMBABWE
MLOTSHWA
MNKANDHLA

ACP-EU COUNCIL

BUNDUKU-LATHA, Minister Delegate to the Minister of Economy, Commerce, Industry and Tourism (Gabon), President-in-Office of the ACP Council

MORATINOS, Minister of Foreign Affairs (Spain), President-in-Office of the EU Council

LOSSADA, Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs, (Spain)

EUROPEAN COMMISSION

PIERALGGS, Member of the Commission with responsibility for development
AU
ANNADIF
BOKILO

ACP Committee of ambassadors
MAKONGO, Chair

EESC
JAHIER
DANTIN
BAIZOU
KING

UNISDR
WAHLSTRÖM, Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Disaster Risk Reduction – United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction Secretariat

COMESA
NKANAGU

CTA
BOTO
BURGUET

ACP SECRETARIAT
CHAMBAS Co-Secretary-General

EU SECRETARIAT
AGUIRIANO NALDA Co-Secretary-General
ANNEX III

ANNEX OF THE SITTING OF MONDAY, 29 MARCH 2010

Accreditation of non-parliamentarian delegates

1. GHANA
   H.E. Mrs Nana Bema KUMI
   Ambassador
   Embassy of Ghana, Brussels

2. KENYA
   H.E. Mr James KEMBI-GITURA
   Ambassador
   Embassy of Kenya, Brussels

3. LESOTHO
   H. E. Ms Mamoruti A. TIHELI
   Ambassador
   Embassy of Lesotho, Brussels

4. MADAGASCAR
   Mr Ibrahim NORBERT-RICHARD
   Chargé d’Affaires a.i.
   Embassy of Madagascar, Brussels

5. NIGER
   Colonel Abdoulkarim GOUKOYE
   Porte-parole du Conseil Suprême pour la restauration de la Démocratie
   Niger

6. SOLOMON ISLANDS
   H.E. Mr Joseph MA’AHANUA
   Ambassador, Brussels
   Embassy of the Solomon Islands, Brussels

7. SUDAN
   Ambassador Hamid TAHA
   Deputy Head of Mission
   Embassy of Sudan, Brussels

8. SURINAME
   Mr Olten Lionel Van GENDEREN
   Adviser,
   Embassy of Suriname, Brussels

9. TUVALU
   H.E. Mr Panapasi NELESONE
   Ambassador,
   Embassy of Tuvalu, Brussels
RESOLUTIONS ADOPTED

— on the financial and economic impact of climate change in ACP countries (ACP-EU/100.642/10/fi.n.) 20
— on the social impact of the global crisis (ACP-EU/100.640/10/fi.n.) 25
— on post-disaster reconstruction and rehabilitation in Haiti, and the link between poverty and natural disasters (ACP-EU/100.726/10/fi.n.) 31
— on supporting the consolidation of peace in Southern Sudan (ACP-EU 100.725/10/fi.n.) 34
— Declaration - The EU-Latin America bananas agreement and its impact on ACP and EU banana producers 38
— Regional Strategy Papers - conclusions
  — Conclusions on the Regional Strategy Paper (RSP) and Regional Indicative Programme (RIP) under the 10th EDF – Caribbean 41
  — Conclusions on the Regional Strategy Paper (RSP) and the Regional Indicative Programme (RIP) under the 10th EDF – Eastern and Southern Africa and Indian Ocean 45
  — Conclusions on the Regional Strategy Paper (RSP) and Regional Indicative Programme (RIP) under the 10th EDF – SADC 48
  — Conclusions on the Regional Strategy Paper (RSP) and Regional Indicative Programme (RIP) under the 10th EDF – Central Africa 51
  — Conclusions on the Regional Strategy Paper (RSP) and Regional Indicative Programme (RIP) under the 10th EDF – West Africa 53
  — Conclusions on the Regional Strategy Paper (RSP) and Regional Indicative Programme (RIP) under the 10th EDF – Pacific 55

RESOLUTION (1)

on the financial and economic impact of climate change in ACP countries

The ACP-EU Joint Parliamentary Assembly,

— meeting in Tenerife (Spain) from 29 March to 1 April 2010,
— having regard to Article 17(1) of its Rules of Procedure,
— having regard to the UN Millennium Declaration of 8 September 2000, which sets out the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) as criteria established jointly by the international community for the elimination of poverty,
— having regard to the Declaration on Integrating Climate Change Adaptation into Development Co-operation, adopted by the Development and Environment ministers of the OECD member countries on 4 April 2006,

(1) Adopted by the ACP-EU Joint Parliamentary Assembly on 1 April 2010 in Tenerife (Spain).
— having regard to the fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), released in Valencia (Spain) on 17 November 2007,

— having regard to its resolution on food security issues in ACP countries and the role of ACP-EU cooperation, adopted in Ljubljana on 20 March 2008 (1),

— having regard to its resolution on the social and environmental consequences of climate change in the ACP countries, adopted in Prague on 9 April 2009 (2),

— having regard to the resolutions adopted on 10 July 2009 at the G8 Summit and the Major Economies’ Forum on Climate and Energy held in L’Aquila in Italy,

— having regard to the World Bank’s World Development Report 2010: Development and Climate Change, released in Washington, USA, on 15 September 2009,

— having regard to its resolution on climate change, adopted in Luanda on 2 December 2009 (3),

— having regard to the conclusions of the European Council held on 10 and 11 December 2009,

— having regard to the outcome of the United Nations Conference on Climate Change held in Copenhagen from 7 to 18 December 2009,

— having regard to the report of the Committee on Economic Development, Finance and Trade (ACP-EU/100.642/10 /fin.),

A. whereas natural changes in the global climate have happened throughout history, but the rapidity and volume of both the global warming and the loss of biodiversity observed are such that their causal link to human activity can no longer be doubted,

B. whereas climate change constitutes a serious threat to poverty reduction, human rights, peace and security, the availability of water, energy and food resources and the achievement of the MDGs in many developing countries,

C. whereas the last century has witnessed an average increase in global surface temperature of 0.74 °C and the IPCC predicts that this will continue rising to between 1.1 °C and 6.4 °C, depending on the scenario,

D. whereas the human, social, financial and economic consequences of these changes will be felt in the achievement of the MDGs and in many sectors, including agricultural and livestock productivity, marine activities, tourist flows, physical infrastructure and health services; whereas they are likely to result in desertification and threaten the existence of many indigenous peoples, islands and forests that constitute tangible and intangible global heritage,

E. whereas ACP countries have least contributed to climate change but are facing its most severe consequences; whereas climate change has the potential to reduce or even annihilate global development trends by destroying productive potential across the developing world,

(3) OJ C 68, 18.3.2010, p. 36.
F. whereas the fragile public finances, high levels of public debt and heavy reliance on monocultures for export which characterise ACP countries render them vulnerable to exogenous shocks; whereas these countries' heavy reliance on primary sector production as a main source of national income leaves them most at risk from climatic changes,

G. whereas at the household level climate change will decrease individual financial, social and physical security, increasing poverty and vulnerability, especially among the most vulnerable groups; whereas, on a macro-economic level, climate change is likely to increase the need for public spending, while at the same time reducing the sources of government revenue,

H. whereas climate change can lead to increased scarcity of resources, such as habitable land, drinking water and arable land, triggering new conflicts, insecurity and migration flows, problems likely to further increase global instability,

I. whereas agricultural production, employing 70% of the population in the Least Developed Countries, is already threatened by rising temperatures and changing levels of precipitation which contribute to decreased and unpredictable yields; whereas, in addition, unsustainable farming practices further degrade lands in a potentially permanent manner,

J. whereas nearly all of the estimated one billion undernourished people in the world live in rural areas and are dependent on the availability of arable land and agricultural yields for their livelihoods, and hence for their survival,

K. whereas marine activities are undergoing changes owing to sea level rises and increases in ocean acidity which damage biodiversity, thus jeopardising the income of local fishermen, the revenue from coastal tourist industries and the scope of coastal countries' commercial portfolios; whereas industrial-scale tourism, when it is environmentally unsustainable, must be rethought,

L. whereas the impact of climate change on agriculture and marine activities poses a serious threat to food security,

M. whereas acute hazards believed to be linked to climate change are often unpredictable and devastating and they can wipe out primary sector production, physical infrastructure and tourist industries and cause widespread loss of life,

N. whereas Small Island Developing States are often hardest hit by acute hazards and also suffer the further geographical disadvantage of being low-lying, therefore in danger of gradual encroachment by the sea and ultimately of their complete submergence as sea levels rise,

O. whereas unstable climatic conditions will mean certain regions are designated as 'high risk' areas, thereby reducing their attractiveness for foreign direct investment,

P. whereas economic actors who vigorously pursue their own interests to the detriment of the global climate, local environments, habitats and social welfare are rarely held accountable for the damage they cause,
Q. whereas in a globalised world with global profits, corporate responsibility must also become global, as must the obligation to compensate for damages and losses,

1. Regrets the failure of the United Nations Conference on Climate Change held in Copenhagen from 7 to 18 December 2009, which, by not leading to a comprehensive legally binding international agreement, has demonstrated that while there is near unanimity on the types of challenges, there is much less agreement on the ways to meet them; takes note that the EU, during the negotiations in Copenhagen, did not withdraw its goals, and therefore calls on the EU to fully assume its responsibility, as a significant actor, in the ongoing efforts to reach a binding agreement during the conference to be held in Cancún from 29 November to 10 December 2010;

2. Recognises that substantial global efforts urgently need to be made, particularly in the most industrialised and developed countries, to limit global warming by implementing coordinated, convergent, ambitious and proactive mitigation and adaptation policies;

3. Notes that among the impacts of climate change on developing countries will be reductions in their productive potential, decreased exports and government revenues, rendering their economies more fragile; insists that support measures be implemented in favour of locally existing sustainable and productive agricultural practices, in order to enhance food security and avoid unnecessary erosion and depletion of soils;

4. Calls on the EU and ACP countries to invest in alternative clean energy sources and in technologies to improve energy efficiency in order to take full advantage of the beneficial effects their use may have on the employment market, energy security and biodiversity and consequently on food security; underlines in particular the need for widespread use of renewable energies, especially solar energy, and more water-efficient farming methods; also urges the Commission to support innovative solutions such as green belts around cities to meet the basic food requirements of urban populations in developing countries;

5. Calls on the EU and ACP countries to implement a vast joint public research programme with large-scale funding from the EU, involving innovative firms and specialist research centres, to develop powerful new technologies to exploit renewable energy sources, making the patents and processes available at no cost to entrepreneurs and state-owned companies in the EU and ACP countries;

6. Calls on the EU, as part of its development cooperation, and on the ACP countries to develop Technology Partnerships in order to facilitate the use of clean technologies in the ACP countries and to support, potentially through the establishment of an ACP-EU energy initiative, research and development of similar technologies in the ACP countries themselves; in a broader context, underlines the necessity to clarify and enhance property rights in ACP countries, in order to create additional development potential based on property and its use for production and as collateral;

7. Underlines the need for private economic actors from EU countries to behave in socially responsible ways whilst present in ACP countries, particularly concerning respect for the employment and remuneration rights of populations and the natural resources, environment, habitats, natural landscapes, fauna and flora of the countries in which they operate and on which local populations depend; emphasises in particular the need to improve the social responsibility of companies as regards the exploitation of natural resources;
8. Demands that funds for climate-related activities constitute money in addition to donors’ long-standing commitments on levels of official development assistance (ODA) and that clear records of funds allocated under these two separate channels be kept;

9. Welcomes the initiative by the Bolivian President Evo Morales Ayma of organising a World People’s Conference on Climate Change and the Rights of Mother Earth in Cochabamba (Bolivia) from 19 to 21 April 2010 as part of the international effort on the road from Copenhagen to Cancún;

10. Recalls that the international commitments made regarding the MDGs will be achievable only if the industrialised countries keep their commitment to contribute 0.7% of their GDP in ODAs;

11. Calls on the EU and its Member States to adequately help the small island ACP States to address the problems caused by climate change in their agriculture and marine/fisheries sectors, including food security, by promoting the development of green economies through the transfer of technology and the provision of additional resources to finance their adaptation and mitigation strategies;

12. States that in the long run, the sums required for combating the impact of climate change in developing countries cannot be mobilised by states drawing on public funds alone, but the private sector must also contribute; welcomes therefore the initiatives of EU Member States on the establishment of voluntary levies on air and sea transport emissions and calls for a consequent taxation on international freight transport to be applied according to the proportional pollution volume and intensity of each mode of transport;

13. Calls for the implementation of a ‘responsible-entity-pays’ principle as a logical extension of the ‘polluter-pays’ principle;

14. Demands that the EU and those of its Member States holding individual seats at the G20 engage in negotiations with G20 and OECD partners and, more generally, within the global financial institutions designed to obtain an agreement on the need for a global levy, the product of which will be used for financing global public goods, including combating the worst effects of climate change;

15. Notes with concern that, apart from South Africa, no ACP state or group of states is present at the G20 table; states that a new model for sustainable global governance cannot be developed without greater participation from the poorest countries in Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific;

16. Calls on the ACP and EU countries to implement international best practices when developing domestic legislation aimed at sustainable development, reducing carbon emissions, fostering cleaner energy technologies and promoting the use of renewable energy;

17. Instructs its Co-Presidents to forward this resolution to the ACP-EU Council of Ministers, the European Parliament, the European Commission, the EU Council Presidency and the African Union.
RESOLUTION (1)

on the social impact of the global crisis

The ACP-EU Joint Parliamentary Assembly,

— meeting in Tenerife (Spain) from 29 March to 1 April 2010,

— having regard to Article 17(1) of its Rules of Procedure,

— having regard to the objectives of the Partnership Agreement between the members of the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States (ACP), on the one hand, and the European Community and its Member States, on the other, signed in Cotonou on 23 June 2000 (the Cotonou Agreement) and all its amendments,

— having regard to the United Nations Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), particularly the commitment to set up a global partnership for development, and the conclusions and recommendations from the UN High-Level Meeting held in New York on 25 September 2008,

— having regard to the Monterrey Consensus, which was adopted at the United Nations International Conference on Financing for Development held on 21 and 22 March 2002, and the Doha Declaration on Financing for Development adopted on 2 December 2008 at the Follow-up International Conference on Financing for Development to review the Implementation of the Monterrey Consensus,

— having regard to the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness of 2 March 2005 and the Accra Agenda for Action adopted at the Accra High-Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness held from 2 to 4 September 2008,

— having regard to the European Commission communication of 8 April 2009 entitled ‘Supporting developing countries in coping with the crisis’ (2),

— having regard to the declarations issued by the G20 following its meetings on the financial crisis held in Washington on 15 November 2008, London on 2 April 2009, and Pittsburgh on 24 and 25 September 2009,

— having regard to the resolutions adopted on 10 July 2009 at the G8 Summit held in L’Aquila (Italy),

— having regard to the conclusions of the European Council of 10 and 11 December 2009,

— having regard to the appeal by the World Bank President, Robert B. Zoellick, to developed countries to pledge 0.7 % of their stimulus packages to a Vulnerability Fund for developing countries,

— having regard to the World Health Organization’s 2008 report entitled ‘Primary health care: now more than ever’,

(1) Adopted by the ACP-EU Joint Parliamentary Assembly on 1 April 2010 in Tenerife (Spain).
— having regard to the IMF report of March 2009 entitled ‘The implications of the global financial crisis for low-income countries’,

— having regard to the Declaration of the World Summit on Food Security held in Rome on 16-18 November 2009,

— having regard to the resolution entitled ‘The effects of the global economic and financial crisis on the African economies: strategies and measures to face them’, adopted by the African Parliamentary Union at its 32nd Conference held in Ouagadougou on 19-20 November 2009,

— having regard to its resolution on the impact of the financial crisis on ACP States, adopted in Luanda on 3 December 2009 (1),

— having regard to the report by the Committee on Social Affairs and the Environment (ACP-EU/100.640/10/fin.),

A. whereas the current crisis is of an exceptional nature and is a conjunction of social, environmental, energy, economic, financial and food crises; whereas the development model has to be adjusted in order to ensure it is effective and transparent,

B. whereas the FAO estimates that the number of people in the world suffering from hunger has reached one billion and the total has increased by 100 million due to the global crisis; whereas the number of people living in poverty could rise by 90 million by December 2010,

C. whereas most ACP countries are dependent on exports of commodities and natural resources, and the crisis has led to a drop in export earnings for many developing countries, a drop in the transfer of funds to these countries, and a drop in foreign direct investment,

D. whereas developing countries also face a reduction in remittances from migrant workers to their countries of origin and a decrease in official development assistance (ODA), estimated by the United Nations at USD 20 million per annum short of the promise of the G8 meeting in Gleneagles in 2005 on aid to Africa,

E. whereas the impact of the various crises on the ACP countries will jeopardise the achievement of the MDGs,

F. whereas HIV/AIDS is not only a health issue as the disease’s spread has created a pandemic with social, economic and demographic consequences in all countries,

G. whereas the economic and financial crisis is likely to increase the lost of skilled labour from ACP countries, exacerbating the long-term effects of the crisis,

H. whereas the ACP countries are not to blame for the financial and economic crisis but are amongst those being hit hardest by its effects, which is also true as regards climate change: whereas the financial and economic crisis was caused, inter alia, by the deregulation of financial and economic markets,

I. whereas employment conditions are worsening following the crisis: unemployment has risen by up to 59 million worldwide and over 200 million workers are exposed to extreme poverty following the financial and economic crisis, both in ACP and EU countries,

J. whereas the vulnerable groups in society, first and foremost young people, will have to bear the brunt of the medium- and long-term effects of the crisis; whereas the already excessive proportion of unemployment accounted for by young people will continue to rise,

K. whereas the effects of the global economic crisis on the ‘middle-income’ developing countries and on their social development programmes should not be overlooked,

**Multifaceted consequences of the crisis**

1. Recalls that the EU is required to play a decisive role in mitigating the effects of the crisis on ACP countries, given its position as the main trading partner of the ACP States, the main provider of private investment, and the world's largest donor of ODA;

2. Urges donor countries to use this unprecedented crisis as a catalyst to further explore existing possibilities in terms of additional and innovative sources of financing for development, such as an international financial transaction tax, and to identify new ones to allow developing countries to diversify their sources of revenue and implement effective, concrete and operational spending programmes;

3. Fears that the crisis will hamper the achievement of the MDGs and the financial crisis will become a development crisis, and calls therefore for respect for and delivery of commitments made by EU Member States to increase ODA to 0.56% of GNI by 2010 and to 0.7% by 2015; calls on Member States to honour these commitments by enshrining them in binding national legislation; calls for coordinated action and reinforcement of the development programmes in order to safeguard existing ODA allocations for the health, education and social protection sectors;

4. Calls on the EU and ACP countries to put European funding to the most effective use with a view to attaining the MDGs through more careful selection of focal sectors in the Country Strategy Papers and National Indicative Programmes;

5. Reiterates the importance of the principles of aid effectiveness set out in the Paris Declaration and the Accra Agenda for Action, and the principles of donor coordination set out in the EU Code of Conduct on Division of Labour in Development Policy (1); calls on the ACP-EU Council of Ministers meeting in June 2010 to renew its commitment in that respect;

6. Calls on EU and ACP governments to fight jointly to eradicate tax evasion, illicit capital flows and money laundering; stresses the need to support capacity-building in ACP States, including national tax systems and the judiciary, in order to better redistribute wealth;

7. Supports the implementation of international practices in tax matters, particularly the observance of the principles of transparency and exchange of information between the ACP States that have committed to them;

8. Insists on the need to reduce the cost of remittance transactions, especially at a time when migrants suffer severely from the crisis and cannot transfer as much to their country of origin;

9. Points out that regional cooperation has a key role to play in surmounting the effects of the crisis;

Improving social sectors

10. Emphasises the role of social protection systems in mitigating poverty and calls for the creation and development of social protection mechanisms;

11. Calls, in the short term, on recipient governments and donors to focus on safety nets to prevent people from falling into poverty; supports the establishment of a Global Poverty Alert System, an international rapid response fund that would provide a safety net for the world’s most vulnerable people;

12. Welcomes the Vulnerability FLEX mechanism from the European Commission, which aims to provide support in order to safeguard social spending; calls on the Commission and the ACP governments to take the opportunity of the mid-term review of Country and Regional Strategy Papers to examine the possibilities of reinforcing social sectors and to increase the resources for the second ‘tranche’ of the V-FLEX with a view to fully financing the residual funding gap of the eligible ACP States in 2010;

13. Urges governments and donors to prioritise support for basic social needs and enhance support to vulnerable children and women hit hard by the crisis, at-risk young people, low-wage, low-skilled and migrant workers, rural workers and disabled people;

14. Recalls that efforts should be made to reduce infant and maternal mortality in Sub-Saharan Africa where these MDGs might not be attained; recalls that education and health should be at the core of development policies and insists that the current situation should not justify any reduction in national spending and international aid to these sectors;

15. Believes that health programmes, including sexual and reproductive health, promotion of gender equality, empowerment of women, and child rights should be prominent in ACP-EU development policy, in particular in areas where gender-based violence is pervasive and women and children are put at risk of contracting HIV/AIDS or denied access to information, prevention and/or treatment;

16. Calls on ACP and EU governments to take measures aimed specifically at integrating young people and women into society and increasing their full participation in the economy;

17. Emphasises that job creation should be facilitated through improving tertiary education, including vocational training, and lifelong learning; calls for an increase in equal access to and opportunities for skills development, quality training and education; calls for improvements to be made as regards access to credit (including micro-finance) to encourage job creation and help set up micro-enterprises to revitalise local economies;
18. Stresses the need to protect workers’ rights and calls for more measures to be taken to fight child labour and youth unemployment; calls on stakeholders to develop crisis response strategies at national and sectoral levels through social dialogue;

19. Underlines that decent work has to be at the heart of job creation to overcome the issue of the ‘working poor’; therefore stresses that a regional growth strategy focusing on employment and decent-work-related issues should be incorporated into the mid-term review of the ACP Country Strategy Papers;

20. Calls on donor countries to support the ACP countries in diversifying their economies so that they become less dependent on a single product; recalls the need to invest in infrastructure and regional connection projects and insists that a partnership of equals should guide trade policies, with a view to placing economies on a stable footing at regional and local level;

21. Points to the need to assess investment in developing countries in terms of its sustainability and to maintain healthy environmental and living conditions on a lasting basis;

22. Reaffirms that brain drain is an alarming reality that threatens the development path and prospects of Least Developed Countries by negatively affecting basic sectors of health and sanitation, education, and the building of the public sector; therefore encourages circular migration;

Food security

23. Reiterates that the recent food crisis has proved that agriculture has been neglected for too long and that malnutrition urgently needs to be tackled by long-term measures; urges the countries, donors and international institutions concerned to encourage investment in food security and agriculture, especially small-scale agriculture; takes the view that the European Commission should take the opportunity provided by the mid-term review of the Country Strategy Papers under the Financing Instrument for Development Cooperation and the European Development Fund to discuss with the recipient countries the need to move agriculture and fisheries higher up in the agenda;

24. Stresses that subsidised EU food exports should be channelled towards regions where there are acute food shortages;

25. Welcomes foreign investment in agriculture when it supports development and helps build local capacity for transforming raw materials (especially agricultural products) into processed products; is nevertheless worried by the current trend whereby some countries rent land in developing countries in order to import production from those countries; insists that such contracts should be transparent and that part of the produce should stay in the producing countries; expresses its concerns regarding food speculation;

26. Calls for technical, financial, and human capacity to be boosted with a view to promoting small farmers, local markets, and modern cultivation techniques in ACP countries so as to make them less vulnerable to the effects of volatile world markets;
27. Calls on the EU and ACP countries to treat development of the agricultural sector, fisheries and food security as a priority and to make them a focal sector when drawing up Country Strategy Papers and National Indicative Programmes; stresses that food production and distribution should be addressed in order to prevent hunger in ACP countries; also suggests that urban agriculture be developed;

28. Calls on the EU to engage with regional fisheries management organisations in order to achieve sustainable fisheries and to develop ACP countries’ in-house capacity to process their fish;

Climate change

29. Recalls that USD 100 billion per annum is needed by 2020 to help developing countries cope with climate change; calls on ACP countries to establish their own priorities to fight climate change through the establishment of national adaptation programmes; insists that the funds should not come from already planned development assistance budgets: they should instead be new and additional funds;

30. Emphasises that mitigating climate change is a huge challenge for developing countries but that it should also become an opportunity, with the financial and technical support of donors, to promote green technologies to develop the countries (green development) through technological transfers (solar power, etc.), and to create green jobs;

31. Regrets the lack of a legally binding agreement at the Copenhagen Summit; therefore calls for a joint ACP-EU strategy towards a real commitment in the framework of the next COP 16 to be held in Mexico;

32. Points to the importance of promoting a world alliance to combat climate change, which should seek to provide greater support to the poorer developing countries more exposed to climate change, in particular Least Developed Countries and Small Island Developing States;

33. Instructs its Co-Presidents to forward this resolution to the ACP-EU Council of Ministers, the European Parliament, the European Commission, the Presidency of the Council of the European Union, the African Union, and the Pan-African Parliament.
RESOLUTION (1)

on post-disaster reconstruction and rehabilitation in Haiti, and the link between poverty and natural disasters

The ACP-EU Joint Parliamentary Assembly,

— meeting in Tenerife (Spain) from 29 March to 1 April 2010,

— having regard to Article 17(2) of its Rules of Procedure,

— having regard to the G7 summit in Iqaluit (Canada) on 6 February 2010,

— having regard to the results of the International Donors’ Conference ‘Towards a New Future for Haiti’, held in New York on 31 March 2010,

— having regard to the conclusions of the Ministerial Preparatory Conference in Montreal on 25 January 2010,

— having regard to the debate on the earthquake in Haiti, held in the European Parliament on 20 January 2010, with the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Baroness Ashton,

— having regard to the conclusions of the extraordinary Foreign Affairs Council meeting in Brussels on 18 January 2010,

— having regard to the United Nations Stabilisation Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH),

A. whereas an earthquake measuring 7.3 on the Richter scale struck Haiti on 12 January 2010, causing catastrophic damage to Port-au-Prince, Jacmel and other settlements in the region, and was followed by numerous powerful aftershocks that continued to affect the country,

B. whereas it is estimated that there are more than 200 000 dead, 250 000 people wounded and more than 3 million people directly affected; whereas the United Nations Stabilisation Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) has paid a heavy toll and is mourning 146 deaths and 70 people reported as missing among its civilian and military staff,

C. whereas the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) has reported that in the country as a whole up to one million people are in need of shelter, particularly on the eve of the rainy season, and there are up to 500 000 internally displaced people,

D. whereas even before the earthquake of 12 January 2010, the country had been devastated by hurricanes and tropical storms in 2008, which caused damage estimated at 15 % of GDP,

E. whereas some 1.8 million people were ‘food insecure’ prior to the earthquake, in a country where close to 60 % of the population live in rural areas and 70 % (12 million people) live on less than USD 2 a day,

F. whereas this extreme poverty has exacerbated the destructive effects of the earthquake and plunged the country into one of the most severe humanitarian crises it has ever experienced,

(1) Adopted by the ACP-EU Joint Parliamentary Assembly on 1 April 2010 in Tenerife (Spain).
G. whereas the Commission has agreed to provide EUR 137 million for short-term needs and at least EUR 200 million for the medium and longer term, with Member States providing an additional EUR 92 million; whereas the Inter-American Development Bank estimates that it will take EUR 10.5 billion to reconstruct Haiti, at a rate of EUR 2 billion a year; noting the decision by the Union of South American Nations to create an aid fund for Haiti of EUR 217 million,

H. whereas Haiti is crippled by foreign debt, estimated at approximately USD 1 billion, which was an obstacle to its development even before the earthquake and may hinder the country's recovery effort,

I. noting the decision by the G7 ministers to cancel Haiti's debt, but also the fact that Haiti's debt to the G7 countries accounted for only USD 214 million out of a total of USD 890 million,

J. whereas, beyond the immediate relief operation, medium- and long-term recovery efforts to rebuild people's livelihoods, destroyed infrastructure, state institutions and economic activities require a long-term international commitment,

1. Expresses its sincere condolences to, and sympathy and solidarity with, the people of Haiti and of the other nations affected, and the staff of international organisations, including the UN and the European Commission, for the massive loss of life and the devastation caused by the exceptionally strong earthquake; pays tribute to the exemplary courage and solidarity shown by the people of Haiti who, in the immediate aftermath of the disaster and before it hit the media, and in utter destitution themselves, saved thousands of lives and gave succour to thousands of injured people and orphans;

2. Welcomes efforts by the Haitian authorities and civil society, as well as by the UN, NGOs and other bilateral donors, to bring aid to the people of Haiti and pays tribute to the work of relief organisations and individuals from across the European Union and the ACP countries and throughout the world;

3. Welcomes wholeheartedly the solidarity shown by the United Nations member states and international partners gathered at the International Donors' Conference 'Towards a New Future for Haiti' in New York on 31 March 2010, which resulted in pledges totalling up to USD 9.9 billion over the next three years and beyond, and urges the international community to fulfil the historic pledges made;

4. Supports the fact that the international donors aligned their contributions on the Action Plan for National Recovery and Development of Haiti, presented by René Préval, President of Haiti, as a clear sign that the Haitian authorities will take the lead in long-term reconstruction efforts;

5. Emphasises that it is crucial for the UN, acting under the aegis of the Government of Haiti, to be and remain in charge of coordinating all civilian and military operations, with regard to restoring security and to humanitarian aid, and also to reconstruction and development;

6. Calls on the UN to review MINUSTAH's mandate in conjunction with the Haitian authorities in order to respond to the country's post-disaster needs, with a particular focus on security issues;

7. Calls for a comprehensive assessment to identify the population's short- and long-term needs and establish the involvement of the international community in the reconstruction process, covering the three phases of emergency aid, rehabilitation and reconstruction;

8. Expresses grave concern about the welfare of the most vulnerable, particularly women, children and the elderly; calls on the Commission and the UN to pay special attention to and support women's participation in reconstruction efforts by actively involving them in the rehabilitation, reconstruction and evaluation phases of all relief and rebuilding programmes;
9. Stresses that unaccompanied children and children separated from their families should be provided with services aimed at reuniting them with their parents or customary care-givers as quickly as possible; calls on the EU and the international community urgently to assess the need for a coordinated plan to deal with the thousands of children left orphaned by the earthquake; highlights the grave risk of illegal adoption and child trafficking;

10. Urges the EU to support a temporary moratorium on new adoptions of children from Haiti for up to two years after tracing efforts have begun; calls for EU efforts to provide children with their basic needs, bring temporary schools into operation and provide counselling to children as a matter of urgency;

11. Strongly urges the European Commission and the international community to monitor the health situation of the Haitian population, especially women and children;

12. Calls on the international community to cancel outright the Republic of Haiti’s external debt and congratulates all those who have taken or announced measures to that end; stresses that any emergency earthquake assistance must be provided in the form of grants, not debt-incurring loans;

13. Supports efforts by the EU and other donors to boost food production locally, rehabilitating damaged infrastructures and making the necessary material (seed, fertiliser and tools) available to agriculture smallholders – particularly for the spring planting season starting in March, which accounts for 60% of national food production; calls on the EU and other international donors wherever possible to purchase locally produced food for the relief effort, thereby making an important contribution to helping the rural economy and protecting local producers;

14. Emphasises the need to focus on long-term investment in the construction of earthquake-resistant buildings that meet appropriate technical standards and in basic infrastructure, such as water supply, roads, electricity and the transfer of technology, which was non-existent or largely inadequate prior to the earthquake, thus greatly exacerbating the potential impact of natural disasters;

15. Calls for the creation of a fund administered by the United Nations to finance public awareness-raising and training measures, prevention and early warning systems, the construction of adequate protective structures and the stockpiling of emergency medical and sanitary equipment;

16. Calls on the international community to ensure that the people of Haiti and their government, under the democratic control of its parliament, are the main actors in the reconstruction process, to allow them to take ownership of their collective future; asks the European Commission and the EU Member States to put the EU’s know-how at their disposal and thus strengthen the national and local, regional and sub-regional capacity;

17. Urges the international community to ensure that the issue of alleviating poverty in Haiti is kept high on the agenda, even when media attention has moved away, in order to help Haiti to emerge from this disaster as a fully functioning democracy with an economy that can provide for its people in a sustainable way;

18. Urges the EU to work with the Haitian authorities to establish a disaster prevention and mitigation mechanism and capacity management for the long term, emphasising that reconstruction efforts must be based on national priorities, while respecting aid-effectiveness principles and supporting Haiti’s institutions in order to enable them to govern effectively; supports President Préval’s proposal to create a permanent structure within the UN that is capable of managing, from day one, crises caused by natural disasters;
19. Considers it vital to undertake massive reafforestation in Haiti, given that the present situation makes the country extremely vulnerable to all kinds of natural disasters, and to find economic and sustainable alternatives to deforestation for cooking food;

20. Calls on the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the Commissioner for International Cooperation, Humanitarian Aid and Crisis Response to play a leading role in coordinating the EU’s crisis response, in cooperation with the United Nations, using the responsibilities created under the Lisbon Treaty to coordinate the EU’s response to future crises more effectively while building on what has already been achieved;

21. Strongly encourages the creation, at international level, of operational civil protection mechanisms that can be used in situations comparable to that of Haiti, on the basis of regional pre-positioning or depending on the frequency or predictability of disasters;

22. Calls on the European Commission to put forward proposals as soon as possible for establishing an EU Civil Protection Force based on the EU Civil Protection Mechanism and enabling the EU to bring together the resources necessary for providing initial emergency humanitarian aid within 24 hours of a disaster;

23. Calls on the European Union, in view of the importance of regional integration and cooperation in the Caribbean region, to release special funds for the French outermost regions of the Caribbean (Guadeloupe, Martinique, Guiana) so that they can continue and intensify their aid to the people of Haiti;

24. Appeals urgently to the re-constituted Government of Haiti to do its utmost to establish and deepen democracy in Haiti;

25. Welcomes the African Union’s positive response to the proposal of President Abdoulaye Wade of Senegal, supported by a resolution of the Senegalese Parliament, on the right to return of Haitians, and urges the international community to take this proposal forward by adopting a United Nations resolution;

26. Instructs its Co-Presidents to forward this resolution to the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the President of the European Commission, the President and Government of Haiti, the ACP Council, the Caricom Member States, the Commission of the African Union, the UN Under Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and the governments of the Member States of the European Union.

RESOLUTION

on supporting the consolidation of peace in Southern Sudan

The ACP-EU Joint Parliamentary Assembly,

— meeting in Tenerife (Spain) from 29 March to 1 April 2010,

— having regard to Article 17(2) of its Rules of Procedure,

— having regard to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) signed between the Government of Sudan and the SPLM/A (Sudan’s People’s Liberation Movement/Army) in January 2005,

— having regard to Sudan’s Interim National Constitution, adopted in 2005,

(1) Adopted by the ACP-EU Joint Parliamentary Assembly on 1 April 2010 in Tenerife (Spain).
having regard to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, both ratified by Sudan,

— having regard to the United Nations Security Council’s resolutions on Sudan,

— having regard to the work of the African Union Ministerial Committee on Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development in the Sudan and other African Union initiatives,

— having regard to the report by the President of the African Union Commission on the process of implementing the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA),

— having regard to the communiqué of the 201st meeting of the African Union Peace and Security Council, held in Addis Ababa on 26 August 2009,

— having regard to the EU code of conduct on trade in small arms and light weapons and the UN conventional weapons systems,

— having regard to its previous resolutions on Sudan and to the European Parliament and the Pan-African Parliament resolutions on Sudan,

— having regard to the EU Council conclusions on Sudan,

— having regard to the International Crisis Group Policy Briefing of 17 December 2009 on ‘Sudan: Preventing Implosion’,

— having regard to the joint NGO report of January 2010 on ‘Rescuing the peace in Southern Sudan’,

A. whereas the CPA ended the terrible and devastating civil war that cost Sudan over two million deaths and nearly four million refugees and displaced persons,

B. aware of the fact that this civil war as well as the increase in the violence can be ascribed to:

— disputes about natural resources and power sharing,

— the widespread availability of small arms and light weapons,

— the continued frequent, brutal and bloody incursions by the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), a Ugandan rebel group operating from outside Uganda,

C. whereas, moreover, the CPA had fixed an interim period of six years (2005-2011), setting out the objectives to be achieved under the heading of ‘peace dividends’ and certain key dates, such as the national elections originally scheduled for 2009 and the referendum on the self-determination of the people of Southern Sudan scheduled for January 2011,

D. whereas the forthcoming national elections are the first elections to be held after the conclusions of the CPA and are crucial for the peace process, before moving to the referendum on self-determination of Southern Sudan and the referendum of Abyei,

E. whereas solutions are needed on citizenship, the remaining parts of north-south border demarcation, demilitarisation of the border areas, and sharing of resources, including oil, ahead of the South’s self-determination referendum,
F. whereas the dispute on the census has been bypassed by the agreement between the two parties which allocates an extra 40 seats in the national Assembly for the SPLM/A,

G. whereas the accuracy of the final data of the May 2008 housing and population census is disputed by the SPLM; whereas in the south 108 % of the estimated eligible number of voters were registered,

H. whereas recent progress of the negotiations between the National Congress Party (NCP) and the SPLM on the Southern Sudan referendum law, the Abyei area referendum and the popular consultations in South Khordofan and Blue Nile regions are positive steps,

I. whereas UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon made clear that the United Nations would work to support the parties in their efforts to make unity attractive and the exercise by the people of Southern Sudan of their right to self-determination in a referendum,

J. whereas the UN Peacekeeping mission (UNMIS) was created in 2005 with the main aim of supporting the implementation of the CPA and deployed over 9 000 military personnel and has over 3 000 local civilian and international personnel; whereas UNMIS has focused on monitoring the CPA to the detriment of its civil protection mandate,

K. whereas at its meeting of January 2010, the African Union Ministerial Committee on Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development in the Sudan stressed the need for the Sudanese parties to spare no efforts to overcome the challenges facing the implementation of the CPA, including the successful conduct of the elections and the democratic transformation of the country, border demarcation, resolution of the issue of Abyei on the basis of the decision of the Permanent Court of Arbitration, and addressing the issue of insecurity in Southern Sudan,

L. whereas a surge in tribal fighting has killed thousands of people since the beginning of 2009 in Southern Sudan, most victims being women and children, in remote rural areas; whereas since the beginning of 2010 hundreds of people have died as a result of violence in the State of Warrap,

M. whereas Southern Sudan is one of the least developed regions in the world; whereas the UN Population Fund puts literacy in Southern Sudan at 24 %; whereas 90 % of women cannot read or write,

N. whereas, according to the World Food Programme, violence forced 350 000 people to flee their homes in 2009, leaving them dependent on food aid; whereas last year's poor seasonal rains also destroyed the harvest; whereas a total of 4.3 million people need food aid, up from around one million last year,

O. whereas, according to the WHO, Southern Sudan is dramatically short of physicians, with 0.22 doctors for every 1 000 people and the government says just 25 % of the population have access to health services; whereas Southern Sudan has the highest world record of maternal mortality and one in each seven children dies before the age of five; whereas according to the South Sudan AIDS Commission, HIV awareness is below 10 %; whereas the government of Southern Sudan is going ahead with a health system reconstruction plan,

P. whereas the donor community has not fulfilled its 2005 commitments made in Oslo (Norway), with only a small fraction of the USD 4.8 billion assistance pledged having actually reached Southern Sudan,
Q. whereas, following the signature of the CPA, the European Commission resumed cooperation with Sudan and has committed over EUR 500 million, principally in the areas of post-conflict recovery, rehabilitation and development activities; whereas because Sudan has decided not to ratify the first revision of the Cotonou Agreement, it is now no longer eligible to receive European Development Fund aid, and whereas the European Commission is working on a solution to this,

1. Solemnly reaffirms its full endorsement of the CPA and urgently requests all parties concerned to implement it effectively and in its entirety in order to promote a comprehensive peace in Sudan; calls for closer cooperation between the Sudanese Government and the Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS), with a view to removing any obstacles to the success of the CPA agenda;

2. Calls also on the AU, the EU and the international community to rapidly agree on action and measures to support the Sudanese parties in the implementation of the CPA and promote democratic governance throughout Sudan;

3. Acknowledges the role played so far by the two partners signatory to the CPA (the NCP and the SPLM) and the Sudanese people for honouring their peace agreement; and calls them to summon their ultimate political goodwill in order to overcome the impasses and to complete the implementation of the CPA to the letter;

4. Calls on the NCP and the SPLM to implement key democratic reforms needed to ensure that national elections and the southern referendum are credible, free and fair;

5. Insists that all fundamental freedoms granted in the Interim Constitution are implemented in practice and calls on the competent authorities, notably the Electoral Commission, to overcome remaining technical problems in the run-up to the elections;

6. Supports the people of Sudan, whose active participation in the process of voter registration shows a significant interest, in taking part in the upcoming elections;

7. Welcomes the fact that with closed party lists for women (25 %) Sudan will have one of the highest percentages of parliamentary representation by women in the region, but would also like to see women proposed by the parties outside the women’s lists;

8. Calls on both parties, the African Union and the international community to consider future political, economic and security relations between the north and the south in the event that secession is approved in the referendum, including transition mechanisms for secession; considers that a post-referendum transition period is needed so that pre-referendum agreements establishing the terms of a peaceful secession can be properly implemented and managed;

9. Calls on both parties to the CPA to create a peaceful and stable environment for conducting a transparent and credible referendum as provided for in the CPA;

10. Calls on all parties to stop violence; calls on the GoSS to facilitate inter-tribal dialogue and to establish institutional mechanisms for achieving and sustaining tribal reconciliation;

11. Calls on the GoSS to put more effort into security at the local level, paying attention to the ethnic composition of units, and to prioritise police reform, building on existing strategy documents and the 2009 Police Act; stresses the importance of security sector reform;
12. Urges the United Nations Security Council:

— to make all the promised resources available to UNMIS, so that it can perform its mission under optimum conditions;

— to make civil protection an UNMIS priority;

— to provide clear guidelines for UNMIS and training for all its personnel on its civil protection responsibilities;

— to continue to take part in resolving the LRA problem and do its utmost to find a comprehensive and lasting solution;

13. Calls on UNMIS to undertake a more proactive civilian protection role and to become an active partner in local conflict prevention, in cooperation with tribal authorities;

14. Considers that the north-south issue cannot be viewed in isolation and that reconciliation is a key element in any lasting peace in southern Sudan; therefore calls on all parties to respect the basic human rights of the population, make protection of civilians a priority area, put an end to impunity and bring criminal suspects to justice in order to build trust;

15. Calls on the EU, and on other donors, in particular those that made commitments at the 2005 Oslo Donors’ Conference, to recognise the significant humanitarian and development needs in Southern Sudan and to ensure that allocated funds reflect those needs and are released; further calls on them to support the government to articulate a strategic vision for the roles of the existing funding mechanisms and to find creative ways to support indigenous organisations, recognising that a strong civil society is critical to Southern Sudan's stability;

16. Instructs its Co-Presidents to forward this resolution to the ACP-EU Council, the European Commission, the African Union, the United Nations and the national, regional and continental parliaments of the ACP Group.

DECLARATION

The EU-Latin America bananas agreement and its impact on ACP and EU banana producers

The deal

A. In December 2009 the EU came to an agreement within the WTO with the US and Latin American producers to put an end to the long-running dispute on bananas.

B. The deal will mean significant tariff cuts (35% between 2010 and 2017 at the earliest) for non-ACP imports and, as a result, it will harm the competitiveness of ACP and EU producers.

C. Moreover, the EU is currently holding bilateral talks with certain Latin American countries, with a view to signing free-trade agreements, which may lead to significant further tariff reductions and considerably reduce any supposed benefits to ACP banana producers derived from EPAs.

D. Bananas are the world's fourth biggest agricultural export. The EU market accounts for over a third of all imports.
E. Multinationals operating in Latin America control over 80% of the global market.

F. In 2008, 72% of the bananas sold in Europe were already from Latin America, whereas bananas from ACP countries and the EU only represented 17% and 10.5% respectively. Virtually all ACP banana exports go to the EU, while Latin American countries also export to North and South America and Russia.

G. Banana production has a major impact on local communities, not only in economic terms, but also as regards the environment, migration, gender and labour standards.

H. In some Latin American countries banana production by multinationals has been linked to a high level of human rights violations.

I. The agreement will enter into force if and when the European Parliament gives its consent and the Council authorises its conclusion.

The impact

J. The effects of the agreement, which is an attempt to match sustainable development objectives with WTO obligations, are already starting to be felt.

K. ACP producers will be hit hard as they lose a significant part of their tariff protection. Some ACP countries, which depend heavily on banana exports, may see their export industries disappear altogether with dire social and economic consequences.

L. Without proper accompanying measures, European banana producing regions, some of which are among the poorest in the EU and already face high unemployment, will also pay a hefty socioeconomic price.

M. The multinationals will benefit enormously at the expense of EU/ACP small-scale farming communities.

N. ACP and European banana producing regions will need more financial support to maintain this key economic activity in order to compete with bananas from regions with very low levels of salaries, social conditions and environmental rules.

O. The move towards ever-cheaper bananas is likely to lead to a race to the bottom in terms of labour standards, including child labour, environmental protection, corruption and tax evasion in the banana sector.

P. The European Commission has put together a support package for ACP producers (banana accompanying measures), worth EUR 190 million over four years, with an extra EUR 10 million depending on certain conditions. This support does not take into account further tariff cuts resulting from bilateral trade agreements with Latin American countries.
Q. The new concessions made to Colombia and Peru and already requested by Central American countries go much further than those included in the recent agreement and may destabilise other countries in the region, as well as the economies of other banana producers in ACP countries and in the EU.

R. No additional support is foreseen for EU producers, particularly from the outermost regions.

The ACP-EU Joint Parliamentary Assembly, recalling that policy coherence for development is now enshrined in the Lisbon treaty, demands that:

1. The Commission conducts an economic, social and environmental impact assessment of the EU-Latin America bananas agreement for ACP and EU banana producers, as provided for in Declaration XXIII of the Cotonou Agreement;

2. The Commission fairly considers increasing the financial package to help ACP and European producers adjust to the new regime and speeds up disbursement of these funds;

3. The Commission considers specific additional financial and technical assistance to ACP countries to address social and environmental effects, supply-side constraints and promoting diversification beyond 2013;

4. The EU brings forward measures to help heavily banana-dependent states to diversify their economies, including more aid-for-trade, fulfilling EC and Member States' aid-for-trade pledges of EUR 1 billion each (with 50% available for ACP countries);

5. The Commission provides support to offset losses incurred by EU producers, gradually puts in place measures to encourage sustainable banana production in the EU and ensures the effective application of the banana safeguard clause in bilateral and multilateral trade agreements;

6. Any new tariff cuts under bilateral trade agreements with Latin American nations over and above the WTO agreement possibly give rise to adequate compensatory measures;

7. The Commission provides ACP and EU producers with genuine legal certainty on the future of the banana trade regime and that the EP and ACP national parliaments continue to monitor this issue closely;

8. EU and ACP authorities step up their efforts to ensure that all banana producing nations effectively apply all aspects of the ILO's decent labour agenda;

9. The Commission raises awareness on ethical trading to discourage European retailers from importing bananas from producers with inadequate policies on tax evasion, corruption, labour standards and human rights violations;

10. The European Parliament seriously considers the impact of the issues raised in this declaration before giving its consent to the bananas agreement.
Conclusions on the Regional Strategy Paper (RSP) and Regional Indicative Programme (RIP) under the 10th EDF – Caribbean

The context in the region

The region faces several sustainable development challenges: small populations; limited and expensive transport; extreme vulnerability to climatic changes and natural disasters; mono-crop economies with limited options for diversification.

The West Indies Federation (1958-1963) formally launched the integration process in the region. Carifta restarted the integration process in 1967 and from 1973 the Caricom added an additional impetus to the process through various initiatives such as cooperation and harmonisation of foreign policy and the Girvan report on a Single Vision for a Single Economy. In 1992, Cariforum was created. It counts the countries of the Caricom (1) as well as the Dominican Republic and Cuba as members and it is a signatory to the Cotonou Agreement.

The role of Cariforum is two fold: to coordinate the allocation of funding and to manage the RSP/RIP implementation as well as the implementation of other regional programmes financed by EU Member States among other donors.

Presently regional integration efforts centre on the CSME, with 2015 as its target date, and on Phase II, designed to consolidate and complete the Single Economy.

Despite these initiatives, the integration process in the region currently lacks a certain impetus. Some argue this is due to a lack of grassroots support while others believe the stagnation can be attributed to a political focus on national issues, political short-termism created by high turnover of elected representatives or to a political belief that world market integration can offer more substantial economic gains. Most acknowledge however that a lack of resources has hampered the process and the RSP/RIP must therefore adequately address this.

Caribbean RSP/RIP

The RSP/RIP must address the aforementioned challenges if it is to foster both regional integration and integration of the region within the global economy. In addition, the RSP/RIP should support the region in its implementation of the Cariforum-EU EPA.

EUR 165 million is available to the Caribbean under the RSP/RIP:

— Focal Area: Regional Economic Integration/Cooperation and EPA capacity building (allocation 85-90 % or EUR 143 million)

— The major intervention areas envisaged are based on the various existing Cariforum integration and cooperation processes: the OECS economic union; the CSME; enlargement of regional markets; EPA implementation (for which the allocation is EUR 72.6 million) and human resource development within the regional institutions.

— Non-Focal Area: Vulnerabilities and Social Issues (allocation 10-15 % or EUR 22 million)

— The non focal area aims to pay particular attention to crime and security, the empowering of non-state actors and capacity development.

Analysis of the RSP/RIP

— Independent expert panel: it is vital that civil society, academics and the private sector are fully involved in the RIP/RSP mid term review process.

(1) Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Saint Christopher and Nevis, Suriname, and Trinidad and Tobago.
— The JPA therefore supports the creation of an independent expert panel with a mandate to identify the bottlenecks to accelerating growth and enhancing livelihoods in the region. Following identification of the necessary financial and human resource inputs, the panel could make financial and institutional recommendations as to how best to stimulate growth and enhance livelihoods.

— **Regional Economic Integration/Cooperation:** In parallel to the capacity building and institutional initiatives supported under the focal area, the JPA believes that some of the EUR 143 million should be allocated to projects within the areas of education, job creation, energy and air and maritime transport.

— There is a real potential to foster regional integration and drive development through such targeted and concrete spending.

— **Economic development:** The RSP/RIP identifies many impediments to economic development; just two of which are the high EU SPS compliance standards and the limited options for economic diversification.

— The JPA highlights the need for a fair proportion of the ACP EUR 30 million SPS compliance funding to be allocated to the Cariforum. In particular, this funding should focus on the fisheries sector as well as the infant industries such as aquaculture, agro-processing and services (e.g. health spas and ecotourism).

— Research and innovation can drive economic diversification and, in particular, SMEs and the agro enterprise sector could benefit from a stronger focus on research and innovation.

— **EPA implementation:** In addition to the RSP/RIP allocation, many of the country specific NIPs are oriented towards EPA related activities such as competitiveness, public administration reforms and infrastructure. EUR 454 million from the national programme resources (75 % of the EUR 600 million available) is allocated to trade-related assistance.

— The EPA requires major organisation and structural changes. The challenges e.g. reinforcing the legal service are considerable and the region should be adequately supported in meeting those challenges.

— The JPA highlights the importance of the EC and the EU Member States fulfilling their AfT pledge of EUR 1 billion each (with 50 % available for ACP countries) by 2010. As mentioned earlier, SPS compliance remains a priority.

— The mid term review of the RSP/RIP (and, similarly, the CSPs/NIPs) should be a genuine opportunity to revise funding if EU Member States do not fulfil their AfT promise.

— **Food security:** The response to the global food crisis was slow in the region. This delay underlines the need for a regional consensus on how best to boost agricultural production. While certain countries already prioritise food security in their development planning, a Comprehensive Regional Development Strategy could more effectively ensure adequate agricultural production. In order to guarantee food security in the medium to long term, the region must secure development aid to stimulate the agricultural sector.

— The JPA recognises that the EC has committed EUR 1 billion over 3 years for the 23 countries worst hit by the food crisis and welcomes the fact that EUR 15.8 million was spent in Haiti in 2009.

— **Human resources and brain drain:** The region struggles to develop a broad range of home grown expertise and this deficit impedes human development, welfare, economic diversification and growth.
— The region is additionally badly affected by a heavy brain drain. (1) Free movement of labour and the pooling of human resources within the region alleviate the problem to a certain extent and the JPA therefore welcomes the allocation of almost EUR 10 million to human resource development and capacity building at the regional level.

— To tackle the root of the problem however, the region must be able to offer incentives to emigrants to return home and share their acquired skills to the benefit of the region.

— A serious political dialogue should be encouraged and, in particular, an analysis of Guyana and other countries’ efforts to reverse migration during the 1990s may be instructive. To this end, the EC should earmark funding to increase regional cooperation on migration issues and to build capacity to reduce brain drain.

— **Climate change:** Climate change disproportionately impacts small island states like those in the Caribbean.

— Although the RSP/RIP does not make provisions to address climate change, in 2009 the European Commission allocated EUR 71 million to tackle climate change related migration and EUR 97 million for adaptation. The Commission further plans to dedicate EUR 3 million to Cuba and EUR 8 million through the GCCA to support the CCCCC in the implementation of the regional strategy.

— It would be helpful for the JPA to have further information - in terms of both funding for and coordination with - EU and regional initiatives and programmes such as the GCCA, the EU Strategy for Disaster Risk Reduction in developing countries, the DCI Thematic Programme for the ‘Environment and Sustainable Management of Natural Resources’, the Caribbean Community Regional Programme Framework for 2005-2015 (of CDEMA), the Comprehensive Disaster Management Framework and Strategy (also of CDEMA) and the CCCCC.

— **Gender:** Gender issues should be higher on the political agenda especially in light of the recent financial crisis which has made the availability of ‘Decent Work’ more difficult for women.

— **Donor coordination:** Coherence of donor strategies and modes of implementation is undoubtedly a priority both to reduce burdens on national governments and regional institutions but also to increase effectiveness of international assistance. However, according to reports from various donors, diplomats and academics, the principles of the Paris and Accra Declarations on Aid Effectiveness are far from being adequately implemented.

— As a key donor, the EU should not only make further efforts to streamline its own donor requirements but also it should work with other donors to increase coordination and minimise wastage. The JPA supports the joint execution of regional projects (e.g. CARTAC, PANCAP, CRNM and many OECS projects) and welcomes the EC’s lead role in the donor coordination for PANCAP. The JPA encourages the EC to provide financial support to CDEMA which involves many donors involved in disaster management but which - according to the RSP/RIP - does not currently have the capacity to coordinate donors effectively.

— **Aid implementation:** The JPA supports the establishment of a regional development fund - within the Caricom Development Fund - to manage EDF and other funding.

— The JPA looks forward to receiving further information on the results of the Cariforum secretariat study as well as on the discussions between the European Commission, regional authorities and the EIB on the possibility of establishing a Caribbean Infrastructure Fund based on the African model.

(1) According to estimates, 60 % of the population in the Caribbean with tertiary education have left the region and in Jamaica, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, St Vincent and the Grenadines these emigration rates go up to 80 %.
Audit: In addition to the parliamentary oversight of the RIP/RSP, the JPA recommends that an independent audit should be carried out. Its objectives should be firstly to assess whether the Cariforum’s share of the 10th EDF has been effectively spent. Secondly the audit should report on whether the benefits of the 10th EDF were felt equally across the region or whether they were concentrated in particular geographic or sectoral pockets.

Recommendations

As noted above, one part of the focal area is regional economic integration and cooperation.

The JPA fully supports this objective while stressing that the goal should be a sustainable and development orientated economic growth which can strengthen and unify the region's negotiating position on the global stage.

Similarly, EPA capacity building is a key part of the focal area and the RSP/RIP must therefore provide the technical and financial support to establish the relevant frameworks.

Countering the effects of migration and brain drain, ensuring food security and combating climate change are key challenges which require a regional response.

Better donor coordination is urgently needed in the region. The JPA asks the EC to take into account its recommendations detailed above.

While the European Parliament can provide parliamentary oversight on the EU side, it should be noted with regret that this is more difficult on the Cariforum side due to the absence of a regional parliament.

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

Aid for Trade

Caribbean Community

Caribbean Free Trade Association

Caribbean Forum of ACP States

Caribbean Regional Technical Assistance Centre

Caribbean Community Climate Change Centre

Caribbean Disaster Emergency Management Agency

Caribbean Regional Negotiating Machinery

CARICOM Single Market and Economy

Country Strategy Paper

Financing Instrument for Development Cooperation

European Development Fund

European Investment Bank

Economic Partnership Agreement
Conclusions on the Regional Strategy Paper (RSP) and the Regional Indicative Programme (RIP) under 10th EDF – Eastern and Southern Africa and Indian Ocean

The Regional Strategy Paper (RSP) for Eastern and Southern Africa and Indian Ocean covers 21 States and 4 regional organisations (ROs) – COMESA, EAC, IGAD and COI. This geographical area also includes a European Outermost Region, La Réunion, and a French Overseas Territory, Mayotte.

Aims and objectives of the RSP

The aim of the RSP as it was defined by the European Union and the various partner ROs is to contribute to a deepening of the regional integration process pursued by these organisations. The emphasis is placed on opening markets and creating a common market.

The strategy also has the ultimate objective of contributing to the eradication of poverty and helping achieve Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). As in the case of regional integration, this objective will be achieved through economic growth and development of trade.

The regional integration processes pursued in the Eastern and Southern Africa and Indian Ocean region

The region in question is driven by four main ROs. These four regional organisations pursue, in parallel, different but complementary objectives.

The regional organisation that includes the greatest number of countries in the area is COMESA. Its objective is to create a free trade area and a customs and monetary union among its members and, in this way, to become a fully integrated, internationally competitive community with a high standard of living for its member nations and any others that are prepared to join an African Economic Community (AEC).

The East African Community (EAC) seems to be pursuing objectives similar to those of COMESA, and even seems to have overtaken the latter: a customs union was formed in 2005, a common market is planned for 2010, and a monetary union for 2012.

The two other main ROs in the region are more limited in scope. They cover smaller regions with shared borders or, in the case of the COI, bordering the same ocean.
The COI has several objectives: solidarity among nations, and defence of island interests in international fora and regional integration organisations; preservation and development of the environment and of natural resources; the regional dimension of human development.

IGAD’s objectives are centred on: agriculture, the environment, social and economic cooperation, peace and security, and equality between men and women.

**Help given by the RSP towards deepening the regional integration process and achieving the MDGs**

An allocation of EUR 645 million has been assigned to the RSP relating to the process of economic integration in the region. For effective implementation of this strategy, the four RECs are working together in an Interregional Coordination Committee.

It is therefore up to the Interregional Coordination Committee (which is made up of representatives of COMESA, the IAC, the COI and the IGAD, as well as representatives of the EU and the ACP secretariat) to take on the task of coordination with a view to achieving more effective regional integration through trade and investment which are truly synonymous with development for the countries concerned. Cooperation and coordination within this committee achieved some encouraging results during the implementation of the 10th EDF. It is on this committee that the success of the aspiration to generate social development and upward levelling of standards of living through economic growth and regional opening of markets will depend. The committee will also have to address the task of ensuring that the various ROs survive without all of them being involved.

As to the MDGs, the RSP should have ensured that a whole chapter was devoted to achieving them, in order to guarantee that economic development was accompanied by a genuine rise in standards of living, not only in terms of economic growth, but also of the right to health, food security, access to drinking water and education.

**RSPs versus economic partnership agreements (EPAs)**

The EPAs are intended to support the process of regional integration, not vice versa. This makes it all the more important to reiterate that one cannot impose from outside the way in which regional integration processes should take place, and the EU must content itself with supporting the process(es) chosen by the ACP countries.

SADEC, COMESA and the IAC decided at the Kampala summit in 2008 to draw up an agenda of work aimed at bringing the three ROs closer together in order to harmonise their laws and create a large single market. The process consists in the preliminary signing of a free trade agreement, which is intended to lead to a customs union and, in its turn, to the setting up of the AEC.

In parallel with this major project agreed among the three ROs, there are two regional strategies and three EPAs. It is difficult, therefore, to define precisely how the EU, via the 10th EDF and the EPAs, intends to give its support to the regional integration processes without setting the various ROs in competition with each other in establishing different common markets (this programme benefiting from EDF funds to a level of 85%) and without, in the final analysis, seeking to support first and foremost the establishment of the EPAs.

The three EPAs under negotiation in the two regions defined by the 10th EDF seem to be regarded by the tripartite council formed by COMESA, SADEC and the EAC as cornerstones of the construction of the AEC. The EU must therefore ensure that the two regional strategies in operation and the three EPAs under negotiation do not have the effect of substantially or lastingly disorganising this process.

The tripartite COMESA-EAC-SADC council decided at the Kampala summit in October 2008 to establish a free trade area, which will be followed by a customs union. The EPAs currently being negotiated in the tripartite's component configurations should strengthen the integration process that has already begun.
The objective of the strategy to support peace and regional stability

Political integration, good governance and human security are key factors in the success of processes of economic integration. Neither can be achieved without the other. Objective II of this strategy is intended to support this dimension by helping the four ROs in the region to improve their levels of transparency, democratisation, security, stability and sustainable development. From that point of view, the preparatory phase of the programme focuses on satisfactory identification of strategic interregional cooperation mechanisms that promote peace, democratisation and sustainable development in the region. Specific, well thought-out projects will be the fruit of this preliminary phase.

The programme seems to be starting off along the right lines. However, it may turn out that the funds allocated to it are not commensurate with the ambitions and needs in this area.

Participation of La Réunion and Mayotte in this strategy

First of all, it is regrettable that the name of the island of Mayotte, which is in every way part of the Indian Ocean, appears nowhere in the strategy.

The annex devoted to the involvement of the La Réunion in the 10th EDF and the process of regional integration is going in the right direction. However, the positions set out by the European Commission are not reflected in what it is actually doing for La Réunion in the parallel negotiation of the EPAs. The Outermost Regions must be seen at all levels by the Commission as potential engines of the development of the geographical region to which they belong, and not merely in the annexes to the 10th EDF.

It is regrettable also that a major project for the development of NICTs (New Information and Communication Technologies), and in particular of high-speed internet, is not specifically funded by the COI. Digital discontinuity persists along this ocean rim, which is naturally highly dependent on intercontinental submarmarine links, and where market forces are in play to the disadvantage of users in terms of the quality of the services offered and their high cost in comparison with continental regions. The 10th EDF should have encouraged the creation of NICT distribution platforms at regional level, particularly for the COI.

It would also be desirable for the Commission to think about drawing up a single financial cooperation instrument specific to the Outermost Regions, and of putting simple management procedures into effect with a view to taking genuine action to ensure that the Outermost Regions can play their acknowledged role as potential engines of mutual regional development.

The same goes for projects to create improved maritime, air and rail links, which remain highly significant in terms of, inter alia, developing trade.

Recommendations

In the light of this strategy, integration into world trade and economic dynamism are assumed to be the main factors that the region lacks as far as the completion of its human and social development is concerned. The model that is quoted and assumed to be the one that will deepen the process of regional integration is that of the EU: the establishment of a common market and a customs and monetary union. It is perhaps regrettable that support for the creation of a common agricultural policy for this region was not made part of a valid integration process. And yet the CAP, like the common market, is part of the model of the EU’s success and has helped to bring about ever closer union among peoples and states. It could also prove to be a more than relevant model for this region, which would enable it, for the full benefit of its inhabitants, to meet their common right to food self-sufficiency (which was the initial aim of the CAP in the EU). It must also be ensured in the context of the 11th EDF that mechanisms are found which will allow the national parliaments of the member states of the region’s ROs to be involved.
Conclusions on the Regional Strategy Paper (RSP) and Regional Indicative Programme (RIP) under the 10th EDF – SADC

The context in the region

The Southern African Development Community (SADC) is an international economic and political body which aims to create conditions for development and economic and social growth in Southern Africa. Although economic integration leads the SADC agenda, political cooperation is also included.

SADC was established in 1980 as the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) with the objective to coordinate development aid and reduce economic dependence on the then apartheid South Africa. It was transformed into SADC twelve years later. SADC is currently composed of 15 members: Angola, Botswana, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, the United Republic of Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe.

Unfortunately, SADC membership overlaps with other regional organizations such as the Southern African Customs Union (SACU), Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), East African Community (EAC), and others. This multiple national membership of regional economic communities continues to pose a challenge for regional integration in Southern Africa. Moreover, the SADC region is negotiating with the EU in three different Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) configurations (SADC, ESA - Eastern and Southern Africa - and EAC). The SADC EPA negotiating group comprises only half of the current SADC members.

In general, SADC is marked by enormous economic regional imbalances, suffering from small and little-diversified economies, pronounced inequalities and poverty. It is one of the poorest regions in the world - nearly 45 % of the total population in SADC lives on USD 1 a day. SADC has the highest HIV prevalence in the world (1/3 of the world’s total population living with HIV/AIDS is in SADC) with catastrophic economic and social implications in the region, affecting GNI growth, the labour supply, income inequality, human development and the attainment of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) in general. As regards primary school completion rate, SADC countries are amongst those with the lowest rates in the world. The region is also faced with challenges in the area of food and water security as well as democracy, peace and security, which often provoke mass movement of people within SADC. Major challenges remain also on issues related to women’s economic empowerment, participation in decision-making and human and legal rights. Civil society in the region is characterised as rather weak, fragmented and with a retroactive approach in its relations with the governments and regional organisations.

The response proposed in the SADC RSP/RIP

The Regional Indicative Programme allocates EUR 116 million to the SADC region, as follows:

— Focal sector 1 - Regional Economic Integration (allocation 80 % or EUR 92.8 million) - will provide broad-based support to deepen SADC economic integration and trade liberalisation and to address supply side constraints in the areas of regional infrastructure and food security.

— Focal sector 2 - Regional Political Cooperation (allocation 15 % or EUR 17.4 million) - will support capacity-building in the context of regional governance and the implementation of some aspects of the Joint Africa-EU Strategy in conflict prevention and in the area of Peace and Security.

— The two non-focal sectors - Technical cooperation facility and support to non-state actors in the implementation of activities in the RSP - will receive 5 % of the resources, or EUR 5.8 million.
Analysis of the SADC RSP/RIP

There is no doubt that regional integration is of crucial importance for the economic and overall development of the SADC countries and to enable them to participate in the global economy on an equal footing with other international players. As the RSP/RIP strongly supports the SADC intra-regional development, the EC programme under the 10th EDF is obviously relevant to the realities in the region. Moreover, the RIP measures foreseen are well-linked to the specific goals set out in the SADC agenda, particularly in the Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan (RISDP), as well as in the Joint Africa-EU Strategy. However, the amount of EUR 92.8 million would have been adequate if the RIP had provided additional resources for short term revenue losses and improvement of regional economic infrastructures. Moreover, as the SADC countries are highly dependent on the export of a few primary commodities, and therefore deeply affected by the financial, economic and social crises, resources should as well be provided to support the SADC states to transform and restructure their economies and engage in downstream value added measures for primary commodities.

The issue of the multiplicity of regional organisations in Southern Africa and the split of SADC Member States into three EPA groups - which seriously complicates inter- and intra-regional cooperation – unfortunately have not been adequately tackled, neither by SADC nor by the EC. The RSP mentions that SADC and the other regional organisations that are involved in economic integration activities, in particular COMESA, have to work in close cooperation and coordinate the implementation of their respective regional strategy. How exactly in reality this coordination is going to take place remains rather unclear.

In addition, while increased regional integration and political cooperation could indirectly contribute to poverty alleviation, a much more direct and clear link of the RSP measures to poverty reduction and the attainment of the MDGs in the SADC region is needed. Some of the shared factors that exacerbate poverty in the region are HIV/AIDS prevalence, gender inequality, lack of access to resources such as food and water, and a lack of human capital and skills.

As regards HIV/AIDS, unless the pandemic is holistically addressed at the national as well as the regional level, the prospects for achieving the MDGs diminish everyday for millions of people in SADC. Unfortunately, the RSP only foresees mainstreaming of HIV issues as part of the capacity building programme under Focal sector 1. The SADC RSP should therefore put greater emphasis on regional HIV/AIDS projects by, for instance, providing resources for the implementation of the SADC HIV/AIDS programmes and strategies, including the SADC Business Plan for AIDS.

Another major challenge for the SADC States is to ensure that children who start school actually complete primary education. The HIV epidemic further deteriorates the situation in schools as the education sector continues to lose staff at an alarming rate, with teacher attrition due to AIDS being reported as 46.2 % and 32.5 % in Zambia and Mozambique respectively. Besides, the SADC RISDP clearly identifies that SADC Member States also underperform in providing secondary and tertiary education and therefore focuses on the coordination, harmonization and engendering of education and training.

In addition, it is commendable that the RSP supports measures for cooperation in sustainable food security, which aims to achieve lasting access to safe and adequate food in the region. However, besides food security, water security and access to water is extremely important for the region's economic and social development. As fresh water is a particularly scarce resource in Southern Africa, demand for water could result in competition and disputes. More than half of the total SADC population lacks access to safe water and sanitation. The implementation of the SADC Regional Strategic Plan for Water Resources Development and Management and the revised Protocol on Shared Watercourse Systems Promotion and the development of water infrastructure would therefore directly improve drinking water supply as well as food security (as there will be sufficient water supply for agricultural needs). The JPA encourages a stronger promotion of environmental sustainability in the RSP, in particular regarding combating deforestation and land degradation.
Migration policies and the situation of refugees and Internally displaced people (IDPs) constitute a further challenge for the region, which should be better reflected in the RSP.

Regarding the implementation of the RIP funding, it is well-suited to achieving the objectives of regional integration and political cooperation as funding would be provided directly to the regional organisation and will use the SADC funding mechanisms. However, as pointed out in the RSP, in view of the subsidiarity principle, some interventions may be implemented at the national level, even though they have a regional integration objective. Furthermore, difficulties in implementing the financed activities need to be better addressed.

The donor matrix for the SADC region also seems well-balanced. Moreover, as the EC interventions are well-related to regional development frameworks and the SADC institutions, this additionally provides good prospects for coordination with other donors.

Prior to the drawing up of the RSP/RIP, consultations between the European Commission and the SADC secretariat, representatives from the SADC member states’ national authorities and regional non-State actors took place in order to coordinate the RSP with the CSPs of the countries from the region. There is, however, no indication on the participation of national and regional parliamentary bodies at these consultations.

**Recommendations**

1. RSP/RIP areas of support well reflect the developments in the SADC region concerning economic regional integration and political cooperation. The measures foreseen will also facilitate the implementation of the future full SADC-EU EPA. Countries in the region belonging to another EPA configuration should nevertheless be assured that they will equally benefit from the RSP.

2. Better and more direct links between the RSP measures and poverty reduction must be established. HIV/AIDS, water security, and human resource development, particularly education - which are some of the root causes for poverty in the SADC countries - should not only be tackled at national level, but at regional level as well. To this end, these issues need to be better addressed in the SADC RSP/RIP.

3. The overall funding for the programme should be increased to be able to secure sufficient funding for the measures in the areas detailed above.

4. The SADC countries’ national parliaments, the SADC Parliamentary Forum and the ACP-EU Joint Parliamentary Assembly should be better involved in programming, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of the SADC Regional Strategy Paper.
Conclusions on the Regional Strategy Paper (RSP) and Regional Indicative Programme (RIP) under the 10th EDF – Central Africa

1. The regional context

(a) Regional Integration

Regional integration in Central Africa is marked by an as yet imprecise definition of the region, and the superimposing of two regional organisations with partially identical objectives and varied composition. The Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa (CEMAC) (1) has been operational since 1999, while the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS/CEEAC) (2) has been in existence since 1983. The first of these is focused mainly on monetary union, in that its Member States share the CFA franc. CEMAC therefore aims essentially to construct a common market when CEEAC has achieved more results in terms of political integration, including peace and stability. However, the institutional weakness of the regional organisations continues to be a problem, as does the implementation of their decisions by the Member States.

The Democratic Republic of the Congo also belongs to the Economic Community of the Great Lakes (CEPGL).

As regards the negotiation of Economic Partnership Agreements and the Indicative Regional Programme, the region is made up of the CEMAC countries plus the Democratic Republic of the Congo and São Tomé e Príncipe.

(b) Other challenges at regional level

The region is characterised by the current or recent instability of some countries (Chad, Central African Republic, DR Congo). Two countries (Chad and CAR) are enclaves, there are few interconnections between the Central African states, and the region suffers from great poverty among its people. Nevertheless, Central Africa has many assets. All the countries have great natural wealth, including major forestry and agricultural potential. In order to overcome the ‘abundance paradox’ – i.e. the fact that natural wealth is not synonymous with development – the Central African States must ensure that wealth is better used and distributed. Democracy and good governance are also major challenges for these States.

2. The answer proposed in the RSP/RIP

The Indicative Regional Programme provides for EUR 165 million, 15 million of which are for the CEPGL, in the following concentration sectors:

— Concentration Sector 1 – Economic and commercial integration and accompaniment of the EPA (EUR 97 million, i.e. 65 %) – should enable the efforts of the regional organisations to be supported in terms of establishing a common market, interconnecting road, telecommunications and electricity networks etc., and developing a regional agricultural and food security policy.

— Concentration Sector 2 – Management of renewable natural resources (EUR 30 million, i.e. 20 %) – should help to improve good governance of the forestry sector and protected areas with fisheries potential.

— Concentration Sector 3 – Political integration (EUR 15 million, i.e. 10 %) – is intended to help reinforce the region’s capacity in terms of conflict prevention, management and resolution, inter alia by reinforcing civil society.

— Extra-concentration areas – Institutional support and technical cooperation facility (EUR 8 million, i.e. 5 %) – inter alia for strengthening coordination between CEMAC and CEEAC.

(1) Made up of Cameroon, Congo, Gabon, Equatorial Guinea, the Central African Republic and Chad.
(2) Made up of Angola, Burundi, Cameroon, the Central African Republic, Congo, Gabon, Equatorial Guinea, Chad, the DR Congo and São Tomé e Príncipe.
3. Analysis of the Central Africa RSP/RIP

The 2008-2013 RSP/RIP was published very late, which poses a problem for, inter alia, the comprehensibility of the European strategy in the region. According to the Commission, the delays were due to problems encountered in the context of the simultaneous consultations with the two regional organisations concerned. They were only able to concentrate their efforts as of February 2009 on deciding on their respective roles and the distribution of resources. Nevertheless, three projects are in preparation in the areas of peace and security, natural resources, and regional integration. Other projects are still under way under the 9th EDF. Because of this delay in the preparation of the RSP/RIP, the mid-term review has also been postponed by a year. The Assembly emphasises that greater efforts should be made to promote coordination of the two regional organisations and to intensify the shared regional integration project, which would also help to avoid delays in programming, which detract from better predictability and effectiveness of aid, giving rise inter alia to problems in disbursing EDF funds in Central Africa.

It seems also that a great many programmes within the first Concentration Sector are dedicated to improving standards (in the areas of trade, health, services, investment, etc.) rather than to implementing specific projects. And, while harmonisation and modernisation of standards are essential tasks, the creation of genuine regional synergies will take place via manufacturing and trade more than through standardisation.

Negotiations on a regional EPA in Central Africa are currently at a standstill. But the main part of the strategy drawn up in the RSP concerns measures to accompany the EPAs. As far as the Commission is concerned, the relationship between the EPA and the RIP was discussed at the time of the preparation of the RSP, on the assumption that there would be an agreement, and that the RIP would remain flexible. It nevertheless continues to be essential that mechanisms should be devised upstream to provide effective accompaniment for the region if it chooses to conclude an EPA. Inter alia, the specific priority aspects to be taken into account would have to be identified. In parallel, the region must not be penalised by the stagnation of the negotiations or by a choice not to continue any further with the process of negotiating the EPA, neither financially, including in terms of the funds granted by the EDF under Aid for Trade, nor in terms of the implementation of the programmes, which must remain consistent with the realities of the region.

The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) are almost never mentioned in the RSP, which is unacceptable given that the EDF is the EU’s principal instrument of aid to the ACP countries, and that its main priority must be to achieve the MDGs. The first area for intervention is the commercial area, but no reference is made to its impact on employment and poverty. And yet it is essential – and this is the declared objective of the EPAs – to place trade at the service of development. Measures that are more concrete and that have a direct impact on the achievement of the MDGs should be planned, inter alia in the areas of health and education, in accordance with the Development Cooperation Instrument and the political undertaking to devote 20 % of resources to health and basic education. Even in commercial areas, the impact on the population, including in terms of employment, is crucial in order that the population should take ownership of the ongoing regional integration process and see the actual benefits of the policies jointly implemented by the EU and the Central African region. According to the Commission, the ultimate aim of the regional strategy is to reduce poverty (MDG 1). The Commission emphasises that more specific programmes, including those to promote employment, will be drawn up, even though this subject area is not mentioned directly in the PIR. It is regrettable, however, that this is not already the case, particularly as the indicative national programmes do not allow the current shortcomings of the PIR with regard to the achievement of the MDGs to be offset.

One important subject should be emphasised more in the document – agriculture, in conjunction with food security (while MDG 1 is to combat poverty and hunger). This is a subject area where there is a direct link between trade (in its dimension of improving and diversifying agricultural production, creating value added, and emerging from export monocultures), development (improving food self-sufficiency and the health of the people, job creation), and protection of the environment (development of new crop production techniques that are more economical of water, provide better soil protection etc.). Agriculture is also one of the main objectives highlighted by the Joint Orientation Document (JOD), an essential document since it genuinely constitutes a set of strategic guidelines drawn up jointly by the EU and the Central African Region. Agriculture therefore deserves to be more directly supported at regional level, and yet it is only mentioned in passing in the first concentration sector (support for the development of a regional policy, without further specification). The Commission, furthermore, recognises the need to reinforce this sector of aid concentration, in terms both of harmonising polices and of diversifying and processing products.
Recommendations

Reinforcing regional integration is certainly a justified priority, particularly for the countries of the region that are enclaves. Careful vigilance must be exercised, however, to ensure that the negotiations on the Economic Partnership Agreements do not run counter to the objective of regional integration.

While it is interesting to note that management of natural resources, with the emphasis on sustainable resource management, is one of the concentration sectors, it must be stressed that, taken overall, the link with combating poverty is very indirect. Achieving the Millennium Development Goals should be at the heart of the Regional Strategy Paper, and in view of this more space should have been devoted to agriculture.

In addition, the region is particularly badly affected by the world economic crisis, given that it exports raw materials for which demand has fallen on world markets. This is further proof, if any more were necessary, of the need to develop capacity for processing raw materials and diversifying these economies, which frequently depend on a single source of wealth. However, despite the delay in adopting the RSP, it would seem that this fundamental element has not been taken into account. The RSP should therefore develop a clear strategy of accompanying measures for trade for the region’s countries in order to promote job creation and development.

Conclusions on the Regional Strategy Paper (RSP) and Regional Indicative Programme (RIP) under the 10th EDF – West Africa

1. The regional context

This document that was signed by the European Commission (10th EDF) on one hand, and Economic Community Of Western African States (ECOWAS) and the Western African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU) on the other, was drawn up on the basis of a regional document.

The region of West Africa is marked by numerous disparities: economic and political development is very different between the 15 countries (plus Mauritania) that form this region. The majority are ‘Least Developed Countries’ (LDC), except for Cape Verde, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana and Nigeria (the latter being an important oil producer). In terms of political stability and democracy, differences are also striking between Ghana and Mali, not even mentioning the difference between Guinea and Guinea-Bissau. The situation is improving in Côte d’Ivoire although it is not completely stabilised. Liberia and Sierra Leone are still in a post-conflict phase. In general, 9 of the 15 ECOWAS countries can be regarded as countries in a situation of fragility.

However, West Africa is one of the best ‘integrated’ regions of the ACP, with regional institutions that also have an important political aspect. The ECOWAS is not only concerned with economic integration but it also plays an important role in terms of promoting good governance, of preventing and resolving conflicts, and of peacekeeping. Obviously its structures remain weak and integration is not yet as thorough as wished. But it is within West Africa that trade is the bulkiest, in comparison to other ACP regional integrations. Moreover, the countries of the African Financial Community (AFC) area formed a customs and monetary union, the WAEMU.

The main obstacle to the development of the region is due to the structure of region’s economy. The majority of the countries are non transformed raw material exporters, particularly exporting agricultural products. Development aid should therefore encourage the emergence of industrial structures, but especially help these countries to respect the sanitary and phytosanitary measures of the export markets (primarily the EU).
2. The answer proposed in the RSP/RIP

The Regional Indicative Programme (RIP) of the RSP provides a budget of EUR 597 million, in the following concentration sectors:

| Concentration sector I: Deepening of regional integration, improvement of competitiveness and EPA | 70 % of the budget (EUR 418 million) |
| Concentration sector II: Consolidation of good governance and of regional stability          | 20 % of the budget (EUR 119 million) |
| Other programmes                                                                    | 10 % of the budget (EUR 60 million) |

Among the ‘additional’ sectors, the EC should seek to improve involvement of civil society, which is insufficiently represented at regional level.

The RSP and its RIP will have to be revised halfway, which will be in 2010.

Analysis of the RSP/RIP West Africa

Food security is one of the priorities of the strategy. This topic is of primary importance in a region that produces and exports agricultural raw materials, but imports processed products. Besides, during the last 30 years, agricultural production did not develop as much as demographic growth, making food security of local people more delicate. Support from RIP for the regional agricultural policy (in particular of WAEMU), for regional strategy for food production and hunger relief does not appear to be very clear. For the European Commission, food security is one of the five axes of the RIP, but cooperation with the regional organisations still has to be finalised in a roadmap. Similarly, the EC should support one of the programmes of ECOWAS’ agricultural policy.

Rightly, the RSP notes the weaknesses of the infrastructures in the region, in particular for transport, and points out that that is a genuine barrier to regional trade, and accordingly to development. Once again, there is no clear response in the RIP, even if the Commission ensures that the Economic Partnership Agreement’s Development Programme (EPADP) will provide a useful framework to channel the aid of the various donors, particularly for infrastructure.

The first concentration sector is related to the Economic Partnership Agreement, which has not been signed yet. Questions also remain on the funding of the Regional Fund EAP and on the use of resources related to the development part of the EPA until it has been signed.

The document is missing precise details regarding possible actions on migration or on the EU fisheries policy and the effectiveness of the fishing agreements.

Recommendations

The JPA would like to know which documents or basic statistics were used by the Commission to start the discussions with the region.

The JPA would like to stress the important role of agriculture and points out the need to involve the regional farmers’ trade unions more. It also stresses the need to set out plans at regional level to fight drought or desert locusts, in order to strengthen food security at regional level.

One of the aims of the RSP/RIP should be the creation of sub-regional markets because the countries of the region do not export to neighbouring countries, which represents underexploited commercial possibilities. It is consequently absolutely necessary to open up the countries and to integrate the markets. Also, the problem of local transformation of products should be addressed because, at this moment, the region exports raw materials and imports manufactured goods. This aspect is missing in the RIP. Additionally, the RIP also pays too little attention to the development of regional infrastructures.
Even if the ultimate aim of cooperation is the poverty alleviation, the link between the RIP and the Millennium Development Goals seems too tenuous. A clearer articulation between the national strategies and the regional strategy would certainly make it possible to improve.

The JPA insists that the PAPED will be financed by additional funds and not by the EDF. Lastly, the JPA also insists that the ECOWAS Parliament should be involved in monitoring the regional strategy.

Conclusions on the Regional Strategy Paper (RSP) and Regional Indicative Programme (RIP) under the 10th EDF – Pacific

Regional Integration in the Pacific

The Pacific region comprises 15 small island states spread over an ocean area the size of Africa. As a region it has unique characteristics found nowhere else in the world: small population (9.55 million, the same as Belgium), a land area of only 560 000 km$^2$, spread over 29 million km$^2$, an extremely wide degree of dispersion. In fact 80% of the land area is accounted for by Papua New Guinea and many of the smaller island states have the surface area of small cities in Europe. The concept of regional integration is therefore fraught with challenges.

Overall, the Pacific ACP nations are diverse in terms of economic development and natural resources but share many human and cultural characteristics, including sport, in particular rugby union. Many of the countries share the same ocean resources, such as fisheries and tourism potential, but are also exposed to rising sea-levels which impact coastal areas. Regional trade remains to be developed due to inadequate transport infrastructure and the distances involved. In economic and social terms most Pacific states are highly dependent on their larger neighbours Australia and New Zealand.

It is in this context that regional cooperation takes place, with the overarching Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) in which the 15 states plus Australia and New Zealand meet once a year. The PIF Secretariat, which also chairs the Council of Regional Organisations in the Pacific (ten other regional intergovernmental organisations), implements the RIP on behalf of the Pacific ACP States. The PIF was also behind the creation of the Pacific Plan (2006-2015) which defines regional cooperation and integration as:

— Setting up dialogues or processes between governments;

— Pooling national services (such as customs, health, education and sport) at regional level;

— Lowering market barriers.

The Pacific Plan contains initiatives to promote development in the region centred round the four pillars of economic growth, sustainable development, governance and security. Overall there has been some progress in aviation and maritime services, security and telecommunications infrastructure, but differences between Pacific ACP economies have made it difficult to implement trade agreements and to establish a sound economic infrastructure. Many challenges remain.

As regards the EU, it adopted its first ‘EU Strategy for the Pacific’ in 2006 which aims to complement the Pacific Plan and focus on enhancing political dialogue, placing greater emphasis on regional cooperation and improving aid effectiveness. This strategy underpins the terms of the current RSP/RIP.
Overview of the Pacific RSP/RIP

The first RSP/RIP for the Pacific region for 2002-2007 provided EUR 29 million (increased to EUR 39 million in the Mid-Term review of the RSP) broken down as follows:

— Regional integration and trade: EUR 9 million
— Human resources development: EUR 8 million
— Fisheries: EUR 5 million
— Non-focal (existing projects/technical assistance): EUR 7 million

The current RSP/RIP for the 10th EDF is much more ambitious, with EUR 95 million allocated for 2008-2013 broken down as follows:

— Focal Sector 1 (Regional economic integration): EUR 45 million
— Focal Sector 2 (Sustainable Management of Natural Resources and the Environment): EUR 40 million
— Non-Focal (non-state actors, technical cooperation etc): EUR 10 million

The first two pillars of the Pacific Plan therefore receive 90 % of the funding. The other two pillars, governance and security, will receive support from structured EU-Pacific ACP dialogue and mechanisms such as the Stability Instrument.

Analysis of the Pacific RSP/RIP

The RSP/RIP focal areas are clear priorities set by the region itself and reflect the major needs for the region to develop further in a sustainable way. Both focal areas continue the momentum achieved through the first RIP in the crucial sectors of economic integration and support for the fisheries sector, although human resources development is no longer a specific focal area.

Focal area 1 is spread over four main areas of intervention:

— Economic Integration and Trade (the EPA and other regional trade agreements)
— Support for the private sector (private sector mechanisms, key sectors such as tourism and fisheries, promoting entrepreneurship)
— Mechanisms for economic growth (fair trading, competition, consumer protection, customs and international standards)
— Human Resources (integrated education programmes and access to technical and vocational training).

Many of these sectors are focussed on the implementation of the EPA, despite the fact that only Fiji and Papua New Guinea have so far signed up to it.
Focal Area 2 has the following areas of intervention:

— Climate Change and disaster risk reduction

— Sustainable management of marine resources (including fisheries)

— Sustainable management of land resources

— Ecosystems and biodiversity

— Waste and pollution

— Environmental monitoring and information management

These areas are a constructive extension of the scope of the RIP and fully reflect the needs of the Pacific ACP states as well as sustainable development priorities.

Finally, the non-focal area provides for technical support for the Pacific Islands Forum as regional authorising officer (EUR 3 million) and EUR 4 million for non-state actor activities. The level of development of the non-state actor sector in the Pacific region varies enormously and there is a clear need for assistance in capacity-building in this area.

**Recommendations**

Overall the JPA welcomes the RSP/RIP under the 10th EDF as a positive contribution to the economic and social development of the Pacific ACP States. It draws the following conclusions for consideration under the mid-term review.

1. The fact that the Pacific EPA has so far only been signed by Papua New Guinea and Fiji calls into question the focus in the RIP Focal Area 1 on EPA implementation, since many of the States in the region are not yet concerned. There needs to be a clear analysis of the impact of this delay in terms of how resources under Focal Area 1 are spent.

2. While there are positive measures in the RIP to promote education and training in the region, one of the major concerns is the migration of skilled labour to the USA, Australia and New Zealand. Although their remittances are important, most of these professionals are trained at high cost to local economies. There needs to be a greater focus in the RIP Focal Area 1 not only on providing these skills but on establishing measures to ensure that the Pacific ACP States benefit themselves from having their own skilled workforce. The same argument applies to Pacific Island sportsmen and women who are recruited by clubs in Australia and New Zealand and are then given nationality of those countries in order for them to play for the national side, which has a negative impact on Pacific national sides such as Fiji, Samoa and Tonga in the field of rugby.

3. The JPA welcomes the detailed focus on developing the fisheries sector but calls for more emphasis to be placed on the issue of illegal fishing which has hugely damaging effects on fish stocks and the livelihood of local fishermen. Illegal fishing is carried out by vessels from countries outside the region that show scant regard or respect for international regulations governing exclusive zones or stocks. Aquaculture should be promoted in local communities of the Pacific to ensure food security and exports of fisheries products.
4. The JPA is concerned at the lack of parliamentary consultation in the preparations of the RSP/RIP, and hopes to encourage this process through its enhanced role of scrutiny over CSPs and RSPs. Not only is there a need for greater consultation of national ACP parliaments in the creation and implementation of the RIP, but also for capacity-building of parliamentarians and their staff in this area.

5. While welcoming the non-focal emphasis on non-state actors the JPA is concerned over which recipients will benefit from funding and hopes that proper care will be taken to verify the credentials and reputation of those concerned. It also calls for NGOs to be more involved in the consultation procedure for the RSP/RIP.

6. The emphasis on climate change and its impact on small island states is welcomed, as is the funding to assist in protection against this growing problem. It is important, though, for funding not to be diverted to support the growing lobby which pins overall responsibility for climate change on industrialised nations and their activities. There is a marked difference between combating climate change and using the phenomenon for political ends.

7. Transport infrastructure needs to be a top priority in any regional development activities for the Pacific region, since the distances between member states and domestically as well as poor infrastructure hamper any progress towards regional trade or the development of tourism and other sectors which would enhance growth of benefit to the local population.