Operative part of the judgment

1) *Article 3(1)(c) of Council Directive 2000/78/EC of 27 November 2000 establishing a general framework for equal treatment in employment and occupation must be interpreted as meaning that pay conditions for civil servants fall within the scope of that directive.*

2) *Articles 2 and 6(1) of Directive 2000/78 must be interpreted as precluding a national measure, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, under which, within each service grade, the step determining basic pay is to be allocated, at the time of recruitment, on the basis of the civil servant's age.*

3) *Articles 2 and 6(1) of Directive 2000/78 must be interpreted as not precluding domestic legislation, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, laying down the detailed rules governing the reclassification within a new remuneration system of civil servants who were established before that legislation entered into force, under which the pay step that they are now allocated is to be determined solely on the basis of the amount received by way of basic pay under the old system, notwithstanding the fact that that amount depended on discrimination based on the civil servant's age, and advancement to the next step is now to depend exclusively on the experience acquired after that legislation entered into force.*

4) *In circumstances such as those of the cases before the referring court, EU law — and, in particular, Article 17 of Directive 2000/78 — does not require civil servants who have been discriminated against to be retrospectively granted an amount equal to the difference between the pay actually received and that corresponding to the highest step in their grade;*

   It is for the referring court to ascertain whether all the conditions, laid down by the case-law of the Court of Justice of the European Union, are met for the Federal Republic of Germany to have incurred liability under EU law.

5) *EU law does not preclude a national rule, like the rule at issue in the main proceedings, which requires the civil servant to take steps, within relatively narrow time-limits — that is to say, before the end of the financial year then in course — to assert a claim to financial payments that do not arise directly from the law, where that rule does not conflict with the principle of equivalence or the principle of effectiveness. It is for the referring court to determine whether those conditions are satisfied in the main proceedings.*

([1]) OJ C 26, 26.1.2013.
OJ C 46, 16.2.2013.

Judgment of the Court (First Chamber) of 19 June 2014 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom — United Kingdom) — Jessy Saint Prix v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions

(Case C-507/12) ([1])

(Reference for a preliminary ruling — Article 45 TFEU — Directive 2004/38/EC — Article 7 — 'Worker' — Union citizen who gave up work because of the physical constraints of the late stages of pregnancy and the aftermath of childbirth)

(2014/C 282/07)

Language of the case: English

Referring court

Supreme Court of the United Kingdom

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicants: Jessy Saint Prix

Defendants: Secretary of State for Work and Pensions

Intervening party: AIRE Centre

Operative part of the judgment

Article 45 TFEU must be interpreted as meaning that a woman who gives up work, or seeking work, because of the physical constraints of the late stages of pregnancy and the aftermath of childbirth retains the status of 'worker', within the meaning of that article, provided she returns to work or finds another job within a reasonable period after the birth of her child.

([1]) OJ C 26, 26.1.2013.

Judgment of the Court (First Chamber) of 19 June 2014 — Commune de Millau, Société d'économie mixte d'équipement de l'Aveyron (SEMEA) v European Commission

(Case C-531/12 P) ([1])

(Appeal — Arbitration clause — Grant contract concerning a local development action — Recovery of part of the sums paid — Assumption of debt — Jurisdiction of the General Court — Limitation period — Liability of the Commission)

(2014/C 282/08)

Language of the case: French

Parties

Appellants: Commune de Millau, Société d'économie mixte d'équipement de l'Aveyron (SEMEA) (represented by: L. Hincker and F. Bleykasten, avocats)

Other party to the proceedings: European Commission (represented by: S. Lejeune and D. Calciu, acting as Agents, and by E. Bouttier, avocat)

Operative part of the judgment

The Court:

1) *Sets aside the judgment of the General Court of the European Union in Joined Cases T-168/10 and T-572/10 Commission v SEMEA and Commune de Millau, in so far as it found, in the assessment of the counterclaim brought by the Commune de Millau and the Société d'économie mixte d'équipement de l'Aveyron (SEMEA), that there is no direct causal link between the conduct of the European Commission and the damage allegedly sustained as a result of the order for payment of default interest;*

2) *Upholds in part the counterclaim brought by the Commune de Millau and the Société d'économie mixte d'équipement de l'Aveyron (SEMEA) and orders the European Commission to pay three quarters of the amount of default interest at the annual statutory rate applied in France that is due in respect of the period from 27 April 1993 to 18 November 2005;*

3) *Dismisses the appeal as to the remainder;*

4) *Orders the European Commission, in addition to bearing its own costs at first instance and on appeal, to pay one quarter of the costs incurred by the Commune de Millau and by the Société d'économie mixte d'équipement de l'Aveyron (SEMEA) in both sets of proceedings;*

5) *Orders the Commune de Millau and the Société d'économie mixte d'équipement de l'Aveyron (SEMEA) to bear three quarters of their own costs incurred at first instance and on appeal.*

([1]) OJ C 32, 2.2.2013.