IV

(Informaciones)

INFORMACIÓN PROCEDENTE DE LAS INSTITUCIONES, ÓRGANOS Y ORGANISMOS DE LA UNIÓN EUROPEA

PARLAMENTO EUROPEO

PREGUNTAS ESCRITAS FORMULADAS CON SOLICITUD DE RESPUESTA ESCRITA

Preguntas escritas formuladas por los diputados al Parlamento Europeo y las respuestas de una de las instituciones de la Unión Europea

(2014/C 288/01)

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(Ελληνική έκδοση)

Ερώτηση με αίτημα γραπτής απάντησης E-011266/13
προς την Επιτροπή
Kyriacos Triantaphyllides (GUE/NGL)
(3 Οκτωβρίου 2013)

Θέμα: Παρακολουθήσεις από τις αμερικανικές μυστικές υπηρεσίες

Τα έγγραφα που αποκαλύφθηκαν από τον Έντουαρντ Σνόουντεν σχετικά με τις παρακολουθήσεις από τις αμερικανικές μυστικές υπηρεσίες ξένων κρατικών υποδομών και της δυνατότητας παρακολουθήσεων που είχαν μέσω διαδικτυακών κόμβων δημιουργούν την λογική απαίτηση αλλαγής πολιτικής από την ΕΕ.

Ερωτάται η Ευρωπαϊκή Επιτροπή για τα εξής:

Σκέφτεται να αναθεωρήσει την νομοθεσία που αφορά τις παρακολουθήσεις τηλεφωνικών και διαδικτυακών συνδιαλέξεων πολιτών της ΕΕ;

Σκέφτεται να αναθεωρήσει την εταιρική σχέση ΕΕ-ΗΠΑ στον τομέα μεταβίβασης δεδομένων των πολιτών των κρατών μελών της ΕΕ, περιλαμβανομένης και της συμφωνίας προσωπικών δεδομένων ταξιδιωτών;

Μελετά το ενδεχόμενο να επιβάλει κυρώσεις στις εταιρείες, περιλαμβανομένων και των εταιρειών διαδικτύου που, όπως αποκαλύπτεται στα δημοσιοποιημένα πλέον έγγραφα της NSA, συνέβαλαν στην παρακολούθηση πολιτών;

Πώς σκέφτεται να αντιδράσει έναντι της κυβέρνησης της Μεγάλης Βρετανίας, λαμβάνοντας υπόψη ότι το πρόγραμμα παρακολούθησης περιελάμβανε και την χρησιμοποίηση των βρετανικών βάσεων Κύπρου;

Απάντηση της κ. Reding εξ ονόματος της Επιτροπής
(25 Μαρτίου 2014)

Η Επιτροπή αντέδρασε στις πρόσφατες αποκαλύψεις περί παρακολουθήσεων με την ανακοίνωση «Αποκατάσταση της εμπιστοσύνης στη ροή δεδομένων μεταξύ ΕΕ και ΗΠΑ» ([1]). Η Επιτροπή αναγνωρίζει ότι έχει πληγεί η εμπιστοσύνη στην διατλαντική σχέση και εξετάζει τις επιλογές άσκησης πολιτικής από την Ένωση που θα εξασφαλίσουν την αποκατάστασή της. Η Επιτροπή υπογραμμίζει τη σπουδαιότητα που έχουν η ταχεία έγκριση της δέσμης για τη μεταρρύθμιση της προστασίας των δεδομένων και η ολοκλήρωση των διαπραγματεύσεων για τη συμφωνία ΕΕ-ΗΠΑ σχετικά με την προστασία των δεδομένων στον τομέα της επιβολής της νομοθεσίας (συμφωνία πλαίσιο), που αναμένεται ότι θα παράσχουν στους πολίτες της ΕΕ δικαίωμα δικαστικής προσφυγής, καθώς και ενίσχυση του συστήματος του «Ασφαλούς Λιμένα».

Την ίδια ημέρα, δημοσιεύτηκαν οι διαπιστώσεις των συμπροέδρων από την ΕΕ της ad hoc ομάδας εργασίας ΕΕ-ΗΠΑ ([2]), στις οποίες αξιολογείται η λειτουργία των προγραμμάτων και η έκταση των εγγυήσεων που προστατεύουν τους πολίτες της Ένωσης.

Η Επιτροπή χαιρετίζει το αποτέλεσμα της ψηφοφορίας στην επιτροπή «Πολιτικές ελευθερίες, δικαιοσύνη και εσωτερικές υποθέσεις» (LIBE) σχετικά με τη δέσμη για τη μεταρρύθμιση της προστασίας των δεδομένων, καθώς και το γεγονός ότι το Ευρωπαϊκό Κοινοβούλιο, όπως και η Επιτροπή, απαιτεί την επιβολή αυστηρών και αποτελεσματικών κυρώσεων στις εταιρείες που παραβιάζουν την νομοθεσία της ΕΕ περί προστασίας δεδομένων. Η Επιτροπή θεωρεί ότι αυτό αποτελεί σημαντική ένδειξη προόδου στη νομοθετική διαδικασία και έχει δεσμευτεί να εξασφαλίσει την ταχεία έγκριση της μεταρρύθμισης της προστασίας των δεδομένων, πριν από το τέλος της τρέχουσας κοινοβουλευτικής περιόδου.

Η ΕΕ διαθέτει ήδη νομικό πλαίσιο προστασίας του απορρήτου των επικοινωνιών. Συγκεκριμένα, στο άρθρο 5 παράγραφος 1 της οδηγίας για την προστασία της ιδιωτικής ζωής στον τομέα των ηλεκτρονικών επικοινωνιών ορίζεται ότι τα κράτη μέλη, μέσω της εθνικής νομοθεσίας, απαγορεύουν την ακρόαση, την υποκλοπή και την αποθήκευση των επικοινωνιών, εκτός αν οι χρήστες έχουν συναινέσει ή υπάρχει σχετική νόμιμη άδεια, σύμφωνα με το άρθρο 15 παράγραφος 1 της οδηγίας.

([1]) 27 Νοεμβρίου 2013.
([2]) Η οποία εξέτασε τον αντίκτυπο των αμερικανικών προγραμμάτων επιτήρησης στο θεμελιώδες δικαίωμα της προστασίας των δεδομένων προσωπικού χαρακτήρα των πολιτών της ΕΕ.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-011266/13
to the Commission
Kyriacos Triantaphyllides (GUE/NGL)
(3 October 2013)

Subject: Surveillance by US secret services

The documents revealed by Edward Snowden in relation to US secret service surveillance of the infrastructure of foreign states, and the possibilities made open to the US secret services through using Internet surveillance, logically demand a change in EU policy.

Will the Commission therefore say:

Is it considering reviewing legislation on surveillance of EU citizens' telephone and Internet communications?

Is it considering reviewing the EU's relationship with the US in the area of transmission of data on EU Member State citizens, including the agreement on travellers' personal data?

Is it considering exploring the possibility of imposing sanctions on companies — including Internet companies — which, as revealed in the National Security Agency documents that have now entered the public domain, have provided assistance in the surveillance of citizens?

What response does it plan against the UK Government in relation to the fact that the surveillance programme included the use of the British bases in Cyprus?

Answer given by Mrs Reding on behalf of the Commission
(25 March 2014)

The Commission responded to recent surveillance revelations in the communication 'Rebuilding trust in EU-US data flows' ([1]). It acknowledges that trust in the transatlantic relationship has been damaged and examines the policy options to ensure it is rebuilt. The Commission emphasises the importance of the swift adoption of the data protection reform package, the completion of negotiations on the EU-US Agreement on Data Protection in the Law Enforcement Sector (the Umbrella Agreement) which should provide a right of judicial redress to EU citizens as well as a strengthening of the Safe Harbour scheme.

On the same day, the findings of the EU co-chairs of the ad-hoc EU-US Working Group ([2]) were published, providing an account of the functioning of the programmes and assess the scope of the safeguards that protect EU citizens.

The Commission welcomes the vote in the LIBE Committee on the data protection reform package and the fact that the European Parliament, like the Commission, demands strong and effective sanctions for companies who breach EU data protection laws. The Commission considers that it is an important signal of progress in the legislative procedure and is committed to ensuring a swift adoption of the data protection reform before the end of this parliamentary term.

The EU has already a legal framework protecting the confidentiality of communications. Indeed, Art 5(1) of the ePrivacy Directive requires Member States, through national legislation, to prohibit the listening into, tapping and storage of communications unless users concerned have consented or unless these practices are legally authorised in accordance with Article 15 (1) of the directive.

([1]) 27 November 2013.
([2]) which examined the impact of US surveillance programmes on the fundamental right to data protection of EU citizens.

(Deutsche Fassung)

Anfrage zur schriftlichen Beantwortung E-012183/13
an die Kommission
Jürgen Klute (GUE/NGL)
(24. Oktober 2013)

Betrifft: Krise der Raffineriebranche in Italien und Europa

Das Abgeordnetenhaus des italienischen Parlaments hat im Dezember 2012 einen Bericht über die „Krise der Raffineriebranche in Italien" erstellt. Zum Zeitpunkt der Abfassung des Berichts bestand dieser italienische Wirtschaftssektor aus mindestens 16 Raffinerien, von denen acht inzwischen geschlossen bzw. in Erdölterminals (z. B. Tamoil in Cremona und Total-ERG in Rom) umgewandelt worden sind. In dem Sektor waren 10 000 Arbeitnehmer direkt und etwa 12 000 Arbeitnehmer über Subunternehmen für die regelmäßige Wartung sowie Tausende weiterer Arbeitnehmer im Rahmen von außerordentlichen Wartungs- und Modernisierungsaufträgen infolge von Investitionen und technischen Innovationen beschäftigt. Einige der Erkenntnisse dieses Berichts sind aus industrieller und gesellschaftlicher Sicht ziemlich besorgniserregend. So geht der Branchenverband „Unione Petrolifera" von Überkapazitäten in einer Größenordnung von 15 bis 20 Mio. Tonnen (von einer Gesamtkapazität von schätzungsweise 100 Mio. Tonnen) aus, was 20 Prozent der Gesamtkapazität oder der Produktionskapazität von vier Raffinerien à 5 Mio. Tonnen entspricht. Derzeit beträgt die Auslastung der in Betrieb befindlichen Anlagen 70 Prozent der maximalen Kapazität. Zusätzlich erschwert wird die derzeit schwierige Lage der europäischen und italienischen Raffinerien noch durch den gesunkenen Verbrauch (zum Teil bedingt durch die Weltwirtschaftskrise) und insbesondere durch aggressive außereuropäische Wettbewerber, deren geringere Produktionskosten und somit beträchtlicher Kostenvorteil auf fehlende Sozial- und Umweltstandards zurückzuführen sind. Diese kritische Situation wirkt sich auch auf andere italienische Anlagen (die Raffinerie Mol in Mantua und die Raffinerie ENI in Marghera und Livorno) aus.

Die Kommission wird daher um die Beantwortung folgender Fragen gebeten:

1. Sollte die Kommission die Krise, in der sich die europäische Raffineriebranche befindet, nicht anerkennen?

2. Welche Maßnahmen gedenkt die Kommission zum Schutz dieses für die Energiesicherheit strategisch bedeutsamen Wirtschaftszweigs zu ergreifen, in dem zudem Tausende von Arbeitnehmern beschäftigt sind?

3. Welche Maßnahmen gedenkt die Kommission im Sinne einer Forschungs- und Investitionspolitik für die Raffineriebranche zu ergreifen, mit der die Anlagen modernisiert sowie ihre Produktivität und Energieeffizienz verbessert werden?

Antwort von Herrn Tajani im Namen der Kommission
(20. Dezember 2013)

1. Die Kommission ist sich der derzeitigen Schwierigkeiten der Raffineriebranche bewusst ([1]). Im Arbeitspapier der Kommissionsdienststellen von 2010 zur Raffinerie und Lieferung von Erdölerzeugnissen in der EU ([2]) werden die wichtigsten Herausforderungen der Gegenwart und der Zukunft ausführlich dargelegt. Außerdem wird im „Energiefahrplan 2050" ([3]) der Kommission Folgendes festgehalten: „… weiterhin im europäischen Raffineriesektor Präsenz zu zeigen (eine Präsenz, bei der die Kapazitäten jedoch an die wirtschaftlichen Gegebenheiten eines reifen Marktes angepasst werden können), ist wichtig für die Wirtschaft der EU, für Sektoren, die wie die petrochemische Industrie auf Raffinerieprodukte als Ausgangsstoffe angewiesen sind, und für die Versorgungssicherheit".

2. Die Kommission hat im Rahmen ihrer Mitteilung zur Industriepolitik von 2012 eine sogenannte „Eignungsprüfung", eine umfassende quantitative und qualitative Bewertung des gesamten einschlägigen EU-Rechts, eingeleitet. Dabei sollen überflüssiger Verwaltungsaufwand, Überschneidungen, Lücken, Unstimmigkeiten und überholte Maßnahmen aufgedeckt werden. Die Ergebnisse dieser Eignungsprüfung werden im September 2014 vorliegen. Die beteiligten Akteure werden über das EU-Raffinerie-Forum regelmäßig über den Stand der Dinge informiert.

3. Über EU-Programme wie die EU-Strukturfonds, das Rahmenprogramm für Forschung und Entwicklung, das Rahmenprogramm für Wettbewerbsfähigkeit und Innovation (CIP) und die von 2014 bis 2020 laufenden Programme „Horizont 2020" und das EU-Programm für die Wettbewerbsfähigkeit von Unternehmen und für KMU COSME können Forschung und Investitionen in Raffinerien unterstützt werden. Die Fördermittel aus „Horizont 2020" sollen, insbesondere im Rahmen der gesellschaftlichen Herausforderung Nr. 2, schwerpunktmäßig im Bereich der Bioökonomie und der weiteren Entwicklung von Bioraffinerien für die Herstellung biobasierter Produkte und von Biokraft- und -brennstoffen eingesetzt werden.

([1]) Um diese Herausforderungen anzugehen, unterstützte sie den EU-Raffinerie-Rundtisch (EU Refining Round Table) und veranstaltet regelmäßig das Raffinerie-Forum; siehe Link: http://ec.europa.eu/energy/observatory/oil/refining_processing_en.htm
([2]) SEK(2010)1398 endg. vom 17.11.2010.
([3]) KOM(2011)885 vom 15. Dezember 2011.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-012183/13
to the Commission
Jürgen Klute (GUE/NGL)
(24 October 2013)

Subject: Crisis in the refining sector in Italy and Europe

In December 2012, the Italian Parliament's Lower House produced a report on 'The crisis in Italy's refining sector'. At the time the report was drafted, the sector in Italy consisted of at least 16 refineries, some of which have now been shut down and/or converted into terminals (e.g. the Tamoil refinery in Cremona and the Total-ERG refinery in Rome). The sector employed more than 10 000 people directly and approximately 12 000 indirectly through contractors involved in routine maintenance and thousands more involved in non-routine maintenance and operations following investments and the introduction of new technologies. Some of the report's claims are extremely worrying from both an industrial and a social point of view. The Unione Petrolifera Italiana, Italy's trade association for oil refiners and distributors, reports excess capacity in the region of 15-20 million tonnes (of the approximately 100 million tonne installed capacity), equivalent to 20% of total capacity or the production capacity of four 5 million-tonne refineries combined. The plants are currently operating at around 70% of their installed capacity. The difficult situation in the European and Italian refining sector is being made worse by lower consumption (partly as a result of the international economic crisis), but more importantly by aggressive competition from non-European producers, who can rely on lower production costs primarily due to the absence of social and environmental regulation, which gives them a significant advantage in terms of lower costs. This critical situation is also causing difficulties at other Italian plants (Mol refinery in Mantua, ENI refineries in Marghera and Livorno).

1. Does the Commission not think that it should acknowledge the crisis situation in Europe's refining sector?

2. What decisions does the Commission envisage taking in order to protect a sector as strategic as this, which is important both from the point of view of security of energy supply and from the social point of view, given that thousands of workers are involved?

3. What action does the Commission envisage taking to promote a policy of research and investment in the refining industry, aimed at improving plants and productivity and boosting energy efficiency?

Answer given by Mr Tajani on behalf of the Commission
(20 December 2013)

1. The Commission does acknowledge the current difficulties of the refining sector ([1]). Actually, the 2010 Staff Working Paper on refining and the supply of petroleum products in the EU ([2]) presents in an exhaustive manner current and future key challenges for the sector. Furthermore, the Commission's 'Energy Roadmap 2050' ([3]) states that 'keeping a European presence in domestic refining — though one that is able to adapt capacity levels to the economic realities of a mature market — is important to the EU economy, to sectors that depend on refined products as feedstocks such as the petrochemical industry, and for security of supply.'

2. The Commission, in the framework of its industrial policy communication of 2012, has launched a 'fitness check', a comprehensive quantitative and qualitative assessment of the entire relevant body of EU legislation. The purpose is to identify excessive burdens, overlaps, gaps, inconsistencies and/or obsolete measures. Results from the Fitness Check will be available in September 2014. Stakeholders are regularly informed and updated on the state-of-play through the EU Refining Forum.

3. EU programmes, i.e. EU structural funds, Framework Programmes for Research and Development, Competitiveness and Innovation Framework Programme (CIP) and — running from 2014 to 2020 HORIZON 2020 and COSME, the EU programme for the Competitiveness of Enterprises and SMEs, may support research and investment in favour of refineries. Horizon 2020 funding will focus, notably under Societal Challenge 2, on bioeconomy and further development of bio-refineries for production of bio-based products and biofuels.

([1]) To address them it sponsored the EU Refining Round Table and organises regularly the Refining Forum; see link — http://ec.europa.eu/energy/observatory/oil/refining_processing_en.htm
([2]) SEC(2010) 1398 final of 17.11.2010.
([3]) COM(2011) 885 of 15 December 2011.

(Version française)

Question avec demande de réponse écrite E-012204/13
à la Commission (Vice-Présidente/Haute Représentante)
Marc Tarabella (S&D)
(24 octobre 2013)

Objet: VP/HR — Des milliers de Dominicains pourraient devenir apatrides

La Cour constitutionnelle de la République dominicaine a, le mois dernier, statué et dit que Juliana Deguis, née en République dominicaine en 1984 de parents haïtiens, n'avait pas été légalement enregistrée comme Dominicaine à sa naissance.

L'affaire pourrait avoir des effets discriminatoires de grande envergure, en particulier pour les Dominicains d'origine haïtienne. La Cour a également demandé à la Commission électorale centrale d'examiner tous les registres de naissances à partir de 1929, notamment ceux concernant les personnes qui ont été enregistrées et reconnues comme Dominicaines, soi-disant à tort. Elle a estimé que ces cas devaient être traités comme celui de Juliana. La mise en œuvre de ce projet a déjà commencé partiellement. Juliana Deguis a été autorisée à rester dans le pays en attendant un plan national de régularisation qui va déterminer le sort de ceux qui sont considérés comme résidant illégalement dans le pays. Beaucoup de personnes étrangères, dont la grande majorité des Dominicains d'origine haïtienne, pourraient être déchues de leur nationalité et forcées de quitter le pays, puis de redemander leur citoyenneté. La mise en œuvre de cette décision aura un impact dévastateur sur la vie de centaines de milliers de personnes dont l'identité administrative risque d'être annulée et qui verront ainsi nombre de leurs droits humains (notamment liberté de circulation, éducation, travail et accès aux soins de santé) totalement bafoués.

1. Quelle est la réaction officielle des autorités européennes?

2. Des contacts vont-ils être pris avec les autorités nationales sur ce dossier?

3. L'application de cette décision ne violerait-elle pas les obligations de la République dominicaine en matière de droits humains?

Réponse donnée par Mme Ashton, Vice-présidente/Haute Représentante au nom de la Commission
(8 janvier 2014)

L'UE a exprimé son inquiétude auprès des autorités dominicaines quant à l'impact éventuel de cette décision de justice sur des dizaines de milliers de Dominicains (en particulier ceux d'origine haïtienne). Elle a également insisté sur l'importance du respect inconditionnel des conventions internationales en matière de Droits de l'homme.

La République dominicaine, au plus haut niveau de l'État, a assuré l'UE qu'une «solution humaine» serait trouvée aux conséquences de la décision de la Cour constitutionnelle et que nul ne deviendrait apatride.

L'UE continuera de suivre de très près la situation avec les autorités dominicaines afin de favoriser l'adoption rapide de mesures empêchant tout cas d'apatridie et de garantir le respect absolu des obligations en matière de Droits de l'homme.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-012204/13
to the Commission (Vice-President/High Representative)
Marc Tarabella (S&D)
(24 October 2013)

Subject: VP/HR — Thousands of Dominicans could become stateless

Last month the Constitutional Court of the Dominican Republic ruled that Juliana Deguis, born in the Dominican Republic in 1984 to Haitian parents, had been wrongly registered as Dominican at her birth.

The case could have wide-reaching discriminatory effects, particularly for Dominicans of Haitian descent. The court also ordered the Central Electoral Board to search all birth registries from 1929 onwards for people who had been supposedly wrongly registered and recognised as Dominican citizens. It said their cases should be treated the same as Juliana's. Some parts of the ruling have already started to be implemented. Juliana Deguis has been allowed to stay in the country pending a National Regularisation Plan that will decide the fate of those deemed to be residing illegally in the country. Many 'foreigners', the vast majority of whom are Dominicans of Haitian descent, could be deprived of their nationality, forced to leave the country and re-apply for their citizenship. The implementation of this decision will have a devastating impact on the lives of hundreds of thousands of people who could lose their official identity and have many of their human rights (including freedom of movement, education, employment and access to healthcare) completely denied.

1. What is the official reaction of the European authorities?

2. Will any contact be made with the national authorities over this matter?

3. Would the implementation of this ruling not violate the Dominican Republic's human rights obligations?

Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission
(8 January 2014)

The EU has expressed concern to the Dominican authorities over the possible impact of the ruling on tens of thousands of Dominicans (notably those of Haitian descent) and has stressed the importance of the unconditional respect of international conventions on human rights.

The EU has received assurances from the Dominican Republic, at the highest level, that a 'human solution' will be found to the implications of the Constitutional Court ruling and that nobody will become stateless.

The EU will continue to follow very closely the situation with the Dominican authorities, aiming at rapid measures impeding cases of statelessness and the full respect of human rights obligations.

(Version française)

Question avec demande de réponse écrite E-012993/13
à la Commission (Vice-présidente/Haute Représentante)
Christine De Veyrac (PPE)
(15 novembre 2013)

Objet: VP/HR — Programme nucléaire iranien

La politique d'ouverture du président iranien Rohani vers l'Occident et les États-Unis a permis de relancer les négociations sur le développement d'un programme nucléaire en Iran.

Ainsi, le Groupe 5 + 1, comprenant les États-Unis, la Russie, La Chine, la France, le Royaume-Uni et l'Allemagne, ainsi que l'Iran et l'Union européenne se sont réunis à Genève en vue d'aboutir à un accord sur le nucléaire en Iran.

Sur ce sujet, le Parlement européen avait adopté, le 2 février 2012, une résolution exprimant ses préoccupations concernant le développement d'un programme nucléaire en Iran et sa volonté de voir l'Iran mettre un terme à la mise au point de la technologie d'enrichissement d'uranium.

Si l'Iran défend son droit à l'énergie nucléaire incluant l'enrichissement d'uranium, les membres du Conseil de sécurité de l'ONU et l'Allemagne restent toutefois fermes sur ce point.

Au cours de ces négociations, les États membres de l'Union ont alors affiché une position forte. En revanche, l'Union européenne apparaît comme ayant une position effacée dans les négociations.

Aussi, le Service européen pour l'action extérieure a-t-il l'intention de défendre les positions européennes précédemment adoptées et de faire entendre une voix forte de l'Union européenne sur le sujet du programme nucléaire iranien pour ainsi s'imposer comme un acteur déterminant sur la scène internationale?

Réponse donnée par Mme Ashton, Vice-présidente/Haute Représentante au nom de la Commission
(30 janvier 2014)

Sur la base du mandat que lui a confié le Conseil de sécurité des Nations unies (CSNU) et conjointement avec le groupe E3+3, Mme Ashton, Vice-présidente/Haute Représentante de l'Union pour les affaires étrangères et la politique de sécurité, est engagée depuis de nombreuses années dans un processus diplomatique visant à trouver une solution globale à la question du nucléaire iranien par le biais de négociations, s'appuyant sur le traité de non-prolifération et sur la pleine mise en œuvre de l'ensemble des résolutions du CSNU et de l'Agence internationale de l'énergie atomique.

Le 24 novembre 2013, la Vice-présidente/Haute Représentante et les ministres des affaires étrangères des E3+3 (Allemagne, Chine, États-Unis, France, Royaume-Uni et Russie) ont trouvé un accord avec l'Iran sur un plan d'action conjoint, comprenant une première étape vers une solution globale à long terme à la question du nucléaire en Iran. La Vice-présidente/Haute Représentante a joué un rôle déterminant dans la conclusion de l'accord à Genève. Elle a, en effet, contribué, de manière décisive, à orienter le processus de négociations, préserver l'unité du groupe E3+3 et garantir que les positions de l'Union européenne soient prises en compte dans la recherche d'un accord.

Le plan d'action conjoint est un accord intérimaire qui définit une approche visant à parvenir à une solution globale à long terme à la question du nucléaire iranien. Il faudra approfondir et résoudre toutes les questions que se pose la communauté internationale à propos du programme nucléaire iranien avant de pouvoir parvenir à une solution définitive avec l'Iran.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-012993/13
to the Commission (Vice-President/High Representative)
Christine De Veyrac (PPE)
(15 November 2013)

Subject: VP/HR — Iranian nuclear programme

The policy of openness of the Iranian President, Hassan Rouhani, towards the West and the United States has made it possible to restart negotiations on the development of a nuclear programme in Iran.

As a result, the P5+1, comprising the United States, Russia, China, France, the United Kingdom and Germany, along with Iran and the European Union, met in Geneva with a view to reaching an agreement on Iran's nuclear programme.

On 2 February 2012, Parliament adopted a resolution on this subject, expressing its concerns regarding the development of a nuclear programme in Iran and its desire to see Iran bring an end to the development of uranium enrichment technology.

While Iran defends its right to nuclear energy including uranium enrichment, the members of the UN Security Council and Germany nevertheless stand firm on this matter.

During these negotiations, EU Member States also adopted a strong stance. However, the European Union appears to have sidelined itself from the negotiations.

Does the European External Action Service intend to defend the European stances previously adopted and make the strong voice of the European Union heard on the matter of the Iranian nuclear programme, thus asserting itself as a key player on the international scene?

Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission
(30 January 2014)

Based on the mandate from the UN Security Council (UNSC), the HR/VP, together with the E3+3 has been engaged for many years in a diplomatic process aimed at achieving a comprehensive solution to the Iranian nuclear issue through negotiations, based on the Non-proliferation Treaty and the full implementation of all relevant UNSC and International Atomic Energy Agency Board Resolutions.

On 24 November 2013 the HR/VP, together with the Foreign Ministers of the E3+3 (China, France, Germany, Russia, UK, USA) reached agreement with Iran on a Joint Plan of Action, comprising a first step towards a long-term comprehensive solution to the Iranian nuclear issue. The role of the HR/VP was decisive in bringing about the agreement reached in Geneva. She played an essential role in steering the process of negotiations, preserving the E3+3 unity, as well as assuring that the EU positions were taken into account in the process to reach agreement.

The Joint Plan of Action is an interim agreement which sets out an approach towards reaching a final comprehensive solution of the Iranian nuclear issue. All concerns of the international community about Iran's nuclear programme will have to be comprehensively addressed and resolved before a final solution will be reached with Iran.

(Deutsche Fassung)

Anfrage zur schriftlichen Beantwortung E-013187/13
an die Kommission
Norbert Neuser (S&D)
(20. November 2013)

Betrifft: Beteiligung der türkischen Volksgruppe Zyperns an der Europawahl 2014

Der Annan-Plan der Vereinten Nationen für Zypern wurde 2004 von den griechischen Zyprern abgelehnt. Seitdem entfallen die sechs Sitze des Europäischen Parlaments, die sowohl für die griechische als auch die türkische Volksgruppe der Insel vorgesehen waren, allein auf griechische Zyprer. Dies bedeutet, dass der türkische Bevölkerungsteil Zyperns im Europäischen Parlament bislang nicht vertreten ist und auch in der Wahlperiode von 2014 bis 2019 dort nicht vertreten sein wird, sofern keine Änderungen vorgenommen werden. Mir sind die politischen Schwierigkeiten bewusst, die einer Wiedervereinigung der Insel im Wege stehen, und ich gehe davon aus, dass es auch kurzfristig zu keiner Wiedervereinigung kommen wird, so bedauernswert dies auch sein mag. Dies führt aber dazu, dass sich an der fehlenden demokratischen Vertretung der türkischen Zyprer auf EU-Ebene nichts ändern wird.

1. Wie bewertet die Kommission dieses Defizit?

2. Was unternimmt die Kommission, abgesehen von den Bemühungen um eine langfristige Wiedervereinigung der Insel, um dieses Defizit zu beheben?

3. Steht die Kommission im Rahmen der Vorbereitungen der bevorstehenden Europawahl im kommenden Jahr in Kontakt mit den griechischen und den türkischen Zyprern, um eine Vertretung beider Volksgruppen zu gewährleisten? Falls ja, wie ist der aktuelle Stand in dieser Angelegenheit? Falls nicht, warum nicht?

4. Ist es nach Ansicht der Kommission möglich, die technischen Schwierigkeiten zu überwinden, damit die türkische Volkgruppe ebenso wie die griechische Volksgruppe Zyperns aktiv und passiv an der kommenden Europawahl teilnehmen kann?

Gemeinsame Antwort von Herrn Füle im Namen der Kommission
(18. März 2014)

Nach Artikel 8 des Akts vom 20. September 1976 zur Einführung allgemeiner unmittelbarer Wahlen der Abgeordneten des Europäischen Parlaments ([1]) bestimmt sich das Wahlverfahren für die Mitglieder des Europäischen Parlaments in jedem Mitgliedstaat — vorbehaltlich der Vorschriften des Akts — nach den innerstaatlichen Vorschriften. Nach Artikel 223 AEUV ist es Sache des Europäischen Parlaments, einen Entwurf der erforderlichen Bestimmungen für die Wahl seiner Mitglieder zu erstellen.

Nach Kenntnisstand der Kommission werden in der Republik Zypern derzeit zwei Gesetzentwürfe über die automatische elektronische Registrierung der Wähler für die Wahlen zum Europäischen Parlament im Mai geprüft.

Die Kommission befürwortet Maßnahmen zur Stärkung des Vertrauens und zur engen Anbindung der türkisch-zyprischen Gemeinschaft an die Europäische Union.

([1]) ABl. L 278 vom 8.10.1976, S. 5. Der Akt von 1976 wurde durch den Beschluss 2002/772 des Rates (ABl. L 283 vom 21.10.2002) geändert.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-013187/13
to the Commission
Norbert Neuser (S&D)
(20 November 2013)

Subject: EU elections 2014 — participation of the Turkish Cypriot community

The UN (Annan) plan for Cyprus was rejected by the Greek Cypriots in 2004. Since then, the six seats in the European Parliament that were foreseen to accommodate both the Greek and the Turkish community have been filled by Greek Cypriots. Thus, the Turkish Cypriot community has never been represented in the European Parliament and, if there are no changes, it will not be represented there in the 2014-2019 term either. I understand the political difficulties of reunifying the island, and believe that, as unfortunate as it may be, a reunification is not likely to be achieved in the short term. That means, however, that the deficit of democratic representation of the Turkish Cypriot community at EU level will be perpetuated.

1. How does the Commission evaluate this deficit of democratic representation?

2. What is the Commission doing — other than working on the long-term goal of unifying the island — to remedy this deficit of democratic representation?

3. In the preparations for the upcoming 2014 European elections, is the Commission in contact with both communities, Greek and Turkish, to ensure the representation of both? If so, what is the state of play? If not, why not?

4. In the Commission's view, are there ways to overcome the technical difficulties for the Turkish Cypriot community to participate, whether actively and passively, on an equal footing with the Greek Cypriots in the next EU elections?

Question for written answer P-000640/14
to the Commission
Andrew Duff (ALDE)
(23 January 2014)

Subject: Turkish Cypriot electoral rights in European parliamentary elections

Is the Commission aware of the draft law tabled by the Government of the Republic of Cyprus to reform its legislation governing European Parliament elections with respect to Turkish Cypriots in possession of a Republic of Cyprus ID card (around 92 000 people)?

Notwithstanding the need to ensure the integrity of the election, does the Commission agree that to let Turkish Cypriots resident in the north of Cyprus vote without prior electoral registration at polling stations at or near the border crossing points would be a welcome expedient and a useful confidence-building measure?

In view of the likelihood of this electoral reform, what will the Commission do to promote the participation of as many Turkish Cypriots as possible in the European Parliament elections?

Will the Commission help the Cypriot Government disseminate information to the Turkish Cypriot community on how to vote and how to stand as a candidate in these elections, both directly and via the media?

Will the Commission monitor the progress and impact of this electoral reform before, during and after polling day, and report back to Parliament?

Joint answer given by Mr Füle on behalf of the Commission
(18 March 2014)

In accordance with Article 8 of the Act of 20 September 1976 concerning the election of the representatives of the European Parliament by direct universal suffrage [1], the electoral procedure for the election of the Members of the European Parliament is governed in each Member State by its national provisions, subject to the provisions of that Act. Pursuant to Article 223 TFEU, it is for the European Parliament to draw up proposals to lay down the provisions necessary for the election of its Members.

The Commission understands that two bills on the automatic registration of voters for the forthcoming European Parliament elections in May are currently under consideration in the Republic of Cyprus.

(1) OJ L 278, 8.10.1976, p. 5. The 1976 Act was amended by Council Decision 2002/772 (OJ L 283, 21.10.2002).

The Commission is in favour of measures aiming at increasing confidence and anchoring the Turkish Cypriot community closely to the European Union.

(Versión española)

Pregunta con solicitud de respuesta escrita E-013378/13
a la Comisión
Francisco Sosa Wagner (NI)
(26 de noviembre de 2013)

Asunto: IKEA incumple la legislación europea en materia de protección de datos personales

La prensa española publicaba una noticia la semana pasada en la que se hacía eco de la imputación de tres directivos de IKEA Francia por espiar a sus empleados y clientes. Al parecer, los directivos se informaron ilegalmente sobre los antecedentes judiciales de sus trabajadores y clientes, utilizando para ello el acceso a un gran fichero policial en virtud de un acuerdo suscrito con una sociedad privada de seguridad. Esas prácticas no se restringen a la filial francesa pues ese tipo de «controles» son bastante comunes en las sedes ubicadas en otros países.

La Unión Europea cuenta desde 1995 con la Directiva 95/46/CE, un referente de protección de las personas físicas en lo que respecta al tratamiento de datos personales y a la libre circulación de estos datos. Es incomprensible que, existiendo un marco jurídico común en esta materia y situándose entre las prioridades de la Unión, se estén llevando a cabo prácticas de este tipo.

El grupo IKEA se ha convertido en emblema de la industria sueca y uno de los principales motores de su economía. Sorprende que Suecia fuera uno de los primeros países del mundo en adoptar leyes de protección de datos en el año 1973, y ahora una de sus principales empresas muestre con sus prácticas una falta de respeto absoluta a la intimidad de las personas. La Unión Europea tiene mucho que decir sobre este tipo de situaciones, ya que el grupo IKEA, al igual que otras grandes empresas europeas, se ha beneficiado de manera directa o indirecta de fondos comunitarios para mejorar sus infraestructuras y su negocio.

Por todo lo expuesto, pregunto a la Comisión:

¿Considera oportuno instar a los Gobiernos de los países de la UE donde IKEA está implantada a llevar a cabo algún tipo de actuación para aclarar lo sucedido? ¿Ve necesario a este respecto indagar en los fondos comunitarios que hayan podido beneficiar al grupo IKEA y su destino?

Pregunta con solicitud de respuesta escrita E-000554/14
a la Comisión
Francisco Sosa Wagner (NI)
(21 de enero de 2014)

Asunto: IKEA incumple la legislación europea en materia de protección de datos personales

La prensa española publicaba una noticia la semana pasada en la que se hacía eco de la imputación de tres directivos de IKEA Francia por espiar a sus empleados y clientes. Al parecer, los directivos se informaron ilegalmente sobre los antecedentes judiciales de sus trabajadores y clientes, utilizando para ello el acceso a un gran fichero policial en virtud de un acuerdo suscrito con una sociedad privada de seguridad. Esas prácticas no se restringen a la filial francesa pues ese tipo de «controles» son bastante comunes en las sedes ubicadas en otros países.

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Por todo lo expuesto, pregunto a la Comisión:

— ¿Considera oportuno llevar a cabo algún tipo de actuación o establecer comunicación con el Gobierno sueco para aclarar lo sucedido?

— ¿Ve necesario indagar sobre los fondos de la UE que hayan podido beneficiar al grupo IKEA y sobre su destino?

Respuesta conjunta de la Sra. Reding en nombre de la Comisión
(17 de marzo de 2014)

Sin perjuicio de las competencias de la Comisión como garante de los Tratados, corresponde a las autoridades competentes de los Estados miembros supervisar la aplicación de los asuntos contemplados en la Directiva 95/46/EC, tal y como se aplica en el Derecho nacional. Dichas autoridades competentes, según el artículo 28 de la citada Directiva, deberán atender las quejas presentadas por cualquier persona en relación con la protección de sus derechos y libertades en lo relacionado con el tratamiento de datos personales.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-013378/13
to the Commission
Francisco Sosa Wagner (NI)
(26 November 2013)

Subject: IKEA in breach of EU legislation on personal data protection

Last week the Spanish press reported that three IKEA France executives had been accused of spying on their employees and customers. Allegedly, the executives obtained illegally information on the criminal records of their employees and customers by gaining access to police records under an agreement signed with a private security company. These practices are not unique to the French subsidiary, since 'checks' of this kind are fairly common in the head offices located in other countries.

Since 1995, the European Union has had, with Directive 95/46/EC, a yardstick on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data. It is incomprehensible that even though a common legal framework exists on this subject, and it is one of the EU's priorities, these kinds of practices are taking place.

The IKEA Group has become the symbol of Sweden's industry and one of the main drivers of its economy. Sweden was one of first countries in the world to adopt data protection laws in 1973, making it surprising that one of its leading businesses has now been found to use practices that demonstrate a complete lack of respect for personal privacy. The European Union has a great deal to say with respect to this kind of situation, since the IKEA Group, like many other major European companies, has benefited directly or indirectly from EU funds to improve its infrastructure and business.

Does the Commission think the governments of the EU countries in which IKEA is established should be urged to take action of some kind to clarify what has happened? Does it deem an investigation necessary into which EU funds the IKEA Group may have benefited from and how these funds were used?

Question for written answer E-000554/14
to the Commission
Francisco Sosa Wagner (NI)
(21 January 2014)

Subject: IKEA in breach of European legislation on the protection of personal data

Last week the Spanish press reported that three executives at IKEA France have been accused of spying on their employees and customers. Apparently, the executives illegally sought information on the criminal backgrounds of their workers and customers by gaining access to police records under an agreement with a private security company. These practices are not limited to the French subsidiary; these kinds of 'checks' are fairly common in the branches based in other countries.

Since 1995, the European Union has had, with Directive 95/46/EC, a yardstick on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data. It is incomprehensible that even though a common legal framework exists on this subject, and it is one of the Union's top priorities, practices of this nature are taking place.

The IKEA group has become the flagship of Swedish industry and one of the main drivers of its economy. It is surprising that Sweden was one of the first countries in the world to adopt data protection laws in 1973 and yet now one of its leading businesses has been found to use practices that demonstrate a complete lack of respect for personal privacy. The European Union has a great deal to say with respect to this kind of situation, as the IKEA group, like many other large European companies, has benefitted, directly or indirectly, from EU funds to improve its infrastructure and business.

As a result, I have the following questions for the Commission:

— Does the Commission think it is appropriate to take some kind of action or communicate with the Swedish Government in order to clarify what has happened?

— Does the Commission deem it necessary to investigate which EU funds the IKEA group may have benefitted from and how these funds were used?

Joint answer given by Mrs Reding on behalf of the Commission

(17 March 2014)

Without prejudice to the powers of the Commission as guardian of the Treaties it is for the competent authorities in the Member States to monitor the application of the matters falling within the scope of Directive 95/46/EC as implemented into national law. These competent authorities, set up on the basis of Article 28 of that directive, shall hear claims lodged by any person concerning the protection of his rights and freedoms in regard to the processing of personal data.

(Version française)

Question avec demande de réponse écrite E-013529/13
à la Commission (Vice-présidente/Haute Représentante)
Marc Tarabella (S&D)
(28 novembre 2013)

Objet: VP/HR — Pussy Riot

Le refus persistant des autorités russes de révéler où se trouve une des membres du groupe punk Pussy Riot, qui est, selon certaines rumeurs, sur le point d'être transférée dans une colonie pénitentiaire en Sibérie, souligne les efforts déployés par ces autorités pour la réduire au silence.

Les autorités russes doivent immédiatement dire à sa famille où cette personne se trouve et lui permettre de s'entretenir avec un avocat. Cette femme est une prisonnière d'opinion et n'aurait pour commencer jamais dû être incarcérée. Refuser de déclarer quel sort lui a été réservé ne fait rien d'autre qu'alimenter les rumeurs les plus pessimistes.

On ignore où se trouve Nadejda Tolokonnikova depuis le 22 octobre, date à laquelle elle aurait quitté la colonie pénitentiaire où elle purgeait une peine de deux ans de prison. Il semble qu'elle soit sur le point d'être transférée dans un autre lieu, mais sa destination n'a pas été précisée.

Son époux vient d'annoncer qu'une source pénitentiaire l'a informé d'un possible transfert dans une colonie de Sibérie.

Si cela est vrai, la transférer dans une colonie pénitentiaire à des milliers de kilomètres de Moscou signifie qu'il sera quasiment impossible pour sa famille et ses avocats de la voir. Cela constituerait une atteinte à ses droits fondamentaux, mais également au droit russe.

1. Comptez-vous officiellement demander aux autorités russes de répondre à nos questions sur le sujet?

2. Quelle est votre position dans le dossier Pussy Riot?

Réponse donnée par Mme Ashton, Vice-présidente/Haute Représentante au nom de la Commission
(7 février 2014)

Le dossier de Nadejda Tolokonnikova a été évoqué avec les autorités russes chaque fois que possible. Les terribles conditions de détention dans la colonie pénitentiaire n° 14 en Mordovie qu'elle a dénoncées ont été abordées lors de réunions organisées dans le cadre du dialogue politique avec la Russie, ainsi que lors du dernier cycle de consultations UE-Russie sur les Droits de l'homme, qui a eu lieu le 28 novembre dernier. Par la suite, l'UE a également prié la Russie d'expliquer pourquoi le lieu de détention de Nadejda Tolokonnikova est resté si longtemps secret durant son transfert. L'UE continuera de demander aux autorités russes de veiller à ce que les conditions de détention soient conformes aux normes européennes et internationales et plus particulièrement, à mettre en œuvre les recommandations du Comité européen pour la prévention de la torture et des peines ou traitements inhumains ou dégradants (CPT).

L'Union européenne a suivi de très près le dossier de Nadejda Tolokonnikova et Maria Alekhina, membres du groupe Pussy Riot. La délégation de l'UE à Moscou a régulièrement rencontré leurs avocats et a observé leur procès. Dans une déclaration du 17 août 2012 de la haute représentante/vice-présidente Catherine Ashton, l'Union européenne a clairement exprimé sa position après leur jugement. Le 20 décembre 2013, la Vice-présidente/Haute Représentante s'est félicitée de l'amnistie accordée pour les 20 ans de la Constitution russe et de la libération prévue des membres de Pussy Riot, Nadejda Tolokonnikova et Maria Alekhina, qui a eu lieu quelques jours plus tard.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-013529/13
to the Commission (Vice-President/High Representative)
Marc Tarabella (S&D)
(28 November 2013)

Subject: VP/HR — Pussy Riot

The Russian authorities are still refusing to disclose the whereabouts of one of the members of the punk group Pussy Riot, highlighting the lengths to which they are prepared to go in order to silence her. According to rumours, she is about to be transferred to a penal colony in Siberia.

The Russian authorities must inform her family of her whereabouts immediately and allow her to meet with a lawyer. This woman is a prisoner of conscience and should never have been imprisoned in the first place. Keeping the outside world in the dark about her fate will merely serve to fuel the most pessimistic rumours.

We do not know where Nadezhda Tolokonnikova has been since 22 October, the date on which she is reported to have been removed from the penal colony where she was serving a two-year prison sentence. It appears that she is about to be transferred elsewhere, to an undisclosed destination.

Her husband recently revealed that a prison source had informed him that she may have been transferred to a colony in Siberia.

Transferring her to a penal colony thousands of kilometres from Moscow would make it almost impossible for her family and lawyers to see her. This would constitute a breach of her fundamental rights and of Russian law.

1. Do you intend to make an official request to the Russian authorities urging them to reply to our questions on this matter?

2. What is your stance on the Pussy Riot case?

Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission
(7 February 2014)

The case of Ms Tolokonnikova was raised with the Russian authorities on all possible occassions.The dire conditions of detention she highlighted in Penal Colony N 14 in Mordovia were addressed at political dialogue meetings with Russia, and also at the most recent round of the EU-Russia human rights consultations, which took place on 28 November. The EU then also called on Russia to clarify why her whereabouts had remained unknown for such a long time during her transfer. The EU will continue to call on the Russian authorities to ensure that detention conditions are in conformity with European and International standards and in particular to implement the recommendations of the Council of Europe Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CPT).

The European Union followed the case of the Pussy Riot group members Nadezhda Tolokonnikova and Maria Alyokhina very closely. The EU Delegation in Moscow met regularly with their lawyers and observed their trial in court. The European Union made its position clear in a statement issued on 17 August 2012 by HR/VP Catherine Ashton, following their sentencing. On 20 December 2013 the HR/VP welcomed the amnesty approved on the 20th Anniversary of Russia's Constitution and the expected release of Pussy Riot' members Nadezhda Tolokonnikova and Maria Alyokhina, which materialized several days later.

(Version française)

Question avec demande de réponse écrite E-013550/13
à la Commission
Jean-Pierre Audy (PPE)
(28 novembre 2013)

Objet: Rapport du président du Conseil européen au Parlement européen à la suite de chaque réunion du Conseil européen — application de l'article 15, point 6 d) du traité sur l'Union européenne (traité UE)

L'article 15, point 6 d) du traité sur l'Union européenne (traité UE) prévoit que le président du Conseil européen est tenu de présenter un rapport au Parlement européen à la suite de chaque réunion du Conseil européen.

Le soussigné s'est déjà étonné (question écrite E-000634/2010) que, dès l'élection du président stable du Conseil européen en novembre 2009, cette disposition n'ait pas été respectée. Le président de la Commission, José-Manuel Barroso a répondu, à l'époque, que la Présidence suédoise avait continué à présider les réunions restantes du Conseil et du Conseil européen pour la période de transition du mois de décembre 2009 et qu'en conséquence, c'était le premier ministre suédois qui avait présenté les conclusions du Conseil européen des 10 et 11 décembre 2009 à la session plénière du Parlement européen du 16 décembre 2009.

La situation, aujourd'hui, n'est plus transitoire.

Malgré plusieurs «rappels au règlement» effectués en plénière, il s'est établi un usage selon lequel le président du Conseil européen est invité à rendre compte des réunions du Conseil européen lors d'une réunion «ad hoc» de la Conférence des présidents élargie à l'ensemble des membres du Parlement.

Le fait pour le Parlement européen d'organiser ces réunions «ad hoc» de la Conférence des présidents et d'y inviter le président du Conseil européen à remplir son obligation de rapport au Parlement européen prévue par le traité UE, outre qu'il est contraire au traité, n'est pas bon pour la démocratie: les réunions ne sont pas publiques, il n'y a pas de compte rendu, les relations avec la presse sont très différentes par rapport à une session plénière et les règles de prise de parole pour les députés européens non membres de la Conférence des présidents sont telles qu'il est très difficile de s'exprimer.

De plus, l'examen du règlement intérieur du Parlement européen ne permet pas de considérer qu'il entre dans son rôle de se substituer à la plénière, même en étant élargi à l'ensemble des membres du Parlement.

C'est dans ce contexte que le député européen soussigné a l'honneur de poser, à qui de droit au sein de la Commission saisie en sa qualité de gardienne des traités chargée de la surveillance de l'application du droit de l'Union sous le contrôle de la Cour de justice, la question suivante: la pratique consistant à inviter le président du Conseil européen à présenter son rapport prévu à l'article 15, point 6 d) du traité sur l'Union européenne devant la Conférence des présidents élargie à l'ensemble des membres du Parlement européen est-elle conforme au droit de l'Union?

Réponse donnée par M. Barroso au nom de la Commission
(11 mars 2014)

L'article 15, paragraphe 6, du TUE prévoit que: «Le président du Conseil européen: (…) d) présente au Parlement européen un rapport à la suite de chacune des réunions du Conseil européen». Il appartient au président du Conseil européen de décider de la forme de ce rapport et, si ce dernier prend la forme d'une déclaration orale, il revient au Parlement européen de décider au cours de quelle réunion cette déclaration sera prononcée.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-013550/13
to the Commission
Jean-Pierre Audy (PPE)
(28 November 2013)

Subject: Report of the President of the European Council presented to Parliament after each meeting of the European Council — pursuant to Article 15(6)(d) of the Treaty on European Union (EU Treaty).

Article 15(6)(d) of the Treaty on European Union (EU Treaty) lays down that the President of the European Council shall present a report to the European Parliament after each of the meetings of the European Council.

I have already expressed surprise (written Question E-000634/2010) that, since the election of the permanent President of the European Council in November 2009, this provision has not been met. The President of the Commission, José Manuel Barroso, said, at the time, that the Swedish Presidency had continued to chair the remaining meetings of the Council and of the European Council for the transition period in December 2009 and that, therefore, it was the Swedish Prime Minister who had presented the conclusions of the European Council of 10 and 11 December 2009 at Parliament's plenary session on 16 December 2009.

The situation, now, is no longer transitional.

Despite several 'points of order' raised in plenary, it has become common practice to invite the President of the European Council to report on the meetings of the European Council at an 'ad hoc' meeting of the Conference of Presidents extended to all members of Parliament.

The fact that Parliament organises these 'ad hoc' meetings of the Conference of Presidents and invites the President of the European Council there to fulfil his obligation to report to Parliament as provided for under the EU Treaty, besides running counter to the Treaty, is not good for democracy: the meetings are not public, there are no records, relations with the press are very different compared with a plenary session and the rules for taking the floor for MEPs who are not members of the Conference of Presidents are such that it is very difficult for them to be heard.

What is more, examination of Parliament's Rules of Procedure does not show it to be part of its role to act as a substitute for the plenary, even by being extended to all members of Parliament.

In that context, can the Commission, in its capacity as guardian of the Treaties responsible for monitoring the application of EC law, subject to scrutiny by the Court of Justice, say whether the practice of inviting the President of the European Council to present his report as provided for under Article 15(6)(d) of the Treaty on European Union to the Conference of Presidents extended to all members of Parliament is compatible with EC law?

Answer given by Mr Barroso on behalf of the Commission
(11 March 2014)

Article 15(6) TEU provides that 'The President of the European Council : (…) (d) shall present a report to the European Parliament after each of the meetings of the European Council'. It is for the President of the European Council to decide what form that report shall take, and, if this report takes the form of an oral statement, it is for the European Parliament to decide in what meeting that statement will be heard.

(Version française)

Question avec demande de réponse écrite E-013551/13
à la Commission (Vice-Présidente/Haute Représentante)
Jean-Luc Mélenchon (GUE/NGL)
(28 novembre 2013)

Objet: VP/HR — Mme Ashton et le nucléaire iranien

Étrange: c'est Catherine Ashton, Vice-présidente/Haute Représentante de l'Union pour les affaires étrangères et la politique de sécurité, qui a annoncé «l'accord sur un plan d'action» concernant le nucléaire iranien. Les négociations impliquaient le groupe 5 + 1 (les États-Unis, la Chine, la Russie, la Grande-Bretagne, la France et l'Allemagne) et l'Iran. L'Union européenne n'en faisait pas partie. À quel titre Mme Asthon a-t-elle participé à ces négociations? Quel était son mandat lors de cette rencontre?

Les commentateurs se réjouissent de cet accord et de la présence de Catherine Ashton lors des négociations. Mais par qui ce mandat de négociation lui a-t-il été confié?

Rappelons que si l'Iran accepte de limiter son programme nucléaire, l'accord est provisoire et doit déboucher sur un accord définitif dans six mois. Les parlementaires européens seront-ils tenus informés des évolutions de cet accord et du rôle que compte y jouer Mme Ashton?

Réponse donnée par Mme Ashton, Vice-présidente/Haute Représentante au nom de la Commission
(30 janvier 2014)

Mandatée par plusieurs résolutions du Conseil de sécurité des Nations unies, dont la plus récente (S/RES/1929 du 9 juin 2010), Mme Ashton, Vice-présidente/Haute Représentante de l'Union pour les affaires étrangères et la politique de sécurité de la Commission, est, en sa qualité de négociatrice pour le groupe E3+3 (Allemagne, Chine, États-Unis, France, Royaume-Uni et Russie), engagée depuis plus de trois ans dans un processus ayant pour but de trouver une solution diplomatique concernant le programme nucléaire iranien.

Lors de la réunion du 24 novembre à Genève, la Vice-présidente/Haute Représentante et les ministres des affaires étrangères des pays du groupe E3+3 sont parvenus à un accord avec l'Iran sur un plan d'action conjoint qui contient une première étape vers une solution globale à long terme à la question du nucléaire iranien.

Le Parlement européen a toujours été informé de l'évolution des négociations du groupe E3/UE+3 avec l'Iran par la Vice-présidente/Haute Représentante et les hauts fonctionnaires du SEAE.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-013551/13
to the Commission (Vice-President/High Representative)
Jean-Luc Mélenchon (GUE/NGL)
(28 November 2013)

Subject: VP/HR — Baroness Ashton and the Iranian nuclear programme

It is odd that it was Catherine Ashton, the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, who announced the 'agreement on a plan of action' for the Iranian nuclear programme. Negotiations involved the 5+1 group (the United States, China, Russia, the United Kingdom, France and Germany) and Iran. The European Union was not involved. In what capacity was Baroness Ashton involved in these negotiations? What was her mandate at this meeting?

Commentators welcome this agreement and Baroness Ashton's presence during the negotiations. Who, though, gave her this mandate for negotiation?

Although Iran has agreed to limit its nuclear programme, the agreement is temporary and should lead to a definitive agreement within six months. Will MEPs be kept informed of any developments in this agreement and of the role that Baroness Ashton will play?

Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission
(30 January 2014)

Mandated by several UN Security Council Resolutions the most recent one (S/RES/1929 from 9 June 2010), the EU HR/VP Ashton is, as a designated negotiator on behalf of the E3+3 (China, France, Germany, Russia, United Kingdom and US) engaged for more than three years in a process to find a diplomatic solution on Iran's nuclear programme.

At the meeting in Geneva on 24 November the EU HR/VP, together with the Foreign Ministers of the E3+3, successfully reached an agreement with Iran on a Joint Plan of Action which contains a first step towards a long-term comprehensive solution to the Iranian nuclear issue.

The European Parliament has always been kept informed about the developments in the E3/EU+3 negotiations with Iran by the EU HR/VP and EEAS high ranking officials.

(Version française)

Question avec demande de réponse écrite E-013565/13
à la Commission (Vice-présidente/Haute Représentante)
Marc Tarabella (S&D)
(29 novembre 2013)

Objet: VP/HR — Exécution en Iraq

La forte augmentation du recours à la peine capitale en Iraq porte le nombre d'exécutions recensées à un record depuis 10 ans, depuis la chute de Saddam Hussein en 2003. Au moins sept prisonniers ont été envoyés à la potence le 7 novembre, attisant les craintes que beaucoup d'autres ne soient exécutés très prochainement.

La recrudescence des condamnations à mort en Iraq, bien souvent à l'issue de procès iniques au cours desquels de nombreux prisonniers affirment avoir été torturés pour «avouer» leur crime, est une vaine tentative de résoudre les graves problèmes de justice et de sécurité que connaît le pays. Afin de protéger plus efficacement les civils contre les attentats violents imputables aux groupes armés, les autorités iraquiennes doivent mener des enquêtes énergiques sur les exactions commises et traduire les responsables présumés en justice, dans le cadre d'un système équitable, sans recourir à la peine de mort.

Au moins 132 personnes ont été exécutées en Iraq depuis le début de l'année, nombre record depuis que la peine de mort y a été rétablie en 2004. Le nombre réel est sans doute plus élevé, mais les autorités iraquiennes n'ont pas encore publié toutes les données.

1. Quelle est la position de l'Union européenne face à ces chiffres accablants?

2. Le sujet est-il abordé avec les autorités du pays?

3. Quelles sont les intentions européennes?

Réponse donnée par Mme Ashton, Vice-présidente/Haute Représentante au nom de la Commission
(30 janvier 2014)

1. L'Union européenne est extrêmement préoccupée par la hausse alarmante du recours à la peine capitale dans le système de justice pénale en Iraq.

2. L'UE a régulièrement abordé la question de la peine de mort et des lacunes du système de justice pénale en Iraq avec ses interlocuteurs iraquiens au plus haut niveau. Elle leur a fait part de sa position de principe à l'égard de la peine capitale et a instamment appelé l'Iraq à appliquer un moratoire.

3. L'UE continuera de demander aux autorités iraquiennes d'appliquer un moratoire sur la peine de mort, notamment dans le cadre du dialogue mené dans le contexte de l'accord de partenariat et de coopération UE-Iraq. Elle continuera également de soutenir des actions concrètes destinées à atténuer le recours à la peine capitale dans le système de justice pénale en Iraq. La mission PSDC civile de l'UE en Iraq (EUJust-Lex) a permis de mener d'importantes actions de formation et de tutorat auprès du personnel de la police, du système judiciaire et des services pénitentiaires dans le but de promouvoir le professionnalisme, la primauté du droit et le respect des Droits de l'homme dans l'accomplissement de ses tâches. La primauté du droit et le respect des Droits de l'homme constitueront un des principaux domaines d'intervention de l'UE dans le cadre de l'instrument de financement de la coopération au développement au cours de la période 2014-2017, ce qui démontre la volonté continue de l'UE de soutenir l'Iraq dans sa transition vers un système démocratique durable, en s'appuyant sur les travaux et les réalisations de la mission EUJust-Lex.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-013565/13
to the Commission (Vice-President/High Representative)
Marc Tarabella (S&D)
(29 November 2013)

Subject: VP/HR — Executions in Iraq

A sharp increase in the use of the death penalty in Iraq has brought the number of known executions to the highest in the decade since the toppling of Saddam Hussein in 2003, with at least seven prisoners sent to the gallows on 7 November, sparking fears that many more death row prisoners are at risk.

Iraq's increased use of the death penalty, often after unfair trials in which many prisoners report having been tortured into 'confessing' crimes, is a futile attempt to resolve the country's serious security and justice problems. In order to protect civilians better from violent attacks by armed groups, authorities in Iraq must effectively investigate abuses and bring those responsible to justice in a system that is fair, without recourse to the death penalty.

At least 132 people have been executed in Iraq so far this year — the highest number since the country reinstated capital punishment in 2004. However, the true number could be higher and the Iraqi authorities have yet to publish full figures.

1. Given these damning figures, what is the European Union's position on this issue?

2. Ha the subject been raised with the Iraqi authorities?

3. What action does the EU intend to take?

Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission
(30 January 2014)

1. The European Union is extremely concerned about the alarming increase in the use of the death penalty in Iraq's criminal justice system.

2. The EU has regularly raised the issue of the death penalty and of the shortcomings of Iraq's criminal justice system with Iraqi interlocutors at the highest level. The EU has expressed its principled position on the death penalty and has urged Iraq to apply a moratorium.

3. The EU will continue to ask Iraq's authorities to apply a moratorium on the death penalty, including as part of its dialogue in the context of the EU-Iraq Partnership and Cooperation Agreement. The EU will also continue to support practical measures that mitigate the use of the death penalty in Iraq's criminal justice system. The EU's civilian CSDP mission in Iraq, EUJust-Lex, has carried out extensive training and mentoring of the police, judiciary and prison services to promote professionalism, the Rule of Law and respect for human rights in their work. Rule of law and human rights will be one of the main areas of EU intervention under the EU Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI) in the period 2014-2017, demonstrating the EU's continued commitment to support Iraq's transition towards a sustainable democratic system and building on the work and the achievements of EUJust-Lex.

(Versione italiana)

Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-013601/13
alla Commissione (Vicepresidente/Alto Rappresentante)
Lorenzo Fontana (EFD)
(2 dicembre 2013)

Oggetto: VP/HR — Conversioni forzate in Pakistan — Il caso di Saba Waris

Secondo quanto riportato da alcune testate giornalistiche, dallo scorso giugno non si avrebbero più notizie della tredicenne Saba Waris, cristiana pakistana, la quale sarebbe stata rapita da un 32enne, Syed Munawar Hussain. L'uomo l'avrebbe costretta a convertirsi all'islam e a farsi sposare. Sembrerebbe che il sequestro sia avvenuto per vendetta nei confronti della famiglia della vittima.

Qualche giorno dopo la scomparsa, la ragazza avrebbe chiamato la madre dicendo: «Munawar Hussain mi ha rapito e ha cercato di convertirmi all'islam con la forza». Inoltre, la madre avrebbe in seguito ricevuto un certificato di matrimonio firmato anche dalla figlia.

Dopo le denunce fatte dalla famiglia, il tribunale avrebbe emesso un mandato d'arresto contro il presunto colpevole il quale ha fatto sparire le sue tracce.

Tenuto conto del fatto che la madre avrebbe ricevuto minacce dalla famiglia del sequestratore se si fosse rivolta alle autorità competenti e che nell'ottobre di quest'anno, sempre in Pakistan, sarebbe avvenuto un fatto simile a questo,

È il VP/HR al corrente delle vicende?

Può riferire a che punto sia l'implementazione del dialogo con le autorità pakistane, necessario per giungere a conclusioni concrete per tutelare la minoranza cristiana, con particolare attenzione alle donne, vittime principali di questa discriminazione?

Risposta dell'Alta Rappresentante/Vicepresidente Catherine Ashton a nome della Commissione
(18 marzo 2014)

L'AR/VP ringrazia l'onorevole deputato per averle segnalato il caso di Saba Waris. L'UE è a conoscenza sia della situazione di vulnerabilità delle minoranze religiose in Pakistan che delle segnalazioni di rapimenti e di conversioni e matrimoni forzati, che riguardano prevalentemente ragazze appartenenti alle minoranze cristiane e indù.

La situazione vulnerabile di tutte le minoranze, compresa quella delle donne appartenenti a minoranze religiose, e il tema generale dei diritti di donne e minori sono un aspetto fondamentale delle preoccupazioni in materia di diritti umani espresse regolarmente dall'UE nel suo dialogo con il governo del Pakistan. La questione della tutela dei diritti delle minoranze viene inoltre sollevata sistematicamente in tutti gli incontri ad alto livello e in tutte le riunioni a livello di funzionari tra l'UE e il Pakistan.

In aggiunta al dialogo politico, la posizione dell'UE consiste in un impegno a tutto campo con il Pakistan destinato, fra l'altro, a migliorare la consapevolezza e la protezione dei diritti umani, a rafforzare le organizzazioni della società civile, a sostenere programmi in materia di istruzione ed equilibrio di genere nonché programmi sullo Stato di diritto e a favorire l'accesso alla giustizia per i gruppi vulnerabili. Attraverso lo strumento europeo per la democrazia e i diritti umani (EIDHR), l'UE sostiene in particolare azioni specifiche volte a migliorare determinati aspetti della situazione dei diritti umani in Pakistan combattendo, fra l'altro, la violenza contro donne e minori e sostenendo le campagne di sensibilizzazione e informazione condotte dalla società civile.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-013601/13
to the Commission (Vice-President/High Representative)
Lorenzo Fontana (EFD)
(2 December 2013)

Subject: VP/HR — Forced conversions in Pakistan: the case of Saba Waris

According to several newspaper reports, there has been no news since June of 13-year-old Saba Waris, a Pakistani Christian kidnapped by a 32-year-old man, Syed Munawar Hussain. The man has forced her to convert to Islam and marry. It would appear that the kidnapping occurred as part of a vendetta against the victim's family.

A few days after her disappearance, the girl called her mother to say Munawar Hussain had kidnapped her and was trying to force her to convert to Islam. Moreover, her mother then received a marriage certificate, also signed by her daughter.

After the family reported this, the court issued an arrest warrant for the alleged culprit, who has disappeared without trace.

Considering that the mother received threats from the kidnapper's family about going to the competent authorities and that a similar incident also took place in Pakistan in October of this year:

Is the VP/HR aware of these facts?

Can she report on the progress of the establishment of dialogue with the Pakistani authorities, necessary for arriving at concrete conclusions to protect the Christian minority, with a particular focus on women, the main victims of such discrimination?

Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission
(18 March 2014)

The HR/VP thanks the honourable member for drawing the situation of Saba Waris to her attention. The EU is well aware of the vulnerable situation of persons belonging to religious minorities in Pakistan, and also of reports of kidnappings, forced conversions and marriages of girls mainly from the Christian and Hindu minorities.

The vulnerable situation of all minorities — including the specific situation of women from religious minorities — and more broadly the rights of women and children are at the forefront of human rights concerns raised by the EU in dialogue with the Government of Pakistan in the EU-Pakistan regular human rights dialogue. The issue of protection of the rights of minorities is also raised systematically in all high-level and senior officials' meetings between the EU and Pakistan.

In addition to political dialogue, the EU's position is to engage with Pakistan across the board, including through improving awareness and protection of human rights, strengthening civil society organisations, supporting programmes related to education and gender balance, and programmes on the rule of law as well as support for access to justice for vulnerable groups. More specifically, the EU currently supports specific actions through the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) which seek to address specific aspects of Pakistan's human rights performance, including tackling violence against women and children, and supporting civil society in awareness raising and information campaigns.

(Versión española)

Pregunta con solicitud de respuesta escrita E-013691/13
a la Comisión
Franziska Keller (Verts/ALE) y Raül Romeva i Rueda (Verts/ALE)
(3 de diciembre de 2013)

Asunto: La Ley española de Seguridad Ciudadana

El 29 de noviembre de 2013, el Gobierno español aprobó una nueva Ley Orgánica de Protección de la Seguridad Ciudadana.

La Ley prevé la imposición de multas severas a los participantes en manifestaciones espontáneas o en manifestaciones con actos violentos. La grabación de imágenes de la actuación policial durante las manifestaciones y la posterior publicación de dichas imágenes será también penalizada. Con dichas medidas, el Gobierno español pretende claramente criminalizar, evitando así protestas contras sus políticas impopulares. La Ley contempla la prohibición de acciones que, en el pasado, como consecuencia de la presión social, condujeron a la modificación de las políticas gubernamentales. Algunos de sus apartados contradicen las resoluciones del Tribunal Supremo, lo cual ha provocado críticas y protestas generalizadas. Los abogados españoles especialistas en Derecho Constitucional consideran que dicha ley viola las libertades de expresión y de reunión, así como otros derechos fundamentales, por lo que es antidemocrática y represiva. Algunos hablan de tendencias hacia un régimen autoritario. La Ley vulnera la libertad de reunión (artículo 12.1) y no cumple los valores fundamentales de la Unión (democracia y libertad, artículo 2 del TUE). El Parlamento ha puesto en marcha la idea de un «Ciclo sobre la política europea en materia de derechos fundamentales», con la cooperación de las instituciones de la UE, los Estados miembros y la Agencia de Derechos Fundamentales, para garantizar el control efectivo del cumplimiento de los valores de la UE.

El artículo 7 del Tratado de la Unión Europea (TUE) prevé mecanismos para velar por el cumplimiento de los valores de la UE. Dichos mecanismos se basan en una decisión política del Consejo con la participación de la Comisión y del Parlamento y quedan sustraídos al control jurisdiccional. En virtud de la Comunicación de la Comisión sobre el artículo 7 del Tratado de la Unión Europea (COM(2003)0606), debería considerarse que la Ley española de Seguridad Ciudadana presenta un claro riesgo de violación grave de los valores comunes de la Unión, que debe abordarse mediante un enfoque político global.

¿Examinará la Comisión con el Gobierno español el alcance de esta ley y sus consecuencias para los valores comunes de la Unión? ¿Se plantea aplicar el artículo 7 del TUE?

Además de lo dispuesto en el artículo 7 del TUE, ¿elaborará la Comisión una propuesta dirigida a garantizar el control efectivo del cumplimiento de los valores de la UE?

Respuesta de la Sra. Reding en nombre de la Comisión
(13 de marzo de 2014)

La Comisión recuerda, como ya indicara en sus respuestas a las preguntas E-013929/2013 y 13763/2013, que el mantenimiento del orden público y la salvaguardia de la seguridad interior de los Estados miembros son competencias nacionales y quedan, por lo tanto, fuera del ámbito del Derecho de la Unión (artículo 72 del TFUE). Los Estados miembros están obligados a respetar el Convenio Europeo para la Protección de los Derechos Humanos y de las Libertades Fundamentales, que consagra la libertad de expresión y la libertad de reunión.

La Comisión confía plenamente en la voluntad de las autoridades españolas de garantizar el respeto de todos los derechos fundamentales, tal y como exigen sus propias obligaciones constitucionales e internacionales.

(Deutsche Fassung)

Anfrage zur schriftlichen Beantwortung E-013691/13
an die Kommission
Franziska Keller (Verts/ALE) und Raül Romeva i Rueda (Verts/ALE)
(3. Dezember 2013)

Betrifft: Spanisches Gesetz für die Sicherheit der Bürger

Die spanische Regierung hat am 29. November 2013 ein neues Gesetz für die Sicherheit der Bürger (span.: „ley orgánica de Protección de la Seguridad Ciudadana") verabschiedet ([1]).

Das Gesetz schreibt hohe Bußgelder für die Beteiligung an spontanen Protesten oder an Protesten, die zu Gewalt führen, vor. Auch für das Filmen der Polizei während Demonstrationen und das Veröffentlichen des Filmmaterials sind Strafen vorgesehen. Mit diesen Verordnungen zielt die Regierung klar darauf ab, Proteste gegen ihre unpopuläre Politik zu kriminalisieren und damit zu verhindern. Durch das Gesetz werden Handlungen untersagt, durch die in der Vergangenheit öffentlicher Druck erzeugt wurde, der dazu geführt hat, dass die Regierung ihre Politik geändert hat. Teile des Gesetzes widersprechen auch den Urteilen des Obersten Gerichtshofes, was auf heftige Kritik und Proteste stieß. Spanische Verfassungsrechtler sind der Ansicht, dass das Gesetz gegen die Versammlungs- und Meinungsfreiheit verstößt sowie gegen andere Grund-und Bürgerrechte und somit antidemokratisch und repressiv ist. Einige sprechen sogar von Tendenzen hin zu einem autoritären Regime. Durch dieses Gesetz wird die Versammlungsfreiheit (Artikel 12 Absatz 1) verletzt und gegen die Grundwerte der Union (Demokratie und Freiheit, Artikel 2 EUV) verstoßen. Das Parlament hat in Zusammenarbeit mit den Organen der EU, den Mitgliedstaaten und der Grundrechteagentur angeregt, einen „Europäischen Politikzyklus der Grundrechte" in die Wege zu leiten, um für dafür zu sorgen, dass die Achtung der Werte der EU wirksam überwacht wird.

In Artikel 7 des Vertrags über die Europäische Union (EUV) sind Mechanismen vorgesehen, um die Achtung der EU-Werte durchzusetzen. Sie sind auf einen politischen Beschluss des Rates unter Mitwirkung der Kommission und des Parlaments gestützt und einer gerichtlichen Nachprüfung entzogen. Vor dem Hintergrund der Mitteilung der Kommission über Artikel 7 des Vertrags über die Europäische Union (KOM(2003)0606) sollte das Spanische Gesetz für die Sicherheit der Bürger als offensichtliches Risiko eines schwerwiegenden Verstoßes gegen die gemeinsamen Werte der Union erachtet werden, wogegen auf der Grundlage eines umfassenden politischen Ansatzes vorzugehen ist.

Wird die Kommission mit der spanischen Regierung den Anwendungsbereich dieses Gesetzes und dessen Folgen für die gemeinsamen Werte der Union erörtern? Wird sie die Anwendung von Artikel 7 EUV in Erwägung ziehen?

Wird die Kommission einen Vorschlag vorlegen, der darauf abzielt, sicherzustellen, dass die Achtung der Werte der EU in Ergänzung zu Artikel 7 EUV wirksam überwacht wird?

Antwort von Frau Reding im Namen der Kommission
(13. März 2014)

Wie auch in ihren Antworten auf die Fragen E-013929/2013 und 13763/2013 verweist die Kommission darauf, dass die Zuständigkeit für die Aufrechterhaltung von Recht und Ordnung sowie den Schutz der inneren Sicherheit der Mitgliedstaaten bei den nationalen Behörden liegt und nicht durch EU-Recht geregelt wird (Artikel 72 AEUV). Die Mitgliedstaaten sind an die Europäische Konvention zum Schutz der Menschenrechte und Grundfreiheiten gebunden, in der die Meinungsfreiheit und die Versammlungsfreiheit festgeschrieben sind.

Die Kommission ist überzeugt, dass die spanischen Behörden beabsichtigen, die Wahrung der Grundrechte entsprechend ihrer nationalen Verfassung und ihren internationalen Verpflichtungen zu gewährleisten.

([1]) http://www.lavanguardia.com/politica/20131129/54395005976/gobierno-aprueba-el-anteproyecto-de-ley-de-seguridad-ciudadana.html

(English version)

Question for written answer E-013691/13
to the Commission
Franziska Keller (Verts/ALE) and Raül Romeva i Rueda (Verts/ALE)
(3 December 2013)

Subject: Spanish Citizens' Security Law

The Spanish Government passed a new Citizens' Security Law (Spanish: *Ley orgánica de Protección de la Seguridad Ciudadana*) on 29 November 2013 ([1]).

The law provides for hefty fines to be imposed on those engaging in spontaneous protests or protests leading to violence. Filming the police during demonstrations and publishing the footage will also be penalised. With these regulations the government is clearly aiming to criminalise and thus prevent protests against its unpopular policies. The law prohibits actions having generated public pressure in the past, as a result of which the government changed its policies. Parts of the law also contradict Supreme Court rulings, and the measure has provoked massive criticism and protests. Spanish constitutional lawyers believe that this law violates the freedoms of assembly and opinion, as well as other fundamental civic rights, and is therefore anti-democratic and repressive. Some speak of tendencies towards an authoritarian regime. This law violates the freedom of assembly (Article 12(1)) and breaches the Union's fundamental values (democracy and freedom, Article 2 TEU). Parliament has launched the idea of a 'European fundamental rights policy cycle', with the cooperation of EU institutions, the Member States and the Fundamental Rights Agency, to ensure effective monitoring of respect for EU values.

Article 7 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) provides mechanisms for enforcing respect for EU values. These are based on a political decision by the Council with the participation of the Commission and Parliament, and are exempt from judicial review. In the light of the Commission communication on Article 7 of the Treaty on European Union (COM(2003) 0606), the Spanish Citizens' Security Law should be regarded as presenting a clear risk of a serious breach of the common values of the Union, which should be addressed by means of a comprehensive political approach.

Will the Commission discuss with the Spanish Government the scope of this law and its consequences for the Union's common values? Will it consider implementing Article 7 TEU?

Is the Commission going to issue a proposal aimed at ensuring effective monitoring of respect for EU values, in addition to Article 7 TEU?

Answer given by Mrs Reding on behalf of the Commission
(13 March 2014)

The Commission recalls, as indicated in its replies to questions E-013929/2013 and 13763/2013, that the maintenance of law and order and the safeguarding of internal security in the Member States fall within national competence and thus outside Union law (Article 72 TFEU). Member States are bound to respect the European Convention for Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, which enshrines freedom of expression and freedom of assembly.

The Commission has full confidence in the willingness of Spanish authorities to ensure respect for fundamental rights as required by their own constitutional and international obligations.

([1]) http://www.lavanguardia.com/politica/20131129/54395005976/gobierno-aprueba-el-anteproyecto-de-ley-de-seguridad-ciudadana.html

(Versión española)

Pregunta con solicitud de respuesta escrita E-013698/13
a la Comisión
Ramon Tremosa i Balcells (ALDE)
(3 de diciembre de 2013)

Asunto: Políticas de igualdad I

La propuesta de reforma de las administraciones locales del Gobierno de España —Proyecto de Ley de racionalización y sostenibilidad de la Administración Local ([1])— suprime el artículo 28 de la Ley de Bases del Régimen Local ([2]). El artículo 28 recogía las competencias de los municipios referidas a la promoción de la mujer. La reforma iniciada por el Gobierno supone, pues, una laminación competencial sin precedentes, ya que minimiza, en materia de igualdad, toda la influencia que la política pública tiene en el ámbito local.

1. ¿Es la igualdad de género materia de seguimiento de la Comisión con los Estados miembros? ¿Cuál es la situación en España en comparación con los demás Estados miembros?

2. ¿Cuántos proyectos en el ámbito de la igualdad de género ha apoyado financieramente la Comisión en los últimos cinco años en España? ¿En cuántos de ellos el gobierno local juega un papel crucial?

Respuesta de la Sra. Reding en nombre de la Comisión
(17 de marzo de 2014)

Los Estados miembros disponen de competencias exclusivas para organizar la distribución de responsabilidades entre los distintos niveles de gobierno, por lo que la Comisión no está facultada para intervenir en el cambio legislativo mencionado por Su Señoría.

En el contexto del Semestre Europeo, la Comisión está analizando las políticas sociales y del mercado de trabajo, incluidos los resultados obtenidos en términos de igualdad entre hombres y mujeres ([3]). La Comisión hace hincapié en los problemas en materia de igualdad de género y, en su caso, en las recomendaciones específicas para cada país y supervisa su aplicación.

En 2009 se financió un proyecto español conforme al capítulo de igualdad entre hombres y mujeres del programa Progress. Los resultados y las prestaciones se transmitieron a las autoridades públicas, regionales y locales.

El FSE ([4]) apoya acciones en el ámbito de la igualdad de género, en particular a través del tema 69: «Medidas para mejorar el acceso de la mujer al mercado laboral, así como para aumentar la participación y los progresos de la mujer en dicho mercado, a fin de reducir la segregación sexista en materia de empleo y reconciliar la vida laboral y privada; por ejemplo, facilitando el acceso a los servicios de guardería y de cuidado de personas dependientes». La dotación del FSE asciende a 178 126 258 EUR para el período 2007-2013 ([5]).

El FEDER ([6]) cofinancia proyectos que contribuyan a la igualdad entre hombres y mujeres, tales como el apoyo a empresarios o a guarderías. Además, el FEDER ha cofinanciado, durante el período 2007-2013, la red española para la igualdad, que tiene por objeto el intercambio de buenas prácticas sobre los proyectos cofinanciados en este ámbito ([7]).

([1]) http://www.congreso.es/public_oficiales/L10/CONG/BOCG/A/BOCG-10-A-58-4.PDF
([2]) http://www.boe.es/buscar/act.php?id=BOE-A-1985-5392
([3]) http://ec.europa.eu/europe2020/europe-2020-in-your-country/espana/country-specific-recommendations/index_es.htm
([4]) Fondo Social Europeo.
([5]) En el contexto de los 22 programas actuales, existen medidas orientadas a favorecer la conciliación de la vida familiar y profesional, a fomentar la igualdad de oportunidades para hombres y mujeres o a mejorar la adaptación de organizaciones a las necesidades del mercado laboral, teniendo en cuenta la perspectiva de género y la inclusión social. En el caso del programa de lucha contra la discriminación, dichas medidas apoyan la igualdad entre hombres y mujeres a través del Instituto de la mujer.
([6]) Fondo Europeo de Desarrollo Regional.
([7]) http://www.inmujer.gob.es/areasTematicas/redPoliticas/metodologia/home.htm

(English version)

Question for written answer E-013698/13
to the Commission
Ramon Tremosa i Balcells (ALDE)
(3 December 2013)

Subject: Equality policies I

Under the Spanish Government's proposal for local government reform — entitled the Draft Act on the Rationalisation and Sustainability of Local Administrations ([1]) — Article 28 of the Basic Law on Local Government is deleted ([2]). Article 28 sets out the competencies of municipal councils in the field of promoting gender equality. The reform launched by the government therefore constitutes an unprecedented slashing of powers, as it minimises any influence local public policy might exert in the field of gender equality.

1. Does the Commission monitor gender equality matters in the Member States? What is the situation like in Spain as compared with other Member States?

2. How many projects in the field of gender equality has the Commission supported financially in Spain in the last five years? In how many of those did local government play a vital role?

Answer given by Mrs Reding on behalf of the Commission
(17 March 2014)

Member States have exclusive competence to organise the distribution of responsibilities among their different levels of government. The Commission has therefore no power to intervene in the legislative change mentioned by the Honourable Member.

In the context of the European semester, the Commission screens labour market and social policies, also in terms of gender equality outcomes ([3]). The Commission highlights the challenges for gender equality and in Country-Specific Recommendations, where relevant, and monitors their implementation.

Since 2009, one Spanish project was financed under the gender equality strand of the PROGRESS programme. Results and deliverables were disseminated to government authorities, regional and local authorities.

ESF ([4]) supports actions in the field of gender equality, notably via theme 69: 'Measures to improve access to employment and increase sustainable participation and progress of women in employment to reduce gender-based segregation in the labour market and to reconcile work and private life, such as facilitating access to childcare and care for dependent persons'. The ESF allocation amounts to EUR 178 126 258 for the period 2007-2013 ([5]).

ERDF ([6]) co-finances projects that contribute to gender equality such as support for entrepreneurs or childcare infrastructure. Moreover, the ERDF has co-financed during the 2007-2013 period the Spanish network for equality that aims to exchange best practice on projects co-financed in this area ([7]).

([1]) http://www.congreso.es/public_oficiales/L10/CONG/BOCG/A/BOCG-10-A-58-4.PDF
([2]) http://www.boe.es/buscar/act.php?id=BOE-A-1985-5392
([3]) http://ec.europa.eu/europe2020/europe-2020-in-your-country/espana/country-specific-recommendations/index_en.htm
([4]) European Social Fund.
([5]) In the context of the current 22 programmes, there are measures oriented to favour the work-life balance, to boost equal opportunities for men and women or to improve the adaptation of organisations to the requirements of the employment market, taking into account the gender perspective and social inclusion. In the case of the 'Lucha Contra la Discriminacion' programme, they support the gender equality through the 'Instituto de la Mujer'.
([6]) European Regional Development Fund.
([7]) http://www.inmujer.gob.es/areasTemáticas(redPoliticas/metodologia/home.htm

(Versione italiana)

Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-013701/13
al Consiglio
Lara Comi (PPE)
(3 dicembre 2013)

Oggetto: Norme sull'indicazione d'origine dei prodotti e tracciabilità

Premesso che:

— la proposta di regolamento COM(2005) 0661 è stata ritirata dalla Commissione europea di fronte alla contrarietà in seno al Consiglio, nonostante il Parlamento avesse raggiunto una propria posizione;

— nella procedura legislativa per l'adozione del regolamento COM(2009) 0031, in tema di etichettatura nel settore tessile, non è stato trovato alcun accordo per introdurre norme vincolanti sull'indicazione d'origine, sempre per la contrarietà in seno al Consiglio;

— il 25.9.2013 la Commissione ha adottato la relazione COM(2013) 0656 con la quale decide di non presentare una nuova proposta legislativa di norme sull'indicazione di origine dei prodotti tessili perché è in corso la procedura sulla proposta di regolamento in tema di «sicurezza dei prodotti di consumo», con la quale si intenderebbe introdurre un sistema «intersettoriale su scala UE» che tenga conto del paese di origine e di altri aspetti relativi alla tracciabilità (articolo 7);

— i lavori negoziali al Consiglio su questo ultimo dossier mostrano, però, che la contrarietà di taluni Stati è ancora attuale e che vi sono seri rischi che anche stavolta l'indicazione d'origine non sia adottata;

— il Parlamento si è pronunciato innumerevoli volte a favore dell'introduzione di norme sull'indicazione di origine e sulla tracciabilità dei prodotti;

— anche i cittadini mostrano di voler essere consapevoli di ciò che acquistano e le imprese apprezzerebbero un nuovo strumento che rafforzi la lotta contro la diffusa contraffazione dei prodotti,

si chiede al Consiglio:

1. di rendere pubbliche le ragioni e le argomentazioni sostenute dai governi che si oppongono all'introduzione di norme sull'indicazione di origine e sulla tracciabilità dei prodotti;

2. se non ritenga che questa contrarietà vada al più presto superata — e, nel caso di risposta affermativa, in che modo — per assicurare ai cittadini e alle imprese europee una normativa adeguata che assicuri i loro diritti e che persegua interessi prioritari degni di tutela, tra i quali la piena consapevolezza delle caratteristiche dei prodotti che si acquistano e la lotta alla contraffazione.

Risposta
(12 marzo 2014)

La proposta di regolamento sulla sicurezza dei prodotti di consumo ([1]) è attualmente all'esame degli organi preparatori del Consiglio.

Il 2 dicembre 2013 il Consiglio ha preso atto di una relazione della presidenza ([2]) sullo stato di avanzamento dei lavori relativi a questa proposta e alla proposta di regolamento sulla vigilanza del mercato ([3]). La relazione mostra un elevato grado di convergenza su tale pacchetto, ma segnala altresì una questione politica ancora in sospeso, ossia la proposta concernente una disposizione che preveda l'obbligo di indicare il paese d'origine per i prodotti non alimentari.

([1]) 5892/13.
([2]) 16872/13.
([3]) 5890/13.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-013701/13
to the Council
Lara Comi (PPE)
(3 December 2013)

Subject: Rules on indication of origin and traceability of products

Proposal for a regulation COM(2005) 0661 has been withdrawn by the Commission following opposition from the Council, even though Parliament had adopted its own position on the matter.

In the legislative procedure concerning the adoption of Regulation COM(2009) 0031, on the labelling of textile products, no agreement was reached on the introduction of binding rules on indication of origin, again, because of opposition from the Council.

On 25 September 2013 the Commission adopted COM(2013) 0656, in which it decided not to submit a new legislative proposal concerning rules on the indication of origin for textile products, because the procedure relating to the proposal for a regulation on 'consumer product safety' was currently under way. This proposal seeks to introduce an EU-wide cross-sector system which takes account of the country of origin and of other traceability-related aspects (Article 7).

Negotiations in the Council on this latter dossier show, however, that some countries are still opposing it and there are serious risks that once again the indication of origin rules will not be adopted.

Parliament has spoken out many times in favour of introducing rules on the indication of origin and traceability of products, and the general public has also shown that it wants to be aware of what it buys. Businesses, meanwhile, would appreciate a new tool that would strengthen the fight against widespread product counterfeiting.

Can the Council therefore answer the following questions:

1. Will it make public the reasons and arguments put forward by the governments that areopposing the introduction of rules on indication of origin and product traceability?

2. Does it not agree that this opposition should be overcome as soon as possible, and if so, how? It is important to provide the citizens and businesses of Europe with appropriate legislation to guarantee their rights and pursue key interests that are worthy of protection, including full knowledge of the characteristics of the products people buy, and the fight against counterfeiting.

Reply
(12 March 2014)

The proposed regulation on consumer product safety ([1]) is currently under discussion in the Council preparatory bodies.

On 2 December 2013, the Council took note of a Presidency report ([2]) on the state of play regarding this proposal as well as the proposal for a regulation on market surveillance ([3]). The report shows a high degree of overall convergence on this package. However, it also highlights an outstanding political issue in the package which remains unsolved, which concerns the proposed provision for establishing mandatory country of origin marking for non-food products.

([1]) 5892/13.
([2]) 16872/13.
([3]) 5890/13.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-013789/13
to the Commission
William (The Earl of) Dartmouth (EFD)
(5 December 2013)

Subject: Georgia and European Union membership

Is it the Commission's position that it will endorse Georgia's application for EU membership?

Answer given by Mr Füle on behalf of the Commission
(13 March 2014)

Georgia has not made such an application and the Commission has not prepared its position.

At the Eastern Partnership Summit in Vilnius in November 2013 the EU and Georgia initialled an Association Agreement, including a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area, which pursues the objectives of political association and economic integration.

The Vilnius Summit Declaration affirmed 'the particular role for the Partnership to support those who seek an ever closer relationship with the EU. The Association Agreements, including DCFTAs, are a substantial step in this direction'. The Declaration also pointed out that 'respect for the common values and implementation of Association Agreements will contribute to the future progressive developments in our relationship'.

The European Council of 19/20 December 2013 confirmed the EU's intention to sign this agreement as soon as possible and no later than the end of August 2014.

It is also worth recalling in this context the European Parliament Resolution of 23 October 2013 on the European Neighbourhood Policy: Towards a Strengthening of the Partnership which 'stresses that Georgia should not abstain from European aspirations and that it should resist pressure to give up association with the EU'.

(Versione italiana)

Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-013814/13
alla Commissione
Mara Bizzotto (EFD)
(5 dicembre 2013)

Oggetto: Diritti della donna e fenomeno delle spose bambine in Yemen

Con riferimento alla mia interrogazione E-005308/2010 può la Commissione fornire aggiornamenti sui diritti della donna e sul fenomeno delle spose bambine in Yemen?

Risposta dell'Alta Rappresentante/Vicepresidente Catherine Ashton a nome della Commissione
(11 marzo 2014)

L'Alta Rappresentante/Vicepresidente rinvia l'onorevole deputata alla propria risposta all'interrogazione scritta E-13231/13 ([1]).

([1]) http://www.europarl.europa.eu/plenary/it/parliamentary-questions.html

(English version)

Question for written answer E-013814/13
to the Commission
Mara Bizzotto (EFD)
(5 December 2013)

Subject: Women's rights and child marriage in Yemen

With reference to my Written Question E-005308/2010, can the Commission provide an update on women's rights and child marriage in Yemen?

Answer given by High-Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission
(11 March 2014)

The High-Representative/Vice-President would refer the Honourable Member to her answer to Written Question E-13231/13 ([1]).

([1]) http://www.europarl.europa.eu/plenary/en/parliamentary-questions.html

(Nederlandse versie)

Vraag met verzoek om schriftelijk antwoord E-013913/13
aan de Raad
Auke Zijlstra (NI)
(6 december 2013)

Betreft: Lidstaten gekant tegen Europees openbaar ministerie

De nationale parlementen hebben de oprichting van een nieuw Europees openbaar ministerie (EPPO) verworpen, waarbij ze argumenteren dat de nationale instanties of bestaande EU-organen, zoals het Europees Bureau voor fraudebestrijding (OLAF) of Eurojust, volstaan. Diverse eerste en tweede kamers van de lidstaten hebben 19 stemmen tegen het voorstel uitgebracht, waar 14 al had volstaan. Ondanks deze gele kaart blijven bepaalde EU-bronnen beweren dat het EPPO vroeg of laat zal worden opgericht via de procedure van nauwere samenwerking waarin artikel 20 van het Verdrag betreffende de Europese Unie voorziet ([1]).

1. Is de Raad op de hoogte van een Commissievoorstel om het EPPO via een procedure van nauwere samenwerking op te richten?

2. Beschouwt de Raad deze gelekaartprocedure als een sterke aanwijzing van de lidstaten dat zij hierover verder wensen te onderhandelen met de Raad?

3. Wat is het standpunt van de Raad over het verband tussen de inleiding van een procedure van nauwere samenwerking en het geven van een gele kaart betreffende dezelfde kwestie? Hoe beïnvloedt het laatste het nemen van een besluit dat een procedure van nauwere samenwerking toestaat, rekening houdend met het feit dat voor een dergelijke procedure unanimiteit in de Raad is vereist?

Antwoord
(12 maart 2014)

De voorwaarden voor het instellen van de procedure voor nauwere samenwerking overeenkomstig artikel 86, lid 1, derde alinea, van het VWEU, artikel 20, van het VEU, en de artikelen 326 tot en met 334, van het VWEU zijn opgenomen in de Verdragen. Indien tot nauwere samenwerking wordt besloten, zullen die voorwaarden ten volle worden nageleefd.

Overeenkomstig artikel 86, lid 1, derde alinea, van het VWEU kan met betrekking tot het Europees openbaar ministerie gebruik worden gemaakt van de bepalingen inzake nauwere samenwerking „indien ten minste negen lidstaten een nauwere samenwerking wensen aan te gaan op grond van de betrokken ontwerpverordening”. Tot nu toe zijn de betrokken Europese instellingen niet in kennis gesteld van een dergelijke wens van ten minste negen lidstaten.

Het is aan de Commissie om zich te buigen over de argumenten van bepaalde nationale parlementen als zou de voorgestelde verordening in strijd zijn met het subsidiariteitsbeginsel. Op 27 november 2013 heeft de Commissie een mededeling gepubliceerd waarin staat dat zij heeft besloten het voorstel te behouden, maar dat zij de gemotiveerde adviezen terdege in aanmerking zal nemen in de loop van het wetgevingsproces. Voorts heeft de Commissie aangegeven dat zij in een brief aan de betrokken nationale parlementen zal ingaan op de aangekaarte punten.

Bij de behandeling van de voorgestelde verordening in de Raad zal ook de Raad rekening moeten houden met de gemotiveerde adviezen die de nationale parlementen overeenkomstig artikel 7, lid 1, van Protocol Nr. 2 hebben uitgebracht.

([1]) Zie http://euobserver.com/justice/121959.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-013913/13
to the Council
Auke Zijlstra (NI)
(6 December 2013)

Subject: Member States against the European Public Prosecutor's Office

National parliaments voted against the creation of a new European Public Prosecutor's Office (EPPO), stating that national authorities or existing EU bodies, such as the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) or Eurojust are sufficient. 19 votes were cast against the proposal in Member States' upper and lower houses of parliament, although 14 would have been sufficient. Despite the issuing of a yellow card, certain EU sources still predict that the EPPO will be established sooner or later, using the enhanced cooperation procedure provided for under Article 20 of the Treaty on European Union ([1]).

1. Is the Council aware of a Commission proposal on the establishment of an enhanced cooperation procedure for the EPPO?

2. Does the Council consider the outcome of the yellow card procedure to be a strong indication from the Member States of their desire to uphold negotiations with the Council on this matter?

3. What is the Council's opinion on the relationship between the establishment of an enhanced cooperation procedure and the issuing of a yellow card on the same issue? How does the latter influence the taking of a decision authorising an enhanced cooperation procedure in light of the fact that unanimity in the Council is required for such a procedure?

Reply
(12 March 2014)

The conditions for launching the enhanced cooperation procedure pursuant to the third paragraph of Article 86(1) TFEU, Article 20 TEU and Articles 326 to 334 TFEU are set out in the Treaties. In the event that it is decided to launch enhanced cooperation, these conditions will be fully respected.

According to the third subparagraph of Article 86(1) TFEU, the provisions on enhanced cooperation may be triggered as regards the European Public Prosecutor's Office 'if at least nine Member States wish to establish enhanced cooperation on the basis of the draft regulation concerned'. To date, no such wish of at least nine Member States has been notified to the relevant European institutions.

The arguments brought forward by national parliaments on the non-compliance with the principle of subsidiarity of the proposed Regulation, have to be addressed by the Commission. On 27 November 2013, the Commission published a communication, in which it noted its decision to maintain the proposal, but addressed that it will take due account of the reasoned opinions during the legislative process. Further, the Commission indicated that it will address in letters to the national parliaments concerned the issues they have raised.

In the examination of the proposed Regulation in the Council the reasoned opinions issued by national parliaments in accordance with Article 7(1) of Protocol to the Commission, will also have_to be taken into account by the Council.

([1]) http://euobserver.com/justice/121959

(English version)

Question for written answer E-013981/13
to the Commission
James Nicholson (ECR)
(10 December 2013)

Subject: Cross-border recovery of debts

On 6 December 2014, the EU's Justice Council agreed to adopt a Commission proposal to help businesses and individuals with the cross-border recovery of debts. The Commission said that its proposal would give creditors more certainty when it came to recovering sums they were owed, and would thus increase confidence in trading within the single market. Nevertheless, the Commission admitted that negotiations with the Council had resulted in a number of changes being made to the initial text of the European Account Preservation Order. For instance, according to the Council text, the rules will only apply to creditors domiciled in a Member State which is bound by the rules.

While I welcome efforts to improve confidence in the single market, I would like to know what assurances the Commission can give that the Council's text will not undermine both this confidence and competition, given that some of the largest creditors may not be domiciled within the EU and will thus be able to circumvent the rules?

Answer given by Mrs Reding on behalf of the Commission
(13 March 2014)

Following up on the successful conclusion of the trilogue negotiations with the European Parliament, the Justice Council on 4 March has unanimously agreed on a compromise text on the establishment of the European Account Preservation Order. This paves the way for a vote in Parliament in a forthcoming plenary session.

The Commission considers that the agreement by Parliament and Council on the European Account Preservation Order will raise the prospects of successfully recovering cross-border debt in the single market and contribute to strengthening the confidence of business and consumers to make full use of the possibilities offered by the single market. This is an important measure for Europe's small businesses. In times of economic recovery, European companies need quick solutions to recover outstanding debts. They need an effective Europe-wide solution so that the money stays where it is until a court has taken a decision on the repayment of the funds.

As a result of the agreed text, modifying the Commission proposal, creditors from non-participating Member States will not be able to make use of the European procedure in disputes before the courts of participating Member States. These creditors will need to use national procedures for the preservation of bank accounts in order to recover their cross-border claims. The use of national procedures is not a circumvention of the European rules as the European Account Preservation Order procedure is optional for the creditor.

(Versão portuguesa)

Pergunta com pedido de resposta escrita E-014046/13
à Comissão (Vice-Presidente/Alta Representante)
Charles Tannock (ECR) e Ana Gomes (S&D)
(12 de dezembro de 2013)

Assunto: VP/HR — Detenção de Bassel Safadi Khartabil

Em março de 2012, o regime de Assad da Síria prendeu Bassel Safadi Khartabil, um sírio de 31 anos de idade, de origem palestiniana. Khartabil é um reconhecido engenheiro informático que, através das suas inovações nos domínios das redes sociais, da educação digital e do software web de fonte aberta, é tido como o responsável pela abertura da Internet na Síria — um país com uma história notável de censura em linha — e pela ampla difusão do acesso e do conhecimento da Internet entre a população síria. Khartabil contribuiu para numerosos projetos de Internet e foi classificado pela revista americana *Foreign Policy* como o 19.° pensador mais influente de 2012 (uma posição acima de Mario Draghi). O seu trabalho voluntário, sempre de natureza não violenta, foi muito apreciado por sírios oriundos de todos os quadrantes, existindo fortes suspeitas de que a sua prisão foi parte de um esforço para restringir o acesso às comunidades e aos discursos em linha, de forma a reprimir a liberdade de expressão na Síria.

Alegadamente, Khartabil foi torturado às mãos das autoridades sírias e foi-lhe negada toda e qualquer forma de representação legal ao longo da sua detenção. Apesar de ter sido transferido de uma prisão militar para um estabelecimento prisional civil, e mesmo não tendo participado em nenhuma atividade militar, ainda enfrenta um tribunal militar e uma pena de prisão perpétua. Ainda assim, Khartabil não foi ainda acusado formalmente de nenhum crime.

1. Tem a VP/AR conhecimento da atual detenção de Bassel Safadi Khartabil? Em caso afirmativo, já proferiu alguma declaração pública relativa a este assunto?

2. Concorda que esta situação representa um novo abuso por parte do regime de Assad nas suas tentativas de bloquear a livre difusão de informação?

3. Irá a VP/AR recorrer à sua capacidade de influência para exercer pressão no sentido da libertação de Khartabil, insistindo no seu estatuto de não combatente cujo único crime foi a sua oposição à censura e a promoção da liberdade de informação?

Resposta dada pela Alta Representante/Vice-Presidente Catherine Ashton em nome da Comissão
(18 de março de 2014)

A Alta Representante/Vice-Presidente (AR/VP) deplora a detenção de Bassel Safadi Khartabil, partilha as preocupações face à sua situação e segue-a muito de perto. A AR/VP emitiu várias declarações condenando as detenções de defensores dos direitos humanos e de ativistas dos meios de comunicação social e solicitando a libertação imediata de todos os presos políticos. Também chamou a atenção para a necessidade de respeitar a liberdade de expressão e a liberdade dos defensores dos direitos humanos e ativistas dos meios de comunicação social para realizarem os seus trabalhos, em conformidade com as obrigações internacionais da Síria. Além disso, a Síria deve proteger os direitos humanos de todas as pessoas detidas nos seus centros de detenção e assegurar que as condições de detenção estão em conformidade com o direito internacional e com as normas mínimas aplicáveis.

A UE continuará a defender os direitos humanos e a participar ativamente no sentido de garantir a responsabilização pelas violações generalizadas e sistemáticas e pelos abusos dos direitos humanos perpetrados na Síria. Recorda que todos os responsáveis por essas violações devem ser responsabilizados pelos seus atos. A União Europeia reitera o seu apoio à Comissão de Inquérito Independente estabelecida pelo Conselho dos Direitos Humanos.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-014046/13
to the Commission (Vice-President/High Representative)
Charles Tannock (ECR) and Ana Gomes (S&D)
(12 December 2013)

Subject: VP/HR — Imprisonment of Bassel Safadi Khartabil

In March 2012, the Assad regime in Syria arrested Bassel Safadi Khartabil, a 31-year-old Syrian of Palestinian origin. Mr Khartabil is a distinguished computer engineer who, through his innovations in social media, digital education and open-source web software, is credited with opening up the Internet in Syria — a country with a notorious record of online censorship — and vastly extending online access and knowledge to the Syrian people. He has contributed to numerous Internet projects and was ranked by the American magazine *Foreign Policy* as the 19th most influential thinker in 2012 (one place above Mario Draghi). His voluntary work, always non-violent in nature, was greatly valued by Syrians of all backgrounds, and it is strongly suspected that his arrest was part of an effort to restrict access to online communities and discourses and stifle free expression in Syria.

It is alleged that Mr Khartabil has faced torture at the hands of the Syrian authorities, and throughout his incarceration he has been denied all forms of legal representation. Although he has been moved from a military to a civilian jail, and although he has taken part in no military activity, he still faces a military court, and a life sentence. Despite all of this, he has still not been formally charged with any crime.

1. Is the VP/HR aware of the ongoing imprisonment of Bassel Safadi Khartabil? If so, has she issued any public statement on the matter?

2. Does she agree that this represents a further abuse by the Assad regime in its attempts to block the free spread of information?

3. Will the VP/HR use the leverage available to her to press for his release, insisting upon his status as a non-combatant whose only crime has been to oppose censorship and promote the freedom of information?

Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission
(18 March 2014)

The HR/VP deplores the ongoing imprisonment of Bassel Safadi Khartabil, shares the concerns at his situation and follows it very closely. The HR/VP has issued several statements condemning the arrests of human rights defenders and media activists and asking for the immediate release of all political prisoners. She also stressed the need to respect the freedom of expression and the freedom of human rights defenders and media activists to carry out their work in line with Syria's international obligations. Moreover, Syria must protect the human rights of all persons held in its detention facilities and ensure that the conditions of detention comply with applicable international law and minimum standards.

The EU will continue to defend human rights and will remain active in ensuring accountability for the widespread and systematic violations and abuses of human rights perpetrated in Syria. It recalls that all those responsible for such violations must be held accountable. The EU reaffirms its support to the Independent Commission of Inquiry established by the Human Rights Council.

(Nederlandse versie)

Vraag met verzoek om schriftelijk antwoord E-014068/13
aan de Commissie (Vicevoorzitter / Hoge Vertegenwoordiger)
Cornelis de Jong (GUE/NGL)
(12 december 2013)

Betreft: VP/HR — Baha'is in Iran

De recente nucleaire overeenkomst en de mogelijke samenwerking met de Iraanse autoriteiten de komende maanden biedt de Europese Unie de kans om de mensenrechtensituatie in Iran aan de kaak te stellen.

Hoe denkt de VV/HV de situatie met betrekking tot de rechten van religieuze minderheden in Iran aan te pakken, met name die van de grootste niet-islamitische minderheid, de Baha'is?

Welke actie is de VV/HV voornemens te ondernemen om de vrijlating te bewerkstelligen van zeven Baha'i-leiders die tot twintig jaar gevangenisstraf zijn veroordeeld?

Welke stappen kunnen er tot slot worden gezet om de Iraanse autoriteiten aan te moedigen het ontwerphandvest van burgerrechten aan te passen dat op 26 november 2013 werd gepubliceerd en waarin de Baha'is feitelijk van bescherming worden uitgesloten, op dusdanige wijze dat de rechten van alle burgers van Iran expliciet worden gewaarborgd?

Antwoord van hoge vertegenwoordiger/vicevoorzitter Ashton namens de Commissie
(14 maart 2014)

De mensenrechtensituatie in Iran blijft een bron van ernstige bezorgdheid voor de EU, waaronder ook de rechten van etnische en religieuze minderheden zoals de Bahai-gemeenschap en haar leiders.

De hv/vv zal in haar contacten met de Iraanse autoriteiten en leiders blijven druk uitoefenen opdat Iran de internationale mensenrechtenverplichtingen zou eerbiedigen die het zelf is aangegaan.

Wat betreft het ontwerp voor een handvest van burgerrechten dat een initiatief is van de nieuwe Iraanse president Rouhani, verwacht de Europese Unie dat de uiteindelijke versie van het handvest zal beantwoorden aan de internationale mensenrechtenverplichtingen en normen inzake de bescherming van minderheden.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-014068/13
to the Commission (Vice-President/High Representative)
Cornelis de Jong (GUE/NGL)
(12 December 2013)

Subject: VP/HR — Bahá'ís in Iran

The recent nuclear agreement and the possible engagement with the Iranian authorities in the coming months is an opportunity for the European Union to address the human rights situation in Iran.

How is the VP/HR envisaging addressing the situation of the rights of religious minorities in Iran and in particular those of the largest non-Muslim minority, the Bahá'ís?

What action will the VP/HR take to secure the release of the seven Bahá'í leaders who have been sentenced to 20 years in jail?

Lastly, what steps can be taken to encourage the Iranian authorities to reframe the draft Charter of Citizens' Rights published on 26 November 2013, effectively excluding the Bahá'ís from protection, in such a way as to explicitly guarantee the rights of all the citizens of Iran?

Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission
(14 March 2014)

The situation of human rights in Iran remains a serious concern for the European Union, including with regard to the rights of ethnic and religious minorities such as the Bahai'is and their leaders.

The HR/VP, in her contacts with Iranian authorities and leaders, will continue to put pressure on Iran to respect the international human rights obligations that it has itself signed up to.

As to the new draft Charter of Citizens Rights, an initiative by the new Iranian President Rouhani, the European Union would expect the final version of the Charter to be in line with international human rights obligations and standards on protection of minorities.

(Latviešu valodas versija)

Jautājums, uz kuru jāatbild rakstiski, E-014099/13
Komisijai
Alexander Mirsky (S&D), Filip Kaczmarek (PPE), Roger Helmer (EFD), Nirj Deva (ECR) un Hannu Takkula (ALDE)
(2013. gada 13. decembris)

Temats: Ievērojami Bulgārijas konstitūcijas pārkāpumi

Vismaz 39 Bulgārijas galēji labējās nacionālistu partijas *Ataka* deputātu kandidāti 2009. gadā parakstīja kredītgarantijas no viena ārzonas uzņēmuma citam. No šiem kandidātiem 17 vēlāk kļuva par Parlamenta deputātiem. Kandidāti tika lūgti ierasties *Ataka* galvenajā ēkā 2009. gada 12. un 13. jūnijā – dienu pirms 2009. gada Parlamenta vēlēšanu kandidātu sarakstu reģistrācijas termiņa. Saskaņā ar viņu liecībām viņi tur tika maldināti un tā rezultātā parakstīja minētās kredītgarantijas un reģistrācijas dokumentus. Līdz ar to katrs kandidāts kļuva par galvotāju aizdevumam EUR 150 000 apmērā, ņemot šo summu no viena ārzonas uzņēmuma kā aizņēmējs un kreditējot to citam kā aizdevējs. Partijas vadība un *Volen Siderov* personīgi viņiem teica, ka viņi parakstot "lojalitātes deklarācijas" jeb "lojalitātes līgumus". Šāda manipulēšana ar demokrātiju ir ļoti nopietns noziegums.

1. Ņemot vērā, ka Bulgārijā acīmredzot neviens nevēlas risināt šīs nopietnās valsts problēmas, vai Komisija plāno iejaukties šajā jautājumā?

2. Vai Komisija plāno Eiropas līmenī pieņemt tiesību aktus, kas aizliegtu šādus noziegumus un paredzētu ļoti stingras sankcijas pret tiem, kuri turpina šādu praksi?

Atbildi Komisijas vārdā sniedza Sesīlija Malmstrēma
(2014. gada 17. februāris)

Komisijai nav tiesību iejaukties individuālos gadījumos, kas saistīti ar iespējamo korupciju valstu politisko partiju pārvaldībā vai vēlēšanu kampaņās. Dalībvalstis atbild par valstu vēlēšanu rīkošanu un par kārtības un likumības uzturēšanu valsts līmenī. Komisijai nav nodoma ierosināt tiesību aktus par politisko partiju finansēšanu valsts līmenī.

Saskaņā ar sadarbības un pārbaudes mehānismu Komisija turpina uzraudzīt Bulgārijas progresu pievienošanās saistību pildīšanā attiecībā uz cīņu pret korupciju. Šis mehānisms būs spēkā, kamēr tiks sekmīgi izpildīti visi kritēriji. Plašāka informācija par ziņojumiem, kurus sagatavo saskaņā ar sadarbības un pārbaudes mehānismu, pieejama tīmekļa vietnē:
http://ec.europa.eu/cvm/progress_reports_en.htm

ES pretkorupcijas ziņojumā, kas publicēts 2014. gada 3. februārī, tiek vērsta uzmanība uz vēlēšanu pārkāpumiem kā uz problēmām, ar ko saskaras vairākas dalībvalstis, tostarp Bulgārija. Ziņojums ir publicēts šādā tīmekļa vietnē:
http://ec.europa.eu/anti-corruption-report/

(Wersja polska)

Pytanie wymagające odpowiedzi pisemnej E-014099/13
do Komisji
Alexander Mirsky (S&D), Filip Kaczmarek (PPE), Roger Helmer (EFD), Nirj Deva (ECR) oraz Hannu Takkula (ALDE)
(13 grudnia 2013 r.)

Przedmiot: Poważne naruszenie bułgarskiej konstytucji

W 2009 r. co najmniej 39 potencjalnych posłów do PE ze skrajnie prawicowej bułgarskiej partii nacjonalistycznej Ataka podpisało gwarancje kredytowe dotyczące dwóch firm typu offshore. Siedemnastu spośród tych kandydatów zostało posłami do PE. Kandydatów poproszono o stawienie się w siedzibie partii Ataka w dniach 12 i 13 czerwca 2009 r., tj. w przeddzień terminu rejestracji list kandydatów w wyborach parlamentarnych 2009. Z ich zeznań wynika, że wprowadzono ich tam w błąd, w związku z czym podpisali oni wyżej wspomniane gwarancje razem z dokumentami rejestracyjnymi. Każdy kandydat stał się zatem poręczycielem pożyczki w wysokości 150 000 euro, pożyczając tę kwotę od jednej spółki typu offshore jako kredytobiorca i pożyczając ją innej spółce jako kredytodawca. Przywódcy partii i osobiście Volen Siderov powiedzieli im, że podpisują „oświadczenia lojalnościowe" lub „umowy lojalnościowe". Manipulowanie demokracją w ten sposób jest bardzo poważnym przestępstwem.

1. Czy Komisja zamierza zainterweniować w tej sprawie, ponieważ najwyraźniej nikt nie chce zająć się tymi poważnymi problemami państwowymi w Bułgarii?

2. Czy Komisja zamierza przyjąć prawodawstwo unijne, które zakaże takich przestępstw i będzie przewidywało bardzo surowe sankcje wobec osób stosujących nadal takie praktyki?

Odpowiedź udzielona przez komisarz Cecilię Malmström w imieniu Komisji
(17 lutego 2014 r.)

Komisja nie posiada kompetencji do podejmowania interwencji w indywidualnych przypadkach domniemanej korupcji w zarządzaniu krajowymi partiami politycznymi i kampaniami wyborczymi. Za organizację krajowych wyborów i za utrzymanie porządku publicznego na szczeblu krajowym odpowiedzialne są państwa członkowskie. Komisja nie planuje przedstawić projektów aktów prawnych dotyczących finansowania partii politycznych na poziomie krajowym.

W ramach mechanizmu współpracy i weryfikacji Komisja monitoruje postępy Bułgarii w realizacji jej zobowiązań związanych z przystąpieniem do UE i dotyczących walki z korupcją. Mechanizm ten będzie obowiązywać do czasu aż wszystkie cele referencyjne zostaną w zadowalający sposób zrealizowane. Więcej informacji na temat sprawozdań publikowanych w ramach mechanizmu współpracy i weryfikacji znajduje się pod adresem: http://ec.europa.eu/cvm/progress_reports_en.htm.

Opublikowane w dniu 3 lutego 2014 r. sprawozdanie o zwalczaniu korupcji w UE podkreśla, że nieprawidłowości wyborcze są wyzwaniem, przed którym stoi kilka państw członkowskich, w tym Bułgaria. Sprawozdanie jest dostępne tutaj: http://ec.europa.eu/anti-corruption-report/.

(Suomenkielinen versio)

Kirjallisesti vastattava kysymys E-014099/13
komissiolle
Alexander Mirsky (S&D), Filip Kaczmarek (PPE), Roger Helmer (EFD), Nirj Deva (ECR) ja Hannu Takkula (ALDE)
(13. joulukuuta 2013)

Aihe: Bulgarian perustuslain räikeä loukkaaminen

Vuonna 2009 ainakin 39 bulgarialaisen äärioikeistolaisen ja kansallismielisen Ataka-puolueen kansanedustajaehdokasta allekirjoitti offshore-yhtiön toiselle offshore-yhtiölle myöntämän lainan takaussopimuksen. Näistä ehdokkaista 17 valittiin parlamentin jäseniksi. Ehdokkaita pyydettiin tulemaan Atakan puoluetoimistoon 12. ja 13. kesäkuuta 2009 eli päivää ennen vuoden 2009 parlamenttivaalien ehdokasluettelon rekisteröimistä koskevan määräajan päättymistä. Ehdokkaiden lausuntojen mukaan heitä johdettiin harhaan ja heidät saatiin allekirjoittamaan edellä mainitun lainan takaussopimus yhdessä rekisteröintiasiakirjojen kanssa. Tämän seurauksena kustakin ehdokkaasta tuli 150 000 euron arvoisen lainan takaaja siten, että ehdokas sai tämän määrän lainanottajana offshore-yhtiöltä ja lainasi sen lainanantajana toiselle offshore-yhtiölle. Puolueen johto ja Volen Siderov henkilökohtaisesti kertoivat ehdokkaille, että he allekirjoittivat ”uskollisuusvakuutuksen” tai ”lojaliteettisopimuksen”. Demokratian manipuloiminen tällä tavalla on hyvin vakava rikos.

1. Aikooko komissio puuttua tähän asiaan, koska ilmeisesti kukaan ei halua käsitellä näitä vakavia valtiollisia ongelmia Bulgariassa?

2. Aikooko komissio laatia Euroopan tasoista lainsäädäntöä, jonka nojalla kielletään tällaiset rikokset ja määrätään hyvin ankarat seuraamukset niille, jotka jatkavat tällaisten käytäntöjen harjoittamista?

Cecilia Malmströmin komission puolesta antama vastaus
(17. helmikuuta 2014)

Komissiolla ei ole valtuuksia puuttua yksittäistapauksiin, jotka koskevat väitettyä korruptiota kansallisten poliittisten puolueiden tai vaalikampanjoiden johtamisessa. Jäsenvaltiot ovat vastuussa kansallisten vaalien järjestämisestä ja yleisen järjestyksen ylläpitämisestä kansallisella tasolla. Komissio ei aio ehdottaa kansallisen tason puoluerahoitusta koskevaa lainsäädäntöä.

Komissio seuraa yhteistyö- ja seurantamekanismin avulla Bulgarian edistymistä niiden korruption torjuntaa koskevien sitoumusten täyttämisessä, jotka se antoi liittyessään unioniin. Mekanismi pysyy voimassa, kunnes kaikki vaatimukset on täytetty tyydyttävästi. Yhteistyö- ja seurantamekanismin puitteissa annetuista kertomuksista on saatavilla lisätietoja osoitteessa http://ec.europa.eu/cvm/progress_reports_en.htm.

Helmikuun 3. päivänä 2014 julkaistun EU:n korruptiontorjuntakertomuksen mukaan vaaleihin liittyvät sääntöjenvastaisuudet ovat ongelma monissa jäsenvaltioissa, myös Bulgariassa. Kertomus on saatavilla osoitteessa http://ec.europa.eu/anti-corruption-report/.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-014099/13
to the Commission
Alexander Mirsky (S&D), Filip Kaczmarek (PPE), Roger Helmer (EFD), Nirj Deva (ECR) and Hannu Takkula (ALDE)
(13 December 2013)

Subject: Gross violations of the Bulgarian Constitution

In 2009 at least 39 prospective MPs from the far-right Bulgarian nationalist party Ataka signed credit guarantees from one offshore company to another. Some 17 of these candidates went on to become MPs. The candidates were asked to appear at the Ataka headquarters on 12 and 13 June 2009, one day before the candidate list registration deadline for the 2009 parliamentary elections. There, according to their testimony, they were misled into signing the aforementioned credit guarantees along with the registration documents. Each candidate therefore became a guarantor for a loan worth EUR 150 000, taking this sum from one offshore company as a borrower and lending it to another as a lender. The party leadership and Volen Siderov in person told them that they were signing 'declarations of loyalty' or 'loyalty contracts'. Manipulating democracy in this way is a very serious crime.

1. Does the Commission intend to intervene in this matter, since apparently nobody wishes to address these serious state problems in Bulgaria?

2. Is the Commission planning to adopt legislation at a European level that will prohibit such crimes and will provide very strict sanctions against those who continue with such practices?

Answer given by Ms Malmström on behalf of the Commission
(17 February 2014)

The Commission has no competence to intervene in individual cases of alleged corruption in the management of national political parties or election campaigns. The Member States are responsible for the organisation of national elections and for the maintenance of law and order at national level. The Commission has no intention to propose legislation on the financing of political parties at national level.

Under the Cooperation and Verification Mechanism, the Commission is monitoring Bulgaria's progress in achieving its accession commitments in the fight against corruption. The mechanism will stay in place until all benchmarks have been satisfactorily fulfilled. More information on the reports issued within the framework of the Cooperation and Verification Mechanism is available here: http://ec.europa.eu/cvm/progress_reports_en.htm

The EU Anti-Corruption Report, published on 3 February 2014, highlights electoral irregularities as a challenge faced by several Member States including Bulgaria. The report is available here: http://ec.europa.eu/anti-corruption-report/

(Versión española)

Pregunta con solicitud de respuesta escrita E-014124/13
a la Comisión
Ramon Tremosa i Balcells (ALDE)
(16 de diciembre de 2013)

Asunto: Exportación de bienes intensivos

Según el informe WEO de 2013, claramente se constata que los precios energéticos pueden resultar vitales para la competitividad de las industrias intensivas en energía y, por lo tanto, para la estabilidad en el empleo y la tan citada creación de riqueza. En dichas industrias intensivas como la química, del cemento, el papel o el cristal, por sólo citar algunos sectores, la factura energética puede suponer un coste superior al del trabajador. De hecho, en algunos segmentos de la industria química los costes energéticos pueden suponer el 80 % de los costes.

Teniendo en cuenta las Directrices 2008/C 82/01 (Diario Oficial C 82 de 1.4.2008),

¿Cree la Comisión que debido a dichos costes vamos a ver una disminución sensible de la participación de las empresas de la UE en el mercado mundial de exportación de bienes intensivos en energía?

Respuesta del Sr.Tajani en nombre de la Comisión
(14 de marzo de 2014)

La Agencia Internacional de la Energía señala claramente en *World Energy Outlook 2013* (Perspectivas de la energía en el mundo, 2013) que el reciente aumento de los precios de la energía constituye uno de los factores que inciden en la competitividad de las industrias de alto consumo energético. En particular, estima como principal hipótesis que la cuota en el mercado mundial de las exportaciones de la UE de bienes intensivos en energía podría caer de aproximadamente el 36 % en 2011 al 26 % en 2035. Este descenso está vinculado a la globalización mundial, a las variaciones en las pautas de la demanda y a las diferentes tendencias por lo que se refiere a la energía.

Como ya señaló en su nueva Comunicación sobre los precios y costes de la energía en Europa ([1]), la Comisión considera con especial preocupación el problema de los elevados costes de la energía en Europa.

En este contexto, la Comisión trabaja activamente a fin de minimizar los efectos negativos de los costes energéticos en nuestra sociedad y en nuestro sector industrial. El reto futuro es confiar en políticas bien diseñadas y complementarias a medio y largo plazo basadas en el principio de rentabilidad que permita conservar la competitividad de la industria europea al tiempo que se mantienen objetivos ambiciosos para el clima y la energía. La estrategia global de la UE debe basarse en la realización del mercado interior de la energía, un mayor aumento de la eficacia y la productividad, la diversificación de los combustibles y las vías de suministro, y en la innovación.

Asimismo, es importante reconocer el papel que pueden desempeñar temporalmente las medidas correctoras para alcanzar una economía competitiva y con bajas emisiones de carbono, como, por ejemplo, la intención de la Comisión de garantizar la continuidad en la composición de la lista de fuga de carbono hasta 2020. Por su parte, las directrices sobre ayudas estatales en favor del medio ambiente o la energía ([2]), que son objeto actualmente de una revisión, constituyen evidentemente una de las herramientas de que dispone Europa.

([1]) COM(2014) 21.
([2]) DO C 82 de 1.4.2008, p. 1.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-014124/13
to the Commission
Ramon Tremosa i Balcells (ALDE)
(16 December 2013)

Subject: Export of energy-intensive goods

The 2013 WEO report clearly confirms that energy prices can be essential to the competitiveness of energy-intensive industries and, thus, to employment stability and to wealth creation, which is so often mentioned. In energy-intensive industries-such as the chemical, cement, paper, and glass industries, to mention just a few sectors-the cost of energy can exceed the cost of labour. In fact, in some segments of the chemical industry, energy costs can represent 80% of total costs.

Taking into account Directive 2008/C 82/01 (Official Journal C 82, 1.4.2008),

Does the Commission believe that, because of these costs, we are going to see a noticeable decrease in EU companies' participation in the global export market for energy-intensive goods?

Answer given by Mr Tajani on behalf of the Commission
(14 March 2014)

The International Energy Agency in the World Energy Outlook 2013 shows clearly that the recent rise in energy prices is one of the factors that affect the competitiveness of the energy-intensive industries. In particular, it estimates in its central scenario that the global market share of exports of EU energy-intensive goods may fall from around 36% in 2011 to 26% in 2035. This decline is linked to a globalising world, shifting demand patters and indeed different developments regarding energy.

As expressed in its new Communication on energy prices and costs in Europe ([1]), the Commission takes very seriously the issue of high European energy prices.

In this context, the Commission is working actively in order to minimise the negative impacts of energy costs on our society and industrial system. The challenge ahead is to rely on well-designed and complementary policies for the medium- to longer term, based on the principle of cost efficiency to preserve Europe's industrial competitiveness while maintaining ambitious climate and energy objectives. Overall, the EU's strategy needs to rely on the completion of the internal energy market, further increasing efficiency and productivity, diversification of fuels and supply routes, and innovation.

At the same time, it is important to recognise the role that corrective measures can temporarily have towards a competitive and low-carbon economy, such as the intention of the Commission to guarantee continuity in the composition of the carbon leakage list up to 2020. Also, the state aid guidelines related to environment and energy ([2]) — currently under review — certainly represent one of the tools at Europe's disposal.

([1]) COM(2014) 21.
([2]) OJ C 82/1, 1.4.2008.

(Versión española)

Pregunta con solicitud de respuesta escrita E-014134/13
a la Comisión
Ramon Tremosa i Balcells (ALDE)
(16 de diciembre de 2013)

Asunto: Estrategia energética para Europa: previsiones

El Consejo de la Industria Química de los Estados Unidos ha señalado en sus últimas previsiones que las exportaciones de productos químicos de los Estados Unidos aumentarán un 45 % durante los próximos cinco años. Mientras tanto, los fabricantes europeos de productos químicos ya han anunciado recortes de puestos de trabajo, cierres de instalaciones y salidas de algunas empresas. A mediados de la década de 2000 los Estados Unidos eran uno de los lugares más caros del mundo en la fabricación de productos químicos. Hoy en día ese país es el segundo más barato del mundo. En 2012 la industria química europea supuso un 18 % de las ventas mundiales de productos químicos, dio empleo a más de 1,1 millones de personas y registró un excedente comercial de casi 50 000 millones de euros.

En vista de lo anterior y teniendo en cuenta la estrategia energética para Europa, ¿cuáles podrían ser las previsiones para la UE en los próximos cinco años?

Respuesta del Sr. Tajani en nombre de la Comisión
(12 de marzo de 2014)

Las industrias químicas, de los plásticos y del caucho figuran entre los sectores industriales de la UE de mayor tamaño y más dinámicos. Generan unos 3,1 millones de empleos en más de 83 000 empresas y alrededor del 20 % de las ventas de productos químicos a nivel mundial ([1]). La industria está formada por una amplia gama de diferentes subsectores, interrelacionados en centros de producción integrados, y que se caracterizan por sus fuertes asociaciones en la cadena de valor de la fabricación.

La reglamentación puede tener una incidencia significativa en la industria química. Algunos subsectores se ven muy afectados por los precios de la energía ([2]). El análisis presentado en la Comunicación «Precios y costes de la energía en Europa» indica que una serie de factores son responsables de los cambios en la estructura industrial de Europa y que la UE se ha estado reestructurando para conseguir una producción que requiera una intensidad energética menor y que ofrezca un mayor valor añadido. También han influido otros muchos factores ([3]). El reciente paquete sobre energía y clima destaca la necesidad de conservar medidas destinadas a mantener las mismas condiciones para todos a escala mundial en el caso de determinadas industrias que requieren gran cantidad de energía.

Otros sectores de la industria química dependen mucho más de la capacidad de innovación de la UE y algunos de ellos son muy competitivos a escala internacional. Una multitud de factores influyen en la competitividad de esta industria, entre los que hay que mencionar la garantía del suministro, la infraestructura, la logística, los recursos humanos y la normativa medioambiental.

Como seguimiento de la Comunicación sobre política industrial de 2014, se pondrá en marcha un estudio en el que se evalúen los costes acumulados de las políticas y exigencias normativas de la UE para la competitividad de la industria química de la UE, y que abordará el asunto de los posibles desventajas de los costes.

La Comisión seguirá examinando con especial atención las tendencias de esta industria.

([1]) 2012.
([2]) P. ej., suponen el 80 % de los costes de producción del amoniaco.
([3]) Entre los que cabe citar los costes laborales y el atractivo de mercados distintos de la UE.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-014134/13
to the Commission
Ramon Tremosa i Balcells (ALDE)
(16 December 2013)

Subject: Energy Strategy for Europe — Forecast

The US Chemical Industry Council has predicted in its recent forecast that US chemical exports will rise by 45% over the next five years. In the meantime, European chemical producers have already announced job cuts, plant closures and exits from some businesses. In the mid-2000s the US was one of the world's most expensive locations for manufacturing chemicals. Today the US is the second cheapest location in the world. The European chemical industry accounted for 18% of world chemical sales in 2012, employing more than 1.1 million people and creating a clear trade surplus of almost EUR 50 billion.

In the light of the above and taking into account the Energy Strategy for Europe, what does the five-year forecast for the EU look like?

Answer given by Mr Tajani on behalf of the Commission
(12 March 2014)

The chemicals, plastics and rubber industries are among the largest and most dynamic EU industrial sectors. They generate about 3.1 million jobs in more than 83 000 companies and about 20% of global chemicals sales ([1]). The industry comprises a wide range of different sub-sectors, interwoven in integrated production sites and characterised by intensive partnerships in the manufacturing value chain.

Regulation can have a significant impact on the chemicals industry. Some sub-sectors are particularly sensitive to energy prices ([2]). The analysis presented in the communication 'Energy prices and costs in Europe' indicates that a range of factors are responsible for Europe's changing industrial structure and the EU has indeed been restructuring towards lower energy intensity and higher value added production. Many other factors have played a role ([3]). The recent energy and climate package underlines the need to preserve measures to maintain a global level playing field for certain energy intensive industries.

Other parts of the chemical industry depend much more on the EU's innovative capacity, and parts of it are highly competitive at international level. A host of factors influence the competitiveness of this industry including security of supply, infrastructure, logistics, human resources and environmental regulation.

As a follow-up to the 2014 Industrial Policy Communication, a study will be launched assessing the cumulative costs of EU policies and regulatory requirements on the competitiveness of the EU chemical industry. It will address the issue of possible cost disadvantages.

The Commission will continue to follow the trends of this industry closely.

([1]) 2012.
([2]) e.g. 80% of production costs for ammonia.
([3]) Including labour costs and the attractiveness of markets outside the EU.

(Versione italiana)

Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-014136/13
alla Commissione
Roberta Angelilli (PPE)
(16 dicembre 2013)

Oggetto: Sottrazione internazionale di minori — Applicazione della normativa europea e internazionale in Austria

L'Ufficio del Mediatore del Parlamento europeo per i casi di sottrazione internazionale di minori riceve sempre più spesso richieste da parte di genitori di nazionalità diversa, relative a casi di sottrazione o trattenimento di minori in Austria.

I genitori non austriaci lamentano numerose difficoltà nell'ottenere, da parte delle competenti autorità austriache, la corretta applicazione del regolamento (CE) n. 2201/2003 (Brussels II) e tempi lunghissimi per il riconoscimento e l'esecuzione in Austria di sentenze giudiziarie di altri Stati membri relative a minori di coppie bi-nazionali.

Spesso l'esecuzione in Austria delle sentenze giudiziarie che prevedono il rimpatrio di minori in altri Stati membri incontra difficoltà di ordine pratico, che di fatto ne impediscono l'esecuzione rendendo cosi vano l'intero procedimento espletato ai sensi di detto regolamento.

Allo stesso modo alcuni genitori lamentano la non corretta applicazione da parte delle competenti autorità austriache della Convenzione dell'Aia del 25 ottobre 1980 sugli aspetti civili della sottrazione internazionale di minori, specificatamente in relazione alla richiesta di condizioni «speciali» non previste dalla Convenzione stessa per ordinare il rimpatrio del minore nella sua residenza abituale in un altro Stato membro.

Può la Commissione far sapere:

1. se a livello dell'UE viene svolto un monitoraggio relativo alla corretta applicazione del regolamento (CE) n. 2201/2003 (Brussels II) da parte dell'Austria, anche per quanto riguarda i tempi impiegati per il ritorno di minori;

2. se è in possesso di statistiche recenti in relazione all'applicazione del regolamento in questione da parte dell'Austria, sempre per quanto riguarda il ritorno di minori;

3. se del caso, quali azioni intende intraprendere al fine di invitare le autorità austriache ad applicare correttamente la normativa comunitaria in vigore e velocizzare i tempi relativi al ritorno di minori da quel paese?

Risposta di Viviane Reding a nome della Commissione
(12 marzo 2014)

I casi di sottrazione transfrontaliera di minori da parte di uno dei genitori all'interno dell'Unione europea sono disciplinati dal regolamento (CE) n. 2201/2003 (regolamento Bruxelles II bis), che integra la convenzione dell'Aia del 1980 sugli aspetti civili della sottrazione di minori. Il regolamento prevede un procedimento rapido e uniforme grazie al quale il genitore leso nei suoi diritti può ottenere il ritorno di un minore che sia stato trasferito o trattenuto illecitamente. Per quanto riguarda l'esecuzione, il regolamento permette che le decisioni emesse in un determinato Stato membro siano eseguite in un altro, in linea con le norme e le procedure nazionali.

La Commissione controlla l'applicazione del regolamento da parte di tutti gli Stati membri, compresa l'Austria. A tal fine, esamina attentamente le denunce presentate dai cittadini, collabora con le autorità centrali austriache designate a norma del regolamento ai fini della sua applicazione e discute il corretto funzionamento dello strumento nel quadro della rete giudiziaria europea in materia civile e commerciale. Inoltre, la Commissione segue attentamente le sentenze della Corte di giustizia dell'Unione europea e della Corte europea dei diritti dell'uomo relative al procedimento di ritorno di minori in Austria. In caso di violazione del diritto dell'Unione, la Commissione ricorre alle procedure disponibili in virtù del trattato.

La Commissione desidera inoltre informare l'onorevole parlamentare che ha avviato una revisione del regolamento Bruxelles II bis e adotterà una relazione sul modo in cui è stato applicato in pratica. È stato altresì richiesto uno studio volto a raccogliere i dati pertinenti, compresi quelli sul procedimento di ritorno dei minori.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-014136/13
to the Commission
Roberta Angelilli (PPE)
(16 December 2013)

Subject: International child abduction — application of EU and international law in Austria

The European Parliament Mediator for International Parental Child Abductions is increasingly receiving requests from parents that hold different nationalities regarding cases of child abduction or detention in Austria.

Non-Austrian parents complain that they have great difficulty in getting the competent Austrian authorities to properly implement Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003 (Brussels II), and that it takes a very long time to have judgments from other Member States, concerning children of binational couples, recognised and enforced in Austria.

The enforcement in Austria of judgments ordering the return of children to other Member States often runs into practical difficulties, actually hindering enforcement, thus making the whole procedure followed under the abovementioned regulation a waste of time.

Likewise, some parents complain that the competent Austrian authorities do not properly implement the Hague Convention of 25 October 1980 on the civil aspects of international child abduction, specifically with regard to the need for 'special' conditions not provided for by the convention to order the return of a child to their habitual residence in another Member State.

1. Is Austria's proper implementation of Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003 (Brussels II), including the time taken for children to be returned, being monitored at EU level?

2. Does the Commission have recent statistics on Austria's implementation of the regulation in question, again as regards children being returned?

3. If necessary, what action will it take to call on the Austrian authorities to properly implement EC law in force and to speed up the time taken to return children from that country?

Answer given by Mrs Reding on behalf of the Commission
(12 March 2014)

Cases of intra-EU cross-border parental child abduction are covered by Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003 (the Brussels IIa regulation), which supplements the 1980 Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction. The regulation provides for an expeditious uniform procedure whereby the left-behind parent can obtain the return of a child who has been wrongfully removed or retained. As regards enforcement, it renders judgments issued in one Member State capable of execution in another, in line with national rules and procedures.

The Commission monitors implementation of the regulation in all Member States including Austria. To this end, it carefully assesses complaints received from citizens and works together with the Austrian central authorities designated under the regulation to assist in its application and discusses proper operation of the instrument within the framework of European Judicial Network in Civil and Commercial Matters. The Commission follows closely also judgments of the European Court of Justice and the European Court of Human Rights concerning the return procedure in Austria. Where EC law is breached, the Commission makes use of the procedures available under the Treaty.

The Commission would like to inform the Honourable Member that it has launched a review of the Brussels IIa regulation and will adopt a report on how it has been applied in practice. In addition, a study has been requested to collect relevant data including on the child return procedure.

(Versione italiana)

Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-000464/14
alla Commissione
Sergio Paolo Francesco Silvestris (PPE)
(20 gennaio 2014)

Oggetto: Cittadinanza maltese in vendita

Il governo maltese ha di recente avanzato l'idea di mettere in vendita la cittadinanza isolana al prezzo di seicentocinquantamila euro. In tal modo ci si aspetta la nazionalizzazione di circa duemila extracomunitari. Se tale proposta dovesse divenire legge, automaticamente chiunque comprasse la cittadinanza europea otterrebbe anche la cittadinanza europea e tutti i diritti a essa connessi.

Alla luce di quanto sopra, può la Commissione chiarire:

1. se ciò non rappresenti una violazione dello spirito dei trattati, in quanto tratta la cittadinanza come un «bene commerciale»;

2. dato l'elevato costo ipotizzato, se tale provvedimento non rappresenti inoltre una misura discriminatoria nei confronti degli extracomunitari appartenenti alle fasce di reddito più basse?

Risposta congiunta di Viviane Reding a nome della Commissione
(13 marzo 2014)

La Commissione rinvia l'onorevole deputata alla propria risposta all'interrogazione scritta E-013318/2013 ([1]).

([1]) http://www.europarl.europa.eu/plenary/it/parliamentary-questions.html

(English version)

Question for written answer E-014152/13
to the Commission
Emma McClarkin (ECR)
(16 December 2013)

Subject: Maltese citizenship

I have read recently that the Maltese Government has passed a law allowing Maltese citizenship to be purchased for EUR 650 000, with immediate family members of the new citizens then being allowed to join for EUR 25 000 each. While I understand that under the tough economic circumstances all Member States face in these difficult times there is a need to generate revenue, I am worried about the effect this measure could have on migration within the rest of the European Union.

Can the Commission state whether it shares the concern that the decision of the Maltese Government is effectively to put European Union passports up for sale? And will the European Union be monitoring the effects of this policy on the European Union as a whole?

Question for written answer E-000464/14
to the Commission
Sergio Paolo Francesco Silvestris (PPE)
(20 January 2014)

Subject: Maltese citizenship for sale

The Maltese Government recently came up with the idea of putting Maltese citizenship up for sale at a price of EUR 650 000. Some 2000 non-EU nationals were expected to acquire citizenship in this way. If this proposal were to become law, any person purchasing Maltese citizenship would automatically obtain EU citizenship, with all the associated rights.

In the light of the above, can the Commission clarify:

1. whether this violates the spirit of the Treaties, by treating citizenship like a ‘commodity’;

2. whether, given the high cost involved, this measure would also discriminate against non-EU nationals in the lowest income brackets?

Joint answer given by Mrs Reding on behalf of the Commission
(13 March 2014)

The Commission refers the Honourable Member to its answer to Written Question E-013318/2013 ([1]).

([1]) http://www.europarl.europa.eu/plenary/en/parliamentary-questions.html

(Ελληνική έκδοση)

Ερώτηση με αίτημα γραπτής απάντησης E-014159/13
προς την Επιτροπή
Nikolaos Chountis (GUE/NGL)
(16 Δεκεμβρίου 2013)

Θέμα: Το ύψος του ΦΠΑ εστίασης και η οικονομική ανάπτυξη στην Ελλάδα

Στην ερώτησή μου E-002036/2013, ζητούσα να πληροφορηθώ αν αυξήθηκαν τα έσοδα του κράτους από τον ΦΠΑ στον τομέα εστίασης στην Ελλάδα, μετά από την απόφαση, την 1.9.2011, να αυξηθεί ο ΦΠΑ στην εστίαση από 13% σε 23%. Στην απάντησή της, (24.4.2013), η Επιτροπή τόνισε ότι «το μέτρο εκτιμήθηκε ότι θα αποφέρει 300 εκατ. ευρώ το 2011 και, επιπλέον, 700 εκατ. ευρώ από το 2012 και μετά. Η εκτίμηση στη συνέχεια αναθεωρήθηκε προς τα κάτω σε 400 εκατ. ευρώ για την περίοδο από το 2012 και μετά» και συνέχισε ότι «οι υπηρεσίες της Επιτροπής ζήτησαν συμπληρωματικά στοιχεία από τις αρχές προκειμένου να εκτιμήσουν τις δημοσιονομικές επιπτώσεις από την αύξηση του ΦΠΑ στον τομέα των υπηρεσιών εστίασης με μεγαλύτερη ακρίβεια».

Την 1.8.2013, ο ΦΠΑ εστίασης επέστρεψε στο 13%, προφανώς διότι η αύξηση στο 23% δεν επέφερε τα αναμενόμενα αποτελέσματα.

Με δεδομένα τα παραπάνω και ότι ήδη από τον Οκτώβριο του 2013, υπάρχουν δημοσιεύματα ότι η τρόικα πιέζει για επαναφορά του ΦΠΑ στο 23%,

ερωτάται η Επιτροπή:

1. Ποια ήταν τα έσοδα από τον ΦΠΑ στην εστίαση σε σχέση με τα εκτιμώμενα α) από 1.9.2011 που αυξήθηκε ο ΦΠΑ από 13% σε 23%; β) από 1/8/2013 που μειώθηκε σε 13%;

2. Με δεδομένο ότι όλες οι ανταγωνίστριες τουριστικά χώρες έχουν καθιερώσει ΦΠΑ στην εστίαση σε μονοψήφιο αριθμό, αντιλαμβάνεται η Ευρωπαϊκή Επιτροπή ότι το θέμα δεν είναι μόνο δημοσιονομικό αλλά κυρίως οικονομικής ανάπτυξης; Μπορεί να πείσει τους Έλληνες πολίτες ότι η περίεργη εμμονή της τρόικα στην αύξηση του ΦΠΑ στην εστίαση δεν γίνεται για να επωφεληθούν ανταγωνίστριες χώρες;

Απάντηση του κ. Rehn εξ ονόματος της Επιτροπής
(17 Μαρτίου 2014)

1. Στην ΜΔΣτρ. 2012-2015, που θεσπίστηκε από τις ελληνικές αρχές και δημοσιεύτηκε στην Εφημερίδα της Κυβερνήσεως την 1η Ιουλίου 2011, η αναμενόμενη απόδοση της αύξησης του συντελεστή ΦΠΑ σε εστιατόρια και υπηρεσίες τροφοδοσίας εκτιμάται σε ύψος 300 εκατ. ευρώ για το 2011 και επιπλέον 700 εκατ. ευρώ για το 2012. Ο αντίκτυπος αποδείχθηκε ωστόσο πολύ μικρότερος, καθώς η οικονομία συρρικνώθηκε σε μεγαλύτερο βαθμό από ό, τι είχε υποτεθεί όταν έγιναν οι εν λόγω ποσοτικοποιήσεις.

2. Η Επιτροπή δεν έχει υπόψη της κάποια συγκεκριμένη ανάλυση σχετικά με τις μακροοικονομικές επιπτώσεις από την εφαρμογή μειωμένων συντελεστών ΦΠΑ σε εστιατόρια ή τον αντίκτυπό της στον τομέα του τουρισμού. Ενώ η Ελλάδα ωφελήθηκε από ισχυρή τουριστική περίοδο το 2013, τούτο δεν μπορεί να αποδοθεί στη μείωση των συντελεστών ΦΠΑ στα εστιατόρια και την τροφοδοσία: τα τουριστικά πακέτα, που αντιπροσωπεύουν το μεγαλύτερο μέρος των εσόδων από τον τουρισμό, είχαν κατά κύριο λόγο πωληθεί στις αρχές του έτους, επομένως προτού ληφθεί η απόφαση για προσωρινή μείωση του ποσοστού, το 2013. Οι δημοσιονομικές επιπτώσεις ενός πλήρους έτους με μειωμένο ΦΠΑ για τα εστιατόρια είναι σημαντικές. Η επιλογή του πλέον αποτελεσματικού τρόπου για να ενισχυθεί η οικονομική μεγέθυνση και να βελτιωθεί η ανταγωνιστικότητα εναπόκειται τελικά στην ελληνική κυβέρνηση.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-014159/13
to the Commission
Nikolaos Chountis (GUE/NGL)
(16 December 2013)

Subject: VAT on catering services and economic development in Greece

In my Question E-002036/2013, I asked for information as to whether state revenue from VAT had increased in the catering sector in Greece, following the decision adopted on 1 September 2011 to increase VAT on catering services from 13% to 23%. In its reply of 24 April 2013, the Commission emphasised that the measure 'was estimated to yield EUR 300 million in 2011 and additional EUR 700 million from 2012 onwards. This estimate was then revised downwards to EUR 400 million for 2012 onwards'. It also stated that 'the Commission services have requested additional information from the authorities in order to assess the budgetary impact of the increase in VAT on catering services more accurately'.

On 1 August 2013, VAT on catering services was restored to 13%, obviously because the increase to 23% had not brought about the anticipated results.

In view of the above and the fact that, since October 2013, reports have been circulating that the Troika is pressing for VAT to be restored to 23%,

Will the Commission say:

1. How did revenue from VAT on catering services compare with estimated revenue a) from 1 September 2011, when VAT was increased from 13% to 23% and b) from 1August 2013, when it was reduced to 13%?

2. Given that all the countries with which Greece competes for tourism have set VAT on catering services in single figures, does the European Commission realise that this is not just a budgetary question; it is, above all, a question of economic development? Can it persuade Greek citizens that the purpose of the Troika's curious insistence on an increase in VAT on catering services is not to benefit competing countries?

Answer given by Mr Rehn on behalf of the Commission
(17 March 2014)

1. The MTFS 2012-2015, adopted by the Greek authorities and published in the Official Gazette on 1 July 2011, estimated at EUR 300 million in 2011 and an additional EUR 700 million in 2012 the expected yields of the increase of VAT rate in restaurants and catering. The impact proved however much smaller, as the economy contracted more severely than assumed when those quantifications were made.

2. The Commission is not aware of any specific analysis on the macroeconomic impact of the reduced VAT rates for restaurants or of its impact on tourism. While Greece has benefited from a strong tourist season in 2013, this cannot be attributed to the reduction in VAT rates for restaurants and catering: tourist packages, which account for most of tourism receipts, were primarily sold early in the year and hence before the decision to temporarily reduce the rate was taken in 2013. The budgetary impact of a full year of reduced VAT for restaurants is significant. The selection of the most effective way to bolster economic growth and improve competitiveness is the ultimate responsibility of the Greek Government.

(Versione italiana)

Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-014169/13
alla Commissione
Barbara Matera (PPE)
(16 dicembre 2013)

Oggetto: Abusi in Iran contro rifugiati afgani

Fin dall'esplosione del conflitto in Afghanistan, circa trenta anni fa, l'Iran è divenuto meta di rifugio per molti cittadini provenienti dal paese, ma negli ultimi cinque anni il governo di Teheran si è rifiutato di offrire loro asilo.

In tale contesto di ostilità si inserisce una recente azione repressiva perpetrata da quest'ultimo nei confronti dei rifugiati afgani già presenti all'interno del paese.

Secondo quanto riportato da «Human Right Watch», il governo iraniano si sta rendendo responsabile di soprusi nei confronti di bambini e donne afgane, di divisioni familiari coatte e sta promuovendo un'attività di sfruttamento nei confronti degli uomini.

L'Unione europea, da sempre fautrice della salvaguardia dei diritti umani e delle libertà fondamentali, non può non considerare la necessità di lavorare, in qualità di mediatore, affinché il governo iraniano si impegni nel tutelare i diritti dei cittadini afgani e, in particolare, dei soggetti che, tra di essi, sono per propria natura svantaggiati, come donne e bambini.

1. È la Commissione a conoscenza di una tale situazione di discriminazione nei confronti dei cittadini afgani rifugiati in Iran?

2. Quali sono le azioni che la Commissione intende compiere, nel tentativo di persuadere il governo iraniano dell'imprescindibile necessità di preservare l'integrità e i diritti umani dei cittadini afgani rifugiati nel paese?

3. Non potrebbe la Commissione farsi promotrice, a nome dell'Unione europea, di un intervento umanitario volto ad alleviare le sofferenze dei cittadini afgani rifugiati in Iran?

Risposta dell'Alta Rappresentante/Vicepresidente Catherine Ashton a nome della Commissione
(13 marzo 2014)

L'AR/VP è a conoscenza della situazione dei rifugiati afghani in Iran. Con circa 840 000 rifugiati afghani registrati a cui si aggiungono, secondo le stime, 2 milioni di rifugiati non registrati, l'Iran accoglie, già da molto tempo, una delle più grandi comunità di rifugiati al mondo. L'UE ha elogiato la generosità dell'Iran durante la conferenza internazionale sui rifugiati afghani tenutasi a Ginevra nel maggio 2012.

L'AR/VP concorda sul fatto che l'Iran deve rispettare i propri obblighi internazionali in tema di diritti umani, anche in relazione a queste persone vulnerabili presenti sul suo territorio. L'UE ha esortato l'Iran a rispettare gli obblighi sottoscritti in materia di diritti umani.

La relazione di Human Rights Watch del novembre 2013 riguardava principalmente i rifugiati privi di status che possono essere espulsi a norma della legislazione iraniana. Le presunte violazioni dei diritti umani dovrebbe essere oggetto di ulteriori indagini.

Nel 2013 l'UE ha erogato 2,85 milioni di EUR a favore dei rifugiati afghani in Iran. Un programma di rimpatrio volontario ha permesso di fornire assistenza ai rifugiati che desiderano tornare in Afghanistan. È importante garantire uno spazio di asilo in Iran. L'assistenza umanitaria mira inoltre a soddisfare il fabbisogno dei rifugiati più vulnerabili dal punto di vista sanitario e alimentare nonché a permettere loro di vivere in condizioni dignitose in Iran. La sola azione umanitaria non può permettere di trovare soluzioni a lungo termine a favore dei rifugiati afghani né di creare i presupposti per un ritorno e un reinserimento duraturi. Occorre un sostegno della comunità internazionale in termini politici e di sviluppo per consentire alla strategia volta a risolvere i problemi dei rifugiati afghani di sostenerne il rimpatrio volontario e il reinserimento duraturo nonché di fornire assistenza ai paesi di accoglienza. L'UE fornisce assistenza allo sviluppo a favore dei rifugiati afghani anche in questo contesto e intende continuare a farlo.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-014169/13
to the Commission
Barbara Matera (PPE)
(16 December 2013)

Subject: Abuses committed against Afghan refugees in Iran

Since the outbreak of the conflict in Afghanistan, some 30 years ago, Iran has been the destination for many Afghan refugees, but over the last five years the Government in Tehran has refused to offer them asylum.

As part of this hostile context, the Government recently took repressive action against Afghan refugees already present in the country.

According to 'Human Rights Watch', the Iranian Government is responsible for the oppression of Afghan women and children, forced family divisions and promoting the exploitation of Afghan men.

The European Union has always endeavoured to protect human rights and fundamental freedoms and cannot fail to acknowledge the need to act as a mediator to ensure that the Iranian Government undertakes to protect the rights of Afghan citizens and, in particular, individuals who, by their very nature, are disadvantaged, such as women and children.

1. Is the Commission aware of this situation of discrimination against Afghan refugees in Iran?

2. What does the Commission intend to do to try and persuade the Iranian Government that it is essential to preserve the integrity and human rights of the Afghan refugees in the country?

3. Could the Commission not promote, on behalf of the European Union, humanitarian intervention aimed at relieving the suffering of the Afghan refugees in Iran?

Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission
(13 March 2014)

The HR/VP is well aware of the situation regarding Afghan refugees in Iran. With some 840 000 registered Afghan refugees and an estimated 2 million unregistered, Iran hosts one of the largest and most protracted refugee populations in the world. The generosity of Iran was applauded by the EU during the International Conference on Afghan Refugees in Geneva in May 2012.

The HR/VP agrees that Iran must respect their international human rights obligations, also in relation to this vulnerable group of people in their country. The EU has called upon Iran to respect the international human rights obligations that Iran has signed up to.

The November 2013 Human Rights Watch Report focused on refugees that have no status and may be subject to deportation under Iranian legislation. Allegations of human rights abuses should be further investigated.

The EU provided EUR 2.85 million to Afghan refugees in Iran in 2013. Assistance has been provided to refugees who wish to return to Afghanistan through a voluntary repatriation scheme. It is important to ensure that asylum space in Iran. Humanitarian assistance is also focused on the needs of the most vulnerable refugees in terms of health and food and their life in dignity in Iran. Long-term solutions for Afghan refugees and creating conditions for sustainable return and reintegration do not lie within the scope of humanitarian action alone. Political and development assistance from the international community is required for the Solutions Strategy for Afghan Refugees to support voluntary repatriation, sustainable reintegration and assistance to host countries. The EU has been providing developmental assistance in this regard to Afghan refugees as well and is planning to continue to do so.

(Versión española)

Pregunta con solicitud de respuesta escrita E-014190/13
a la Comisión
Ramon Tremosa i Balcells (ALDE)
(17 de diciembre de 2013)

Asunto: Televisión pública española (TVE). Otra comparación de los catalanes con los nazis

En el programa informativo de la televisión pública española (TVE) Informe Semanal emitido el sábado 14 de diciembre de 2013 bajo el título «La consulta soberanista», el filósofo Fernando Savater fue uno de los analistas del proceso soberanista catalán. Savater, comparando a los catalanes con los nazis en la televisión pública española, aseguró que «la manipulación que ha habido hoy y en los últimos años en Cataluña es sorprendente; yo creo que desde que murió el añorado Goebbels nunca se ha mentido tanto en Europa como se ha mentido en Cataluña en los últimos años» ([1]). Las afirmaciones del señor Savater violan claramente los valores en los que se fundamenta la Unión Europea, en particular lo dispuesto en el artículo 2 del Tratado de la Unión Europea, y son asimismo contrarias a la Decisión Marco 2008/913/JAI del Consejo.

A la luz de lo anterior y sujeto a la legalidad vigente:

1. ¿Qué información tiene la Comisión sobre la transposición de la Decisión Marco 2008/913/JAI sobre la trivialización de símbolos relacionados con dictaduras y crímenes contra la humanidad por parte del Estado español, como la comparación que aquí se cita?

2. ¿Podría informar la Comisión, antes de su valoración a finales de este año, cuál es su opinión sobre cómo se está aplicando este instrumento en el Estado español y de la eficacia de la legislación española para luchar contra la incitación pública e intencional a la violencia y al odio?

Pregunta con solicitud de respuesta escrita E-014303/13
a la Comisión
Ramon Tremosa i Balcells (ALDE)
(18 de diciembre de 2013)

Asunto: Ex presidente del Gobierno español, José María Aznar, compara el desafío del referéndum catalán con el grupo terrorista ETA

En un acto celebrado en Granada, organizado por la Fundación Luis Portero y financiado por la Asociación de Víctimas del Terrorismo (AVT), José María Aznar impartió una conferencia junto al ex magistrado español en el Tribunal Europeo de Derechos Humanos (TEDH) de Estrasburgo, Francisco Javier Borrego. El título de las jornadas era «Por un final de ETA sin impunidad», y su tema central, la doctrina Parot. El ex presidente del Gobierno José María Aznar equiparó el referéndum de autodeterminación catalán, proceso pacífico y democrático, con la organización terrorista ETA por considerar que ambos suponen un intento de destruir «el pacto de convivencia» que representaría la Constitución de 1978 ([2]). Las afirmaciones del señor Aznar violan claramente los valores en los que se fundamenta la Unión Europea, en particular lo dispuesto en el artículo 2 del Tratado de la Unión Europea, y son asimismo contrarias a la Decisión Marco 2008/913/JAI del Consejo.

A la luz de lo anterior, y sujeto a la legalidad vigente:

1. ¿Qué información tiene la Comisión sobre la transposición por parte del Estado español de la Decisión Marco 2008/913/JAI, en vista de la trivialización que contiene la comparación aquí citada?

2. ¿Podría informar la Comisión, antes de su valoración a finales de este año, de cuál es su opinión sobre cómo se está aplicando este instrumento en el Estado español y sobre la eficacia de la legislación española para luchar contra la incitación pública e intencional a la violencia y el odio?

([1]) http://www.naciodigital.cat/noticia/62808/savater/tve/des/goebbels/no/mentit/mai/tant/ara/catalunya
([2]) http://www.eldiario.es/andalucia/Aznar-Espana-referendum-catalan-ETA_0_207879684.html

Respuesta conjunta de la Sra. Reding en nombre de la Comisión
(12 de marzo de 2014)

La Comisión informa a Su Señoría de que el informe de la Comisión sobre la aplicación de la Decisión marco 2008/913/JHA ([3]) se publicó el 27 de enero de 2014.

Corresponde a los Estados miembros y a las autoridades nacionales garantizar que la Decisión marco se aplique a escala nacional. La Comisión ha anunciado que en 2014 iniciará diálogos bilaterales con los Estados miembros, con el fin de garantizar la incorporación íntegra y correcta de la Decisión marco al Derecho nacional.

([3]) COM(2014) 27 final.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-014190/13
to the Commission
Ramon Tremosa i Balcells (ALDE)
(17 December 2013)

Subject: Spanish State television (TVE): another instance of Catalonians being compared to Nazis

In the episode of the news programme *Informe Semanal* broadcast on 14 December 2013 on Spanish State television (TVE), entitled 'Consultation on sovereignty', the philosopher Fernando Savater was one of those analysing the sovereignty process in Catalonia. Mr Savater, in likening the Catalan people to Nazis on Spanish State television, claimed that the manipulation today and in recent years in Catalonia was astonishing. He said that he believed that ever since the death of the late lamented Goebbels, there had never been so many lies told in Europe as in Catalonia in recent years ([1]). Mr Savater's statements clearly violate the values on which the European Union is founded, in particular the provisions of Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union, as well as running counter to Council Framework Decision 2008/913/JHA.

Under current legislation:

1. What information does the Commission have on the transposition of Council Framework Decision 2008/913/JHA as regards the trivialisation by the Spanish State of symbols linked to dictatorship and crimes against humanity, such as the comparison described here?

2. Could the Commission, prior to its assessment at the end of the year, say what view it takes of how this instrument is being applied in Spain, and of the effectiveness of Spanish legislation to combat intentional public incitement to violence and hatred?

Question for written answer E-014303/13
to the Commission
Ramon Tremosa i Balcells (ALDE)
(18 December 2013)

Subject: José María Aznar, the former Spanish Prime Minister, likening the Catalan referendum on independence to the terrorist group ETA

José María Aznar and Francisco Javier Borrego, the former Spanish judge at the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg, have spoken at an event held in Granada that was organised by the Luis Portero Foundation and funded by the Association of Victims of Terrorism (AVT). The conference was entitled 'For an End to ETA Without Impunity' and its central theme was the Parot doctrine. José María Aznar, the former Spanish Prime Minister, compared the peaceful and democratic process that is the Catalan referendum on independence to the terrorist organisation ETA, claiming that they both represent an attempt to destroy the 'pact of co-existence' embodied in the 1978 constitution ([2]). Mr Aznar's statements are clearly in breach of the values on which the EU is based, particularly those laid down in Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union. The statements in question also run counter to Council Framework Decision 2008/913/JHA.

1. In view of the trivialising nature of the comparison quoted above, and subject to the law in force, what information does the Commission have on Spain's transposition of Framework Decision 2008/913/JHA?

2. Before it carries out its assessment at the end of 2013, could the Commission give its opinion on the way that this instrument is being applied in Spain and the efficacy of Spanish laws intended to fight against deliberate, public incitement to violence and hatred?

Joint answer given by Mrs Reding on behalf of the Commission
(12 March 2014)

The Commission informs the Honourable Member that the Commission report on the implementation of Framework Decision 2008/913/JHA ([3]) was published on 27 January 2014.

It is up to Member States and national authorities to ensure that the framework Decision is implemented at national level. The Commission has announced that during 2014 it will enter into bilateral dialogues with Member States, with a view to ensure full and correct transposition of the framework Decision into national law.

([1]) http://www.naciodigital.cat/noticia/62808/savater/tve/des/goebbels/no/mentit/mai/tant/ara/catalunya
([2]) http://www.eldiario.es/andalucia/Aznar-Espana-referendum-catalan-ETA_0_207879684.html
([3]) COM(2014) 27 final

(Versión española)

Pregunta con solicitud de respuesta escrita E-014192/13
al Consejo
Luis de Grandes Pascual (PPE)
(17 de diciembre de 2013)

Asunto: Aplicación del Reglamento (CE) n° 391/2009 sobre reglas y normas comunes para las organizaciones de inspección y reconocimiento de buques

Las medidas necesarias para la aplicación de los Artículos 6 y 7 del Reglamento (CE) n° 391/2009 relativas a las multas y sanciones pecuniarias periódicas y a la retirada del reconocimiento de las organizaciones reconocidas («RO» en sus siglas en inglés) tienen que adoptarse de acuerdo con el procedimiento de reglamentación con control, tal y como se recoge en el Artículo 14, apartado 2, del mencionado Reglamento.

La Comisión, en el cumplimiento de sus obligaciones derivadas del Artículo 14, apartado 2, transmitió al Parlamento Europeo el 2 de julio de 2013, a través del registro de comitología, un proyecto de Reglamento que contenía normas detalladas para la puesta en marcha de las disposiciones arriba mencionadas. El procedimiento pertinente para ello sería el de reglamentación con control del Parlamento Europeo (PRAC).

No obstante, el Comité de seguridad marítima y prevención de la contaminación por los buques («COSS» en sus siglas en inglés) aún no ha emitido una opinión acerca de la propuesta de la Comisión.

1. ¿Puede el Consejo explicar sus preocupaciones relativas al Reglamento propuesto para la aplicación del Reglamento (CE) n°391/2009 teniendo en cuenta que las consecuencias de la medida, así como sus límites, se recogen en el mencionado Reglamento y que, por tanto, no pueden ser negociadas o enmendadas en el marco de una medida de ejecución?

2. ¿Está el Consejo preparado para asumir responsabilidades en caso de que se imponga una multa a una organización de inspección por vulneración de los criterios y obligaciones recogidos en el Reglamento (CE) n° 391/2009, de acuerdo con el Artículo 6, en ausencia de reglas de procedimiento pertinentes, ya que actualmente se encuentran estancadas en el Consejo?

Respuesta
(12 de marzo de 2014)

El Consejo aún no ha recibido ningún proyecto de medidas para adoptar de conformidad con el procedimiento de reglamentación con control, tal como establece el artículo 14, apartado 2, del Reglamento n° 391/2009.

El Consejo no está representado en el Comité de seguridad marítima y prevención de la contaminación por los buques (COSS).

(English version)

Question for written answer E-014192/13
to the Council
Luis de Grandes Pascual (PPE)
(17 December 2013)

Subject: Implementation of Regulation (EC) No 391/2009 on common rules and standards for ship inspection and survey organisations

The necessary measures to implement Articles 6 and 7 of Regulation (EC) No 391/2009 on fines and periodic penalty payments and on the withdrawal of the recognition of recognised organisations (ROs) have to be adopted in accordance with the regulatory procedure with scrutiny, as set out in Article 14(2) of the regulation.

On 2 July 2013, the Commission, in fulfilment of its obligations arising from Article 14(2), forwarded to Parliament, by means of the comitology register, a draft regulation containing detailed rules for the implementation of the provisions referred to above. The relevant procedure for this is the regulatory procedure with scrutiny by Parliament.

However, the Committee on Safe Seas and the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (COSS) has still not issued an opinion on the Commission's proposal.

1. Can the Council explain what concerns it has over the proposed regulation to implement Regulation (EC) No 391/2009, considering that the consequences of the measure, as well as its limitations, are set out in the aforementioned Regulation and that, therefore, they cannot be negotiated or amended in the framework of an implementing measure?

2. Is the Council prepared to take responsibility if an inspection organisation is fined for breaching the criteria and obligations laid down in Regulation (EC) No 391/2009, in accordance with Article 6, in the absence of relevant procedural rules, given that the Council is currently deadlocked?

Reply
(12 March 2014)

The Council has not yet received any draft proposal of measures to be adopted in accordance with the regulatory procedure with scrutiny, as set out in Article 14(2) of Regulation 391/2009.

The Council is not represented on the Committee on Safe Seas and the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (COSS).

(Versión española)

Pregunta con solicitud de respuesta escrita E-014205/13
al Consejo
José Ignacio Salafranca Sánchez-Neyra (PPE)
(18 de diciembre de 2013)

Asunto: Acuerdo de Asociación con Chile

El 1 de febrero de 2013 se completó la reducción arancelaria acordada entre Chile y la UE mediante el actual Acuerdo de Asociación. Hoy son 9 595 los productos chilenos exportados a la UE que gozan de preferencias arancelarias, el equivalente al 91,8 % del total de productos chilenos negociados.

En noviembre de 2012, durante la V Cumbre UE-Chile, tanto la parte chilena como la contraparte europea manifestaron el deseo de explorar diferentes opciones con el fin de modernizar el actual Acuerdo de Asociación.

Este deseo volvió a manifestarse el pasado 3 de octubre de 2013, durante la 11ª reunión del Comité de Asociación de la UE y Chile en Bruselas.

En este contexto, ¿cuáles considera el Consejo que serían las áreas y los sectores en los que redundaría en los intereses de la Unión Europa profundizar el actual Acuerdo?

Pregunta con solicitud de respuesta escrita E-014208/13
al Consejo
José Ignacio Salafranca Sánchez-Neyra (PPE)
(18 de diciembre de 2013)

Asunto: Acuerdo de Asociación UE-Chile: futuras negociaciones

Durante la V Cumbre UE-Chile, que tuvo lugar en noviembre de 2012 con motivo de la visita del Presidente Piñera a las Instituciones Europeas, tanto la parte europea como la chilena acordaron explorar las opciones para avanzar en la profundización del actual Acuerdo de Asociación UE-Chile —suscrito el 18 de noviembre de 2002— al haber transcurrido diez años desde su implementación.

Coincidiendo con el décimo aniversario del Acuerdo de Asociación UE-Chile, el pasado 3 de octubre de 2013 tuvo lugar la XI Reunión del Comité de Asociación de la Unión Europea y Chile en Bruselas.

En dicha reunión, la parte chilena entregó en forma de *non-paper* su primera propuesta sobre la posible modernización del Acuerdo para su estudio por la parte europea y se determinó que la próxima reunión del Comité de Asociación tendría lugar durante el año 2014.

En este contexto y dado que todavía no se han abierto formalmente las negociaciones para tal modernización, pregunto al Consejo:

¿Cuándo considera el Consejo que comenzarán dichas negociaciones?

¿Cuánto tiempo prevé el Consejo que durarán las mismas?

Pregunta con solicitud de respuesta escrita E-014211/13
al Consejo
José Ignacio Salafranca Sánchez-Neyra (PPE)
(18 de diciembre de 2013)

Asunto: Prioridad de las posibles negociaciones para el Acuerdo de Asociación con Chile

La Unión Europea se encuentra negociando un Acuerdo de Libre Comercio e Inversión con los EEUU.

Asimismo, ha concluido prácticamente las negociaciones con Canadá.

Se encuentra, también, en negociaciones con India, Tailandia, Vietnam y otros países.

Por último, se encuentra en pleno de proceso de negociación para la actualización del Acuerdo de Asociación con México.

En este contexto, ¿podría el Consejo especificar qué grado de prioridad otorga a las posibles negociaciones para la revisión y puesta al día del actual Acuerdo de Asociación con Chile?

Pregunta con solicitud de respuesta escrita E-014214/13
al Consejo
José Ignacio Salafranca Sánchez-Neyra (PPE)
(18 de diciembre de 2013)

Asunto: Acuerdo de Asociación UE-Chile

Durante la XVIII Reunión de la Comisión Parlamentaria Mixta Unión Europea-Chile celebrada en Valparaíso el pasado 22 de enero de 2013 se adoptaron las siguientes conclusiones en relación con el Acuerdo de Asociación entre Chile y la Unión Europea suscrito en Bruselas el 18 de noviembre de 2002 y con entrada en vigor el 1° de febrero de 2003:

«Las delegaciones del Congreso Nacional de Chile y del Parlamento Europeo […]:

— […] reiteran la importancia de profundizar el pilar comercial del Acuerdo a través de sus cláusulas evolutiva y de revisión en tanto herramientas que permiten aprovechar de modo flexible y eficaz las nuevas oportunidades que vayan surgiendo en materia de acceso a mercados de bienes y servicios, así como de flujos de capitales e inversiones, sobre la base del principio de reciprocidad y atendiendo a un adecuado equilibrio de los intereses de ambas partes;

— Reiteran su recomendación tendiente a dar mayor protección y difusión a los contenidos y oportunidades del Acuerdo de Asociación en beneficio de los emprendedores y el conjunto de los ciudadanos, con particular atención a los beneficios que puede reportar para las pequeñas y medianas empresas, que son las principales generadoras de empleo en Chile y en la EU;

— Coinciden en la necesidad de modernizar el pilar de la cooperación establecido en el Acuerdo de Asociación, aprovechando las lecciones aprendidas en su exitosa implementación en su primera década, para adaptarlo a las nuevas realidades socioeconómicas de Chile y la UE, así como a su grado de desarrollo. En este sentido, destacan que se requiere reforzar el diseño de nuevos temas de cooperación en que ambas partes puedan aportar de igual manera, profundizar en los temas de interés compartidos, y buscar nuevas modalidades de asociación para la cooperación bilateral, incluyendo una mayor participación de la sociedad civil y el sector privado o el despliegue de iniciativas de cooperación triangular;

[…]

— Resaltan que esta evolución en la cooperación bilateral también debe implicar el desarrollo previsto en el artículo 22 del Acuerdo, en materia de cooperación en el sector de la energía.»

¿Podría explicar el Consejo qué importancia concede al contenido de dichas conclusiones?

Respuesta conjunta
(12 de marzo de 2014)

La propuesta chilena de revisión del Acuerdo de Asociación es de amplio alcance e incluye cuestiones institucionales, diálogos sectoriales y asuntos comerciales. La UE acoge con satisfacción esta iniciativa y pronto dará respuesta a las autoridades chilenas. En esta fase del proceso, siguen en curso trabajos pormenorizados entre Chile, el SEAE y la Comisión. Dependiendo del ámbito de cooperación, el ritmo de la revisión puede variar.

La UE tiene intención de comenzar nuevos diálogos sectoriales, que serán determinados en función del contenido y el interés común de las partes. Por el momento no está prevista la creación de nuevos subcomités.

Por lo que respecta al comercio, la propuesta de Chile es una aportación útil al proceso de examen de las posibilidades de modernización de la parte comercial del Acuerdo.

Por último, dado que la cobertura de cualquier modernización ambiciosa del Acuerdo iría más allá del alcance de las cláusulas de revisión (en materia de agricultura, servicios e inversión), la Comisión tendrá que respetar los procedimientos pertinentes de la UE. Es posible que, antes de iniciar cualquier posible negociación, sean necesarias una evaluación de impacto y propuestas de directrices de negociación. Ello dependerá de los resultados del proceso de consultas con Chile, así como de las consultas internas de la UE.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-014205/13
to the Council
José Ignacio Salafranca Sánchez-Neyra (PPE)
(18 December 2013)

Subject: Association Agreement with Chile

On 1 February 2013, tariffs between Chile and the EU were lowered in accordance with the current Association Agreement. Tariff preferences are now applied to 9 595 Chilean products exported to the EU, a figure equating to 91.8% of all Chilean products subject to negotiation.

During the 5th EU-Chile Summit, which took place in November 2012, both the Chilean party and the European party expressed the desire to explore the various possible ways of modernising the current Association Agreement.

On 3 October 2013, this desire was expressed again during the 11th meeting of the EU-Chile Association Committee in Brussels.

In the opinion of the Council, which of the EU's areas and sectors would stand to benefit if the current agreement were strengthened?

Question for written answer E-014208/13
to the Council
José Ignacio Salafranca Sánchez-Neyra (PPE)
(18 December 2013)

Subject: EU-Chile Association Agreement: forthcoming negotiations

The fifth EU-Chile Summit took place in November 2012 on the occasion of President Piñera's visit to the European institutions. During this summit, both the Chilean and the European parties agreed to explore the possibility of strengthening the current EU-Chile Association Agreement, which was signed on 18 November 2002 and had therefore been in force for 10 years.

Coinciding with the 10th anniversary of the EU-Chile Association Agreement, the 11th meeting of the EU-Chile Association Committee took place in Brussels on 3 October 2013.

At that meeting, a non-paper on the possible modernisation of the agreement was submitted by the Chilean party to be studied by the European party. It was also agreed that the next meeting of the Association Committee would be held in 2014.

Given that negotiations over this modernisation process have yet to begin formally, could the Council state when they will begin and how long they are expected to take?

Question for written answer E-014211/13
to the Council
José Ignacio Salafranca Sánchez-Neyra (PPE)
(18 December 2013)

Subject: Priority of the possible negotiations for the new Association Agreement with Chile

The European Union is currently negotiating a Free Trade and Investment Agreement with the United States.

In addition, it has nearly concluded negotiations with Canada.

It is also engaged in negotiations with India, Thailand, Vietnam and other countries.

Finally, it is in the midst of negotiations to update the Association Agreement with Mexico.

In this context, can the Council specify what degree of priority it is giving to the possible negotiations to revise and update the current Association Agreement with Chile?

Question for written answer E-014214/13
to the Council
José Ignacio Salafranca Sánchez-Neyra (PPE)
(18 December 2013)

Subject: EU-Chile Association Agreement

During the 18th Meeting of the EU-Chile Joint Parliamentary Committee, which was held in Valparaíso on 22 January 2013, the following conclusions were adopted in relation to the EU-Chile Association Agreement, which was signed in Brussels on 18 November 2002 and entered into force on 1 February 2003:

'The delegations from the Chilean National Congress and the European Parliament […]:

— […] reiterate the importance of strengthening the trade pillar of the Agreement by using its development and review clauses as tools that allow both parties to benefit, in a flexible and efficient manner, from new opportunities to access markets for goods and services and capital and investment flows on the basis of the principle of reciprocity and with the aim of establishing a suitable balance between the interests of both parties;

— Reiterate their recommendation that the contents of the Association Agreement and the opportunities that it offers should be given greater protection and disseminated more widely for the benefit of entrepreneurs and citizens as a whole. In this regard, particular attention should be paid to benefits that might assist SMEs, which are the main generators of employment in Chile and the EU;

— Agree on the need to modernise the cooperation pillar laid down in the Association Agreement, taking advantage of the lessons learnt from the first decade of its successful implementation so that it may be adapted in accordance with the new socioeconomic realities in Chile and the EU and the extent to which it has developed. In this respect, the parties stress the need to strengthen the design of new areas of cooperation in which both parties can contribute equally; to explore shared areas of interest more deeply; and to seek new forms of association to bring about bilateral cooperation, including greater participation by civil society and the private sector or the deployment of triangular cooperation initiatives;

[…]

— They stress that this development in bilateral cooperation must also involve the development of cooperation on energy, as laid down in Article 22 of the Agreement'.

In the view of the Council, how significant are these conclusions?

Joint reply
(12 March 2014)

The Chilean proposal to review the Association Agreement is wide-ranging and covers institutional issues, sectoral dialogues and trade matters. The EU welcomes this initiative and will soon provide an answer to the Chilean authorities. At this stage of the process, further in-depth work between Chile, the EEAS and the Commission is on-going. Depending on the area of cooperation, the speed of review may differ.

The EU intends to begin new sectoral dialogues that will be determined by the substance and joint interest of the parties. Establishing new Sub-Committees is not foreseen for the time being.

As far as trade is concerned, the Chilean proposal is a useful contribution to the process of exploring the possibilities of modernising the trade part of the Agreement.

Finally, as the coverage of any ambitious modernisation of the Agreement would go beyond the scope of the review clauses (on agriculture, services and investment), the Commission will have to respect the relevant EU procedures. It is possible that this will require an impact assessment and proposals for negotiating directives before launching any possible negotiation. This will depend on the outcome of the consultation process with Chile as well as on the internal EU consultations.

(Ελληνική έκδοση)

Ερώτηση με αίτημα γραπτής απάντησης E-014217/13
προς την Επιτροπή
Theodoros Skylakakis (ALDE)
(18 Δεκεμβρίου 2013)

Θέμα: Δεύτερη Ευκαιρία στους Έλληνες Επιχειρηματίες και αυτο-απασχολούμενους

Στην Ελλάδα, σύμφωνα με την κοινή υπουργική απόφαση Κ1-802/23-3-2011, προϋπόθεση για την ίδρυση νέων επιχειρήσεων είναι η φορολογική και ασφαλιστική ενημερότητα (άρθρα 5, 7 και 8). Ωστόσο, λόγω της οικονομικής ύφεσης και της έλλειψης ρευστότητας, εκατοντάδες χιλιάδες επιχειρηματίες και ελεύθεροι επαγγελματίες έχουν ληξιπρόθεσμα χρέη και αδυνατούν να πληρώσουν τις φορολογικές και ασφαλιστικές υποχρεώσεις τους στο κράτος και στον Οργανισμό Ασφάλισης Ελευθέρων Επαγγελματιών (ΟΑΕΕ). Σε περίπτωση δε που το κράτος διαπιστώσει αδυναμία είσπραξης οφειλής, μετά από την εξάντληση κάθε πρόσφορου μέσου, δεν χορηγεί φορολογική ενημερότητα για μια δεκαετία.

Η δεύτερη ευκαιρία στην επιχειρηματική προσπάθεια είναι βασικό μέτρο βιώσιμης ανάπτυξης και ευημερίας. Η προϋπόθεση της φορολογικής και ασφαλιστικής ενημερότητας για την ίδρυση νέων επιχειρήσεων και κατ' επέκταση η άρνηση στο δικαίωμα μιας δεύτερης ευκαιρίας, οδηγεί στην οικονομική και κοινωνική εξόντωση δεκάδων χιλιάδων ασφαλισμένων στον ΟΑΕΕ.

Έχοντας υπόψη ότι, πανευρωπαϊκά, από το σύνολο των επιχειρηματιών και των ελεύθερων επαγγελματιών που κηρύσσουν πτώχευση, το 94% με 96% ειλικρινώς αδυνατούν να πληρώσουν τις υποχρεώσεις τους ([1]) και ότι η δεύτερη ευκαιρία συμπεριλαμβάνεται στα μέτρα προώθησης της οικονομικής ανάκαμψης και διασφάλισης της απασχόλησης που λαμβάνει η Επιτροπή ([2]), ότι το ελληνικό ΑΕΠ μειώθηκε κατά 25% τα τελευταία χρόνια και ο τζίρος ορισμένων κλάδων κατά 70-80%, λόγω κακής μακροοικονομικής διαχείρισης και μη έγκαιρης προειδοποίησης των επιχειρηματιών για τα πραγματικά στοιχεία της οικονομίας, χωρίς δική τους αντικειμενική ευθύνη, καθώς και ότι οι πολιτικές της ελληνικής κυβέρνησης δεσμεύονται από το μνημόνιο συμφωνίας μεταξύ της Ελλάδας και της Τρόικα, μέλος της οποίας είναι η Επιτροπή,

Ερωτάται η Επιτροπή:

1. Έλαβε γνώση και συνήνεσε στην έκδοση της Κ1-802/23-3-2011, απόφαση που στερεί χιλιάδες ανθρώπους από το δικαίωμα στην δεύτερη ευκαιρία;

2. Προτίθεται να αναλάβει πρωτοβουλία για την εναρμόνιση της κείμενης ελληνικής νομοθεσίας με τις δικές της προτάσεις για την δεύτερη ευκαιρία που κατεξοχήν θα έπρεπε να εφαρμόζονται σε μια χώρα όπως η Ελλάδα, στην οποία η ανάγκη για δεύτερη ευκαιρία αφορά μεγάλο μέρος των επιχειρηματιών και αυτο-απασχολούμενων;

Απάντηση του κ. Rehn εξ ονόματος της Επιτροπής
(14 Μαρτίου 2014)

1. Η Επιτροπή γνωρίζει την κοινή υπουργική απόφαση που αναφέρει ο κ. βουλευτής. Μολονότι το εν λόγω μέτρο δεν εγκρίθηκε βάσει του ελληνικού προγράμματος προσαρμογής, η προϋπόθεση αυτή συμβαδίζει με το στόχο της επιβολής φορολογικής συμμόρφωσης στην Ελλάδα, συμβάλλοντας έτσι στην ύπαρξη ενός βιώσιμου συστήματος κοινωνικής ασφάλισης. Η άρση της εν λόγω απαίτησης ενδέχεται να έχει σημαντικό αντίκτυπο στην είσπραξη των εισφορών κοινωνικής ασφάλισης, που ήδη πλήττονται από χαμηλά ποσοστά είσπραξης.

2. Μέτρα για τη βελτίωση του επιχειρηματικού περιβάλλοντος είναι απαραίτητα για την ενίσχυση της ανταγωνιστικότητας και συναποτελούν ήδη βασικό συστατικό στοιχείο των όρων πολιτικής στο πλαίσιο του 2ου προγράμματος προσαρμογής για την Ελλάδα. Η Επιτροπή είναι της γνώμης ότι τέτοια μέτρα οφείλουν να αποβλέπουν στη μείωση του διοικητικού φόρτου και την ενίσχυση της επιχειρηματικότητας, παραμένοντας απολύτως συμβατά με την επίτευξη των δημοσιονομικών στόχων.

3. Η Επιτροπή αναγνωρίζει την ανάγκη να βελτιωθούν, ανά την Ευρωπαϊκή Ένωση, οι συνθήκες για τους επιχειρηματίες και τους αυτοαπασχολουμένους που δεν είναι σε θέση να ανταποκριθούν στις χρηματοοικονομικές υποχρεώσεις τους, όπως αναφέρεται στην ανακοίνωση του 2012 σχετικά με μια νέα προσέγγιση στην επιχειρηματική αποτυχία και την αφερεγγυότητα. Για τη συνέχεια, η Επιτροπή επεξεργάζεται ένα νομικό μέσο που θα στηρίζει τις προσπάθειες των κρατών μελών που σήμερα εφαρμόζουν ή εξετάζουν μεταρρυθμίσεις στο πεδίο αυτό.

([1]) Report of the Expert Group — Second Chance for Entrepreneurs: Prevention of Bankruptcy, Simplification of Bankruptcy Procedures and Support for a fresh start, DG Enterprise and Industry, January 2011.

([2]) Ανακοίνωση της Επιτροπής προς το Ευρωπαϊκό Κοινοβούλιο, το Συμβούλιο και την Οικονομική και Κοινωνική Επιτροπή: Μια νέα Ευρωπαϊκή προσέγγιση για την επιχειρηματική αποτυχία και την αφερεγγυότητα, Στρασβούργο 12 Δεκεμβρίου 2012.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-014217/13
to the Commission
Theodoros Skylakakis (ALDE)
(18 December 2013)

Subject: Second chance for Greek entrepreneurs and self-employed people

In Greece, according Joint Ministerial Decision K1-802/23-3-2011, tax and insurance clearance is a prerequisite for the establishment of a new business (Articles 5, 7 and 8). However, due to the economic downturn and lack of liquidity, hundreds of thousands of entrepreneurs and self-employed people have outstanding debts, and fail to pay their tax and insurance obligations to the state and the Insurance Organisation for the Self-Employed (OAEE). If the state finds that someone is unable to pay a debt, following the exhaustion of all appropriate means, tax clearance is then not granted for 10 years.

A second chance for entrepreneurial ventures is a basic measure for sustainable development and prosperity. The prerequisite of tax and insurance clearance for establishing enterprises, and, by extension, refusal of the right to a second chance, is leading to economic and social destruction for tens of thousands of people insured at the OAEE.

Given that, all over Europe, 94-96% of entrepreneurs and self-employed people who declare bankruptcy are genuinely unable to pay their obligations ([1]), and given that the idea of a second chance is included in the measures taken by the Commission to promote economic recovery and safeguard employment ([2]), and that Greek GDP has fallen by 25% in recent years — with turnover of certain goods down by 70-80% — due to poor macroeconomic management and the absence of an early-warning system for business in respect of real economic data, something for which entrepreneurs and self-employed people are not objectively responsible, as well as the fact that the policies of the Greek Government are constrained by the Troika, of which the Commission is a member:

1. Is the Commission aware of, and has it consented to, the issuing of decision K1-802/23-3-2011, which deprives thousands of people of the right to a second chance?

2. Does it intend to take the initiative to harmonise current Greek legislation with its own second chance proposals in a country such as Greece, where the need for a second chance applies to a large proportion of entrepreneurs and self-employed people?

Answer given by Mr Rehn on behalf of the Commission
(14 March 2014)

1. The Commission is aware of the joint Ministerial Decision mentioned by the Honourable Member. Although this measure was not adopted on the basis of the Greek adjustment programme, this pre-requisite is consistent with the objective of enforcing tax compliance in Greece, thereby contributing to a sustainable social security system. Removing this requirement may therefore have a significant impact on collection of social security contributions, which already suffer from low collection rates.

2. Measures to improve the business environment are crucial to enhance Greece's competitiveness and already conform a key building block of the policy conditionality under the 2nd adjustment programme for Greece. The Commission is of the opinion that such measures should aim to reduce administrative burden and foster entrepreneurship, while remaining fuly compatible with the achievement of the fiscal targets.

3. The Commission acknowledges the need to improve across the European Union the conditions for entrepreneurs including self-employed persons who are unable to meet their financial obligations, as set out in the 2012 Communication on a new approach to business failure and insolvency. As a follow up, the Commission is working on a legal instrument which would support the efforts of those Member States currently undergoing or considering reforms in this area.

([1]) Report of the Expert Group — Second Chance for Entrepreneurs: Prevention of Bankruptcy, Simplification of Bankruptcy Procedures and Support for a fresh start, DG Enterprise and Industry, January 2011.
([2]) Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council and the European Economic and Social Committee — A new European approach to business failure and insolvency, Strasbourg, 12 December 2012.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-014242/13
to the Commission
Ian Hudghton (Verts/ALE)
(18 December 2013)

Subject: Free movement

What assessment has been made of the potential negative social and economic consequences for Member States of introducing a cap on the right of citizens to free movement?

Answer given by Mrs Reding on behalf of the Commission
(17 March 2014)

The Commission has not carried out any assessment of the potential social and economic consequences for Member States in case of introducing a cap on the right of EU citizens to free movement. Any such cap would violate EC law on free movement of EU citizens.

Intra-EU mobility is beneficial for European economies and labour markets as demonstrated by recent Commissions communications such as 'Free Movement of EU citizens and their families: five actions to make a difference' ([1]), and other studies such as 'Evaluation of the impact of the free movement of EU citizens at local level' ([2]).

([1]) COM(2013) 873, 25 November 2013.
([2]) Report 27 January 2014: http://ec.europa.eu/justice/citizen/files/dg_just_eva_free_mov_final_report_27.01.14.pdf

(Deutsche Fassung)

Anfrage zur schriftlichen Beantwortung E-014270/13
an die Kommission
Bernd Lange (S&D)
(18. Dezember 2013)

Betrifft: REACH-Verordnung

Mit der Umsetzung der REACH-Verordnung wird der Anhang XIV erarbeitet. Für viele Substanzen entstehen damit neue Anforderungen für die Autorisierung. Damit kommen auch Substanzen in den Blick, die in Ersatzteilen von historischen Fahrzeugen verwendet werden. Die relativ geringe Nachfrage nach diesen Ersatzteilen macht eine Neukonzeption und Substitution von kritischen Substanzen in Ersatzteilen völlig unrealistisch. Zudem ist nicht absehbar, wie eine Neukonzeption von einzelnen Teilen auf den Gesamtwirkungszusammenhang von Fahrzeugen wirkt.

1. Ist der Kommission das Problem einer möglichen gravierenden Einschränkung des Betriebes von historischen Fahrzeugen aufgrund von REACH (Annex XIV) bedingten Vermarktungsverboten von Ersatzteilen bewusst und wie wird sie darauf reagieren?

2. In der Altautorichtlinie (2000/53/EG) ist für Ersatzteile, die für Autos verwendet werden, die vor dem Stichtag (1.7.2003) auf den Markt gebracht werden, eine Ausnahme vorgesehen (Anhang II). Wäre es nicht auch für den Anhang XIV der REACH-Verordnung ratsam, angesichts der aufgezeichneten Probleme eine Ausnahme, etwa mit folgendem Wortlaut: „Ersatzteile, die nach dem Stichtag auf den Markt gebracht werden und für Autos, die vor dem Stichtag auf den Markt gebracht worden sind, werden von den Regelungen des Artikels 56 der REACH-Verordnung ausgenommen." vorzusehen?

Antwort von Herrn Tajani im Namen der Kommission
(13. März 2014)

In Artikel 56 Absatz 1 der REACH-Verordnung ([1]) ist festgelegt, dass die Hersteller, Importeure und nachgeschalteten Anwender eines besonders besorgniserregenden Stoffs (SVHC), der in Anhang XIV der Verordnung aufgelistet ist, den Stoff nach einem bestimmten Ablauftermin nur in Verkehr bringen oder verwenden dürfen, wenn sie eine Zulassung für eine bestimmte Verwendung erhalten haben. In der REACH-Verordnung ist eine Reihe von Ausnahmen von dieser Anforderung vorgesehen, nicht jedoch für den vom Herrn Abgeordneten genannten besonderen Fall von Ersatzteilen für historische Fahrzeuge. Die Kommission ist sich dieser Problematik bewusst, die möglicherweise auch andere ältere Kraftfahrzeuge betrifft.

In Anhang II der Richtlinie 2000/53/EG über Altfahrzeuge sind spezifische Ausnahmen für die Verwendung von vier Stoffen in Ersatzteilen für Kraftfahrzeuge, die vor dem 1. Juli 2003 in Verkehr gebracht wurden, vorgesehen sowie für Ersatzteile für später in Verkehr gebrachte Fahrzeuge, für die jedoch die Stoffe verwendet werden durften, als sie auf den Markt gebracht wurden. Allerdings beschränkt sich der Geltungsbereich der Richtlinie 2000/53/EG auf Fahrzeuge der Klassen M1 und N1, während die REACH-Verordnung die Verwendung von Chemikalien auch in anderen Fahrzeugklassen abdeckt sowie in anderen langlebigen Produkten, auf die diese Problematik möglicherweise ebenfalls zutrifft.

Die Zulassungspflicht ist nicht einem Verbot gleichzusetzen, und Zulassungen werden erteilt, wenn die Risiken, die durch die Verwendung von SVHC entstehen, angemessen kontrolliert werden oder die sozioökonomischen Vorteile ihrer Verwendung größer sind als die davon ausgehenden Gefahren für die menschliche Gesundheit und die Umwelt und es keine geeigneten Alternativen gibt. Die Kommission konsultiert derzeit die Mitgliedstaaten, um zu ermitteln, wie die Problematik innerhalb des durch die REACH-Verordnung vorgegebenen Rechtsrahmens angegangen werden kann.

([1]) Verordnung (EG) Nr. 1907/2006 des Europäischen Parlaments und des Rates vom 18. Dezember 2006 zur Registrierung, Bewertung, Zulassung und Beschränkung chemischer Stoffe.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-014270/13
to the Commission
Bernd Lange (S&D)
(18 December 2013)

Subject: REACH Regulation

With the implementation of the REACH Regulation, Annex XIV is being compiled. For many substances this gives rise to new requirements for authorisation. This also includes substances used in spare parts for vintage vehicles. The relatively low demand for these spare parts makes new designs and the substitution of critical substances in the spare parts wholly unrealistic. Furthermore, it is impossible to know how a new design for individual parts would affect the overall working of vehicles.

1. Is the Commission aware of the problem of a potential major restriction on the running of vintage vehicles on account of a prohibition of the marketing of spare parts as a result of REACH (Annex XIV), and how will it respond to this?

2. The End-of-life Vehicles Directive (2000/53/EC) provides for an exemption (Annex II) for spare parts for cars placed on the market before the specified date (1 July 2003). Would it not be advisable, in view of the problems described, to also provide for an exemption from Annex XIV to the REACH Regulation, to read, for example, as follows: 'spare parts put on the market after the specified date which are used for vehicles put on the market before the specified date are exempted from the provisions of Article 56 of the REACH Regulation'?

Answer given by Mr Tajani on behalf of the Commission
(13 March 2014)

Article 56 (1) of REACH ([1]) provides that manufacturers, importers and downstream users of a substance of very high concern (SVHC) listed in Annex XIV of REACH may only place the substance on the market or use it, after a given sunset date, if they have been granted an authorisation for the specific use. REACH provides for a number of exemptions to that requirement, but the specific case of spare parts of vintage vehicles referred to by the Honourable Member is not foreseen in the regulation. The Commission is aware of these issues, which may also concern other older motor vehicles in addition to vintage vehicles.

Annex II to Directive 2000/53/EC on end-of-life vehicles provides for specific exemptions for the use of four substances in spare parts intended for motor vehicles placed on the market before 1 July 2003 and spare parts for vehicles put on the market in later dates but covered by an exemption for using these substances when they were put on the market. However the scope of Directive 2000/53/EC is limited to motor vehicles of categories M1 and N1, whereas the REACH Regulation covers the use of chemicals also in other vehicle categories as well as in other durable articles which may potentially also be facing a similar situation.

The authorisation requirement is not a ban and authorisations will be granted where the risks from the use of SVHC is adequately controlled or when the socioeconomic benefits outweigh the risks to human health and the environment from its use and there are no suitable alternatives. The Commission is presently in consultation with the Member States in order to identify possible ways to address the matter within the existing legal framework provided by the REACH Regulation.

([1]) Regulation (EC) No 1907/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 December 2006 concerning the Registration, Evaluation, Authorisation and Restriction of Chemicals.

(Versione italiana)

Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-014277/13
alla Commissione
Fiorello Provera (EFD) e Charles Tannock (ECR)
(18 dicembre 2013)

Oggetto: Antisemitismo in Ungheria

Il 3 novembre 2013 il partito ungherese di estrema destra Jobbik ha inaugurato a Budapest una statua del leader del paese durante la guerra Miklós Horthy che ha guidato l'alleanza dell'Ungheria con la Germania nazista. Il partito è stato accusato di diffamazione contro gli ebrei e Israele negli interventi pronunciati al Parlamento ungherese, dove è attualmente il terzo partito per grandezza. Uno degli organizzatori della cerimonia di Budapest era un alto funzionario dello Jobbik, Márton Gyöngyösi, che aveva già dovuto presentare le sue scuse per aver richiesto che fosse stilato un elenco di cittadini ungheresi con ascendenza ebraica.

Il governo guidato dal Primo ministro Viktor Orbán si sta attualmente adoperando per dissipare l'immagine negativa che l'Ungheria trasmette all'estero a causa del trattamento che riserva agli ebrei e alle altre minoranze. Sebbene l'Ungheria abbia annunciato di celebrare l'Anno di commemorazione dell'olocausto 2014, molti ebrei e altri osservatori nel paese temono che il problema dell'antisemitismo abbia radici profonde. András Kovács, responsabile del programma sugli Studi ebraici e il Nazionalismo presso l'Università dell'Europa centrale, ha dichiarato che «l'antisemitismo in Ungheria è un fenomeno di dimensioni maggiori rispetto agli altri paesi europei», aggiungendo che «le dichiarazioni ci sono, vediamo adesso cosa succede».

1. Qual è la posizione della Commissione riguardo all'inaugurazione della statua di Miklós Horthy a Budapest?

2. Qual è il suo parere in merito alla sincerità degli sforzi profusi dal governo ungherese per far fronte al problema dell'antisemitismo in Ungheria?

3. Quali misure sta adottando per sostenere i gruppi e le organizzazioni ungheresi che si prefiggono di contrastare le percezioni negative degli ebrei e della cultura ebraica?

Risposta di Viviane Reding a nome della Commissione
(12 marzo 2014)

1) La Commissione ricorda che spetta alle autorità ungheresi investigare i singoli casi per determinare se costituiscano un incitamento alla violenza o all'odio razziali in funzione della legislazione penale vigente.

2) La relazione della Commissione sull'attuazione da parte degli Stati membri della decisione quadro 2008/913/GAI sulla lotta contro il razzismo e la xenofobia è stata pubblicata il 27 gennaio 2014, data in cui ricorre il Giorno della memoria in commemorazione delle vittime dell'Olocausto ([1]). La Commissione ha annunciato di voler intavolare nel corso del 2014 dialoghi bilaterali con gli Stati membri per garantire il recepimento pieno e corretto della decisione quadro negli ordinamenti nazionali.

3) Spetta dunque agli Stati membri prendere le misure necessarie, in particolare in termini di formazione e informazione, per evitare che la memoria della natura criminale e totalitaria del fascismo e del nazismo vada perduta o sia banalizzata. Il nuovo programma «Europa per i cittadini» (2014-2020) comprenderà un elemento significativo dedicato alla «Memoria europea», in particolare per indurre a riflettere sulle cause dei regimi totalitari nella storia recente dell'Europa.

([1]) http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2014:0027:FIN:IT:PDF

(English version)

Question for written answer E-014277/13
to the Commission
Fiorello Provera (EFD) and Charles Tannock (ECR)
(18 December 2013)

Subject: Anti-Semitism in Hungary

On 3 November 2013, Hungary's far-right Jobbik party unveiled a statue in Budapest of the country's wartime leader, Miklós Horthy, who presided over Hungary's alliance with Nazi Germany. The party has been accused of vilifying Jews and Israel in speeches in the Hungarian Parliament, where it is currently the third largest party. One of the organisers of the ceremony in Budapest was a senior member of Jobbik, Márton Gyöngyösi, who has previously had to apologise after calling for lists of people in Hungary with Jewish ancestry to be commissioned.

The Government of Prime Minister Viktor Orbán is currently working to dispel the poor image that Hungary projects to outsiders over its treatment of Jews and other minorities. Hungary has announced that it will commemorate the Holocaust Memorial Year 2014, yet many Jews, as well as other observers based in the country, suggest that the problem of anti-Semitism runs deep. András Kovács, who heads the Jewish Studies and Nationalism programme at the Central European University, says that 'the proportion of anti-Semitism in Hungary is higher than in other countries' in Europe, adding that 'the declarations are there. Now let's see what happens'.

1. What is the position of the Commission regarding the unveiling of the Miklós Horthy statue in Budapest?

2. What is the assessment of the Commission regarding the sincerity of the Hungarian government's efforts to tackle the problem of anti-Semitism within Hungary?

3. What steps is the Commission adopting to support groups and organisations within Hungary that are working to challenge negative perceptions of Jews and Jewish culture?

Answer given by Mrs Reding on behalf of the Commission
(12 March 2014)

1. The Commission recalls that it is for the Hungarian authorities to investigate individual cases in order to determine whether they represent incitement to racial violence or hatred, and to draw the necessary conclusions under criminal law.

2. The Commission report on the implementation by Member States of Framework Decision 2008/913/JHA on racism and xenophobia was published on 27 January 2014, International Holocaust Remembrance Day ([1]). The Commission has announced that it will now engage in bilateral dialogues with Member States during 2014 with a view to ensuring full and correct transposition of the framework Decision into national law.

3. It pertains to Member States to take the necessary measures, notably in terms of education and information, to ensure that, among others, the memory of the criminal and totalitarian nature of fascism and Nazism is not forgotten or banalised. The new 'Europe for Citizens' programme (2014-2020) will include a significant part dedicated to European Remembrance, notably to reflect on the causes of totalitarian regimes in Europe's modern history.

([1]) http://ec.europa.eu/justice/fundamental-rights/files/com_2014_27_en.pdf

(Versione italiana)

Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-014289/13
alla Commissione (Vicepresidente/Alto Rappresentante)
Fiorello Provera (EFD) e Charles Tannock (ECR)
(18 dicembre 2013)

Oggetto: VP/HR — Situazione in Ucraina

Il 1º dicembre 2013 Valery Harahuts, fondatore del giornale Faces, con base a Dnipropetrovsk, si trovava a Kiev per un lavoro giornalistico quando è stato attaccato dalle forze speciali ucraine note come «Berkut». Stava cercando di prestare assistenza medica ad alcuni manifestanti, anch'essi in precedenza malmenati dalla polizia. Harahuts è stato colpito ripetutamente allo stomaco, alla schiena e al capo ed è stato trattenuto dalle forze Berkut per tre ore senza ricevere alcuna cura medica. Dopo quattro ore lui e altri otto detenuti sono stati portati al reparto penitenziario dell'ospedale per le emergenze di Kiev.

Harahuts ha in seguito depositato una dichiarazione in merito alla sua detenzione illegale, all'uso eccessivo della forza da parte degli agenti del ministero degli Interni, alla violazione dei diritti e delle libertà dei cittadini e all'inibizione dell'attività giornalistica. La polizia non ha trovato alcuna prova materiale dello svolgimento di attività illecite da parte di Harahuts, ciononostante egli è stato accusato a norma dell'articolo 294, parte 1, del codice penale ucraino. Il 3 dicembre il tribunale distrettuale di Ševčenko, Kiev, ha respinto tutti gli appelli presentati dai difensori di Harahuts, scegliendo la detenzione quale misura preventiva (60 giorni di fermo amministrativo). Egli rischia ora di dover scontare da cinque a otto anni di reclusione.

1. È il Vicepresidente/Alto Rappresentante a conoscenza del caso di Valery Harahuts?

2. È ella disposta a chiedere alle autorità ucraine di ritirare le accuse nei confronti di Harahuts e rilasciarlo immediatamente?

3. Quali provvedimenti sta adottando l'Unione europea per documentare i singoli casi di cittadini ucraini che sono stati vittime di brutali attacchi da parte della polizia, soprattutto alla luce delle numerose manifestazioni di protesta che hanno avuto luogo nella capitale?

Risposta dell'Alta Rappresentante/Vicepresidente Catherine Ashton a nome della Commissione a nome della Commissione
(26 marzo 2014)

1. L'Alta Rappresentante/Vicepresidente è al corrente degli episodi di pestaggio e della detenzione di pacifici protestanti a seguito del giro di vite del 1º dicembre 2013.

2. Nelle dichiarazioni del 30 novembre ([1]), 11 dicembre ([2]), 22 gennaio ([3]) e 31 gennaio ([4]), l'AR/VP ha condannato l'uso eccessivo della forza da parte della polizia, ha esortato l'Ucraina a onorare pienamente gli impegni internazionali assunti in materia di rispetto della libertà di espressione e di riunione e a consegnare tutti i responsabili di atti di violenza alla giustizia. Tali inviti sono stati ripetuti dal commissario Füle nella dichiarazione a nome dell'AR/VP in sede di Parlamento europeo del 5 febbraio ([5]) e da tutti i ministri degli Esteri nelle conclusioni del Consiglio del 10 febbraio ([6]).

3. La delegazione dell'UE a Kiev è in stretto contatto con tutte le parti in causa per denunciare questo caso e altri analoghi. Inoltre, l'Unione europea è pienamente favorevole all'idea del gruppo di inchiesta consultivo, proposta dal Segretario generale del Consiglio d'Europa e accolta dal governo e dall'opposizione. L'AR/VP ha esortato il governo dell'Ucraina a nominare il proprio rappresentante in tale gruppo consultivo, come ha già fatto l'opposizione.

([1]) http://eeas.europa.eu/statements/docs/2013/131130_02_en.pdf
([2]) http://eeas.europa.eu/statements/docs/2013/131211_02_en.pdf
([3]) http://eeas.europa.eu/statements/docs/2014/140122_01_en.pdf
([4]) http://eeas.europa.eu/statements/docs/2014/140131_en_02.pdf
([5]) http://ec.europa.eu/commission_2010-2014/fule/headlines/news/2014/02/20140205_en.htm
([6]) http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/140960.pdf

(English version)

Question for written answer E-014289/13
to the Commission (Vice-President/High Representative)
Fiorello Provera (EFD) and Charles Tannock (ECR)
(18 December 2013)

Subject: VP/HR — Situation in Ukraine

On 1 December 2013, Valery Harahuts, founder of the Dnipropetrovsk-based newspaper *Faces*, was in Kiev on an editorial assignment when he was attacked by Ukrainian special forces known as the Berkut. He had been trying to offer medical assistance to some of the protestors who had also been beaten up by the police. Harahuts was stabbed a number of times in the stomach, back and head and was detained by Berkut for three hours without receiving any medical attention. After four hours, he and eight detainees were brought to the police branch of the Kiev emergency hospital.

Harahuts later filed statements about his unlawful detention, the excessive use of force by agents of the Ministry of Interior, the violation of citizens' rights and freedoms, and obstruction of journalistic activity. The police discovered no material evidence of any unlawful actions carried out by Harahuts, but he was nevertheless charged in accordance with Article 294 Part 1 of Ukraine's Criminal Code. On 3 December, Kiev's Shevchenkivskyi regional court denied all appeals from Harahuts's lawyers, choosing detention as a preventive measure — 60 days of administrative arrest. He is now facing a prison term of five to eight years.

1. Is the Vice-President /High Representativeaware of the case of Valery Harahuts?

2. Is the VP/HR prepared to call on the Ukrainian authorities to drop the charges against Harahuts and release him immediately?

3. What steps is the EU taking to document individual cases of Ukrainians who have been subject to brutal attacks at the hands of the police, especially in the light of the numerous protests which have taken place in the capital?

Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission
(26 March 2014)

1. The HR/VP aware of the cases of beatings and detentions of peaceful protesters following the crackdown on 1 December 2013.

2. In her statements of 30 November ([1]), 11 December ([2]), 22 January ([3]) and 31 January ([4]), HR/VP condemned the excessive use of force by police, called on Ukraine to fully abide by its international commitments to respect the freedom of expression and assembly and to bring all perpetrators of acts of violence to justice. These calls have been repeated in the statement made by Commissioner Füle on behalf of the HR/VP in the European Parliament on 5 February ([5]) and by all EU Foreign Ministers in the Council Conclusions of 10 February ([6]).

3. The EU Delegation in Kyiv is in close contact with all actors involved to report this and similar cases. In addition, the European Union fully supports the idea of an Investigation Advisory Panel, proposed by the Secretary General of the Council of Europe, and accepted by the government and opposition. The HR/VP urged the Ukrainian government to nominate its representative to this Panel, as the opposition has already done.

([1]) http://eeas.europa.eu/statements/docs/2013/131130_02_en.pdf
([2]) http://eeas.europa.eu/statements/docs/2013/131211_02_en.pdf
([3]) http://eeas.europa.eu/statements/docs/2014/140122_01_en.pdf
([4]) http://eeas.europa.eu/statements/docs/2014/140131_en_02.pdf
([5]) http://ec.europa.eu/commission_2010-2014/fule/headlines/news/2014/02/20140205_en.htm
([6]) http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/140960.pdf

(Versione italiana)

Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-014299/13
alla Commissione
Oreste Rossi (PPE)
(18 dicembre 2013)

Oggetto: Possibili connessioni tra perfluorurati e diabete di tipo 2

I composti perfluorurati (PFC) sono sostanze utilizzate in molti prodotti industriali quali pentole antiaderenti, schiume antincendio, grasso e materiali idrorepellenti, materiali a contatto con alimenti, sciolina e tessuti in GoreTex. Essi sono già stati al centro di numerosi studi e inchieste per i loro effetti sulla salute umana, ma un nuovo studio è stato condotto dalla Divisione di Medicina del Lavoro e Ambientale dell'Università di Uppsala, Svezia, per misurare i livelli di 7 diversi tipi di perfluorurati nel sangue e valutare se questi fossero correlati al diabete. Il team di ricerca ha notato che questi sette composti perfluorurati erano rilevabili in quasi tutti gli individui coinvolti nello studio. Le analisi specifiche condotte hanno poi permesso di scoprire che alti livelli nel sangue di uno di questi composti, l'acido perfluorononanoico (PFNA), erano collegati al diabete. I risultati finali dello studio, pubblicati sulla rivista Diabetologia, hanno tuttavia mostrato che non solo il PFNA era collegato al diabete, ma anche il noto PFOA (acido perfluoroottanoico) utilizzato nella produzione di pentole antiaderenti. Questo stesso composto è stato trovato essere correlato all'interruzione nella secrezione dell'insulina da parte del pancreas.

Considerato che la pericolosità cancerogena ed epatica del PFOA viene riconosciuta anche nel «The EFSA Journal» (2008), numero 653, può la Commissione far sapere se:

1. intende acquisire e valutare i risultati di tale studio;

2. intende valutare nuove misure per la tutela della salute del consumatore.

Risposta di Antonio Tajani a nome della Commissione
(21 marzo 2014)

Nel dicembre 2011 il Comitato per la valutazione dei rischi (RAC) facente capo all'Agenzia europea per le sostanze chimiche ha emanato un parere ([1]) su una proposta di classificazione ed etichettatura armonizzate dell'acido perflurottanoico (PFOA). Successivamente la Commissione ha adottato un regolamento ([2]) che rendeva legalmente vincolante la classificazione di tale sostanza. Tra le altre cose il PFOA è stato classificato cancerogeno di categoria 2 e tossico per la riproduzione di categoria 1B.

Lo studio menzionato dall'Onorevole deputato è stato pubblicato nel dicembre 2013, vale a dire successivamente al parere del RAC. Comunque, sulla base di nuove informazioni uno Stato membro può proporre la modifica di una classificazione armonizzata.

A motivo della sua classificazione quale tossico per la riproduzione di categoria 1B la Commissione ha proposto il divieto di vendita del PFOA al pubblico in quanto sostanza e nelle miscele conformemente all'articolo 68, paragrafo 2, del regolamento REACH ([3]). Il PFOA è stato inoltre aggiunto all'Elenco di sostanze candidate ([4]) tra le sostanze estremamente preoccupanti (SVHC) in base a questa classificazione e nella sua qualità di sostanza persistente bioaccumulabile e tossica (PBT). Ciò determina l'obbligo per i fornitori di trasmettere informazioni ai consumatori sull'uso sicuro degli articoli contenenti PFOA ([5]).

Se dalla fabbricazione, dall'uso o dall'immissione sul mercato di sostanze deriva un rischio inaccettabile per la salute umana o l'ambiente che deve essere affrontato su scala dell'intera UE, si deve iniziare un processo di restrizione ([6]) ([7]). All'atto di elaborare una proposta di restrizione si deve tener conto di tutti i dati pertinenti tra cui quelli provenienti dalle schede di registrazione nonché di altre informazioni.

([1]) http://echa.europa.eu/documents/10162/e7f15a22-ba28-4ad6-918a-6280392fa5ae.
([2]) Regolamento (UE) n. 944/2013 della Commissione, del 2 ottobre 2013, recante modifica, ai fini dell'adeguamento al progresso tecnico e scientifico, del regolamento (CE) n. 1272/2008 del Parlamento europeo e del Consiglio relativo alla classificazione, all'etichettatura e all'imballaggio delle sostanze e delle miscele.
([3]) Regolamento (CE) n. 1907/2006 del Parlamento europeo e del Consiglio, del 18 dicembre 2006, concernente la registrazione, la valutazione, l'autorizzazione e la restrizione delle sostanze chimiche (REACH), che istituisce un'Agenzia europea per le sostanze chimiche, che modifica la direttiva 1999/45/CE e che abroga il regolamento (CEE) n. 793/93 del Consiglio e il regolamento (CE) n. 1488/94 della Commissione, nonché la direttiva 76/769/CEE del Consiglio e le direttive della Commissione 91/155/CEE, 93/67/CEE, 93/105/CE e 2000/21/CE.
([4]) Articolo 59 del regolamento REACH.
([5]) I fornitori nell'UE o nel SEE di articoli contenenti sostanze che figurano sull'Elenco delle sostanze candidate in una concentrazione superiore allo 0,1 % (p/p) devono fornite informazioni sufficienti per assicurare un uso sicuro dell'articolo da parte dei loro clienti oppure fornirle a richiesta a un consumatore entro 45 giorni dal ricevimento della richiesta stessa.
([6]) Ai sensi dell'articolo 68, paragrafo 1, del regolamento REACH.
([7]) Il processo di restrizione può essere iniziato dall'ECHA, su richiesta della Commissione, o da uno Stato membro.

L'uso del PFOA nei materiali di plastica destinati a venire a contatto con gli alimenti [8] è autorizzato sulla base del parere dell'Autorità europea per la sicurezza alimentare del 2005 [9] nelle applicazioni che non sprigionano quantitativi rilevabili di PFOA negli alimenti.

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[8] Regolamento (UE) n. 10/2011 della Commissione, del 14 gennaio 2011, riguardante i materiali e gli oggetti di materia plastica destinati a venire a contatto con i prodotti alimentari, GU L 12 del 15.1.2011, pag. 1.

[9] http://www.efsa.europa.eu/en/efsajournal/doc/248a.pdf

(English version)

Question for written answer E-014299/13
to the Commission
Oreste Rossi (PPE)
(18 December 2013)

Subject: Potential links between perfluorinated compounds and type 2 diabetes

Perfluorinated compounds (PFC) are used in a wide variety of industrial products, including non-stick cookware, fire fighting foam, grease and water-repellent materials, food contact material, ski wax and GoreTex fabrics. They have already been the subject of many studies and investigations into their effects on human health, but a new study has been carried out by the Department of Occupational and Environmental Medicine at the University of Uppsala, Sweden, to measure the levels of 7 different types of perfluorinated compounds in the blood and assess whether these are related to diabetes. The research team observed that these seven perfluorinated compounds were detectable in virtually all the individuals involved in the study. Specific analyses then enabled the researchers to discover that high levels of one of these compounds in the blood, perfluorononanoic acid (PFNA), were linked to diabetes. The final results of the study, published in the magazine Diabetologia, nevertheless showed that not only was PFNA linked to diabetes, but so was the well-known PFOA (perfluorooctanoic acid), used in the production of non-stick cookware. This same compound was also was also found to be linked to disrupted secretion of insulin from the pancreas.

Considering that the carcinogenic and hepatic danger of PFOA has also been recognised in 'The EFSA Journal' (2008), number 653, can the Commission state whether:

1. it intends to acquire and assess the results of this study;

2. it intends to evaluate new measures for the protection of consumers' health?

Answer given by Mr Tajani on behalf of the Commission
(21 March 2014)

In December 2011, the Risk Assessment Committee (RAC) of the European Chemicals Agency issued an opinion ([1]) on a proposal for harmonised classification and labelling of perflurooctanoic acid (PFOA). The Commission subsequently adopted a regulation ([2]) making the classification for this substance legally binding. Among others, PFOA was classified as Carcinogenic Cat. 2 and Toxic to Reproduction Cat. 1B.

The study referred to by the Honourable Member was published in December 2013, i.e. posterior to the RAC opinion. However, a change of the harmonised classification of a substance can be proposed by a Member State on the basis of new information.

Due to its classification as Toxic to Reproduction Cat. 1B, the Commission has proposed a ban on the sale to the general public of PFOA as a substance and in mixtures in accordance with Article 68 (2) of REACH ([3]). PFOA was also added to the Candidate List ([4]) of Substances of Very High Concern (SVHC) based on this classification and as persistent, bioccumulative and toxic (PBT) substance. This triggers the obligation for suppliers to provide information to consumers on safe use of articles containing PFOA ([5]).

When there is an unacceptable risk to human health or the environment, arising from the manufacture, use or placing on the market of substances, which needs to be addressed on a Union-wide basis, a restriction process should be initiated ([6]) ([7]). In the development of a restriction proposal, all relevant data shall be considered, including from registration dossiers and other information.

The use of PFOA in plastic food contact materials ([8]) is authorised based on the European Food Safety Authority opinion of 2005 ([9]) in those applications that do not release detectable amounts of PFOA into food.

([1]) http://echa.europa.eu/documents/10162/e7f15a22-ba28-4ad6-918a-6280392fa5ae
([2]) Commission Regulation (EU) No 944/2013 of 2 October 2013 amending, for the purpose of its adaptation to technical and scientific progress, Regulation (EC) No 1272/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council on classification, labelling and packaging of substances and mixtures.
([3]) Regulation (EC) No 1907/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 December 2006 concerning the Registration, Evaluation, Authorisation and Restriction of Chemicals (REACH), establishing a European Chemicals Agency, amending Directive 1999/45/EC and repealing Council Regulation (EEC) No 793/93 and Commission Regulation (EC) No 1488/94 as well as Council Directive 76/769/EEC and Commission Directives 91/155/EEC, 93/67/EEC, 93/105/EC and 2000/21/EC.
([4]) Article 59 of REACH.
([5]) EU or EEA suppliers of articles which contain substances on the Candidate List in a concentration above 0.1% (w/w) have to provide sufficient information to allow safe use of the article to their customers or upon request, to a consumer within 45 days of the receipt of the request.
([6]) Pursuant to Article 68(1) of REACH.
([7]) The restriction process can be started either by ECHA, on request of the Commission, or by a Member State.
([8]) Commission Regulation (EU) No 10/2011 of 14 January 2011 on plastic materials and articles intended to come into contact with food, OJ L 12, 15.1.2011, p.1.
([9]) http://www.efsa.europa.eu/en/efsajournal/doc/248a.pdf

(Svensk version)

Frågor för skriftligt besvarande E-014316/13
till kommissionen
Isabella Lövin (Verts/ALE)
(18 december 2013)

Angående: Fortsatta oegentligheter i samband med transport av delfiner mellan medlemsstater

År 2010 transporterades elva flasknosdelfiner från det litauiska havsmuseet till Atticas djurpark i Grekland med anledning av att delfinariet i Litauen skulle renoveras. Djuren började uppträda i Greklands nya delfinarium, trots att djurparken inte hade något byggnadstillstånd för den nya anläggningen, och trots att de grekiska myndigheterna inte hade gett sitt tillstånd till att delfinerna fördes in i landet. Dessutom är djurföreställningar numera förbjudna i Grekland ([1]). Sju delfiner av de 14 stycken som enligt uppgift hölls i Atticas djurpark fördes tillbaka till Litauen i september 2013 ([2]). De grekiska myndigheterna har bekräftat att de godkände reviderade ursprungskoder för delfinerna för deras intyg för överföring till Litauen. Sedan delfinerna anlände i Litauen har en hona fött en unge, trots att IATA:s (International Air Transport Association) bestämmelser för transport av levande djur fastställer att högdräktiga djur inte får transporteras, utom under exceptionella omständigheter. IATA:s regler för transport att djur som finns upptagna i Cites (konventionen om internationell handel med utrotningshotade arter av vilda djur och växter), däribland delfiner, måste följas för att ett Citestillstånd ska vara giltigt. Dessutom tycks en videofilm från ett litauiskt medieföretag av delfinernas ankomst i Litauen från Atticas djurpark i Grekland i september 2013 visa att djuren transporterades i vattentankar med två djur i varje tank. Dessa transportförhållanden strider också mot IATA:s bestämmelser om transport av levande djur, enligt vilka varje delfin ska transporteras individuellt, med segelduk som stöd. Transporter som inte efterlever dessa bestämmelser strider också mot Cites.

Vilka åtgärder kommer kommissionen att vidta i reaktion på dessa oegentligheter i delfinhandeln mellan Grekland och Litauen?

Svar från Janez Potočnik på kommissionens vägnar
(13 mars 2014)

De litauiska och grekiska myndigheterna för Citesförvaltning har nyligen lämnat uppgifter till kommissionen som beskriver under vilka förhållanden överföringen av de sju delfiner som parlamentsledamoten hänvisar till ägde rum. Enligt denna information uppfyllde överföringen IATA:s standarder samt EU-lagstiftningen om skydd av djur under transport ([3]) och om skyddet av arter av vilda djur och växter genom kontroll av handeln med dem ([4]).

([1]) http://www.minagric.gr/images/stories/docs/politis/Zoa_Syntrofias/nomos4039_adespota.pdf
([2]) http://tv.lrytas.lt/?id=13793545601378908477and laipeda.diena.lt/naujienos/klaipeda/miesto-pulsas/atenu-i-uostamiescio-delfinariuma-grizo-dar-trys-delfinai-414986#.UlVV6lCsh8F
([3]) Rådets förordning (EG) nr 1/2005 av den 22 december 2004 om skydd av djur under transport och därmed sammanhängande förfaranden.
([4]) Rådets förordning (EG) nr 338/97 av den 9 december 1996 om skyddet av arter av vilda djur och växter genom kontroll av handeln med dem.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-014316/13
to the Commission
Isabella Lövin (Verts/ALE)
(18 December 2013)

Subject: Continued irregularities with regard to dolphin transfers between Member States

In 2010 11 bottlenose dolphins were transferred from the Lithuanian Sea Museum to Attica Zoological Park in Greece, while the dolphinarium in Lithuania underwent refurbishment. The animals began performing in shows in Greece's new dolphinarium, although the zoo had no planning permission for its new facility and permission had not been granted by the Greek authorities for the dolphins to enter the country. Furthermore, animal performances are now banned in Greece ([1]). Seven dolphins from a reported 14 now held at the Attica Zoo were transferred back to Lithuania in September 2013 ([2]). The Greek authorities have confirmed that they accepted revised source codes for the dolphins for their transfer certificates to Lithuania. Since the dolphins' arrival in Lithuania, one female has given birth, in spite of the International Air Transport Association's live animal regulations stating that 'heavily pregnant animals must not be carried except under exceptional circumstances'. International Air Transport Association rules for the transport of animals listed under the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species, including dolphins, must be followed for a CITES permit to be valid. Furthermore, video footage shot by a Lithuanian media outlet of the September 2013 arrival in Lithuania from Greece of the dolphins from Attica Zoological Park suggests that the animals were transported in tanks of water with two animals in each. These transport conditions also violate the IATA's live animal regulations, which require the use of an individual transport container for each dolphin, with a canvas sling for support Transfers which do not meet these regulations are also in violation of CITES.

What action will the Commission take in response to these irregularities in dolphin trade between Greece and Lithuania?

Answer given by Mr Potočnik on behalf of the Commission
(13 March 2014)

The Lithuanian and Greek CITES Management Authorities have recently provided information to the Commission on the conditions under which the transfer of the seven dolphins to which the Honourable Member refers took place. According to this information, the transfer was in compliance with the standards of the International Air Transport Association, as well as with the EU legislation on the protection of animals during transport ([3]) and on the protection of species of wild fauna and flora by regulating trade therein ([4]).

([1]) http://www.minagric.gr/images/stories/docs/politis/Zoa_Syntrofias/nomos4039_adespota.pdf
([2]) http://tv.lrytas.lt/?id=13793545601378908477and laipeda.diena.lt/naujienos/klaipeda/miesto-pulsas/atenu-i-uostamiescio-delfinariuma-grizo-dar-trys-delfinai-414986#.UlVV6lCsh8F
([3]) Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2005 of 22 December 2004 on the protection of animals during transport and related operations.
([4]) Council Regulation (EC) No 338/97 of 9 December 1996 on the protection of species of wild fauna and flora by regulating trade therein.

(Versión española)

Pregunta con solicitud de respuesta escrita E-014331/13
al Consejo
Salvador Sedó i Alabart (PPE)
(19 de diciembre de 2013)

Asunto: Islamismo extremista en Catalunya

Según investigaciones policiales recientes, Catalunya ha acabado por convertirse en el foco de expansión del extremismo salafí-wahabí en toda Europa. La celebración de varios «congresos» salafistas en Catalunya a lo largo del presente año confirma un extremismo creciente.

A estos mencionados «congresos» acuden ulemas o doctores de la ley islámica llegados desde Arabia Saudí, Qatar o los Emiratos Árabes Unidos, además de activistas procedentes de toda Europa y de otros puntos de España.

La ciudad de Reus se ha caracterizado por la organización de congresos de formación islámica convocados en paralelo por dos asociaciones de corte salafista enfrentadas entre sí desde mediados de 2010, en un intento de hacerse con el control del salafismo en su zona de influencia.

¿Está la Oficina Europea de Policía (Europol) al corriente de la celebración de dichos «congresos»? ¿Qué análisis hace Europol de la situación en la que se encuentra Catalunya? ¿Cuál es el nivel actual de cooperación entre los Estados miembros de la UE y sus servicios correspondientes en la lucha contra el terrorismo en España?

Respuesta
(17 de marzo de 2014)

El Consejo no ha debatido la situación concreta a la que hace referencia Su Señoría ni ha tomado posición al respecto.

El Consejo recuerda, por otra parte, que, tal como establece el artículo 72 del TFUEU, el mantenimiento del orden público y la salvaguardia de la seguridad interior son responsabilidad de los Estados miembros.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-014331/13
to the Council
Salvador Sedó i Alabart (PPE)
(19 December 2013)

Subject: Islamist extremism in Catalonia

According to recent police investigations, Catalonia has become a focal point for the spread of Salafi-Wahhabi extremism across Europe. This growth in extremism is reflected by the fact that various Salafi ‘conferences’ were held in Catalonia throughout 2013.

These ‘conferences’ were attended by ulamas and doctors of Islamic law from Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates and by activists from all over Europe and other parts of Spain.

In the city of Reus, Islamic training conferences have been held by two Salafi organisations that have been in conflict with each other since mid-2010 in an attempt to gain control of the Salafi movement within their area of influence.

Is Europol aware that these ‘conferences’ are being held? What is Europol’s view of the situation in Catalonia? To what extent do Member States and their respective security services cooperate in fighting against terrorism in Spain?

Reply
(17 March 2014)

The Council has neither discussed nor taken a view on the specific situation referred to by the Honourable Member.

Furthermore, the Council recalls that, as provided for in Article 72 TFEU, maintaining law and order and safeguarding internal security are the responsibility of Member States.

(Deutsche Fassung)

Anfrage zur schriftlichen Beantwortung E-014340/13
an die Kommission
Axel Voss (PPE)
(19. Dezember 2013)

Betrifft: Herausgabe von Unterlagen an Angeklagte in Zivil/Strafsachen

In Dänemark gibt es das Gesetz „Retsplejeloven" (Prozessordnung), das es Anwälten untersagt den Klientinnen und Klienten Unterlagen, die sie von Polizei und/oder Gericht bekommen haben, auszuhändigen: § 729 a, part 3 („*Forsvareren må ikke uden politiets samtykke overlevere det modtagne materiale til sigtede eller andre. (…)*" — auf Deutsch: „*Der Verteidiger darf nicht ohne die Zustimmung der Polizei das erhaltene Material dem Angeklagten oder anderen übergeben*"). Auf der anderen Seite gibt es zum Beispiel Artikel 6 der Europäischen Menschenrechtskonvention (EMRK).

1. Ist der Kommission dieser Umstand in Dänemark bekannt? Wenn ja: Wie kann nach Auffassung der Kommission ein „faires Verfahren" gegeben sein, wenn dem Angeklagten Unterlagen vorenthalten werden können?

2. Sieht die Kommission gegebenenfalls noch weitere Artikel der EMRK verletzt?

3. Was gedenkt die Kommission zu unternehmen, um diesen Missstand möglichst rasch zu unterbinden?

4. Was rät die Kommission Dänemark, um Bürger und Bürgerinnen, denen dadurch Schaden entstanden ist, nun in angemessener Form allenfalls zu entschädigen?

5. Wie gedenkt die Kommission die Achtung dieses Rechtes in Dänemark notfalls zu überwachen?

Antwort von Frau Reding im Namen der Kommission
(12. März 2014)

Bestimmte Aspekte des in Dänemark gesetzlich festgelegten Verbots für Strafverteidiger, ihren Mandanten Unterlagen auszuhändigen, scheinen mit dem Recht auf ein faires Verfahren zusammenzuhängen. Dieses Recht ist auch in Artikel 47 der Charta der Grundrechte der Europäischen Union festgeschrieben. Dabei ist jedoch zu beachten, dass nach Artikel 51 Absatz 1 die Bestimmungen der Charta für die Mitgliedstaaten ausschließlich bei der Durchführung des EU-Rechts gelten.

Die Richtlinie 2012/13/EU ([1]) sieht vor, dass verdächtige und beschuldigte Personen sowie deren Anwälte Zugang zu allen Beweismitteln im Besitz der zuständigen Behörden haben sollen, damit ein faires Verfahren gewährleistet ist und die Verteidigung vorbereitet werden kann ([2]). Eine begrenzte Ausnahme von diesem Recht ist nur vorgesehen, wenn die Verweigerung des Zugangs zum Schutz eines wichtigen öffentlichen Interesses unbedingt erforderlich ist, etwa wenn der Zugang eine ernsthafte Gefährdung der nationalen Sicherheit des betreffenden Mitgliedstaats bedeuten könnte.

Gemäß den Artikeln 1 und 2 des dem Vertrag über die Europäische Union und dem Vertrag über die Arbeitsweise der Europäischen Union beigefügten Protokolls Nr. 22 über die Position Dänemarks beteiligt sich Dänemark jedoch nicht an der Annahme der Richtlinie 2012/13/EU und ist daher nicht durch diese gebunden ([3]). Die Kommission hat daher keine rechtliche Handhabe, um Maßnahmen gegen Dänemark wegen Nichtumsetzung der Richtlinie zu ergreifen.

Was die Auslegung von Artikel 6 Absatz 3 EMRK betrifft, hat der EGMR wiederholt entschieden, dass den angeklagten Personen und ihren Strafverteidigern Akteneinsicht gewährt werden muss, damit die Verteidigung ausreichend vorbereitet werden kann und der Grundsatz der Waffengleichheit zwischen Anklage und Verteidigung gewahrt wird ([4]). Der Kommission sind jedoch keine Fälle des EGMR bekannt, die eine vergleichbare rechtliche Situation behandeln wie jene in Dänemark, die Sie in Ihrer Frage beschreiben.

([1]) Richtlinie 2012/13/EU vom 22. Mai 2012 über das Recht auf Belehrung und Unterrichtung in Strafverfahren, ABl. L 142 vom 1.6.2012, S. 1-10. Die Richtlinie muss bis zum 2. Juni 2014 von den Mitgliedstaaten umgesetzt werden.
([2]) Artikel 7.
([3]) Siehe Erwägungsgrund 45 der Richtlinie 2012/13/EU.
([4]) Kamasinski gegen Österreich (Urteil vom 19.12.1989); Ocalan gegen die Türkei (Urteil vom 12.5.2005); Moiseyev gegen Russland (Urteil vom 9.10.2008).

(English version)

Question for written answer E-014340/13
to the Commission
Axel Voss (PPE)
(19 December 2013)

Subject: Issuing of documents to defendants in civil/criminal cases

In Denmark, 'Retsplejeloven' (the Administration of Justice Act) prohibits lawyers from passing on to their clients documents that they have obtained from the police and/or the Court: Section 729 a, part 3 ('Forsvareren må ikke uden politiets samtykke overlevere det modtagne materiale til sigtede eller andre. (…)' — in English: 'The defence counsel must not pass on the material received to the defendant or anyone else without the consent of the police.') In contrast to this, we have Article 6 of the European Convention for Human Rights (ECHR), for example.

1. Is the Commission aware of this situation in Denmark? If so, how, in its opinion, can there be a 'fair trial' if documents can be withheld from the defendant?

2. Does the Commission also see possible violations of other articles of the ECHR?

3. What does it intend to do to eliminate these shortcomings as quickly as possible?

4. What does it advise Denmark to do in order to provide an appropriate form of compensation, where necessary, for citizens who have been harmed by this?

5. If necessary, how does it intend to monitor respect for this right in Denmark?

Answer given by Mrs Reding on behalf of the Commission
(12 March 2014)

Certain aspects with regard to the prohibition of defence lawyers to pass on documents to their clients as foreseen in Danish law seem to be related to the right to a fair trial. This right is also enshrined in Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU. However, it has to be recalled that according to Article 51(1), the provisions of the Charter are addressed to the Member States only when they implement Union law.

Directive 2012/13/EU ([1]), provides that suspected or accused persons or their lawyers should have access to all material evidence in the possession of the competent authorities in order to safeguard the fairness of the proceedings and to prepare the defence ([2]). A limited exception from this right is foreseen only if the refusal is strictly necessary to safeguard an important public interest, such as in cases where access could seriously harm the national security of the Member State concerned.

However, in accordance with Articles 1 and 2 of the Protocol No22 on the position of Denmark, annexed to the TEU and TFEU, Denmark has not taken part in the adoption of Directive 2012/13/EU and is therefore not bound by it ([3]). The Commission is therefore not in a legal position to take any measures against Denmark for possible non-transposition of this directive.

As regards the interpretation of Art.6(3)b of the ECHR, the ECtHR repeatedly decided that the accused or his defence lawyer has to be given access to the case-file in order to prepare the defence adequately and provide equality of arms between defendants and prosecutors ([4]). However, the Commission is not aware of ECHR cases which cover a legal situation comparable to the one in Denmark described in your question.

([1]) Directive 2012/13/EU of 22. Mai 2012 on the right to information in criminal proceedings, OJ. L 142 of 1.6.2012, p. 1-10. The directive has to be transposed by Member States by 2 June 2014.
([2]) Article 7.
([3]) See Recital 45 of Directive 2012/13/EU.
([4]) Kamasinski v Austria (Judgment of 19.12.1989); Ocalan v Turkey (Judgment of 12.5.2005); Moiseyev v Russia (Judgment of 9.10.2008).

(Versión española)

Pregunta con solicitud de respuesta escrita E-014343/13
al Consejo
Rosa Estaràs Ferragut (PPE)
(19 de diciembre de 2013)

Asunto: Ratificación por parte de la UE del Tratado de Marrakech

El pasado junio se firmó en Marruecos el Tratado de Marrakech sobre facilidades de acceso a obras publicadas para personas con discapacidades visuales o con problemas de lectura.

Este tratado internacional vinculante de las Naciones Unidas y la OMPI tiene por objeto acabar con «la hambruna de libros» que priva a 250 millones de personas del acceso a la cultura y a la educación. Las personas con discapacidades visuales únicamente tienen acceso a entre el 1 y el 5 % de los libros publicados. El acuerdo se centra en excepciones a los derechos de autor para facilitar la creación de versiones accesibles y asequibles de libros y otras obras con derechos de autor. Fija una norma para que los países que ratifiquen el Tratado establezcan excepciones nacionales a los derechos de autor para cubrir estas actividades, y permite la importación y exportación de este material.

Más de 5 meses después de aprobar el texto del tratado, la UE sigue sin firmarlo y ni si quiera ha decidido qué procedimiento jurídico deberán aplicar los Estados miembros y el Parlamento Europeo en el proceso de ratificación.

¿Por qué la UE no ha ratificado aún este tratado? ¿Qué medidas ha adoptado el Consejo para firmar y ratificar lo antes posible este tratado de derechos de personas discapacitadas? ¿Cuáles son los pasos siguientes?

Respuesta
(12 de marzo de 2014)

La propuesta de la Comisión de Decisión del Consejo relativa a la firma, en nombre de la Unión Europea, del Tratado al que alude Su Señoría, fue presentada al Consejo el 20 de diciembre de 2013 y está estudiandose actualmente en el Consejo.

En virtud del artículo 218, apartado 6, del TFUE, para la celebración del Tratado en cuestión en nombre de la Unión Europea, el Consejo solo puede pronunciarse sobre la base de una propuesta de la Comisión y, de momento, no ha recibido una propuesta en este sentido.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-014343/13
to the Council
Rosa Estaràs Ferragut (PPE)
(19 December 2013)

Subject: EU ratification of Marrakesh Treaty

In June 2012, the Marrakesh Treaty to Facilitate Access to Published Works by Visually Impaired Persons and Persons with Print Disabilities was concluded in Morocco.

This internationally binding UN/WIPO treaty aims at ending the 'book famine' that deprives 250 million people of access to culture and education. Visually impaired persons only have access to between 1 and 5% of books published. The agreement focuses on copyright exceptions to facilitate the creation of accessible and affordable versions of books and other copyrighted works. It sets a norm for countries ratifying the treaty to have a domestic copyright exception covering these activities, and allowing for the import and export of such material.

Over five months after agreeing to the treaty text, the EU has still not signed the treaty and has not even decided on the legal procedure to be used in the ratification process by Member States and the European Parliament.

Why has this treaty still not been ratified by the EU? What measures have been taken by the Council to sign and ratify this disability rights treaty as soon as possible? What are the next steps?

Reply
(12 March 2014)

The Commission proposal for a Council Decision on the signing, on behalf of the European Union, of the Treaty referred to by the Honourable Member was submitted to the Council on 20 December 2013 and is currently under examination within the Council.

Under Art. 218(6) TFEU, for the conclusion of the Treaty in question on behalf of the European Union, the Council may only act on the basis of a proposal by the Commission. No such proposal has been submitted to the Council so far.

(Ελληνική έκδοση)

Ερώτηση με αίτημα γραπτής απάντησης E-014353/13
προς την Επιτροπή
Konstantinos Poupakis (PPE)
(19 Δεκεμβρίου 2013)

Θέμα: Συρρίκνωση του εργασιακού κόστους στην Ελλάδα

Σύμφωνα με πρόσφατα δημοσιοποιημένα στοιχεία της έκθεσης της Τράπεζας της Ελλάδος, αναφορικά με τις διακυμάνσεις των μισθών των εργαζομένων στον ιδιωτικό και ευρύτερο δημόσιο τομέα, προκύπτει ότι την τριετία 2012-2014 η σωρευτική μείωση του κόστους εργασίας ανά μονάδα προϊόντος θα αγγίξει το 21,7%, υπερκαλύπτοντας κατά πολύ το στόχο του 15% που είχε τεθεί στο πλαίσιο του 2ου Προγράμματος Οικονομικής Προσαρμογής (ν. 4046/2012). Ειδικότερα, τα στοιχεία δείχνουν ότι, από το 2011 μέχρι και σήμερα, ένα ποσοστό εργαζομένων που αθροιστικά υπολογίζεται σε 64% έχουν υποστεί μειώσεις μισθών — είτε με ατομικές και επιχειρησιακές συμβάσεις, είτε με μετατροπή σύμβασης ή ακόμη και με κλαδικές συλλογικές συμβάσεις — χωρίς δυστυχώς το αναμενόμενο αντίκρισμα στην αύξηση της απασχόλησης και με την ανεργία να καλπάζει. Το μέγεθος, λοιπόν, της προσαρμογής για το συγκεκριμένο ζήτημα υπερβαίνει τη στοχοθεσία των Μνημονίων Δανεισμού και, λαμβάνοντας υπόψη, αφενός, τα εκτεταμένα φαινόμενα κατακερματισμού της αγοράς εργασίας, και, αφετέρου, τις τραγικές συνέπειες των μειωμένων αποδοχών στην πραγματική οικονομία (ραγδαία μείωση αγοραστικής δύναμης-ιδιωτικής κατανάλωσης), ερωτάται η Επιτροπή:

1. Ως μέλος της τρόικα επεξεργάζεται την προώθηση ρυθμίσεων για την αποκατάσταση μέτρων στο πλαίσιο των εργασιακών σχέσεων και των συλλογικών συμβάσεων στην Ελλάδα που έχουν ανασταλεί προσωρινά προκειμένου να ανακοπεί η μείωση των αμοιβών και, κατ' επέκταση, οι αρνητικές της συνέπειες σε σχέση με την οικονομία και τις κοινωνικές συνθήκες;

2. Με δεδομένη τη δραματική αύξηση του φαινομένου των φτωχών εργαζομένων και των καταγεγραμμένων μειώσεων των αμοιβών, προτίθεται να προβεί σε συστάσεις προς την ελληνική κυβέρνηση αναφορικά με το ποσό του κατώτατου μισθού αλλά και το μέγεθος της φορολογίας στο εισόδημα από την εργασία (σύμφωνα και με τις παραδοχές του κ. Άντορ στην απάντηση E-012312/2013);

Απάντηση του κ. Rehn εξ ονόματος της Επιτροπής
(17 Μαρτίου 2014)

Όπως αναφέρθηκε στην απάντηση που δόθηκε στην ερώτηση E-012312/2013 την οποία υπέβαλε το Αξιότιμο Μέλος του Κοινοβουλίου, ως γενική αρχή η Επιτροπή δεν προτείνει κανένα ιδιαίτερο επίπεδο διαπραγματεύσεων.

Η προσεκτική ρύθμιση των μηχανισμών αναπροσαρμογής των μισθών μπορεί να συμβάλει στην αντιστοίχηση μισθών και οικονομικής δραστηριότητας προκειμένου να διατηρηθούν οι υπάρχουσες θέσεις εργασίας και να διευκολυνθεί η δημιουργία νέων.

Ένας βασικός στόχος του κατώτατου νόμιμου μισθού είναι να μειωθούν οι κίνδυνοι κατάχρησης στην αγορά εργασίας, όπως οι μισθοί που διαμορφώνονται σε επίπεδα κατώτερα της παραγωγικότητας λόγω, μεταξύ άλλων, της ύπαρξης μονοψωνίου. Οι κατώτατοι μισθοί μπορούν επίσης να μειώσουν την φτώχεια ατόμων που έχουν εργασία και να στηρίξουν τη ζήτηση από μέρους των χαμηλόμισθων. Αυτά τα οφέλη οφείλουν να σταθμιστούν σε σχέση με τον κίνδυνο να υπάρξει ιδιαίτερα υψηλός κατώτατος μισθός, ο οποίος θα μειώσει τις ευκαιρίες απασχόλησης των χαμηλής παραγωγικότητας /χαμηλόμισθων εργαζομένων εξωθώντας τους εκτός αγοράς ή στον άτυπο τομέα.

Σύμφωνα με τα μνημόνια που συμφωνήθηκαν μεταξύ της Ελλάδας και των δανειστών της (κράτη μέλη της ζώνης του ευρώ, ΕΤΧΣ και ΔΝΤ), οι ελληνικές αρχές πρόκειται να επανεξετάσουν το πλαίσιο των κατώτατων αποδοχών μέχρι τον Μάρτιο του 2014. Στόχος είναι να αναλυθεί το ζήτημα, λαμβάνοντας υπόψη τις εξελίξεις της οικονομικής κατάστασης και της αγοράς εργασίας μέχρι αυτό το χρονικό σημείο και τις προοπτικές για το μέλλον. Πριν από κάθε σύσταση πρέπει να προηγείται εμπεριστατωμένη ανάλυση.

Η χαμηλότερη φορολόγηση της εργασίας και κατ' επέκταση το υψηλότερο διαθέσιμο εισόδημα μπορούν να αποτελέσουν κίνητρα εργασίας. Όμως αυτά τα οφέλη πρέπει να εξετασθούν σε σχέση με το βάρος που αντιπροσωπεύουν τα χαμηλότερα φορολογικά έσοδα στους κρατικούς λογαριασμούς.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-014353/13
to the Commission
Konstantinos Poupakis (PPE)
(19 December 2013)

Subject: Falling labour costs in Greece

According to data recently published in a Bank of Greece report on fluctuations in the pay of employees in the private and the wider state sector, it is clear that the total reduction in unit labour costs will reach 21.7% in the three-year period 2012-2014, greatly exceeding the target of 15% set within the framework of the 2nd Economic Adjustment Programme (Law 4046/2012). More specifically, the data show that, from 2011 to the present, an estimated 64% of employees have suffered pay cuts — either under individual or enterprise agreements, and either with amendments to agreements or with collective sectoral agreements, but unfortunately without the expected result of an increase in employment, and with unemployment remaining rampant. The size, then, of the adjustment for the specific issue exceeds the target set by the Lending Memoranda, and, bearing in mind the widespread phenomena of labour market fragmentation on the one hand, and the tragic consequences of pay cuts in the real economy (the rapid fall in buying power — private consumption) on the other hand, will the Commission say:

1. As a member of the troika, is it working for the promotion of arrangements to implement measures in labour relations and collective agreements in Greece that were provisionally suspended with a view to cutting remuneration, and thus to reduce its negative consequences for the economy and social conditions?

2. Given the dramatic increase in in-work poverty and the reductions seen in remuneration, does it intend to make recommendations to the Greek Government concerning the minimum wage and levels of income tax (also in accordance with the assumptions made by Mr Andor in answer E-012312/2013)?

Answer given by Mr Rehn on behalf of the Commission
(17 March 2014)

As mentioned in the reply to the Question E-012312/2013 placed by the Honourable Member, as a general principle, the Commission does not advocate any particular level of bargaining.

Fine tuning wage-setting mechanisms can help in ensuring an adequate response of wages to economic activity in order to preserve existing jobs and facilitate the creation of new ones.

One main objective of a statutory minimum wage is to reduce the risks of abuse in the labour market, namely wages much below productivity linked *inter alia* to monopsony power. Minimum wages can also reduce in-work poverty and sustain demand by low wage earners. These benefits have to be balanced against the risk of a too-high minimum wage reducing employment opportunities by pricing low-productivity/low-wage workers out of the market or pushing them into the informal sector.

According to the memoranda agreed between Greece and its Lenders (euro area MS, EFSF and IMF), the Greek authorities are reviewing the minimum wage framework by March 2014. The goal is to analyse the issue taking into account the economic and labour market developments up to that moment and the trends expected going forward. A solid analysis should precede any recommendation.

A lower tax burden on labour, and subsequently a higher take-home pay, can favour incentives to work. But those benefits have to be seen against the drag of lower tax revenues on the government accounts.

(English version)

Question for written answer P-014368/13
to the Council
Syed Kamall (ECR)
(19 December 2013)

Subject: Inclusion of individual in restrictive measures list

I have passed on your answer to my previous question (P-011476/2013) and have been told that Dr Tarif Akhas strongly refutes the allegations made against him.

1. Can the Council explain what proof or evidence it has to substantiate its claim?

2. Can the Council reveal the source of information for the allegations against Dr Tarif Akhas?

Reply
(12 March 2014)

1. The information on the basis of which the Council decided to impose restrictive measures against Dr Akhras was contained in a listing proposal presented by a Member State. The Council has provided Dr Akhras with the text of that proposal.

2. The identity of the Member State which proposed the designation of Dr Akhras is confidential and cannot be disclosed by the Council.

(Suomenkielinen versio)

Kirjallisesti vastattava kysymys E-014381/13
komissiolle
Hannu Takkula (ALDE)
(19. joulukuuta 2013)

Aihe: Natsihenkiset euro-vaaliehdokkaat

Tulevien Euroopan parlamentin vaalien lähestyessä on myös käymässä ilmi, millaisten poliittisten ja aatteellisten ajatusten pohjalta vaaleihin osallistuvat ovat asettumassa ehdolle. Poliittisten ryhmien taustalta löytyykin kokonainen kirjo yhteiskunnallisia ja ideologisia aatteita ja asenteita. Osa vaaleihin tähtäävistä poliittisista puolueista edustaa kuitenkin aatteita, jotka ovat kyseenalaisia eurooppalaisesta arvolähtökohdasta arvioitaessa, mutta myös useiden EU-maiden rikoslainsäädännön vastaisia.

Tämän johdosta haluan kysyä komissiolta:

Kuinka on mahdollista, että avoimesti natsimieliset, holokaustin kieltävät tai rasistisia asenteita ja käsityksiä kannattavat ehdokkaat voivat osallistua ehdokkaina vaaleihin?

Millä tavalla komissio seuraa eurovaaliehdokkaiden aatteellisia taustoja?

Aikooko komissio ryhtyä toimiin, mikäli rikoslainsäädännön vastaisten aatteiden edustajia on ehdolla tulevissa vaaleissa?

Viviane Redingin komission puolesta antama vastaus
(12. maaliskuuta 2014)

Komissio tuomitsee jyrkästi kaikenlaiset rasismin ja muukalaisvihan muodot ja ilmentymät, riippumatta siitä, kuka niistä on vastuussa, koska ne eivät sovi yhteen niiden arvojen ja periaatteiden kanssa, joihin Euroopan unioni perustuu.

Neuvoston puitepäätöksessä 2008/913/YOS ([1]) säädetään, että kaikkien jäsenvaltioiden on säädettävä rangaistavaksi tahallinen julkinen kannustaminen väkivaltaan tai vihaan, kun se on kohdistettu rodun, ihonvärin, uskonnon, syntyperän taikka kansallisen tai etnisen alkuperän mukaan määräytyvään ihmisryhmään tai tällaisen ryhmän jäseneen. Jäsenvaltiot ja kansalliset viranomaiset ovat vastuussa puitepäätöksen täytäntöönpanosta kansallisella tasolla. Jäsenvaltioiden on huolehdittava siitä, että myös oikeushenkilöt voidaan saattaa vastuuseen tällaisesta toiminnasta.

Komissio julkaisi ensimmäisen kertomuksen rasismin ja muukalaisvihan torjumisesta jäsenvaltioissa tehdyn puitepäätöksen 2008/913/YOS täytäntöönpanosta 27. tammikuuta 2014, juutalaisten joukkotuhon muistopäivänä, ja ilmoitti, että se aikoo käydä kahdenvälisiä keskusteluja jäsenvaltioiden kanssa vuoden 2014 aikana varmistaakseen tämän lainsäädännön täysimääräisen ja asianmukaisen ottamisen osaksi kansallista lainsäädäntöä.

Asetuksen (EY) N:o 2004/2003 ([2]) mukaan Euroopan tason poliittisten puolueiden on kunnioitettava puolueohjelmassaan ja toiminnassaan "Euroopan unionin perusperiaatteita eli vapauden, demokratian, ihmisoikeuksien ja perusoikeuksien kunnioittamisen sekä oikeusvaltion periaatetta". Tämä on yksi neljästä ehdosta, jotka Euroopan tason poliittisen puolueen on täytettävä voidakseen hakea rahoitusta Euroopan unionilta. Asetuksessa säädetään erityisestä menettelystä, jolla varmistetaan se, että tämä ehto täytetään.

([1]) Neuvoston puitepäätös 2008/913/YOS, tehty 28 päivänä marraskuuta 2008, rasismin ja muukalaisvihan tiettyjen muotojen ja ilmaisujen torjumisesta rikosoikeudellisin keinoin, EUVL L 328, 6.12.2008, s. 55–58.
([2]) Euroopan parlamentin ja neuvoston asetus (EY) N:o 2004/2003, annettu 4 päivänä marraskuuta 2003, Euroopan tason poliittisia puolueita ja niiden rahoitusta koskevista säännöistä.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-014381/13
to the Commission
Hannu Takkula (ALDE)
(19 December 2013)

Subject: Nazi-minded European election candidates

As the European Parliament elections draw near, the sorts of political and ideological ideas that the people who are standing as candidates are relying on are becoming clear. Behind the political groups is a whole spectrum of social and ideological ideas and attitudes. Some of the political parties with their sights on the election, however, represent ideas that are questionable from the perspective of European values, and, furthermore, are contrary to the criminal legislation of many EU countries.

How is it possible that openly Nazi-minded or holocaust-denying candidates or candidates supporting racist attitudes and ideas are able to stand for election?

How will the Commission monitor the ideological backgrounds of European election candidates?

Does it intend to take action if representatives of ideas that are against the law stand in future elections?

Answer given by Mrs Reding on behalf of the Commission
(12 March 2014)

The Commission strongly condemns all forms and manifestations of racism and xenophobia, regardless of who they come from, as they are incompatible with the values and principles on which the European Union is founded.

Council Framework Decision 2008/913/JHA ([1]) obliges all Member States to make punishable the intentional public incitement to violence or hatred targeted against a group of people or a member of such ground defined by reference to race, colour, religion, descent, or ethnic or national origin. It is up to Member States and national authorities to ensure that the framework Decision is implemented at national level. Member States must ensure that also legal persons are liable for such conduct.

Following the publication, on 27 January 2014, Holocaust Remembrance Day, of the first Commission report on the implementation of Framework Decision 2008/913/JHA on racism and xenophobia by the Member States, the Commission announced that it will enter into bilateral dialogues with Member States, in the course of 2014, with a view to ensuring full and correct transposition of this legislation into national law.

According to Regulation (EC) 2004/2003 ([2]), political parties at European level must observe, in particular in their programme and in their activities, 'the principles on which the European Union is founded, namely the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedom, and the rule of law'. This is one of the four conditions political parties at European level must satisfy in order to apply for EU funding. The regulation provides for a specific procedure to verify that that this condition continues to be met.

([1]) Council Framework Decision 2008/913/JHA of 28 November 2008 on combating certain forms and expressions of racism and xenophobia by means of criminal law, OJ L 328, 6.12.2008, p. 55-58.

([2]) Regulation (EC) No 2004/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 November 2003 on the regulations governing political parties at European level and the rules regarding their funding.

(Versione italiana)

Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-014391/13
alla Commissione
Susy De Martini (ECR)
(20 dicembre 2013)

Oggetto: Discriminazione sulla base della nazionalità tra cittadini tedeschi e cittadini di altri Stati membri nelle procedure di estradizione verso Stati terzi

Nella Repubblica federale di Germania l'estradizione verso Stati extracomunitari è regolata dall'art. 16 della Costituzione (Grundgesetz), secondo cui i cittadini tedeschi possono essere soggetti a estradizione in due soli casi: a) in virtù di un mandato d'arresto europeo o b) a seguito di richiesta delle Corti penali internazionali.

L'estradizione di cittadini tedeschi verso Stati extracomunitari è sempre vietata dall'art. 16. È sempre consentita l'estradizione di cittadini europei non tedeschi che si trovino in Germania.

Ciò significa che la disciplina sull'estradizione tra Stati terzi e Repubblica federale di Germania è esclusivamente applicabile ai cittadini stranieri, anche europei, che si trovano sul territorio tedesco ma non è mai applicabile ai cittadini tedeschi.

Si tratta di una discriminazione esplicita e diretta a favore dei cittadini tedeschi e nei confronti degli altri cittadini europei che si trovano in Germania.

Questa norma ha già portato a una discriminazione materiale sulla base della nazionalità nei confronti del Sig. Pisciotti, cittadino italiano, arrestato in Germania al momento dell'arrivo a Francoforte, sulla base della richiesta di estradizione emessa dagli Stati Uniti per una violazione della concorrenza che, nella maggior parte degli Stati europei, non costituisce neppure un reato.

Il Sig. Pisciotti ha già subito una violazione in quanto non ha potuto fruire della protezione Costituzionale garantita ai soli cittadini tedeschi dall'art. 16 e rischia di subire un'ulteriore violazione a causa del rischio di accoglimento della domanda di estradizione da parte dell'Autorità giudiziaria tedesca.

In virtù di quanto sopra, e dell'art. 18 TFUE che vieta le discriminazioni sulla base della nazionalità, dell'art. 21 che garantisce il diritto alla libera circolazione delle persone e dell'art. 56 TFUE che garantisce il diritto alla libera circolazione dei servizi, si chiede alla Commissione:

1. se sia a conoscenza della discriminazione di cui all'art. 16 della Costituzione tedesca e della situazione che sta interessando il Sig. Pisciotti;

2. quali approfondimenti e quali iniziative siano state già poste in essere al fine di verificare l'eventuale inadempimento del diritto dell'UE da parte della Repubblica federale di Germania;

3. quali ulteriori iniziative intenda promuovere e quali atti intenda adottare per verificare la compatibilità dell'ordinamento tedesco con il diritto dell'UE e garantire la piena applicazione del principio di non discriminazione sulla base della nazionalità.

Risposta di Viviane Reding a nome della Commissione
(12 marzo 2014)

Nel campo di applicazione dei trattati è vietata qualsiasi discriminazione in base alla nazionalità. Al riguardo, secondo una giurisprudenza costante, il principio della non discriminazione impone di non trattare situazioni analoghe in maniera diversa e situazioni diverse in maniera uguale.

Il trattato sull'estradizione tra la Repubblica federale di Germania e gli Stati Uniti d'America esime le parti contraenti dall'estradare i propri cittadini, fatta salva una certa discrezionalità di cui godono le rispettive autorità ed eventuali preclusioni legali negli ordinamenti delle Parti.

Si pone la questione se ciò debba applicarsi anche ad altri cittadini dell'UE.

Il sig. Pisciotti ha presentato alla Commissione una denuncia a carico della Germania che è attualmente al vaglio dei nostri servizi. La denuncia mira a chiarire se la vertenza rientri nel campo di applicazione dei trattati, fermo restando che l'Unione europea è tenuta a rispettare l'accordo del 2003 sull'estradizione tra l'Unione europea e gli Stati Uniti. Ciò richiede il contributo di diversi servizi della Commissione, che devono coordinarsi fra loro. L'esito sarà comunicato direttamente al sig. Pisciotti.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-014391/13
to the Commission
Susy De Martini (ECR)
(20 December 2013)

Subject: Discrimination on grounds of nationality between German citizens and citizens of other Member States in extradition to third countries

In the Federal Republic of Germany, extradition to non-EU countries is regulated by Article 16 of the Constitution (Grundgesetz), under which German citizens may be extradited in only two cases: a) under a European arrest warrant, or b) following a request from the international criminal courts.

Extradition of German citizens to non-EU countries is prohibited by Article 16. Extradition of non-German European citizens living in Germany is permitted.

That means that the regulations on extradition between third countries and the Federal Republic of Germany apply exclusively to foreign citizens, including Europeans, who are in Germany, but they never apply to German citizens.

This is blatant and direct discrimination in favour of German citizens, against other European citizens living in Germany.

This rule has already led to an actual case of discrimination on the grounds of nationality, against one Mr Pisciotti, an Italian national, who was arrested in Germany on arrival in Frankfurt, on the basis of an extradition request issued by the United States for breaching competition rules, which is not even a crime in many EU Member States.

Mr Pisciotti has already had his rights violated as he has not been able to enjoy the constitutional protection afforded only to German citizens by Article 16, and he risks having his rights further violated if the German legal authorities grant the extradition request.

In view of the above and Article 18 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, which prohibits discrimination on grounds of nationality, Article 21, which guarantees the right to the free movement of persons, and Article 56, which guarantees the right to the free movement of services:

1. Is the Commission aware of the discrimination under Article 16 of the German Constitution and of Mr Pisciotti's situation?

2. What inquiries have already been made and what steps taken in order to determine whether there has been any breach of EC law by the Federal Republic of Germany?

3. What further action will the Commission take and what will it do to determine the compatibility of German law with EC law, and to guarantee that the principle of non-discrimination on grounds of nationality is fully implemented?

Answer given by Mrs Reding on behalf of the Commission
(12 March 2014)

Within the scope of application of the Treaties, any discrimination on grounds of nationality shall be prohibited. It is in this regard settled case-law that the principle of non-discrimination requires that comparable situations must not be treated differently and that different situations must not be treated in the same way.

The Treaty between the Federal Republic of Germany and the United States of America concerning extradition states that the contracting parties shall not be bound to extradite their own nationals subject to certain discretion for their authorities and provided their law does not so preclude.

The question arises as to whether this should also apply to other EU Citizens.

The Commission services are currently examining Mr Pisciotti's complaint against Germany which he introduced with the Commission directly in relation to the question whether this matter falls within the scope of the application of the Treaties, against the background that the European Union is bound by the 2003 Agreement on extradition between the EU and the US. This requires consultation and coordination with several different Commission departments. He will be informed directly of the outcome when finalised.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-014398/13
to the Commission
Diane Dodds (NI)
(20 December 2013)

Subject: Sustaining peace in Tunisia

Despite widespread violence and political instability in Egypt, Libya and Syria, relative peace and stability prevail in Tunisia, which was also affected by the Arab Spring. It was the first state to overthrow its dictator, in 2011, and Tunisian protestors continue to focus on the need for democratic transition and national debate, rather than tending towards violence.

In this context, can the Commission detail what steps are being taken at EU level to facilitate continuing peace in Tunisia, as well as to encourage the application of democratic principles and values in every aspect of Tunisian society?

Answer given by Mr Füle on behalf of the Commission
(17 March 2014)

In its political dialogue with the Tunisian authorities, its political leaders and civil society, the EU consistently advocates for a peaceful democratic transition through inclusive dialogue. The national dialogue initiated by the 'Quartet' in October 2013 was supported by the EU with a view to finding a compromise on different issues (government, constitution, elections).

The EU is well aware of the security risks and terrorist threats. The reform of the security sector is a priority for dialogue and cooperation with Tunisia and the issue of radicalisation is on the agenda at different levels. The EU is closely monitoring the protection of human rights and the reinforcement of civil society.

The EU financial instruments are used to support the transition in different fields (ex. reform of the judicial sector, support to the National Constituent Assembly). Tunisia received in 2012 an allocation of EUR 7 million for a civil society capacity building programme and benefits from the Civil Society Facility (EUR 11 million for the Southern Mediterranean countries in 2013) to strengthen and promote non-state actors' role in reforms and democratic changes, as well as from the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EUR 4 million over 2011-2013).

The EU has also facilitated the cooperation between the Council of Europe, and notably the Venice Commission, and the Tunisian authorities with a view to provide expert advice on the drafting of the new Constitution. The constitution that was finally adopted in January 2014 took account of many of the recommendations made by experts from the Venice Commission.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-014403/13
to the Commission
Diane Dodds (NI)
(20 December 2013)

Subject: Commission investigations into alleged breach of state aid rules

This week, it emerged that the Commission has opened three formal investigations following allegations that public funding given to seven Spanish football clubs was in breach of EU state aid rules. Allegations surround state-backed loans and the sale of land and involve seven clubs, including Real Madrid and FC Barcelona.

In light of this, can the Commission provide a status update as to the nature, scope and proposed timeline for these investigations, as well as information detailing whether any other European football clubs are implicated?

Answer given by Mr Almunia on behalf of the Commission
(11 March 2014)

On 18 December 2013, the Commission opened formal state aid investigations regarding certain Spanish football clubs. One case concerns three clubs in the Valencia region, where it seems that aid was awarded in the form of State guarantees which have been invoked in January 2013. A second investigation concerns Real Madrid CF, which benefitted from a possibly advantageous real property swap with the City of Madrid. The third investigation concerns the special tax status for four clubs. Real Madrid CF, FC Barcelona, Athletic Club Bilbao, and Club Atlético Osasuna seem to benefit from an exception to the general obligation of professional football clubs to turn into a limited company. The effect of this exemption is that these clubs enjoy a preferential corporate tax rate.

Spain has been invited to comment on the opening decisions. Once a non-confidential version of the decisions is established, in cooperation with the Spanish authorities, they will be published in the Official Journal, together with an invitation to third parties to make observations. It is at this stage not possible to indicate a time for the adoption of the final decisions.

The Commission is also looking into cases in other Member States. On 18 December 2013, the Commission also approved the planned public support to the financing of the stadiums for the European Football Championship in France 2016. On 20 November 2013, it approved an investment aid scheme for football stadiums in Flanders, Belgium. There is an ongoing formal investigation regarding several Dutch football clubs. Furthermore, complaints have been received concerning Celtic Glasgow and Swansea and possible aid to Athletic Bilbao for a new stadium. These investigations are still at an early stage.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-014404/13
to the Commission
Diane Dodds (NI)
(20 December 2013)

Subject: Unrest in Central African Republic

Earlier this month, UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon warned that current unrest in the Central African Republic risked spiralling out of control. He estimated that somewhere in the region of 9 000 peacekeepers would be required to respond to the situation.

In light of this, can the Commission indicate:

1. What steps have been and will be taken at EU level to encourage social and political stability in the Central African Republic following the recent upsurge in violence?

2. What specific efforts have been made at EU level to protect Christians and other vulnerable groups who are at risk of persecution as a result of the unrest?

3. If it is able to provide assurances that its approach to promoting peace in the Central African Republic will have the rule of law and the respect of fundamental freedoms, including freedom of religion and of association, at its core?

Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission
(19 March 2014)

The EU is involved in efforts of the international community to address the political, humanitarian, social, and human rights dimension of the CAR crisis and gave its full support to the appointment of the new transitional authorities and is ready to support the elections process. The EU is the most important humanitarian and development partner and has recently scaled up its humanitarian engagement. The Commission and the UN USG Amos organised a ministerial meeting on the CAR's humanitarian situation on 20th January during which EUR 366 m were pledged. The development portfolio has been adapted to the crisis with EUR 23 m of remaining 10th EDF-funding having been reprogrammed. The EU has development cooperation projects in the field of justice, police, public finance and infrastructure and is preparing a development package to support the transition phase.

The first operation tasked to protect civilians in the CAR was the African Union Mission, MISCA, supported by the EU which is committed to foster the Mission under the African Peace Facility (EUR 50 m). A political decision has been taken by the Council on 20 January 2013 to prepare for an EU military operation. UNSC adopted resolution on 28 January authorising the EU operation in CAR thus providing the required legal framework.

According to the principles and values of the EU the approach to promoting peace in CAR will focus on the rule of law and the respect of the fundamental freedom. The EU will continue to support inter-faith dialogue and inter-communitarian mediation and reconciliation as well as the deployment of human rights observers within the UN Integrated Office in CAR. This support is provided by a 'Stabilisation programme in response to the post-coup crisis' under the Instrument of Stability.

(Versão portuguesa)

Pergunta com pedido de resposta escrita E-014426/13
à Comissão
Edite Estrela (S&D)
(20 de dezembro de 2013)

Assunto: Falta de recursos e de apoio político da UE para a igualdade de género

Tendo em conta o relatório do Instituto Europeu para a Igualdade de Género (EIGE) sobre a «eficácia dos mecanismos institucionais e a transversalidade da igualdade de género na União Europeia, entre 2005 e 2012»;

Tendo em conta que o EIGE considera que a igualdade entre mulheres e homens «está a enfrentar sérios desafios» na União Europeia, entre os quais a «falta de recursos e de apoio político» e que há, inclusive, a «tendência para marginalizar as estruturas institucionais nacionais especificamente dedicadas à promoção da igualdade de género»;

Tendo em conta que, entre 2005 e 2012, os organismos que trabalham nesta área foram reduzidos a metade e «crescentemente substituídos por estruturas de proteção contra a discriminação em geral», e que o EIGE defende que «o fortalecimento dos organismos nacionais para a igualdade de género é uma condição necessária à aplicação efetiva das políticas da UE e à realização da igualdade entre mulheres e homens»;

Tendo em conta que as políticas preconizadas pela UE não «transversalizam» a dimensão da igualdade entre homens e mulheres (mainstreaming) em todas as áreas de intervenção da UE, como, aliás, os Tratados determinam;

Pergunto à Comissão:

1. Que medidas desenvolve atualmente a Comissão para garantir a efetiva aplicação do princípio da igualdade entre homens e mulheres?

2. Perante as conclusões do relatório do EIGE, que medidas adicionais pensa a Comissão apresentar?

Resposta dada por Viviane Reding em nome da Comissão
(18 de fevereiro de 2014)

1. A Comissão prossegue a aplicação da sua Estratégia para a igualdade entre homens e mulheres 2010-2015 ([1]), da qual acabou de ser feito um balanço intercalar ([2]). Esta estratégia tem duas vertentes, prevendo, por um lado, ações específicas em prol da igualdade entre homens e mulheres e, por outro, a aplicação do princípio do *gender mainstreaming* (integração da perspetiva do género).

As medidas específicas revestem natureza diversa, incluindo, entre outras:

— ações legislativas, como a proposta de diretiva relativa à melhoria do equilíbrio entre homens e mulheres no cargo de administrador não-executivo das empresas cotadas em bolsa e a outras medidas conexas ([3]);

— subvenções, com fundos estruturais, atribuídas aos programas Progress ou Daphne (2007-2013), cuja designação atual é Direitos, Igualdade e Cidadania (2014-2020);

— ações de coordenação das políticas nacionais.

O princípio do *gender mainstreaming* é o instrumento que decorre do artigo 8.° do Tratado sobre o Funcionamento da União Europeia, que estabelece que, «na realização de todas as suas ações, a União terá por objetivo eliminar as desigualdades e promover a igualdade entre homens e mulheres». Concretamente, cada direção-geral da Comissão inclui uma dimensão de género na definição, proposta e aplicação das suas políticas, graças a uma pessoa de referência. O conjunto destes agentes trabalha igualmente em rede e é coordenado pela Unidade da Igualdade Mulheres-Homens da Direção-Geral da Justiça, que coordena nomeadamente um grupo interserviços.

2. As conclusões do relatório do Instituto Europeu para a Igualdade de Género (EIGE) referem-se aos mecanismos institucionais dos Estados-Membros, que continuam a ser os únicos competentes a nível nacional em matéria de igualdade entre homens e mulheres.

([1]) http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:52010DC0491:PT:NOT
([2]) http://ec.europa.eu/justice/gender-equality/files/strategy_women_men/131011_mid_term_review_en.pdf
([3]) http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2012:0614:FIN:PT:PDF

(English version)

Question for written answer E-014426/13
to the Commission
Edite Estrela (S&D)
(20 December 2013)

Subject: Lack of resources and political support from the EU for gender equality

The European Institute for Gender Quality (EIGE) has published a report on the effectiveness of institutional mechanisms and gender mainstreaming in the European Union between 2005 and 2012.

According to the EIGE, 'gender equality in the EU is facing serious challenges', including a lack of resources and 'support from political leaders', and there is a 'tendency to marginalise national institutional structures that are specifically focused on the advancement of gender equality'.

The number of bodies working in this area halved between 2005 and 2012 and they 'are increasingly replaced by bodies for protection against discrimination on various grounds', and according to the EIGE, 'strengthening national gender equality bodies is a necessary condition for the effective implementation of all EU policies and making equality between women and men a reality in the EU'.

Policies advocated by the EU do not provide for gender mainstreaming in all areas of EU action, as laid down, moreover, by the Treaties.

1. What steps is the Commission currently taking to ensure the effective application of the principle of gender equality?

2. In view of the conclusions of the EIGE report, what additional measures does the Commission plan to present?

(Version française)

Réponse donnée par Mme Reding au nom de la Commission
(18 février 2014)

1. La Commission poursuit la mise en œuvre de sa Stratégie pour l'égalité entre les femmes et les hommes 2010-2015 ([1]), dont un premier bilan vient d'être fait à mi-parcours ([2]). Cette Stratégie suit une double approche avec, d'une part, des actions spécifiques en faveur de l'égalité entre les femmes et, d'autre part, l'application du principe de gender mainstreaming.

L'approche spécifique consiste en des actions de diverses natures, avec entre autres:

— des actions législatives, comme la proposition de directive relative à un meilleur équilibre hommes-femmes parmi les administrateurs non exécutifs des sociétés cotées en bourse et à des mesures connexes ([3]);

— des subventions, avec les fonds structurels, les programmes Progress ou Daphne (2007-2013) puis Droits, Égalité et Citoyenneté (2014-2020);

— des actions de coordination des politiques nationales.

Le principe de gender mainstreaming est l'outil déclinant l'article 8 du Traité sur le fonctionnement de l'UE, qui dispose que «pour toutes ses actions, l'Union cherche à éliminer les inégalités, et à promouvoir l'égalité, entre les hommes et les femmes». Concrètement chaque direction générale de la Commission inclut une dimension de genre dans la définition, la proposition et la mise en œuvre de ses politiques grâce à une personne de référence. L'ensemble de ces agents travaillent également en réseau et sont coordonnés par l'unité égalité femmes/hommes de la Direction Générale Justice qui coordonne notamment un groupe interservices.

2. Les conclusions du rapport de l'Institut européen pour l'égalité entre les hommes et les femmes (EIGE) portent sur les mécanismes institutionnels dans les États membres, qui seuls restent compétents au niveau national en matière d'égalité femmes/hommes.

([1]) http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:52010DC0491:FR:NOT
([2]) http://ec.europa.eu/justice/gender-equality/files/strategy_women_men/131011_mid_term_review_en.pdf
([3]) http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2012:0614:FIN:fr:PDF

(Ελληνική έκδοση)

Ερώτηση με αίτημα γραπτής απάντησης E-014433/13
προς την Επιτροπή
Georgios Papanikolaou (PPE)
(23 Δεκεμβρίου 2013)

Θέμα: Δηλώσεις Επιτρόπου Περιβάλλοντος σχετικά με την διαχείριση αποβλήτων και την χρήση ανακυκλώσιμων προϊόντων στην ΕΕ

Ενόψει της πρωτοβουλίας των ευρωπαϊκών περιφερειών και της Ένωσης Πόλεων και Περιφερειών για την Ανακύκλωση και την Αειφόρο Διαχείριση Αποβλήτων, με τίτλο «Ευρωπαϊκή Εβδομάδα για τη Μείωση των Αποβλήτων», αναδείχθηκαν ζητήματα υγειονομικής ταφής των απορριμμάτων και δράσεις για την αύξηση της ανακύκλωσης. Παράλληλα, τέθηκαν προς συζήτηση θέματα όπως η μείωση της κατανάλωσης και της επαναχρησιμοποίησης ανακυκλώσιμων προϊόντων στα πλαίσια ενός διαλόγου για την δημιουργία μίας νέας προσέγγισης στην διαχείριση των αποβλήτων. Ο Επίτροπος Περιβάλλοντος, Janez Potočnik, δήλωσε πως «Υπάρχει τεράστια δυναμική στην επαναχρησιμοποίηση και στην ανακύκλωση των αποβλήτων. Έχουμε κάνει μεγάλη πρόοδο στην μείωση της υγειονομικής ταφής και της αύξησης της ανακύκλωσης». Παράλληλα, ο Επίτροπος διατύπωσε τον στόχο της Επιτροπής για την δημιουργία μιας κοινωνίας με μηδενικά απόβλητα.

Ερωτάται η Επιτροπή:

1. Διαθέτει στοιχεία σχετικά με την εφαρμογή στρατηγικών ανακύκλωσης στα κράτη μέλη; Διατίθενται αντίστοιχοι πίνακες αξιολόγησης σχετικά με την απορροφητικότητα των ευρωπαϊκών προγραμμάτων ανακύκλωσης από τα κράτη μέλη; Ποιά η περίπτωση της Ελλάδας;

2. Έχει καταθέσει προτάσεις στα κράτη μέλη σχετικά με την ενίσχυση της χρήσης ανακυκλώσιμων προϊόντων στην λογική της «κυκλικής οικονομίας», ενόψει της περιόδου 2014-2020;

Απάντηση του κ. Potočnik εξ ονόματος της Επιτροπής
(20 Μαρτίου 2014)

Η Επιτροπή παρακολουθεί τακτικά την εφαρμογή της νομοθεσίας για τα απόβλητα στα κράτη μέλη και τα εμπεριστατωμένα στοιχεία σχετικά με τη διαχείριση των αποβλήτων σε όλα τα κράτη μέλη είναι διαθέσιμα στο κοινό ([1]). Η τελευταία έκθεση ελέγχου ([2]) που εκπονήθηκε για λογαριασμό της Επιτροπής σχετικά με τη διαχείριση των αστικών αποβλήτων στα κράτη μέλη δείχνει ότι η Ελλάδα εξακολουθεί να βασίζεται κυρίως στην υγειονομική ταφή των αποβλήτων (82% το 2011), ενώ μόνο το 18% ανακυκλώνεται και δεν υπάρχει ανάκτηση ενέργειας.

Η Επιτροπή εξακολουθεί να θεσπίζει κριτήρια αποχαρακτηρισμού των αποβλήτων για ορισμένες κατηγορίες ροών αποβλήτων για να ενισχύσει την εμπορευσιμότητά τους. Τα ανακυκλώσιμα προϊόντα προωθούνται μέσω του προαιρετικού συστήματος για το οικολογικό σήμα και της πολιτικής των πράσινων δημόσιων συμβάσεων. Η Επιτροπή μελετά τη δυνατότητα να συμπεριληφθούν υποχρεωτικές απαιτήσεις αποδοτικότητας κατά τη χρήση των υλικών, όπως και ορισμένες πτυχές της ανακυκλωσιμότητας (π.χ. ευκολία αποσυναρμολόγησης, σήμανση των συστατικών στοιχείων, κ.λπ.) στα εκτελεστικά μέτρα της οδηγίας για τον οικολογικό σχεδιασμό σχετικά με συγκεκριμένα προϊόντα προτεραιότητας.

Η Επιτροπή θα παρουσιάσει στο εγγύς μέλλον μία νομοθετική πρωτοβουλία για την αποδοτική χρήση των πόρων και τα απόβλητα. Η πρωτοβουλία θα βασιστεί στην πρόοδο του χάρτη πορείας για μια αποδοτική, από πλευράς πόρων, Ευρώπη για την αξιοποίηση του οικονομικού δυναμικού της ΕΕ, ώστε να καταστεί πιο παραγωγική με τη χρήση λιγότερων πόρων. Η Επιτροπή θα επανεξετάσει τους βασικούς στόχους στη νομοθεσία της ΕΕ για τα απόβλητα και θα αναλύσει μηχανισμούς και μέσα (όπως η βιομηχανική συμβίωση, ο οικολογικός σχεδιασμός και η μίσθωση), προκειμένου να αυξηθεί η αναλογία των αποβλήτων που τίθενται εκ νέου σε παραγωγική χρήση μέσω των μοντέλων κυκλικής οικονομίας.

([1]) http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/waste/introduction
http://ec.europa.eu/environment/waste/reporting/index.htm
http://ec.europa.eu/environment/waste/framework/support_implementation.htm

([2]) http://ec.europa.eu/environment/waste/studies/pdf/Screening_report.pdf

(English version)

Question for written answer E-014433/13
to the Commission
Georgios Papanikolaou (PPE)
(23 December 2013)

Subject: Statements by the Commissioner for the Environment on waste management and the use of recyclable products in the EU

In the run-up to the initiative by the European regions and the Association of Cities and Regions for Recycling and Sustainable Resource Management entitled 'European Week for Waste Reduction', issues have been raised concerning landfills and action to increase recycling. At the same time, questions such as a reduction in consumption and the re-use of recyclable products have been tabled within the framework of a dialogue on the creation of a new approach to waste management. According to the Commissioner for the Environment Janez Potočnik, 'there is enormous potential in re-using and recycling waste. We are making great progress in reducing landfilling and increasing recycling'. At the same time, the Commissioner noted that the Commission's aim is to create a zero-waste society.

In view of the above, will the Commission say:

1. Does it have data on the application of recycling strategies in the Member States? Are evaluation tables available on the take-up of European recycling programmes by the Member States? Where does Greece stand?

2. Has it tabled proposals to the Member States to increase the use of recyclable products as part of a 'cyclical economy' in the run-up to the 2014-2020 period?

Answer given by Mr Potočnik on behalf of the Commission
(20 March 2014)

The Commission regularly monitors the implementation of waste legislation in the Member States and comprehensive data about waste management in all Member States is publicly available ([1]). The latest screening report ([2]) prepared for the Commission on the management of municipal waste in Member States shows that Greece still predominantly relies on the landfilling of waste (82% in 2011), with only 18% of recycling and no energy recovery.

The Commission continues to develop end-of-waste criteria for certain waste streams to enhance their marketability. Recyclable products are promoted through the voluntary Ecolabel scheme and the Green Public Procurement policy. The Commission is studying the feasibility of including mandatory material efficiency requirements, including some aspects of recyclability (e.g. ease of dismantlement, marking of components etc.) into implementing measures of the Ecodesign Directive related to specific priority products.

The Commission will present in the near future a legislative initiative on resource efficiency and waste. The initiative will build on progress of the Roadmap to Resource Efficient Europe in unlocking EU economic potential to be more productive whilst using fewer resources. It will review key targets in EU waste legislation and consider mechanisms and instruments (such as industrial symbiosis, ecodesign and leasing) to increase the proportion of waste being put back into productive use through circular economy models.

([1]) http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/waste/introduction
http://ec.europa.eu/environment/waste/reporting/index.htm
http://ec.europa.eu/environment/waste/framework/support_implementation.htm
([2]) http://ec.europa.eu/environment/waste/studies/pdf/Screening_report.pdf

(Versione italiana)

Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-014444/13
alla Commissione
Roberta Angelilli (PPE)
(23 dicembre 2013)

Oggetto: Adozioni internazionali — Famiglie italiane bloccate in Congo

26 famiglie italiane sono bloccate nella Repubblica democratica del Congo da quasi due mesi. Infatti, il 25 settembre 2013 le autorità congolesi hanno deciso di sospendere tutte le procedure di adozione internazionale già avviate, comprese quelle riguardanti genitori adottivi italiani. La situazione si è poi complicata e aggravata per il fatto che alcuni visti dei genitori italiani sono giunti a scadenza e altri lo saranno a breve.

Ne consegue che alcuni cittadini italiani potrebbero essere rimpatriati a breve, senza i figli che hanno adottato e che si aspettano di essere accolti dalla famiglia che considerano già la propria.

Il benessere di ogni bambino e la tutela degli interessi e dei diritti dei minori sono aspetti di assoluto rilievo e principi cardine dell'Unione europea.

Considerando che la tutela del diritto del minore a una vita famigliare e il far sì che i bambini non siano costretti a vivere in orfanotrofio sono elementi prioritari per il Parlamento europeo, ribaditi nella sua risoluzione del 19 gennaio 2011 sull'adozione internazionale nell'Unione europea, può la Commissione rispondere ai seguenti quesiti:

1. come intende fare chiarezza sulla situazione?

2. Quali iniziative intende porre in essere al fine di sbloccare tale situazione e permettere ai cittadini italiani di rientrare in Italia con i bambini adottati?

3. Quali iniziative intende promuovere al fine di creare un quadro legislativo chiaro nell'ambito delle adozioni internazionali?

Risposta di Viviane Reding a nome della Commissione
(12 marzo 2014)

Attualmente non vi è alcuna normativa dell'Unione europea sulle adozioni: la materia è disciplinata dalle legislazioni nazionali e dalle convenzioni internazionali. Di conseguenza, spetta alle autorità nazionali di ciascuno Stato membro dell'Unione stabilire regole per l'adozione, le misure preparatorie o i provvedimenti di annullamento.

In qualità di membro della Conferenza dell'Aia di diritto internazionale privato dal 2007, l'Unione europea è parte attiva nello sviluppo e nella promozione di strumenti giuridici multilaterali per la protezione dei diritti dei minori. In particolare, la Commissione controlla gli sviluppi relativi alla convenzione dell'Aia del 1993 sulla protezione dei minori e sulla cooperazione in materia di adozione internazionale, cui hanno aderito tutti gli Stati dell'Unione europea. Poiché la Repubblica democratica del Congo non ha sottoscritto la convenzione del 1993 ([1]), le garanzie previste da quest'ultima non possono applicarsi al caso in questione.

([1]) Attualmente, 93 Stati di tutto il mondo sono parti contraenti della convenzione dell'Aia del 1993: http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=conventions.status&cid=69

(English version)

Question for written answer E-014444/13
to the Commission
Roberta Angelilli (PPE)
(23 December 2013)

Subject: International adoptions — Italian families stranded in the Democratic Republic of Congo

On 25 September 2013, the Congolese authorities suspended all international adoption procedures that had already been initiated, including those involving prospective adoptive parents from Italy. As a result, 26 Italian families have now been stranded in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) for almost two months. The situation has now been further complicated by the fact that the visas of some of the Italian parents have expired, and others will do so in the near future.

Consequently, a number of Italian citizens could soon be forced to return to Italy without their adopted children, who have been looking forward to the day when they are welcomed into families which already regard them as one of their own.

The welfare of every child and the protection of children's interests and rights are two of the European Union's most fundamental principles.

Given that protecting a child's right to a family life and ensuring that no child is forced to live in an orphanage form two of the European Parliament's key priorities, as it reaffirmed in its resolution of 19 January 2011 on international adoption in the European Union, can the Commission answer the following questions:

1. How does it intend to clarify the situation?

2. What steps does it intend to take in order to resolve this situation and enable the Italian citizens currently stranded in the DRC to return to Italy with their adopted children?

3. How does it intend to foster the establishment of a clear legal framework on international adoptions?

Answer given by Mrs Reding on behalf of the Commission
(12 March 2014)

There is currently no European Union legislation on adoption. This matter is regulated by national laws and international conventions. This means that it is up to the national authorities in each EU Member State to establish rules regarding adoption, measures preparatory to adoption or its annulment.

As a member of the Hague Conference on Private International Law since 2007, the European Union is actively involved in developing and promoting multilateral legal instruments for the protection of children's rights. In particular, the Commission monitors in general the developments in relation to the 1993 Hague Convention on Protection of Children and Cooperation in Respect of Inter-country Adoption, to which all the Member States of the European Union are Party. The Democratic Republic of Congo is not a Party to the 1993 Convention ([1]) and therefore the guarantees provided by this Convention cannot be applied to the cases at stake.

([1]) To date, 93 States all over the world are Contracting Parties to the 1993 Hague Convention: http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=conventions.status&cid=69

(Deutsche Fassung)

Anfrage zur schriftlichen Beantwortung E-014453/13
an die Kommission
Andreas Mölzer (NI)
(23. Dezember 2013)

Betrifft: Abcashen bei Beratung für die Troika

Jene Länder, die unter den EU-Rettungsschirm geschlüpft sind, erhalten regelmäßig Besuch von der Troika, bestehend aus Experten der EU, der Europäischen Zentralbank (EZB) und dem Internationalen Währungsfonds (IWF). Wie ein europäisches Journalisten-Netzwerk recherchiert hat, kostete die angeforderte externe Beratung die Steuerzahler der Krisenländer bisher mehr als 80 Millionen EUR.

Um herauszufinden, wie viel Geld die ins Straucheln geratenen Länder brauchen, um einen Zahlungsausfall zu verhindern, werden anscheinend unabhängige Consultingfirmen von der Troika beauftragt. Die Consulter sollen den Zuschlag oft ohne öffentliche Ausschreibung erhalten.

1. Werden tatsächlich trotz der großen Anzahl an Experten der EU, der EZB und des IWF externe Consultingfirmen im Rahmen der Troika-Arbeiten beauftragt?

2. Falls ja: Wie viel wurde bis dato für diese Aufträge ausgegeben und wer kommt für diese Ausgaben auf?

3. Werden diese Aufträge tatsächlich ohne öffentliche Ausschreibungen vergeben?

4. Wie sieht es in diesem Zusammenhang mit der Haftung aus?

Antwort von Herrn Rehn im Namen der Kommission
(24. März 2014)

Die Ausarbeitung eines finanziellen Anpassungsprogramms ist eine komplexe Aufgabe, die in relativ kurzer Zeit durchgeführt werden muss. Das bei sehr spezifischen finanziellen Fragen erforderliche hohe Maß an Fachkenntnissen zwang die betreffenden Regierungen in einigen Fällen, externe Beratung hinzuzuziehen.

Die Überprüfung der Qualität von Bankenaktiva zählt zu den aufsichtsbehördlichen Aufgaben. Die Entscheidung darüber, ob hier auf externe Berater zurückgegriffen werden soll, obliegt in letzter Instanz den betreffenden Mitgliedstaaten. Dies gilt auch für die Abwicklung des Auswahlverfahrens, deren vollständige Kontrolle bei den Regierungen der begünstigten Mitgliedstaaten liegt, sowie für jede zugehörige Entgeltvereinbarung. Jedoch besteht die Kommission, wie in allen anderen Fällen, auch hier auf die ordnungsgemäße Anwendung der EU-Vorschriften für die Auftragsvergabe. Externe Berater sind an den sich daraus ergebenden politischen Maßnahmen weder innerhalb noch außerhalb des Programms beteiligt.

In der Regel besitzen die jeweiligen nationalen Aufsichtsbehörden die benötigten Fachkenntnisse. Ist der Bankensektor allerdings von einer schweren Krise betroffen, stellen die jeweiligen Marktteilnehmer die Qualität und Unparteilichkeit der zuständigen Aufsichtsbehörden üblicherweise in Frage. Diese Zweifel können größere makrofinanzielle Risiken hervorrufen. Die Troika-Partner verfügen nicht über die notwendigen Kapazitäten, um den Bankensektor bei Bedarf einer Prüfung in großem Maßstab zu unterziehen. Die Einbindung externer Berater ermöglicht daher die nötige unabhängige Beurteilung für eine klare und fristgerechte Bewertung der größten Probleme der Kreditinstitute und sichert den Marktteilnehmer und der breiten Öffentlichkeit die Unparteilichkeit einer solchen Prüfung zu.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-014453/13
to the Commission
Andreas Mölzer (NI)
(23 December 2013)

Subject: Cashing in on consultancy for the Troika

The countries which have resorted to a bail-out by the EU are regularly visited by the Troika, consisting of experts from the EU, the European Central Bank (ECB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). As a European network of journalists has discovered, the external consulting commissioned has to date cost the taxpayers of the countries affected by the crisis more than EUR 80 million.

It appears that independent consulting firms are being given contracts by the Troika to establish how much money the countries that have got into difficulties require in order to prevent a payment default. It is said that the consultants are often awarded contracts without any public tender procedure.

1. Are contracts really given to external consulting firms in connection with the work of the Troika, despite the large number of experts at the EU, the ECB and the IMF?

2. If so: how much has to date been spent on these contracts and who bears these costs?

3. Are these contracts really awarded without any public tender procedures?

4. What is the position here as far as liability is concerned?

Answer given by Mr Rehn on behalf of the Commission
(24 March 2014)

Designing a financial adjustment programme is a complex task which has to be carried out in a relatively short period of time. In some cases, the high level of expertise needed to address very specific financial issues required national government to resort to external consultancies.

Asset Quality Reviews (AQRs) are supervisory tasks and it is the ultimate responsibility of the Member States concerned to contract for advisory services. This also applies to the handling of the selection process which is fully under the control of the governments of beneficiary Member States and any agreement on fees involved, but, as in any other case, the Commission always insist on the thorough application of EU procurement rules. External consultants are not involved in the design of the ensuing policy response within, or outside, the context of the programme.

Relevant expertise is normally available within respective national supervisors. But in the context of a severe crisis of the banking sector market participants typically question the quality and impartiality of prudential oversight of competent supervisors. Such doubts may give rise to major macro-financial risk. While Troika partners do not have the necessary capacity to necessarily quickly carry out large-scale banking sector assessments, the use of external consultants provides for a degree of independence of appreciation that is necessary to obtain a clear and timely assessment of the main problems in credit institutions and to reassure market participants and the broader public of the impartiality of such assessment.

(Ελληνική έκδοση)

Ερώτηση με αίτημα γραπτής απάντησης E-014461/13
προς την Επιτροπή
Nikolaos Chountis (GUE/NGL)
(23 Δεκεμβρίου 2013)

Θέμα: Μη εξυπηρετούμενα δάνεια στα τραπεζικά συστήματα της Ευρώπης και της Ελλάδας

Σύμφωνα με έκθεση της PricewaterhouseCooper (PwC), το ευρωπαϊκό χρηματοοικονομικό σύστημα απειλείται από την εκτίναξη του όγκου των μη εξυπηρετούμενων δανείων σε όλη την Ευρώπη. Πιο συγκεκριμένα, ο διεθνής οικονομικός οίκος εκτιμά ότι το ύψος των μη εξυπηρετούμενων δανείων στις ευρωπαϊκές τράπεζες, στο τέλος του 2012, βρισκόταν στα 1,2 τρισ. ευρώ, με τη Γερμανία και την Ισπανία να κατέχουν τις πρώτες θέσεις σε απόλυτους αριθμούς. Επίσης, σημαντικές είναι οι πιέσεις των κόκκινων δανείων στα τραπεζικά συστήματα των χωρών που πλήττονται από την οικονομική κρίση, αφού τα μη εξυπηρετούμενα δάνεια παρουσίασαν αύξηση, από το 2008 μέχρι το 2012, 153% στην Ισπανία, 197% στην Ιταλία, 240% στην Πορτογαλία, 366% στην Ελλάδα και 800% στην Ιρλανδία.

Ωστόσο, πίσω από τη σταθερότητα του χρηματοπιστωτικού συστήματος και από τους αριθμούς των μη εξυπηρετούμενων δανείων υπάρχουν εργαζόμενοι, άνεργοι, συνταξιούχοι, μικρές και μεσαίες επιχειρήσεις κ.ά., που έχουν ήδη απολέσει μεγάλο ποσοστό του εισοδήματός τους, λόγω της οικονομικής κρίσης και των πολιτικών λιτότητας που επιβάλλει η ΕΕ και κινδυνεύουν τώρα να χάσουν ακόμα και τις περιουσίες τους, εξαιτίας των κατασχέσεων των τραπεζών.

Με δεδομένο ότι οι πολιτικές της ανακεφαλαιοποίησης των ευρωπαϊκών τραπεζών και της επιβολής ρυθμίσεων σταθεροποίησης έχουν δημιουργήσει έντονες υφεσιακές πιέσεις στις ευρωπαϊκές οικονομίες, χωρίς να έχουν δημιουργήσει σταθερότητα στο τραπεζικό σύστημα, ερωτάται η Επιτροπή:

1. Πώς σχολιάζει τις ανησυχίες του εν λόγω οίκου για την εκτίναξη των κόκκινων δανείων;

2. Έχει στη διάθεσή της στοιχεία για το ύψος των μη εξυπηρετούμενων δανείων στην Ευρωπαϊκή Ένωση και σε κάθε κράτος μέλος ξεχωριστά; Ποιες είναι οι προβλέψεις της για την πορεία των «κόκκινων δανείων» για το 2013 και 2014;

3. Τι σενάρια επεξεργάζεται η Ευρωπαϊκή Επιτροπή προκειμένου να αρθούν οι κίνδυνοι, οικονομικοί και κοινωνικοί, από τη συνεχιζόμενη αύξηση των κόκκινων δανείων στο ευρωπαϊκό τραπεζικό σύστημα;

Απάντηση του κ. Rehn εξ ονόματος της Επιτροπής
(17 Μαρτίου 2014)

Η Επιτροπή έχει την πεποίθηση ότι ένα εύρωστο και υγιές χρηματοπιστωτικό σύστημα είναι καθοριστικής σημασίας για την επανενεργοποίηση της ροής των πιστώσεων και για την ανάκαμψη της πραγματικής οικονομίας στην ΕΕ.

Η σταθερότητα των προγραμμάτων χρηματοδοτικής βοήθειας αποσκοπεί στην εξασφάλιση των χρηματοπιστωτικών συστημάτων. Άλλα μέτρα έχουν εφαρμοστεί για σημαντικές τράπεζες, όπως το σχέδιο ανακεφαλαιοποίησης της ΕΑΤ και η συνολική αξιολόγηση της ΕΚΤ που θα διεξαχθεί το 2014.

Τα δεδομένα σχετικά με τα μη εξυπηρετούμενα δάνεια που δημοσιοποιούνται από τις κεντρικές τράπεζες, τις εθνικές εποπτικές αρχές ή τις τράπεζες, αλλά η Επιτροπή δεν προβαίνει σε προβλέψεις ως προς την εξέλιξη των μη εξυπηρετούμενων δανείων στις τράπεζες. Υπό το νέο ρόλο της ως μοναδικής αρχής εποπτείας, η ΕΚΤ θα παρακολουθεί στενά την εξέλιξη των μη εξυπηρετούμενων δανείων της ζώνης του ευρώ.

Επιπλέον, η Επιτροπή εξέδωσε το 2012 την ανακοίνωση «Μια νέα ευρωπαϊκή προσέγγιση για την επιχειρηματική αποτυχία και την αφερεγγυότητα». Στη συνέχεια δρομολογήθηκε δημόσια διαβούλευση στα τέλη του 2013 για την κατάθεση απόψεων σχετικά με την ανάγκη και τη σκοπιμότητα εναρμόνισης ορισμένων πτυχών της νομοθεσίας περί αφερεγγυότητας. Η Επιτροπή έχει επίγνωση των κοινωνικών επιπτώσεων της ανεργίας και της φτώχειας. Ως εκ τούτου, η Επιτροπή έχει προωθήσει διάφορες πρωτοβουλίες για την αντιμετώπιση αυτών των προβλημάτων, συμπεριλαμβάνοντας την πρωτοβουλία για την απασχόληση των νέων, που εγκρίθηκε πέρυσι από το Ευρωπαϊκό Συμβούλιο.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-014461/13
to the Commission
Nikolaos Chountis (GUE/NGL)
(23 December 2013)

Subject: Non-performing loans in the banking systems of Europe and Greece

According to a report by PricewaterhouseCooper (PwC), the European financial system is threatened by the surge in the volume of non-performing loans across Europe. To be more precise, the international financial group estimates that the level of non-performing loans in European banks at the end of 2012 stood at EUR 1.2 trillion, with Germany and Spain holding the top positions in absolute terms. The pressure exercised by non-performing loans on the banking systems of countries affected by the economic crisis is also significant, as they increased, during the period from 2008 to 2012, by 153%, 197%, 240%, 366% and 800% in Spain, Italy, Portugal, Greece and Ireland, respectively.

However, behind the stability of the financial system and the non-performing loans, there are employed and unemployed individuals, pensioners, small and medium-sized businesses and others who have already lost a large percentage of their income due to the economic crisis and the austerity policies imposed by the EU, and who are now faced with the risk of losing their belongings because of bank foreclosures.

Given that the policies for the recapitalisation of European banks and the imposition of stabilisation regulations have created strong recessionary pressures on European economies, without creating stability within the banking system:

1. What are the Commission's views on the concerns expressed by PwC regarding the steep increase of 'bad debts'?

2. Does it have information on the volume of non-performing loans in the European Union and in each individual Member State? What are its predictions regarding the development of 'bad debts' in 2013 and 2014?

3. What possible solutions are being considered by the European Commission with a view to eliminating the economic and social risks arising from the continued increase in 'bad debts' in the framework of the European banking system?

Answer given by Mr Rehn on behalf of the Commission
(17 March 2014)

The Commission believes that a sound and healthy financial system is key for the reactivation of credit flow and for the recovery of the real economy within the EU.

Stability of the financial assistance programmes aim at ensuring financial systems. Other measures have been implemented for significant banks such as the EBA recapitalisation plan and the ECB comprehensive assessment to be conducted in 2014.

Data on non-performing loans are made public by Central Banks, national supervisors or banks but the Commission does not forecast the evolution of NPLs in banks. The ECB in its new role as a single supervisor will closely monitor the trend of EA banks' NPLs.

In addition, the Commission adopted in 2012 a communication 'A new European approach to business failure and insolvency'. As a follow-up a public consultation was launched at the end of 2013 to acquire views on the need for and feasibility of harmonising some aspects of insolvency law. The Commission is aware about the social impact of unemployment and poverty. Hence, the Commission has promoted several initiatives to tackle these problems, including the Youth Employment Initiative adopted last year by the European Council.

(Ελληνική έκδοση)

Ερώτηση με αίτημα γραπτής απάντησης E-014462/13
προς την Επιτροπή
Nikolaos Chountis (GUE/NGL)
(23 Δεκεμβρίου 2013)

Θέμα: Προνοιακό επίδομα και ιατροφαρμακευτική περίθαλψη για ανασφάλιστους υπερήλικες στην Ελλάδα

Στην ερώτησή μου αρ. E-001910/2013, είχα αναφερθεί στην απαράδεκτη πρόβλεψη του ελληνικού νόμου 4093/2012, που με τους όρους που έθετε στερούσε μια ελάχιστη σύνταξη/προνοιακό επίδομα, από ανασφάλιστους υπερήλικες που ήρθαν στην Ελλάδα από χώρες της πρώην ΕΣΣΔ και την Αλβανία και απέκτησαν ελληνική υπηκοότητα. Η Επιτροπή τότε μου είχε απαντήσει ότι «η περιγραφόμενη κατάσταση δεν φαίνεται να εμπίπτει στο πεδίο εφαρμογής της οδηγίας 2000/43» και ότι «δεν έχει αρμοδιότητα να παρέμβει στη συγκεκριμένη περίπτωση». Επανέρχομαι όμως και ξαναζητάω από την Επιτροπή να επανεξετάσει το σοβαρό αυτό ζήτημα, καθώς οι άνθρωποι αυτοί όχι απλά θα αναγκαστούν να επιβιώσουν με περίπου 100 ευρώ τον μήνα, που είναι μια σύνταξη π.χ. Αλβανίας, αλλά, από το 2014, θα μείνουν στην πράξη χωρίς ιατροφαρμακευτική περίθαλψη, αφού με το παραπάνω εισόδημα θα είναι αδύνατο να πληρώσουν έστω και 48,29 ευρώ μηνιαίως για να ασφαλιστούν στο ΙΚΑ.

Το θέμα τέθηκε και σε Διαμεσολάβηση του Συνηγόρου του Πολίτη της Ελλάδας (Αρ. Πρωτ. 163203/17875/2013) όπου διαπιστώνεται, μεταξύ άλλων, και παραβίαση του κοινοτικού δικαίου. Σύμφωνα με τον Συνήγορο του Πολίτη, ο καθορισμός της διάρκειας προηγούμενης διαμονής στην χώρα για 20 έτη έρχεται σε αντίθεση με τις γενικότερες διατάξεις του ενωσιακού δικαίου και τη νομολογία εφαρμογής του. Ο Συνήγορος, επικαλούμενος, μεταξύ άλλων, την οδηγία 2004/38 (σχετικά με την ελεύθερη κυκλοφορία των πολιτών της Ένωσης και των μελών της οικογενείας τους), αναφέρει ότι έχει διαμορφωθεί στο ενωσιακό δίκαιο ένας γενικότερος κανόνας, σύμφωνα με τον οποίο η προηγούμενη πενταετής μόνιμη και νόμιμη διαμονή ενός προσώπου σε κράτος μέλος συνεπάγεται … το δικαίωμά του για πρόσβαση σε μη ανταποδοτικές παροχές κοινωνικής αλληλεγγύης.

Με δεδομένα τα παραπάνω, ερωτάται η Επιτροπή: Σκοπεύει άμεσα να εξετάσει αν υπάρχει παραβίαση του κοινοτικού δικαίου; Αν ναι, προτίθεται άμεσα να παρέμβει προς τις ελληνικές αρχές; Ποια η διάρκεια προηγούμενης διαμονής που θέτουν οι χώρες μέλη για την απονομή σύνταξης/προνοιακού επιδόματος ανασφάλιστου υπερηλίκου και ασφάλειας υγείας;

Απάντηση της κ. Reding εξ ονόματος της Επιτροπής
(12 Μαρτίου 2014)

Στη γνωμοδότηση που αναφέρει ο κ. βουλευτής, ο Έλληνας Συνήγορος του Πολίτη επισημαίνει το γεγονός ότι ορισμένες πτυχές του νόμου 4093/2012 είναι ασυμβίβαστες τόσο με διάφορες διατάξεις της Ευρωπαϊκής Σύμβασης για τα ανθρώπινα δικαιώματα, όσο και με το ελληνικό Σύνταγμα, και προτείνει στον Έλληνα νομοθέτη δυνατότητες τροποποίησής τους.

Σχετικά με το θέμα της ελάχιστης περιόδου μόνιμης διαμονής στην επικράτεια, το οποίο αποτελεί την προϋπόθεση για τη χορήγηση προνοιακών επιδομάτων σε ανασφάλιστους υπερήλικες, ο Συνήγορος του Πολίτη βασίζεται σε ορισμένους κανόνες της ΕΕ (που περιλαμβάνονται στην οδηγία 2004/38/ΕΚ σχετικά με την ελεύθερη κυκλοφορία των πολιτών της Ένωσης, και στην οδηγία 2003/109/ΕΚ σχετικά με τους επί μακρόν διαμένοντες υπηκόους τρίτων χωρών), από τους οποίους συνάγει γενικές κατευθύνσεις που, κατά τη γνώμη του, θα πρέπει να καθοδηγούν τον νομοθέτη, ακόμη και όταν αυτός ρυθμίζει περιπτώσεις που δεν εμπίπτουν στο προσωπικό πεδίο εφαρμογής του δικαίου της Ένωσης. Πράγματι, ο Συνήγορος του Πολίτη αναφέρει στη γνωμοδότησή του ότι, ελλείψει στοιχείων διασυνοριακής κυκλοφορίας εντός της ΕΕ, η κατάσταση των Ελλήνων πολιτών και όσων έχουν έρθει στην Ελλάδα από την Αλβανία και άλλες τρίτες χώρες και έχουν αποκτήσει την ελληνική ιθαγένεια, δεν εμπίπτει στο πεδίο εφαρμογής του δικαίου της ΕΕ.

Η εν λόγω γνωμοδότηση δεν θέτει θέμα άνισης μεταχείρισης βάσει φυλετικής ή εθνοτικής καταγωγής, η οποία θα ενέπιπτε στο πεδίο εφαρμογής της οδηγίας 2000/43/ΕΚ για τη φυλετική ισότητα, ούτε περιέχει κάποια ένδειξη ότι η ελληνική νομοθεσία εφαρμόζει το δίκαιο της Ένωσης, με αποτέλεσμα να καθιστά εφαρμοστέο τον Χάρτη των θεμελιωδών δικαιωμάτων.

Ως εκ τούτου, η εν λόγω γνωμοδότηση δεν περιέχει κανένα νέο στοιχείο που να επηρεάζει την αξιολόγηση της Επιτροπής (απάντηση στην ερώτηση E-1910/2013), σύμφωνα με την οποία η περιγραφόμενη κατάσταση δεν φαίνεται να εμπίπτει στο πεδίο εφαρμογής της νομοθεσίας της ΕΕ.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-014462/13
to the Commission
Nikolaos Chountis (GUE/NGL)
(23 December 2013)

Subject: Welfare benefits and healthcare for uninsured elderly persons in Greece

In my Question E-001910/2013, I referred to the unacceptable provisions of Greek Law 4093/2012, which are depriving uninsured elderly persons — who have come to Greece from former USSR countries and Albania and who have acquired Greek citizenship — of minimum pension/welfare benefits. In its answer, the Commission stated that 'the situation described does not appear to fall within the scope of Directive 2000/43', and that 'it has no power to intervene in this case'. I am nevertheless raising this major issue again for reconsideration by the Commission, as those affected will not only be forced to survive on approximately EUR 100 per month (the pension entitlement in countries such as Albania), but, from 2014 onwards, they will effectively be left without healthcare, since the above amount will leave them unable to afford even the monthly Social Security Institute (IKA) premium of EUR 48.29.

The issue was also raised by the Greek Ombudsman (163203/17875/2013) who also maintained that EC law was being infringed. According to the Ombudsman, the 20-year residence requirement is at odds with the general provisions of EC law and the relevant implementing case-law. Citing, *inter alia*, Directive 2004/38/EC (on the free movement of Union citizens and their family members), the Ombudsman notes that a more general principle has been adopted under EC law, under which, permanent and legal residence in a Member State for a period of five years entitles those concerned to non-contributory social security benefits.

In view of this, does the Commission intend to examine immediately whether the denial of benefits constitutes an infringement of EC law and, if so, does it intend to make immediate representations to the Greek authorities? What is the residence requirement in the individual Member States governing the entitlement to pensions/welfare benefits and health cover for elderly persons who are uninsured?

Answer given by Mrs Reding on behalf of the Commission
(12 March 2014)

In the opinion referred to by the Honourable Member, the Greek Ombudsman draws attention to the fact that certain aspects of Law 4093/2012 are incompatible with different provisions of the European Convention on Human Rights and the Greek Constitution and provides suggestions to the Greek legislator for amendments.

On the issue of the minimum period of permanent residence in the territory that conditions the granting of welfare benefits to uninsured elderly people, the Ombudsman draws from certain EU rules (contained in Directives 2004/38/EC, on the free movement of Union citizens, and 2003/109/EC, on long-term resident third-country nationals) general orientations which, in his view, should guide the legislator 'even when regulating situations which do not fall within the personal scope of Union law'. Indeed, it is indicated in this opinion that, in the absence of elements of cross-border movement within the EU, the situation of Greek citizens and those who have come to Greece from Albania and other third countries and have acquired Greek citizenship does not fall within the scope of EC law.

This opinion does not point to any issue of discrimination on the basis of racial or ethnic origin that would fall under Directive 2000/43/EC on racial equality nor does it contain any indication that the Greek law is implementing Union law, thus making applicable the Charter of Fundamental Rights.

This opinion does not therefore contain any new element affecting the assessment by the Commission (reply to Question E-1910/2013), according to which the situation described does not appear to fall within the scope of EC law.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-014469/13
to the Commission
Sir Graham Watson (ALDE)
(23 December 2013)

Subject: Defamation laws

Free speech is the foundation on which modern Europe is built.

The Council of Europe's European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms guarantees freedom of expression (under its Article 10) in respect not only of 'information' or 'ideas' that are favourably received or regarded as inoffensive or as a matter of indifference, but also of those that offend, shock or disturb. Freedom of expression is not unlimited: it may prove necessary for the state to intervene in a democratic society, provided that there is a solid legal basis and that such intervention is clearly in the public interest, in accordance with Article 10(2) of the Convention.

The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union also enshrines in EC law certain political, social, and economic rights for EU citizens and residents, and this includes freedom of expression under its Article 11. This means that the EU must legislate consistently with the Charter, the same applying to Member States when implementing EC law.

Anti-defamation laws pursue the legitimate aim of protecting the reputation and rights of others. However, it remains the case that in a number of Member States actions in this field are pursued and prosecuted via the criminal rather than the civil law.

Notwithstanding the Union's limited competence in the area of criminal law (as defined under Article 83 TFEU), what steps are being undertaken at Community level to encourage all Member States to decriminalise defamation?

Answer given by Mrs Reding on behalf of the Commission
(12 March 2014)

According to Article 51 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, the Charter is only binding on Member States when they are implementing Union law.

There are currently no plans at Union level to regulate the decriminalisation of defamation. Member State laws and policies differ considerably with regard to the rules and procedures concerning defamation.

(Ελληνική έκδοση)

Ερώτηση με αίτημα γραπτής απάντησης E-000004/14
προς την Επιτροπή
Antigoni Papadopoulou (S&D)
(3 Ιανουαρίου 2014)

Θέμα: Ραγδαία επιδείνωση της οικονομικής και κοινωνικής κατάστασης στην Κύπρο

Πρόσφατη έρευνα του Κυπριακού Ινστιτούτου Στατιστικολόγων (ΚΙΣ) καταδεικνύει ότι περίπου το 6,0% του πληθυσμού της Κύπρου, ηλικίας άνω των 18 ετών, τυγχάνει βοήθειας από Δημοτικά ή Κοινοτικά Παντοπωλεία ή άλλες παρόμοιες οργανώσεις αρωγής. Αυτό οφείλεται στη ραγδαία επιδείνωση της οικονομικής κατάστασης και της αύξησης της ανεργίας, εξαιτίας της οποίας πολλοί πολίτες αδυνατούν να εξασφαλίσουν έστω και βασικά τρόφιμα για την επιβίωση τους.

Ερωτάται η Επιτροπή:

— Συμφωνεί με την άποψη που εκφράζεται ευρύτατα στην Κύπρο ότι οι πολιτικές λιτότητας, που εφαρμόζονται στα πλαίσια του Μνημονίου, αυξάνουν κατακόρυφα το οικονομικό και κοινωνικό κόστος της κρίσης;

— Πώς μπορούν οι αναξιοπαθούντες πολίτες της Κύπρου να επωφεληθούν από τυχόν ευρωπαϊκά προγράμματα στήριξης;

— Προτίθεται η Επιτροπή να εισαγάγει νέα προγράμματα στήριξης των πολιτών, οι οποίοι λόγω της κρίσης αδυνατούν να ικανοποιήσουν έστω και τις πλέον βασικές τους ανάγκες;

Απάντηση του κ. Rehn εξ ονόματος της Επιτροπής
(17 Μαρτίου 2014)

Το πρόγραμμα οικονομικής προσαρμογής για την Κύπρο δίνει έμφαση στον σημαντικό ρόλο των δικτύων ασφαλείας και λαμβάνει υπόψη την ανάγκη για την ελαχιστοποίηση των επιπτώσεων προς τις ευάλωτες ομάδες. Για τον σκοπό αυτό, οι κυπριακές αρχές έχουν ξεκινήσει ένα σχέδιο μεταρρυθμίσεων του συστήματος πρόνοιας που αποσκοπεί στην αύξηση της αποδοτικότητας και της αποτελεσματικότητας, κυρίως παρέχοντας ένα ελάχιστο εγγυημένο εισόδημα (GMI), το οποίο θα αντικαταστήσει το ισχύον σύστημα πρόνοιας και θα επεκτείνει την κάλυψη αυτή για να καλύψει επίσης και αυτούς που δεν καλύπτονται επί του παρόντος από το δημόσιο σύστημα πρόνοιας (δηλαδή, τους φτωχούς εργαζομένους, τους αυτοαπασχολούμενους που εισέρχονται στην ανεργία και τους νέους ανέργους πτυχιούχους).

Η πρωτοβουλία για την απασχόληση των νέων σκοπό έχει να διευκολύνει τη δημιουργία θέσεων εργασίας και την είσοδο των νέων στην αγορά εργασίας και να συμβάλει στη μείωση της ανεργίας των νέων. Επιπλέον, ένα νέο μέσο, το Ταμείο για την ευρωπαϊκή βοήθεια προς τους απόρους, θα παρέχει υλική βοήθεια που θα συμβάλλει στη μείωση της φτώχειας. Η Επιτροπή έχει επίσης δημιουργήσει μία ομάδα στήριξης για την Κύπρο, η οποία στοχεύει στο να βοηθήσει την Κύπρο να μειώσει τις κοινωνικές συνέπειες της οικονομικής κρίσης με την κινητοποίηση των κεφαλαίων αυτών από τα μέσα της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-000004/14
to the Commission
Antigoni Papadopoulou (S&D)
(3 January 2014)

Subject: Rapid deterioration of the economic and social situation in Cyprus

A recent survey carried out by the Cyprus Institute of Statisticians shows that approximately 6.0% of the population over 18 years old receives aid from municipal or communal food banks or other similar welfare organisations. This is due to the rapid deterioration of the economic situation and the rise in unemployment, leaving many Cypriot citizens unable to afford even the staple foods necessary for survival.

Will the Commission say:

— Does it agree with the view expressed widely in Cyprus that austerity policies implemented under the memorandum of understanding (MoU) are sharply exacerbating the social and economic cost of the crisis?

— How can the hard pressed Cypriot citizens obtain relief from any of the EU support programmes?

— Does the Commission intend to introduce new support programmes for citizens who are unable to cover even their most basic needs due to the crisis?

Answer given by Mr Rehn on behalf of the Commission
(17 March 2014)

The economic adjustment programme for Cyprus puts emphasis on the crucial role of safety nets and takes into consideration the need to minimise the impact on vulnerable groups. To this end, the Cypriot authorities have embarked on a reform plan of the welfare system aimed at increasing its efficiency and effectiveness, notably by providing a guaranteed minimum income (GMI) scheme, which will replace the current public assistance scheme and expand its coverage to cover also those currently not covered by the public assistance scheme (i.e., the working poor, the self-employed entering unemployment, and young unemployed graduates).

The Youth Employment Initiative aims to faciliate job creation and the entrance of youth to the labour market and help reduce the youth unemployment. In addition, a new instrument, the Fund for European Aid to the Most Deprived, will provide material aid contributing to reducing poverty. The Commission has also set up a Support Group for Cyprus whose aim is to assist Cyprus in alliviating the social consequences of the economic shock by mobilising these funds from European Union instruments.

(Ελληνική έκδοση)

Ερώτηση με αίτημα γραπτής απάντησης E-000006/14
προς την Επιτροπή
Antigoni Papadopoulou (S&D)
(3 Ιανουαρίου 2014)

Θέμα: Κριτική σε Τρόικα και Eurogroup

Στο αρχικό συμπέρασμα του προσχεδίου έκθεσης του Ευρωπαϊκού Κοινοβουλίου οι συντάκτες της έκθεσης Ότμαρ Κάρας (ΕΛΚ) και Λιέμ Χοάνγκ Νγκοκ (Σ&Δ) καταλήγουν ότι τόσο η Τρόικα όσο και το Eurogroup, πρέπει να λογοδοτούν στους ευρωπαϊκούς θεσμούς για τα προγράμματα στήριξης, προκειμένου να τεκμηριώνουν με μεγαλύτερη διαφάνεια και επιστημονική επάρκεια τις παρεμβάσεις πολιτικής που ζητούν στα κράτη μέλη όπου εφαρμόζονται μνημόνια.

Ερωτάται η Επιτροπή:

— Σε ποια νομική βάση στηρίχθηκε η σύσταση της Τρόικας;

— Θεωρεί σωστή την επιλογή της Επιτροπής να μετέχει στην Τρόικα, όντας ταυτόχρονα και θεσμικό όργανο της Ένωσης;

— Ποια δημοκρατικά ελλείμματα και αδυναμίες εντοπίζει η ίδια η Επιτροπή στα προγράμματα προσαρμογής όσον αφορά τη διαφάνεια και τη λογοδοσία; Προτίθεται να αναθεωρήσει τους δημοσιονομικούς πολλαπλασιαστές στους οποίους βασίζονται οι υποθέσεις επί των οποίων έχουν καταρτιστεί τα προγράμματα στήριξης;

— Γιατί δεν λήφθηκαν υπόψη οι επιπτώσεις των εφαρμοζόμενων δημοσιονομικών πολιτικών στην Ελλάδα και στα υπόλοιπα κράτη μέλη; Γιατί παρά την ελεγχόμενη χρεοκοπία της Ελλάδας, δεν εμποδίστηκε η μετάδοση της κρίσης στα υπόλοιπα κράτη μέλη;

— Πώς αξιολογεί η Επιτροπή τα αποτελέσματα των μέχρι σήμερα εφαρμοζόμενων «διασώσεων» στις χώρες των μνημονίων ξεχωριστά;

Απάντηση του κ. Rehn εξ ονόματος της Επιτροπής
(17 Μαρτίου 2014)

Ο κανονισμός αριθ. 472/2013 του Ευρωπαϊκού Κοινοβουλίου και του Συμβουλίου επικύρωσε επίσημα τη συμμετοχή της Επιτροπής, της ΕΚΤ και του ΔΝΤ σε χώρες του προγράμματος, επίσης και σε σχέση με την υποχρέωση λογοδοσίας έναντι του Ευρωπαϊκού Κοινοβουλίου και των εθνικών κοινοβουλίων.

Ο ρόλος της Επιτροπής στο πλαίσιο των προηγούμενων προγραμμάτων χρηματοδοτικής βοήθειας είναι να ενεργεί εξ ονόματος των κρατών μελών της ζώνης του ευρώ. Στο πλαίσιο αυτό, η τελική απόφαση για την παροχή οικονομικής βοήθειας και τους όρους παροχής βοήθειας δεσμεύει τους δανειστές. Τα προγράμματα χρηματοδοτικής βοήθειας αποτέλεσαν αντικείμενο διαπραγμάτευσης με τις κυρίαρχες κυβερνήσεις των δικαιούχων κρατών μελών που λογοδοτούν πλήρως ενώπιον των εθνικών κοινοβουλίων.

Σε συνθήκες κρίσης, οι συνήθεις δημοσιονομικοί πολλαπλασιαστές δεν προσφέρουν αξιόπιστη βάση για τις οικονομικές και δημοσιονομικές προβλέψεις. Οι δημοσιονομικοί πολλαπλασιαστές τείνουν να είναι μεγαλύτεροι στην παρούσα συγκυρία.

Τα προγράμματα οικονομικής βοήθειας απέτρεψαν την ανεξέλεγκτη χρεοκοπία ενός κράτους μέλους, αποφεύγοντας πολύ πιο σοβαρές και αιφνίδιες κοινωνικές συνέπειες, και περιόρισαν την εξάπλωση. Ο κοινωνικός αντίκτυπος των πολιτικών απετέλεσε το κύριο μέλημα κατά τον σχεδιασμό πολιτικών στις χώρες του προγράμματος, που αντικατοπτρίζεται στα μνημόνια συνεννόησης ([1]).

Οι αξιολογήσεις της Επιτροπής σχετικά με την εφαρμογή των προγραμμάτων μπορούν να αναζητηθούν στις τακτικές εκθέσεις συμμόρφωσης, οι οποίες είναι διαθέσιμες στον δικτυακό τόπο της Επιτροπής:
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/occasional_paper/index_en.htm

Η Επιτροπή δημοσίευσε τις απαντήσεις της στο ερωτηματολόγιο που αφορά την έκθεση πρωτοβουλίας του Κοινοβουλίου στη διεύθυνση:
http://ec.europa.eu/commission_2010-2014/rehn/documents/troika_questionnaire_2014_en.pdf

Ο αντιπρόεδρος της Επιτροπής, αρμόδιος για τις οικονομικές και νομισματικές υποθέσεις και το ευρώ, είχε ακρόαση από την επιτροπή ECON σχετικά με αυτό το θέμα, στις 13.1.2014, στο Στρασβούργο.

([1]) Μνημόνιο συνεννόησης.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-000006/14
to the Commission
Antigoni Papadopoulou (S&D)
(3 January 2014)

Subject: Criticism of the Troika and the Eurogroup

In the preliminary conclusion of the Parliament's draft report, the rapporteurs Othmar Karas (EPP) and Liem Hoang Ngoc (S&D) conclude that both the Troika and the Eurogroup must report to EU institutions with regard to support programmes so as to provide more transparent and scientific justification for the measures called for in the Member States where the Memorandums of Understanding are applied.

Will the Commission say:

— What was the legal basis for the formation of the Troika?

— Does the Commission consider its decision to participate in the Troika, while being an EU institution as appropriate?

— What are the democratic deficits and shortcomings identified by the Commission itself in the adjustment programmes in terms of transparency and accountability? Does it intend to review the fiscal multipliers used as a basis for the assumptions on which the support programmes rely?

— Why is it that the consequences of the fiscal policies currently implemented in Greece and in other Member States were not taken into account? Why is it that, despite Greece's controlled bankruptcy, the spread of the crisis to the other Member States was not prevented?

— What is the Commission's assessment of the results from the 'bailouts' implemented in each MoU country to date?

Answer given by Mr Rehn on behalf of the Commission
(17 March 2014)

Regulation No 472/2013 of the European Parliament and the Council, has formally endorsed the involvement of the Commission, the ECB and IMF in programme countries, also in relation to accountability vis-à-vis the European and national parliaments.

The Commission's role in past financial assistance programmes is to act on behalf of euro area Member States. Within this framework, the final decision on financial assistance and on conditionality lies with the lenders. The financial assistance programmes have been negotiated with the sovereign governments of the beneficiary Member States which are fully accountable before their national parliaments.

In crisis conditions historical fiscal multipliers do not provide a reliable guide for economic and fiscal forecasting. Fiscal multipliers tend to be larger at the current juncture.

Economic assistance programmes prevented the disorderly default of a Member State, avoiding much more severe and abrupt social consequences, and limited contagion. The social impact of policies has been a key concern when designing policies in programme countries, reflected in the MoUs ([1]).

The Commission assessments of the implementation of the programmes can be found in the regular compliance reports that are available on the Commission website: http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/occasional_paper/index_en.htm.

The Commission published its replies to the questionnaire related to the own initiative report of the parliament at: http://ec.europa.eu/commission_2010-2014/rehn/documents/troika_questionnaire_2014_en.pdf

The Vice-President responsible for Economic and Monetary Affairs and the Euro was heard by ECON committee on this matter on 13.1.2014 in Strasbourg.

([1]) Memorandum of Understanding.

(Ελληνική έκδοση)

Ερώτηση με αίτημα γραπτής απάντησης E-000007/14
προς την Επιτροπή
Antigoni Papadopoulou (S&D)
(3 Ιανουαρίου 2014)

Θέμα: Μέτρα κατά της Google

Νωρίτερα εντός του 2013, η Εθνική Επιτροπή για συστήματα Πληροφορικής και Ελευθερίες (CNIL) της Γαλλίας συμβούλεψε έξι χώρες της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης να αναλάβουν δράση ενάντια στην πολιτική προστασίας της ιδιωτικότητας της Google. Η πρώτη από της έξι χώρες που επιλήφθηκε του θέματος, είναι η Ισπανία που, όπως ανακοίνωσε, επιβάλλει πρόστιμο ύψους 900 000 ευρώ στον κολοσσό της αναζήτησης, επειδή παραβιάζει τη νομοθεσία περί ιδιωτικότητας της χώρας. Όπως αναφέρει η Ισπανική αρχή για την παραβίαση των δεδομένων (AEPD), η παραβίαση έχει να κάνει συγκεκριμένα με τη συλλογή των δεδομένων των χρηστών, την ενοποίηση των δεδομένων αυτών μεταξύ όλων των υπηρεσιών της Google και τη διατήρηση του ενοποιημένου αρχείου επ' άπειρον, χωρίς τη γνώση ή τη συγκατάθεση των χρηστών.

Ερωτάται λοιπόν η Επιτροπή:

1. Ποίες συγκεκριμένες αλλαγές ζήτησε από τη Google τον Σεπτέμβριο του 2012, ώστε η Google να συμμορφωθεί με τους Ευρωπαϊκούς νόμους περί προστασίας προσωπικών δεδομένων;

2. Γνωρίζει κατά πόσον η εταιρεία-κολοσσός έχει προχωρήσει σε αλλαγές και αν έχει ικανοποιήσει πλήρως το αίτημα της Επιτροπής;

3. Γνωρίζει αν και οι υπόλοιπες πέντε χώρες, δηλαδή η Ιταλία, Γερμανία, Γαλλία, Μεγάλη Βρετανία και Ολλανδία, ανέλαβαν ανάλογη δράση, ώστε να μην παραβιάζεται η νομοθεσία περί ιδιωτικότητας από την Google;

Απάντηση της κ. Reding εξ ονόματος της Επιτροπής
(12 Μαρτίου 2014)

Με την επιφύλαξη της αρμοδιότητας της Ευρωπαϊκής Επιτροπής ως θεματοφύλακα των Συνθηκών, ο έλεγχος και η επιβολή της νομοθεσίας για την προστασία των δεδομένων εμπίπτει στο πεδίο αρμοδιοτήτων των εθνικών αρχών, και ειδικότερα των αρχών ελέγχου προστασίας δεδομένων (ΑΠΔ) και των δικαστηρίων.

Οι εθνικές ΑΠΔ εξετάζουν τη νέα πολιτική προστασίας της ιδιωτικότητας της Google. Στο συγκεκριμένο πλαίσιο, στις 16 Οκτωβρίου 2012 συνέστησαν, στο πλαίσιο της Ομάδας του άρθρου 29 ([1]), να ζητηθεί από την Google να προβεί, εντός προθεσμίας τεσσάρων μηνών, στα ακόλουθα:

— να χορηγήσει βελτιωμένες πληροφορίες για τα συλλεγόμενα δεδομένα προσωπικού χαρακτήρα και για τους σκοπούς καθεμιάς εκ των πράξεων επεξεργασίας δεδομένων προσωπικού χαρακτήρα στις οποίες προβαίνει,

— να τροποποιήσει τις πρακτικές της όταν συνδυάζει δεδομένα από τις υπηρεσίες που παρέχει ([2]),

— να προβλέψει περιόδους διατήρησης των δεδομένων προσωπικού χαρακτήρα που έχουν υποστεί επεξεργασία.

Οι εθνικές ΑΠΔ της Γαλλίας (CNIL), της Ισπανίας, του ΗΒ, των Κάτω Χωρών, της Γερμανίας και της Ιταλίας κίνησαν διαδικασίες, σύμφωνα με το εθνικό δίκαιο για την εφαρμογή της οδηγίας 95/46/ΕΚ.

Μετά την επιβολή προστίμου από την ισπανική ΑΠΔ, στις 3 Ιανουαρίου 2014 η CNIL επέβαλε πρόστιμο ύψους 150 000 ευρώ και την υποχρέωση ανάρτησης της απόφασης στον *ιστότοπο www.google.fr*. Οι διαδικασίες ενώπιον των τεσσάρων άλλων ΑΠΔ εκκρεμούν.

([1]) Η ομάδα εργασίας του άρθρου 29 για την προστασία δεδομένων προσωπικού χαρακτήρα («Ομάδα του άρθρου 29») έχει συμβουλευτικό χαρακτήρα και χαίρει ανεξαρτησίας. Οι εθνικές αρχές προστασίας δεδομένων όλων των κρατών μελών της ΕΕ καθώς και ο ευρωπαίος επόπτης προστασίας δεδομένων εκπροσωπούνται σε αυτήν.

([2]) Με τους ακόλουθους τρόπους:
— παρέχοντας έλεγχο στον χρήστη επί του συνδυασμού δεδομένων από τις πολυάριθμες υπηρεσίες της·
— ενισχύοντας τη συναίνεση των χρηστών για συνδυασμό δεδομένων για τους σκοπούς των βελτιώσεων της υπηρεσίας, της ανάπτυξης νέων υπηρεσιών, της διαφήμισης και των αναλύσεων·
— προσφέροντας βελτιωμένο έλεγχο στο συνδυασμό δεδομένων με την απλούστευση και την κεντρικοποίηση του δικαιώματος αντίταξης (opt-out) και παρέχοντας τη δυνατότητα στους χρήστες να επιλέξουν για ποια υπηρεσία θα συνδυασθούν τα δεδομένα τους·
— προσαρμόζοντας τα εργαλεία που χρησιμοποιούνται από την Google για το συνδυασμό δεδομένων, ούτως ώστε η χρήση τους να περιορίζεται στους εγκεκριμένους σκοπούς.
Περισσότερες πληροφορίες στη διεύθυνση
http://www.cnil.fr/english/news-and-events/news/article/googles-new-privacy-policy-incomplete-information-and-uncontrolled-combination-of-data-across-ser/

Ο προτεινόμενος γενικός κανονισμός για την προστασία δεδομένων ([3]) θα διευκολύνει τη διερεύνηση διασυνοριακών υποθέσεων όπως η προκειμένη. Περιλαμβάνει τη θέσπιση κανόνων για την αρμόδια ΑΠΔ σε περιπτώσεις που ο υπεύθυνος επεξεργασίας ή ο επεξεργαστής δεδομένων είναι εγκατεστημένος σε περισσότερα του ενός κράτη μέλη, καθώς και έναν «μηχανισμό συνεκτικότητας» για να κατοχυρωθεί η ενιαία εφαρμογή σε σχέση με πράξεις επεξεργασίας που αφορούν ενδεχομένως υποκείμενα δεδομένων σε διάφορα κράτη μέλη. Θα εξουσιοδοτήσει επίσης τις αρχές προστασίας των δεδομένων να επιβάλλουν πρόστιμα ανερχόμενα μέχρι το 2% του ετήσιου παγκόσμιου κύκλου εργασιών μιας επιχείρησης.

([3]) COM/2012/011 τελικό — 2012/0011(COD).

(English version)

Question for written answer E-000007/14
to the Commission
Antigoni Papadopoulou (S&D)
(3 January 2014)

Subject: Measures against Google

Earlier in 2013, the French National Commission for Information Technology and Civil Liberties (CNIL) advised six EU countries to take action against Google's privacy policy. Spain was the first of the six countries to act on the matter, by imposing a fine amounting to EUR 900 000 to the search giant, for breaching the country's privacy laws. As stated by the Spanish Agency for Data Protection (AEPD), the breach pertains specifically to the collection of data on users, the consolidation of the said data across all Google services and the retention of this consolidated file indefinitely, without the knowledge or the consent of the users.

Will the Commission say:

1. What were the specific changes it requested from Google in September 2012, in order to ensure Google's compliance with EU privacy laws?

2. Does the Commission know whether the search giant has implemented any changes and whether it has fully complied with the Commission's request?

3. Does the Commission know whether the other five countries, namely Italy, Germany, France, Great Britain and the Netherlands, have taken similar measures to prevent privacy law breaches by Google?

Answer given by Mrs Reding on behalf of the Commission
(12 March 2014)

Without prejudice to the competence of the European Commission as guardian of the Treaties, the supervision and enforcement of data protection legislation falls within the competence of national authorities, in particular the data protection supervisory authorities (DPAs) and courts.

The national DPAs have been examining the new Google privacy policy. In that context, on 16 October 2012 they recommended in the framework of the Article 29 Working Party ([1]) in particular that, within a period of four months, Google:

— provides better information about the collected personal data and purposes of each of its personal data processing operations

— modifies its practices when combining data across services ([2])

— provides retention periods for the processed personal data.

The national DPAs from France (CNIL), Spain, the UK, the Netherlands, Germany and Italy launched proceedings under the national law implementing Directive 95/46/EC.

Following the imposition of the fine by the Spanish DPA, on 3 January 2014 the CNIL imposed a fine of 150 000 EUR and an obligation to display the decision on www.google.fr. The proceedings before the other four DPAs are pending.

([1]) The Article 29 Working Party on data protection ('WP29') has advisory status and acts independently. National data protection authorities (DPAs) of all EU Member States as well as the European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS) are represented in it.

([2]) By:
— providing for user control over the combination of data across its numerous services;
— reinforcing users' consent to the combination of data for the purposes of service improvements, development of new services, advertising and analytics;
— offering an improved control over the combination of data by simplifying and centralizing the right to object (opt-out) and by allowing users to choose for which service their data are combined;
— adapting the tools used by Google for the combination of data so that it remains limited to the authorised purposes.
More information available at http://www.cnil.fr/english/news-and-events/news/article/googles-new-privacy-policy-incomplete-information-and-uncontrolled-combination-of-data-across-ser/

The proposed The General Data Protection Regulation ([3]) will facilitate the investigation of cross-border cases such as the one at hand. It includes the introduction of rules on the competent DPA in cases when the data controller or processor is established in more than one Member State, a 'consistency mechanism' for ensuring unity of application in relation to processing operations which may concern data subjects in several Member States. It would also empower data protection authorities to impose fines of up to 2% of a company's annual worldwide turnover.

([3]) COM(2012) 011 final — 2012/0011 (COD).

(Ελληνική έκδοση)

Ερώτηση με αίτημα γραπτής απάντησης E-000008/14
προς την Επιτροπή
Theodoros Skylakakis (ALDE)
(3 Ιανουαρίου 2014)

Θέμα: Έρευνα της ΕΕ και της OLAF σχετικά με περίπτωση διαφθοράς σε έργο χρηματοδοτούμενο από το ΕΣΠΑ

Τις τελευταίες ημέρες αποκαλύφθηκε ότι διοικητής δημοσίου νοσοκομείου συνελήφθη με προσημειωμένα χαρτονομίσματα αξίας 25 000 ευρώ, και ήδη κατηγορείται για παθητική δωροδοκία και απόπειρα εκβίασης. Το έργο για το οποίο φέρεται να ζήτησε χρήματα αφορά το ΕΣΠΑ και εντάσσεται σε ένα πολύ ευρύτερο πρόγραμμα (MIS: 301205 ([1])) με προϋπολογισμό 2 790 032,64 ευρώ. Εις εκ των δύο υπευθύνων υλοποίησης του προγράμματος είναι στέλεχος του κυβερνητικού κόμματος ΠΑΣΟΚ, τον οποίο — σύμφωνα με δημοσιεύματα του Τύπου — ο κατηγορούμενος ενέπλεξε στις μαγνητοφωνημένες συνομιλίες του στην υπόθεση. Το πρόγραμμα έχει δημιουργήσει σοβαρά ερωτήματα σε σχέση με την σκοπιμότητα της σχετικής μεθοδολογίας και το ύψος του προϋπολογισμού, σε μια εποχή που η χώρα βρίσκεται σε δεινή κατάσταση. Ειδικότερα, ο Τύπος αναφέρει ότι μια τέτοια δράση μπορούσε να έχει αντίστοιχα αποτελέσματα με πολύ μικρότερο κόστος ([2]).

Επιπροσθέτως, το κεντρικό υποέργο του προγράμματος (1 979 000 ευρώ!) σχεδιάστηκε για να υλοποιηθεί με αυτεπιστασία, ενώ στον προϋπολογισμό και την υλοποίηση παρουσιάζονται διάφορα άλλα παράδοξα, όπως: δαπάνες 350 χιλ. ευρώ για ταξίδια, διανυκτερεύσεις και διατροφή προσωπικού ([3]), όπου τίθεται το ερώτημα γιατί δεν χρησιμοποιήθηκε για την έρευνα επιτόπιο προσωπικό (πρακτική που ακολουθούν π.χ. οι εταιρίες ερευνών) του δημοσίου ή του ιδιωτικού τομέα. Προϋπολογίστηκαν επίσης διάφορες άλλες δαπάνες, π.χ. ενοικίασης εξοπλισμού και προγραμμάτων τηλεδιάσκεψης (29 χιλ. ευρώ ([4])), ανάπτυξη εξειδικευμένου λογισμικού για συγχώνευση βάσεων δεδομένων! (9,9 χιλ. ευρώ ([5])). Από όλες τις σχετικές διαδικασίες, δημιουργείται η εντύπωση ότι υπάρχει σοβαρή πιθανότητα ενσυνείδητης υπερδιαστασιοποίησης του έργου. Επίσης, ο επίμαχος διαγωνισμός, ενώ κατακυρώθηκε σε συγκεκριμένη εταιρία ([6]) στις 5.10.2012, στη συνέχεια ακυρώθηκε με διάφορες αιτιάσεις, περιλαμβανομένης της πολύ χαμηλής τιμής, της μη δημοσίευσης λόγω και της «δυσλειτουργίας» του e-mail του Γραφείου προμηθειών ([7]) και επαναλήφθηκε με τελική κατάληξη την κατακύρωση σε λίγο μεγαλύτερη τιμή, στο πλαίσιο της οποίας ζητήθηκε η σχετική δωροδοκία.

Δεδομένων των πολλαπλών ερωτηματικών που δημιουργούνται, αλλά και της προφανούς περίπτωσης διαφθοράς, ερωτάται η Επιτροπή αν σκοπεύει να ερευνήσει το θέμα με την εμπλοκή και της OLAF, για να διακριβώσει αν και κατά πόσον έχουν προστατευτεί στο πλαίσιο των σχετικών διαδικασιών τα συμφέροντα της Ένωσης.

Απάντηση του κ. Šemeta εξ ονόματος της Επιτροπής
(24 Μαρτίου 2014)

Η Ευρωπαϊκή Υπηρεσία Καταπολέμησης της Απάτης (OLAF) αξιολογεί επί του παρόντος τις σχετικές με την υπόθεση στην οποία αναφέρεται ο κ. βουλευτής πληροφορίες, σύμφωνα με τις συνήθεις διαδικασίες της. Οι συνήθεις διαδικασίες κατά το στάδιο της επιλογής περιλαμβάνουν κατάλληλη συγκέντρωση πληροφοριών από τις αρχές των κρατών μελών, με τις οποίες οι επαφές βρίσκονται σε εξέλιξη.

Σκοπός της διαδικασίας αξιολόγησης είναι να εξακριβωθεί κατά πόσον οι πληροφορίες εμπίπτουν στην εντολή της OLAF και επαρκούν για να κινηθεί διαδικασία υπόθεσης έρευνας ή συντονισμού. Με βάση τα αποτελέσματα της διαδικασίας επιλογής, η OLAF θα αποφασίσει εάν πρέπει να κινηθεί επίσημη διαδικασία έρευνας.

Για λόγους εμπιστευτικότητας των ερευνητικών διαδικασιών της OLAF, και με σκοπό την προστασία των θεμελιωδών δικαιωμάτων των ατόμων που ενδεχομένως εμπλέκονται, η OLAF δεν μπορεί να προβεί σε περαιτέρω παρατηρήσεις για το εν λόγω θέμα.

([1]) «ΕΘΝΙΚΟ ΣΧΕΔΙΟ ΔΡΑΣΗΣ ΓΙΑ ΤΗ ΔΗΜΟΣΙΑ ΥΓΕΙΑ: ΑΠΟΤΥΠΩΣΗ, ΠΡΟΛΗΨΗ ΚΑΙ ΑΝΤΙΜΕΤΩΠΙΣΗ ΤΗΣ ΠΑΙΔΙΚΗΣ ΠΑΧΥΣΑΡΚΙΑΣ — ΔΡΑΣΕΙΣ ΓΙΑ ΤΗΝ ΑΣΚΗΣΗ ΚΑΙ ΤΗΝ ΥΓΕΙΝΗ ΔΙΑΤΡΟΦΗ» με φορέας υλοποίησης το ΝΟΣΟΚΟΜΕΙΟ ΠΑΙΔΩΝ «ΑΓΛΑΙΑ ΚΥΡΙΑΚΟΥ».
([2]) http://tvxs.gr/news/ellada/o-tompoylogloy-einai-i-koryfi-toy-pagoboynoy
([3]) http://static.diavgeia.gov.gr/doc/4%CE%913%CE%A4%CE%98-%CE%A9%CE%A7
([4]) Διαύγεια ΑΔΑ: Β44Ε46906Ρ-42Ε.
([5]) Διαύγεια ΑΔΑ: ΒΛ4346906Ρ-55Α.
([6]) Διαύγεια ΑΔΑ: Β43246906Ρ-4ΥΓ.
([7]) Διαύγεια ΑΔΑ: Β4ΣΙ46906Ρ-689.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-000008/14
to the Commission
Theodoros Skylakakis (ALDE)
(3 January 2014)

Subject: EU and OLAF investigation for corruption in an NSRF-financed project

It was recently revealed that the director of a public hospital was caught with marked bills worth EUR 25 000 and is already accused for passive bribery and attempted extortion. The project under which he allegedly requested money was financed by the NSRF and is part of a larger programme (MIS: 301205 ([1])) with a budget of EUR 2 790 032.64. One of the two persons responsible for the project's implementation is a senior official of the ruling party, PASOK, whom — according to the press — the defendant implicated in his tape-recorded conversations regarding the case. Serious questions are posed about the appropriateness of the project's methodology and budget, at a time when Greece is in dire straits. In particular, according to the press, such an action would achieve similar results at a much lower cost ([2]).

In addition, the main subproject (EUR 1 979 000!) was designed to be implemented through a direct labour contract, while its budget and implementation procedures present a series of extravagances, such as: EUR 350 000 for travel, accommodation and daily expenses of the staff members ([3]), which poses the question as to why local staff members of the public or private sector were not used for the survey (a method followed by survey companies, for example). Several other expenses were included in the budget, e.g. rental equipment and teleconference software (EUR 29 000 ([4])), development of specialised database merge software! (EUR 9 900 ([5])). All this gives the impression that the project's budget may have been intentionally inflated. Additionally, despite the fact that the tender in question was awarded to a specific company ([6]) on 5 October 2012, it was then cancelled on various grounds, including its very low price and its non-publication, partly due to the failure of the e-mail system of the Public Procurement Office ([7]). The tender procedure was repeated and the project was finally awarded at a slightly higher price, in the context of which, the bribery in question was requested.

Given the numerous questions arising from this matter and the fact that this is obviously a case of corruption, will the Commission say if it intends to investigate the issue with the involvement of OLAF in order to ascertain whether and to what extent the Union's interests have been protected in the relevant procedures?

Answer given by Mr Šemeta on behalf of the Commission
(24 March 2014)

The European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) is currently evaluating information concerning the matter mentioned by the Honourable Member, in line with its standard procedures. The standard procedures at the selection stage include appropriate gathering of information from MS Authorities, with whom contacts are ongoing.

The purpose of the evaluation-process is to verify whether the information falls within OLAF's mandate and is sufficient to open an investigation or coordination case. On the basis of the results of the selection process, OLAF will decide if a formal investigation needs to be opened.

Due to confidentiality of OLAF's investigative process, and in order to protect the fundamental rights of persons possibly involved, OLAF cannot make any further comments on this matter.

([1]) 'NATIONAL ACTION PLAN FOR PUBLIC HEALTH: SURVEY, PREVENTION AND TREATMENT OF CHILDHOOD OBESITY — ACTIONS TOWARDS EXERCISE AND A HEALTHY DIET' implemented by the 'AGLAIA KYRIAKOU' CHILDREN'S HOSPITAL.
([2]) http://tvxs.gr/news/ellada/o-tompoylogloy-einai-i-koryfi-toy-pagoboynoy
([3]) http://static.diavgeia.gov.gr/doc/4%CE%913%CE%A4%CE%98-%CE%A9%CE%A7
([4]) Transaction No of the 'Clarity' Programme: B44E46906P-42E.
([5]) Transaction No of the 'Clarity' Programme: BL4346906P-55A.
([6]) Transaction No of the 'Clarity' Programme: B43246906P-4YC.
([7]) Transaction No of the 'Clarity' Programme: B4SI46906P-689.

(Nederlandse versie)

Vraag met verzoek om schriftelijk antwoord E-000037/14
aan de Commissie
Laurence J. A. J. Stassen (NI)
(6 januari 2014)

Betreft: Corruptieschandaal Turkije. Bağış gaat, Çavuşoğlu komt

Ten gevolge van het corruptieschandaal binnen de Turkse regering en de daaraan gekoppelde gaande herbenoeming van in totaal tien ministers heeft Egemen Bağış, minister van EU-zaken en toetredingsonderhandelaar, het veld moeten ruimen. Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu volgt hem op ([1]).

1. Hoe ervaart de Commissie het dat de heer Bağış, met wie zij jarenlang over Turkse toetreding tot de EU heeft onderhandeld, het veld heeft moeten ruimen en door de heer Çavuşoğlu wordt opgevolgd? Is zij thans teleurgesteld / verbaasd / aangedaan / opgelucht / tevreden?

2. Hoe kijkt de Commissie, de huidige omstandigheden en de recente ontwikkelingen in acht nemende, terug op de periode van onderhandelen met de heer Bağış?

3. Welke verwachtingen heeft de Commissie van de heer Çavuşoğlu? Welke overeenkomsten en verschillen ziet zij tussen hem en de heer Bağış? Welke gevolgen heeft de herbenoeming van de Turkse minister van EU-zaken en toetredingsonderhandelaar voor de toetredingsonderhandelingen tussen de EU en Turkije?

4. Deelt de Commissie de mening dat ieder nadeel z'n voordeel heeft en dat het derhalve verstandig is van de omstandigheden gebruik te maken door de toetredingsonderhandelingen voor eens en voor altijd te beëindigen? Zo neen, waarom wil de Commissie de toetredingsonderhandelingen, alias een gebed zonder einde, klaarblijkelijk koste wat het kost doorzetten?

Vraag met verzoek om schriftelijk antwoord E-000038/14
aan de Commissie
Laurence J. A. J. Stassen (NI)
(6 januari 2014)

Betreft: Corruptieschandaal Turkije. Erdoğans nieuwe corruptieonderzoekswet geblokkeerd

Als reactie op het corruptieschandaal binnen de Turkse regering was premier Erdoğan voornemens een wet in te voeren die ervoor moet zorgen dat formeel onderzoek naar corruptiepraktijken alleen nog door politieofficieren, en niet door „lagere rangen", mag worden uitgevoerd. Het betreft hier Erdoğans „bevriende" politieofficieren die hij heeft aangesteld nadat hij onder andere hun voorgangers, die de corruptiepraktijken binnen de Turkse regering onderzochten en aan het licht brachten, heeft laten ontslaan.

De Turkse Raad van State heeft de invoering van de nieuwe wet geblokkeerd.

1. Hoe beoordeelt de Commissie Erdoğans poging de omschreven wet in te voeren en daarmee de absolute macht in dezen naar zich toe te trekken ([2])?

2. Deelt de Commissie de mening dat Erdoğans actie van dictatoriale kenmerken getuigt en bijgevolg in strijd is met de rechtsstaat? Zo neen, welke omschrijving hanteert de Commissie in dezen dan wél?

3. Deelt de Commissie de mening dat er géén plaats is in de EU voor een land als Turkije, waarvan de regering probeert de rechtsstaat te ondermijnen? Deelt de Commissie aldus de mening dat de toetredingsonderhandelingen tussen de EU en Turkije zo snel mogelijk moeten worden beëindigd?

([1]) http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/eu-minister-bagis-vows-to-close-ranks-within-the-govt-at-handover-ceremony.aspx?pageID=238&nID=60163&NewsCatID=338.
([2]) http://www.businessinsider.com/turkish-court-blocks-erdogan-attempt-2013-12.

Vraag met verzoek om schriftelijk antwoord E-000039/14
aan de Commissie
Laurence J. A. J. Stassen (NI)
(6 januari 2014)

Betreft: Corruptieschandaal Turkije. Minister Çavuşoğlu: „EU-kritiek = vooroordelen”

De nieuwe Turkse minister voor EU-zaken, Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu, wijst alle kritiek van EU-zijde op Turkije, naar aanleiding van het omvangrijke corruptieschandaal binnen de Turkse regering en hoe de regering daar thans mee omgaat, resoluut van de hand. Ook het statement van commissaris Füle, die „bezorgd is over de manier waarop de regering zich met politie en justitie bemoeit”, het feit dat de Turkse regering politieofficieren die zich met de corruptie bezighielden door „vriendjes” heeft laten vervangen en de regels voor onderzoek naar corruptie heeft aangepast, slaat minister Çavuşoğlu in de wind. Hij beschuldigt de EU van „vooroordelen jegens Turkije” en stelt dat Turkije „zijn politieke problemen prima zélf kan oplossen”.

1. Is de Commissie bekend met de houding van minister Çavuşoğlu resp. van Turkije ([3]) ten aanzien van de kritiek van EU-zijde ([4]) op genoemde kwestie? Hoe reageert de Commissie hierop?

2. Wat vindt de Commissie ervan dat Turkije alle kritiek van EU-zijde als „vooroordelen” afdoet? Deelt de Commissie de mening dat deze arrogante houding, van nota bene een kandidaat-EU-lidstaat!, ronduit stuitend is en impliceert dat Turkije de EU, en de daarmee gepaard gaande waarden zoals rechtsstaat en democratie, helemaal niet serieus neemt? Zo neen, hoe ziet de Commissie dit dan wél?

Vraag met verzoek om schriftelijk antwoord E-000040/14
aan de Commissie
Laurence J. A. J. Stassen (NI)
(6 januari 2014)

Betreft: Corruptieschandaal Turkije. Ondermijning van de rechtsstaat

Tientallen leden van de regerende AK-partij en goedverdienende zakenmensen worden opgepakt op verdenking van corruptie. Drie ministers stappen vervolgens op. Premier Erdoğan laat de politiechefs, die zich met de corruptiepraktijken bezighouden, ontslaan. Erdoğan besluit de bezem door zijn kabinet te halen: in totaal worden tien ministersposten, de helft van het kabinet, gewijzigd; ook Egemen Bağış, minister van EU-zaken en toetredingsonderhandelaar, moet het veld ruimen. Erdoğan beweert echter dat er geen sprake is van een schandaal, maar van „internationale samenzweringen tegen de Turkse staat”. Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu, Bağış’ opvolger, wijst alle EU-kritiek op deze ontwikkelingen van de hand.

1. Deelt de Commissie de mening dat:

— het omvangrijke corruptieschandaal binnen de Turkse regering, ten gevolge waarvan zelfs de voormalige minister van EU-zaken, Egemen Bağış, het veld moest ruimen ([5]),

— de inmenging van de Turkse regering in politiële en justitiële aangelegenheden, in een poging het corruptieschandaal in de doofpot te stoppen, en daarmee de ondermijning van de Turkse rechtsstaat, de onafhankelijkheid van de rechtspraak en de democratie ([6]),

— en de arrogante, afwijzende houding van de Turkse regering ten aanzien van de EU-kritiek in dezen resp. de beschuldiging dat deze kritiek louter „vooroordelen” zou betreffen ([7]),

aantonen dat Turkije géén serieuze kandidaat-EU-lidstaat is (en dat bovendien nooit is geweest)? Is de Commissie bijgevolg ertoe bereid de toetredingsonderhandelingen tussen de EU en Turkije onmiddellijk, eens en voor altijd!, te beëindigen? Zo neen, waarop baseert de Commissie thans haar dikwijls geuite contradictoire overtuiging dat Turkije „aan het handje van de EU” in positieve zin zal hervormen, wetende dat het land helemaal geen oren heeft naar de EU, nog eens bevestigd door minister Çavuşoğlu?

2. Hoe reageert de Commissie op de uitspraak van premier Erdoğan dat „er geen sprake is van een schandaal, maar van „internationale samenzweringen tegen de Turkse staat””? Deelt de Commissie de mening dat het „wijzen naar en beschuldigen van anderen” louter ertoe dient om de ernst van het corruptieschandaal onder het tapijt te vegen, en dat dat bijzonder kwalijk is? Zo neen, hoe interpreteert de Commissie dit dan wél?

([3]) http://www.nu.nl/algemeen/3664039/turkse-minister-wijst-eu-kritiek-van-hand.html
([4]) http://www.nu.nl/politiek/3663684/eu-bezorgd-schandaal-turkije.html
([5]) http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-25516449
([6]) http://www.nrc.nl/nieuws/2013/12/18/turkije-onderzoekt-drie-grote-corruptiezaken-vijf-politiechefs-ontslagen/
([7]) http://www.nu.nl/algemeen/3664039/turkse-minister-wijst-eu-kritiek-van-hand.html

Antwoord van de heer Füle namens de Commissie

(13 maart 2014)

De Commissie verwijst het geachte Parlementslid naar haar antwoord op vraag P-000195/2014 ([8]).

([8]) http://www.europarl.europa.eu/plenary/en/parliamentary-questions.html

(English version)

Question for written answer E-000037/14
to the Commission
Laurence J.A.J. Stassen (NI)
(6 January 2014)

Subject: Corruption scandal in Turkey. Bağış replaced by Çavuşoğlu

As a result of the corruption scandal within the Turkish Government and the resulting replacement of a total of ten ministers, Egemen Bağış has been forced to step down as minister for EU affairs and accession negotiator, and has been replaced by Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu ([1]).

1. How does the Commission feel about the fact that Mr Bağış, who for many years has been the Commission's partner in negotiations on Turkish accession to the EU, has been forced to step down and has been replaced by Mr Çavuşoğlu? Is it disappointed/surprised/moved/relieved/pleased?

2. In light of the current circumstances and recent developments, how does the Commission look back on the negotiations with Mr Bağış?

3. What does the Commission expect of Mr Çavuşoğlu? What similarities and differences does the Commission see between him and Mr Bağış? What will the consequences of the replacement of the Turkish Minister for EU Affairs and accession negotiator be for the accession negotiations between the EU and Turkey?

4. Does the Commission share the view that every cloud has a silver lining and that it is therefore sensible to take advantage of this situation by terminating the accession negotiations once and for all? If not, why does the Commission wish to continue with these never-ending accession negotiations, seemingly at whatever cost?

Question for written answer E-000038/14
to the Commission
Laurence J.A.J. Stassen (NI)
(6 January 2014)

Subject: Corruption scandal in Turkey. Erdoğan's new corruption investigation law is blocked

In response to the corruption scandal within the Turkish Government, Prime Minister Erdoğan intended to introduce a law which would ensure that formal investigations into corruption could only be carried out by senior police officers, and not by the 'lower ranks'. The police officers in question are 'sympathetic' to Erdoğan and were appointed by him after he dismissed their predecessors following their investigations which brought to light the corrupt practices within the Turkish Government.

The Turkish Council of State blocked the introduction of the new law.

1. How does the Commission assess Erdoğan's attempt to introduce the aforementioned law and thereby gain absolute power in this matter ([2])?

2. Does the Commission share the view that Erdoğan's actions demonstrate dictatorial tendencies and are therefore in conflict with the rule of law? If not, how would the Commission describe these actions?

3. Does the Commission share the view that there is no place in the EU for a country like Turkey, whose government is attempting to undermine the rule of law? Does the Commission therefore share the view that the accession negotiations between the EU and Turkey should be terminated as soon as possible?

([1]) http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/eu-minister-bagis-vows-to-close-ranks-within-the-govt-at-handover-ceremony.aspx?pageID=238&nID=60163&NewsCatID=338
([2]) http://www.businessinsider.com/turkish-court-blocks-erdogan-attempt-2013-12

Question for written answer E-000039/14
to the Commission
Laurence J.A.J. Stassen (NI)
(6 January 2014)

Subject: Corruption scandal in Turkey. Minister Çavuşoğlu: EU criticism = prejudice

The new Turkish Minister for EU Affairs, Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu, has resolutely dismissed all criticism from the EU directed at Turkey in relation to the scandal of large-scale corruption within the Turkish government and the government's response to this scandal. Minister Çavuşoğlu has also ignored a statement made by Commissioner Füle, who is concerned about the way the government is dealing with the police and judiciary, referring to the fact that the Turkish government has replaced police officials working to uncover the corruption with 'sympathisers', and has changed the rules for investigating corruption. Minister Çavuşoğlu accuses the EU of 'prejudice' towards Turkey and argues that Turkey is more than capable of solving its own political problems.

1. Is the Commission aware of the position of Minister Çavuşoğlu, and therefore of Turkey ([3]), with respect to criticism from the EU ([4]) on the abovementioned matter? How does the Commission respond to this?

2. What does the Commission think about the fact that Turkey dismisses any criticism from the EU as 'prejudice'? Does the Commission share the view that this arrogant attitude, held by none other than a candidate Member State, is completely unacceptable and suggests that Turkey does not take the EU or its associated values, such as the rule of law and democracy, at all seriously? If not, how does the Commission view the matter?

Question for written answer E-000040/14
to the Commission
Laurence J.A.J. Stassen (NI)
(6 January 2014)

Subject: Corruption scandal in Turkey. Undermining the rule of law

Dozens of members of the ruling AK Party and well-paid business people have been arrested on suspicion of corruption. Three ministers resigned as a result. Prime Minister Erdoğan dismissed the police chiefs who were investigating the corruption. He announced a cabinet reshuffle, in which a total of ten cabinet positions, half of the cabinet, changed hands. Among those to be removed were Egemen Bağış, Minister for EU Affairs and accession negotiator. However, Erdoğan claims that there is not a scandal but international conspiracies against the Turkish state, and Bağış's successor, Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu, has dismissed all EU criticism of these developments.

1. Does the Commission share the view that

— the scandal of widespread corruption within the Turkish Government, which even forced the removal of former Minister for EU Affairs, Egemen Bağış ([5]), and

— the Turkish Government's interference in police and judicial matters and their attempt to cover up the corruption scandal, thereby undermining the rule of law, the independence of the judicial system and democracy in Turkey ([6]), and

— the arrogant, dismissive attitude of the Turkish Government towards EU criticism of this matter and the accusation that this criticism is merely 'prejudice' ([7]),

demonstrate that Turkey is not a serious candidate for becoming an EU Member State (and indeed that it never was)? As a consequence, is the Commission prepared to immediately terminate the accession negotiations between the EU and Turkey once and for all? If not, why does the Commission continue to believe its frequently repeated conviction that Turkey will undergo positive reforms under the guidance of the EU, when this is contradicted by Turkey's disregard for the EU, as proved once again by Minister Çavuşoğlu?

2. What is the Commission's response to Prime Minister Erdoğan's statement that there is not a scandal but international conspiracies against the Turkish state? Does the Commission share the view that pointing the finger at others merely serves to deflect attention away from the severity of the corruption scandal, and that this is to be condemned? If not, how does the Commission interpret this situation?

([3]) http://www.nu.nl/algemeen/3664039/turkse-minister-wijst-eu-kritiek-van-hand.html
([4]) http://www.nu.nl/politiek/3663684/eu-bezorgd-schandaal-turkije.html
([5]) http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-25516449
([6]) http://www.nrc.nl/nieuws/2013/12/18/turkije-onderzoekt-drie-grote-corruptiezaken-vijf-politiechefs-ontslagen/
([7]) http://www.nu.nl/algemeen/3664039/turkse-minister-wijst-eu-kritiek-van-hand.html

Joint answer given by Mr Füle on behalf of the Commission

(13 March 2014)

With regard to the events mentioned, the Commission refers the Honourable Member to its reply to Question P-000195/2014 ([8]).

([8]) http://www.europarl.europa.eu/plenary/en/parliamentary-questions.html

(Verżjoni Maltija)

Mistoqsija għal tweġiba bil-miktub E-000047/14
lill-Kummissjoni
Claudette Abela Baldacchino (S&D)
(6 ta' Jannar 2014)

Suġġett: Ir-riintegrazzjoni ta' persuni li kkommettew reat

Persuni li kkommettew reat u qed jintegraw mill-ġdid fil-komunità jaffaċjaw numru ta' sfidi, speċjalment biex isibu impjieg. Fl-istess ħin, għajnuna sabiex dawn ikunu jistgħu jsibu u jżommu l-impjieg tagħhom tista' tgħin biex titnaqqas ir-reċidività. Uħud mill-proġetti eżistenti f'dan il-qasam iħallu lil persuni li kkommetew reat jieħdu sehem fi programmi komprensivi edukattivi jew ta' impjieg waqt li jkunu għadhom il-ħabs, u jkomplu jipprovdu konnessjoni ma' servizzi edukattivi u ta' impjieg wara li dawn jinħelsu.

1. Il-Kummissjoni tista' tipprovdi statistika dwar ir-rata ta' reċidività fit-28 Stat Membru?

2. L-UE b'liema mod qed tippromwovi l-aċċess għall-edukazzjoni u l-impjiegi għal persuni li kkommettew reat u servew is-sentenzi ta' ħabs tagħhom?

3. Il-Kummissjoni liema programmi għandha fis-seħħ, jew biħsiebha tniedi biex tappoġġja l-familji ta' dawk li kkommettew reat u tiżgura l-istabilità ekonomika u s-sigurtà finanzjarja tagħhom waqt il-proċess ta' riintergrazzjoni?

Tweġiba mogħtija mis-Sinjura Reding f'isem il-Kummissjoni
(12 ta' Marzu 2014)

Il-Kummissjoni ma għandhiex statistika dwar ir-rata ta' reċidività fl-Istati Membri.

Barra minn hekk, wara l-Green Paper tagħha dwar it-tisħiħ tal-fiduċja reċiproka fil-qasam tad-detenzjoni ([1]), il-Kummissjoni tiżgura li l-għodda eżistenti tal-UE fil-qasam tal-liġi kriminali bil-għan li jsaħħu l-possibbiltà tar-riabilitazzjoni soċjali tat-trażgressuri jiġu implimentati kif xieraq mill-Istati Membri ([2]).

Il-Kummissjoni ffinanzjat b'mod kontinwu l-proġetti tal-UE relatati mal-edukazzjoni u mat-taħriġ fil-ħabs permezz tal-programmi Grundtvig u Leonardo da Vinci. L-Istati Membri individwali użaw ukoll il-finanzjament mill-Fond Soċjali Ewropew (FSE) biex jappoġġaw il-proġetti relatati mat-taħriġ għall-ħabsin. Netwerk tat-Tagħlim tal-Awtoritajiet tal-Ġestjoni tal-FSE ta' bosta Stati Membri ġie stabbilit matul il-perjodu 2009-2012 biex jappoġġa t-tagħlim reċiproku u l-iskambju ta' prattiċi tajbin biex jappoġġaw l-integrazzjoni mill-ġdid tal-ekstrażgressuri (http://ec.europa.eu/esf/main.jsp?catId=56&langId=en).

Barra minn hekk fl-2012, il-Kummissjoni għamlet stħarriġ dwar l-edukazzjoni u t-taħriġ fil-ħabs fl-Ewropa (http://ec.europa.eu/education/adult/studies_en.htm), li juri s-sitwazzjoni attwali ta' bħalissa tal-livell nazzjonali.

([1]) Green Paper li Ssaħħaħ il-fiduċja reċiproka fiż-żona ġudizzjarja Ewropea — Green Paper dwar l-applikazzjoni tal-leġiżlazzjoni tal-UE dwar il-ġustizzja kriminali fil-qasam tad-detenzjoni, COM/2011/0327 finali. Sommarju tat-tweġibiet ġie ppubblikat fis-sit http://ec.europa.eu/justice/newsroom/criminal/opinion/110614_en.htm

([2]) Id-Deċiżjoni Qafas 2008/909/ĠAI tas-27 ta' Novembru 2008 dwar l-applikazzjoni tal-prinċipju ta' rikonoxximent reċiproku ta' sentenzi f'materji kriminali li jimponu pieni ta' kustodja jew miżuri li jinvolvu ċ-ċaħda tal-libertà bil-għan li jiġu infurzati fl-Unjoni Ewropea, ĠU 5.12.2008, L 327/27, id-Deċiżjoni Qafas 2008/947/ĠAI tas-27 ta' Novembru 2008 dwar l-applikazzjoni tal-prinċipju ta' rikonoxximent reċiproku ta' sentenzi u deċiżjonijiet li jinvolvu probation bil-ħsieb ta' sorveljanza ta' miżuri ta' probation u ta' sanzjonijiet alternattivi, ĠU 16.12.2008, L 337/102.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-000047/14
to the Commission
Claudette Abela Baldacchino (S&D)
(6 January 2014)

Subject: Reintegration of ex-offenders

Ex-offenders reintegrating into the community face a number of challenges, especially when it comes to finding employment. At the same time, support in finding and maintaining employment may help reduce recidivism. Certain existing projects in this field enable offenders to participate in comprehensive education and employment programmes while still in prison, and provide a continued connection to education and employment services after their release.

1. Can the Commission provide statistical data on the rate of recidivism across the 28 Member States?

2. In what ways is the EU promoting access to education and employment for ex-offenders who have served their prison sentences?

3. What programmes does the Commission have in place, or intend to start, to support families of ex-offenders and ensure their economic stability and financial security during the reintegration process?

Answer given by Mrs Reding on behalf of the Commission
(12 March 2014)

The Commission does not have statistical data on the rate of recidivism in the Member States.

In addition, following its Green Paper on strengthening mutual trust in the field of detention ([1]), the Commission will ensure that the existing EU instruments in the field of criminal law that aim at enhancing the possibility of social rehabilitation of offenders are properly implemented by the Member States ([2]).

The Commission has continuously funded EU projects related to prison education and training through the Grundtvig and the Leonardo da Vinci programmes. Individual Member States have also used the European Social Fund (ESF) funding to support projects relating to inmates training. A Learning Network of ESF Managing Authorities of several Member States was established during the period 2009-2012 in order to support mutual learning and exchange of good practices to support the reintegration of ex-offenders (http://ec.europa.eu/esf/main.jsp?catId=56&langId=en)

In addition in 2012, the Commission has undertaken a survey on prison education and training in Europe (http://ec.europa.eu/education/adult/studies_en.htm), which illustrates the current state-of-play at national level.

([1]) Green Paper Strengthening mutual trust in the European judicial area — A Green Paper on the application of EU criminal justice legislation in the field of detention, COM(2011) 0327 final. A summary of the replies has been published on the website http://ec.europa.eu/justice/newsroom/criminal/opinion/110614_en.htm

([2]) The framework Decision 2008/909/JHA of 27 November 2008 on the application of the principle of mutual recognition to judgments in criminal matters imposing custodial sentences or measures involving deprivation of liberty for the purpose of their enforcement in the European Union, OJ 5.12.2008, L 327/27, the framework Decision 2008/947/JHA of 27 November 2008 on the application of the principle of mutual recognition to judgments and probation decisions with a view to the supervision of probation measures and alternative sanctions, OJ 16.12.2008, L 337/102.

(Deutsche Fassung)

Anfrage zur schriftlichen Beantwortung E-000063/14
an die Kommission
Angelika Werthmann (ALDE)
(7. Januar 2014)

Betrifft: Kindesabnahmen in Dänemark

Kindesabnahmen und Zwangsadoptionen beziehungsweise Einweisungen in sogenannte Spezialheime und Jugendheime — Vorgänge, die in der ehemaligen DDR unser aller Wissen nach an der Tagesordnung waren — scheinen heute mehr als aktuell zu sein.

Nicht nur, weil die Opfer nicht mal als solche anerkannt werden, sondern weil es auch heute in der Europäischen Union durchaus vergleichbare Zustände gibt.

So leiden in Dänemark durch die strikte Auslegung des „Parental Responsibility Act" vorwiegend Kinder, besonders jene, die durch — meist — den Vater Missbrauch und/oder Gewalt erfahren müssen und sich der Mutter anvertrauen, die ihr/e Kind/er davor — verständlicherweise dem biologischen Instinkt folgend — schützen will und der dann in der Folge der Sohn/die Tochter abgenommen wird. Entweder wird das Kind in der Folge dem Vater zugesprochen oder gar in ein Kinderheim oder eine Spezialinstitution gesteckt — und dies obwohl die Mutter kerngesund ist und jedes Potenzial hätte, dem Kind eine gute Mutter zu sein.

1. Sind der Kommission diese Umstände und Zustände in Dänemark bekannt? Wenn ja, was gedenkt die Kommission Dänemark diesbezüglich zu empfehlen, um sowohl die Rechte der Kinder als auch der Mütter in vollem Ausmaß zu wahren?

2. Wie sieht die Kommission diese Kindesabnahmen in Dänemark unter Berücksichtigung der Menschenrechte?

3. Gedenkt die Kommission hier tätig zu werden, um die Menschenrechte der Kinder und Mütter zu wahren? Falls nein, wie gedenkt die Kommission, das Eingreifen zur Verteidigung der Menschenrechte in Nicht-EU-Staaten zu rechtfertigen, wenn die Menschenrechte innerhalb der Europäischen Union nicht gewahrt werden?

4. Wenn der Kommission diese Umstände bekannt sind, wie rechtfertigt sie das „stillschweigende Akzeptieren" dieser, wo es doch um europäische Werte und die Einhaltung der Charta der Grundrechte der Europäischen Union geht?

Antwort von Frau Reding im Namen der Kommission
(12. März 2014)

Das EU-Familienrecht ([1]), das Lösungen für Streitigkeiten in Scheidungs- und Sorgerechtsfällen mit grenzüberschreitendem Bezug bieten soll, ist auf gemeinsame Vorschriften für die gerichtliche Zuständigkeit sowie die Anerkennung und Vollstreckung diesbezüglicher Entscheidungen in einem anderen Mitgliedstaat beschränkt. Die Erteilung des Sorgerechts, dessen Ausübung und die Rolle, die Sozial- und Jugendbehörden dabei einnehmen, wird nicht durch EU-Recht, sondern durch die Vorschriften der Mitgliedstaaten geregelt. Es ist daher Sache der Mitgliedstaaten, dafür zu sorgen, dass die Grundrechte im Einklang mit dem innerstaatlichen Recht und den internationalen Menschenrechtsverpflichtungen wirksam geachtet und geschützt werden.

Die Kommission hat sich im Rahmen ihrer Kompetenzen immer schon entschieden für die Förderung der Rechte von Kindern und Frauen eingesetzt. Mit der „EU-Agenda für die Rechte des Kindes" bekräftigt die Kommission ihr Engagement, das Kindeswohl in den Mittelpunkt aller relevanten Maßnahmen und politischen Strategien der EU zu rücken. Die Kommission hat sich auch zur Unterstützung der Mitgliedstaaten bei der Bekämpfung von Gewalt gegen Frauen verpflichtet; dies soll durch Verbreitung von Wissen und eine verbesserte Datenerhebung, durch den Austausch von bewährten Praktiken und die Stärkung der Rolle der Frau sowie durch Bewusstseinsbildung erreicht werden. Und nicht zuletzt mit den drei Generationen von Daphne-Programmen trägt die Kommission zum Schutz von Kindern, Jugendlichen und Frauen vor jeglicher Form von Gewalt bei.

([1]) Verordnung (EG) Nr. 2201/2003 des Rates über die Zuständigkeit und die Anerkennung und Vollstreckung von Entscheidungen in Ehesachen und in Verfahren betreffend die elterliche Verantwortung und zur Aufhebung der Verordnung (EG) Nr. 1347/2000 (die „Verordnung Brüssel IIa").

(English version)

Question for written answer E-000063/14
to the Commission
Angelika Werthmann (ALDE)
(7 January 2014)

Subject: Taking children into custody in Denmark

Instances of children being taken from their parents, forced adoptions and referrals to 'special homes' and children's homes — nothing unusual in the former GDR, as we all know — are apparently still a real issue today.

This is not only because the children are not even considered to be victims, but also because very similar things still occur in the European Union today.

Strict interpretations of Denmark's Parental Responsibility Act have been the cause of suffering, predominantly among children. This is especially true of those who experience violence and/or abuse at the hands of their father (as is more often the case). These children trust their mothers who, following their biological instinct, want to protect their child(ren), but then have their son or daughter taken away from them. The father is subsequently awarded custody or the child may be put in a children's home or special institution, even if the mother is perfectly healthy and capable of being a good parent.

1. Is the Commission aware of this situation in Denmark? If so, what does it intend to recommend that Denmark do in order to fully protect the rights of children and mothers?

2. In the context of human rights, what is the Commission's view of the fact that children in Denmark are being taken away from their parents?

3. Does the Commission intend to take action to protect the human rights of children and mothers? If not, how does the Commission justify intervening in defence of human rights in non-EU countries when those rights are not observed in the EU?

4. If the Commission is aware of the above, how does it justify simply accepting the situation when what is really at stake are European values and observance of the EU Charter of the Fundamental Rights?

Answer given by Mrs Reding on behalf of the Commission
(12 March 2014)

EU family law ([1]) in the area of divorce and custody cases is aimed at solving cross-border disputes and is limited to common rules on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of an existing judgment in another Member State. The granting of custody rights, the arrangements for their exercise and the role of the social and child protection authorities in it are not governed by EC law, but by national law. It is therefore for Member States to ensure that fundamental rights are effectively respected and protected in accordance with their national legislation and international human rights obligations.

Within its competences, the Commission has always been strongly committed to promoting the rights of children and women. The 'EU Agenda on the Rights of the Child' reaffirms the Commission's commitment to ensure that the child's best interests are at the centre of all relevant EU actions and policies. The Commission is also committed to support Member States in combating violence against women, by improving knowledge and data collection, exchanging good practices, empowering women and raising awareness. Through its three generations of Daphne Programmes, the Commission has also aimed to contribute to the protection of children, young people and women against all forms of violence.

([1]) Council Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003 concerning jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in matrimonial matters and the matters of parental responsibility, repealing Regulation (EC) No 1347/2000 (so-called Brussels IIa regulation).

(Versión española)

Pregunta con solicitud de respuesta escrita E-000065/14
a la Comisión
Ramon Tremosa i Balcells (ALDE)
(7 de enero de 2014)

Asunto: Un concejal de UPyD en Madrid compara Cataluña con la Alemania nazi — Transposición de la Decisión Marco 2008/913/JAI

El concejal de UPyD en el Ayuntamiento de Madrid Jaime Berenguer ha comparado Cataluña con la Alemania nazi en varios tuits de su Twitter. En uno de esos tuits, Berenguer ha afirmado que «la libertad que se vive hoy en la Cataluña nacionalista es muy parecida a la que se vivía en la Alemania de 1933, es decir, ninguna» ([1]).

En otro tuit, el profesor de la Universidad Autónoma de Madrid hace referencia al concierto del Orfeón Catalán que tuvo lugar el día de San Esteban en el Palau de la Música y que acabó con un clamor a favor del sí a la independencia. En concreto, critica que «los nacionalistas catalanes siguen utilizando niños. Nada hemos aprendido de los horrores del nacionalismo del siglo XIX».

Además, respondiendo a un usuario de la misma red social, Berenguer vaticina que «el día 1 de enero en Cataluña el nacionalismo seguirá haciendo lo mismo que hoy, es decir, puro fascismo». E insiste en esta comparación: «El nacionalismo catalán es fascista» y tacha a los nacionalistas catalanes de «degenerados y sinvergüenzas».

A la luz de lo anterior, y teniendo en cuenta los precedentes de actos de violencia y manifestación fascistas y de intolerancia denunciados en las preguntas E-011140/2013, E-010490/2013 y E-010386/2013, deseo formular las siguientes preguntas:

1. En vista de la trivialización de la comparación con el nazismo anteriormente citada y con arreglo a la legislación vigente, ¿qué información tiene la Comisión sobre la transposición de la Decisión Marco 2008/913/JAI en España?

2. Antes de que se lleve a cabo su evaluación, ¿podría emitir la Comisión su opinión sobre la forma en que este instrumento se aplica en España y la eficacia con que la legislación española pretende luchar contra la deliberada incitación pública a la violencia y el odio?

Pregunta con solicitud de respuesta escrita E-000087/14
a la Comisión
Ramon Tremosa i Balcells (ALDE)
(7 de enero de 2014)

Asunto: Democracia en España: un concejal del PP catalán equipara a ETA con la Vía Catalana y Artur Mas — transposición de la Decisión Marco 2008/913/JAI

Andrés Cano, concejal del PP en La Bisbal, no tiene ningún inconveniente en equiparar la Vía Catalana de este 11 de septiembre con ETA en un tuit en la red social Twitter. Así, comentando la cadena humana que la izquierda independentista vasca se ha propuesto llevar a cabo el 8 de junio, asegura que «ETA tiene un espejo donde mirarse, Artur Mas», y además añade que «los asesinos copian el modelo de un iluminado»; todo ello lo considera «patético» ([2]).

Con posterioridad a la publicación de la noticia, Cano ha decidido proteger su cuenta de Twitter para que el tuit no se pueda consultar públicamente. Con todo, ha decidido mantenerlo en su *timeline*.

El *modus operandi* de Cano se asemeja en parte al del concejal popular de Santa Coloma de Cervelló (Baix Llobregat) Francisco Javier Belloso, que a finales del año pasado comparó catalanismo y nazismo, y terminó borrando el tuit tras la polémica generada.

A la luz de lo anterior y teniendo en cuenta los precedentes de actos de violencia y manifestación fascistas y de intolerancia denunciados en las preguntas E-011140/2013, E-010490/2013 y E-010386/2013,

1. En vista de la trivialización de la comparación con el nazismo antes citada, y con sujeción a la legislación vigente, ¿qué información tiene la Comisión sobre la transposición de la Decisión Marco 2008/913/JAI por el Gobierno de España?

2. Antes de llevar a cabo su evaluación, ¿podría emitir la Comisión su opinión sobre la forma en que este instrumento se aplica en España y la eficacia de la legislación española? ¿Pretende luchar contra la deliberada incitación pública a la violencia y el odio?

([1]) http://www.elsingulardigital.cat/cat/notices/2013/12/regidor_upyd_97852.php
([2]) http://www.naciodigital.cat/noticia/63426/regidor/pp/catala/equipara/eta/amb/via/catalana/artur/mas

Respuesta conjunta de la Sra. Reding en nombre de la Comisión

(25 de marzo de 2014)

El informe de la Comisión sobre la aplicación de la Decisión marco 2008/913/JAI se aprobó el 27 de enero de 2014 y abarca a todos los Estados miembros ([3]).

Corresponde a las autoridades de los Estados miembros aplicar la citada Decisión. Más concretamente, corresponde a las autoridades nacionales investigar casos específicos, y a los tribunales nacionales establecer si cada situación, en función de sus circunstancias y su contexto, supone incitación a la violencia o al odio por motivos racistas o xenófobos.

([3]) Dicho informe está disponible en inglés en http://ec.europa.eu/justice/fundamental-rights/files/com_2014_27_en.pdf y http://ec.europa.eu/justice/fundamental-rights/files/swd_2014_27_en.pdf

(English version)

Question for written answer E-000065/14
to the Commission
Ramon Tremosa i Balcells (ALDE)
(7 January 2014)

Subject: A Councillor for the Union, Progress and Democracy Party (UPyD) in Madrid compares Catalonia with Nazi Germany — Transposition of Framework Decision 2008/913/JHA

The Councillor for the Union, Progress and Democracy Party (UPyD) on Madrid City Council, Jaime Berenguer, has compared Catalonia to Nazi Germany in several tweets on his Twitter account. In one of these tweets, Berenguer stated that 'the freedom enjoyed by those currently living in nationalist Catalonia is very similar to the freedom enjoyed by those living in Germany in 1933, i.e. non-existent' ([1]).

In another tweet, the lecturer at the Autonomous University of Madrid referred to the Orfeón Catalán concert held in the Palau de la Música on Boxing Day (St Stephen's Day), which culminated in chants in favour of the 'yes' to independence. Specifically, he criticised that 'Catalan nationalists continue using children. We have learnt nothing from the horrors of 19th century nationalism'.

Furthermore, in a reply to a tweet by another user on the social network, Berenguer predicted that 'on 1 January, nationalism in Catalonia will continue doing what it does currently, i.e. pure fascism'. He reiterated this comparison, stating that 'Catalan nationalism is fascist' and accusing Catalan nationalists of being 'degenerates and crooks'.

In view of the above, and taking into consideration the precedents concerning fascist violence and demonstrations and acts of intolerance reported in questions E-011140/2013, E-010490/2013 and E-010386/2013:

1. In the light of this trivialisation of the comparison with Nazism and taking account of current legislation, what information does the Commission have on the transposition of Framework Decision 2008/913/JHA in Spain?

2. Before it carries out its assessment, could the Commission give its opinion on the way in which this framework Decision is being applied in Spain and how effective Spanish legislation is in combating deliberate public incitement to violence and hatred?

Question for written answer E-000087/14
to the Commission
Ramon Tremosa i Balcells (ALDE)
(7 January 2014)

Subject: Democracy in Spain: a Catalan People's Party (PP) Councillor compares ETA to the Vía Catalana and Artur Mas — transposition of Framework Decision 2008/913/JHA

In a tweet on the social network Twitter, Andrés Cano, a People's Party Councillor in La Bisbal, saw fit to compare the 'Catalan Way towards Independence' event of 11 September to ETA. Commenting on the human chain that the Basque independent left has proposed to form on 8 June, Mr Cano stated that 'ETA sees itself as a reflection of Artur Mas', adding that 'murderers are copying a visionary's model', all of which he considers to be 'pathetic' ([2]).

Subsequent to the press picking up on this, Cano decided to protect his Twitter account to prevent the tweet being visible to the general public. However, he did decide to keep the tweet on his timeline.

Cano's *modus operandi* partly resembles that of the People's Party Councillor for Santa Coloma de Cervelló (Baix Llobregat), Francisco Javier Belloso, who late last year compared Catalan nationalism to Nazism, but ended up deleting his tweet following the controversy that ensued.

In view of this, and taking into consideration the precedents concerning fascist acts of violence and expression, and acts of intolerance condemned in questions E-011140/2013, E-010490/2013 and E-010386/2013:

1. In the light of this trivialisation of the comparison with Nazism and taking account of current legislation, what information does the Commission have on the transposition of Framework Decision 2008/913/JHA by the Spanish Government?

([1]) http://www.elsingulardigital.cat/cat/notices/2013/12/regidor_upyd_97852.php
([2]) http://www.naciodigital.cat/noticia/63426/regidor/pp/catala/equipara/eta/amb/via/catalana/artur/mas

2. Before it carries out its assessment, could the Commission give its opinion on the way in which this framework Decision is being applied in Spain and the effectiveness of Spanish legislation? Is it seeking to combat deliberate public incitement to violence and hatred?

Joint answer given by Mrs Reding on behalf of the Commission

(25 March 2014)

The Commission report on the implementation of Framework Decision 2008/913/JHA was adopted on 27 January 2014 and covers all Member States ([3]).

It is up to the Member States authorities to implement the abovementioned decision. More particularly it is for national authorities to investigate specific cases, and the national courts to establish, according to the circumstances and context of each individual situation, whether such situation represents an incitement to racist or xenophobic violence or hatred.

([3]) The report is available at: http://ec.europa.eu/justice/fundamental-rights/files/com_2014_27_en.pdf and http://ec.europa.eu/justice/fundamental-rights/files/swd_2014_27_en.pdf

(Deutsche Fassung)

Anfrage zur schriftlichen Beantwortung E-000077/14
an die Kommission
Sabine Lösing (GUE/NGL)
(7. Januar 2014)

Betrifft: Aktivitäten EUROPOL und European Cybercrime Centre

Nicht erst seit der Einrichtung seines neuen „European Cybercrime Centre" (EC3) geht Europol auch gegen Netzaktivismus vor: Zusammen mit der internationalen Polizeiorganisation Interpol hatte sich die Agentur beispielsweise an Razzien gegen vermeintliche Mitglieder des Anonymous-Netzwerks beteiligt. Bei Europol firmierte die Aktion als „Operation Thunder", bei Interpol als „Operation Unmask". Europol richtete damals ein internationales Treffen zu „Hacktivism" aus, um die verschiedenen Ermittlungsverfahren zu koordinieren und das weitere Vorgehen zu planen. Überspitzt finden sich ähnliche Szenarien im „Project 2010" wieder, das im fiktiven Staat „South Sylvania" spielt. Vermeintliche „Hacker" und „Cyberkriminelle" bedrohen die Gesellschaft, die Folge sind Chaos und Revolution. Der Einrichtung des EC3 ging eine Umstrukturierung der gesamten Architektur Europols voraus: Der Bereich „Cybercrime" hat als drittes Standbein nun die gleiche Wertigkeit wie „Terrorismus" und „Organisierte Kriminalität". Das EC3 soll Bedrohungsanalysen erstellen und IT-Systeme auf ihre Verwundbarkeit testen. Bislang zeichnet sich das EC3 aber eher durch eine Aufrüstung des Vokabulars aus.

1. Auf welche Weise war EUROPOL im Rahmen der „Operation Thunder"/„Operation Unmask" aktiv und welche weiteren Behörden welcher EU-Mitgliedstaaten bzw. welche sonstigen Einrichtungen waren beteiligt?

2. Aus welchem Grund ermitteln EUROPOL bzw. das EC3 nicht wegen der mutmaßlichen staatlichen Hackerangriffe vom Sommer 2013 beim belgischen Finanzdienstleister SWIFT, dem Telekommunikationsanbieter Belgacom oder Einrichtungen der Europäischen Union in Brüssel?

3. Welche Datensammlungen existieren bei EUROPOL zu den Phänomenen „Hacktivismus" oder „Anonymous" und wie viele Personen, Vorgänge und Sachen waren dort 2012 und 2013 gespeichert?

4. In welchen weiteren Vorhaben befassen sich EUROPOL und das EC3 mit dem Phänomenen „Hacktivismus" oder „Anonymous" und welche anderen Einrichtungen oder Firmen sind daran jeweils beteiligt?

5. Welche Treffen oder Konferenzen sind hierzu in 2014 geplant?

6. Worum handelt es sich beim EUROPOL-Projekt zu „TOR and anonymous surfing on the Internet" und welche anderen Einrichtungen oder Firmen sind daran beteiligt (Ratsdokument 10182/13)?

7. Welche Kosten entstanden bei der Produktion der Clips des „Project 2010" und wer war für die inhaltliche Gestaltung verantwortlich?

8. Welche Firmen oder Institute sind mit welchen Produkten und Beiträgen an der Entwicklung einer „European Tracking Solution" (ETS) beteiligt?

Antwort von Frau Malmström im Namen der Kommission
(14. März 2014)

Die Kommission hat das Europäische Polizeiamt (Europol) um eine Stellungnahme zu der Frage der Frau Abgeordneten gebeten. Die Antwort des Amtes wird so bald wie möglich von der Kommission an die Frau Abgeordnete übermittelt.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-000077/14
to the Commission
Sabine Lösing (GUE/NGL)
(7 January 2014)

Subject: Work at Europol and the European Cybercrime Centre

Europol has been working to counter net activism since before the establishment of its new European Cybercrime Centre (EC3). For example, the agency has participated in raids with the international police organisation Interpol against alleged members of the Anonymous collective in a crackdown known as 'Operation Thunder' at Europol and 'Operation Unmask' at Interpol. At the same time Europol organised an international conference on 'hacktivism' in an effort to coordinate the various investigations and to plan further action. The campaign film 'Project 2010', which is set in the fictional country of 'South Sylvania', depicts similar, exaggerated scenarios in which supposed 'hackers' and 'cybercriminals' threaten society, resulting in chaos and revolution. EC3 was created following a restructuring of the whole Europol organisation. As one of Europol's top three priorities, the domain of 'cybercrime' is now just as important as 'terrorism' and 'organised crime'. EC3 is supposed to carry out threat analyses and test IT systems for vulnerability. So far, however, it has focused more on terminological refinements.

1. How was Europol involved in 'Operation Thunder'/'Operation Unmask'? What other bodies or authorities participated and which EU Member States were they from?

2. Why is Europol or EC3 not investigating the alleged state hacker attacks on the Belgian financial services provider SWIFT, the telecommunication company Belgacom, or EU bodies in Brussels in summer 2013?

3. What data collections does Europol have on the 'hacktivism' or 'Anonymous' phenomena, and on how many people, events and issues was intelligence stored in them in 2012 and 2013?

4. What further plans do Europol and EC3 have concerning the 'hacktivism' and 'Anonymous' phenomena, and what other bodies or firms are involved?

5. What meetings or conferences on this issue are planned for 2014?

6. What is the Europol project 'TOR and anonymous surfing on the Internet' about, and what other bodies or firms are involved (Council document 10182/13)?

7. How much did the production of the clips for 'Project 2010' cost, and who was responsible for the content?

8. What firms or institutions are involved in the development of the European Tracking Solution? What products and contributions are they making?

Answer given by Ms Malmström on behalf of the Commission
(14 March 2014)

The Commission has asked the European Police Office (Europol) to deliver elements for a reply to the question put forward by the Honourable Member. The reply of the agency will be transmitted by the Commission to the Honourable Member as soon as possible.

(Version française)

Question avec demande de réponse écrite E-000101/14
à la Commission (Vice-présidente/Haute Représentante)
Marc Tarabella (S&D) et Jean Louis Cottigny (S&D)
(8 janvier 2014)

Objet: VP/HR — Falloujah = Al-Qaida

Un haut responsable de la sécurité de la province d'Al-Anbar (ouest) a affirmé samedi 4 janvier avoir perdu le contrôle de la ville de Falloujah, tombée aux mains de combattants liés à Al-Qaida. «Falloujah est sous le contrôle de l'EIIL», a indiqué le responsable, faisant référence à l'État islamique en Irak et au Levant, émanation d'Al-Qaida en Irak.

Quelle est la réaction des autorités européennes?

Comptent-elles se contenter de mots ou des actions concrètes sont-elles prévues?

Quelle est l'implication européenne en Irak?

Quels sont les projets européens prévus pour 2014?

Réponse donnée par Mme Ashton Vice-présidente/Haute Représentante au nom de la Commission
(14 mars 2014)

L'Union européenne est préoccupée par la dégradation de la situation en matière de sécurité en Iraq, y compris par la menace terroriste croissante que connaît le pays et l'augmentation des violences interconfessionnelles qui, l'année dernière, ont fait le plus grand nombre de victimes enregistré depuis 2008. L'UE suit également de près l'évolution de la situation dans la province d'Al-Anbar, y compris dans les villes de Ramadi et de Falloujah. Elle considère qu'il est primordial de protéger les civils des violences et encourage les efforts déployés par le gouvernement iraquien pour assurer la fourniture des services essentiels et garantir aux agences humanitaires l'accès aux zones touchées par les combats. L'UE soutient l'Iraq dans ses efforts pour relever les défis en matière de sécurité auxquels fait face le pays. Elle a entrepris une mission d'évaluation en Iraq en décembre 2013 afin d'examiner les possibilités d'aide dans le domaine de la lutte contre le terrorisme.

En mai 2012, l'UE et l'Iraq ont signé un accord de partenariat et de coopération qui établit un cadre pour le renforcement futur des relations entre les deux parties. La mise en œuvre concrète de l'APC a commencé par les réunions des premiers sous-comités techniques l'année dernière et la tenue du Conseil de coopération le 20 janvier 2014. Pour la période 2014-2020, l'UE a programmé l'octroi de 75 millions d'euros d'aide à l'Iraq dans les domaines de l'État de droit, de l'éducation et de l'énergie. L'aide humanitaire de l'UE soutient actuellement les rapatriés iraquiens et les personnes déplacées à l'intérieur du pays ainsi que les réfugiés syriens.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-000101/14
to the Commission (Vice-President/High Representative)
Marc Tarabella (S&D) and Jean Louis Cottigny (S&D)
(8 January 2014)

Subject: VP/HR — Fallujah = Al-Qaeda

A high-ranking security official from Anbar Province (west) stated on Saturday 4 January that the government had lost control of the city of Fallujah, which has fallen into the hands of militants linked to Al-Qaeda. 'Fallujah is under the control of the ISIL', the official said, referring to the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, an offshoot of Al-Qaeda in Iraq.

What is the response of the European authorities?

Will they make do with words, or is any concrete action planned?

What is Europe's involvement in Iraq?

What plans does Europe have for 2014?

Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission
(14 March 2014)

The EU is concerned about the worsening security situation in Iraq, including the growing terrorist threat facing the country and the increase in sectarian violence that last year led to the highest casualty figures since 2008. The EU is also closely following the developments in Anbar province, including in the cities of Ramadi and Fallujah. The EU considers that the protection of civilians from violence is of paramount importance, and encourages efforts by the Government of Iraq to ensure the provision of essential services as well as access by humanitarian agencies to areas affected by the fighting. The EU supports Iraq in its efforts to address security challenges facing the country, and undertook an assessment mission to Iraq in December 2013 to look at possibilities for assistance to counter-terrorism.

In May 2012 the EU and Iraq signed a Partnership and Cooperation Agreement that provides a framework for further enhancing relations between the two sides. Concrete implementation of the PCA has started with the holding of the first technical sub-committees last year and of the Cooperation Council on 20 January 2014. For 2014-2020 the EU has programmed 75 Mio euros of assistance to Iraq in the areas of the Rule of Law, education and energy. EU humanitarian assistance is on-going to Iraqi returnees, IDPs (Internally Displaced People) and to Syrian refugees.

(Ελληνική έκδοση)

Ερώτηση με αίτημα γραπτής απάντησης E-000106/14
προς την Επιτροπή
Theodoros Skylakakis (ALDE)
(8 Ιανουαρίου 2014)

Θέμα: Εκκρεμείς αιτήσεις συνταξιοδότησης και ελληνικό έλλειμμα

Σε ερώτησή μου προς την Επιτροπή (3.9.2013) σχετικά με το ζήτημα δημοσιονομικής τάξης που προκύπτει από τα εκκρεμή συνταξιοδοτικά δικαιώματα στην Ελλάδα, όπου οι εκκρεμείς αιτήσεις συνταξιοδότησης προσεγγίζουν τις 360 000, η Επιτροπή ρωτήθηκε αν έχει γίνει πρόβλεψη στα ασφαλιστικά ταμεία, ώστε τα εκκρεμή συνταξιοδοτικά δικαιώματα να περιλαμβάνονται στο έλλειμμα των ετών στα οποία αντιστοιχούν. Η Επιτροπή απάντησε (E-009840/2013) ότι οι Ελληνικές αρχές είναι αρμόδιες να παρέχουν έγκυρες φορολογικές και στατιστικές πληροφορίες, ενώ η Επιτροπή εξακολουθεί να παρακολουθεί την εφαρμογή του προγράμματος δημοσιονομικής προσαρμογής, συμπεριλαμβανομένων όλων των παραγόντων που επηρεάζουν τις δημόσιες δαπάνες για τις συντάξεις.

Λαμβάνοντας υπόψη αυτήν την απάντηση, και σύμφωνα με τα στοιχεία που διαβίβασαν οι Ελληνικές αρχές, βάσει των οποίων αξιολογείται το πρόγραμμα δημοσιονομικής προσαρμογής και καταρτίζονται οι στατιστικοί πίνακες της Eurostat, ερωτάται η Επιτροπή:

Κατά τον υπολογισμό του ελληνικού ελλείμματος για το 2012 και το 2013, σε ποιο σημείο περιλαμβάνονται οι σχετικές δημοσιονομικές προβλέψεις για τα εκκρεμή συνταξιοδοτικά δικαιώματα και πόσο επιβαρύνουν το έλλειμμα της γενικής κυβέρνησης;

Απάντηση του κ. Rehn εξ ονόματος της Επιτροπής
(14 Μαρτίου 2014)

Σύμφωνα με τους δημοσιονομικούς στατιστικούς κανόνες του ΕΣΛ, η συνταξιοδότηση επηρεάζει το δημοσιονομικό έλλειμμα αφότου έχει εγκριθεί η σχετική αίτηση.

Όπως έχει ήδη αναφερθεί στην απάντηση (E-009840/2013 ([1])), μέρος των εκκρεμουσών αιτήσεων οφείλεται στο γεγονός ότι η ηλικία συνταξιοδότησης αυξήθηκε κατά 2 έτη από την 1η Ιανουαρίου 2013. Αυτό οδήγησε σε εκκρεμούσες αιτήσεις συνταξιοδότησης εκ μέρους εκείνων που υπέβαλαν σχετική αίτηση για σύνταξη χωρίς να έχουν ακόμη συμπληρώσει το νέο όριο ηλικίας συνταξιοδότησης. Οι αιτήσεις αυτές φυσικά δεν θα εγκριθούν. Ως εκ τούτου, δεν θα έχουν δημοσιονομικές επιπτώσεις.

Επιπλέον, η εξέταση των εκκρεμουσών αιτήσεων για τις εφάπαξ παροχές καλύφθηκε με υπουργική απόφαση από τον Έλληνα Υπουργό Εργασίας, Κοινωνικής Ασφάλισης και Πρόνοιας στις 10 Φεβρουαρίου 2014.

([1]) http://www.europarl.europa.eu/plenary/en/parliamentary-questions.html

(English version)

Question for written answer E-000106/14
to the Commission
Theodoros Skylakakis (ALDE)
(8 January 2014)

Subject: Pension applications pending and the Greek deficit

In my question to the Commission (E-009840/2013) of 3 September 2013 regarding the financial implications of outstanding pension rights in Greece, where approximately 360 000 pension applications are pending, I asked whether provision has been made by the insurance funds for the outstanding pension rights to be included in the deficit of the years to which they relate. The Commission answered that the Greek authorities are responsible for providing accurate fiscal and statistical information, while the Commission continues to monitor the implementation of the adjustment programme, including all factors affecting public pension expenditure.

In view of this answer and the information provided by the Greek authorities, based on which the fiscal adjustment programme is assessed and Eurostat statistics are compiled, will the Commission say:

At which point are the relevant financial provisions for outstanding pension rights included in the calculation of the Greek deficit for 2012 and 2013 and to what extent do they encumber the general government deficit?

Answer given by Mr Rehn on behalf of the Commission
(14 March 2014)

According to the ESA fiscal statistical rules a pension application affects the fiscal deficit once the application is approved.

As already stated in the reply (E-009840/2013 ([1])), a part of the pending applications is due to the fact that retirement ages were increased by 2 years as of 1 January 2013. This resulted in pending applications for those who applied for a pension without having yet reached their new retirement age. These applications will naturally not be approved; therefore they will not have any fiscal consequences.

Furthermore the treatment of pending applications for lump-sum benefits was addressed by a Ministerial Decision by the Greek Minister of Labour, Social Security and Welfare on the 10th of February 2014.

([1]) http://www.europarl.europa.eu/plenary/en/parliamentary-questions.html

(English version)

Question for written answer E-000134/14
to the Commission
Brian Simpson (S&D) and Claude Moraes (S&D)
(8 January 2014)

Subject: Article 29 Working Party investigation into new distribution capability

On 23 September 2013, the Commission received Written Question E-010787-13 concerning the data protection implications of the potential development by the International Air Transport Association (IATA) of a new distribution capability (NDC) on the basis of IATA Resolution 787.

Specifically, Written Question E-010787-13 asked for an update on the activities of the article 29 Data Protection Working Party, which is the body responsible for investigating the data protection implications of the potential NDC.

In its answer, the Commission asserted that the conclusions of the Working Party's investigation will not necessarily be shared with the European Parliament.

Is it therefore the Commission's position that IATA's plans to develop an NDC under Resolution 787 should not concern Parliament?

How will the Commission ensure transparency on this issue, if the Working Party's findings are not made available?

Answer given by Mrs Reding on behalf of the Commission
(12 March 2014)

IATA's plans to develop a new distribution capability (NDC) is of general concern, thus also for all European institutions.

The Article 29 Data Protection Working Party (composed by EU supervisory authorities competent for data protection matters) is continuing its examination of the data protection implications of the International Air Transport Association's (IATA) plans to develop a NDC for flight tickets and has addressed a letter and questionnaire to IATA end of last year.

Information about the activities of the Article 29 Data Protection Working Party is published on the Website of the Commission ([1]). Also the recent letter and questionnaire addressed to IATA have been published ([2]). The Commission finally notes that Regulation 1049/2001 ([3]) regarding public access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents applies to the documents of the Article 29 Data Protection Working Party if they are held by one of these institutions.

([1]) http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/article-29/index_en.htm
([2]) http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/article-29/documentation/other-document/index_en.htm#h2-2
([3]) OJ L 145, 31.5.2001 p. 43.

(Versão portuguesa)

Pergunta com pedido de resposta escrita P-000143/14
ao Conselho
Mário David (PPE)
(9 de janeiro de 2014)

Assunto: Levantamento das sanções ao Zimbabué

Decorreram doze anos desde que a UE adotou medidas ao abrigo do disposto na Decisão 2002/148/CE do Conselho no sentido de suspender a cooperação com o Zimbabué, tendo depois sido dados passos graduais pelo governo e pela oposição do Zimbabué para restaurar a estabilidade política e económica do país. Entre essas iniciativas incluem-se a assinatura, sob a mediação dos Chefes de Estado e de Governo da Comunidade para o Desenvolvimento da África Austral (SADAC), do Acordo Político Global de 2009 entre os partidos ZANU-PF e MDC, que levou ao estabelecimento de um Governo de Unidade Nacional (GUN) e à subsequente aprovação de uma nova Constituição, com base num referendo nacional que se realizou em 16 de março de 2013. A Decisão 2012/97/CFSP do Conselho, de 17 de fevereiro de 2012, reconheceu que a criação de um GUN proporciona uma oportunidade para o restabelecimento de uma relação construtiva entre a UE e o Zimbabué. Mais recentemente, a UE comprometeu-se a respeitar, quer os resultados das eleições harmonizadas de 31 de julho de 2013, quer a avaliação que delas fizessem as missões de observação eleitoral do grupo de países ACP, da SADAC e da União Africana. Essas eleições, que foram rotuladas pela maioria dos observadores internacionais como as mais livres, justas e pacíficas de toda a história do Zimbabué, foram justamente aquelas que, para surpresa da comunidade internacional, deram ao Presidente Robert Mugabe e ao partido ZANU-PF a vitória mais expressiva e mais credível de sempre.

Desde então, as sanções da UE foram atenuadas em vários momentos. Em 23 de setembro de 2013, a UE decidiu retirar a empresa «Zimbabwe Mining Development Corporation» da lista de sanções.

As graves consequências económicas e sociais das sanções têm causado um sofrimento profundo na população do Zimbabué, em particular entre os membros mais pobres da sociedade, em consequência das restrições ao emprego, à prestação de serviços sociais e às oportunidades de desenvolvimento. Quando a União Europeia proceder à reapreciação do assunto, em fevereiro de 2014, será chegado o momento de a UE levantar as sanções contra o Zimbabué e reencetar a mútua cooperação política e económica em todos os domínios, o que só será benéfico para ambas as partes. A UE não deve empregar dois pesos e duas medidas no modo como lida com os seus parceiros.

Se a UE tivesse de avaliar de forma séria e coerente o respeito dos Direitos Humanos, dos princípios democráticos e do Estado de Direito, quantos países não se veriam a braços com sanções? Independentemente do tipo de «desculpas» encontradas para justificar o levantamento das sanções impostas à exportação de diamantes, ninguém entenderia que estivéssemos perante outra coisa que não uma decisão hipócrita tomada para defender os interesses da indústria da UE.

Não concorda o Conselho com o ponto de vista segundo o qual já é tempo de a UE levantar as sanções contra o povo do Zimbabué?

Resposta
(24 de março de 2014)

As medidas restritivas da União Europeia formam parte de uma política mais geral da UE e destinam-se a cumprir os objetivos estratégicos da Política Externa e de Segurança Comum. Quando estiverem reunidas as condições necessárias, a UE irá rever as medidas restritivas que aplica contra o Zimbabué.

As medidas restritivas da UE contra o Zimbabué consistem ainda numa proibição de exportar armas e equipamento que podem ser utilizados para a repressão interna. Além disso, um certo número de pessoas (91 pessoas) e de entidades (9 entidades) zimbabueanas continua sujeito a medidas restritivas. No entanto, estas últimas medidas têm sido gradualmente suspensas em relação a uma grande maioria destas pessoas e entidades. Em fevereiro de 2013, o Conselho decidiu suspender a proibição de viagem imposta a seis membros do Governo do Zimbabué e retirar da lista 21 pessoas e uma entidade sujeitas a medidas restritivas. Tendo em conta os resultados do referendo constitucional do Zimbabué de 16 de março de 2013, o Conselho decidiu suspender as medidas aplicadas à maioria das pessoas e entidades designadas. Em setembro de 2013, o Conselho levantou as medidas contra a «Zimbabwe Mining Development Corporation».

Em 17 de fevereiro de 2014, o Conselho reapreciem todas as medidas e decidiu renová-las, mas decidiu igualmente suspender a aplicação da proibição de viagem e do congelamento de bens a mais oito pessoas. Estas medidas específicas foram agora suspensas em relação a todas elas, com exceção de duas pessoas e de uma entidade. As medidas restritivas contra o Zimbabué aplicam-se até 20 de fevereiro de 2015.

(English version)

Question for written answer P-000143/14
to the Council
Mário David (PPE)
(9 January 2014)

Subject: Lifting of sanctions on Zimbabwe

Twelve years have passed since the EU adopted measures under Council Decision 2002/148/EC to suspend cooperation with Zimbabwe, and gradual steps have been taken by the Government of Zimbabwe and the opposition to restore the country's political and economic stability. These include the signing, under the mediation of the Heads of State and Government of the South African Development Community (SADC), of the 2009 Global Political Agreement between the ZANU-PF and MDC groupings which led to the establishment of a Government of National Unity (GNU), and the subsequent adoption of a new constitution on the basis of a national referendum on 16 March 2013. Council Decision 2012/97/CFSP of 17 February 2012 recognised that the creation of the GNU afforded an opportunity to re-establish a constructive relationship between the EU and Zimbabwe. More recently, the EU has given an undertaking to respect both the outcome of the Harmonised Elections of 31 July 2013 and the assessment of those elections by the ACP Group, SADC and African Union observation missions. The elections that were deemed by most international observers as the most free, fair and peaceful to have been held in Zimbabwe's history were, to the surprise of the international community, those that gave President Robert Mugabe and the ZANU-PF the largest and most credible victory.

Since then, EU sanctions have been eased on several occasions. On 23 September 2013, the EU decided to withdraw the Zimbabwe Mining Development Corporation from the sanctions list.

The grave economic and social consequences of the sanctions have caused deep suffering among the Zimbabwean people, in particular among the poorer members of society, by restricting employment, social services provision and development opportunities. When the EU reviews the subject in February 2014, it will be time for it to lift the sanctions against Zimbabwe and to restart mutual political and economic cooperation in all fields, which will only prove beneficial to both sides. The EU should not employ double standards in dealing with its partners.

If the EU were to appraise respect for human rights, democratic principles and the rule of law seriously and coherently, how many countries would face sanctions? No matter what kind of 'excuses' are found to justify the lifting of sanctions on the export of diamonds, no one would understand it to be anything but a hypocritical decision taken in the interests of the EU industry.

Does the Council agree that it is time for the EU to lift its sanctions against the people of Zimbabwe?

Reply
(24 March 2014)

EU restrictive measures form part of a wider EU policy and are designed to meet the strategic goals of the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy. When the necessary conditions are met, the EU will review its restrictive measures against Zimbabwe.

EU restrictive measures against Zimbabwe still consist of a prohibition to export arms and equipment which may be used for internal repression. In addition, a number of Zimbabwean persons (91 persons) and entities (9 entities) remain subject to restrictive measures. However, these latter measures have over recent years been gradually suspended in relation to a large majority of these persons and entities. In February 2013, the Council decided to suspend the travel ban imposed on 6 Members of the Government of Zimbabwe and to delist 21 persons and 1 entity subject to restrictive measures. In view of the outcome of the Zimbabwean constitutional referendum of 16 March 2013, the Council decided to suspend the measures applying to the majority of the designated individuals and entities. In September 2013 the Council lifted the measures against the Zimbabwe Mining Development Corporation.

On 17 February 2014, the Council reviewed all the measures and decided to renew them, but also to suspend the application of the travel ban and asset freeze in relation to a further eight individuals. These particular measures have now been suspended in relation to all but two individuals and one entity. The restrictive measures against Zimbabwe apply until 20 February 2015.

(Versione italiana)

Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-000151/14
alla Commissione
Mario Borghezio (NI)
(9 gennaio 2014)

Oggetto: Preoccupante retromarcia della Commissione sulla separazione bancaria

Voci insistenti raccolte dal Financial Times del 6.1.2014 farebbero emergere l'intenzione della Commissione di emanare una direttiva che, dovendo dare seguito alle raccomandazioni del rapporto Liikanen sulla scissione delle attività bancarie più a rischio da quelle delle banche di raccolta motivata dalla necessità di evitare il ripetersi della crisi finanziaria del 2008, non imporrebbe tuttavia una drastica separazione così come previsto dalla normativa della legge Glass Steagall.

Qualora tali informazioni corrispondano a verità, intende la Commissione far conoscere se questa inattesa rinuncia ad una stretta separazione bancaria sia stata motivata da interventi della BCE o da pressioni della potente lobby delle grandi banche europee?

Risposta di Michel Barnier a nome della Commissione
(17 marzo 2014)

Il 29 gennaio 2014 la Commissione europea ha adottato una proposta di regolamento sulle misure strutturali volte ad accrescere la resilienza degli enti creditizi dell'UE. Il regolamento proposto consentirebbe di evitare che le grandi banche intraprendano attività di negoziazione per conto proprio considerate rischiose. La proposta integra le riforme regolamentari in ambito finanziario degli ultimi anni volte a disciplinare i cambiamenti strutturali relativi alle cosiddette banche «too-big-to-fail» (TBTF), ossia le banche ritenute troppo grandi per fallire. Una banca è considerata TBTF se si ritiene che le conseguenze del suo fallimento possano ripercuotersi sull'intero sistema finanziario. Al fine di prevenire tale rischio, il regolamento proposto imporrebbe un divieto di attività di natura speculativa (negoziazione per conto proprio, ossia usando mezzi propri invece di agire per conto dei clienti) e contemplerebbe la possibilità di separare altre attività di negoziazione a rischio svolte da tali banche. Le nuove norme conferirebbero altresì alle autorità di vigilanza il potere di imporre alle banche di separare determinate attività di negoziazione potenzialmente rischiose dalla funzione di raccolta di depositi se l'esercizio di tali attività compromette la stabilità finanziaria. La proposta si basa sulle raccomandazioni formulate dal gruppo di esperti ad alto livello presieduto dal governatore della Banca di Finlandia Erkki Liikanen.

Il seguente link rimanda al testo e all'illustrazione del contesto della proposta di regolamento:
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/bank/structural-reform/index_en.htm.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-000151/14
to the Commission
Mario Borghezio (NI)
(9 January 2014)

Subject: Worrying about-turn by the Commission on banking separation

Persistent rumours reported in the *Financial Times* on 6 January 2014 suggest that the Commission is planning to propose a directive, which, while following up the recommendations set out in the Liikanen Report concerning the separation of higher-risk banking activities from those of the retail banks, which was prompted by the need to prevent a repeat of the 2008 financial crisis, would not require a complete split, as provided for by the US Glass-Steagall Act.

If this information is correct, can the Commission say whether this unexpected abandonment of a rigorous policy of banking separation was prompted by intervention from the ECB or by pressure from the powerful European banking lobby?

Answer given by Mr Barnier on behalf of the Commission
(17 March 2014)

On 29 January 2014, the European Commission adopted a proposal for a regulation on structural measures improving the resilience of EU credit institutions. The proposed regulation would prevent the biggest banks from engaging in the risky activity of proprietary trading. The proposal completes the financial regulatory reforms undertaken over the last few years by setting out rules on structural changes for 'too-big-to-fail banks' (TBTF). A bank is considered TBTF when the consequences of its failure are believed to be detrimental for the financial system as a whole. In order to prevent this risk from materialising, the proposal would impose a ban on speculative activities (proprietary trading, i.e. trading using own money as opposed to on behalf of customers) and caters for the potential separation of other risky trading activities carried out by these banks. The new rules would also give supervisors the power to require banks to separate certain potentially risky trading activities from their deposit-taking business if the pursuit of such activities compromises financial stability. The proposal builds on the recommendations made by the High Level Expert Group chaired by the Governor of the Bank of Finland, Mr Erkki Liikanen.

Please find the text of the draft regulation and explanatory information under the following link:
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/bank/structural-reform/index_en.htm

(Versão portuguesa)

Pergunta com pedido de resposta escrita E-000153/14
à Comissão
João Ferreira (GUE/NGL) e Inês Cristina Zuber (GUE/NGL)
(9 de janeiro de 2014)

Assunto: Apoios à despoluição da Ria Formosa e à promoção de uma fileira produtiva

Ano após ano, têm sido adiadas importantes intervenções na Ria Formosa — como dragagens que possibilitem a circulação e renovação da massa de água lagunar ou a construção das infraestruturas de tratamento de águas residuais —, indispensáveis à manutenção da boa qualidade da massa de água, da qual depende, por sua vez, um conjunto amplo de atividades socioeconómicas de grande importância para a região do Algarve, de que a apanha de marisco é um exemplo. A degradação da qualidade da massa de água tem justificado, por diversas vezes, períodos mais ou menos longos de interrupção forçada da atividade, para além de uma elevada mortalidade de bivalves, que acarreta consequências sociais e económicas profundamente negativas para muitos milhares de famílias e para toda a região.

Em aditamento a perguntas anteriormente feitas sobre este assunto (E-001991/2010, E-001992/2010, E-010895/2012), solicitamos à Comissão que nos informe sobre o seguinte:

1. Que verbas do novo Quadro Financeiro Plurianual (2014-2020) poderão apoiar a realização de ações como:

a) a realização operações de dragagem e de abertura de barras,

b) investimentos nas Estações de Tratamento de Águas Residuais,

c) um levantamento exaustivo das fontes de poluição e de deterioração da qualidade da água em todas as zonas estuarino-lagunares e litorais de produção comercial de moluscos bivalves, determinando a origem da contaminação microbiológica dos bivalves,

d) um plano de intervenção de médio prazo para as zonas estuarino-lagunares e litorais de produção comercial de moluscos bivalves com classificação inferior a A, com vista à melhoria da qualidade da água e à eliminação de fontes de poluição e contaminação microbiológica dos bivalves, e

e) a implementação de uma política de promoção de uma fileira produtiva em torno das pescas e da produção/apanha de bivalves, que potencie a criação de emprego, o desenvolvimento da indústria, o respeito pelo meio ambiente e a melhoria das condições de vida dos trabalhadores e das populações?

2. Quais as percentagens de cofinanciamento previstas em cada caso? Quais os procedimentos necessários à mobilização dessas verbas e quais os prazos envolvidos?

Resposta dada por Johannes Hahn em nome da Comissão
(13 de março de 2014)

A Comissão está atualmente a negociar o acordo de parceria de 2014-2020, bem como programas de acompanhamento com Portugal, pelo que não está em posição de dar mais informações até que as negociações sejam concluídas.

A abordagem da gestão partilhada continuará a ser aplicada em relação à execução dos fundos europeus estruturais e de investimento. Neste contexto, a seleção dos projetos continuará a ser da responsabilidade das autoridades nacionais competentes que gerem os programas, devendo a aprovação dos projetos estar em conformidade com as regulamentações nacionais e os critérios de seleção estabelecidos.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-000153/14
to the Commission
João Ferreira (GUE/NGL) and Inês Cristina Zuber (GUE/NGL)
(9 January 2014)

Subject: Aid for cleaning up the Ria Formosa and encouraging productive activity

Essential public works in the Ria Formosa have been put off year after year. Dredging to improve water circulation and renewal in the lagoons and the construction of waste water treatment plants are badly needed to maintain good water quality. A wide range of socioeconomic activities of great importance to the Algarve region, such as shellfish gathering, depend on this. Deteriorating water quality has forced these activities to close down on several occasions for short or sometimes longer periods and has also caused large numbers of bivalves to die off, with serious social and economic consequences for many thousands of families and the region as a whole.

Further to previous questions tabled on this subject (E-001991/2010, E-001992/2010 and E-010895/2012), we would ask the Commission to provide the following information:

1. What money is available in the new Multiannual Financial Framework (2014-2020) to support measures such as:

a) dredging and sand bar clearance operations,

b) investment in waste water treatment plants,

c) a thorough survey of sources of pollution and water quality deterioration in all estuary- lagoon and coastal areas where bivalve molluscs are produced commercially, in order to identify the source of any microbiological contamination of bivalves,

d) a plan for medium-term intervention in those estuary-lagoon and coastal areas where bivalve molluscs are produced commercially which have anything less than an ‘A’ rating, with a view to improving water quality and eliminating sources of pollution and microbiological contamination of bivalves, and

e) implementation of a policy to encourage productive activity centred around fishing and bivalve production or gathering, so as to promote job creation, development of the sector, respect for the environment and improved living conditions for workers and communities?

2. What co-financing percentages are provided for in each case? What procedures are required to mobilise these funds, and what time periods are involved?

Answer given by Mr Hahn on behalf of the Commission
(13 March 2014)

The Commission is currently negotiating the 2014-2020 partnership agreement and accompanying programmes with Portugal. The Commission is therefore not in a position to give more information until the negotiations have been concluded.

The shared management approach will continue to apply for the implementation of the European Structural and Investment Funds. In this context, the selection of projects will continue to be the responsibility of the competent national authorities managing the programmes and the approval of projects will have to be in compliance with national rules and the established selection criteria.

(Versión española)

Pregunta con solicitud de respuesta escrita E-000155/14
a la Comisión
Willy Meyer (GUE/NGL)
(9 de enero de 2014)

Asunto: Renovación del título nobiliario del militar fascista José Enrique Varela Iglesias

El pasado 18 de diciembre el Ministro de Justicia del Gobierno de España renovaba, a través de una Orden Ministerial, el título de «Marqués de Varela de San Fernando» a Don José Enrique Varela y Urquijo, nieto del militar fascista José Enrique Varela Iglesias, que recibiera su título nobiliario de manos del dictador Francisco Franco en 1951 a título póstumo.

El título otorgado al militar fascista tenía una validez de dos generaciones, quedando invalidado tras la muerte de su hijo el pasado mayo. A través de esta orden el Gobierno garantiza el título, mostrando su férreo compromiso con el reconocimiento a través de las instituciones oficiales a los criminales fascistas que acabaron con el régimen democrático de la segunda república española.

José Enrique Varela Iglesias fue el general que ocupó la ciudad de Cádiz en Julio de 1936, desencadenando un genocidio político que supuso la muerte de miles de personas inocentes por su orientación política. Estas víctimas no han recibido reconocimiento alguno desde las instituciones oficiales y sus restos continúan esparcidos en lugares desconocidos para los parientes. Sin embargo el Gobierno de España continúa con la línea de reconocer desde las instituciones oficiales del Estado a los criminales fascistas que asesinaron impunemente en el país durante la guerra civil y la dictadura. Pese a las numerosas críticas recibidas, así como a la querella contra los crímenes del fascismo presentada por la justicia argentina, el Gobierno de España no ha dejado en los últimos meses de celebrar o permitir todo tipo de actos de enaltecimiento del fascismo desde instituciones oficiales.

¿Conoce la Comisión la citada Orden Ministerial?

¿Considera que la renovación del citado título nobiliario al militar fascista constituye una acción contraria a lo establecido en la Decisión Marco 2008/913/JAI?

En su respuesta a mi pregunta E-005538/2013 afirmaba «no está permitido incoar procedimientos de infracción sobre este asunto hasta el 1 de diciembre de 2014», ¿piensa abrir un procedimiento de infracción al Gobierno de España por sus continuos actos de enaltecimiento del fascismo?

Respuesta de la Sra. Reding en nombre de la Comisión
(13 de marzo de 2014)

Como ya se ha señalado en repetidas respuestas a estas preguntas, la Decisión marco 2008/913/JAI obliga a los Estados miembros a castigar la incitación pública e intencionada a la violencia o al odio dirigidos contra un grupo de personas o un miembro de tal grupo, definido en relación con la raza, el color, la religión, la ascendencia o el origen nacional o étnico. Corresponde a las autoridades nacionales investigar los casos individuales para determinar si representan incitación a la violencia o al odio y extraer las consecuencias necesarias en el marco del Derecho penal.

El informe de la Comisión sobre la aplicación de la citada Decisión marco se publicó el 27 de enero de 2014 y durante el presente año se mantendrán debates bilaterales con los Estados miembros, con el fin de garantizar la incorporación íntegra y correcta de la Decisión marco al Derecho nacional.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-000155/14
to the Commission
Willy Meyer (GUE/NGL)
(9 January 2014)

Subject: Renewal of fascist military officer José Enrique Varela Iglesias's title of nobility

On 18 December 2013 the Spanish Ministry of Justice issued a Ministerial Order renewing José Enrique Varela y Urquijo's title of 'Marquis of San Fernando de Varela', a title that his grandfather, fascist military officer José Enrique Varela Iglesias, was handed posthumously by the dictator Francisco Franco in 1951.

The title granted to the fascist military officer was valid for two generations, and became invalid following the death of his son last May. With this Ministerial Order the government is safeguarding the title, demonstrating its firm commitment to recognise via official institutions the fascist criminals who brought down the democratic regime of the Second Spanish Republic.

José Enrique Varela Iglesias was the general who occupied the city of Cadiz in July 1936, unleashing a wave of political genocide that saw thousands of innocent people killed for their political beliefs. These victims have not received any recognition from the official institutions and to this day their relatives have no idea of the whereabouts of their remains. However, the Spanish Government is sticking to its policy of recognising via official state institutions fascist criminals who went unpunished for murders carried out during the Civil War and the dictatorship. Despite the great many criticisms this has attracted, and the lawsuit filed against the crimes of fascism by the Argentine justice system, in the past few months the Spanish Government has been relentlessly celebrating or allowing all kinds of glorifications of fascism by official institutions.

Is the Commission aware of the abovementioned Ministerial Order?

Does it consider the renewal of the abovementioned fascist military officer's title of nobility to be an action that contravenes Framework Decision 2008/913/JHA?

In your answer to my Question E-005538/2013, you stated that 'it is not authorised to launch infringement proceedings in this regard until 1 December 2014'; are you thinking of launching infringement proceedings against the Spanish Government for its constant glorifications of fascism?

Answer given by Mrs Reding on behalf of the Commission
(13 March 2014)

As has been stated in several previous replies to such questions, Framework Decision 2008/913/JHA obliges Member States to penalise the intentional public incitement to violence or hatred directed against a group of persons or a member of such a group defined by reference to race, colour, religion, descent or national or ethnic origin. It is for national authorities to investigate individual cases to determine whether they represent incitement to violence or hatred, and to draw the necessary consequences under criminal law.

The Commission's report on the implementation of this framework Decision was published on 27 January 2014 and bilateral discussions will be held with Member States throughout this year with a view to ensuring full and correct transposition of the framework Decision into national law.

(Versión española)

Pregunta con solicitud de respuesta escrita E-000156/14
a la Comisión (Vicepresidenta/Alta Representante)
Willy Meyer (GUE/NGL)
(9 de enero de 2014)

Asunto: VP/HR — Reforma de la Ley de prevención de la infiltración y protestas de inmigrantes en Israel

El pasado 5 de enero tuvo lugar en Tel Aviv una histórica manifestación de la comunidad de inmigrantes que habita en la ciudad israelí en protesta contra la reforma de la Ley de prevención de la infiltración que, en la práctica, impedirá que miles de refugiados puedan acogerse a este estatuto jurídico.

La reforma de la ley de inmigración israelí, aprobada el pasado mes de diciembre, introduce la posibilidad de encarcelamiento de los inmigrantes que no dispongan de documentos en regla. Dicho encarcelamiento se puede prorrogar hasta un año, e incluso puede llegarse a encarcelar a inmigrantes de manera indefinida. Para estas detenciones el Gobierno dispone de los centros de internamiento que, según numerosos testimonios, se trata de «cárceles abiertas».

En Israel habitan más de 60 000 personas de origen africano, en su mayoría procedentes de Eritrea y Sudán, que entraron en el país entre 2006 y 2012 y ahora se podrían ver amenazadas por el control estipulado en esta reforma legislativa. Ante este proceso de movilización sin precedentes en el país, el Gobierno de Benjamín Netanyahu reafirmó su política de criminalización sosteniendo frente a las críticas que «no son refugiados, sino gente que viola la ley».

Walpurga Englbrecht, representante del ACNUR, ha criticado contundentemente el viraje de la política migratoria israelí, afirmando que los centros de internamiento en realidad lo son de detención, así como pidiendo al país que examine individualmente las peticiones de asilo político de los refugiados, les permita tener protección internacional y deje definitivamente de denominarlos «infiltrados».

¿Conoce la vicepresidenta/alta representante la reforma de la política de inmigración israelí?

Considerando su preocupación, expresada en su respuesta a la pregunta E-009712/2012, ¿cuál es su opinión ante esta reforma de la Ley de prevención de la infiltración?

¿Considera la vicepresidenta/alta representante la congelación del Acuerdo de Asociación UE-Israel como medida de presión para el cumplimiento del Derecho internacional en materia de asilo político por parte de Israel?

Respuesta de la Alta Representante y Vicepresidenta Ashton en nombre de la Comisión
(26 de marzo de 2014)

Los temas de migración y asilo se debaten con Israel a todos los niveles pertinentes, en particular en el marco del diálogo político UE-Israel, en el subcomité UE-Israel sobre migración y en el grupo de trabajo informal sobre derechos humanos.

La UE es consciente de que Israel aplicó una política altamente disuasoria mediante la construcción de la valla fronteriza con Egipto y la estricta aplicación de la enmienda de 2012 a la ley contra las infiltraciones, que permite la detención automática de inmigrantes ilegales y solicitantes de asilo durante un periodo de hasta tres años y el internamiento de inmigrantes por delito sin juicio previo.

La UE ha observado también que el Tribunal Supremo israelí consideró por unanimidad en septiembre que la enmienda era anticonstitucional y contradecía el derecho básico relativo a la dignidad humana y la libertad.

En diciembre, la Knesset aprobó una nueva enmienda a la ley contra las infiltraciones, que permite la detención durante un año de los solicitantes de asilo recién llegados y el traslado de los que ya se encuentran detenidos a un centro de detención abierto por un periodo indefinido. Tras la aprobación de esta nueva ley, los solicitantes de asilo han organizado manifestaciones y huelgas públicas exigiendo que se reconozcan sus derechos.

La UE ha comunicado a Israel su preocupación al respecto y continuará siguiendo de cerca la evolución de la situación. Además, ha pedido a las autoridades israelíes, por las vías apropiadas, que adapten su práctica a las normas internacionales.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-000156/14
to the Commission (Vice-President/High Representative)
Willy Meyer (GUE/NGL)
(9 January 2014)

Subject: VP/HR — Reform of the Prevention of Infiltration Act and protests by immigrants in Israel

On 5 January this year, a historical demonstration was held in Tel Aviv by the city's immigrant community who were protesting against the reform of the Prevention of Infiltration Act, which in practice prevents thousands of refugees from seeking this legal status in Israel.

The Israeli immigration law reform, adopted last December, introduced the power to imprison immigrants without valid documents for up to one year, although this also established the ability to imprison immigrants indefinitely. The Government operates internment centres for such detentions, which are essentially 'open prisons', according to various witness accounts.

There are more than 60 000 people of African origin living in Israel, the majority of whom came from Eritrea and Sudan between 2006 and 2012 and are now under threat of the controls established in this reform. Faced with this unprecedented act of mobilisation in the country, Benjamin Netanyahu's Government reiterated its policy of criminalisation and, when faced with criticism, insisted that 'they are not refugees; they are people who are breaking the law'.

Walpurga Englbrecht, a representative for the UNHCR, strongly condemned this turning point in Israeli immigration policy, stating that the internment centres are in fact detention centres, and called for the country to review refugees' requests for political asylum on an individual basis, to grant them international protection and to stop referring to them as 'infiltrators' once and for all.

Is the Vice-President/High Representative aware of Israel's immigration policy reform?

Considering their concerns, as expressed in the answer to Question E-009712/2012, what is their opinion on the reform of the Prevention of Infiltration Act?

Will the Vice-President/High Representative consider freezing the EU-Israel Association Agreement as a way of pressuring Israel to comply with international law on political asylum?

Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission
(26 March 2014)

The issue of migration and asylum is discussed with Israel at all relevant levels, in particular at the EU-Israel political dialogue, at the EU-Israel subcommittee on migration and the informal working group on human rights.

The EU has witnessed that Israel pursued a policy of strong deterrence through the completion of the Egypt-Israel border fence coupled with a vigorous enforcement of the 2012 amendment to the Anti-Infiltration Law, which allows for automatic detention of illegal migrants and asylum-seekers for up to three years. The same legislation allows the detention of migrants for criminal acts without trial.

The EU has also noted that the Israeli Supreme Court unanimously ruled in September that the amendment was unconstitutional and contradicted the basic law of human dignity and liberty.

A new Amendment to the Anti-Infiltration Law was adopted by the Knesset in December. The new law allows for a one year detention for newly arrived asylum-seekers and the transfer of those currently in detention to an open detention centre for an indefinite period. Following adoption of this new law, asylum-seekers have organised public demonstrations and strikes, demanding that their rights be recognised.

The EU has expressed its concerns on this issue to the Israeli side and will continue to closely follow developments and call upon Israeli authorities, in the appropriate format, to bring its practice in line with international standards.

(Versión española)

Pregunta con solicitud de respuesta escrita E-000165/14
a la Comisión
Willy Meyer (GUE/NGL)
(9 de enero de 2014)

Asunto: Factoría textil incendiada por los trabajadores en Bangladés e importación textil europea

El pasado 29 de noviembre, los trabajadores de una de las diez fábricas más grandes de todo el país provocaron un grave incendio que prácticamente destruyó unas instalaciones que producían ropas que venderían marcas occidentales, entre las que se encontraba Zara, una de las marcas del grupo empresarial español Inditex.

En anteriores preguntas, he expresado mi preocupación por la situación de los trabajadores textiles en Bangladés, así como por las prácticas esclavistas que se producen en muchos de los telares subcontratados por el grupo empresarial Inditex a lo largo de todo el mundo. Esta fábrica daba empleo a alrededor de 18 000 trabajadores, que producían todo tipo de ropas destinadas a la venta en grandes cadenas occidentales de primer orden en el sector textil, entre las que se encuentra Zara. Desde el gravísimo incendio ocurrido en Dacca el pasado 25 de abril de este mismo año, las organizaciones de trabajadores han denunciado continuamente la falta de medidas de seguridad y participación de los sindicatos en el diseño de las mismas.

Bangladés continúa siendo el mayor productor mundial del sector textil, produciendo todo tipo de prendas para las principales marcas comercializadas en todo el mundo. Este sector se ha visto afectado a lo largo de todo 2013 por una serie de trágicos accidentes e incendios, debido a la falta de seguridad en estos centros de producción, que ha llevado a los trabajadores a luchar por su propia seguridad. Sin embargo, esto no ha afectado un ápice a compañías como Inditex, que no han cesado lo más mínimo sus contratos con subcontratas en dicho país debido a los competitivos precios ofrecidos a costa de los derechos y la seguridad de los trabajadores. Este incendio es una pura muestra de la lucha de los trabajadores de Bangladés por el derecho a unas condiciones seguras en sus trabajos.

¿Considera que las empresas europeas que realizan sus compras en el sector textil de Bangladés lo hacen garantizando que se dé voz a los sindicatos en materia de seguridad? ¿De qué mecanismos dispone para comprobarlo?

¿Piensa publicar la información disponible sobre las compañías europeas que compran sus productos textiles en Bangladés para garantizar el derecho de los consumidores a ser informados? ¿Considera que dichas empresas podrían estar haciendo dumping social con el resto de empresas del sector que compran en países que respetan los derechos de los trabajadores?

Respuesta del Sr. Tajani en nombre de la Comisión
(26 de marzo de 2014)

En lo que respecta a las iniciativas sobre las actividades relativas a las condiciones de los trabajadores bangladesíes del sector textil, la Comisión remite a Su Señoría a su respuesta a la pregunta E-00164/2014 ([1]).

La Comisión no recaba información sobre las empresas europeas que compran productos textiles de Bangladesh ni dispone de información al respecto. A través de su estrategia sobre la responsabilidad social de las empresas (RSE) ([2]), la Comisión confía en que las empresas de la UE integren inquietudes sociales y acerca de los derechos humanos en sus operaciones empresariales, en particular respetando las normas internacionales sobre una conducta responsable de las empresas y poniendo en práctica en sus cadenas de suministro un sistema de diligencia debida basado en el riesgo.

En cuanto a la transparencia y el acceso a la información, la Comisión adoptó, el 16 de abril de 2013, una medida legislativa relativa a la divulgación de información no financiera por parte de determinadas grandes sociedades y determinados grupos. La propuesta obligaría a las grandes empresas a ofrecer en sus informes de gestión información relativa a las políticas, los resultados y los riesgos vinculados, entre otras cosas, con asuntos sociales y de los trabajadores y cuestiones relativas al respeto de los derechos humanos. El Parlamento Europeo y el Consejo han alcanzado ya un acuerdo sobre esta propuesta. Este acuerdo será sometido a votación por el Parlamento Europeo en una sesión plenaria lo más rápidamente posible ([3]).

Las organizaciones de interlocutores sociales de la UE del sector textil y sus afiliados nacionales ([4]), que están desarrollando su diálogo social autónomo y sectorial, han comenzado a trabajar en un proyecto conjunto sobre la RSE, de un año de duración, que cuenta con el apoyo financiero de la Comisión y que pretende elaborar un conjunto armonizado de directrices en este ámbito para el sector.

La Comisión está al corriente de ciertas iniciativas del sector privado en el ámbito textil para mejorar las condiciones de trabajo en todo el mundo, como es el caso de la *iniciativa para un comercio ético* (ETI) que ha suscrito Inditex.

([1]) http://www.europarl.europa.eu/plenary/es/parliamentary-questions.html
([2]) COM(2011) 681 final: Estrategia renovada de la UE para 2011-2014 sobre la responsabilidad social de las empresas.
([3]) COM(2013) 207: Propuesta de Directiva por la que se modifican las Directivas 78/660/CEE y 83/349/CEE del Consejo en lo que respecta a la divulgación de información no financiera e información sobre la diversidad por parte de determinadas grandes sociedades y determinados grupos.
([4]) http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=480&langId=en&intPageId=1858

(English version)

Question for written answer E-000165/14
to the Commission
Willy Meyer (GUE/NGL)
(9 January 2014)

Subject: Textile factory set alight by workers in Bangladesh and textile imports to Europe

On 29 November last year, workers at one of the 10 largest factories in Bangladesh started a serious fire that practically destroyed some of the facilities used to produce clothes that are sold by Western brands, including Zara, a brand of the Spanish Inditex Group.

In previous questions, I have voiced my concern about the conditions of textile workers in Bangladesh, as well as the slave-labour practices used in many of the textile mills subcontracted by the Inditex Group across the world. This factory employed around 18 000 workers, who produced many different types of clothes intended for sale by leading clothing chains in the West, including Zara. Since the extremely serious fire that occurred in Dhaka on 25 April 2013, labour organisations have been continually speaking out against insufficient safety measures and the fact that the unions are not involved in drawing them up.

Bangladesh remains the world's largest textile producer, manufacturing all kinds of garments for the biggest global brands. Throughout 2013, the textile sector was plagued by a series of tragic accidents and fires stemming from insufficient safety measures in these production centres, which has led to workers fighting for their own safety. However, companies like Inditex have still not taken the slightest bit of notice and continue to subcontract in the country, because of the competitive prices on offer, at the expense of the rights and safety of workers. This arson attack is just one example of the Bangladeshi workers' fight for the right to work in safe conditions.

Does the Commission believe that European companies that buy from the textile sector in Bangladesh also ensure that the unions' voices are heard on matters relating to safety? What mechanisms does it have in place to verify this?

Does the Commission intend to publish the information available on European companies that buy textile products from Bangladesh in order to guarantee the right of consumers to remain informed? Does it believe that these companies could be using social dumping, to the detriment of the companies in the textile industry which import from countries where workers' rights are respected?

Answer given by Mr Tajani on behalf of the Commission
(26 March 2014)

On initiatives regarding activities on the conditions of textile workers in Bangladesh, the Commission would refer the Honourable Member to its reply to Question E-00164/2014 ([1]).

The Commission does not have and collect information on European companies that buy textile products from Bangladesh. Through its strategy on Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) ([2]), it expects EU enterprises to integrate social and human rights concerns into their business operations, including through adhering to international standards of responsible business conduct and carrying out risk-based due diligence in their supply chains.

In terms of transparency and access to information, the Commission adopted on 16 April 2013 a legislative measure on the disclosure of non-financial information by certain large companies and groups. The proposal would require large companies to report in their management reports information on policies, outcomes and risks concerning, *inter alia*, social and employee-related matters and respect for human rights. The EP and the Council have already reached agreement on this proposal. This agreement will be voted by the EP in plenary as soon as possible ([3]).

The EU social partner organisations of the textile sector and their national affiliates ([4]) are developing their autonomous social dialogue and started working on a one-year sector-specific joint project on CSR, which is financially supported by the Commission and aims at producing a harmonised set of CSR guidelines for the sector.

The Commission is aware of private sector initiatives in the textile sector to enhance the working conditions across the globe, such as the ethical trading initiative (ETI), which Inditex has signed up.

([1]) http://www.europarl.europa.eu/plenary/en/parliamentary-questions.html
([2]) COM(2011) 681, 'A renewed EU strategy 2011-14 for Corporate Social Responsibility'.
([3]) COM(2013) 207, 'Proposal for a directive amending Council Directives 78/660/EEC and 83/349/EEC as regards disclosure of non-financial and diversity information by certain large companies and groups'.
([4]) http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=480&langId=en&intPageId=1858

(Ελληνική έκδοση)

Ερώτηση με αίτημα γραπτής απάντησης E-000167/14
προς την Επιτροπή
Nikolaos Chountis (GUE/NGL)
(9 Ιανουαρίου 2014)

Θέμα: Εναρμόνιση αντικειμενικών αξιών ακινήτων με τις πραγματικές στην Ελλάδα

Προκειμένου για τη φορολόγηση ακινήτων στην Ελλάδα, ο φόρος δεν προσδιορίζεται με βάση την τρέχουσα αγοραία αξία αυτών, αλλά με βάση την αντικειμενική αξία, δηλαδή βάση συντελεστών (π.χ., περιοχής, παλαιότητας, μεγέθους, κ.λπ.), που κατά ορισμένα χρονικά διαστήματα αναθεωρούνται από την Πολιτεία. Με δεδομένο ότι:

α. μετά την εκδήλωση της κρίσης, οι πραγματικές αξίες των ακινήτων στην Ελλάδα έχουν κυριολεκτικά καταρρεύσει και ότι οι τεκμαρτές «αντικειμενικές αξίες» έχουν παραμείνει στα επίπεδα προ της κρίσης, οδηγώντας σε εξωφρενικές καταστάσεις, αφού για ακίνητα τα οποία φορολογούνται με βάση την «αντικειμενική αξία», προκύπτουν φόροι δυσανάλογα μεγάλοι, που, σε ορισμένες περιπτώσεις, ισοδυναμούν με δήμευση της ακίνητης περιουσίας των πολιτών,

β. στο πλαίσιο της απόφασης 2011/734/ΕΕ του Συμβουλίου, όπως τροποποιήθηκε από την απόφαση 2013/6/ΕΕ της 4.12.2012, η Ελλάδα υποχρεούταν, μεταξύ άλλων, στην «πλήρη εφαρμογή μιας τυποποιημένης διαδικασίας για την αναθεώρηση των αντικειμενικών αξιών των ακινήτων, με στόχο την καλύτερη ευθυγράμμισή τους προς τις αγοραίες τιμές υπό την ευθύνη της διεύθυνσης φορολογίας κεφαλαίου», μέχρι το Μάρτιο του 2013,

γ. οι συνταγματικές ρυθμίσεις στα κράτη μέλη συγκλίνουν στην παραδοχή ότι «ο φόρος ακίνητης περιουσίας δεν θα πρέπει να θίγει το καθ' εαυτό δικαίωμα της ιδιοκτησίας», ερωτάται η Επιτροπή:

1. Γιατί δεν έχει αντιδράσει στο γεγονός της μη εναρμόνισης των αντικειμενικών αξιών με τις πραγματικές, όπως ορίζεται στην απόφαση 2011/734/ΕΕ του Συμβουλίου, όπως τροποποιήθηκε από την 2013/6/ΕΕ; Αυτό δεν αποτελεί κατάφωρη αδικία σε βάρος των φυσικών προσώπων, τα οποία καλούνται να πληρώνουν τεράστιους φόρους, οι οποίοι επιβάλλονται σε «ανύπαρκτες» αξίες;

2. Τι θα πράξει προκειμένου η ελληνική κυβέρνηση να προχωρήσει άμεσα στον εξορθολογισμό των αντικειμενικών αξιών των ακινήτων, ώστε να ταυτιστούν με τις πραγματικές τους τιμές;

Απάντηση του κ. Rehn εξ ονόματος της Επιτροπής
(17 Μαρτίου 2014)

Το μνημόνιο συνεννόησης για τους ειδικούς όρους της οικονομικής πολιτικής στο πλαίσιο του 2ου προγράμματος οικονομικής προσαρμογής για την Ελλάδα ([1]), ορίζει ότι οι ελληνικές αρχές εξακολουθούν να εργάζονται για τη δημιουργία μιας τυποποιημένης διαδικασίας αναθεώρησης της αντικειμενικής αξίας των ακινήτων, ώστε να εναρμονιστούν καλύτερα με τις τιμές της αγοράς. Προς τούτο απαιτείται να είναι διαθέσιμα επαρκή επικαιροποιημένα δεδομένα σχετικά με τις τρέχουσες τιμές, καθώς και η ανάπτυξη κατάλληλων τεχνικών για την αποτίμηση των εμπορικών ιδιοκτησιών. Λαμβανομένων υπόψη των περιορισμών αυτών, αναμένεται ότι για το οικονομικό έτος 2016 θα υπάρχει τυποποιημένη διαδικασία φορολογίας ακινήτων.

([1]) http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/occasional_paper/2013/pdf/ocp159_en.pdf

(English version)

Question for written answer E-000167/14
to the Commission
Nikolaos Chountis (GUE/NGL)
(9 January 2014)

Subject: Alignment of tax-assessed property values with actual market prices in Greece

Property tax in Greece, tax is based not on current market prices but on tax-assessed property values calculated in accordance with a number of factors (such as location, age, size, etc.), which are periodically reviewed by the Government.

Since the onset of the crisis, property market price in Greece have literally collapsed, while theoretical 'tax-assessed values' have remained at pre-crisis levels, with the result that disproportionately high taxes are being imposed on properties based on their 'tax-assessed value', a totally inadmissible situation sometimes leading to actual loss of ownership.

Under Council Decision 2011/734/EU, as amended by Decision 2013/6/EU of 4 December 2012, Greece was obliged, *inter alia*, to 'fully implement a standardised procedure for the revision of the tax-assessed property values in order to better align them with market prices under the responsibility of the Directorate of Capital Taxation' by March 2013.

In view of this and the fact that it is an accepted constitutional principle in the Member States that 'immovable property tax must not affect the right to ownership':

1. Why has the Commission not reacted to the failure to bring tax-assessed values into line with actual market prices, as required by Council Decision 2011/734/EU, amended by Decision 2013/6/EU? Is this not a flagrant injustice against individuals faced with huge tax bills based on 'fictitious' property values?

2. How will it ensure that the Greek Government brings tax-assessed property values into line with actual market prices without delay?

Answer given by Mr Rehn on behalf of the Commission
(17 March 2014)

The Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) of Specific Economic Policy conditionality under the 2nd economic adjustment programme for Greece ([1]), stipulates that the Greek authorities continue to work on a standard procedure for the revision of legal values of real estate in order to better align them with market prices. This requires the availability of sufficient timely data on current prices and the development of appropriate techniques to value commercial properties. Taking into account these constraints, a standard procedure should be in place for the purposes of real estate taxation for the fiscal year 2016.

([1]) http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/occasional_paper/2013/pdf/ocp159_en.pdf

(Ελληνική έκδοση)

Ερώτηση με αίτημα γραπτής απάντησης E-000169/14
προς την Επιτροπή
Nikolaos Chountis (GUE/NGL)
(9 Ιανουαρίου 2014)

Θέμα: Πτώση ρεκόρ των εξαγωγών στην Ελλάδα

Σύμφωνα με πρόσφατα στοιχεία της Ελληνικής Στατιστικής Αρχής, οι εξαγωγές της Ελλάδας το μήνα Νοέμβριο του 2013, σε σχέση με τον ίδιο μήνα του προηγούμενου έτους, παρουσίασαν μείωση ρεκόρ, της τάξης του 22,6% για το σύνολο των εξαγωγών και 7,9% για τις εξαγωγές χωρίς τα πετρελαιοειδή.

Με δεδομένο ότι σύμφωνα με τις εκτιμήσεις της Ευρωπαϊκής Επιτροπής και άλλων οικονομικών αναλυτών για την Ελλάδα, η συνολική κατανάλωση μειώνεται, η ακαθάριστη δημιουργία κεφαλαίου μειώνεται, η σωρευτική μείωση του κόστους εργασίας την τριετία 2012-2014 έχει φθάσει στο 21,7% και οι δημόσιες δαπάνες βαίνουν μειούμενες, λόγω της δημοσιονομικής προσαρμογής, ερωτάται η Επιτροπή:

1. Με ποιο τρόπο θα επιτευχθεί η περιβόητη ανάκαμψη της ελληνικής οικονομίας, όταν μέσα στο φαύλο κύκλο της ύφεσης ακόμα και οι καθαρές εξαγωγές, μειώνονται;

2. Πώς αξιολογείται το ελληνικό πρόγραμμα οικονομικής προσαρμογής μετά από 3 χρόνια εφαρμογής του, όταν όλοι οι οικονομικοί και κοινωνικοί δείκτες, αποδεικνύουν τις καταστροφικές επιπτώσεις του;

Απάντηση του κ. Rehn εξ ονόματος της Επιτροπής
(17 Μαρτίου 2014)

1. Τα στατιστικά στοιχεία που αναφέρθηκαν αφορούν εμπορικές συναλλαγές, δηλαδή εξαγωγές και εισαγωγές αγαθών, χωρίς να περιλαμβάνουν τις συναλλαγές στον τομέα των υπηρεσιών (δηλ. τον τουρισμό), έναν από τους μοχλούς οικονομικής μεγέθυνσης της Ελλάδας. Όντως, η ισχυρή ανάκαμψη του τουρισμού, που σημειώθηκε το καλοκαίρι του 2013, είχε ήδη δώσει ώθηση στην οικονομική βελτίωση το δεύτερο τρίμηνο του 2013 και συνέβαλε στην επίτευξη καλού αποτελέσματος για το ΑΕΠ το τρίτο τρίμηνο του έτους. Ως εκ τούτου, η πραγματική αύξηση του ΑΕΠ αναθεωρήθηκε προς τα πάνω, σε -4,0% για το 2013.

Για το 2014, το πραγματικό ΑΕΠ αναμένεται να αυξηθεί με ρυθμό 0,6% ετησίως, ωθούμενο από τις εξαγωγές και τις επενδύσεις. Το 2015, αναμένεται περαιτέρω ενίσχυση της ανάκαμψης. Η πραγματική αύξηση του ΑΕΠ αναμένεται σε +2,9%, με κύριο μοχλό τις επενδύσεις. Το έλλειμμα του ισοζυγίου τρεχουσών συναλλαγών προβλέπεται να ανέλθει σε -2,3% του ΑΕΠ το 2013, αναμένεται δε να μειωθεί σε -1,9% το 2014 και σε -1,6% το 2015, καθώς με την ανάκαμψη θα αυξηθούν εξαγωγές και εισαγωγές.

2. Με το ελληνικό πρόγραμμα απετράπη η άμεση ανεξέλεγκτη χρεοκοπία της χώρας και η αθέτηση των υποχρεώσεών της (που περιλαμβάνουν και τις κοινωνικές παροχές για τους Έλληνες πολίτες και τους μισθούς των υπαλλήλων του δημόσιου τομέα), ενώ περιορίστηκε ο κίνδυνος μεταδοτικών παρενεργειών. Χωρίς το πρόγραμμα, η απομόχλευση θα ήταν πολύ ταχύτερη, με αντίστοιχα επαχθέστερες και απότομες οικονομικές, δημοσιονομικές και κοινωνικές συνέπειες.

3. Στόχος του προγράμματος ήταν εξαρχής να δημιουργηθεί μια σταθερότερη βάση για την οικονομική μεγέθυνση και τη δημιουργία θέσεων απασχόλησης, στηριζόμενης σε βιώσιμα δημόσια οικονομικά, σταθερό χρηματοπιστωτικό σύστημα και ανταγωνιστικότερη οικονομία. Η Ελλάδα προχώρησε σε φιλόδοξη δημοσιονομική εξυγίανση, ο τραπεζικός τομέας της ανακεφαλαιοποιήθηκε, ενώ η πρόοδος όσον αφορά τις διαρθρωτικές μεταρρυθμίσεις έχει ήδη βελτιώσει την ανταγωνιστικότητα και τους όρους άσκησης επιχειρηματικής δραστηριότητας. Το έργο δεν έχει όμως ολοκληρωθεί και η πλήρης εφαρμογή του προγράμματος είναι προϋπόθεση ζωτικής σημασίας για τη δημιουργία ισχυρής βάσης για την αειφόρο ανάπτυξη και την απασχόληση.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-000169/14
to the Commission
Nikolaos Chountis (GUE/NGL)
(9 January 2014)

Subject: Record fall in Greek exports

According to recent figures published by the Greek Statistical Authority, Greece's exports in November 2013, compared with the same month last year, had fallen by a record amount, namely 22.6% for total exports and 7.9% for exports excluding petroleum.

Given that, according to estimates by the Commission and other economic analysts concerning Greece, total consumption is falling, gross capital formation is in decline, the cumulative reduction of labour costs for the three years 2012-2014 is 21.7% and public spending is also decreasing because of fiscal adjustment, will the Commission say:

1. How can the much discussed recovery of the Greek economy take place, when in the vicious cycle of recession even net exports are falling?

2. How does it evaluate the Greek economic adjustment programme after three years of implementation, when all the economic and social indicators show that its impact has been devastating?

Answer given by Mr Rehn on behalf of the Commission
(17 March 2014)

1. The statistics mentioned concern commercial trades, i.e. exports and imports of goods, and do not include trade in services (i.e. tourism), one of Greece's growth engines. The strong revival of tourism in the summer 2013 triggered the economic improvement in the second quarter of 2013 and supported a good GDP reading in the third quarter. Accordingly real GDP growth has been revised upwards to -4.0% in 2013.

For 2014 real GDP is expected to expand at an annual rate of 0.6% supported by export and investments. In 2015, the recovery is forecast to gain strength. The real GDP growth is expected at +2,9% with investment becoming its main engine. The current-account deficit is projected at -2.3% of GDP for 2013, expected to narrow to -1.9% in 2014 and then to -1.6% in 2015, as exports and imports pick up with the recovery.

2. The Greek programme averted an immediate disorderly default of the country on its obligations (that include also welfare benefits for the Greek citizens and wages of the employees in the public sector) and limited contagion. Without the programme the deleveraging would have been much faster, with commensurately more severe and abrupt economic, financial and social consequences.

3. From the start, the objective of the programme was to build a more solid basis for growth and job creation, based on sustainable public finances, a stable financial system, and a more competitive economy., Greece has undertaken an ambitious fiscal consolidation, its banking sector has been recapitalised and progress with structural reforms has already improved competitiveness and the conditions for doing business. But the task is not complete, and full implementation of the programme is crucial to set a strong basis for sustainable growth and jobs.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-000172/14
to the Commission
David Martin (S&D)
(9 January 2014)

Subject: Defence procurement between two independent Member States

Under the terms of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), the UK is required to act fairly, transparently and openly by meeting EU-level public procurement requirements. An exception can be applied under Article 346 TFEU in respect of the 'production of or trade in arms, munitions and war material' where a Member State considers it necessary for the protection of its essential national security interests. In those circumstances the UK can, like all Member States, derogate from the Treaty to the extent necessary to protect those interests by invoking Article 346.

It has recently been stated that, should Scotland vote for independence in this year's referendum, the rest of the UK (rUK) could conclude a 'credible and sensible arrangement' with regard to the procurement of defence contracts with an independent Scottish nation, i.e. it could continue to benefit from the application of an exemption from EU procurement law for UK MoD orders.

In light of the article 346 TFEU exemption as currently applied, can the Commission advise as to the whether the rUK could conclude procurement contracts with Scotland without going through the competitive tendering process laid down by the European Union?

Answer given by Mr Barnier on behalf of the Commission
(12 March 2014)

The Commission refers the Honourable Member to its replies to parliamentary questions E-008133/2012, P-009756/2012, and P-009862/2012 [1].

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(1) http://www.europarl.europa.eu/plenary/en/parliamentary-questions.html

(Nederlandse versie)

Vraag met verzoek om schriftelijk antwoord E-000180/14
aan de Commissie
Laurence J. A. J. Stassen (NI)
(9 januari 2014)

Betreft: Visumliberalisatie Turkije onwettig

Turkije heeft de „terugnameovereenkomst voor mensen uit derde landen" ondertekend. „In ruil hiervoor" zullen de EU en Turkije werken aan visumliberalisatie. In het Raadsdocument van 30 november 2012 ([1]) worden echter voorwaarden opgesomd, waaraan Turkije dient te voldoen om überhaupt voor visumliberalisatie in aanmerking te komen. Zo dient het land op het gebied van migratiebeheer

— deugdelijke grenscontroles uit te voeren met correcte apparatuur en opgeleid personeel, in overeenstemming met internationaal vluchtelingenverdrag en het principe van non-refoulement,

— samen te werken met Frontex en aangrenzende EU-lidstaten,

— niet-discriminerende, visavrije toegang tot Turkije voor alle EU-burgers te verlenen,

— (illegale) migratiestromen te monitoren.

Wat betreft de nationale veiligheid dient Turkije

— de strijd tegen terrorisme en georganiseerde misdaad te intensiveren,

— de strijd tegen mensenhandel te intensiveren en genoeg middelen ter beschikking te stellen voor de opvang van en hulp aan slachtoffers van mensenhandel,

— de strijd tegen corruptie te intensiveren en ethische codes in te voeren voor autoriteiten die met reisdocumenten te maken hebben.

1. Is de Commissie thans van mening dat Turkije aan bovengenoemde voorwaarden voldoet? Zo ja, met welke feiten staaft zij dat dan, voor elke afzonderlijke voorwaarde?

2. Deelt de Commissie de conclusie dat Turkije vooral niet voldoet aan laatstgenoemde voorwaarde tot intensivering van de strijd tegen corruptie — integendeel, blijkende het medio december 2013 aan het licht gekomen omvangrijke corruptieschandaal binnen de Turkse regering, ten gevolge waarvan zelfs de minister van EU-zaken én toetredingsonderhandelaar Bağış het veld moest ruimen? Deelt de Commissie dientengevolge de mening dat de op stapel staande visumliberalisatie onwettig is? Zo neen, hoe duidt de Commissie het corruptieschandaal, waarover Eurocommissaris dhr. Füle nota bene zijn zorgen heeft geuit ([2]), in combinatie met bovengenoemde voorwaarde tot intensivering van de strijd tegen corruptie dan wél?

3. Deelt de Commissie de mening dat Turkije nooit visumliberalisatie en nooit EU-lidmaatschap dient te verkrijgen? Zo neen, waarom kiest de Commissie er aldus voor om aan een dood paard te blijven trekken?

Antwoord van de heer Füle namens de Commissie
(13 maart 2014)

Het stappenplan voor een visumvrije regeling met Turkije bevat een aantal benchmarks waaraan de vooruitgang van Turkije in de relevante gebieden zal worden getoetst. Het uiteindelijke doel van visumliberalisatie zal worden bereikt wanneer de Commissie beslist, op basis van de vooruitgang die Turkije volgens deze benchmarks heeft geboekt, dat een voorstel tot opheffing van de visumplicht kan worden ingediend en wanneer het Europees Parlement en de Raad dit voorstel hebben goedgekeurd.

Turkije is onder andere verplicht om verder te gaan met het implementeren van zijn nationale strategie, het actieplan ter bestrijding van corruptie en de aanbevelingen van de GRECO ([3]) (beoordelingsronde I, II en III). De Commissie zal de vooruitgang ten opzichte van deze benchmarks beoordelen in het kader van de bovengenoemde procedure.

([1]) 16929/12, LIMITE, ENLARG 123, JAI 849.
([2]) http://www.nu.nl/politiek/3663684/eu-bezorgd-schandaal-turkije.html
([3]) Groep van staten tegen corruptie — Raad van Europa.

Het openen van de dialoog met Turkije inzake visumliberalisatie is in overeenstemming met de conclusies van de Raad van juni 2012 over het ontwikkelen van samenwerking met Turkije op het gebied van justitie en binnenlandse zaken. Toetredingsonderhandelingen met Turkije vinden plaats op basis van het onderhandelingskader dat in oktober 2005 door de Raad is goedgekeurd.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-000180/14
to the Commission
Laurence J.A.J. Stassen (NI)
(9 January 2014)

Subject: Illegality of visa liberalisation for Turkey

Turkey has signed the agreement on the repatriation of people from third countries. In 'exchange' for this, the EU and Turkey are to work on visa liberalisation. However, the Council document of 30 November 2012 ([1]) lists conditions with which Turkey must comply in order to be considered for visa liberalisation at all. For example, with regard to the management of migration, the country must:

— operate effective border controls with correct equipment and trained personnel, in accordance with the international convention on refugees and the principle of *non-réfoulement*,

— cooperate with Frontex and neighbouring EU Member States,

— grant all EU citizens non-discriminatory, visa-free access to Turkey,

— monitor migration flows, particularly those which are illegal.

As regards national security, Turkey must:

— step up the fight against terrorism and organised crime,

— step up the fight against trafficking in persons, and allocate enough resources to look after and assist victims of such trafficking,

— step up the fight against corruption and introduce ethical codes for authorities which deal with travel documents.

1. Does the Commission now consider that Turkey is complying with the above conditions? If so, what facts bear out this view, for each separate condition?

2. Does the Commission agree that Turkey particularly fails to comply with the last condition, which concerns stepping up the fight against corruption — spectacularly so, in view of the corruption scandal within the Turkish Government which came to light in mid-December 2013, as a result of which even EU Affairs Minister and accession negotiator Bağış had to step down? Does the Commission therefore agree that the planned visa liberalisation is unlawful? If not, how does the Commission interpret the corruption scandal — about which Commissioner Füle has expressed concern, let it not be forgotten ([2]) — in conjunction with the abovementioned condition that the fight against corruption must be stepped up?

3. Does the Commission agree that Turkey should never be granted visa liberalisation or membership of the EU? If not, why does the Commission insist on continuing to flog a dead horse in this way?

Answer given by Mr Füle on behalf of the Commission
(13 March 2014)

The roadmap towards a visa-free regime with Turkey includes a number of benchmarks against which Turkey's progress in the relevant areas will be measured. The final goal of visa liberalisation will be achieved once the Commission decides that, on the basis of the progress made by Turkey against these benchmarks, it is appropriate to present a proposal to lift the visa obligation, and the European Parliament and the Council have agreed on that proposal.

Turkey is required, *inter alia*, to continue implementing the National Strategy and the action plan on Fight against Corruption and the recommendations of GRECO ([3]) (I, II and III Evaluation Round). The Commission will assess the fulfilment of this benchmark in the framework of the abovementioned procedure.

([1]) 16929/12, LIMITE, ENLARG 123, JAI 849.
([2]) http://www.nu.nl/politiek/3663684/eu-bezorgd-schandaal-turkije.html
([3]) Group of States against corruption — Council of Europe.

The launch of the visa liberalisation dialogue with Turkey is in line with the Council conclusions of June 2012 on developing cooperation with Turkey in the areas of Justice and Home Affairs. Accession negotiations with Turkey take place on the basis of the negotiating framework adopted by the Council in October 2005.

(Versiunea în limba română)

Întrebarea cu solicitare de răspuns scris E-000183/14
adresată Comisiei
Rareş-Lucian Niculescu (PPE)
(9 ianuarie 2014)

Subiect: Tot mai mulți europeni sunt expulzați din Belgia

Din ce în ce mai mulți cetățeni ai țărilor membre ale Uniunii Europene sunt expulzați din Belgia, chiar după un sejur îndelungat în regat, din cauza presiunii pe care ar exercita-o asupra sistemului de ajutor social belgian.

Expulzările cetățenilor europeni au explodat în ultimii trei ani. În 2010 au fost expulzați din Belgia 343 cetățeni din statele membre ale Uniunii Europene, în 2011 numărul lor a crescut la 989, iar în 2012 s-a dublat, ajungând la 1 918. În primele nouă luni ale anului 2013 au mai fost expulzați alți 1 130 de cetățeni europeni.

În acest context:

1. Care este opinia Comisiei cu privire la acțiunile guvernului belgian?

2. Are Comisia în vedere propuneri de modificare a Directivei 2004/38/CE din 29 aprilie 2004 privind dreptul la liberă circulație și ședere pe teritoriul statelor membre pentru cetățenii Uniunii și membrii familiilor acestora?

Răspuns dat de dna Reding în numele Comisiei
(12 martie 2014)

În conformitate cu Directiva 2004/38, pentru a beneficia de dreptul de ședere în alt stat membru pe o perioadă mai mare de trei luni, cetățenii inactivi ai UE trebuie să aibă asigurare completă de sănătate și resurse financiare suficiente pentru a nu deveni o povară pentru sistemul de asistență socială al statului membru-gazdă. În cazul în care cetățenii nu îndeplinesc aceste condiții, ei pot primi un ordin de părăsire a teritoriului.

Cu toate acestea, măsurile de expulzare nu pot constitui consecința automată a recurgerii la sistemul de asistență socială. Pentru a determina dacă o persoană a devenit o povară excesivă pentru sistemul de asistență socială, statele membre trebuie să analizeze dacă este vorba despre un caz de dificultăți temporare și să ia în considerare criterii precum durata șederii, situația personală și cuantumul ajutorului acordat.

Aceste garanții vizează în același timp respectarea dreptului la liberă circulație al cetățenilor UE și protejarea țărilor-gazdă împotriva unor sarcini financiare nerezonabile.

În ceea ce privește măsurile de expulzare a cetățenilor UE menționate de distinsul deputat și de presă, Comisia nu dispune de niciun element care să permită evaluarea unor cazuri specifice, cu excepția cazului în care anumite reclamații individuale în care se face referire la încălcări ale normelor UE în domeniu sunt transmise Comisiei.

Cu toate acestea, în contextul procedurilor de constatare a neîndeplinirii obligațiilor deschise împotriva Belgiei în ceea ce privește transpunerea incorectă a Directivei 2004/38, Comisia a invitat autoritățile să ofere clarificări cu privire la garanțiile menționate mai sus. Comisia remarcă faptul că legea de modificare ([1]) aprobată de Parlamentul belgian la 13 februarie reflectă în prezent garanțiile din Directiva 2004/38/CE.

([1]) de modificare a legii din 15 decembrie 1980 privind accesul pe teritoriu, șederea, stabilirea și îndepărtarea străinilor.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-000183/14
to the Commission
Rareş-Lucian Niculescu (PPE)
(9 January 2014)

Subject: More and more Europeans are being expelled from Belgium

An increasing number of citizens of the EU Member States are being expelled from Belgium, even after a long stay in the country, due to the pressure they allegedly put on the Belgian welfare system.

Expulsions of European citizens have dramatically increased in the last three years. In 2010, 343 citizens of EU Member States were expelled from Belgium, in 2011 their number grew to 989, and in 2012 it doubled, reaching 1 918. In the first nine months of 2013, another 1 130 European citizens were expelled.

In this context:

1. What is the Commission's opinion regarding the actions of the Belgian government?

2. Is the Commission envisaging proposals to amend Directive 2004/38/EC of 29 April 2004 on the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States?

Answer given by Mrs Reding on behalf of the Commission
(12 March 2014)

According to Directive 2004/38, to have the right to reside for longer than three months in another Member State, non-active EU citizens must have comprehensive health insurance and sufficient financial resources so as not to become a burden on the host Member State's social assistance system. Where the citizens do not meet these conditions, they may be issued with an order to leave the territory.

However, expulsion measures shall not be the automatic consequence of recourse to the social assistance system. To determine whether a person has become an unreasonable burden on their social assistance system, Member States must examine whether it is a case of temporary difficulties and take into account criteria such as the duration of residence, the personal circumstances and the amount of aid granted.

These safeguards strike a balance between safeguarding the free movement rights of EU citizens whilst protecting host countries from unreasonable financial burdens.

As regards the expulsion measures toward EU citizens reported by the Honourable Member and by the press, the Commission has no element to assess specific cases unless individual complaints indicating violations of related EU rules are sent to the Commission.

However, in the context of the infringement proceedings opened against Belgium regarding the incorrect transposition of Directive 2004/38, the Commission had asked the authorities to clarify the safeguards detailed above. The Commission notes that the amending law ([1]) approved by the Belgian Parliament on 13 February now reflects the safeguards of Directive 2004/38/EC.

([1]) Amending the law of 15 December 1980 on access to the territory, the stay, the establishment and the removal of aliens.

(Ελληνική έκδοση)

Ερώτηση με αίτημα γραπτής απάντησης P-000194/14
προς την Επιτροπή
Nikos Chrysogelos (Verts/ALE)
(10 Ιανουαρίου 2014)

Θέμα: Καταστροφή χημικών όπλων της Συρίας σε διεθνή ύδατα της Μεσογείου και ενδεχόμενες επιπτώσεις

Το πρώτο πλοίο με φορτίο από το χημικό οπλοστάσιο της Συρίας έφυγε από το λιμάνι της Λατάκειας, στις 7.1.2014, για την Ιταλία ([1]), όπου οι «πιο κρίσιμες» χημικές ουσίες θα φορτωθούν στο πλοίο της ναυτικής διοίκησης των ΗΠΑ MV Cape Ray, και θα καταστραφούν με τη μέθοδο της υδρόλυσης στα διεθνή ύδατα μεταξύ Ιταλίας, Ελλάδας, Λιβύης και Μάλτας. Η όλη επιχείρηση είναι υπό τον συντονισμό των Ηνωμένων Εθνών και του Οργανισμού για την Απαγόρευση Χρήσης Χημικών Όπλων. Εκατοντάδες τόνοι χημικών όπλων, μεταξύ των οποίων «αέριο μουστάρδας» και νευροτοξικό «σαρίν» πρέπει να καταστραφούν, όμως Έλληνες επιστήμονες έχουν εκφράσει επιφυλάξεις για το αν τα χημικά αυτά μπορούν να αδρανοποιηθούν μόνο με υδρόλυση ([2]). Αν τα υπολείμματα διατεθούν στη θάλασσα υπάρχουν ανησυχίες για πιθανούς κινδύνους για τα οικοσυστήματα, την αλιεία, τους θαλάσσιους οργανισμούς και την παράκτια ζώνη. Η μέθοδος δεν έχει χρησιμοποιηθεί για αυτά τα χημικά και μάλιστα στη θάλασσα ([3]), πολύ περισσότερο σε κλειστή θάλασσα όπως η Μεσόγειος με ιδιαίτερα ευαίσθητες περιοχές ([4]). Η ζώνη όπου φαίνεται ότι θα γίνουν οι διαδικασίες καταστροφής και πιθανόν διάθεσης των υπολειμμάτων επεξεργασίας είναι σημαντική για τη βιοποικιλότητα ([5]) ([6]), τις παράκτιες κοινότητες και τους αλιείς.

Ερωτάται η Επιτροπή:

1. Είναι σε γνώση της το συγκεκριμένο σχέδιο; Έχει σχετικές διασφαλίσεις από τις αρμόδιες υπηρεσίες του ΟΗΕ και του Οργανισμού για την Απαγόρευση Χρήσης Χημικών Όπλων; Τα υπολείμματα πρόκειται να διατεθούν στη θάλασσα ή αλλού;

2. Είναι η διαδικασία συμβατή με τις διατάξεις της Σύμβασης και του Πρωτοκόλλου του Λονδίνου για την Αποφυγή Ρύπανσης της Θάλασσας ([7]); Έχουν εκπονηθεί ειδικές μελέτες για τυχόν επιπτώσεις σε θαλάσσια οικοσυστήματα, είδη και παράκτιες κοινότητες;

3. Προτίθεται το Ευρωκοινοβούλιο να ενημερώσει την επιστημονική κοινότητα και την κοινή γνώμη για την ακριβή διαδικασία και την ταυτότητα των χημικών ουσιών που θα καταλήξουν τυχόν στη θάλασσα και τις πιθανές επιπτώσεις τους στο θαλάσσιο περιβάλλον;

4. Προτίθεται να παρακολουθήσει στενά την διαδικασία και να συμβάλει πιθανόν σε ασφαλέστερη μέθοδο καταστροφής των χημικών όπλων;

Ερώτηση με αίτημα γραπτής απάντησης E-000314/14
προς την Επιτροπή (Αντιπρόεδρος / Ύπατη Εκπρόσωπος)
Nikos Chrysogelos (Verts/ALE)
(14 Ιανουαρίου 2014)

Θέμα: VP/HR — Καταστροφή χημικών όπλων της Συρίας σε διεθνή ύδατα της Μεσογείου και ενδεχόμενες επιπτώσεις

Το πρώτο πλοίο με φορτίο από το χημικό οπλοστάσιο της Συρίας έφυγε από το λιμάνι της Λατάκειας, στις 7.1.2014, για την Ιταλία ([8]), όπου οι «πιο κρίσιμες» χημικές ουσίες θα φορτωθούν στο πλοίο της ναυτικής διοίκησης των ΗΠΑ MV Cape Ray, και θα καταστραφούν με τη μέθοδο της υδρόλυσης στα διεθνή ύδατα μεταξύ Ιταλίας, Ελλάδας, Λιβύης και Μάλτας. Η όλη επιχείρηση είναι υπό τον συντονισμό των Ηνωμένων Εθνών και του Οργανισμού για την Απαγόρευση Χρήσης Χημικών Όπλων. Εκατοντάδες τόνοι χημικών όπλων, μεταξύ των οποίων «αέριο μουστάρδας» και νευροτοξικό «σαρίν» πρέπει να καταστραφούν, όμως Έλληνες επιστήμονες έχουν εκφράσει επιφυλάξεις για το αν τα χημικά αυτά μπορούν να αδρανοποιηθούν μόνο με υδρόλυση ([9]). Αν τα υπολείμματα διατεθούν στη θάλασσα υπάρχουν ανησυχίες για πιθανούς κινδύνους για τα οικοσυστήματα, την αλιεία, τους θαλάσσιους οργανισμούς και την παράκτια ζώνη. Η μέθοδος δεν έχει χρησιμοποιηθεί για αυτά τα χημικά και μάλιστα στη θάλασσα ([10]), πολύ περισσότερο σε κλειστή θάλασσα όπως η Μεσόγειος με ιδιαίτερα ευαίσθητες περιοχές ([11]). Η ζώνη όπου φαίνεται ότι θα γίνουν οι διαδικασίες καταστροφής και πιθανόν διάθεσης των υπολειμμάτων επεξεργασίας είναι σημαντική για τη βιοποικιλότητα ([12]) ([13]), τις παράκτιες κοινότητες και τους αλιείς.

([1]) http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-25642463
([2]) http://www.haniotika-nea.gr/toxiki-apili/#ixzz2ppUWhuas
([3]) http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/12/05/us-usa-syria-idUSBRE9B40VP20131205
([4]) http://www.plosone.org/article/info:doi/10.1371/journal.pone.0011842
([5]) http://www.cetaceanhabitat.org/view_news.php?select=20
http://www.pelagosinstitute.gr/gr/prostasia/prostatevomenes_perioches.html
([6]) http://www.rac-spa.org/node/597
([7]) http://www.imo.org/OurWork/Environment/LCLP/Pages/default.aspx
([8]) http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-25642463
([9]) http://www.haniotika-nea.gr/toxiki-apili/#ixzz2ppUWhuas
([10]) http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/12/05/us-usa-syria-idUSBRE9B40VP20131205
([11]) http://www.plosone.org/article/info:doi/10.1371/journal.pone.0011842
([12]) http://www.cetaceanhabitat.org/view_news.php?select=20,
http://www.pelagosinstitute.gr/gr/prostasia/prostatevomenes_perioches.html
([13]) http://www.rac-spa.org/node/597

Ερωτάται η Ύπατη Εκπρόσωπος:

1. Είναι σε γνώση της το συγκεκριμένο σχέδιο; Έχει σχετικές διασφαλίσεις από τις αρμόδιες υπηρεσίες του ΟΗΕ και του Οργανισμού για την Απαγόρευση Χρήσης Χημικών Όπλων; Τα υπολείμματα πρόκειται να διατεθούν στη θάλασσα ή αλλού;

2. Είναι η διαδικασία συμβατή με τις διατάξεις της Σύμβασης και του Πρωτοκόλλου του Λονδίνου για την Αποφυγή Ρύπανσης της Θάλασσας ([14]); Έχουν εκπονηθεί ειδικές μελέτες για τυχόν επιπτώσεις σε θαλάσσια οικοσυστήματα, είδη και παράκτιες κοινότητες;

3. Προτίθεται το Ευρωκοινοβούλιο να ενημερώσει την επιστημονική κοινότητα και την κοινή γνώμη για την ακριβή διαδικασία και την ταυτότητα των χημικών ουσιών που θα καταλήξουν τυχόν στη θάλασσα και τις πιθανές επιπτώσεις τους στο θαλάσσιο περιβάλλον;

4. Προτίθεται να παρακολουθήσει στενά την διαδικασία και να συμβάλει πιθανόν σε ασφαλέστερη μέθοδο καταστροφής των χημικών όπλων;

Κοινή απάντηση της Ύπατης Εκπροσώπου/Αντιπροέδρου Ashton εξ ονόματος της Επιτροπής
(14 Μαρτίου 2014)

Η καταστροφή των χημικών όπλων της Συρίας έχει συμφωνηθεί και ελέγχεται από το Εκτελεστικό Συμβούλιο του ΟΑΧΟ και το Συμβούλιο Ασφαλείας του ΟΗΕ που έλαβαν όλα τα αναγκαία μέτρα για να εξασφαλίσουν τα υψηλότερα πρότυπα ασφάλειας και περιβαλλοντικής προστασίας κατά την καταστροφή όλων των κατηγοριών των συριακών χημικών. Το σχέδιο αυτό περιλαμβάνεται σε σειρά δημοσίων εγγράφων ΟΑΧΟ που περιέχουν σχετικές αποφάσεις του Εκτελεστικού Συμβουλίου του ΟΑΧΟ. Τόσο το Πρόγραμμα των Ηνωμένων Εθνών για το Περιβάλλον (UNEP) όσο και η Παγκόσμια Οργάνωση Υγείας (ΠΟΥ) συμμετέχουν ενεργά στον σχεδιασμό του εγχειρήματος.

Η μέθοδος της υδρόλυσης για την προτεραιότητα 1 πρόδρομων χημικών ουσιών έχει ως βάση τη μακρά επιτυχή πείρα της εφαρμογής της στο πλαίσιο αντίστοιχων καταστάσεων. Η ακριβής θέση του πλοίου που παρέχεται από την κυβέρνηση των ΗΠΑ στα διεθνή ύδατα δεν έχει ακόμη αποφασιστεί.

Δεν θα γίνει απόρριψη στη θάλασσα των χημικών ή λυμάτων τους μετά την υδρόλυση. Αντίθετα, θα αποθηκευθούν σε σκάφος των ΗΠΑ και θα μεταφερθούν μαζί με τις λοιπές συριακές βιομηχανικές χημικές ουσίες σε επιλεγμένες εγκαταστάσεις για τελική καταστροφή με αποτέφρωση.

Η κοινή αποστολή διοργάνωσε πρόσφατα στη Χάγη συνεδρίαση με τις σημαντικότερες διεθνείς και εθνικές περιβαλλοντικές ΜΚΟ για να εξηγηθεί ότι η καταστροφή θα πραγματοποιηθεί σύμφωνα με τις σχετικές διατάξεις του διεθνούς και εθνικού δικαίου.

Τέλος, πρέπει να υπογραμμιστεί ότι η ΕΕ και τα κράτη μέλη της συνεισέφεραν σε μεγάλο βαθμό, τόσο οικονομικά όσο και σε είδος, στο παρόν εγχείρημα που αποσκοπεί στην εξάλειψη μιας κατηγορίας θανατηφόρων όπλων μαζικής καταστροφής και στην πρόληψη της επανάληψης της χρήσης τους κατά του συριακού λαού.

([14]) http://www.imo.org/OurWork/Environment/LCLP/Pages/default.aspx

(English version)

Question for written answer P-000194/14
to the Commission
Nikos Chrysogelos (Verts/ALE)
(10 January 2014)

Subject: Destruction of Syria's chemical weapons in international waters in the Mediterranean and the potential impact thereof

The first vessel bearing a cargo of Syria's chemical arsenal left the Syrian port of Latakia on 7 January 2014, bound for Italy ([1]) , where the 'most critical' chemicals will be loaded on board the US maritime administration vessel, MV Cape Ray, and destroyed by hydrolysis in international waters between Italy, Greece , Libya and Malta. The entire operation is being coordinated by the United Nations and the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. Hundreds of tonnes of chemical weapons, including 'mustard gas' and the neurotoxic agent sarin, have to be destroyed, but Greek scientists have expressed reservations about whether these chemicals can be neutralised by hydrolysis alone. ([2]) If the residues are disposed of at sea, there are concerns about potential risks to ecosystems, fisheries, marine organisms and coastal zones. Hydrolysis has never been used on these chemicals, let alone at sea ([3]), and the Mediterranean is a closed sea which has highly sensitive areas ([4]). The area where the chemicals are likely to be destroyed and the residues disposed of is an area noted for its biodiversity ([5]) ([6]), coastal and fishing communities.

In view of the above, will the Commission say:

1. Is it aware of this plan? Has it received assurances in this connection from the relevant UN agencies and the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons? Will the residues be disposed of at sea or elsewhere?

2. Is the procedure consistent with the provisions of the London Convention and Protocol on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes ([7])? Have specific studies have been drawn up on the potential impact on marine ecosystems, species and coastal communities?

3. Does the European Parliament intend to inform the scientific community and the general public about the precise processes involved, the identity of the chemicals which will end up in the sea and potential impacts on the marine environment?

4. Does it intend closely to monitor the operation and help to find safer methods of destroying these chemical weapons?

Question for written answer E-000314/14
to the Commission (Vice-President/High Representative)
Nikos Chrysogelos (Verts/ALE)
(14 January 2014)

Subject: VP/HR — Destruction of Syria's chemical weapons in international waters in the Mediterranean and the potential impact thereof

The first vessel bearing a cargo of Syria's chemical arsenal left the Syrian port of Latakia on 7 January 2014, bound for Italy ([8]) , where the ' most critical' chemicals will be loaded on board the US maritime administration vessel, MV Cape Ray, and destroyed by hydrolysis in international waters between Italy, Greece , Libya and Malta. The entire operation is being coordinated by the United Nations and the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. Hundreds of tonnes of chemical weapons, including 'mustard gas' and the neurotoxic agent sarin, have to be destroyed, but Greek scientists have expressed reservations about whether these chemicals can be neutralised by hydrolysis alone. ([9]) If the residues are disposed of at sea, there are concerns about potential risks to ecosystems, fisheries, marine organisms and coastal zones. Hydrolysis has never been used on these chemicals, let alone at sea ([10]), and the Mediterranean is a closed sea which has highly sensitive areas ([11]). The area where the chemicals are likely to be destroyed and the residues disposed of is an area noted for its biodiversity ([12]) ([13]), coastal and fishing communities.

In view of the above, will the Vice-President/High Commissioner say:

([1]) http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-25642463
([2]) http://www.haniotika-nea.gr/toxiki-apili/#ixzz2ppUWhuas
([3]) http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/12/05/us-usa-syria-idUSBRE9B40VP20131205
([4]) http://www.plosone.org/article/info:doi/10.1371/journal.pone.0011842
([5]) http://www.cetaceanhabitat.org/view_news.php?select=20, http://www.pelagosinstitute.gr/gr/prostasia/prostatevomenes_perioches.html
([6]) http://www.rac-spa.org/node/597
([7]) http://www.imo.org/OurWork/Environment/LCLP/Pages/default.aspx
([8]) http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-25642463
([9]) http://www.haniotika-nea.gr/toxiki-apili/#ixzz2ppUWhuas
([10]) http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/12/05/us-usa-syria-idUSBRE9B40VP20131205
([11]) http://www.plosone.org/article/info:doi/10.1371/journal.pone.0011842
([12]) http://www.cetaceanhabitat.org/view_news.php?select=20, http://www.pelagosinstitute.gr/gr/prostasia/prostatevomenes_perioches.html
([13]) http://www.rac-spa.org/node/597

1. Is she aware of this plan? Has she received assurances in this connection from the relevant UN agencies and the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons? Will the residues be disposed of at sea or elsewhere?

2. Is the procedure consistent with the provisions of the London Convention and Protocol on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes ([14])? Have specific studies have been drawn up on the potential impact on marine ecosystems, species and coastal communities?

3. Does the European Parliament intend to inform the scientific community and the general public about the precise processes involved, the identity of the chemicals which will end up in the sea and potential impacts on the marine environment?

4. Does it intend closely to monitor the operation and help to find safer methods of destroying these chemical weapons?

Joint answer given by High-Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission

(14 March 2014)

The destruction of the Syrian chemical weapon arsenal has been agreed and is supervised by the OPCW Executive Council and the UN Security Council, who have taken all the necessary measures to ensure the highest standards of environmental safety, while proceeding with the destruction of all categories of the Syrian chemicals. This plan is contained in a series of public OPCW documents containing relevant decisions by the OPCW Executive Council. Both UNEP and WHO were actively involved in the planning of the operation.

The method of hydrolysis for the Priority 1 chemical precursors has been based on long, successful experience in similar situations.. The exact location of the ship provided by the US government in international waters has not yet been decided.

There will be no discharge of chemicals or their effluent after hydrolysis into the sea. Instead, they will be stored on the US vessel and transferred together with the rest of the Syrian industrial chemicals to selected commercial facilities for final destruction by incineration.

The Joint Mission has recently organised a meeting with leading international and national environmental NGOs to explain that the destruction will take place in accordance with the relevant provisions of international and national legislation.

Finally, it should be underlined that the EU and its Member States have been contributing heavily, both financially and in kind, to this operation, aiming at eliminating a category of lethal weapons of mass destruction and preventing a repetition of their use against the Syrian people.

([14]) http://www.imo.org/OurWork/Environment/LCLP/Pages/default.aspx

(České znění)

Otázka k písemnému zodpovězení E-000201/14
Komisi
Zuzana Roithová (PPE)
(10. ledna 2014)

Předmět: Jednotná pravidla prodeje léku pseudoefedrin

Pseudoefedrin je lék patřící do skupiny dekongescencia, užívaný na tlumení překrvení nosní sliznice způsobené alergiemi či rýmou. Jedná se ale také o lék ve velké míře zneužívaný pro výrobu drogy pervitin, a proto v mnoha státech EU patří do skupiny léků vydávaných na předpis či „volně prodejných s omezením". Například v České republice je nutné ověření totožnosti nakupujícího a registrace transakce u Státního ústavu pro kontrolu léčiv. Přísná pravidla pro výdej tohoto snadno zneužitelného léku nejsou však ve všech státech EU jednotná a hrozí tudíž, že drogoví dealeři nakoupí snadno drogu v jednom státě a poté ji nezákonně zpracují v amatérských varnách na drogu, kterou distribuují v okolních státech. V této souvislosti je často uváděn příklad Polska, kde je pseudoefedrin snadno dostupný, a České republiky, kde je pervitin jedním z nejrozšířenějších narkotik a odkud je pašován dále do západních zemí EU.

Chystá se Komise s ohledem na společenskou závažnost drogové problematiky v blízké budoucnosti učinit kroky, které zpřísní stávající podmínky prodeje pseudoefedrinu v zemích EU, kde jeho dostupnost není nijak regulována?

Odpověď Antonia Tajaniho jménem Komise
(10. března 2014)

Pseudoefedrin je látka zařazená do tabulky I Úmluvy OSN proti nedovolenému obchodu s omamnými a psychotropními látkami z roku 1988. Podle nařízení (ES) č. 273/2004 o prekursorech drog, kterým se řídí obchod s těmito látkami uvnitř EU podle požadavků úmluvy OSN, je proto pseudoefedrin uvedenou látkou kategorie 1. Nařízení (ES) č. 273/2004 bylo nedávno změněno nařízením (EU) č. 1258/2013.

To znamená, že hospodářské subjekty a profesionální uživatelé, kteří si přejí pseudoefedrin uvést na trh nebo jej vlastnit, musí získat povolení od příslušných orgánů členského státu, kde jsou usazeni. Příslušné orgány mohou lékárnám udělit zvláštní povolení, které bude platné pouze pro použití uvedené látky v oblasti oficiálních činností dotyčného hospodářského subjektu.

Kromě toho může hospodářský subjekt, který získal povolení, látky kategorie 1 dodávat dále pouze hospodářským subjektům nebo profesionálním uživatelům, kteří rovněž mají povolení a podepsali prohlášení odběratele. Hospodářské subjekty musí zdokumentovat všechny operace vedoucí k uvedení látek kategorie 1 na trh. Tyto záznamy se musí uchovávat nejméně tři roky a být k dispozici ke kontrole; hospodářské subjekty musí příslušným orgánům poskytovat všechny relevantní údaje o svých operacích týkajících se uvedených látek.

Rozhodování o tom, zda je třeba prodej daného léčivého přípravku spotřebiteli omezit, tj. podmínit jej lékařským předpisem – včetně zvláštních lékařských předpisů a lékařských předpisů s omezením – , je výsadou příslušných orgánů členských států ([1]).

([1]) Článek 70 směrnice 2001/83/ES.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-000201/14
to the Commission
Zuzana Roithová (PPE)
(10 January 2014)

Subject: Uniform rules for sale of pseudoephedrine

Pseudoephedrine is a decongestant drug used to control nasal congestion caused by allergies or colds. However, it is also misused to a large extent to produce methamphetamine, which is why it is available only with a prescription or as a limited over-the-counter drug in many EU Member States. For instance, in the Czech Republic the identity of the purchaser must be checked and the transaction must be registered with the State Institute for Drug Control. However, not all EU Member States have put in place strict and uniform rules on the distribution of this easily abused drug. Drug dealers, therefore, have little difficulty in travelling to one country and buying up large amounts of the drug, which they then process in amateur drug labs for distribution in neighbouring countries. Countries that are often mentioned in this context are Poland, where pseudoephedrine is easily available, and the Czech Republic, where methamphetamine is one of the most widely used drugs and which serves as a launch pad for smuggling to western EU Member States.

Given the impact that this drug has on society, does the Commission intend to take steps in the near future to tighten up the rules on the sale of pseudoephedrine in those EU Member States where the drug's availability is completely unregulated?

Answer given by Mr Tajani on behalf of the Commission
(10 March 2014)

Pseudoephedrine is a substance listed in Table I of the UN Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances of 1988. Therefore, pseudoephedrine is a scheduled substance of Category C under Regulation (EC) No 273/2004 on drug precursors, which regulates intra-EU trade of these substances according to the requirements of the UN Convention. Regulation (EC) No 273/2004 has been recently revised by Regulation (EU) No 1258/2013.

This means that economic operators and professional users wishing to place pseudoephedrine on the market or to possess it must obtain a licence from the competent authorities of the Member State in which they are established. The competent authorities may grant special licences to pharmacies, which will be valid only for a use of the scheduled substance within the scope of the official duties of the operator concerned.

A licenced economic operator may supply Category C substances only to other operators or professional users who also hold a licence and have signed a customer declaration. Additionally, operators must document all transactions leading to the placing on the market of Category C substances. Those records must be kept for at least three years and must be available for inspection, and operators have to provide the competent authorities with all relevant information about their transactions involving scheduled substances.

The responsibility to decide whether the sale of a medicinal product to consumers should be restricted, i.e. by subjecting the medicinal product to medical prescription — including special and 'restricted' medical prescriptions, is a prerogative of the competent authorities of the Member States ([1]).

([1]) Article 70 of Directive 2001/83/EC.

(Ελληνική έκδοση)

Ερώτηση με αίτημα γραπτής απάντησης E-000205/14
προς την Επιτροπή
Antigoni Papadopoulou (S&D)
(10 Ιανουαρίου 2014)

Θέμα: Αναφορικά με την ερώτηση μου αρ. E-011624/2013 — Απόλυση της Τουρκάλας τηλεπαρουσιάστριας Γκοζντέ Κανσού

Σε συνέχεια της πιο πάνω ερώτησής μου και της αντίστοιχης απάντησης εκ μέρους της Επιτροπής, παρακαλώ να μου δοθούν οι ακόλουθες διευκρινίσεις:

1. Πού ευρίσκεται σήμερα το θέμα της κ. Γκοζντέ Κανσού; Έχει επαναπροσληφθεί στην εργασία της ή εξακολουθεί να υφίσταται τις συνέπειες της άδικης και αντιδεοντολογικής απόφασης για απόλυση της;

2. Επαναλαμβάνω επίσης το σκέλος (3) της ερώτησής μου αρ. E-011624/2013, το οποίο δεν έχει απαντηθεί. Τι προτίθεται να πράξει η Επιτροπή για αποκατάσταση των δικαιωμάτων της κ. Κανσού;

3. Θεωρεί η Επιτροπή ότι σημειώνεται ικανοποιητική πρόοδος στο θέμα της διασφάλισης των δικαιωμάτων των γυναικών στην υποψήφια για ένταξη Τουρκία;

Απάντηση του κ. Füle εξ ονόματος της Επιτροπής
(14 Μαρτίου 2014)

Η Επιτροπή παρακολουθεί εκ του σύνεγγυς την υπόθεση Gözde Kansu. Μετά την απόλυσή της, οι εκπρόσωποι του καναλιού ATV απέρριψαν τους ισχυρισμούς της σχετικά με τις επικρίσεις του αναπληρωτή προέδρου του κόμματος AK Hüseyin Çelik για τον τρόπο ένδυσής της. Σε δήλωση της 9ης Οκτωβρίου 2013, η ραδιοτηλεοπτική εταιρεία εξήγησε ότι η το «στυλ και η συμπεριφορά της κ. Kansu στην παρουσίαση του προγράμματος δεν ταιριάζουν με το πρόγραμμα». Σύμφωνα με πληροφορίες που διαθέτει έως σήμερα η Επιτροπή, η κ. Kansu δεν επαναπροσλήφθηκε από το τηλεοπτικό κανάλι.

Η Επιτροπή έθεσε επανειλημμένα και θα συνεχίσει να θέτει το ζήτημα των δικαιωμάτων των γυναικών και της ισότητας των φύλων, σε κάθε ευκαιρία, στους Τούρκους συνομιλητές της, καθώς και μέσω των ετήσιων εκθέσεων προόδου.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-000205/14
to the Commission
Antigoni Papadopoulou (S&D)
(10 January 2014)

Subject: Question E-011624/2013 — Dismissal of Turkish television presenter Gözde Kansu

Further to the above question and the answer provided by the Commission, will the Commission provide answers to the following questions:

1. What developments have there been in the Gözde Kansu affair? Has she been reinstated in her work or is she continuing to suffer the consequences of the unfair and unethical decision to dismiss her?

2. I repeat also the third part of my Question E-011624/2013 that has not been answered. What does it intend to do to restore Ms Kansu's rights?

3. Does it consider that satisfactory progress is being made in securing women's rights in Turkey, a candidate country?

Answer given by Mr Füle on behalf of the Commission
(14 March 2014)

The Commission has been following Gözde Kansu's case closely. Following her dismissal, ATV channel representatives rejected claims that it was related to AK Party Deputy Chairman Hüseyin Çelik's criticism for her clothing style. In a statement on 9 October 2013, the broadcasting company explained that Ms Kansu's 'style and presentation behaviour did not fit well with the project.' According to information available to the Commission to date, Ms Kansu, has not been reemployed by the TV channel.

The Commission has raised and will continue to raise women's rights and gender equality consistently on all appropriate occasions with its Turkish interlocutors, including in the annual progress reports.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-000211/14
to the Commission
James Nicholson (ECR)
(10 January 2014)

Subject: Improving air quality

In the context of the Commission's review of air quality policy and the EU 'Year of Air,' a new report from the European Environment Agency (EEA) has found that the EU limit and target values for PM10 (particulate matter up to 10 micrometers in size) have been widely exceeded in numerous European countries. The report found that the targets should have been met in 2005 but were still far off the mark in 2011, with some one-third of the urban population being exposed to PM10 concentrations higher than the daily EU limit value.

My own constituency of Northern Ireland, and indeed the rest of the United Kingdom, appears to have largely met the EU targets, particularly in regard to PM10. Nevertheless, the fact that the daily EU limit value was exceeded in 22 countries is clearly unacceptable.

What assurances can the Commission give that the forthcoming Thematic Strategy on Air Pollution will effectively tackle the air pollution problem in order to reduce risks to public health in these countries? Furthermore, what steps will the Commission take to ensure that Member States breaking the EU limit and target values are deterred from doing so in the future?

Answer given by Mr Potočnik on behalf of the Commission
(14 March 2014)

The Thematic Strategy on Air Pollution to which the Honourable Member refers was adopted by the Commission on 18 December 2013 ('Clean Air Programme for Europe') and its elements are detailed at:
http://ec.europa.eu/environment/air/clean_air_policy.htm
The package is designed to minimise negative impacts by tackling the problem at source; further reducing harmful emissions to air from industry, traffic, energy plants and agriculture. It is based on a comprehensive review of existing EU air policy and on extensive consultations with key sectors and stakeholders, including the agricultural sector. If implemented in line with the Commission's proposal, these actions will more than halve the number of premature deaths from air pollution by 2030 compared to 2005, increase protection for the vulnerable groups who need it most, and improve the quality of life for all.

In parallel the Commission will take appropriate action against Member States which are in breach of the limit values. As regards PM10, the Commission has started infringement procedures against 17 Member States, listed in its press release of 24 January 2013:
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-13-47_en.htm

(Versión española)

Pregunta con solicitud de respuesta escrita E-000228/14
a la Comisión
Antolín Sánchez Presedo (S&D)
(10 de enero de 2014)

Asunto: Ayudas a la investigación para la memoria histórica de Europa

En enero del año pasado, la Comisión Europea publicaba una convocatoria de ayudas a la investigación sobre la memoria histórica activa de Europa dentro del programa «Europa para los Ciudadanos» (2007-2013) (acción 4) en la que se establecía una amplia variedad de actividades para la promoción de la ciudadanía europea activa y la participación de la sociedad civil en el proceso de integración europea en relación con la conmemoración de las víctimas, los lugares y archivos asociados a las deportaciones, la memoria histórica, etc.

Sin embargo, esta convocatoria establecía unos límites que circunscribían la línea de ayudas al tratamiento del Holocausto y el Gulag, dejando así fuera, entre otras, las persecuciones derivadas del Golpe de Estado en España en 1936, central en los procesos europeos de la época que la historiografía aborda como un todo.

Esta circunstancia hace difícil que puedan acceder a estas ayudas grupos europeos con líneas de investigación en relación con, por ejemplo, la dictadura franquista. En este sentido, ¿está previsto que los programas de ayuda a la investigación histórica vinculados a las nuevas perspectivas financieras 2014-2020 incorporen a las víctimas de la Guerra Civil en España entre las posibles líneas de investigación?

Respuesta de la Sra. Reding en nombre de la Comisión
(12 de marzo de 2014)

El capítulo sobre Memoria Histórica del programa Europa con los Ciudadanos 2014-2020 ([1]) presentado por la Comisión prevé el apoyo a proyectos que reflexionen sobre las causas de los regímenes totalitarios en la historia moderna de Europa, así como sobre otros momentos determinantes y puntos de referencia de la reciente historia europea. La financiación se destina a acciones transnacionales o de dimensión europea con preferencia por aquellas que fomenten la tolerancia y la reconciliación como modo de superar el pasado y construir el futuro.

El Reglamento por el que se establece el programa Europa de los Ciudadanos 2014-2020 está pendiente de adopción por el Consejo y de publicación en el Diario Oficial.

([1]) http://ec.europa.eu/citizenship/about-the-europe-for-citizens-programme/future-programme-2014-2020/index_en.htm

(English version)

Question for written answer E-000228/14
to the Commission
Antolín Sánchez Presedo (S&D)
(10 January 2014)

Subject: Support for research into European remembrance

In January of last year, the European Commission published a call for research proposals on active European remembrance within the 'Europe for Citizens' Programme (2007-2013) (Action 4). This established a wide variety of activities aimed at promoting active European citizenship and civil society participation in the process of European integration in relation to commemorating victims, sites and archives associated with deportations, historical memory, etc.

However, this call for proposals set boundaries that limited the support to research related to the Holocaust and the Gulags, thus overlooking, among other things, the persecutions that resulted from the Spanish coup d'état of 1936. This coup represented a key event in this period of European history, a period which historiography treats as a whole.

This makes it difficult for European groups with research areas related, for example, to the Franco dictatorship to access this support. In this regard, are there any plans to include the victims of the Spanish Civil War as a possible research area within historical research funding programmes in the new 2014-2020 financial perspective?

Answer given by Mrs Reding on behalf of the Commission
(12 March 2014)

The Remembrance strand in the Europe for the Citizens programme 2014-2020 ([1]), as proposed by the Commission, would support projects reflecting on causes of totalitarian regimes in Europe's modern history as well as projects concerning other defining moments and reference points in recent European history. It would finance actions implemented at transnational level or with a European dimension and give preference to actions which encourage tolerance and reconciliation as a means of moving beyond the past and building the future.

The regulation establishing the Europe for Citizens Programme 2014-2020 still has to be adopted by Council and published in the Official Journal.

([1]) http://ec.europa.eu/citizenship/about-the-europe-for-citizens-programme/future-programme-2014-2020/index_en.htm

(Ελληνική έκδοση)

Ερώτηση με αίτημα γραπτής απάντησης E-000232/14
προς την Επιτροπή
Antigoni Papadopoulou (S&D)
(10 Ιανουαρίου 2014)

Θέμα: Το τουρκικό πλοίο «Μπαρμπαρόσα» στον κόλπο της Μόρφου

Το τουρκικό ερευνητικό σκάφος «Μπαρμπαρόσα», μετά από 17 ημέρες παρουσίας στην περιοχή της κατεχόμενης Αμμοχώστου και αφού εισήλθε μέχρι και στο οικόπεδο 3 της Κυπριακής ΑΟΖ, συνεχίζει τις έρευνες βόρεια και δυτικά της Κύπρου, στον κόλπο της κατεχόμενης Μόρφου, συνοδευόμενο από ένα ακόμη πλοίο. Στόχος της Άγκυρας είναι η αμφισβήτηση των κυριαρχικών δικαιωμάτων της Κυπριακής Δημοκρατίας και η συντήρηση της έντασης στην περιοχή.

Ερωτάται η Επιτροπή:

1. Γιατί δεν επεμβαίνει έμπρακτα ζητώντας από την Τουρκία να τερματίσει αυτές τις προκλήσεις, που διαρκώς κλιμακώνονται από την ημέρα που η Κυπριακή Δημοκρατία ανακοίνωσε την πρόθεσή της να ξεκινήσει έρευνες για τον εντοπισμό κοιτασμάτων πετρελαίου και φυσικού αερίου στη θαλάσσια περιοχή της Κύπρου;

2. Τι απαντά στις καταγγελίες της Κυπριακής Δημοκρατίας;

3. Πώς μπορεί έμπρακτα να αναγκάσει την Τουρκία να τερματίσει τις απειλές της και την παραβίαση των κυριαρχικών δικαιωμάτων ενός κράτους μέλους;

Απάντηση του κ. Füle εξ ονόματος της Επιτροπής
(12 Μαρτίου 2014)

Η Επιτροπή παραπέμπει τον κ. βουλευτή στην απάντηση που δόθηκε στις κοινοβουλευτικές ερωτήσεις E-013548/2013, E-013801/2013 και E-014065/2013 ([1]).

([1]) http://www.europarl.europa.eu/plenary/el/parliamentary-questions.html

(English version)

Question for written answer E-000232/14
to the Commission
Antigoni Papadopoulou (S&D)
(10 January 2014)

Subject: Presence of Turkish vessel 'Barbarossa' in Morphou Bay

Having spent 17 days in the waters off occupied Famagusta, entering Sector 3 of the Cyprus EEZ, the Turkish vessel 'Barbarossa', accompanied by another vessel, is now continuing its prospecting activities to the north and west of Cyprus in Morphou Bay, which is also situated in occupied territory. The purpose behind Ankara's strategy is to challenge the sovereign rights of Cyprus and maintain levels of tension in the region.

In view of this:

1. Why is the Commission not actively calling on Turkey to end such acts, which have become increasingly provocative since the Republic of Cyprus first announced its intention of prospecting for deposits of oil and natural gas within its waters?

2. What is its response to the protests voiced by the Cyprus authorities?

3. What specific measures can it take to force Turkey abandon such threatening behaviour and end its infringement of the sovereign rights of a Member State?

Answer given by Mr Füle on behalf of the Commission
(12 March 2014)

The Commission refers the Honourable Member to its answer given to Parliamentary Questions E-013548/2013, E-013801/2013 and E-014065/2013 ([1]).

([1]) http://www.europarl.europa.eu/plenary/en/parliamentary-questions.html

(Versione italiana)

Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-000233/14
alla Commissione
Fiorello Provera (EFD)
(10 gennaio 2014)

Oggetto: Antisemitismo in Francia

L'8 gennaio 2013 vari mezzi di informazione hanno riferito che il Presidente francese François Hollande ha chiesto che vengano vietati gli spettacoli del comico francese Dieudonné M'bala M'bala, salito alla ribalta per i suoi commenti antisemiti. Verso la metà del mese di dicembre, ad esempio, Dieudonné ha detto, in riferimento al presentatore radiofonico francese Patrick Cohen, che «quando sento parlare Patrick Cohen, penso: camere a gas…che peccato [non esistono più]». Nel 2009 Dieudonné si è recato persino in Iran per incontrare il Presidente Mahmoud Ahmadinejad e raccogliere fondi per la realizzazione di un film sull'Olocausto.

In occasione delle elezioni europee del 2009 Dieudonné si è esibito nel gesto noto come «quenelle», che è considerato una forma invertita di saluto nazista. All'epoca era impegnato in una campagna elettorale «antisionista». Stando al notiziario della BBC, la «quenelle» ha ricevuto in Francia un'attenzione significativa dopo che due soldati erano stati fotografati mentre facevano il gesto fuori da una sinagoga di Parigi. M'bala M'bala sostiene tuttavia che il gesto è un simbolo antisistema. Ciònondimeno in Internet sono apparse foto che ritraggono persone intente a fare il gesto all'esterno del campo di concentramento di Auschwitz.

Per ragioni di ordine pubblico almeno quattro città francesi hanno vietato gli spettacoli in programma di Dieudonné. Per i suoi commenti antisemiti è stato condannato almeno sei volte, sebbene sostenga di aver iniziato la sua carriera come attivista contro il razzismo. Purtroppo si teme che la «quenelle» e il successo riscosso da persone come Dieudonné rappresentino un simbolo per la nuova ondata antisemita che si sta diffondendo in Europa. Altri temono che il divieto imposto ai suoi spettacoli contribuirà ad alimentare la sua popolarità. Il Presidente Hollande ha affermato tuttavia che «nessuno deve utilizzare il suo spettacolo per provocare e promuovere apertamente idee antisemite».

1. È disposta a prendere contatto con le autorità francesi per valutare in che modo stia gestendo la questione dell'incitamento all'odio? È disposta a ideare una campagna europea nelle scuole e in altri istituti d'istruzione per affrontare la questione dell'antisemitismo?

2. Ritiene, e tale aspetto è ancora più rilevante, che il problema dell'antisemitismo stia crescendo in Europa?

Risposta di Viviane Reding a nome della Commissione
(13 marzo 2014)

Rientra fra le competenze degli Stati membri adottare le misure necessarie, in particolare in termini di istruzione e informazione, per garantire che la memoria della natura criminale e totalitaria del fascismo e del nazismo non sia dimenticata o banalizzata.

In seguito alla pubblicazione, il 27 gennaio 2014 nella Giornata internazionale della Memoria, della prima relazione della Commissione sull'attuazione della decisione quadro 2008/913/GAI relativa alla lotta contro il razzismo e la xenofobia da parte degli Stati membri, la Commissione ha annunciato che intende intessere dialoghi bilaterali con gli Stati membri nel corso del 2014, al fine di garantire il recepimento integrale e corretto della decisione quadro nella legislazione nazionale.

Nel nuovo programma «Europa per i cittadini» (2014-2020) sarà compresa una parte significativa dedicata alla memoria europea per riflettere, in particolare, sulle cause dei regimi totalitari nella storia europea moderna.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-000233/14
to the Commission
Fiorello Provera (EFD)
(10 January 2014)

Subject: Anti-Semitism in France

On 8 January 2013, various media sources reported that French President François Hollande had called for shows by the French comedian Dieudonné M'bala M'bala to be banned. The comedian has gained a notorious reputation for making anti-Semitic remarks. For example, in mid-December last year, Dieudonné said, in reference to the French radio presenter Patrick Cohen, that 'when I hear Patrick Cohen speak, I think to myself: "gas chambers…too bad [they no longer exist]"'. In 2009 Dieudonné even went to Iran to meet President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in order to raise funds for a film he was making about the Holocaust.

During the 2009 European elections Dieudonné made the gesture known as the 'quenelle', which is considered to be an inverted form of the Nazi salute. At the time he was running an 'anti-Zionist' electoral campaign. According to BBC news, the 'quenelle' gained significant attention in France after two soldiers were photographed making the gesture outside a Paris synagogue. However, M'bala M'bala claims that the gesture is an anti-establishment symbol. Nevertheless, photos have appeared on the Internet showing people making the gesture outside the grounds of the Auschwitz concentration camp.

At least four French cities have banned Dieudonné's upcoming shows on grounds of risk to public order. He has been convicted at least six times for his anti-Semitic remarks, even though he claims to have started his career as an anti-racism activist. Unfortunately, there are concerns that the 'quenelle' and the success of individuals such as Dieudonné are symbolic of the new wave of anti-Semitism that is spreading across Europe. Others worry that banning his shows will only help to fuel his popularity. Nevertheless, President Hollande has said that 'no one should be able to use this show for provocation and to promote openly anti-Semitic ideas'.

1. Is the Commission prepared to liaise with the French authorities to assess how it is handling the issue of hate speech? Is the Commission prepared to devise a Europe-wide campaign in schools and other educational institutions to tackle the issue of anti-Semitism?

2. More importantly, does the Commission believe that the problem of anti-Semitism is on the rise across Europe?

Answer given by Mrs Reding on behalf of the Commission
(13 March 2014)

It pertains to Member States to take the necessary measures, notably in terms of education and information, to ensure that the memory of the criminal and totalitarian nature of fascism and Nazism is not forgotten or banalised.

Following the publication, on 27 January 2014, Holocaust Remembrance Day, of the first Commission report on the implementation of Framework Decision 2008/913/JHA on racism and xenophobia by Member States, the Commission announced that it will enter into bilateral dialogues with Member States, in the course of 2014, with a view to ensuring full and correct transposition of the framework Decision into national law.

The new 'Europe for Citizens' Programme (2014-2020) will include a significant part dedicated to European Remembrance, notably to reflect on the causes of totalitarian regimes in Europe's modern history.

(Versione italiana)

Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-000234/14
alla Commissione
Fiorello Provera (EFD)
(10 gennaio 2014)

Oggetto: Opposizione del Regno Unito a un ruolo maggiore dell'UE in materia di politiche di difesa

Il 19 dicembre 2013 il primo ministro britannico David Cameron ha annunciato, in vista della partecipazione a un vertice UE sulla difesa, di essere contrario a un ruolo maggiore dell'UE nell'ambito delle politiche di difesa, riferendosi ai piani dell'UE volti a rafforzare la politica di difesa comune per i 28 Stati membri. Il Regno Unito è del parere che le questioni inerenti alla difesa siano di competenza della NATO e degli Stati membri. Cameron, inoltre, ritiene che la Commissione non debba occuparsi di capacità militari come ad esempio nell'ambito dei droni. Inoltre si teme che la Commissione possa minare la sovranità nazionale. Un funzionario britannico ha affermato: «Non riteniamo che la Commissione europea debba svolgere un ruolo nelle politiche di difesa o in materia di approvvigionamento di materiali per la difesa».

1. Qual è la posizione della Commissione riguardo agli ammonimenti secondo i quali mirerebbe a minare il ruolo della NATO in Europa?

2. Quali misure è disposta ad adottare per contribuire ad alleviare i timori di alcuni Stati membri che vedono potenzialmente minata la loro sovranità dalle future proposte dell'UE in materia di difesa?

Risposta di Antonio Tajani a nome della Commissione
(11 marzo 2014)

La Commissione è pienamente consapevole del fatto che la NATO costituisce una pietra angolare delle strategie di difesa di molti Stati membri e che il suo ruolo è essenziale per la sicurezza dell'Europa. La Commissione agisce in piena conformità con l'articolo 42, paragrafo 2, del TUE, il quale recita a chiare lettere che la politica di sicurezza e di difesa comune (PSDC) dell'UE «non pregiudica il carattere specifico della politica di sicurezza e di difesa di taluni Stati membri, rispetto agli obblighi di alcuni Stati membri, i quali ritengono che la loro difesa comune si realizzi tramite l'Organizzazione del trattato del Nord-Atlantico (NATO), nell'ambito del trattato dell'Atlantico del Nord, ed è compatibile con la politica di sicurezza e di difesa comune adottata in tale contesto». Ciò è riecheggiato anche nella comunicazione che illustra le azioni da intraprendere per rafforzare il settore della difesa «… deve risultare pienamente compatibile con la NATO e i suoi principi ([1])».

La Commissione ha delineato la sua politica in merito al settore europeo della difesa nella sua comunicazione «Verso un settore della difesa e della sicurezza più concorrenziale ed efficiente» ([2]), adottata nel luglio 2013 e fatta segno di apprezzamento nelle conclusioni del Consiglio europeo del 19 dicembre 2013 relative al PSDC. Nella sua comunicazione la Commissione esprime il proprio sostegno al rafforzamento della cooperazione europea nel campo della difesa e indica gli ambiti in cui può recare un contributo nel rispetto delle sue competenze. La sovranità nazionale svolge un ruolo centrale nelle questioni legate alla difesa, del che si prende atto nella comunicazione che recita esplicitamente «la difesa è ancora al centro della sovranità nazionale e le decisioni riguardanti le capacità militari restano prerogativa degli Stati membri» ([3]).

([1]) Ibidem, paragrafo iniziale della comunicazione.
([2]) COM(2013) 542.
([3]) Ibidem, frase iniziale della sezione 1.2.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-000234/14
to the Commission
Fiorello Provera (EFD)
(10 January 2014)

Subject: UK opposition to greater EU role in defence policy

On 19 December 2013, British Prime Minister David Cameron announced, before attending an EU defence summit, that he is opposed to the EU having a greater role in defence policy. He was responding to EU plans to bolster the common defence policy for the 28 Member States. The UK believes that defence issues lie with NATO and with the Member States. In addition, Cameron does not believe the Commission should be in charge of military capabilities such as drones. There are also concerns that the Commission could undermine national sovereignty. A British official said: 'We do not believe the European Commission has any role to play in defence policy or defence procurement'.

1. What is the position of the Commission regarding the warnings that it seeks to undermine the role of NATO in Europe?

2. What steps is the Commission prepared to take to help allay the fears of certain Member States that their sovereignty could be undermined by future EU defence proposals?

Answer given by Mr Tajani on behalf of the Commission
(11 March 2014)

The Commission is fully aware that NATO is a cornerstone for many Member States' defence strategies and its role is essential for European security. The Commission acts fully in accordance with Article 42.2 of the TEU, which clearly spells out that the EU's Common Security Defence Policy (CSDP) 'shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy of certain Member States and shall respect the obligations of certain Member States, which see their common defence realised in the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, under the North Atlantic Treaty and be compatible with the common security and defence policy established within that framework'. This is also reflected in the communication which states that moves to strengthen European defence '… must be fully compatible with NATO and its principles ([1])'.

The Commission sets out its policy on the European defence sector in its communication 'Towards a more competitive and efficient defence and security sector' ([2]), adopted in July 2013 and welcomed in the Conclusions on the CSDP of the European Council on 19 December 2013. In this communication, the Commission supports reinforcing European defence cooperation and highlights areas where it can make a contribution within its competence. National sovereignty plays a central role in defence matters which is recognised in the communication which states that 'defence is still at the heart of national sovereignty and decisions on military capabilities remain with Member States' ([3]).

([1]) Ibid, opening paragraph of the communication.
([2]) COM(2013) 542.
([3]) Ibid, opening sentence of Section 1.2.

(Versione italiana)

Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-000235/14
alla Commissione (Vicepresidente/Alto Rappresentante)
Fiorello Provera (EFD)
(10 gennaio 2014)

Oggetto: VP/HR — Implicazioni dell'accordo in materia di pesca con il Marocco per le politiche dell'UE nei confronti di Israele

L'accordo sulla pesca tra l'UE e il Marocco, votato dal Parlamento alla fine di novembre 2013, riconosce la «giurisdizione» del Marocco sulla regione del Sahara occidentale. Ciò ha suscitato la ferma opposizione dei rappresentanti politici della popolazione del Sahara occidentale (Sahrawi). L'UE e l'ONU, inoltre, non riconoscono il Sahara occidentale come parte del territorio del Regno del Marocco. Con il nuovo accordo l'UE verserà al Marocco una somma di denaro per pescare nelle acque marocchine e in quelle del Sahara occidentale.

Nei suoi orientamenti sulle entità israeliane in Cisgiordania l'UE ha recentemente stabilito che a norma del diritto internazionale non dovrà essere versato nemmeno 1 euro alle attività israeliane esercitate al di fuori dei suoi confini sovrani, ossia nei territori acquisiti con la guerra del 1967. Tuttavia, l'UE non sta adottando la stessa posizione riguardo alle attività marocchine nel Sahara occidentale, sebbene l'ONU l'abbia dichiarato territorio occupato.

1. Potrebbe il Vicepresidente/Alto Rappresentante fornire informazioni sulle differenze giuridiche tra le politiche dell'UE nei confronti di Israele e del Marocco, con riferimento all'esempio del Sahara occidentale e agli orientamenti dell'UE in materia di finanziamento per quanto concerne la Cisgiordania?

2. Non ritiene il VP/AR che sia necessario adottare misure per rivalutare la strategia dell'UE nei confronti di Israele per quanto concerne gli orientamenti in materia di finanziamento?

3. Secondo alcune notizie di stampa il Sahara occidentale, essendo elencato dal comitato speciale dell'ONU per la decolonizzazione come «entità senza autogoverno», non sarebbe quindi occupato. Ciò significa che l'UE considera la Cisgiordania come un territorio che si autogoverna?

4. Quali sono le misure adottate dal VP/AR per garantire che la popolazione del Saharaoccidentale tragga beneficio dal recente accordo firmato con il Marocco?

Risposta dell'Alta Rappresentante/Vicepresidente Catherine Ashton a nome della Commissione
(13 marzo 2014)

Il caso del Marocco/Sahara occidentale è diverso da quello di Israele/Alture del Golan, della Striscia di Gaza e della Cisgiordania, compresa Gerusalemme est.

Nel 1963 il comitato speciale per la decolonizzazione dell'ONU ha dichiarato il Sahara occidentale «territorio senza autogoverno da decolonizzare» a norma della risoluzione 1514 (XV) dell'Assemblea generale del 14 dicembre 1960. Il Marocco amministra de facto il territorio dal 1976.

Per le Nazioni Unite, i territori occupati da Israele dopo il 1967 sono occupati in seguito a un conflitto armato e rientrano nel campo di applicazione della quarta convenzione di Ginevra dell'ONU. In conformità del diritto internazionale e come specificato in diverse conclusioni del Consiglio, gli Stati membri dell'UE considerano illegali sia l'annessione ad opera di Israele di parte di questi territori occupati da Israele dopo il 1967 che gli insediamenti israeliani in questi territori. Gli orientamenti citati si limitano a tradurre questa posizione di lunga data in disposizioni finanziarie che disciplinano le sovvenzioni, i premi e gli strumenti finanziari dell'UE a partire dal 2014 e non saranno modificati.

Conformemente agli obblighi previsti dal diritto internazionale (articolo 73 della Carta delle Nazioni Unite) quali individuati dal consigliere giuridico dell'ONU nel 2002, nell'ambito del nuovo protocollo UE-Marocco sulla pesca è stato istituito un meccanismo per il monitoraggio e la presentazione di relazioni onde garantire che la popolazione locale tragga beneficio del contributo finanziario dell'UE a favore del Marocco. La Commissione europea e le autorità marocchine sono incaricate di applicare questo meccanismo, il cui funzionamento sarà esaminato durante le riunioni annuali della commissione mista.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-000235/14
to the Commission (Vice-President/High Representative)
Fiorello Provera (EFD)
(10 January 2014)

Subject: VP/HR — Implications of the Moroccan fisheries deal for EU policy with regard to Israel

The EU-Morocco Fisheries Agreement which Parliament voted on in late November 2013 recognises Moroccan 'jurisdiction' over the region of Western Sahara. This is strongly opposed by the political representatives of the Western Saharan people (Sahrawi). Moreover, the EU and the UN do not recognise Western Sahara as part of the territory of the Kingdom of Morocco. Under the new agreement, the EU will pay money to Morocco to fish in both Moroccan and Western Saharan waters.

The EU recently outlined, in its guidelines on Israeli entities in the West Bank, that, under international law, not a single euro may go towards the funding of Israeli activities outside Israel's sovereign borders, i.e. the territories captured during the war of 1967. However, the EU is not adopting the same position regarding Moroccan activities in Western Sahara, even though the UN has declared it to be an occupied territory.

1. Could the Vice-President/High Representative provide some information on the legal differences between the EU's policies towards Israel and Morocco with regard to the example of Western Sahara and the EU funding guidelines relating to the West Bank?

2. Does the VP/HR believe that steps need to be taken to reassess EU policy with regard to Israel where the funding guidelines are concerned?

3. Some press reports have suggested that because Western Sahara is listed as a 'non-self-governing entity' by the UN Special Committee on Decolonization, it is therefore not occupied. Does this mean that the EU regards the West Bank as a self-governing territory?

4. What steps have been taken by the VP/HR to ensure that native Western Saharans will benefit from this latest agreement signed with Morocco?

Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission
(13 March 2014)

The cases of Morocco/Western Sahara and Israel/ Golan Heights, the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, including East Jerusalem are different.

In 1963, the UN Special Committee on Decolonisation declared Western Sahara as a 'non-self-governing territory to be decolonised' in accordance with General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 Dec. 1960. Morocco is de facto administrator of this territory since 1976.

For the UN, territories occupied by Israel after 1967, are occupied as a consequence of an armed conflict and fall under the UN Fourth Geneva convention. In line with international law and as outlined in several Council Conclusions, the EU MS unanimously consider the annexation by Israel of part of these territories occupied by Israel after 1967 and Israeli settlements in these territories as illegal. The Guidelines in reference merely implement this long-standing position into financial provisions governing EU grants, prizes and financial instruments from 2014 onwards and they will not be modified.

Pursuant to the international law obligations under Article 73 of the UN Charter as identified by the UN legal Counsel in 2002, a monitoring and reporting mechanism is being designed under the new EU-Morocco Fisheries Protocol in order to ensure that the EU financial contribution to Morocco benefits local population. The European Commission and Moroccan authorities are in charge of implementing this mechanism which will be scrutinised during the annual Joint Committee meetings.

(Ελληνική έκδοση)

Ερώτηση με αίτημα γραπτής απάντησης E-000260/14
προς την Επιτροπή
Nikos Chrysogelos (Verts/ALE)
(13 Ιανουαρίου 2014)

Θέμα: Πυρηνικό πρόγραμμα με δυνατότητα εμπλουτισμού ουρανίου από Τουρκία

Η τουρκική κυβέρνηση υπέγραψε προσφάτως με την ιαπωνική κυβέρνηση συμβόλαιο συνεργασίας ύψους 22 δις για την κατασκευή πυρηνικού σταθμού, ενώ παράλληλα ζήτησε να της επιτραπεί ο εμπλουτισμός ουρανίου και η παραγωγή πλουτωνίου ([1]). Πολλοί φορείς στην Τουρκία και σε γειτονικές χώρες έχουν επισημάνει ότι η κατασκευή πυρηνικών σταθμών σε μια ιδιαίτερα σεισμογενή χώρα σαν την Τουρκία, που στον σεισμό του 1999 θρήνησε 17 000 θύματα, αντιπροσωπεύει μεγάλο κίνδυνο για την ευρύτερη περιοχή. Η συμφωνία αφορά κυρίως στην κατασκευή μιας πυρηνικής μονάδας στη Σινώπη της Μαύρης Θάλασσας, με τη συμμετοχή της Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, ενώ μια άλλη πρόκειται να κατασκευαστεί από Ρώσικη εταιρία ([2]), στο Ακούγιου, στη Ν. Τουρκία, δίπλα στη Συρία και κοντά στην Κύπρο ([3]). Η κατασκευή πυρηνικών εγκαταστάσεων αποτελεί μια μεγάλη απειλή για τους πολίτες της χώρας αλλά και γειτονικών περιοχών, όπως απέδειξε εξάλλου η πυρηνική καταστροφή στην Φουκουσίμα της Ιαπωνίας, μια χώρα που διαφήμιζε ότι είχε τους πιο ασφαλής πυρηνικούς αντιδραστήρες. Η καταστροφή στην Φουκουσίμα κόστισε στην Ιαπωνία χιλιάδες θύματα, ανυπολόγιστες οικονομικές ζημιές, μετακινήσεις πληθυσμού κι εκκένωση ολόκληρων περιοχών. Επιπλέον, ανησυχίες προκαλεί και η πιθανότητα εξάπλωσης των πυρηνικών όπλων, καθώς η συμφωνία μπορεί να επιτρέψει στην Τουρκία — αν και ο υπουργός ενέργειας της Τουρκίας προέβη σε διάψευση ([4]) — τη δημιουργία πυρηνικού υλικού για όπλα, σε μια περιοχή που υποφέρει ήδη από παρόμοια πυρηνικά προγράμματα και σχέδια (Ιράν, Ισραήλ, Ινδία, Αίγυπτος).

Ερωτάται η Επιτροπή:

1. Ανησυχεί για το ενδεχόμενο κατασκευής πυρηνικών αντιδραστήρων σε ιδιαίτερα σεισμογενείς περιοχές ([5]) κοντά στα ευρωπαϊκά σύνορα;

2. Την έχει απασχολήσει μέχρι τώρα το ενδεχόμενο, με βάση το συμβόλαιο που ανακοινώθηκε, απόκτησης, και από την Τουρκία, της τεχνολογικής δυνατότητας εμπλουτισμού ουρανίου και παραγωγής πλουτωνίου για πυρηνικά όπλα; Με την υπογραφή της συγκεκριμένης συμφωνίας μεταξύ Τουρκίας και Ιαπωνίας παραβιάζεται η αρχή της μη-διάδοσης πυρηνικών όπλων; Αν ναι, τι μέτρα προτίθεται να λάβει;

3. Προτίθεται να θέσει αυτό το ζήτημα κατά τις ενταξιακές διαπραγματεύσεις με την Τουρκία;

Απάντηση του κ. Füle εξ ονόματος της Επιτροπής
(12 Μαρτίου 2014)

Η χρήση πυρηνικής ενέργειας αποτελεί καταρχήν κυρίαρχη απόφαση κάθε χώρας. Μια τέτοια απόφαση θα πρέπει να βασίζεται στην ικανότητα της χώρας να εξασφαλίζει υψηλό επίπεδο ασφάλειας, προστασίας και διασφαλίσεων κατά τη διάρκεια του πλήρους κύκλου ζωής μιας πυρηνικής εγκατάστασης, σύμφωνα με τις διεθνείς συμβάσεις. Η Τουρκία, ως συμβαλλόμενο μέρος της σύμβασης για την πυρηνική ασφάλεια, πρέπει να συμμορφώνεται με όλα τα σχετικά διεθνή πρότυπα. Επιπλέον, η Τουρκία υπέβαλε στην Επιτροπή έκθεση όσον αφορά άσκηση προσομοίωσης ακραίων καταστάσεων που διεξήγαγε στους εθνικούς πυρηνικούς σταθμούς ηλεκτροπαραγωγής, βασιζόμενη στην ίδια μεθοδολογία με αυτή που χρησιμοποιείται στην ΕΕ. Οι ασκήσεις προσομοίωσης ακραίων καταστάσεων αξιολογούν τον τρόπο με τον οποίο οι πυρηνικοί σταθμοί μπορούν να αντέξουν τις συνέπειες διαφόρων απρόσμενων συμβάντων, όπως οι σεισμοί ([6]).

Η Τουρκία και η Ιαπωνία είναι συμβαλλόμενα μέρη της συνθήκης για τη μη διάδοση των πυρηνικών όπλων και έχουν αναλάβει τη δέσμευση να μην αποκτούν πυρηνικά όπλα. Οι εν λόγω χώρες έχουν θέσει σε ισχύ γενικές συμφωνίες διασφαλίσεων του ΔΟΑΕ σε συνδυασμό με πρόσθετα πρωτόκολλα, και υπόκεινται σε αυστηρές διασφαλίσεις επαλήθευσης από τον ΔΟΑΕ. Είναι επίσης μέλη της ομάδας προμηθευτών πυρηνικών υλικών, η οποία έχει στόχο να διασφαλίσει ότι η ειρηνική πυρηνική συνεργασία δεν θα έχει ως αποτέλεσμα τη διάδοση των πυρηνικών όπλων. Το έργο πυρηνικού σταθμού στη Σινώπη είναι πλήρως ευθυγραμμισμένο με όλες αυτές τις δεσμεύσεις. Η Επιτροπή δεν γνωρίζει τυχόν σχέδια της Τουρκίας να αποκτήσει σταθμούς εμπλουτισμού ή επανεπεξεργασίας.

([1]) http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/ankara-adds-uranium-clause-in-nuclear-deal-with-tokyo.aspx?pageID=238&nID=60729&NewsCatID=348
([2]) http://www.power-technology.com/projects/akkuyu/
([3]) https://www.google.gr/search?q=akkuyu+nuclear+power+plant&tbm=isch&tbo=u&source=univ&sa=X&ei=dcrTUobYM8mStAaL14DQAg&ved=0CDsQsAQ&biw=1195&bih=677
([4]) http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkish-energy-minister-denies-uranium-enrichment-intention.aspx?pageID=238&nID=60787&NewsCatID=348
([5]) http://www.share-eu.org/node/90
([6]) Η τουρκική έκθεση προσομοίωσης κάλυπτε το Ακούγιου, αλλά όχι τη Σινώπη.

Ως υποψήφια χώρα, η Τουρκία αναμένεται να ευθυγραμμίσει τη νομοθεσία της με το κεκτημένο της ΕΕ για την πυρηνική ασφάλεια, συμπεριλαμβανομένης της οδηγίας για την πυρηνική ασφάλεια ([7]). Η Επιτροπή, στις συνεδριάσεις της με την Τουρκία, υπογραμμίζει την ανάγκη ενός νόμου-πλαισίου για τα πυρηνικά, που να κατοχυρώνει υψηλό επίπεδο πυρηνικής ασφάλειας με βάση τα πρότυπα της ΕΕ.

([7]) Οδηγία 2009/71/Ευρατόμ.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-000260/14
to the Commission
Nikos Chrysogelos (Verts/ALE)
(13 January 2014)

Subject: Nuclear programme allowing Turkey to enrich uranium

Under a recently concluded 22 billion joint venture agreement with the Japanese Government for the construction of a nuclear plant, the Turkish government has sought leave to carry out uranium enrichment and plutonium extraction. ([1]) Numerous bodies in Turkey and in neighbouring countries have pointed out that the construction of nuclear plants in high seismic hazard areas such as Turkey, where an earthquake killed 17 000 people in 1999, represents a serious risk to the area, as a whole. The agreement relates primarily to the construction of a nuclear plant in Sinop, in the Black Sea region, in a joint venture with Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, and to the construction of another plant by a Russian company ([2]), in Akkuyu, in southern Turkey, next to Syria and close to Cyprus. ([3]) The construction of nuclear plants poses a serious risk to citizens in Turkey, as well as neighbouring areas, as demonstrated by the nuclear disaster in Fukushima, Japan, a country which boasted that it had the safest nuclear reactors. The disaster in Fukushima claimed thousands of lives in Japan, as well as causing, incalculable economic damage, population displacement and abandonment of large areas. Furthermore, the possibility of nuclear weapon proliferation is also a cause of concern, as the agreement may allow Turkey to create nuclear material for weapons — despite the denial by the Turkish Minister for Energy ([4]) — in an area already plagued by similar nuclear programmes and plans (Iran, Israel, India and Egypt).

In view of this:

1. Is the Commission concerned by the prospect of nuclear reactors being constructed in high seismic hazard areas ([5]) close to European borders?

2. Has it already considered the possibility that Turkey will make use of the announced agreement to acquire the technology needed to enrich uranium and extract plutonium for nuclear weapons? Does this particular agreement between Turkey and Japan infringe the ban on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons? If so, what measures does the Commission intend to take?

3. Does it intend to raise this issue during accession negotiations with Turkey?

Answer given by Mr Füle on behalf of the Commission
(12 March 2014)

The use of nuclear power is in principle a sovereign decision of each country. Such a decision should be based on the country's capacity to ensure a high level of safety, security and safeguards throughout the entire lifecycle of a nuclear installation, in line with international conventions. Turkey, as Contracting Party to the Convention on Nuclear Safety, has to comply with all relevant international standards. Furthermore, Turkey submitted to the Commission a national stress test report on nuclear power plants, based on the same methodology as the one applied in the EU. The stress tests assess how nuclear power plants can withstand the consequences of various unexpected events, including earthquakes ([6]).

Turkey and Japan are parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and have committed themselves to not acquire nuclear weapons. They have brought into force IAEA Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements coupled with Additional Protocols and are subject to stringent safeguards verification by the IAEA. They are also members of the Nuclear Suppliers Group which seeks to ensure that peaceful nuclear cooperation does not result in nuclear proliferation. The power plant project at Sinop is fully in-line with all these commitments. The Commission is not aware of any plans of Turkey to acquire enrichment or reprocessing plants.

As a candidate country, Turkey is expected to align its legislation with all the EU *acquis* on nuclear safety, including the Nuclear Safety Directive ([7]). The Commission, in its meetings with Turkey, lays emphasis on the need of a nuclear law framework which ensures a high level of nuclear safety in line with the EU standards.

([1]) http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/ankara-adds-uranium-clause-in-nuclear-deal-with-tokyo.aspx?pageID=238&nID=60729&NewsCatID=348
([2]) http://www.power-technology.com/projects/akkuyu/
([3]) https://www.google.gr/search?q=akkuyu+nuclear+power+plant&tbm=isch&tbo=u&source=univ&sa=X&ei=dcrTUobYM8mStAaL14DQAg&ved=0CDsQsAQ&biw=1195&bih=677
([4]) http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkish-energy-minister-denies-uranium-enrichment-intention.aspx?pageID=238&nID=60787&NewsCatID=348
([5]) http://www.share-eu.org/node/90
([6]) The Turkish stress test report covered Akkuyu, but not Sinop.
([7]) Directive 2009/71/Euratom.

(Versión española)

Pregunta con solicitud de respuesta escrita E-000266/14
a la Comisión
Ramon Tremosa i Balcells (ALDE)
(13 de enero de 2014)

Asunto: Hipotética acción militar en España

La semana pasada, el ministro de Defensa, Pedro Morenés, afirmaba: «Los militares están preocupados por la unidad de España». Esta afirmación, lejos de ser neutra, guarda un fuerte contenido político, teniendo en cuenta la historia del Estado español en los últimos cien años. Además, no se haría una afirmación semejante en relación con otros sectores como, por ejemplo, los médicos o los profesores.

En ocasiones anteriores, no se han admitido a trámite preguntas de diversos diputados al Parlamento Europeo que pedían a la Comisión que aportase claridad sobre la posible aplicación del artículo 7 del TUE en caso de que el ejército de un Estado miembro use la violencia con el fin de frenar un movimiento político pacífico y democrático. Se adujo el argumento de que la Comisión no se posiciona sobre situaciones hipotéticas.

No obstante, en el caso de la independencia de una región de un Estado miembro, la Comisión sí se ha posicionado, pese a que los Tratados no hacían mención específica de este caso, y ha declarado que «si una parte del territorio de un Estado miembro dejase de ser parte de ese Estado para convertirse en un nuevo Estado independiente, los Tratados ya no serían aplicables en dicho territorio. En otras palabras, un nuevo Estado independiente, por el hecho de alcanzar la independencia, pasaría a convertirse en un tercer país con respecto a la UE y los Tratados dejarían de ser aplicables en su territorio» (E-011023/2013).

¿Piensa la Comisión clarificar si pediría que se aplicara el artículo 7 del TUE en caso de una intervención del ejército en la vida democrática de un Estado miembro?

¿Existe algún motivo formal por el cual la Comisión puede interpretar los Tratados para manifestar su posición sobre qué puede pasar con la pertenencia a la UE de una región que declare su independencia, pero no para pronunciarse sobre qué ocurriría en caso de que el ejército de un Estado miembro actuase contra un movimiento político pacífico y democrático?

Respuesta de la Sra. Reding en nombre de la Comisión
(14 de marzo de 2014)

En respuesta a la pregunta de Su Señoría, la Comisión se remite a su Comunicación sobre el artículo 7 del Tratado de la Unión Europea ([1]), que aclara, en términos generales, las condiciones para la incoación de los procedimientos del artículo 7.

([1]) Comunicación de la Comisión al Consejo y al Parlamento Europeo sobre el artículo 7 del Tratado de la Unión Europea. Respeto y promoción de los valores en los que está basada la Unión, COM(2003) 606 final.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-000266/14
to the Commission
Ramon Tremosa i Balcells (ALDE)
(13 January 2014)

Subject: Hypothetical military intervention in Spain

Spanish Defence Minister Pedro Morenés said last week that members of the Spanish armed forces were concerned about Spain's national unity. Bearing in mind the role played by the military in Spain over the last century, we can see that this was certainly not a neutral statement but was in fact highly political. What is more, no such remark would be made in relation to other sections of society such as the medical or teaching profession.

MEPs have submitted questions in the past about the possibility of applying Article 7 TEU against a Member State which deploys its army to violently supress a peaceful and democratic political movement, but these questions have been dismissed on the grounds that the Commission cannot take up a position on hypothetical situations.

The Commission has, however, taken up a position on independence for a region of a Member State, although this eventuality is not specifically covered in the treaties, declaring that 'If part of the territory of a Member State would cease to be part of that state because it were to become a new independent state, the Treaties would no longer apply to that territory. In other words, a new independent state would, by the fact of its independence, become a third country with respect to the EU and the Treaties would no longer apply on its territory' (E-011023/2013).

Does the Commission intend to clarify whether Article 7 TEU will be applied in the event of an army intervention in democratic life in a Member State?

Is there any official reason why the Commission can interpret the treaties to clarify its position on the consequences for EU membership in the event of a region declaring independence but not on the consequences in the event of a Member State's army intervening against a peaceful and democratic political movement?

Answer given by Mrs Reding on behalf of the Commission
(14 March 2014)

In reply to the question of the Honourable Member, the Commission refers to its communication on Article 7 of the Treaty on European Union ([1]) in which it has clarified in general terms the conditions for activating the procedures of Article 7.

([1]) Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on Article 7 of the Treaty on European Union. Respect for and promotion of the values on which the Union is based, COM(2003) 606 final.

(Versione italiana)

Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-000269/14
alla Commissione (Vicepresidente/Alto Rappresentante)
Sergio Paolo Francesco Silvestris (PPE)
(13 gennaio 2014)

Oggetto: VP/HR — Rischio pena di morte per i due fucilieri di marina detenuti in India

In seguito all'incidente dell'Enrica Lexie, avvenuto il 15 febbraio 2012 nel contesto di una missione di scorta anti-pirateria nell'Oceano Pacifico, due fucilieri di marina italiani sono stati arrestati dalle autorità indiane con l'accusa di omicidio e sono trattenuti in attesa di giudizio da oltre un anno, lontani dal proprio paese e dai propri cari.

Nonostante le rassicurazioni delle autorità indiane sulla non applicazione della pena capitale contro i due «marò», il processo ha subito numerosi capovolgimenti e, con il passaggio delle indagini in mano alla National Investigative Agency, l'autorità indiana competente per i reati di terrorismo, è riemersa la scorsa settimana la possibilità che ai due soldati italiani venga impartita la pena di morte.

Inoltre, l'Enrica Lexie, al momento dell'incidente, batteva bandiera italiana. Tenuto conto di questo elemento e considerando che il G8 di Washington del 2012 ha riconosciuto il principio che attribuisce alla bandiera delle navi il diritto di giurisdizione in caso di incidente in acque internazionali, i due marò dovrebbero essere sottoposti a giudizio in Italia.

Alla luce di questi eventi, può l'Alto Rappresentante per gli affari esteri e la politica di sicurezza, Baronessa Catherine Ashton, chiarire:

1. se è a conoscenza dei recenti sviluppi processuali in India;

2. se i due militari abbiano il diritto di essere giudicati dallo Stato italiano e se, impegnati in una legittima operazione anti-pirateria, possa essere loro applicata una legge anti-terrorismo;

3. quali siano state e quali saranno le azioni intraprese dall'Alto Rappresentante affinché i diritti fondamentali dei due militari, così come sanciti nella Carta dei diritti fondamentali dell'Unione europea e nella Convenzione europea dei diritti dell'uomo, tra i quali spiccano in particolare il diritto alla vita, il diritto a un equo processo e il diritto al rispetto della vita familiare, siano pienamente rispettati?

Risposta dell'Alta Rappresentante/Vicepresidente Catherine Ashton a nome della Commissione
(13 marzo 2014)

L'AR/VP Catherine Ashton segue con estrema attenzione il caso dei due fucilieri della Marina italiana detenuti in India ed è estremamente preoccupata per i recenti sviluppi. La questione è stata discussa, su iniziativa del ministro degli Esteri italiano Emma Bonino, anche in occasione dei Consigli Affari esteri del 20 gennaio e del 10 febbraio 2014.

L'AR/VP ha sollevato ripetutamente la questione con le autorità indiane, esortandole a trovare rapidamente una soluzione equa nel pieno rispetto della convenzione delle Nazioni Unite sul diritto del mare e del diritto internazionale e ribadendo che l'UE considererebbe inaccettabile il fatto che il comportamento di militari di uno Stato membro durante un'operazione ufficiale antipirateria sia assimilato ad atti di pirateria o di terrorismo. Questo avrebbe implicazioni gravissime per tutti i paesi impegnati nelle attività di lotta alla pirateria.

L'AR/VP ha ribadito l'opposizione dell'UE alla pena di morte in qualsiasi circostanza e continuerà ad adoperarsi con la massima determinazione per risolvere rapidamente il caso nel pieno rispetto del diritto internazionale.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-000269/14
to the Commission (Vice-President/High Representative)
Sergio Paolo Francesco Silvestris (PPE)
(13 January 2014)

Subject: VP/HR — Possible death sentence for two marines held in India

In the aftermath of the incident involving the Enrica Lexie, which occurred on 15 February 2012 in the Pacific Ocean, two Italian marines belonging to the vessel's anti-piracy detail were arrested by the Indian authorities on murder charges and have now been held for over a year awaiting trial away from their country and loved ones.

Despite assurances from the Indian authorities that the two marines will not face the death penalty, the legal proceedings have been marked by numerous reversals. After the investigation was placed in the hands of the Indian National Investigative Agency, which is responsible for investigating acts of terrorism, it was revealed last week that that the two Italian marines could after all still be sentenced to death.

Given that the Enrica Lexia was flying the Italian flag when the incident occurred and that the principle of flag state jurisdiction in the event of an incident in international waters was recognised at the Washington 2012 G8 summit, the marines should rightfully stand trial in Italy.

In view of this:

1. Is the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy aware of this recent turn of events in India?

2. If the two marines are indeed entitled to stand trial in Italy and were legitimately engaged in operations intended to prevent piracy, is it admissible for them to be judged under anti-terrorist legislation?

3. What action has been taken by the High Representative to ensure that their fundamental rights as enshrined in the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and the European Convention for the protection of Human Rights, including in particular the right to life, the right to a fair trial and the right to respect for family life, are fully respected? What further action will she take?

Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission
(13 March 2014)

The HR/VP Catherine Ashton is fully aware of the situation of the two Italian marines detained in India, a case which she has been following closely. She is very concerned by the latest developments. The matter was also discussed, upon the initiative of the Italian Foreign Minister Ms Emma Bonino, in the Foreign Affairs Councils of 20 January and 10 February 2014.

The HR/VP has raised the issue with the Indian authorities many times, urging them to find a rapid and fair solution to the case, in full respect of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea and international law. On these occasions she also pointed out that it would be unacceptable for the EU that the conduct of military personnel of an EU Member State on official anti-piracy duties could be classified as acts of piracy or terrorism. This would have enormous implications for all the countries engaged in anti-piracy activities.

The HR/VP has also reiterated the opposition of the EU to the death penalty in any circumstance. The HR/VP remains steadfast in her support to resolve this case quickly in a straightforward manner in full respect with international law.

(Deutsche Fassung)

Anfrage zur schriftlichen Beantwortung E-000276/14
an den Rat
Hans-Peter Martin (NI)
(14. Januar 2014)

Betrifft: Abgesagte Tagungen des Rates

Wie viele bereits geplante Tagungen des Rates wurden in den Jahren 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012 und 2013 abgesagt?

Wie hoch waren die Kosten für bereits geplante und dann abgesagte Tagungen des Rates in den Jahren 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012 und 2013?

Antwort
(17. März 2014)

Das Generalsekretariat des Rates führt keine Statistiken zu Annullierungen von Ratstagungen, insbesondere weil derartige Annullierungen selten vorkommen.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-000276/14
to the Council
Hans-Peter Martin (NI)
(14 January 2014)

Subject: Cancelled meetings of the Council

How many already planned meetings of the Council were cancelled in 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012 and 2013?

What were the costs for already planned and then cancelled meetings of the Council in 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012 and 2013?

Reply
(17 March 2014)

The General Secretariat of the Council does not keep statistics on cancellations of Council meetings, particularly in view of the rarity of such cancellations.

(Deutsche Fassung)

Anfrage zur schriftlichen Beantwortung E-000277/14
an den Rat
Hans-Peter Martin (NI)
(14. Januar 2014)

Betrifft: Reisekosten für Tagungen des Rates und Vorbereitungsgremien

Wie hoch waren die Gesamtkosten für Reisen (Beförderungskosten und Unterbringung und Verpflegung vor Ort) der Teilnehmer von (1) Tagungen des Rates und (2) Sitzungen von Vorbereitungsgremien des Rates jeweils in den Jahren 2012 und 2013?

Antwort
(17. März 2014)

Im Jahr 2012 übermittelten die Mitgliedstaaten dem Rat Erklärungen über die Rückzahlung von Kosten für Reise und Unterkunft in Höhe von insgesamt 22 435 378 EUR. Kosten für die Verpflegung werden vom Rat nicht rückerstattet.

Für 2013 liegen noch keine endgültigen Zahlen vor.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-000277/14
to the Council
Hans-Peter Martin (NI)
(14 January 2014)

Subject: Travel costs for meetings of the Council and preparatory bodies

What were the total costs for travel (transport costs, accommodation and food and drink on site) for participants of (1) meetings of the Council and (2) meetings of preparatory bodies of the Council in 2012 and 2013, respectively?

Reply
(17 March 2014)

For 2012, Member States forwarded to the Council declarations for reimbursement of travelling and accommodation costs totalling EUR 22 435 378. Food and beverage costs are not reimbursed by the Council.

Final figures for 2013 are not yet available.

(Deutsche Fassung)

Anfrage zur schriftlichen Beantwortung E-000282/14
an den Rat
Hans-Peter Martin (NI)
(14. Januar 2014)

Betrifft: Kosten des Rates für Reisen zu den Plenartagungen in Straßburg

Wie hoch ist der finanzielle Zusatzaufwand für den Rat aufgrund der Notwendigkeit, bei Tagungen des Europäischen Parlaments in Straßburg vertreten zu sein?

Welche finanziellen Zusatzaufwendungen (Reisekosten, Tagegelder, Unterbringung, Dienstreisekosten, Zeitausgleich bzw. Überstunden) entstanden bei den entsendeten Beamten des Rates in den Jahren 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012 und 2013?

Welche finanziellen Zusatzaufwendungen (Reisekosten, Tagegelder, Unterbringung, Dienstreisekosten) entstanden bei den entsendeten Vertretern der jeweiligen Ratspräsidentschaft in den Jahren 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012 und 2013?

Antwort
(17. März 2014)

Die Gesamtkosten für Dienstreisen des Personals, dessen Anreise zu Tagungen des Europäischen Parlaments in Straßburg erforderlich war, belaufen sich auf schätzungsweise:

— 2009: 237 932 EUR

— 2010: 288 623 EUR

— 2011: 314 234 EUR

— 2012: 312 129 EUR

— 2013: 401 973 EUR

Für den Rat fallen keine weiteren Ausgaben aufgrund der Notwendigkeit an, bei Tagungen des Europäischen Parlaments in Straßburg vertreten zu sein.

Ausgaben für die Anreise von Vertretern des Ratsvorsitzes sind von dem Mitgliedstaat zu tragen, der den Vorsitz im Rat innehat.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-000282/14
to the Council
Hans-Peter Martin (NI)
(14 January 2014)

Subject: The Council's costs for trips to plenary sessions in Strasbourg

What is the Council's additional expenditure due to the necessity of attending sessions of the European Parliament in Strasbourg?

What additional expenditure (travel expenses, daily allowances, local accommodation, time in lieu or overtime) was incurred in relation to the Council's officials who were sent during the years 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012 and 2013?

What additional expenditure (travel expenses, daily allowances, local accommodation, mission expenses) was incurred in relation to representatives of the respective Council Presidencies who were sent during the years 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012 and 2013?

Reply
(17 March 2014)

The total cost of missions undertaken by staff required to travel to the European Parliament in Strasbourg is estimated as follows:

— 2009: EUR 237.932

— 2010: EUR 288.623

— 2011: EUR 314.234

— 2012: EUR 312.129

— 2013: EUR 401.973

The Council has no further expenditure caused by the necessity of attending sessions of the European Parliament in Strasbourg.

Expenses for travel by representatives of Council Presidencies are borne by the Member State holding the Presidency.

(Deutsche Fassung)

Anfrage zur schriftlichen Beantwortung E-000283/14
an die Kommission
Hans-Peter Martin (NI)
(14. Januar 2014)

Betrifft: Kosten der Kommission für Reisen zu den Plenartagungen in Straßburg

Wie hoch ist der finanzielle Zusatzaufwand für die Kommission aufgrund der Notwendigkeit, bei Tagungen des Europäischen Parlaments in Straßburg vertreten zu sein?

Welche finanziellen Zusatzaufwendungen (Reisekosten, Tagegelder, Unterbringung, Dienstreisekosten, Zeitausgleich bzw. Überstunden) entstanden bei den entsendeten Beamten der Kommission in den Jahren 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012 und 2013?

Welche finanziellen Zusatzaufwendungen (Reisekosten, Tagegelder, Unterbringung, Dienstreisekosten) entstanden bei den entsendeten Mitgliedern der Kommission in den Jahren 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012 und 2013?

Antwort von Herrn Šefčovič im Namen der Kommission
(26. März 2014)

1. Der Begriff des „finanziellen Zusatzaufwandes“ ist zu vage, um ihn in diesem Zusammenhang zu beantworten.

Die Kommission beantwortet grundsätzlich keine hypothetischen Fragen — es gibt keine vereinbarten Mindestsätze, die zur Erfüllung des Vertrages und zur Anwesenheit bei den Sitzungen in Straßburg notwendig sind.

2./3. Die Recherche, die für eine detaillierte Beantwortung der Fragen des Herrn Abgeordneten notwendig wäre, würde den Rahmen der Beantwortung einer schriftlichen Anfrage sprengen.

Der Herr Abgeordnete wird auf die Antworten auf die schriftlichen Anfragen E-001506/2011 und E-004135/2012 verwiesen, die Erklärungen zu Dienstreisekosten enthalten.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-000283/14
to the Commission
Hans-Peter Martin (NI)
(14 January 2014)

Subject: The Commission's costs for trips to plenary sessions in Strasbourg

What is the Commission's additional expenditure due to the necessity of attending sessions of the European Parliament in Strasbourg?

What additional expenditure (travel expenses, daily allowances, local accommodation, mission expenses, time in lieu or overtime) was incurred in relation to the Commission's officials who were sent during the years 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012 and 2013?

What additional expenditure (travel expenses, daily allowances, local accommodation, mission expenses) was incurred in relation to Members of the Commission who were sent during the years 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012 and 2013?

Answer given by Mr Šefčovič on behalf of the Commission
(26 March 2014)

1. The use of the term 'additional expenditure' is too vague to be answered in this context.

It is not the Commission's policy to answer hypothetical questions, as there are no agreed thresholds on minimum spending necessary to meet the requirements of the Treaty and to attend the sessions in Strasbourg.

2 and 3. The research required to provide a detailed answer to the Honourable Member's questions would be out of proportion to the result obtained and would be inappropriate in the context of answering a written question.

The Honourable Member is referred to the answers to written questions E-001506/2011 and E-004135/2012 which provide explanations on mission costs.

(Deutsche Fassung)

Anfrage zur schriftlichen Beantwortung E-000285/14
an die Kommission
Hans-Peter Martin (NI)
(14. Januar 2014)

Betrifft: Krankenstände der EU-Beamten in der Kommission

1. Wie viele Beamte der Kommission gingen im Jahr 2013 in den Krankenstand? Wie hoch ist der prozentuale Anteil gemessen an der Gesamtanzahl an Beamten in der Kommission?

2. Wie hoch waren die Gesamtkosten, die durch den Krankenstand der Beamten der Kommission im Jahr 2013 entstanden? Wie hoch waren die Durchschnittskosten pro erkranktem Beamten in der Kommission im Jahr 2013?

3. Wie viele Tage befand sich ein Beamter der Kommission durchschnittlich im Jahr 2013 im Krankenstand? Wie viele Beamte fehlten wegen Krankheit jeweils a) null bis fünf Tage, b) fünf bis 20 Tage und c) mehr als 20 Tage?

Antwort von Herrn Šefčovič im Namen der Kommission
(14. März 2014)

Die Kommission hat bereits mehrmals darauf hingewiesen, dass es keine besonderen Probleme bezüglich krankheitsbedingten Fehlzeiten ihres Personals gibt und die Kommission in dieser Hinsicht im Vergleich zu anderen Organisationen in Europa eher niedrige Durchschnittszahlen vorweisen kann. Sie bedauert, dass durch bestimmte Medien ein anderer Eindruck vermittelt wurde.

1. Im Jahr 2013 haben sich 17 465 Beamte für mindestens einen halben Tag krank gemeldet, das heißt 77 % aller Beamten waren im Jahr 2013 mindestens einen halben Tag krank.

2. Krankheitsbedingte Fehlzeiten verursachen keine nachweisbaren zusätzlichen Kosten für den EU-Haushalt, da es sich größtenteils um kurzfristige Fehlzeiten handelt, die durch die Umverteilung der Arbeitsbelastung auf das anwesende Personal ausgeglichen werden. Die Generaldirektionen ziehen daher eine Vertretung nur bei langfristigen Fehlzeiten in Erwägung. Gleichwohl kann diese unterschiedliche Formen annehmen, so dass es nicht möglich ist, die durchschnittlichen Kosten pro Kommissionsbeamten zu berechnen.

3. Die durchschnittliche Anzahl der Krankheitstage — nicht die krankheitsbedingten Fehlzeiten — lag im Jahr 2013 bei 14 von 365 Tagen. Dies schließt auch durch ärztliche Atteste abgedeckte Wochenenden und Feiertage mit ein. Während des gesamten Jahres betrug die Fehlzeit bei 8 055 Beamten zwischen einem halben Tag und 5 Tagen, bei 6 144 Beamten zwischen 6 und 20 Tagen und bei 3 266 Beamten mehr als 20 Tage. Die Europäische Kommission berechnet Fehlzeiten in Bezug auf 365 Kalendertage, d. h. auch Samstage, Sonntage und Feiertage zählen zu den Krankheitstagen. Dies umfasst auch alle schweren Krankheitsfälle wie Krebserkrankungen und Fehlzeiten aufgrund von Operationen oder Unfällen.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-000285/14
to the Commission
Hans-Peter Martin (NI)
(14 January 2014)

Subject: Number of absences due to illness among EU officials within the Commission

1. How many officials of the Commission reported sick during 2013? What was the percentage rate measured against the total number of officials in the Commission?

2. What were the total costs incurred as a result of the absence of officials of the Commission due to illness during 2013? What were the average costs within the Commission per official who was absent due to illness in 2013?

3. For how many days, on average, was an official of the Commission absent due to illness during in 2013? How many officials were absent due to illness for a) zero to five days, b) five to twenty days and c) more than twenty days respectively?

Answer given by Mr Šefčovič on behalf of the Commission
(14 March 2014)

The Commission has already pointed out on previous occasions that there is no specific problem with regard to sick leave of its staff and that the Commission is rather at the lower end of average absence rates among organisations across Europe. It regrets that certain media tried to convey a different impression.

1. 17 465 officials reported sick for at least half a day in 2013. This means that 77% of the total number of officials were sick for at least half a day in 2013.

2. Absences from work due to illness do not create measurable additional costs for the EU budget, as the majority of such absences are short-term and are therefore covered by the redistribution of the workload to the staff who continues to be present. It is therefore only in cases of long term absence that the Directorates-General can ask for some form of replacement. This can however take various forms, so that it is not feasible to calculate an average cost per absent Commission official.

3. The average number of days of illness — i.e. not days of absence from work due to illness — was 14 days out of 365 days in 2013. This figure includes weekends and holidays covered by medical certificates. 8 055 officials were absent for a total between a half day and 5 days over the entire year, 6 144 for a total between 6 days and 20 days over the entire year and 3 266 for a total of more than 20 days over the entire year. The EU Commission calculates its absences and absence rate based on 365 calendar days per year, i.e. the figures for days of illness include Saturdays, Sundays and holidays. They include all cases of serious illness such as cancer, absences connected with surgery and absences following accidents.

(Deutsche Fassung)

Anfrage zur schriftlichen Beantwortung E-000287/14
an den Rat
Hans-Peter Martin (NI)
(14. Januar 2014)

Betrifft: Anzahl der und Kosten für die gemäß Artikel 50 des Beamtenstatuts ihrer Stelle enthobenen EU-Beamten

Wie viele EU-Beamte sind nach Artikel 50 des Statuts der EU-Beamten in den Jahren 2010, 2011, 2012 und 2013 ihrer Stelle enthoben worden?

Wie hoch ist die durchschnittliche Vergütung der nach Artikel 50 des Statuts der EU-Beamten ihrer Stelle enthobenen EU-Beamten?

In wie vielen Fällen hat der Rat bei einer vorzeitigen Versetzung eines EU-Beamten in den Ruhestand von der Möglichkeit nach Anhang VIII Artikel 9 Absatz 2 des Statuts der EU-Beamten Gebrauch gemacht und auf eine Kürzung des Ruhegehalts ganz oder teilweise verzichtet?

Antwort
(17. März 2014)

In den Jahren 2010, 2012 und 2013 wurden keine EU-Beamten nach Artikel 50 des Statuts der Beamten der Europäischen Gemeinschaften ihrer Stelle enthoben; 2011 wurden zwei Beamte ihrer Stelle enthoben.

Die durchschnittliche Vergütung für Beamte, die 2011 nach Artikel 50 des Statuts ihrer Stelle enthoben wurden, belief sich auf 13 279,53 EUR pro Monat.

Die jährlichen Verfahren für die Anwendung des Artikels 9 Absatz 2 des Anhangs VIII des Statuts der Beamten wurden von 2004 bis 2013 mit Schwerpunkt auf der Umstrukturierung der Dienststellen des Rates durchgeführt, und 84 Beamten wurde ein Vorruhestand ohne Gehaltskürzung gewährt.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-000287/14
to the Council
Hans-Peter Martin (NI)
(14 January 2014)

Subject: Number of EU officials retired from their posts in accordance with Article 50 of the Staff Regulations of Officials of the European Communities and the costs associated with these

How many EU officials were retired in accordance with Article 50 of the Staff Regulations of Officials of the European Communities during the years 2010, 2011, 2012 and 2013?

How much is the average allowance of EU officials who have been retired from their posts in accordance with Article 50 of the Staff Regulations of Officials of the European Communities?

In how many cases of the early retirement of an EU official has the Council made use of the facility in accordance with Annex VIII, Article 9, Section 2 of the Staff Regulations of Officials of the European Communities and foregone the option to reduce the retirement pension in whole or in part?

Reply
(17 March 2014)

No EU officials were retired under Article 50 of the Staff Regulations of Officials of the European Communities during the years 2010, 2012 and 2013; 2 officials were retired in 2011.

The average allowance granted to officials retired in 2011 under Article 50 of the Staff Regulations was EUR 13 279.53 per month.

Annual exercises for the application of Article 9(2) of Annex VIII to the Staff Regulations have been organised from 2004 to 2013 focusing on restructuring Council departments and 84 officials have been granted early retirement without reduction of salary.

(Deutsche Fassung)

Anfrage zur schriftlichen Beantwortung E-000289/14
an die Kommission (Vizepräsidentin / Hohe Vertreterin)
Hans-Peter Martin (NI)
(14. Januar 2014)

Betrifft: VP/HR — Anzahl und Kosten der gemäß Artikel 50 des Beamtenstatuts ihrer Stelle enthobenen EU-Beamten

Wie viele EU-Beamte sind nach Artikel 50 des Statuts der EU-Beamten in den Jahren 2011, 2012 und 2013 ihrer Stelle enthoben worden?

Wie hoch ist die durchschnittliche Vergütung der nach Artikel 50 des Statuts der EU-Beamten ihrer Stelle enthobenen EU-Beamten?

In wie vielen Fällen hat der Europäische Auswärtige Dienst bei einer vorzeitigen Versetzung eines EU-Beamten in den Ruhestand von der Möglichkeit nach Anhang VIII Artikel 9 Absatz 2 des Statuts der EU-Beamten Gebrauch gemacht und auf eine Kürzung des Ruhegehalts ganz oder teilweise verzichtet?

Antwort von Frau Ashton — Hohe Vertreterin/Vizepräsidentin im Namen der Kommission
(20. März 2014)

1. Die Anzahl der nach Artikel 50 des Statuts ihrer Stelle enthobenen EU-Beamten aus allen Institutionen belief sich auf 6 im Jahr 2011, 2 im Jahr 2012 und 1 im Jahr 2013.

2. Zwischen 2011 und 2013 wurden aus allen Institutionen insgesamt 9 EU-Beamte nach Artikel 50 des Statuts ihrer Stelle enthoben; ihre durchschnittliche Vergütung beläuft sich auf 9 778,46 EUR.

3. Die Anzahl der Beamten des EAD, die nach dem früheren Abschnitt 2 Artikel 9 des Anhangs VIII des Statuts ohne Kürzung der Ruhegehaltsansprüche in den Ruhestand treten konnten, belief sich 2011 auf 7, 2012 auf 3 und 2013 auf 7.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-000289/14
to the Commission (Vice-President/High Representative)
Hans-Peter Martin (NI)
(14 January 2014)

Subject: VP/HR — Number of EU officials retired from their posts in accordance with Article 50 of the Staff Regulations of Officials of the European Communities and costs associated with these

How many EU officials were retired in accordance with Article 50 of the Staff Regulations of Officials of the European Communities during the years 2011, 2012 and 2013?

How much is the average allowance of EU officials who have been retired from their posts in accordance with Article 50 of the Staff Regulations of Officials of the European Communities?

In how many cases of the early retirement of an EU official has the European External Action Service made use of the facility in accordance with Annex VIII, Article 9, Section 2 of the Staff Regulations of Officials of the European Communities and foregone the option to reduce the retirement pension in whole or in part?

Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission
(20 March 2014)

1. Considering all institutions, number of EU officials retired in accordance with Article 50 of the Staff Regulations is as follows: 6 in 2011, 2 in 2012 and 1 in 2013.

2. Considering all institutions, 9 EU officials retired in accordance with Article 50 of the Staff Regulations between 2011 and 2013, with an average allowance of EUR 9 778.46.

3. The number of EEAS officials allowed to retire without reduction of pension rights in accordance with the former Section 2 of Annex VIII, Article 9 of the Staff Regulations was seven in 2011, three in 2012, and seven in 2013.

(Dansk udgave)

Forespørgsel til skriftlig besvarelse E-000305/14
til Kommissionen
Ole Christensen (S&D) og Jutta Steinruck (S&D)
(14. januar 2014)

Om: Opfølgende spørgsmål til Kommissionen om anvendelse af postkasseselskaber i transportsektoren

Jeg har i et spørgsmål, sendt til Kommissionen den 10. september 2013, gjort opmærksom på eventuelle brud på bestemmelserne i forordning (EF) nr. 1071/2009 i transportsektoren (E-010156/2013). I svaret angiver Kommissionen, at de oplysninger, jeg lægger til grund for mit spørgsmål, ikke er af en sådan karakter, at det er muligt for den at slå fast, hvorvidt de i mit spørgsmål omtalte virksomheder overtræder bestemmelserne i forordning (EF) nr. 1071/2009. Jeg vil derfor bede Kommissionen svare på, om det danske transportfirma H.P. Therkelsen forbryder sig mod reglerne i forordning (EF) nr. 1071/2009, når virksomheden:

— indregistrerer lastbiler på tyske nummerplader gennem virksomhedens datterselskab med adresse og postadresse i Flensburg (Bachstrasse 1 a, D-24893 Taarstedt)

— administrerer såvel sin danske virksomhed som sit tyske datterselskab fra den danske virksomheds adresse i Padborg (Eksportvej 1, DK-6330 Padborg)

— udfører alle faktiske aktiviteter på virksomhedens danske adresse i Padborg

— og samtidig opbevarer alle kernedokumenterne på den danske virksomheds adresse i Padborg?

Kan Kommissionen nærmere bestemt svare på, om disse forhold er i strid med reglerne i forordning (EF) nr. 1071/2009 om, at virksomheder, der udøver vejtransporterhverv, skal have et faktisk etableret og varigt forretningssted, herunder at virksomhederne for at opfylde kravet om et sådant forretningssted skal råde over lokaler, hvor virksomhedens kernedokumenter opbevares (artikel 5, litra a)), samt være i besiddelse af administration og driftscentral for virksomhedens indregistrerede køretøjer (artikel 5, litra c))?

Kan Kommissionen videre svare på, om den vil rette henvendelse til tyske myndigheder i denne konkrete sag? Vil Kommissionen, hvis ovenstående oplysninger er af en sådan karakter, at den ikke kan tage stilling til mit spørgsmål på baggrund heraf, tydeligt angive, hvilken type oplysninger den har brug for?

Svar afgivet på Kommissionens vegne af Siim Kallas
(28. februar 2014)

I henhold til forordning (EF) nr. 1071/2009 ([1]) skal virksomheder, der udfører godskørsel, opfylde en række betingelser for at få adgang til vejtransporterhvervet. For at opfylde kriteriet om en »stabil og effektiv virksomhed« skal de bl.a.:

»råde over et forretningssted i denne medlemsstat med lokaler, hvor virksomhedens kernedokumenter opbevares, navnlig alle dokumenter vedrørende regnskaber og personaleforvaltning, dokumenter med oplysninger om køre- og hviletid samt andre dokumenter, som den kompetente myndighed skal have adgang til for at kunne kontrollere, om kravene i denne forordning er opfyldt« (artikel 5, litra a)).

I henhold til artikel 5, litra c), i samme forordning, skal godstransportørerne også:

»være i besiddelse af det påkrævede administrative apparatur og effektivt og vedvarende drive en driftscentral for de i litra b) nævnte køretøjer beliggende i denne medlemsstat og med det hensigtsmæssige udstyr og de hensigtsmæssige faciliteter.«

Kommissionen vil derfor anmode om, at de tyske myndigheder gennemfører en individuel undersøgelse for at kontrollere, om virksomheden fortsat opfylder betingelserne for adgang til vejtransporterhvervet i henhold til den procedure, der er fastlagt i artikel 12, stk. 3, i forordningen ([2]). Kommissionen informerer de ærede medlemmer om resultatet af denne procedure.

Kommissionen bemærker også, at det i sidste ende er medlemsstaternes pligt at sikre, at forordningen overholdes.

([1]) EUT L 300 af 14.11.2009.

([2]) »3. Når Kommissionen i behørigt begrundede tilfælde anmoder herom, foretager medlemsstaterne individuel kontrol af, om en virksomhed fortsat opfylder betingelserne for adgang til vejtransporterhvervet. Medlemsstaten underretter Kommissionen om resultaterne af den således foretagne kontrol og om, hvilke foranstaltninger der er truffet, hvis det blev konstateret, at virksomheden ikke længere opfylder kravene i denne forordning.«.

(Deutsche Fassung)

Anfrage zur schriftlichen Beantwortung E-000305/14
an die Kommission
Ole Christensen (S&D) und Jutta Steinruck (S&D)
(14. Januar 2014)

Betrifft: Zusatzfrage an die Kommission zur Verwendung von Briefkastenfirmen im Verkehrssektor

In einer Anfrage an die Kommission vom 10. September 2013 hat der Fragesteller auf mögliche Verstöße gegen die Vorschriften der Verordnung (EG) Nr. 1071/2009 im Verkehrssektor aufmerksam gemacht (E-010156/2013). In ihrer Antwort erklärt die Kommission, die der Anfrage zugrunde liegenden Angaben reichten ihr nicht aus, um festzustellen, inwieweit die in der Anfrage erwähnten Unternehmen gegen die Vorschriften der Verordnung (EG) Nr. 1071/2009 verstoßen. Daher wird die Kommission gebeten zu beantworten, ob das dänische Transportunternehmen H. P. Therkelsen gegen die Verordnung (EG) Nr. 1071/2009 verstößt, wenn es

— Lkws über eine Tochterfirma des Unternehmens mit Sitz und Postanschrift in Flensburg (Bachstrasse 1 a, D-24893 Taarstedt) mit deutschen Kennzeichen anmeldet,

— sowohl seinen dänischen Betrieb als auch seine deutsche Tochterfirma von der Adresse des dänischen Unternehmens in Padborg (Pattburg) (Eksportvej 1, DK-6330 Padborg) aus verwaltet,

— sämtliche tatsächlichen Tätigkeiten an der dänischen Adresse des Unternehmens in Padborg ausführt

— und gleichzeitig alle wesentlichen Unterlagen an der dänischen Adresse des Unternehmens in Padborg aufbewahrt.

Kann die Kommission im Einzelnen beantworten, ob diese Gegebenheiten deshalb im Widerspruch zu der Verordnung (EG) Nr. 1071/2009 stehen, weil Unternehmen, die Kraftverkehr betreiben, eine tatsächliche und dauerhafte Niederlassung besitzen müssen, unter anderem weil Unternehmen, um die Anforderung einer solchen Niederlassung zu erfüllen, über Räumlichkeiten verfügen müssen, in denen die wichtigsten Unternehmensunterlagen aufbewahrt werden (Artikel 5 Buchstabe a) und in denen sie für die auf das Unternehmen angemeldeten Fahrzeuge über eine Verwaltungs- und Betriebsstätte verfügen (Artikel 5 Buchstabe c)?

Wird die Kommission in dieser konkreten Angelegenheit eine Anfrage an die deutschen Behörden richten? Wird die Kommission, falls die vorstehenden Angaben nicht ausreichen, damit sie auf deren Grundlage zu der vorliegenden Anfrage Stellung beziehen kann, eindeutig angeben, welche Angaben sie dafür benötigt?

Antwort von Herrn Kallas im Namen der Kommission
(28. Februar 2014)

Nach der Verordnung (EG) Nr. 1071/2009 [1] müssen Güterkraftverkehrsunternehmen mehrere Voraussetzungen erfüllen, um Zugang zum Beruf des Kraftverkehrsunternehmers zu erhalten. Um das Kriterium der „tatsächlichen und dauerhaften Niederlassung" zu erfüllen, muss das Unternehmen unter anderem

„über eine Niederlassung in dem genannten Mitgliedstaat verfügen, mit Räumlichkeiten, in denen seine wichtigsten Unternehmensunterlagen aufbewahrt werden, insbesondere seine Buchführungsunterlagen, Personalverwaltungsunterlagen, Dokumente mit den Daten über die Lenk- und Ruhezeiten sowie alle sonstigen Unterlagen, zu denen die zuständige Behörde Zugang haben muss, um die Erfüllung der in dieser Verordnung festgelegten Voraussetzungen überprüfen zu können" (Artikel 5 Buchstabe a).

Gemäß Artikel 5 Buchstabe c derselben Verordnung muss das Güterkraftverkehrsunternehmen außerdem

„seine Tätigkeit betreffend die unter Buchstabe b genannten Fahrzeuge tatsächlich und dauerhaft, mittels der erforderlichen verwaltungstechnischen Ausstattung und der angemessenen technischen Ausstattung und Einrichtung, an einer in dem betreffenden Mitgliedstaat gelegenen Betriebsstätte ausüben".

Die Kommission wird daher die deutschen Behörden gemäß dem Verfahren nach Artikel 12 Absatz 3 der Verordnung [2] zur Durchführung einer Einzelkontrolle auffordern, um zu überprüfen, ob das Unternehmen die Voraussetzungen für die Zulassung zum Beruf des Kraftverkehrsunternehmers erfüllt. Die Kommission wird die Abgeordneten über den Ausgang dieses Verfahrens unterrichten.

Die Kommission weist auch darauf hin, dass letztlich die jeweiligen Mitgliedstaaten für die Durchsetzung der Bestimmungen der Verordnung verantwortlich sind.

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[1] ABl. L 300 vom 14.11.2009.

[2] „(3) Auf Aufforderung der Kommission in gebührend begründeten Fällen nimmt ein Mitgliedstaat Einzelkontrollen vor, um zu überprüfen, ob ein Unternehmen die Voraussetzungen für die Zulassung zum Beruf des Kraftverkehrsunternehmers weiterhin erfüllt. Der Mitgliedstaat teilt der Kommission das Ergebnis dieser Kontrollen sowie gegebenenfalls die ergriffenen Maßnahmen mit, falls festgestellt wird, dass das Unternehmen die Voraussetzungen dieser Verordnung nicht mehr erfüllt".

(English version)

Question for written answer E-000305/14
to the Commission
Ole Christensen (S&D) and Jutta Steinruck (S&D)
(14 January 2014)

Subject: Follow-up question to the Commission about the use of letter box companies in the transport sector

In a question to the Commission dated 11 September 2013 (E-010156/2013), attention was drawn to a possible breach of the provisions of Regulation (EC) No 1071/2009 in the transport sector. In its answer, the Commission stated that the information on which the question was based did not allow it to establish whether the companies referred to in the question were infringing the provisions of Regulation (EC) No 1071/2009. Would the Commission therefore state whether the Danish transport company H.P. Therkelsen is infringing Regulation EC No 1071/2009 by:

— registering goods vehicles under German registration plates through its subsidiary, which has a postal address in Flensburg (Bachstrasse 1 a, D-24893 Taarstedt),

— managing both its Danish company and its German subsidiary from the Danish company's address in Padborg (Eksportvej 1, DK-6330 Padborg),

— carrying out all its real activities at the company's Danish address in Padborg,

— and at the same time keeping all core documents at the company's address in Padborg.

Specifically, can the Commission state whether these practices are contrary to the rules of Regulation (EC) No 1071/2009, which state that companies operating a road transport business must have an effective and stable establishment, and that, in order to fulfil the requirement to have such an establishment, companies must have premises in which they keep their core business documents (Article 5(a)) and have the necessary administration and operating centre for their registered vehicles (Article 5(c))?

Can the Commission also state whether it will make inquiries with the German authorities in this particular case? If the above information does not provide an adequate basis for the Commission to reply to this question, will it clearly state what information it needs?

Answer given by Mr Kallas on behalf of the Commission
(28 February 2014)

According to Regulation (EC) No 1071/2009 ([1]), road haulage undertakings must fulfil several conditions to gain access to the occupation of road transport operator. To meet the 'stable and effective establishment' criterion, they must among others:

'have an establishment situated in that Member State with premises in which it keeps its core business documents, in particular its accounting documents, personnel management documents, documents containing data relating to driving time and rest and any other document to which the competent authority must have access in order to verify compliance with the conditions laid down in this regulation' (Article 5(a)).

According to Article 5(c) of the same Regulation, road haulage undertakings must also:

'conduct effectively and continuously with the necessary administrative equipment its operations concerning the vehicles mentioned in point (b) and with the appropriate technical equipment and facilities at an operating centre situated in that Member State.'

The Commission will therefore request that the German authorities carry out an individual check to verify whether the undertaking meets the conditions governing admission to the occupation of transport operator, under the procedure laid out in Article 12(3) of the regulation ([2]). The Commission will inform the Honourable Members of the results of this procedure.

The Commission also notes that it is ultimately the duty of the Member States concerned to ensure that the provisions of the regulation are enforced.

([1]) OJ L 300, 14.11.2009.
([2]) '3.Member States shall carry out individual checks to verify whether an undertaking meets the conditions governing admission to the occupation of road transport operator whenever the Commission so requests in duly motivated cases. It shall inform the Commission of the results of such checks and of the measures taken if it is established that the undertaking no longer fulfils the requirements laid down in this regulation.'.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-000306/14
to the Commission
Sir Graham Watson (ALDE)
(14 January 2014)

Subject: Mining in Costa Rica

1. Is the Commission aware of the legal action that has been launched to the tune of over USD 1 billion by the Canadian mining company Infinito Gold against the Costa Rican Government because it rejected the company's plan to build an open-pit gold mine in a tropical rain forest? A mine of this kind could lead to the clearance of 190 hectares of rainforest, which is home to many already endangered species, such as the green macaw.

2. Part of the basis for this legal action is an investor state dispute settlement mechanism provided for in a trade agreement to which Costa Rica is party. The Commission may be aware of misgivings about such mechanisms, for example those expressed by parts of the British press, in light of ongoing negotiations on the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership. Whilst it is important that a balance be struck between preventing abuses (such as discrimination and unfair practices) against business investors and protecting investments, what steps is the Commission taking to ensure democratic prerogatives are fully enshrined in EU trade agreements?

Answer given by Mr De Gucht on behalf of the Commission
(11 March 2014)

1. According to public sources, on 10 February 2014, the Canadian owned company Infinito Gold filed a request for arbitration at the International centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes under the Wold Bank (ICSID) on the basis of the investment protection provisions of the Canada-Costa Rica Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT). According to a public statement released by the company, it is seeking USD 94 million in compensation for investments and costs incurred after the Costa Rican government revoked its mining licence and after failure to find an amicable solution.

2. The Council has authorised the Commission to negotiate on investment protection including Investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) in the Free Trade Agreement negotiations with, respectively, Canada, India, Singapore, Japan, the USA, Morocco, Jordan, Tunisia, Egypt and all the ASEAN countries. In addition, the Council has authorised the Commission to negotiate an investment agreement with China, including ISDS as well. The Commission has since 2010 been working on a new Union wide policy on investment protection and ISDS, based on lessons learnt from the 1 400 EU Member State BITs, and addressing concerns raised by the public on the right to regulate and the ISDS system itself. The new EU investment policy seeks to achieve a balance between the protection of investors and the confirmation of states' right to regulate. The Commission is also bringing improvements to the ISDS provisions to increase transparency and avoid the risk of abuse. These include changes to the appointment of arbitrators and a binding code of conduct. On transparency, documents will be made public and civil society groups will be able to attend hearings and make submissions.

(Versión española)

Pregunta con solicitud de respuesta escrita E-000318/14
al Consejo
Iñaki Irazabalbeitia Fernández (Verts/ALE), Izaskun Bilbao Barandica (ALDE), Salvador Sedó i Alabart (PPE) y Ramon Tremosa i Balcells (ALDE)
(14 de enero de 2014)

Asunto: Carta de las Lenguas e ingreso en la EU (2)

En la pregunta escrita E-011480/2013, le preguntamos al Consejo si tenía previsto tomar en consideración la recomendación del Parlamento Europeo sobre «Lenguas europeas amenazadas de desaparición y diversidad lingüística», particularmente el punto 5, que afirma: «Pide a las autoridades de la Unión que incorporen el respeto efectivo a la diversidad lingüística y especialmente la protección de las lenguas no hegemónicas europeas a la serie de condiciones que deben cumplir todos los Estados que quieran ingresar en la EU como Estados miembros».

Resulta que, en su respuesta, el Consejo muestra su interés por la diversidad lingüística y hace referencia a algunas iniciativas que había tomado en la materia, pero no responde de manera precisa a la pregunta, es decir, no hace ninguna referencia a la recomendación arriba mencionada.

A partir de ahí, ¿tiene el Consejo previsto tomar en consideración la recomendación del Parlamento Europeo?

Más precisamente, ¿piensa el Consejo cumplir con el punto 5 de la recomendación?

Respuesta
(12 de marzo de 2014)

El Consejo invita amablemente a Sus Señorías a que consulten la respuesta que ya dio a la misma pregunta ([1]).

Reitera que tomó nota del informe mencionado por Sus Señorías en la pregunta, aunque les recuerda que, desde un punto de vista jurídico, las recomendaciones, sean del Parlamento Europeo o del mismo Consejo, no tienen carácter vinculante.

Asimismo, como Sus Señorías sin duda saben, el Consejo solo es competente para pronunciarse sobre propuestas de la Comisión Europea. Hasta la fecha, no se ha presentado al Consejo propuesta alguna sobre el tema que plantean en su pregunta.

([1]) E-011480/2013.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-000318/14
to the Council
Iñaki Irazabalbeitia Fernández (Verts/ALE), Izaskun Bilbao Barandica (ALDE), Salvador Sedó i Alabart (PPE) and Ramon Tremosa i Balcells (ALDE)
(14 January 2014)

Subject: Charter for Languages and admission to the EU (2)

In Written Question E-011480/2013, we asked the Council whether it intended to take into consideration Parliament's recommendation concerning 'Endangered European languages and linguistic diversity', and in particular paragraph 5 which 'calls on the Union authorities to include effective respect for linguistic diversity, and protection for the most vulnerable European languages in particular, as a condition that must be met by all states wishing to be admitted as an EU Member State'.

In its response, the Council expressed an interest in linguistic diversity and referred to several initiatives it had taken in this area; it did not, however, reply specifically to the question — that is, it did not refer to the abovementioned recommendation.

Does the Council therefore intend to take into consideration Parliament's recommendation?

More specifically, will the Council comply with paragraph 5 of the recommendation?

Reply
(12 March 2014)

The Council kindly invites the Honourable Members to refer to its reply to the same question ([1]).

It reiterates that it took note of the report referred to in the Honourable Members' question, nevertheless recalling that, from a legal point of view, recommendations — whether from the European Parliament or indeed the Council — are non-binding in nature.

Also, as the Honourable Members are aware, the Council is competent to act solely on proposals from the European Commission. To date, no proposal on the issue raised in the question has been submitted to the Council.

([1]) E-011480/2013.

(Hrvatska verzija)

Pitanje za pisani odgovor E-000324/14
upućeno Komisiji
Ruža Tomašić (ECR)
(14. siječnja 2014.)

Predmet: Izlazak iz ribarstva

Ulaskom u EU hrvatski su ribari suočeni s poteškoćama pri usklađivanju sa zahtjevima Unije i dosta restriktivnim odredbama Mediteranske konvencije. Sve potezne mreže, poput migavica ili šabakuna, postale su ilegalne odnosno moraju biti korištene isključivo na većim dubinama i udaljenostima od obale za što mnogi ribari nemaju odgovarajuće alate i brodove.

S obzirom na to da s postojećim brodovima i alatima ne mogu zadovoljiti uvjete Unije, mnogi rade ilegalno, za velike troškove i sve manji ulov (69 700 tona ulova u 2012. u odnosu na 77 000 tona u 2010.) pa razmatraju mogućnost izlaska iz klasičnog ribarstva.

Izlazak se nudi na dva načina: uništavanjem starih brodova uz isplatu određene naknade ribarima ili prelaskom na druge aktivnosti. No Uprava za ribarstvo Ministarstva poljoprivrede RH još nije donijela programe odnosno odredila pravila, kriterije i uvjete za izlazak iz ribarstva u skladu s europskim programima na tom području.

Zbog svega navedenog želim znati koje mogućnosti Komisija može ponuditi onima koji žele izaći iz ribarstva za što uspješniji i bezbolniji prelazak na druge aktivnosti? Koje uvjete moraju ispuniti ribari koji imaju namjeru napustiti ribolov i baviti se drugom djelatnošću, a koje pak programe moraju donijeti nadležna nacionalna tijela radi osiguravanja takvog prelaska?

Odgovor gđe Damanaki u ime Komisije
(10. ožujka 2014.)

Europski fond za ribarstvo (EFR) i njegov nasljednik Europski fond za pomorstvo i ribarstvo (EFPR) provode se u kontekstu „podijeljenog upravljanja", što znači da je detaljna provedba operativnog programa (OP) u okviru ciljeva iz OP-a, nakon što ga odobri Europska komisija, u nadležnosti odgovarajućih tijela države članice.

U okviru ta dva fonda na raspolaganju su raznovrsne mjere za pomoć ribarima i obalnim zajednicama koje uključuju potpore za poboljšanje sigurnosti na plovilu i radnih uvjeta, kupnju selektivnijih alata i zamjenu motora pod određenim uvjetima. Ako ribar želi napustiti sektor ribarstva, dostupne su naknade za odlaganje brodova u rezalište.

Osim toga u okviru komponente EFPR-a, koja se odnosi na lokalni razvoj kojim upravlja zajednica, pružit će se potpora za diversifikaciju i stvaranje radnih mjesta unutar i izvan sektora ribarstva. Projekti bi trebali imati za cilj stvaranje novih radnih mjesta, omogućivanje dodatnih izvora prihoda za ribare, ali i za one koji žele napustiti taj sektor i širu ribarstvenu zajednicu. Ti projekti mogu obuhvaćati razvoj turizma i rekreacijskih aktivnosti, potporu za pružanje usluga zaštite okoliša, kao što je prikupljanje otpada, ili dodavanje vrijednosti lokalnom ulovu.

Kako bi počela provoditi EFR, Hrvatska trenutačno radi na osnivanju odbora za praćenje nadležnog za utvrđivanje kriterija odabira, koji bi trebao početi s djelovanjem 17. ožujka. Financijska sredstva trebala bi biti na raspolaganju nakon tog datuma. Usporedno s time u tijeku je rad na nacrtu operativnog programa EFPR-a.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-000324/14
to the Commission
Ruža Tomašić (ECR)
(14 January 2014)

Subject: Moving away from fishing

With Croatia's entry into the EU, Croatian fishermen faced difficulties fulfilling EU requirements and the rather restrictive provisions of the Barcelona Convention. All trawl-nets, such as migavica-type and šabakun-type nets, became illegal and may now only be used at greater depths and distances from the shore. Many fishermen, however, do not have the appropriate equipment or boats to engage in such fishing.

Given that they are unable to meet EU requirements with their current boats and tools, many fishermen are working illegally, at great expense and for ever-decreasing catches (69 700 tonnes in 2012, compared with 77 000 tonnes in 2010), and are consequently considering leaving behind traditional fishing.

There are two options for fishermen considering leaving fishing behind: they can have their old boats scrapped in exchange for compensation, or they can take up other activities. However, the Department of Fisheries at the Croatian Ministry of Agriculture has so far failed to reach a decision on determining the rules, criteria and conditions for leaving fishing in accordance with the relevant EU programmes.

In view of the above, what opportunities can the Commission offer to those who wish to leave fishing to ensure that their transition to other activities is as successful and painless as possible? What conditions must be fulfilled by fishermen who wish to leave fishing behind in order to engage in other activities, and what programmes must then be adopted by the competent national authorities to ensure such a successful and painless transition?

Answer given by Ms Damanaki on behalf of the Commission
(10 March 2014)

The European Fisheries Fund (EFF) and its successor — the European Maritime and Fisheries Fund (EMFF) are implemented in the context of 'shared management', which means that once an Operational Programme (OP) is approved by the European Commission, its detailed implementation within the objectives set in the OP is the responsibility of the relevant Member State authorities.

The two funds offer a variety of measures to help fishermen and coastal communities. These include support for improvements of safety on board and working conditions, the purchase of more selective gears, and engine replacement under certain conditions. Should fishermen wish to leave the sector, compensation for vessel scrapping is available.

Besides this, under the community-led local development strand of the EMFF, support will be granted for diversification and job creation within and beyond the fisheries sector. Projects should aim at creating jobs, providing additional sources of income for fishermen, but also for those wishing to leave the sector and the wider fisheries community. These projects can include the development of tourism and leisure activities, support for the provision of environmental services such as the collection of waste, or adding value to the local catches.

To launch the EFF implementation, Croatia is currently working on the establishment of the Monitoring Committee responsible for setting up the selection criteria, which is expected to be up and running on 17 March. The funding should be available after that date. In parallel, preparations are ongoing on the draft EMFF OP.

(Ελληνική έκδοση)

Ερώτηση με αίτημα γραπτής απάντησης E-000328/14
προς την Επιτροπή
Antigoni Papadopoulou (S&D)
(14 Ιανουαρίου 2014)

Θέμα: Εκφοβισμός της Κύπρου από την τρόικα

Σύμφωνα με δήλωση του Γερμανού βουλευτή του ΕΚ, Jürgen Klute, στον EU Observer, η τρόικα «έβαλε το όπλο στο κεφάλι της Κύπρου και της Πορτογαλίας» και δεν έδειξε κανένα ενδιαφέρον για κοινωνικά μέτρα, αλλά ανησυχούσε περισσότερο για τη μείωση του ελλείμματος.

Ο κ. Klute επέκρινε την αντιδημοκρατική λειτουργία της τρόικας και το γεγονός ότι δεν λήφθηκαν υπόψη οι κοινωνικές επιπτώσεις του έργου της λόγω της «βιασύνης να πληγούν οι Ρώσοι ολιγάρχες που διέθεταν καταθέσεις στις τράπεζες». Επιπλέον, επισήμανε ότι η παρούσα οικονομική κατάσταση στη νήσο διαφέρει από τις προβλέψεις που είχαν πραγματοποιηθεί κατά την επιβολή της διάσωσης με ίδια μέσα. Έχουν προκύψει προβλήματα όπως έλλειψη ρευστότητας, αύξηση της ανεργίας από 3% σε 17% και αδυναμία αποπληρωμής δανείων και υποθηκών.

Ο κ. Klute εξήγησε ότι η Κύπρος δεν διαθέτει ισχυρό σύστημα κοινωνικής προστασίας, σε αντίθεση με τη Γερμανία και τη Γαλλία. Κατά συνέπεια, οι άνθρωποι αποταμιεύουν για την εκπαίδευση των παιδιών τους, την υγειονομική τους περίθαλψη ή τη συνταξιοδότησή τους. Ωστόσο, οι αποταμιεύσεις αυτές είτε έχουν εξανεμιστεί πλήρως είτε έχουν μειωθεί στο μισό λόγω της διάσωσης με ίδια μέσα.

1. Ποια είναι η άποψη της Επιτροπής όσον αφορά την παραπάνω αξιολόγηση και τις δηλώσεις του Γερμανού βουλευτή του ΕΚ, Jürgen Klute;

2. Σύμφωνα με δήλωση του βουλευτή του ΕΚ, Nils Torvalds, «τα κράτη μέλη της ζώνης του ευρώ είναι επίσης εν μέρει υπεύθυνα για το γεγονός ότι επί μακρόν αγνοούσαν τα προβλήματα της Ελλάδας και τα παραποιημένα στοιχεία σχετικά με το έλλειμμα … κάτι που είχε ως αποτέλεσμα να αντιμετωπιστεί η Κύπρος με μεγαλύτερη σκληρότητα από ότι θα έπρεπε». Πώς σχολιάζει η Επιτροπή την ανωτέρω δήλωση;

3. Θεωρεί ότι η τρόικα δεν υπολόγισε σωστά τις κοινωνικές επιπτώσεις της διάσωσης με ίδια μέσα;

4. Δεν πιστεύει ότι ήταν εσφαλμένη η αντιμετώπιση των Κυπρίων καταθετών, γεγονός που αποδεικνύεται σαφώς από την απώλεια σημαντικού μέρους των αποταμιεύσεών τους και της εγγύησής τους για το μέλλον τους και το μέλλον των παιδιών τους;

Απάντηση του κ. Rehn εξ ονόματος της Επιτροπής
(14 Μαρτίου 2014)

Η Επιτροπή έχει επίγνωση των προβλημάτων που ανέκυψαν από την τρέχουσα κρίση για τη φτώχεια και την κοινωνική συνοχή. Είναι απαραίτητο να εξασφαλιστεί επαρκής υποστήριξη για τις πλέον ευάλωτες ομάδες. Η Κύπρος ήταν μια μοναδική περίπτωση, λόγω της δομής του τραπεζικού της τομέα, του βαθμού ανάληψης κινδύνου και της ανεπαρκούς εποπτείας.

Το πρόγραμμα οικονομικής προσαρμογής για την Κύπρο δίνει έμφαση στον σημαντικό ρόλο των δικτύων ασφαλείας και λαμβάνει υπόψη την ανάγκη ελαχιστοποίησης των επιπτώσεων για τις ευάλωτες ομάδες. Για τον σκοπό αυτόν, οι κυπριακές αρχές έχουν ξεκινήσει ένα σχέδιο μεταρρυθμίσεων του συστήματος πρόνοιας που αποσκοπούν στην αύξηση της αποδοτικότητας και της αποτελεσματικότητας, κυρίως παρέχοντας ένα ελάχιστο εγγυημένο εισόδημα (GMI), το οποίο θα αντικαταστήσει το ισχύον σύστημα κοινωνικής πρόνοιας και θα επεκτείνει την κάλυψή του.

Τα μέτρα που θέσπισε η Κύπρος μελετήθηκαν ειδικά για την έκτακτη κατάστασή της προκειμένου να αποκατασταθεί η βιωσιμότητα ενός μικρότερου τραπεζικού τομέα και, παράλληλα, να προστατευθούν όλες οι καταθέσεις κάτω των 100 000, σύμφωνα με τις αρχές της ΕΕ.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-000328/14
to the Commission
Antigoni Papadopoulou (S&D)
(14 January 2014)

Subject: Troika bullied Cyprus

According to a statement made to the EU Observer by German MEP Juergen Klute, the Troika 'held a gun to the head of Cyprus and Portugal' and showed no interest in social measures, but was more concerned about cutting back the deficit.

Mr Klute criticised the undemocratic workings of the Troika and the fact that the social impact of its work was ignored on account of the 'rush to hit Russian oligarchs who held deposits in the banks'. Furthermore, he noted that the present economic situation on the island differs to what was predicted when the bail-in was imposed. Problems emerged including a liquidity shortage, an increase in unemployment from 3% to 17% and an inability to repay loans and mortgages.

Mr Klute explained that Cyprus does not have a strong social system, contrary to Germany and France. People saved money, therefore, to pay for their children's education, healthcare or their retirement. However, this money has either completely disappeared or been halved due to the bail-in.

1. What view does the Commission take on the above evaluation and statements by German MEP Juergen Klute?

2. MEP Nils Torvalds has stated that 'eurozone Member States are also partly to blame for ignoring Greece's problems and rigged deficit figures for too long … this led to Cyprus being treated more roughly than it should have been'. How would the Commission comment on the above statement?

3. Does it believe that the Troika miscalculated the social impact of the bail-in?

4. Does it not believe that the Cypriot depositors were wrongly treated, as clearly evidenced by the fact that they have lost a substantial part of their lifetime savings and reassurance about their and their children's future?

Answer given by Mr Rehn on behalf of the Commission
(14 March 2014)

The Commission is aware of the challenges posed by the current crisis for poverty and social cohesion. It is essential to ensure adequate support for the most vulnerable. Cyprus was a unique case because its structure level of risk-taking and suboptimal supervision.

The economic adjustment programme for Cyprus puts emphasis on the crucial role of safety nets and takes into consideration the need to minimise the impact on vulnerable groups. To this end, the Cypriot authorities have embarked on a reform plan of the welfare system aimed at increasing its efficiency and effectiveness, notably by providing a guaranteed minimum income (GMI) scheme, which will replace the current public assistance scheme and expand its coverage.

Measures taken by Cyprus were tailor-made to its very exceptional situation in order to restore the viability of a smaller banking sector while, at the same time, protecting all deposits below 100 000 in accordance with the EU principles.

(Versione italiana)

Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-000330/14
alla Commissione
Sergio Paolo Francesco Silvestris (PPE)
(14 gennaio 2014)

Oggetto: NSA e spionaggio degli iphone

Recentemente il settimanale tedesco Der Spiegel ha pubblicato alcuni documenti relativi allo scandalo Datagate, che ha visto coinvolto una rete di spionaggio internazionale per conto della National Security Agency americana. Da questi documenti emerge l'esistenza di un programma della NSA denominato «Dropout Jeep», tramite cui un sofisticato software installato sugli smartphone di un noto produttore di dispositivi elettronici americano darebbe accesso ai dati personali memorizzati sui dispositivi dagli utenti, incluse e-mail, messaggi di testo e rubrica telefonica, nonché la possibilità di attivare remotamente microfono e telecamera dello smartphone. Il documento risalirebbe al 2008 e il produttore in questione smentisce assolutamente qualsiasi coinvolgimento.

Alla luce di questi fatti, può la Commissione far sapere se:

1. intende avviare un'indagine conoscitiva sui dispositivi smartphone distribuiti in Europa;

2. intende instaurare un dialogo con l'azienda americana per chiarire la posizione di quest'ultima nel presunto scandalo?

Risposta di Viviane Reding a nome della Commissione
(12 marzo 2014)

Il 27 novembre la Commissione ha definito le azioni da intraprendere al fine di ripristinare la fiducia nei flussi di dati tra l'UE e gli USA La Commissione ha pubblicato due comunicazioni indirizzate al Parlamento europeo e al Consiglio, intitolate «Ripristinare un clima di fiducia negli scambi di dati fra l'UE e gli USA» ([1]) e «Comunicazione sul funzionamento del regime "Approdo sicuro" dal punto di vista dei cittadini dell'UE e delle società ivi stabilite» ([2]), che illustrano la posizione e le richieste della Commissione al fine di ripristinare la fiducia nei flussi transatlantici.

Nel novembre 2013 è stata anche pubblicata la Relazione sulle conclusioni raggiunte dai copresidenti UE del gruppo ad hoc UE-USA sulla protezione dei dati ([3]).

In particolare, per quanto riguarda il regime «Approdo sicuro» (Safe Harbour), strumento utilizzato per i trasferimenti di dati commerciali verso gli Stati Uniti, la Commissione ha definito tredici raccomandazioni volte a migliorarne il funzionamento. Le misure da prendere per rimediare ai punti deboli individuati nel regime sono attese entro l'estate 2014. La Commissione dovrà successivamente rivedere il funzionamento del regime sulla base dell'attuazione delle citate tredici raccomandazioni.

([1]) COM(2013) 846 final.
([2]) COM(2013) 847 final.
([3]) Consultabile al seguente indirizzo: http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/files/report-findings-of-the-ad-hoc-eu-us-working-group-on-data-protection.pdf.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-000330/14
to the Commission
Sergio Paolo Francesco Silvestris (PPE)
(14 January 2014)

Subject: The NSA and iPhone hacking

The German weekly news magazine *Der Spiegel* recently published several documents relating to the Datagate scandal, which involved an international spying network run on behalf of the USA's National Security Agency (NSA). These documents revealed the existence of an NSA program called 'Dropout Jeep', through which a sophisticated item of software, installed on the smartphones of a well-known US-based manufacturer of electronic devices, purportedly gave access to the personal data stored on users' devices, including emails, text messages and contacts lists, and also made it possible to remotely activate the microphones and cameras of the smartphones. The document allegedly dated from 2008, and the manufacturer in question categorically denied that it was involved in any way.

1. In light of the above, does the Commission intend to launch a fact-finding survey concerning smartphones distributed in Europe?

2. Does it intend to establish a dialogue with the American company in question in order to clarify the latter's position in the alleged scandal?

Answer given by Mrs Reding on behalf of the Commission
(12 March 2014)

On 27 November, the Commission set out the actions that need to be taken to restore trust in data flows between the EU and the US. The Commission published a communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on Rebuilding Trust in EU-US Data Flows ([1]) and a communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the Functioning of the Safe Harbour from the Perspective of EU Citizens and Companies Established in the EU ([2]). These Communications outline the Commission position and demands in a bid to restore trust in transatlantic flows.

The EU Co-chairs of the ad hoc EU-US Working Group on Data Protection also published their Report on the findings by the group in November 2013 ([3]).

In particular with respect to the Safe Harbour, which is an instrument used for commercial data transfers to the US, the Commission made thirteen recommendations to improve the functioning of the Safe Harbour scheme. Remedies should be identified by summer 2014. The Commission will then review the functioning of the scheme based on the implementation of these thirteen recommendations.

([1]) COM(2013) 846.
([2]) COM(2013) 847.
([3]) Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/files/report-findings-of-the-ad-hoc-eu-us-working-group-on-data-protection.pdf

(Versión española)

Pregunta con solicitud de respuesta escrita E-000335/14
a la Comisión
Willy Meyer (GUE/NGL)
(15 de enero de 2014)

Asunto: Expulsión de Bélgica de ciudadanos intracomunitarios

El pasado 10 de enero, la prensa española se hacía eco de las estadísticas relativas a los ciudadanos intracomunitarios expulsados de Bélgica, que otorgaban el tercer puesto entre los expulsados a los ciudadanos de origen español. Estas expulsiones eran justificadas por la Secretaría de Estado de Asilo e Inmigración del Gobierno de España por suponer una carga excesiva al sistema de seguridad social de Bélgica.

A lo largo de 2013, el Ejecutivo belga retiró el permiso de estancia a 2 712 personas: 816 de nacionalidad rumana, 393 de nacionalidad búlgara y 323 de nacionalidad española. Esta cifra muestra que prosigue la tendencia de las autoridades belgas a incrementar el número de expulsiones, que en 2012 fueron 2 407, lo que denota un progresivo endurecimiento de la política migratoria intracomunitaria del país. En el caso de los ciudadanos rumanos y búlgaros, el Gobierno belga puede argumentar que dichos países no han podido acceder al espacio europeo de libre circulación Schengen; en los demás casos, Bélgica debe demostrar que dichos ciudadanos suponen una carga excesiva al sistema de seguridad social del país, tras los primeros 90 días de estancia.

En un momento en el que la implementación de las medidas de la Troika en España y otros países está provocando flujos masivos de desempleados a países como Bélgica, el endurecimiento de los controles y de los procedimientos de expulsión supone un atentado contra una de las libertades más importantes para la Unión Europea. Al mismo tiempo que las autoridades europeas y los gobiernos nacionales exigen flexibilidad y movilidad a la mano de obra europea, culpabilizando a los desempleados de su situación por no querer moverse, se demuestra que, tras ir a otro Estado miembro de la Unión a trabajar, este puede decidir unilateralmente su expulsión. Según las fuentes periodísticas, entre los expulsados se encuentran residentes que llevaban un largo periodo en el país, lo que reafirma que los ciudadanos de otros Estados miembros de la UE parecen no tener los mismos derechos sociales que los belgas de nacimiento.

¿Dispone la Comisión de información sobre los motivos del aumento del número de expulsiones de ciudadanos intracomunitarios en Bélgica? ¿Considera que Bélgica está cumpliendo con la directiva que garantiza la libre circulación de los ciudadanos en la EU? ¿Considera que Bélgica está garantizando una igualdad de trato a los ciudadanos comunitarios que están siendo expulsados del país? ¿Qué procedimientos no unilaterales dispone la UE para que los ciudadanos intracomunitarios expulsados puedan recurrir la decisión del país que los expulsa?

Respuesta de la Sra. Reding en nombre de la Comisión
(12 de marzo de 2014)

De conformidad con la Directiva 2004/38, para tener el derecho de residir durante más de tres meses en otro Estado miembro, los ciudadanos de la UE que no se encuentren en situación de actividad deben poseer un régimen global de seguridad social y recursos financieros suficientes, de modo que no se conviertan en una carga para el sistema de seguridad social del Estado miembro de acogida. Las personas que buscan un empleo pueden residir durante un periodo de hasta seis meses sin condiciones, y posiblemente durante un periodo más largo si tienen posibilidades reales de encontrar un empleo. Cuando los ciudadanos no cumplen estas condiciones, se les puede dirigir una orden de abandonar el territorio.

Sin embargo, las medidas de expulsión no deben ser la respuesta automática al recurso al sistema de seguridad social. A efectos de determinar si una persona se ha convertido en una carga excesiva para su sistema de seguridad social, los Estados miembros deben examinar si en el caso de que se trata concurren dificultades temporales, y tener en cuenta criterios tales como la duración de la residencia, las circunstancias personales y el importe de la ayuda concedida.

La Directiva también garantiza a los ciudadanos la posibilidad de iniciar procedimientos de recurso contra las medidas de expulsión.

En cuanto a las medidas de expulsión a las que hace referencia Su Señoría y la prensa, la Comisión no dispone de elementos para evaluar casos específicos a menos que se le envíen denuncias individuales de violaciones de normas comunitarias relacionadas.

No obstante, en el contexto del procedimiento de infracción incoado contra Bélgica en relación con la transposición incorrecta de la Directiva 2004/38, la Comisión ha pedido a las autoridades aclaraciones sobre las salvaguardias especificadas más arriba. La Comisión observa que la Ley modificadora aprobada por el Parlamento belga el 13 de febrero ([1]) refleja las salvaguardias establecidas en la Directiva 2004/38/CE.

([1]) Modificación de la Ley de 15 de diciembre de 1980 sobre el acceso al territorio, la residencia, el establecimiento y la expulsión de los extranjeros.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-000335/14
to the Commission
Willy Meyer (GUE/NGL)
(15 January 2014)

Subject: Expulsion of EU citizens from Belgium

On 10 January 2014 the Spanish press reported on statistics on EU citizens expelled from Belgium, which put Spanish citizens in third place overall. Spain's Secretary of State for Immigration and Asylum explained that these people had been expelled on the grounds of their constituting an excessive burden on Belgium's social security system.

In 2013, the Belgian Government withdrew residence permits from 2 712 people: 816 were Romanians, 393 were Bulgarians and 323 were Spaniards. In 2012 the figure was 2 407. This shows that the Belgian authorities' tendency to step up the number of expulsions is being maintained, indicating that the country is taking a progressively tougher stance on intra-EU migration. The Belgian Government may argue in the case of the Romanians and Bulgarians that these countries have not yet acceded to the Schengen area, but in the remaining cases Belgium must prove that, after the first 90 days of their stay, these EU citizens constitute an excessive burden upon the country's social security system.

At a time when implementation of the Troika's measures in Spain and other countries is causing the unemployed to move in massive numbers to countries such as Belgium, tougher controls and expulsion procedures constitute an attack upon what the European Union considers to be one of its most important freedoms. The EU authorities and national governments say EU workers must be flexible and move in search of work, casting the blame for being out of work on them for not wanting to move. However here it can be seen that once the unemployed move to another EU Member State in search of work, that Member State may then decide unilaterally to expel them. According to journalist sources, the people expelled include some who have been resident in the country for a long period of time, confirming that citizens of other EU Member States do not appear to have the same welfare rights as native-born Belgians.

Does the Commission have information regarding the reasons for the rise in the number of EU citizens expelled from Belgium? Does it consider that Belgium is complying with the directive guaranteeing free movement for EU citizens? Does it consider that Belgium is guaranteeing those EU citizens who are being expelled from the country the right to equal treatment? What non-unilateral procedures does the EU have that would allow EU citizens expelled from an EU country to appeal against this decision?

Answer given by Mrs Reding on behalf of the Commission
(12 March 2014)

According to Directive 2004/38, to have the right to reside for longer than three months in another Member State, non-active EU citizens must have comprehensive health insurance and sufficient financial resources so as not to become a burden on the host Member State's social assistance system. Jobseekers can reside for up to six months without conditions and possibly longer if they show that they have a genuine chance of finding a job. Where the citizens do not meet these conditions, they may be issued with an order to leave the territory.

However, expulsion measures shall not be the automatic consequence of recourse to the social assistance system. To determine whether a person has become an unreasonable burden on their social assistance system, Member States must examine whether it is a case of temporary difficulties and take into account criteria such as the duration of residence, the personal circumstances and the amount of aid granted.

The directive also guarantees to citizens access to redress procedures against expulsion measures.

As regards the expulsion measures reported by the Honourable Member and the press, the Commission has no element to assess specific cases unless individual complaints indicating violations of related EU rules are sent to the Commission.

However, in the context of the infringement proceedings opened against Belgium regarding the incorrect transposition of Directive 2004/38, the Commission had asked the authorities to clarify the safeguards detailed above. The Commission notes that the amending law ([1]) approved by the Belgian Parliament on 13 February reflects the safeguards of Directive 2004/38/EC.

([1]) Amending the law of 15 December 1980 on access to the territory, the stay, the establishment and the removal of aliens.

(Version française)

Question avec demande de réponse écrite E-000338/14
à la Commission
Gaston Franco (PPE)
(15 janvier 2014)

Objet: Stratégie de l'Union européenne pour la région alpine

Dans ses conclusions, le Conseil européen des 19 et 20 décembre demande à la Commission d'élaborer, en collaboration avec les États membres, une stratégie de l'Union européenne pour la région alpine: «rappelant ses conclusions de juin 2011 ainsi que les conclusions du Conseil sur la valeur ajoutée des stratégies macrorégionales d'octobre 2013, le Conseil européen invite la Commission, en coopération avec les États membres, à élaborer, d'ici juin 2015, une stratégie de l'UE pour la région alpine».

1. La Commission a-t-elle d'ores et déjà défini de grands objectifs et établi quelles seraient les priorités de chacun d'entre eux?

2. Comment compte-t-elle associer les parlements nationaux à l'élaboration de cette stratégie et du plan d'action qui suivra?

3. A-t-elle des recommandations à formuler sur le plan de l'organisation et de la répartition des responsabilités parmi les parties intéressées?

Réponse donnée par M. Hahn au nom de la Commission
(14 mars 2014)

1. Les régions alpines et les gouvernements nationaux concernés (Autriche, France, Allemagne, Italie, Liechtenstein, Slovénie et Suisse) avaient déjà mené des travaux préparatoires pour mettre en œuvre une stratégie pour la région alpine avant le Conseil européen de décembre.

Ils avaient préparé une résolution politique ainsi qu'un document d'intervention pour sa mise en œuvre qui dégage trois enjeux principaux:

— Compétitivité et innovation

— Mobilité respectueuse de l'environnement

— Gestion durable de l'énergie, des ressources naturelles et culturelles

Le futur contenu de la stratégie doit être conforme à ces trois enjeux, bien qu'une telle stratégie doive orienter ses priorités de manière à garantir qu'elles soient suffisamment «fonctionnelles» pour mener à bien des projets concrets.

2. La Commission est consciente de la nécessité de sensibiliser davantage les parties prenantes à la vision, aux objectifs ainsi qu'au calendrier de la stratégie dans les pays et les régions concernés. À cet effet, il convient de renforcer la participation nationale, régionale et locale, notamment des Parlements nationaux, régionaux et du Parlement européen.

3. Il est prématuré, à ce stade, de déterminer de quelle manière les responsabilités peuvent être partagées entre les parties concernées. Toutefois, l'expérience acquise précédemment dans le cadre d'autres stratégies macrorégionales souligne la nécessité d'une structure de gouvernance claire, d'un processus décisionnel effectif, et d'un fort sentiment d'appropriation et de participation chez les acteurs de terrain. La coordination doit être améliorée et l'appui technique professionnel pour les actions quotidiennes est essentiel. Ce sont des exigences qui permettent aux stratégies macrorégionales d'améliorer les résultats et les conséquences pour les citoyens, sans alourdir la réglementation ni la charge administrative.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-000338/14
to the Commission
Gaston Franco (PPE)
(15 January 2014)

Subject: EU Strategy for the Alpine region

In its conclusions, the European Council of 19 and 20 December 2013 called on the Commission to work together with the Member States to draw up an EU strategy for the Alpine region: 'Recalling its conclusions of June 2011 and the Council Conclusions of the added value of macro-regional strategies of October 2013, the European Council invites the Commission, in cooperation with Member States, to elaborate an EU Strategy for the Alpine Region by June 2015'.

1. Has the Commission already set the main objectives of this strategy and the priorities for each objective?

2. How does it plan to involve national parliaments in drawing up this strategy and the subsequent action plan?

3. Can the Commission give any recommendations on how to organise the process and share responsibilities among the parties concerned?

Answer given by Mr Hahn on behalf of the Commission
(14 March 2014)

1. The Alpine regions and relevant national governments (Austria, France, Germany, Italy, Liechtenstein, Slovenia and Switzerland) had already undertaken preparatory work for an Alpine Region Strategy prior to December's European Council.

They had prepared a political resolution and an intervention document for implementation which identifies 3 main issues:

— Competitiveness and Innovation

— Environmentally friendly mobility

— Sustainable management of energy, natural and cultural resources

The future contents of the strategy should be in line with the above three main issues, although any such Strategy must focus its priorities in order to guarantee these are 'operational' enough to deliver concrete projects.

2. The Commission is conscious of the need to enforce stakeholders' awareness of the vision, targets, and timelines of the strategy in the countries and regions. To do so, national, regional and local involvement, notably via national, regional and European Parliaments should be strengthened.

3. It is too early at this stage to say how responsibilities may be shared among the parties involved. However, previous experience from other macroregional strategies underlines the need for clear leadership, effective decision-making, and a strong feeling of ownership and input from people on the ground. Coordination needs to be improved and professional technical support for day-to-day actions is crucial. These are requirements that allow macroregional strategies to improve results and impact for citizens, without increasing regulations or administrative burdens.

(Ελληνική έκδοση)

Ερώτηση με αίτημα γραπτής απάντησης E-000604/14
προς την Επιτροπή
Antigoni Papadopoulou (S&D)
(22 Ιανουαρίου 2014)

Θέμα: Ανήλικες νύφες στην Τουρκία

Σύμφωνα με την εφημερίδα *Hurriyet*, 17 648 κορίτσια κάτω των 15 ετών έγιναν μητέρες στην Τουρκία μεταξύ των ετών 2001 και 2012. Επιπλέον, 130 000 κορίτσια κάτω των 18 ετών παντρεύτηκαν στην Τουρκία τα τελευταία 3 χρόνια, γεγονός που, σύμφωνα με την εκτίμηση μιας οργάνωσης για τα δικαιώματα των γυναικών, συνιστά περίπτωση παιδικής κακοποίησης. Η εφημερίδα αναφέρει ότι οι νόμοι στην Τουρκία δεν εφαρμόζονται πλήρως, στερούνται πειστικότητας και δεν είναι επαρκείς. Τονίζει επίσης ότι πρέπει να υπάρξει μεγαλύτερη ευαισθητοποίηση στην τουρκική κοινωνία στο ζήτημα της ισότητας των φύλων.

Ερωτάται συνεπώς η Επιτροπή:

1. Έχει σχηματίσει την πεποίθηση ότι οι νέοι νόμοι της Τουρκίας κατά του φαινομένου των ανηλίκων νυφών είναι πλήρως συμβατοί με τη σχετική νομοθεσία της ΕΕ;

2. Επιτηρεί η ΕΕ τα μέτρα που εφαρμόζει η Τουρκία για την πρόληψη και καταπολέμηση του φαινομένου των ανηλίκων νυφών;

3. Τί περαιτέρω προληπτικά μέτρα καλείται να λάβει η Τουρκία, ως υποψήφια προς ένταξη χώρα, ώστε να διασφαλίσει ότι τα ανήλικα κορίτσια θα συνεχίσουν να ζουν με ασφάλεια και χωρίς να διατρέχουν τον κίνδυνο να εξαναγκασθούν σε γάμο;

Κοινή απάντηση του κ. Füle εξ ονόματος της Επιτροπής
(14 Μαρτίου 2014)

Η Επιτροπή είναι ενήμερη για τα θέματα στα οποία αναφέρονται οι κύριοι βουλευτές, συμπεριλαμβανομένων των δημοσιευμάτων του τύπου για τα παιδιά-νύφες και επιμέρους περιπτώσεων.

Η Επιτροπή παραπέμπει τον κ. βουλευτή στις προηγούμενες απαντήσεις της σχετικά με το θέμα, συμπεριλαμβανομένων των P-008130/2011 και E-012423/2013 ([1]).

([1]) http://www.europarl.europa.eu/plenary/en/parliamentary-questions.html

(Versione italiana)

Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-000342/14
alla Commissione
Sergio Paolo Francesco Silvestris (PPE)
(15 gennaio 2014)

Oggetto: Ragazza suicida in Turchia

Il dramma delle spose bambine e del delitto d'onore in Turchia continua a rappresentare una palese quanto inaccettabile violazione dei diritti umani in un paese che aspira a diventare membro dell'Unione europea. Un nuovo caso si è verificato a Siirt, nel sud-est della Turchia, area a maggioranza curda e una delle zone dove la violenza sulle donne viene perpetrata quotidianamente.

Una giovane, andata in sposa a soli 11 anni per volere dei genitori, a 12 anni ha dato alla luce il primo figlio. Poi, ad appena quattordici anni, ha partorito il suo secondo figlio, morto a poche ore dalla nascita. È stato il colpo di grazia per la psiche di una bambina, già provata dalla difficile vita del clan, dalle fatiche fisiche di due gravidanze e dalla responsabilità di una famiglia in così tenera età.

Il fenomeno delle spose bambine ha anche pesanti ripercussioni sulla società turca, dal momento che allontana le fanciulle dalla scuola e ne provoca il mancato inserimento nel mondo del lavoro, obbligandole a una vita domestica di privazioni.

Alla luce di questi eventi, può la Commissione chiarire:

1. se è a conoscenza del grado di estensione di questo fenomeno sociale in Turchia;

2. se e quali misure abbia adottato nei negoziati di adesione della Turchia all'Unione europea per eliminare questa piaga?

Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-000608/14
alla Commissione
Lorenzo Fontana (EFD)
(22 gennaio 2014)

Oggetto: Fenomeno delle spose bambine in Turchia: il caso di Kader Erten

Secondo quanto riportato da alcune testate giornalistiche negli ultimi giorni, la quattordicenne turca Kader Erten, data in sposa quando era undicenne, è stata trovata morta (forse suicida) dopo il secondo parto durante il quale sarebbe morto il neonato. Il fenomeno delle spose bambine sarebbe diffuso in tutto il Paese, soprattutto nelle aree rurali.

Considerando i dati pubblicati da una ricerca della Kamer (una ONG che si occupa dei diritti delle donne), la quale afferma che in un matrimonio su tre le ragazzine sono minorenni (nella maggior parte dei casi avrebbero meno di quindici anni), e la percentuale dei matrimoni tra minori raggiungerebbe il 33 %;

considerando che, negli ultimi 10 anni, almeno 4 711 donne si sarebbero sposate a 16 e 17 anni, 2217 fra i 13 e i 15, e 54 sotto i 12 anni;

considerando lo status della Turchia di paese candidato all'adesione all'Unione Europea;

considerando che la soglia dell'età minima per contrarre il matrimonio sarebbe stata alzata ad oltre i 15 anni ma mancherebbero i controlli necessari;

può la Commissione rispondere ai seguenti quesiti:

1. è al corrente di questa pratica ed, eventualmente, dispone di statistiche diverse?

2. ha intenzione di interloquire con le autorità turche per porre rimedio alla predetta situazione, lesiva dei diritti basilari delle cittadine minorenni?

Risposta congiunta di Stefan Füle a nome della Commissione
(14 marzo 2014)

La Commissione è al corrente delle questioni a cui fa riferimento l'onorevole deputato, compresi gli articoli di stampa sul fenomeno delle spose bambine e sui singoli casi.

La Commissione rimanda l'onorevole deputato alle sue precedenti risposte in merito, tra cui quelle alle interrogazioni P-008130/2011 e E-012423/2013 ([1]).

([1]) http://www.europarl.europa.eu/plenary/it/parliamentary-questions.html

(English version)

Question for written answer E-000342/14
to the Commission
Sergio Paolo Francesco Silvestris (PPE)
(15 January 2014)

Subject: Girl's suicide in Turkey

The drama of child brides and honour crime in Turkey continues to represent a clear breach of human rights that is unacceptable in a country seeking to become a member of the European Union. A new case has been reported in Siirt in south-east Turkey, an area with a Kurdish majority and one where violence against women is a daily occurrence.

A young girl, married at the age of only 11 at her parents' behest, gave birth to her first child at the age of 12. Then, when she was barely 14, her second child was born and died a few hours after birth. This was the last straw for the mind of a child, already sorely tried by her difficult life within the clan, the physical strain of two pregnancies and responsibility for a family at such a tender age.

The phenomenon of child brides also has serious repercussions on Turkish society, given that it keeps girls away from school and prevents them from entering the world of work, forcing them into a domestic life of privation.

In the light of these events, can the Commission clarify:

1. whether it is aware how extensive this social phenomenon is in Turkey;

2. what steps, if any, it has taken in the EU accession negotiations with Turkey to eliminate this scourge?

Question for written answer E-000604/14
to the Commission
Antigoni Papadopoulou (S&D)
(22 January 2014)

Subject: Child brides in Turkey

According to the *Hurriyet* newspaper, 17 648 girls below the age of 15 became mothers in Turkey between 2001 and 2012. Furthermore, 130 000 girls below the age of 18 got married in Turkey in the last three years, with a women's organisation describing this as a problem of child molestation. The newspaper states that the laws in Turkey are not implemented fully, lack persuasive power and are not sufficient on their own. It also stresses the need to further raise awareness of gender equality in Turkish society.

The Commission is therefore asked to answer the following:

1. Is it satisfied that Turkey's new laws against child brides are fully in line with the relevant EU legislation?

2. Is the EU monitoring Turkey's measures to prevent and combat the problem of child brides?

3. What further preventive action is Turkey expected to take, as a candidate country for accession, to ensure that children can continue to live in security and without any danger of becoming child brides?

Question for written answer E-000608/14
to the Commission
Lorenzo Fontana (EFD)
(22 January 2014)

Subject: Issue of child brides in Turkey: the case of Kader Erten

According to various newspaper reports over the past few days, a fourteen-year-old Turkish girl, Kader Erten, who was married off at the age of eleven, has been found dead (possibly suicide) after giving birth to her second child, which died during childbirth. The issue of child brides is apparently widespread in Turkey, and is particularly common in rural areas.

In view of the figures published in a report by women's rights organisation Kamer, which claims that one in three brides in Turkey are minors (mostly under the age of fifteen), and that as many as 33% of marriages are between minors;

in view of the fact that, over the past 10 years, at least 4 711 women have been married at the age of 16 or 17; 2 217 between the ages of 13 and 15, and 54 under the age of 12;

in view of Turkey's status as a candidate for accession to the European Union;

in view of the fact that the minimum age for marriage is supposed to have been raised to over 15, but without the necessary controls;

can Commission answer the following questions:

1. is it aware of this issue and does it perhaps have different statistics?

2. does it intend to engage in discussions with the Turkish authorities to remedy the situation, which contravenes the basic human rights of minors?

Joint answer given by Mr Füle on behalf of the Commission
(14 March 2014)

The Commission is aware of the issues the Honourable Members refer to, including press reports on child brides and individual cases.

The Commission refers the Honourable Member to its previous replies on the matter, including P-008130/2011 and E-012423/2013 ([1]).

([1]) http://www.europarl.europa.eu/plenary/en/parliamentary-questions.html

(Versione italiana)

Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-000345/14
alla Commissione
Sergio Paolo Francesco Silvestris (PPE)
(15 gennaio 2014)

Oggetto: Facebook e violazione della privacy

Due utenti statunitensi di Facebook hanno avviato una class action contro il famoso social network a nome di tutti gli utenti della piattaforma. Secondo i due, quando un utente condivide un link a un altro sito Internet attraverso un messaggio privato, quell'informazione viene registrata dal gruppo contribuendo a definire il profilo dell'attività sul web del mittente. Tale operazione avverrebbe in contrasto con quanto sostenuto nei termini e nelle condizioni presentati agli utenti al momento dell'iscrizione al sito.

Alla luce di quest'accusa, può la Commissione chiarire se:

1. è a conoscenza della class action avviata e se denunce simili sono state esposte in uno o più Stati membri;

2. se tale operazione, qualora confermata, avvenga in violazione della normativa europea sulla protezione della privacy e l'utilizzo dei dati personali?

Risposta di Viviane Reding a nome della Commissione
(17 marzo 2014)

La Commissione è a conoscenza del fatto che in California è stata avviata un'azione legale collettiva contro Facebook.

La direttiva 95/46/CE ([1]) si applica, tra l'altro, quando il trattamento dei dati personali è effettuato nel contesto delle attività di uno stabilimento del responsabile del trattamento nel territorio dello Stato membro ([2]) e quando il responsabile del trattamento, non stabilito nel territorio dell'UE, ricorre, ai fini del trattamento di dati personali, a strumenti, automatizzati o non automatizzati, situati nel territorio dello Stato membro ([3]).

Fatta salva la competenza della Commissione europea in qualità di custode dei trattati, il controllo e l'applicazione della normativa in materia di protezione dei dati è di competenza delle autorità nazionali, in particolare le autorità di controllo della protezione dei dati, e dei giudici.

Nel 2011 e nel 2012 l'autorità irlandese di controllo della protezione dei dati ha effettuato due audit al fine di analizzare il trattamento dei dati personali di Facebook. Per ulteriori dettagli su tale argomento la Commissione rinvia l'onorevole parlamentare alle risposte alle interrogazioni scritte E-4630/13 e E-12644/13.

Chiunque subisca un danno cagionato da un trattamento illecito di dati o da qualsiasi altro atto incompatibile con le disposizioni nazionali di attuazione ha diritto di ottenere il risarcimento da parte del responsabile del trattamento ([4]). La richiesta di risarcimento può essere presentata ai giudici nazionali.

L'11 giugno 2013 la Commissione ha definito una serie di principi comuni non vincolanti in materia di meccanismi di ricorso collettivo, al fine di istituire nell'Unione europea un approccio orizzontale uniforme in materia di ricorsi collettivi, senza armonizzare i sistemi degli Stati membri. Le raccomandazioni si applicano anche in materia di protezione dei dati ([5]).

([1]) Direttiva del Parlamento europeo e del Consiglio, del 24 ottobre 1995, relativa alla tutela delle persone fisiche con riguardo al trattamento dei dati personali, nonché alla libera circolazione di tali dati, GU L 281 del 23.11.1995, pagg. 31-50.
([2]) Secondo le informazioni a disposizione della Commissione, Facebook ha uffici in molti Stati membri dell'UE e la sede centrale europea si trova a Dublino, Irlanda.
([3]) Articolo 4, paragrafo 1, lettere a) e c), della direttiva.
([4]) Articolo 23 della direttiva.
([5]) http://ec.europa.eu/justice/newsroom/civil/news/130611_en.htm

(English version)

Question for written answer E-000345/14
to the Commission
Sergio Paolo Francesco Silvestris (PPE)
(15 January 2014)

Subject: Facebook and violation of privacy

Two Facebook users in the United States have brought a class action against the famous social network in the name of all users of the platform. According to them, when a user shares a link to another website via a private message, the group records that information, helping to profile the sender's web activity. This operation is said to occur contrary to the statements made in the terms and conditions presented to users when they register on the website.

In the light of this charge, can the Commission clarify whether:

1. it is aware of the class action brought and whether similar complaints have been made in one or more Member States;

2. such an operation, if confirmed, is in breach of European regulations on the protection of privacy and use of personal data?

Answer given by Mrs Reding on behalf of the Commission
(17 March 2014)

The Commission is aware of the fact that a class action has been brought against Facebook in California.

Directive 95/46/EC ([1]) applies *inter alia* when the processing of personal data is carried out in the context of the activities of an establishment of the data controller on the territory of the Member State ([2]) and when the data controller, who is not established on the EU territory, makes use, for purposes of processing personal data, of equipment, automated or otherwise, situated on the territory of the Member State ([3]).

Without prejudice to the competence of the European Commission as guardian of the Treaties, the supervision and enforcement of data protection legislation falls within the competence of national authorities, in particular the data protection supervisory authorities (DPAs) and courts.

In 2011 and 2012, the Irish DPA has carried out two audits to analyse Facebook's personal data processing activities. For more details on this topic, the Commission would like to refer the Honourable MEP to its replies to written questions E-4630/13 and E-12644/13.

Any person who has suffered damage as a result of an unlawful processing operation or of any act incompatible with the national implementing provisions is entitled to receive compensation from the data controller ([4]). Such compensation can be sought before national courts.

On 11 June 2013 the Commission has set out a series of common, non-binding principles for collective redress mechanisms with the aim to ensure a coherent horizontal approach to collective redress in the European Union without harmonising Member States' systems. These recommendations apply also in the field of data protection ([5]).

([1]) Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, OJ L 281, 23.11.1995, p. 31-50.
([2]) According to the Commission's best knowledge Facebook has offices in many EU Member States while its European headquarters is located in Dublin, Ireland.
([3]) Articles 4(1)(a) and 4(1)(c) of the directive.
([4]) Article 23 of the directive.
([5]) http://ec.europa.eu/justice/newsroom/civil/news/130611_en.htm

(Versión española)

Pregunta con solicitud de respuesta escrita E-000356/14
a la Comisión
Raül Romeva i Rueda (Verts/ALE)
(15 de enero de 2014)

Asunto: Expulsión de personas comunitarias

La crisis económica deja a la luz la débil integración europea: algunos estados han comenzado a expulsar a aquellos ciudadanos o ciudadanas que representan una «carga excesiva» para sus sistemas de bienestar.

Bélgica ha endurecido la política de expulsar a personas comunitarias. Las autoridades belgas expidieron la orden de salida a 4 812 ciudadanos de la UE en 2013. En 2013 la comunidad más expulsada de Bélgica fue la española (291 personas), por detrás de los rumanos, búlgaros, holandeses y franceses.

Si bien la Comisión se ha esforzado en recordar que la libre circulación es un pilar básico de la UE y que la movilidad ha generado muchos beneficios, la crisis, los recortes en gasto social y el populismo facilitan la posición anti-UE de los gobiernos de expulsar a comunitarios.

Cuando las autoridades demuestran que una persona representa «una carga excesiva» para el sistema social (por ejemplo, si no ha trabajado durante mucho tiempo y, en cambio, consume ayudas sociales), emiten una orden de expulsión que generalmente se transforma en un cierre de todos los cauces oficiales en un país para darse de alta en el Ayuntamiento y acceder a la sanidad, a la educación y a todas las prestaciones sociales que ofrece el territorio. Se borra a la persona del registro oficial, dejándola en un limbo.

Así, la libre circulación de personas se transforma en un lujo para aquellos que puedan pagarla o en un callejón sin salida que obliga a los europeos y europeas de bajos recursos a aceptar trabajos precarios en cualquier condición a fin de poder acceder, al menos, a una sala de urgencias.

¿Considera la Comisión que se está malinterpretando la Directiva de Libre circulación de personas 2004/38/CE? Si no es el caso, ¿considera necesario un cambio en dicha Directiva para eliminar los vacíos legales y garantizar que ninguna persona comunitaria caiga en un limbo legal, sin protección social alguna?

En momentos de crisis, ¿cómo garantiza un mercado laboral único con un marco legal insuficiente que deja totalmente vulnerables a los trabajadores y trabajadoras que están dispuestos a buscar oportunidades en otros países?

¿Obligará con carácter urgente y excepcional, hasta que llegue el cambio de legislación pertinente, a que cesen las expulsiones y se garanticen los derechos sociales de las personas afectadas?

Respuesta de la Sra. Reding en nombre de la Comisión
(17 de marzo de 2014)

El artículo 45 del TFUE garantiza el derecho a la libre circulación de todos los trabajadores de la UE sin condiciones, mientras que el artículo 21 del TFUE confiere dicho derecho, sujeto a ciertas condiciones, a ciudadanos inactivos de la UE. El artículo 7 de la Directiva 2004/38 especifica que, para tener derecho a residir durante más de 3 meses en otro Estado miembro, los ciudadanos inactivos de la UE deben poseer un seguro médico completo y recursos financieros suficientes para no convertirse en una carga para el sistema de asistencia social del Estado miembro de acogida. Los solicitantes de empleo pueden residir hasta 6 meses sin condiciones y posiblemente más tiempo, si demuestran que tienen posibilidades reales de encontrar un empleo. Si los ciudadanos no cumplen estas condiciones, se puede emitir una orden para que abandonen el territorio.

Sin embargo, el recurso a la asistencia social no puede conducir automáticamente a medidas de expulsión. Con el fin de determinar si una persona se ha convertido en una carga excesiva para sus sistemas de asistencia social, los Estados miembros deben examinar si se trata de un caso de dificultades temporales y tener en cuenta la duración de la residencia, las circunstancias personales y la cuantía de la ayuda concedida.

Esto asegura lograr el equilibrio entre la salvaguardia de los derechos de libre circulación de los ciudadanos de la UE y la protección de los países de acogida frente a cargas financieras excesivas.

La Comisión no dispone de ningún elemento para evaluar casos concretos, salvo que se presenten reclamaciones individuales.

En el contexto de los procedimientos de infracción iniciados contra Bélgica por la aplicación incorrecta de la Directiva 2004/38, la Comisión ha pedido a las autoridades que aclaren las salvaguardias detalladas anteriormente. La Comisión señala que la ley modificatoria ([1]) aprobada por el Parlamento Belga el 13 de febrero de 2014, refleja las salvaguardias de la Directiva 2004/38/EC.

([1]) Modifica la ley de 15 de diciembre de 1980 sobre el acceso al territorio, la estancia, el establecimiento y la expulsión de extranjeros.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-000356/14
to the Commission
Raül Romeva i Rueda (Verts/ALE)
(15 January 2014)

Subject: Expulsion of Community citizens

The economic crisis has highlighted the weakness of European integration: some states have begun to expel citizens who represent an 'unreasonable burden' on their welfare systems.

Belgium has tightened its policy of expelling Community citizens. In 2013, for example, the Belgian authorities issued deportation orders for 4 812 EU citizens. After the Romanians, Bulgarians, Dutch and French, the community most affected by this was the Spanish (291 individuals).

Although the Commission has endeavoured to stress that freedom of movement is a cornerstone of the EU and that this mobility has resulted in many benefits, the crisis, the cuts in social expenditure and a populist attitude are facilitating governments' anti-European stance of expelling Community members.

When the authorities can demonstrate that a person represents 'an unreasonable burden' on the social system (for example, if he or she has not worked for a long time and yet is receiving welfare benefits), they issue a deportation order that generally results in the closure of all official channels in the country in terms of registering with the local authority and accessing healthcare, education and all other social provisions. The person is wiped from the official records, leaving them in limbo.

Freedom of movement is thus turning into a luxury for those who can afford it but a road to nowhere for Europeans with few resources who are forced to accept insecure jobs under any conditions in order to be able, at the very least, to access emergency healthcare.

Does the Commission consider that directive 2004/38/EC on freedom of movement in the EU is being misinterpreted? If not, does it believe that a change is necessary to this directive to close the legal loopholes and guarantee that no Community citizen is left in legal limbo, without any social protection?

In times of crisis, how can it guarantee a single labour market when an insufficient legal framework leaves workers who are willing to seek opportunities in other countries completely defenceless?

Until the relevant legislation can be amended, will it urgently and exceptionally demand an immediate end to these expulsions and guarantee the social rights of those affected?

Answer given by Mrs Reding on behalf of the Commission
(17 March 2014)

Article 45 TFEU guarantees the right to free movement for all EU workers without conditions, whereas Article 21 TFEU confers such a right to non-active EU citizens only subject to some limitations. Article 7 of Directive 2004/38 specifies that, to have the right to reside for longer than 3 months in another Member State, non-active EU citizens must have comprehensive health insurance and sufficient financial resources so as not to become a burden on the host Member State's social assistance system. Jobseekers can reside for up to 6 months without conditions and possibly longer if they show that they have a genuine chance of finding a job. Where citizens do not meet these conditions, they may be issued with an order to leave the territory.

However, expulsion measures shall not be the automatic consequence of recourse to the social assistance system. To determine whether a person has become an unreasonable burden on their social assistance system, Member States must examine whether it is a case of temporary difficulties and take into account criteria such as the duration of residence, the personal circumstances and the amount of aid granted.

These safeguards strike a balance between safeguarding the free movement rights of EU citizens whilst protecting host countries from unreasonable financial burdens.

The Commission has no element to assess specific cases unless individual complaints are sent.

In the context of the infringement proceedings opened against Belgium for incorrect transposition of Directive 2004/38, the Commission had asked the authorities to clarify the safeguards detailed above. The Commission notes that the amending law ([1]) approved by the Belgian Parliament on 13 February 2014 reflects the safeguards of Directive 2004/38/EC.

([1]) Amending the law of 15 December 1980 on access to the territory, the stay, the establishment and the removal of aliens.

(Deutsche Fassung)

Anfrage zur schriftlichen Beantwortung E-000357/14
an die Kommission
Nadja Hirsch (ALDE)
(15. Januar 2014)

Betrifft: Beihilfenrecht, Rundfunkgebühren

Die Kommission hat am 27.10.2009 eine revidierte Rundfunkmitteilung veröffentlicht (Mitteilung der Kommission über die Anwendung der Vorschriften über staatliche Beihilfen auf den öffentlich-rechtlichen Rundfunk 2009/C 257/01). Diese ersetzt die Mitteilung aus dem Jahr 2001 und trägt den seither erfolgten Entwicklungen auf den Märkten und in der Technologie Rechnung. Insbesondere werden strengere Regeln zur Rundfunkfinanzierung beschlossen und die ex-ante Evaluierung von neuen Diensten eingeführt.

1. Hat die Kommission eine Übersicht darüber, welche Mitgliedsländer den Empfehlungen der Mitteilung von 2009 zwischenzeitlich Folge geleistet haben, insbesondere im Bereich der ex-ante Evaluierung, und kann sie diese gegebenenfalls der Öffentlichkeit zugänglich machen?

2. Hat die Kommission aufgrund der Ergebnisse der Übersicht evaluiert, ob ihre Entscheidung, die beihilferechtlich relevante Verwendung von Rundfunkgebühren in Form einer nicht verbindlichen Mitteilung anstatt in Form einer verbindlichen Verordnung zu regeln, zielführend gewesen ist?

Antwort von Herrn Almunia im Namen der Kommission
(11. März 2014)

Die Liste der von der Kommission untersuchten Regelungen bezüglich staatlicher Beihilfen für den öffentlich-rechtlichen Rundfunk befindet sich unter: http://ec.europa.eu/competition/sectors/media/decisions_psb.pdf.

Bei allen aufgeführten Regelungen hat die Kommission zudem geprüft, ob ein Mechanismus für die Ex-ante-Prüfung eingeführt wurde. Die vor der Rundfunkmitteilung von 2009 getroffenen Beschlüsse sind für die Ex-ante-Prüfung ebenfalls relevant, da die bisherige Beschlusspraxis in diesem Bereich in der Mitteilung von 2009 festgesetzt ist.

Das Protokoll 29 zum Vertrag über die Arbeitsweise der Europäischen Union bezieht sich auf den öffentlich-rechtlichen Rundfunk in den Mitgliedstaaten. Dem Protokoll zufolge besitzt jeder Mitgliedstaat die Kompetenz zur Festlegung, Organisation und Erteilung eines öffentlich-rechtlichen Sendeauftrags für Rundfunkanstalten sowie zur Bereitstellung der Mittel für die Erfüllung des Auftrags. Deshalb war zur Einhaltung des Subsidiaritätsprinzips sowie der Artikel 4 und 5 des Vertrags über die Europäische Union eine Mitteilung über die Anwendung von Artikel 106 Absatz 2 AEUV der richtige Weg.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-000357/14
to the Commission
Nadja Hirsch (ALDE)
(15 January 2014)

Subject: State aid / public service broadcasting levies

On 27 October 2009, the Commission issued a revised Communication on Broadcasting (Communication from the Commission on the application of state aid rules to public service broadcasting 2009/C 257/01). This replaced the 2001 Communication and took account of market and technological developments that had taken place in the meantime. In particular, tougher rules on broadcasting finance were brought in and the *ex ante* evaluation of new services was introduced.

1. Does the Commission have a summary of which Member States have since complied with the recommendations set out in the 2009 Communication, in particular as regards *ex ante* evaluation, and if so, could this be made public?

2. Has the Commission evaluated, on the basis of the summary, whether its decision to regulate the state aid-relevant use of public service broadcasting levies in the form of a non-binding Communication rather than a binding Regulation was the right way to proceed?

Answer given by Mr Almunia on behalf of the Commission
(11 March 2014)

The list of schemes examined by the Commission regarding state aid to public service broadcasting can be found under: http://ec.europa.eu/competition/sectors/media/decisions_psb.pdf

In all schemes listed, the Commission also assessed whether an *ex-ante* evaluation mechanism had been introduced. The decisions taken before the adoption of the 2009 Broadcasting Communication are also relevant for the *ex-ante* evaluation, because the 2009 Communication codified the existing case practice in this respect.

Protocol 29 to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union concerns the system of public broadcasting in the Member States. According to the Protocol, each Member State has the competence to define, organise and confer a public service remit on broadcasting organisations and to provide the funding for the fulfilment of the remit. Therefore, and in order to fully respect the subsidiarity principle and Articles 4 and 5 of the Treaty on European Union, a communication on the application of Article 106(2) TFEU to the sector was the right way to proceed.

(Nederlandse versie)

Vraag met verzoek om schriftelijk antwoord E-000365/14
aan de Commissie
Kathleen Van Brempt (S&D)
(15 januari 2014)

Betreft: Giftige stoffen in kinderkledij

Greenpeace publiceerde in januari 2014 de studie „A little story about the monsters in your closet" over het gebruik van chemicaliën in kinderkleding. De studie heeft in kinderkledij tal van toxische stoffen gevonden die kanker kunnen veroorzaken of de hormonale werking kunnen verstoren. De stoffen werden teruggevonden in kledij en schoenen van verschillende grote en kleine merken, hetgeen doet vermoeden dat het een wijdverspreid fenomeen is dat in de hele kledingsector voorkomt. Onder de gevonden stoffen zijn NPE's (nonylfenolethoxylaten), cadmium, perfluoroctaanzuren en ftalaten. Het is bovendien zeer verwonderlijk dat speelgoed dat ftalaten bevat in de EU niet meer verkocht mag worden, maar dat dit verbod blijkbaar niet geldt voor kinderkledij.

Is de Commissie zich bewust van deze problematiek?

Plant de Commissie initiatieven hieromtrent?

Voorziet de Commissie een verbod op de verkoop van kinderkledij waarin kankerverwekkende of hormonenverstorende stoffen gebruikt werden (analoog aan de regeling m.b.t. speelgoed)?

Antwoord van de heer Tajani namens de Commissie
(12 maart 2014)

De Commissie is bekend met de Greenpeace-studie volgens welke er bepaalde gevaarlijke stoffen in kinderkleding voorkomen.

Het beperken van de aanwezigheid van die stoffen in kleding in het algemeen komt aan de orde in de EU-wetgeving via verschillende benaderingen voor alle consumentengroepen, inclusief kinderen.

In het kader van REACH ([1]) heeft Zweden een voorstel gedaan om de aanwezigheid van nonylfenol en nonylfenolethoxylaten (NF en NFE) in textielwaren te beperken, dat momenteel wordt behandeld door het Europees Agentschap voor chemische stoffen (ECHA). Dit kan leiden tot een wijziging van bijlage XVII bij de REACH-verordening door de Commissie, waarschijnlijk in 2015.

In de Kaderrichtlijn Water (KRW) ([2]) is nonylfenol opgenomen als prioritaire gevaarlijke stof waarvan de emissies in het aquatische milieu progressief moeten worden verminderd met de bedoeling ze uiteindelijk geleidelijk te beëindigen. Toezicht onder de KRW is een manier waarop de Commissie kan bepalen of de bestaande beperkingen doeltreffend zijn.

De EU-milieukeurcriteria ([3]) voor textielproducten zijn gericht op een vermindering van waterverontreiniging, het beperken van het gebruik van gevaarlijke stoffen en het vergroten van transparantie in de productieketen van het product. Dit vrijwillig wetgevend kader beperkt het gebruik van giftige chemische stoffen in textielproducten, zoals organische tinverbindingen, antimoon in polyester en plastisoladditieven.

Bovendien nemen de lidstaten maatregelen tegen onveilige producten die op de markt of aan de EU-grenzen worden aangetroffen en melden zij deze aan de Commissie via het EU-systeem voor snelle waarschuwingen over niet voor voeding bestemde producten (RAPEX) ([4]).

([1]) Verordening (EG) nr. 1907/2006 van het Europees Parlement en de Raad van 18 december 2006 inzake de registratie en beoordeling van en de autorisatie en beperkingen ten aanzien van chemische stoffen.
([2]) Richtlijn 2000/60/EG.
([3]) http://ec.europa.eu/environment/ecolabel/
([4]) Het EU-systeem voor snelle waarschuwingen over niet voor voeding bestemde producten: http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/safety/rapex/

(English version)

Question for written answer E-000365/14
to the Commission
Kathleen Van Brempt (S&D)
(15 January 2014)

Subject: Poisonous substances in children's clothing

In January 2014, Greenpeace published a study entitled 'A Little Story About the Monsters in Your Closet' concerning the use of chemicals in children's clothing. The study found a large number of toxic substances in children's clothing which could cause cancer or disrupt hormonal function. The substances were found in clothes and shoes from several large and small brands, suggesting that it is a widespread phenomenon that occurs across the whole of the clothing sector. The substances found included NPEs (nonylphenol ethoxylates), cadmium, perfluorooctanoic acids and phthalates. Moreover, it is very surprising that toys containing phthalates may no longer be sold in the EU, but that this ban does not seem to apply to children's clothing.

Is the Commission aware of this problem?

Is the Commission planning any action in this respect?

Does the Commission foresee a ban on the sale of children's clothing manufactured using carcinogenic or hormone-disrupting substances (in line with the regulation on toys)?

Answer given by Mr Tajani on behalf of the Commission
(12 March 2014)

The Commission is aware of the Greenpeace study reporting the presence of certain hazardous substances in children's clothing.

Limiting the presence of those substances in clothing in general is addressed by EU legislation through several approaches covering all consumer groups including children.

A proposal under REACH ([1]) limiting the presence of nonylphenol and nonylphenol ethoxylates (NP and NPE) in textile articles was made by Sweden and is currently under consideration by the European Chemical Agency (ECHA) Committees. This could lead to an amendment to Annex XVII of REACH by the Commission, probably in 2015.

The Water Framework Directive (WFD) ([2]) lists nonylphenol as a priority hazardous substance whose emissions to the aquatic environment have to be progressively reduced with the aim of eventually phasing them out completely. Monitoring under the WFD is one means by which the Commission can determine whether existing restrictions are effective.

The EU Ecolabel ([3]) criteria established for textile products aim at promoting the reduction of water pollution, limiting the use of hazardous substances and increasing transparency in the products' value chain. This voluntary legislative framework restricts the use of toxic chemicals in textiles, such as organotin compounds, antimony in polyester, plastisol additives, among others.

Also, Member States take measures against unsafe products found on the market or at EU borders and notify them to the Commission through EU Rapid Alert System for non-food products (RAPEX) ([4]).

([1]) Regulation (EC) No 1907/2206 of the European parliament and of the Council of 18 December 2006 concerning the Registration, Evaluation, Authorisation and Restriction of Chemicals.
([2]) Directive 2000/60/EC.
([3]) http://ec.europa.eu/environment/ecolabel/
([4]) EU Rapid Alert System for non-food products: http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/safety/rapex/

(Nederlandse versie)

Vraag met verzoek om schriftelijk antwoord E-000366/14
aan de Commissie
Gerben-Jan Gerbrandy (ALDE)
(15 januari 2014)

Betreft: Aanwezigheid gifstoffen in textiel

Is de Commissie op de hoogte van het onderzoek van Greenpeace: „A Little Story About the Monsters In Your Closet” ([1])?

Greenpeace heeft 82 kledingstukken voor kinderen onderzocht van twaalf bekende merken, Adidas, Nike, en Gap. Het ging onder meer om sportkleding, kinderschoenen en andere kleding. In die kleren werden verschillende gevaarlijke stoffen aangetroffen die kanker kunnen veroorzaken of invloed kunnen hebben op de hormoonhuishouding. Stoffen die o.a. gevonden werden waren ftalaten (weekmakers), cadmium en nonylfenol. Deze stoffen zijn niet alleen milieuvervuilend in het productieland van het textielstuk, maar komen in de EU tijdens het wassen vrij en eindigen zo in het grondwater.

Wat is het huidige wet- en regelgevende kader voor de concentratie van gifstoffen aanwezig in kleding in de Europese Unie? Kan de Commissie mij, indien van toepassing, voorzien van een overzicht van dit kader?

Hoe schat de Commissie het risico van de aanwezigheid van gifstoffen in kleding in voor de volksgezondheid en milieu? Is de Commissie, in de gevallen dat het risico onaanvaardbaar is voor de gezondheid van onze kinderen of een negatieve impact op het milieu heeft, bereid om maatregelen te treffen om de concentratie van gifstoffen in textiel sterk te verminderen? Zo niet, waarom niet?

Antwoord van de heer Mimica namens de Commissie
(26 februari 2014)

De Commissie weet van het door het geachte Parlementslid genoemde onderzoeksverslag. Voor het onderzoek werden 82 producten gekocht in 25 landen wereldwijd (waarvan 7 lidstaten van de EU). Van die 82 producten was er slechts één in de EU geproduceerd.

In de REACH-verordening ([2]) worden beperkingen opgelegd voor het gebruik van enkele gevaarlijke stoffen in textielproducten die in de EU worden geproduceerd of verhandeld, zoals nonylfenol of ftalaten. De richtlijn inzake industriële emissies ([3]) en de kaderrichtlijn water ([4]) beperken de lozingen en emissies van dergelijke stoffen in de lucht, de grond en het water, ook als die voortkomen uit de productie van textiel. De emissies in het water van verschillende verontreinigende stoffen worden bijgehouden in het Europees register inzake de uitstoot en overbrenging van verontreinigende stoffen ([5]).

De EU-milieukeur ([6]) is een vrijwillig milieukeursysteem dat duurzame productie en consumptie van producten en duurzame verlening en duurzaam gebruik van diensten aanmoedigt. Dit wetgevend kader beperkt het gebruik van giftige chemische stoffen in textielproducten, zoals organische tinverbindingen, antimoon in polyester en plastisoladditieven.

Waar nodig nemen autoriteiten voor markttoezicht in de lidstaten maatregelen tegen onveilige producten die op de markt of aan de EU-grenzen worden aangetroffen, en maken daar melding van bij de Commissie via het systeem van snelle waarschuwing voor niet voor voeding bestemde producten (RAPEX) van de EU ([7]). Het aantal meldingen met betrekking tot de aanwezigheid van chemische stoffen in textielproducten die een ernstig gevaar vormden voor consumenten bedroeg 73 in 2011, 66 in 2012 en 99 in 2013.

Voor meer informatie verwijst de Commissie het geachte Parlementslid naar de antwoorden op de vragen E-931/2013 en E-10799/2012.

([1]) http://www.greenpeace.org/eastasia/monstersinyourcloset/ (geraadpleegd op 15.1.2014).
([2]) Verordening (EG) nr. 1907/2006 van het Europees Parlement en de Raad van 18 december 2006 inzake de registratie en beoordeling chemische stoffen; PB L 396 van 30.12.2006, blz. 3.
([3]) Richtlijn 2010/75/EU van het Europees Parlement en de Raad van 24 november 2010 inzake industriële emissies (geïntegreerde preventie en bestrijding van verontreiniging); PB L 334 van 17 december 2010.
([4]) Richtlijn 2000/60/EG van het Europees Parlement en de Raad van 23 oktober 2000 tot vaststelling van een kader voor communautaire maatregelen betreffende het waterbeleid; PB L 327 van 22.12.2000, blz. 1.
([5]) http://prtr.ec.europa.eu/.
([6]) http://ec.europa.eu/environment/ecolabel/.
([7]) http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/dyna/rapex/rapex_archives_en.cfm.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-000366/14
to the Commission
Gerben-Jan Gerbrandy (ALDE)
(15 January 2014)

Subject: Presence of toxins in textiles

Is the Commission familiar with Greenpeace's investigation, which is entitled 'A Little Story About the Monsters in Your Closet' ([1])?

Greenpeace carried out an investigation of 82 items of children's clothing made by twelve well-known brands, among which were Adidas, Nike and Gap. The items investigated included sportswear, children's shoes and other clothing. These clothes were found to contain various hazardous substances which can be carcinogenic or disrupt the endocrine system. The substances found included phthalates (softening agents), cadmium and nonylphenol. As well as causing environmental pollution in the country in which the textiles are manufactured, these substances are also released into the EU when the clothes are washed and are therefore ending up in the groundwater.

What is the current legislative and regulatory framework surrounding the concentration of toxins in clothing in the European Union? Can the Commission provide me with an overview of this framework, if applicable?

How does the Commission assess the risk posed by the presence of toxins in clothing to public health and the environment? Where the risk posed is unacceptable with regard to the health of our children or where these toxins have an adverse effect on the environment, is the Commission willing to take steps to dramatically reduce the concentration of toxins in textiles? If not, why not?

Answer given by Mr Mimica on behalf of the Commission
(26 February 2014)

The Commission is aware of the study report referred to by the Honourable Member. For the study, 82 products were purchased worldwide in 25 countries (7 EU Member States). Out of the 82 products, only one was made in the EU.

The REACH ([2]) Regulation imposes restrictions on the use of some dangerous substances in textiles produced or marketed in the EU, such as nonylphenol or phthalates. The Industrial Emissions Directive ([3]) and the Water Framework Directive ([4]) restrict the discharges and emissions of such substances to air, soil and water, including from the production of textiles. The emissions to water of various polluting substances are recorded in the European Pollutant Release and Transfer Register ([5]).

The EU Ecolabel ([6]) is a voluntary environmental labelling scheme encouraging the sustainable production and consumption of products and the sustainable provision and use of services. This legislative framework restricts the use of toxic chemicals in textiles, such as organotin compounds, antimony in polyester and plastisol additives.

Where necessary, market surveillance authorities in the Member States take measures against unsafe products found on the market or at EU borders and notify them to the Commission through the EU Rapid Alert System for non-food products (RAPEX) ([7]). The number of notifications related to the presence of chemicals in textile products posing a serious risk to consumers was 73 in 2011, 66 in 2012 and 99 in 2013.

For additional information, the Commission would refer the Honourable Member to the answers to questions E-931/2013 and E-10799/2012.

([1]) http://www.greenpeace.org/eastasia/monstersinyourcloset/ (retrieved on 15.1.2014).
([2]) Regulation (EC) No 1907/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 December 2006 concerning the Registration, Evaluation, Authorisation and Restriction of Chemicals; OJ L 396, 30.12.2006, p. 3.
([3]) Directive 2010/75/EU of the European parliament and of the Council of 24 November 2010 on industrial emissions (integrated pollution prevention and control); OJ L 334, 17 December 2010.
([4]) Directive 2000/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2000 establishing a framework for Community action in the field of water policy; OJ L 327, 22.12.2000, p. 1.
([5]) http://prtr.ec.europa.eu/
([6]) http://ec.europa.eu/environment/ecolabel/
([7]) http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/dyna/rapex/rapex_archives_en.cfm

(Hrvatska verzija)

Pitanje za pisani odgovor E-000384/14
upućeno Komisiji
Ruža Tomašić (ECR)
(16. siječnja 2014.)

Predmet: Kriteriji za Srbiju pri zatvaranju Poglavlja 23 pristupnih pregovora s EU-om

U svom je Izvješću o napretku Srbije u 2013. (Serbia 2013 Progress Report) povjerenik za proširenje Štefan Füle u ime Komisije s pravom ustanovio kako je u pogledu procesuiranja ratnih zločina počinjenih u ratu u Hrvatskoj, BiH i Kosovu u 2012. optužen mali broj osoba, kako nema napretka u istraživanju uloge visokorangiranih časnika u tim ratovima, a nadležni sudovi izriču preblage kazne.

Ovakvo mi je činjenično stanje nažalost odavno poznato. No zabrinuta sam što u svojoj ocjeni o spremnosti Srbije za preuzimanje obveza koje proizlaze iz članstva u EU-u Komisija u okviru Poglavlja 23 „Pravosuđe i temeljna prava" nije spomenula problem ratnih zločina i neučinkovitosti Srbije u njihovom procesuiranju, nego je on spomenut samo u kontekstu političkih regionalnih izazova.

Željela bih Vas podsjetiti da je u slučaju pristupanja Hrvatske Uniji pitanje postupanja s domaćim slučajevima ratnih zločina predstavljalo jedan od glavnih kriterija za zatvaranje Poglavlja 23.

Stoga me zanima hoće li Komisija odrediti pitanje procesuiranja ratnih zločina počinjenih u ratovima u Hrvatskoj, BiH i Kosovu kao mjerilo za zatvaranje Poglavlja 23 u slučaju Srbije.

Odgovor g. Fülea u ime Komisije
(11. ožujka 2014.)

Komisija je tijekom godina pomno pratila napredak Srbije u ispunjavanju uvjeta procesa stabilizacije i pridruživanja. Jedan od glavnih zaključaka mišljenja o zahtjevu za članstvo Srbije iz 2011. je upravo taj da je uhićenjem i izručenjem svih preostalih bjegunaca i kontinuiranom suradnjom s Međunarodnim kaznenim sudom za bivšu Jugoslaviju (MKSJ) što se tiče zahtjeva za pristup dokumentima i svjedocima postignuta puna suradnja s MKSJ-om. Srbija je također aktivna u procesuiranju ratnih zločina, uključujući pojačanje napora za suradnju s Hrvatskom, Bosnom i Hercegovinom te s EULEX-om po pitanju Kosova ([1]).

Pristupni pregovori između EU-a i Srbije službeno su otvoreni na prvoj međuvladinoj konferenciji Europske unije i Srbije 21. siječnja 2014., nakon što je Vijeće donijelo pregovarački okvir u prosincu 2013. To se dogodilo nakon što je Komisija procijenila da je Srbija ispunila političke kriterije za pristupanje i uvjete procesa stabilizacije i pridruživanja u dovoljnoj mjeri.

Komisija očekuje da će Srbija nastaviti usklađivanje sa zakonodavstvom Europske unije, uključujući ključna područja pravosuđa i temeljnih prava (poglavlje 23.) kojima je obuhvaćeno pitanje procesuiranja ratnih zločina. Komisija će i dalje pomno pratiti ovo pitanje i blisko surađivati s OESS-om i EULEX-om na njegovu ocjenjivanju. U skladu s novim pristupom vladavini prava, Srbija će morati pripremiti detaljan akcijski plan za poglavlje 23. Vijeće će tada odrediti privremene referentne ciljeve s namjerom otvaranja tog poglavlja. Završni referentni ciljevi za poglavlje 23. utvrdit će se tek u kasnijoj fazi.

([1]) Ovim nazivom ne dovode se u pitanje stajališta o statusu te se on koristi u skladu s Rezolucijom Vijeća sigurnosti UN-a 1244/99 i mišljenjem Međunarodnog suda pravde o proglašavanju neovisnosti Kosova.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-000384/14
to the Commission
Ruža Tomašić (ECR)
(16 January 2014)

Subject: Criteria for closing Chapter 23 in Serbia's accession negotiations with the EU

In the Serbia 2013 Progress Report, the Commissioner for Enlargement Štefan Füle, writing on behalf of the Commission, rightly concludes, with regard to Serbia's processing of war crimes carried out during the wars in Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo, that the number of people indicted in 2012 was low, that no progress has been made in investigating the role of senior officers in those wars, and that the competent courts are handing down excessively lenient sentences.

Sadly this state of affairs has long been all-too familiar to me. I am concerned that the Commission, in its evaluation of Serbia's preparedness to take on the duties arising from EU Membership under Chapter 23 'Judiciary and fundamental rights', made no mention of Serbia's failure to process war crimes in an effective manner and only dealt with the issue of war crimes in the context of regional political challenges.

I would like to remind you that when Croatia was negotiating its accession to the EU, the issue of dealing with our own instances of war crimes was one of the main criteria for closing Chapter 23.

Will the Commission designate the issue of processing war crimes committed during the wars in Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Kosovo as a criterion for the closing of Chapter 23 in Serbia's accession negotiations?

Answer given by Mr Füle on behalf of the Commission
(11 March 2014)

The Commission has closely monitored over the years Serbia's progress in complying with the conditions of the Stabilisation and Association process. A key finding of the 2011 Opinion on Serbia's membership application had precisely been that it had achieved full cooperation with the International Criminal tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), by arresting and transferring all remaining fugitives and by continuously cooperating with the ICTY on requests for access to documents and witnesses. Serbia has also been active in the processing of war crimes, including by stepping up its efforts to cooperate with Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and with EULEX with regards to Kosovo ([1]).

Accession negotiations between the EU and Serbia have been formally opened, at the first EU-Serbia inter-governmental conference on 21 January 2014, following the adoption by the Council in December 2013 of the negotiating framework. This happened following the Commission's assessment that Serbia had sufficiently fulfilled the political criteria for accession and the conditions of the Stabilisation and Association Process.

The Commission expects Serbia to continue aligning with the EU legislation, including in the key areas of judiciary and fundamental rights (Chapter 23) which do encompass the issue of processing of war crimes. The Commission will continue to closely monitor this issue and will closely interact with OSCE and EULEX for its assessment. In line with the new approach on the rule of law, Serbia will be required to prepare a detailed Action Plan for Chapter 23. The Council will then define interim benchmarks with a view to opening that chapter. Closing benchmarks for Chapter 23 will only be defined at a later stage.

([1]) This designation is without prejudice to positions on status, and is in line with UNSCR 1244/1999 and the ICJ Opinion on the Kosovo declaration of independence.

(Version française)

Question avec demande de réponse écrite E-000402/14
à la Commission
Marc Tarabella (S&D) et Jean Louis Cottigny (S&D)
(16 janvier 2014)

Objet: Protection des données liées à la santé sur internet

1. Comment la Commission compte-t-elle établir des lignes directrices et légiférer sur lesaspects juridiques et de protection des données dans le domaine de la santé en ligne?

2. Comment compte-t-elle faire en sorte que soient sécurisés le partage, le traitement etl'analyse des données, afin de trouver un équilibre entre l'accès aux données et leurprotection?

3. Comment la Commission compte-t-elle garantir la bonne gestion et l'exploitationadéquate des informations relatives à la santé sur internet?

Réponse donnée par Mme Kroes au nom de la Commission
(14 mars 2014)

1. La proposition de règlement général sur la protection des données ([1]) permettra d'adapter le cadre juridique actuel relatif à la protection des données à caractère personnel afin de mieux répondre aux défis posés par l'évolution des nouvelles technologies, tels que le traitement en ligne des données relatives à la santé. Le règlement fournira un ensemble unique de règles applicables dans l'ensemble de l'EEE qui garantira le respect intégral du droit fondamental à la protection des données à caractère personnel, assurant ainsi une plus grande sécurité juridique. Le futur Comité européen de la protection des données pourra adopter des lignes directrices.

2. La proposition prévoit que les responsables du traitement et les sous-traitants doivent mettre en œuvre les mesures de sécurité techniques et organisationnelles appropriées. En vertu du règlement, la «protection des données dès la conception» et la «protection des données par défaut» deviendront également des principes contraignants fondamentaux. La révision du cadre juridique reconnaît le traitement des données relatives à la santé qui est nécessaire à des fins de recherche historique, statistique ou scientifique, comme l'établissement de registres de patients pour améliorer les diagnostics.

3. En ce qui concerne la protection des données à caractère personnel, relatives notamment à la santé, les dispositions législatives suivantes ont été adoptées dans l'UE:

— la directive 95/46/CE relative à la protection des personnes physiques à l'égard du traitement des données à caractère personnel et à la libre circulation de ces données ([2]);

— la directive 2002/58/CE concernant le traitement des données à caractère personnel et la protection de la vie privée dans le secteur des communications électroniques ([3]);

— la décision cadre 2008/977/JAI du Conseil ([4]).

Les propositions de réforme relatives à la protection des données renforceront encore davantage la protection des données à caractère personnel.

Enfin, la stratégie de la Commission relative à l'informatique en nuage ([5]) devrait également contribuer à garantir le stockage et le transfert en toute sécurité des données relatives à la santé.

([1]) Proposition de règlement du Parlement européen et du Conseil relatif à la protection des personnes physiques à l'égard du traitement des données à caractère personnel et à la libre circulation de ces données (règlement général sur la protection des données), COM(2012) 11 final.
([2]) http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/privacy/docs/95-46-ce/dir1995-46_part1_fr.pdf
([3]) http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CONSLEG:2002L0058:20091219:FR:PDF
([4]) http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2008:350:0060:01:FR:HTML
([5]) Communication de la Commission intitulée «Exploiter le potentiel de l'informatique en nuage en Europe», COM(2012) 529.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-000402/14
to the Commission
Marc Tarabella (S&D) and Jean Louis Cottigny (S&D)
(16 January 2014)

Subject: Protection of health-related data on the Internet

1. How does the Commission intend to draw up guidelines and legislate with regard to legal aspects and data protection in the field of online health?

2. How will the Commission ensure that the sharing, processing and analysis of data are done securely, striking a balance between data access and data protection?

3. How does the Commission intend to guarantee that health-related information on the Internet is managed properly and used appropriately?

Answer given by Ms Kroes on behalf of the Commission
(14 March 2014)

1. The proposed General Data Protection regulation ([1]) will adapt the current legal framework for the protection of personal data to better respond to the challenges posed by the development of new technologies, such as the online processing of health data. The regulation will provide a single set of rules applicable across the EEA guaranteeing that the fundamental right to personal data protection is fully respected, thus ensuring greater legal certainty. The future European Data Protection Board may adopt guidelines.

2. The proposal provides that data controllers and processors must implement appropriate technical and organisational data security measures. Pursuant to the regulation, 'data protection by design' and 'data protection by default' will also become key binding principles. The review recognises the processing of health data necessary for historical, statistical or scientific research purposes, such as patient registries set up for improving diagnoses.

3. As regards the protection of personal data, including health related data, following legislation has been enacted in the EU:

— Directive 95/46/EC on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data ([2]);

— Directive 2002/58/EC on privacy and electronic communications ([3]);

— Council Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA ([4]).

The proposed Data Protection reform proposals will further strengthen the protection of personal data.

Finally, the Commission cloud computing ([5]) should also ensure that health data are stored and transferred in a secure way.

([1]) Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data (General Data Protection Regulation), COM(2012) 11final.
([2]) http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/privacy/docs/95-46-ce/dir1995-46_part1_en.pdf
([3]) http://www.dataprotection.ie/documents/legal/directive2002_58.pdf
([4]) http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2008:350:0060:01:EN:HTML
([5]) The Commission Communication on Unleashing the Potential of Cloud Computing in Europe, COM(2012) 529.

(Versione italiana)

Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-000418/14
alla Commissione
Oreste Rossi (PPE)
(16 gennaio 2014)

Oggetto: Rischio di estinzione dei leoni in Africa occidentale

Una recente indagine svolta in un'area che comprende 17 nazioni dell'Africa occidentale ha evidenziato che sono solo 400 i leoni superstiti in quest'area, di cui meno di 250 in età riproduttiva.

La ricerca è durata sei anni e il territorio africano è stato censito palmo per palmo alla ricerca di leoni per riuscire ad ottenere una stima aggiornata del numero di animali. Fino al 2005 si riteneva che fossero almeno 21 le aree protette in cui i leoni potessero vivere liberamente e in sicurezza. Invece sono solo 4: nel complesso di parchi W-Arly-Pendjari che attraversa i confini di Benin, Burkina Faso e Niger e in altri tre siti tra Senegal e Nigeria. La zona in questione comprende alcuni tra i paesi più poveri del mondo, che non hanno i fondi per gestire i parchi e per tenerli in condizioni adeguate. I ricercatori hanno scoperto che questi parchi non hanno controlli di sicurezza e non riescono a gestire la presenza degli animali al loro interno. Ciò che preoccupa, in particolar modo, è la bassissima densità che conta circa 1 leone per 100 chilometri quadrati. La causa della riduzione del numero di questi felini è da rintracciare nell'uomo. Da una parte, ci sono i pastori che avvelenano i grandi mammiferi per proteggere il proprio allevamento, dall'altra i bracconieri uccidono questi animali per il commercio di carne selvatica, sempre più richiesta.

Si tenga presente che tra il 1970 e il 2005 la popolazione di questi grandi mammiferi è scesa dell'85 % nell'Africa occidentale.

Si rilevi altresì che l'Unione europea fa parte del CITES, il più grande accordo globale esistente di conservazione della fauna selvatica.

Inoltre, in data 15 gennaio 2013 è stata approvata in seno al Parlamento europeo una risoluzione sui reati contro le specie selvatiche.

Alla luce di quanto precede, può la Commissione rispondere ai seguenti quesiti:

1. È a conoscenza della drastica riduzione della popolazione di leoni in Africa occidentale?

2. Può indicare quali sono state le azioni effettuate fino ad ora per proteggere tale specie selvatica?

3. Può illustrare quali sono le strategie che intende mettere in atto per perseguire tale obiettivo

Risposta di Janez Potočnik a nome della Commissione
(13 marzo 2014)

La Commissione è a conoscenza della riduzione della popolazione di leoni in Africa occidentale.

Il commercio internazionale di leoni africani è strettamente regolamentato sia, a partire dal 1977, nell'ambito della convenzione sul commercio internazionale delle specie minacciate di estinzione (CITES) sia in quello della normativa UE per la protezione di specie della flora e della fauna selvatiche ([1]). La Commissione sta seguendo da vicino le discussioni riguardanti il leone africano che hanno avuto luogo nel contesto della CITES e sta prendendo in considerazione l'adozione di norme più severe per quanto riguarda le importazioni verso l'UE dei trofei di caccia mediante modifiche al regolamento (CE) n. 865/2006 della Commissione ([2]). La Commissione fornisce anche il suo sostegno per le aree protette della regione al fine di ridurre i livelli di abbattimento dei leoni e delle loro prede.

([1]) Regolamento (CE) n. 338/97 del Consiglio relativo alla protezione di specie della flora e della fauna selvatiche mediante il controllo del loro commercio (GU L 61 del 3.3.1997).

([2]) Regolamento (CE) n. 865/2006 della Commissione, del 4 maggio 2006, recante modalità di applicazione del regolamento (CE) n. 338/97 del Consiglio relativo alla protezione di specie della flora e della fauna selvatiche mediante il controllo del loro commercio (GU L 166 del 19.6.2006).

Nel contesto più ampio dell'attuale crisi legata al bracconaggio in Africa e dell'aumento significativo nel corso degli ultimi anni del traffico illecito in fauna selvatica a livello mondiale, la Commissione ha recentemente adottato una comunicazione sulla strategia dell'UE contro tale traffico ([3]), avviando un'ampia consultazione con le parti interessate in merito all'efficacia delle misure vigenti e al futuro ruolo dell'UE nella lotta contro il traffico illecito di specie selvatiche a livello mondiale. L'UE è anche il principale donatore di fondi destinati all'International Consortium against Wildlife Crime (Consorzio internazionale contro i crimini sulla flora e la fauna selvatiche), che riunisce l'Interpol, l'Ufficio delle Nazioni Unite contro la droga e il crimine (UNODC), l'Organizzazione mondiale delle dogane, la CITES e la Banca mondiale.

([3]) Comunicazione della Commissione al Consiglio e al Parlamento europeo COM(2014) 64 final del 7 febbraio 2014, sulla strategia dell'UE contro il traffico illegale di specie selvatiche.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-000418/14
to the Commission
Oreste Rossi (PPE)
(16 January 2014)

Subject: Risk of extinction of lions in West Africa

A recent survey carried out in an area covering 17 countries in West Africa showed that there are only 400 surviving lions in this area, of which fewer than 250 are of reproductive age.

The search lasted six years and the African land was surveyed inch by inch in search of lions to be able to obtain an updated estimate of the number of animals. Until 2005, it was believed that the lions could live freely and safely in at least 21 protected areas. Now it seems there are only four: in the W-Arly-Pendjari parks complex that straddles the boundaries of Benin, Burkina Faso and Niger and three other sites between Senegal and Nigeria. The area in question includes some of the poorest countries in the world that do not have the funds to manage the parks and maintain them in appropriate conditions. The researchers found that these parks do not have security checks and are unable to manage the animals that live within them. One particularly worrying aspect is the very low population density, amounting to approximately one lion per 100 square kilometres. The cause of the fall in the number of these big cats can be traced back to humans. Shepherds poison the large mammals to protect their livestock and poachers also kill these animals to supply the trade in bushmeat, which is increasingly in demand.

It should be noted that between 1970 and 2005, the population of these large mammals has fallen by 85% in West Africa.

It should also be noted that the European Union is part of the CITES , the largest global wildlife conservation agreement in existence.

On 15 January 2013, a resolution was passed in the European Parliament on crimes against wildlife.

Given this situation, can the Commission answer the following questions:

1. Is it aware of the drastic fall in the West African lion population?

2. Can it state what actions have been taken so far to protect this wild species?

3. Can it explain what strategies it intends to put in place to achieve this goal?

Answer given by Mr Potočnik on behalf of the Commission
(13 March 2014)

The Commission is aware of the fall in the West African lion population.

International trade in African lions is strictly regulated both under the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES) since 1977, and under the EU legislation for the protection of species of wild fauna and flora [1]. The Commission is following closely discussions on the African lion within the CITES context and is considering the adoption of stricter rules regarding imports into the EU of lion hunting trophies through amendments to Commission Regulation (EC) No 865/2006 [2]. The Commission also provides support for protected areas in the region in order to reduce levels of killing of lions and of their prey.

In the broader context of the current poaching crisis in Africa and the significant increase in wildlife trafficking globally over the recent years, the Commission has recently adopted a communication on the EU approach on wildlife trafficking [3], launching a wide stakeholder consultation on the effectiveness of current measures and the future role of the EU in the global fight against wildlife trafficking. The EU is also the main donor to the International Consortium against Wildlife Crime which brings together Interpol, the UN Office on Drugs and Crime, the World Customs Organisation, CITES and the World Bank.

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(1) Council Regulation (EC) No 338/97 on the protection of species of wild fauna and flora by regulating trade therein, OJ L 61, 3.3.1997.
(2) Commission Regulation (EC) No 865/2006 of 4 May 2006 laying down detailed rules concerning the implementation of Council Regulation (EC) No 338/97 on the protection of species of wild fauna and flora by regulating trade therein (OJ L 166, 19.6.2006.
(3) Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament COM(2014) 64 final of 7 February 2014 on the EU Approach against Wildlife Trafficking.

(Ελληνική έκδοση)

Ερώτηση με αίτημα γραπτής απάντησης P-000426/14
προς την Επιτροπή
Theodoros Skylakakis (ALDE)
(17 Ιανουαρίου 2014)

Θέμα: Επιπτώσεις του PSI στα φυσικά πρόσωπα ομολογιούχους ελληνικού δημοσίου

Οι πολίτες που αποταμίευσαν σε Ομόλογα Ελληνικού Δημοσίου και οι οποίοι ξεπερνούν τις 15 000 (έλληνες πολίτες οι περισσότεροι αλλά και πολίτες άλλων κρατών μελών της ΕΕ) υπολογίζουν ότι υπέστησαν ζημία ύψους 1 δισ. ευρώ από το PSI (το 70% των αποταμιεύσεών τους) και καταγγέλλουν ότι η διαδικασία που επελέγη για το «κούρεμα» δεν ήταν εθελοντική, όπως επίσημα λέγεται, αλλά υποχρεωτική.

Επίσης, καταγγέλλουν ότι το PSI είχε δυσανάλογη επίπτωση στα οικονομικά συμφέροντα μεμονωμένων ιδιωτών με μικρό εισόδημα, τη στιγμή που τράπεζες και άλλα νομικά πρόσωπα είχαν προνομιακή μεταχείριση από το νόμο. Πράγματι, το ελληνικό Δημόσιο, με το άρθρο 3 παράγραφος 5 του Ν. 4046/2012 ([1]), εξασφάλισε φορολογικές ελαφρύνσεις και συμψηφισμούς, προκειμένου οι ελληνικές τράπεζες και τα λοιπά νομικά πρόσωπα να αποσβέσουν μέρος της ζημίας που υπέστησαν από το PSI.

Αν το PSI δεν έχει γίνει με την εθελοντική συμμετοχή των φυσικών προσώπων και έχει ζημιώσει δυσανάλογα τους μεμονωμένους ομολογιούχους, τότε το κούρεμα των ομολόγων ισοδυναμεί με δήμευση των ιδιωτικών αποταμιεύσεων και πλήττει καίρια την αξιοπιστία του ελληνικού κράτους και της ευρωζώνης.

Γι' αυτό τον λόγο, και δεδομένου ότι η Επιτροπή συμμετείχε καθοριστικά στη διαπραγμάτευση του PSI ως μέλος της Τρόικα, της ζητείται σχετικά:

— Να επιβεβαιώσει ότι η διαδικασία που αφορούσε τα φυσικά πρόσωπα ομολογιούχους του ελληνικού δημοσίου στο PSI ήταν εξ ολόκληρου εθελοντική·

— Να πάρει θέση απέναντι στο άρθρο 3 παρ.5 του Ν. 4046/2012 που συνιστά προνομιακή μεταχείριση στα νομικά πρόσωπα και προκαλεί δυσανάλογη και άδικη επίπτωση του PSI στα φυσικά πρόσωπα-ομολογιούχους του ελληνικού δημοσίου και στη δυνατότητα να υπάρξει ανάλογη ρύθμιση και για τους ιδιώτες ομολογιούχους.

Απάντηση του κ. Rehn εξ ονόματος της Επιτροπής
(13 Μαρτίου 2014)

Στην Ελλάδα, κατά την τελευταία δεκαετία, δημιουργήθηκε ένα μεγάλο κενό ανταγωνιστικότητας έναντι των άλλων κρατών μελών της ζώνης του ευρώ και σωρεύθηκε πολύ υψηλό δημόσιο χρέος. Στο 2ο ελληνικό πρόγραμμα οικονομικής προσαρμογής, εξετάζονται οι βασικές προκλήσεις που αντιμετωπίζει η Ελλάδα. Η επιτυχής εθελοντική ανταλλαγή ομολόγων ήταν σημαντική προϋπόθεση για ένα διάδοχο πρόγραμμα ([2]).

Οι γενικοί όροι της προσφοράς για την ανταλλαγή ομολόγων, που καλύπτουν όλους τους κατόχους ομολόγων στον ιδιωτικό τομέα, συμφωνήθηκαν μεταξύ των ελληνικών αρχών και του ιδιωτικού τομέα ([3]).

([1]) Η χρεωστική διαφορά που προκύπτει σε βάρος των νομικών προσώπων από την ανταλλαγή ομολόγων του Ελληνικού Δημοσίου ή εταιρικών ομολόγων, κατ' εφαρμογή προγράμματος συμμετοχής στην αναδιάταξη του ελληνικού χρέους, εκπίπτει σε ίσες δόσεις από τα ακαθάριστα έσοδα των διαχειριστικών περιόδων που μεσολαβούν μέχρι τη λήξη των Ομολόγων του Ελληνικού Δημοσίου που δόθηκαν σε ανταλλαγή, αρχής γενομένης από αυτή μέσα στην οποία πραγματοποιείται η ανταλλαγή των τίτλων και ανεξάρτητα από τον χρόνο διακράτησής τους (Αρ. 3 παρ. 5 Ν. 4046/2012).

([2]) Δήλωση της Ευρωομάδας, της 21ης Φεβρουαρίου 2012, στη διεύθυνση:
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ecofin/128075.pdf

([3]) Για περισσότερες λεπτομέρειες σχετικά με τους όρους της ανταλλαγής βλέπε:
http://www.minfin.gr/portal/en/resource/contentObject/id/7ad6442f-1777-4d02-80fb-91191c606664 and Box.4 «Το δεύτερο πρόγραμμα οικονομικής προσαρμογής για την Ελλάδα» στη διεύθυνση:
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/occasional_paper/2012/pdf/ocp94_en.pdf

(English version)

Question for written answer P-000426/14
to the Commission
Theodoros Skylakakis (ALDE)
(17 January 2014)

Subject: Effects of the PSI on private persons holding Greek Government bonds

The over fifteen thousand citizens (mostly Greek citizens, but also citizens of other EU Member States) who put their savings in Greek Government bonds estimate that they have suffered losses of EUR 1 billion from the PSI (70% of their savings) and complain that the procedure chosen for the 'haircut' was not voluntary, as was officially maintained, but mandatory.

They also complain that the PSI had a disproportionately adverse effect on the financial interests of private persons with small incomes, since banks and other legal entities received preferential treatment under the law. Indeed, the Greek State, in Article 3, paragraph 5, of Law 4046/2012 ([1]), secured tax relief and clearing arrangements so that Greek banks and other legal entities were able to recoup part of the losses suffered due to the PSI.

If the PSI was not undertaken with the voluntary participation of private persons and resulted in disproportionate losses for individual bondholders, then the 'haircut' of the bonds amounts to the confiscation of private savings and fatally undermines the credibility the Greek Government and the Eurozone.

For this reason, and because the Commission played a decisive role, as a member of the Troika, in negotiating the PSI, will it say:

— Can it confirm that the procedure applied to private persons holding Greek Government bonds in respect of the PSI was entirely voluntary?

— Will it adopt a position with regard to Article 3, paragraph 5, of Law No 4046/2012 which constitutes preferential treatment of legal entities and means that the PSI had a disproportionately harsh and unfair impact on private persons holding Greek Government bonds? Will it also adopt a position on the possibility of introducing similar arrangements for these private bondholders?

Answer given by Mr Rehn on behalf of the Commission
(13 March 2014)

Greece developed over the last decade a large competitiveness gap vis-à-vis the other euro-area Member States and accumulated a very high public debt stock. The 2nd Greek economic adjustment programme addresses the major challenges which Greece is facing. A successful voluntary debt exchange was an important pre-condition for a successor programme ([2]).

The general terms of the debt exchange offer covering all private sector bondholders were agreed between the Greek authorities and the private sector ([3]).

([1]) The debit balance arising from the exchange of Greek State or corporate bonds for legal entities, in application of the programme of participation in the restructuring of the Greek debt, shall be deducted from the gross profits in equal annual instalments corresponding to the tax periods until the maturity of the exchanged bonds, starting from the tax period in which the exchange of securities took place and regardless of the time for which they were held (Article 3, paragraph 5, Law No 4046/2012).

([2]) Eurogroup statement of 21 February 2012 at: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ecofin/128075.pdf

([3]) For more details on the terms of the exchange see:
http://www.minfin.gr/portal/en/resource/contentObject/id/7ad6442f-1777-4d02-80fb-91191c606664 and Box.4 in 'The Second Economic Adjustment programme for Greece' at: http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/occasional_paper/2012/pdf/ocp94_en.pdf

(Versión española)

Pregunta con solicitud de respuesta escrita E-000428/14
a la Comisión
Ramon Tremosa i Balcells (ALDE)
(17 de enero de 2014)

Asunto: Directiva 2011/7/UE sobre morosidad

En relación con las preguntas E-003999/2013 y E-004000/2013, el Sr. Tajani respondió, en nombre de la Comisión, que «Por lo que se refiere a la medida de transposición española, España ha implementado la Directiva 2011/7/UE por el Real Decreto-ley 4/2013, que se notificó el 22 de febrero de 2013. La Comisión está realizando actualmente un análisis jurídico […] para comprobar que las medidas se ajustan a lo dispuesto en la Directiva. A este respecto, la Comisión está en contacto con las autoridades españolas competentes».

El Gobierno del Reino de España estableció, mediante la Disposición Transitoria tercera — Contratos preexistentes (RDL 4/2013 de 22 de febrero), que «Quedarán sujetos a las disposiciones de la Ley 3/2004, de 29 de diciembre (RDL 2004, 2678) […] la ejecución de todos los contratos a partir de un año a contar desde su entrada en vigor, aunque los mismos se hubieran celebrado con anterioridad».

Posteriormente estableció, mediante la Disposición transitoria tercera — Contratos preexistentes (Ley 11/2013 de 26 de julio), que «Quedarán sujetos a las disposiciones de la Ley 3/2004, de 29 de diciembre […] la ejecución de los contratos celebrados con anterioridad a la entrada en vigor de esta última, a partir de un año a contar desde su publicación en el Boletín Oficial del Estado».

En el primer caso, no se aplicarán las nuevas medidas contra la morosidad hasta el 24 de febrero de 2014 y, en el segundo, estas no se aplicarán hasta el 27 de julio de 2014.

A la vista de lo anterior:

¿Ya ha concluido la Comisión el análisis jurídico de la transposición de la Directiva 2011/7/UE en el Estado español?

¿Ha advertido la *vacatio legis* que se produce en la primera de las disposiciones transitorias aquí expuestas, así como la incongruencia de esta con la segunda de las expuestas?

Pregunta con solicitud de respuesta escrita E-000429/14
a la Comisión
Ramon Tremosa i Balcells (ALDE)
(17 de enero de 2014)

Asunto: Directiva 2011/7/UE sobre morosidad

En relación con las preguntas E-003999/2013 y E-004000/2013, el Sr. Tajani respondió, en nombre de la Comisión, que «Por lo que se refiere a la medida de transposición española, España ha implementado la Directiva 2011/7/UE por el Real Decreto-ley 4/2013, que se notificó el 22 de febrero de 2013. La Comisión supervisará de cerca la correcta aplicación de la Directiva a nivel nacional a través del grupo de expertos sobre morosidad, que será convocado para una tercera reunión que tendrá lugar en los próximos meses. La Comisión también apoya la correcta aplicación a través de la campaña de información sobre la morosidad en los pagos, en marcha desde octubre de 2012 en todos los países de la UE.».

Las farmacias de Cataluña siguen padeciendo retrasos en el cobro de las facturas de medicamentos dispensados con cargo a fondos públicos. A 5 de enero de 2014, el importe pendiente de cobro de las facturas correspondientes a octubre y noviembre de 2013 era de 226 000 millones de euros. Parece ser que las farmacias de otras comunidades autónomas españolas cobran puntualmente sus facturas, excepto en Cataluña.

Los mecanismos de financiación habilitados por el Gobierno de España —tales como el plan de pago a proveedores o el fondo de liquidez autonómico— se demuestran ineficaces para evitar la morosidad que sufren las oficinas de farmacia en Cataluña.

Cataluña se financia, en un 85 %, por transferencias directas del Gobierno español porque solamente el Gobierno central tiene poder recaudatorio de los principales impuestos.

A la vista de lo anterior:

¿Considera la Comisión que la morosidad que están padeciendo las oficinas de farmacia en Cataluña se ajusta al espíritu de la Directiva y a su trasposición en el Reino de España?

¿Qué mecanismos piensa la Comisión proponer al Gobierno de España para asegurar que se cumpla la normativa sobre morosidad?

Respuesta conjunta del Sr. Tajani en nombre de la Comisión
(12 de marzo de 2014)

En el caso de España, la Comisión ha concluido ya el análisis jurídico de la medida española de transposición. El Real Decreto Ley de transposición de la Directiva contiene algunas ambigüedades que deben ser subsanadas por las autoridades españolas. Por ejemplo, la Comisión ha comprobado que existe un problema de vacatio legis. Por lo tanto, la Comisión está actualmente en contacto con las autoridades españolas con el fin de aclarar estas cuestiones.

La Comisión no ha recibido notificación alguna respecto a los retrasos en los pagos a las farmacias catalanas. No obstante, si las farmacias catalanas sufren retrasos en los pagos de las Administraciones Públicas que exceden de 60 días (véase el artículo 4 de la Directiva), dicha práctica es incompatible con la Directiva. Por regla general, las infracciones de la legislación nacional deben resolverse en los órganos jurisdiccionales nacionales. Por consiguiente, se debería buscar la reparación adecuada garantizando la correcta aplicación de las normas nacionales de transposición.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-000428/14
to the Commission
Ramon Tremosa i Balcells (ALDE)
(17 January 2014)

Subject: Directive 2011/7/EU on late payments

The answer given by Mr Tajani on behalf of the Commission to written questions E-003999/2013 and E-004000/2013 was as follows: 'As regards the Spanish transposition measure, Spain has implemented Directive 2011/7/EU by Royal Decree Law No 4/2013, which was notified on 22 February 2013. The Commission is currently undertaking a legal analysis [...] to verify whether the measures comply with the directive. With regard to this, the Commission is in contact with the competent authorities in Spain.'

The Government of the Kingdom of Spain established, by means of the Third Transitional Provision — Pre-existing Contracts (Royal Decree Law No 4/2013 of 22 February), that 'the execution of all contracts will be subject to the provisions of Law No 3/2004 of 29 December (Royal Decree Law 2004, 2678), from one year as from its entry into force, even if they had been concluded previously.'

It subsequently established, by means of the Third Transitional Provision — Pre-existing Contracts (Law No 11/2013 of 26 July), that 'the execution of contracts concluded prior to the entry into force of Law No 3/2004 of 29 December, from one year as from its publication in the Official State Gazette, will be subject to the provisions of said law.'

In the former case, the new late payment measures will not apply until 24 February 2014. In the latter case, these measures will not apply until 27 July 2014.

In view of the above:

Has the Commission concluded the legal analysis of the transposition of Directive 2011/7/EU in Spain?

Has it observed the *vacatio legis* which occurs in the first of the transitory provisions set forth here, as well as its incongruity with the second transitory provision?

Question for written answer E-000429/14
to the Commission
Ramon Tremosa i Balcells (ALDE)
(17 January 2014)

Subject: Directive 2011/7/EU on late payments

The answer given by Mr Tajani on behalf of the Commission to written questions E-003999/2013 and E-004000/2013 was as follows: 'As regards the Spanish transposition measure, Spain has implemented Directive 2011/7/EU by Royal Decree Law No 4/2013, which was notified on 22 February 2013. The Commission will closely monitor the correct implementation of the directive at national level through the late payment expert group that will be called for its third meeting in the following months. The Commission also supports correct implementation through the Late Payment Information Campaign that has been running since October 2012 in all EU countries'.

Catalan pharmacies are continuing to suffer delays in receipt of payments for medicines dispensed through public funds. As of 5 January 2014, the outstanding amount for payments for October and November of 2013 was 226 000 million euros. It seems that there are no delays in pharmacies receiving payments in other Spanish autonomous communities, unlike in Catalonia.

Funding mechanisms set up by the Government of Spain, such as the Supplier Payment Scheme and the Regional Liquidity Fund, are proving ineffective in preventing the late payments endured by Catalan pharmacies.

Catalonia is 85% financed by direct transfers from the Spanish Government, because only the central government has powers to collect money from the main taxes.

In view of the above:

Does the Commission believe that the late payments endured by Catalan pharmacies is in keeping with the spirit of the directive and its transposition in the Kingdom of Spain?

What mechanisms is the Commission intending to propose to the Government of Spain to ensure compliance with the regulation on late payments?

Joint answer given by Mr Tajani on behalf of the Commission
(12 March 2014)

In the case of Spain, the Commission has now completed the legal analysis of the Spanish transposition measure. The transposition law of the directive contains some ambiguities that need to be addressed by the Spanish authorities. For instance, the Commission has noted the problem concerning the *vacatio legis*. Therefore, the Commission is currently in contact with the Spanish authorities in order to clarify these issues.

The payment delay in relation to Catalan pharmacies in Spain has not been brought to the Commission's attention. Nevertheless, if the Catalan pharmacies are subjected to payment delays from the public authorities which exceed 60 days (cf. art. 4 of the directive), such a practice is not compatible with the directive. As a general rule, contraventions of national legislation normally ought to be resolved before the national courts. Therefore, appropriate redress should be sought by securing the proper application of the national implementing legislation.

(Versione italiana)

Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-000436/14
alla Commissione
Sergio Paolo Francesco Silvestris (PPE)
(17 gennaio 2014)

Oggetto: Mercato dell'auto

Dati recenti dell'ACEA, l'Associazione europea dell'industria automobilistica, confermano un calo delle vendite di auto in Europa dell'1,8 % rispetto al 2012, per un totale di circa 12 milioni in meno di nuovi autoveicoli immatricolati. Si tratta del sesto calo consecutivo.

Inoltre, la stessa ACEA si è mostrata piuttosto scettica sui negoziati sul libero scambio con il Giappone, discussi in occasione del 21esimo summit UE-Giappone, temendo un'eccessiva deregolamentazione dell'accesso di autovetture giapponesi al mercato europeo a scapito dei produttori europei.

Alla luce di ciò, può la Commissione rispondere ai seguenti quesiti:

1. può presentare dei dati di lungo periodo relativamente al trend del mercato automobilistico europeo, con particolare riguardo rispetto alle performance di vendita dei maggiori produttori europei?

2. Può chiarire se non ritiene che i recenti accordi commerciali col Giappone non debbano essere rivisti, in quanto troppo penalizzanti per l'industria europea dell'automobile?

Risposta di Antonio Tajani a nome della Commissione
(12 marzo 2014)

Le vendite (immatricolazioni) di automobili e di veicoli commerciali leggeri hanno registrato un lieve aumento nell'UE nel 2013 su base annuale arrivando a 13,95 milioni di veicoli; ciò corrisponde a un aumento dello 0,8 % rispetto al 2012.

In effetti, mentre l'attività del settore aveva subito un deterioramento nel primo semestre del 2013 rispetto allo stesso periodo del 2012, tale tendenza ha registrato un'inversione. Il 2013 si è concluso con un aumento medio delle vendite del 4,1 % nell'ultimo semestre rispetto allo stesso periodo del 2012, con cifre particolarmente positive a dicembre (aumento più marcato dal 2009). L'anno ha registrato pertanto una tendenza positiva che dovrebbe perdurare.

Secondo le previsioni ([1]), il 2014 e il 2015 dovrebbero segnare un giro di boa sia per quanto concerne la produzione che le vendite, e ci si attende una ripresa. Per la produzione si prevede un aumento medio del 4 % all'anno fino al 2015 (nel 2013 la produzione aveva raggiunto 15,65 milioni di automobili e furgoni). Per quanto concerne le vendite nell'UE, le previsioni indicano una ripresa progressiva nel corso del 2014 rispetto al 2013, e la tendenza dovrebbe consolidarsi nel 2015 e negli anni successivi.

Gli introiti netti delle grandi società automobilistiche europee sono rimasti essenzialmente positivi dal 2010 al 2012, in particolare grazie ai buoni risultati delle vendite di veicoli in paesi extra UE (crescita media annua del 16 %).

I negoziati di un accordo commerciale con il Giappone sono stati avviati nel marzo 2013 e si è tenuto pienamente conto delle esigenze dell'industria automobilistica nella fase di definizione e nel mandato. Il settore è al centro degli sforzi di negoziazione della Commissione, soprattutto per quanto concerne la risoluzione degli ostacoli non tariffari agli scambi con il Giappone. Tale attenzione verrà mantenuta nelle prossime fasi dei negoziati.

([1]) Le previsioni citate si basano sui dati forniti, su base contrattuale, dagli analisti di IHS Automotive.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-000436/14
to the Commission
Sergio Paolo Francesco Silvestris (PPE)
(17 January 2014)

Subject: Automobile market

Recent figures from the ACEA, the European Automobile Manufacturers Association, confirm a fall in car sales in Europe of 1.8% compared with 2012, representing a total of approximately 12 million fewer new vehicles registered. This is the sixth consecutive fall.

The ACEA has also expressed some scepticism with regard to free trade negotiations with Japan, discussed at the 21st EU-Japan Summit, fearing excessive deregulation of the access of Japanese cars to the European market to the detriment of European producers.

In the light of the above, can the Commission respond to the following questions:

1. Can the Commission present long-term data on trends in the European car market, with particular reference to the sales performance of leading European producers?

2. Can the Commission clarify whether or not it considers that recent trade agreements with Japan should be reviewed on the grounds that they penalise the European motor industry excessively?

Answer given by Mr Tajani on behalf of the Commission
(12 March 2014)

The sales (registrations) of passenger cars and light commercial vehicles have seen a very slight increase in the EU in 2013 on a year to year basis to 13.95 million vehicles; this means an increase of 0.8% compared to 2012.

In fact, while the activity in the sector has deteriorated in the first half of 2013 compared to the same period in 2012, this trend was then reversed. 2013 concluded with an average growth in sales of 4.1% over its last 6 months compared to the same period in 2012, with particularly positive December figures (steepest growth since 2009). The year has therefore showed a positive trend that is expected to be sustained.

According to the forecasts ([1]), 2014 and 2015 would mark a turning point both in production and sales, and a recovery is expected. For production there is a forecast of a 4% average increase per year until 2015 (production in 2013 topped 15.65 million of cars and vans). For sales in the EU, the forecast is for a progressive recovery during 2014 compared to 2013, and the trend is expected to be consolidated in 2015 and in the following years.

The net group revenues of the large European automotive groups have remained largely positive from 2010 to 2012, notably considering the good results of sales of vehicles in non-EU countries (growth of 16% on average year on year).

The negotiations for a trade agreement with Japan were launched in March 2013 and the needs of the automotive industry have been taken into full consideration in the scoping exercise and in the mandate. The sector is central in the negotiation efforts of the Commission, especially as regards the resolution of non-tariff barriers to trade with Japan. This attention will be maintained in the next phases of the negotiations.

([1]) The forecasts referred are based on data provided contractually by analysts of IHS Automotive.

(Versione italiana)

Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-000437/14
alla Commissione
Sergio Paolo Francesco Silvestris (PPE)
(17 gennaio 2014)

Oggetto: Sito archeologico di Herdonia

Nel corso di oltre quarant' anni, gli scavi della città di epoca romana di Herdonia (attuale Ordona), nella provincia di Foggia, hanno portato a un parco archeologico di circa 4 ettari che, unito agli scavi complementari adiacenti, copre una superficie totale di oltre m^2 5000.

Per oltre dieci anni gli scavi sono stati interrotti a causa di un contenzioso tra la Soprintendenza regionale e i privati possessori dei terreni interessati, con conseguente abbandono del sito e degrado di una parte importante della storia del territorio. Tuttavia, di recente la Soprintendenza regionale ai beni archeologici ha avuto la meglio, è riuscita ad acquisire parte della superficie sulla quale si estende l'area archeologica e si è detta pronta e riprendere i lavori.

A tal proposito, può la Commissione chiarire se:

1. esistono metodi di finanziamento per favorire il rapido recupero dell'area dal degrado dovuto al prolungato abbandono;

2. esistono fondi per sponsorizzare il turismo culturale nell'area, anche alla luce degli obiettivi di accrescimento dell'attrattività regionale nel contesto del progetto della Macroregione adriatico-ionica?

Risposta di Johannes Hahn a nome della Commissione
(14 marzo 2014)

I progetti cui fa riferimento l'Onorevole deputato potrebbero essere ammissibili a un sostegno finanziario dei Fondi strutturali per il periodo 2007-2013. Il programma regionale per la Puglia, cofinanziato dal Fondo europeo di sviluppo regionale, prevede uno stanziamento di 59 milioni di euro nell'ambito della priorità «Risorse culturali e naturali» per la protezione e lo sviluppo del patrimonio culturale. Inoltre, la priorità «Competitività e attrattiva delle aree urbane» nello stesso programma comprende uno stanziamento di 260 milioni di euro per progetti integrati di rigenerazione urbana e rurale.
In linea con il principio di gestione concorrente applicato all'amministrazione della politica di coesione, la selezione dei progetti e la loro attuazione rientrano nella responsabilità delle autorità nazionali. Pertanto, la Commissione suggerisce all'Onorevole deputato di mettersi direttamente in contatto con l'autorità di gestione del programma per la Puglia:

Autorità di Gestione POR Puglia:
Viale Japigia, n. 145
70126 BARI
adgfesr@regione.puglia.it

Un'altra fonte potenziale di finanziamento potrebbe provenire dagli inviti annuali a presentare proposte ([1]) per sostenere lo sviluppo del turismo transnazionale in relazione al patrimonio culturale e industriale europeo.

([1]) http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/sectors/tourism/contracts-grants/calls-for-proposals/index_en.htm

(English version)

Question for written answer E-000437/14
to the Commission
Sergio Paolo Francesco Silvestris (PPE)
(17 January 2014)

Subject: Archaeological site at Herdonia

For more than forty years, excavations of the Roman city of Herdonia (now called Ordona), in the Province of Foggia, have created an archaeological site extending to approximately 4 hectares which, taking into account additional adjacent excavations, covers an overall area of over 5 000 m^2.

For more than 10 years, excavations have been suspended due to a dispute between the competent regional authority and the private landowners concerned, resulting in the abandonment of the site and the deterioration of an important part of our heritage. However, the matter was recently resolved in favour of the Regional Archaeological Heritage Authority which has enabled it to acquire part of the archaeological site. It has now declared itself ready to resume the works.

In view of the above, can the Commission clarify whether:

1. sources of funding exist to facilitate the rapid regeneration of the area, which has deteriorated as a result of prolonged abandonment;

2. funding exists to promote cultural tourism in this area in the light of the objective to increase the number of visitors attracted to the Region under the Adriatic/Ionian macro-region project?

Answer given by Mr Hahn on behalf of the Commission
(14 March 2014)

The projects referred to by the Honourable Member could be eligible for financial support from the Structural Funds for the 2007-2013 period. The regional programme for Puglia, co-financed by the European Regional Development Fund, provides an allocation of EUR 59 million under the 'cultural and natural resources' priority for the protection and development of cultural heritage. In addition, the 'Competitiveness and attractiveness of urban areas' priority in the same programme includes an allocation of EUR 260 million for integrated projects for urban and rural regeneration.

In line with the shared management principle used for the administration of cohesion policy, project selection and implementation is the responsibility of the national authorities. Therefore the Commission suggests that the Honourable Member contact directly the managing authority of the Puglia programme:

Autorità di Gestione POR Puglia:
Viale Japigia, n. 145
70126 BARI
adgfesr@regione.puglia.it

Another potential source of funding could come from the annual calls for proposals ([1]) to support the development of transnational tourism related to European cultural and industrial heritage.

([1]) http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/sectors/tourism/contracts-grants/calls-for-proposals/index_en.htm

(Versione italiana)

Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-000440/14
alla Commissione (Vicepresidente/Alto Rappresentante)
Pino Arlacchi (S&D)
(17 gennaio 2014)

Oggetto: VP/HR — Strategia dell'UE nei confronti dei paesi del partenariato orientale

I recenti sviluppi nei paesi del partenariato orientale europeo hanno dimostrato il fallimento della politica dell'UE nei loro confronti. Si può infatti affermare che la maggiore carenza della nostra politica orientale è di aver seguito passivamente la strategia degli Stati Uniti nella regione, con il suo profilo antirusso e basato sullo scontro delle civiltà. Le politiche euroamericane sono state inoltre caratterizzate da altri errori. Prima di tutto, vi era il pretesto di esportare qualcosa, ovvero la democrazia del libero mercato, che non può essere esportata poiché, se da un lato è già potenzialmente presente ovunque a causa della sua universalità, dall'altro necessita di un proprio tempo e di propri strumenti per svilupparsi e instaurarsi.

In secondo luogo, l'UE ha dato il proprio sostegno e la propria fiducia a forze locali interessate solo in apparenza ai valori e alle istituzioni occidentali, ma che in realtà desideravano potere e denaro ed erano pronte a cambiare parte e utilizzare l'ultranazionalismo e lo sciovinismo per rimanere a galla.

Molti osservatori ritengono che, al fine di promuovere una cooperazione proficua con i paesi del partenariato orientale, l'UE e gli Stati Uniti avrebbero dovuto adottare un approccio totalmente diverso nei confronti della Russia e dell'Iran, le due forze più influenti della regione.

Alla luce dei recenti eventi e a seguito del vertice di Vilnius:

1. Quali misure intende adottare l'UE per modificare e rilanciare le sue relazioni con i paesi del partenariato orientale?

2. Ritiene l'Alto Rappresentante che l'UE debba imparare dagli errori del passato e discostare le sue politiche da quelle degli Stati Uniti abbandonando l'approccio da Guerra fredda e segnando un'inversione di rotta verso la cooperazione e la pace?

Risposta dell'Alta Rappresentante/Vicepresidente Catherine Ashton a nome della Commissione
(14 marzo 2014)

Il partenariato orientale è un'iniziativa congiunta fra l'UE, i suoi Stati membri e 6 partner, basata sull'impegno comune nei confronti del diritto internazionale, dei valori e delle libertà fondamentali, dell'economia di mercato, dello sviluppo sostenibile e della buona governance, che contribuisce a rafforzare la democrazia, la stabilità e la sicurezza sul continente, a migliorare la competitività dell'Europa e a creare economie moderne e sostenibili. Il partenariato orientale non è diretto contro la Russia né mira a contrastare i suoi interessi nella regione. Il partenariato orientale non si basa né su una rivalità geopolitica né su un gioco a somma zero.

Nonostante la mancata firma dell'AA/DCFTA con l'Ucraina, il vertice di Vilnius è stato produttivo, perché ha segnato una tappa importante nello sviluppo e nei progressi del partenariato orientale e delle relazioni dell'UE con i 6 partner. La prima serie di obiettivi è stata realizzata. I 6 partner erano presenti al vertice e hanno confermato il proprio impegno nei confronti del partenariato orientale. Dal canto suo, l'UE ha ribadito che le pressioni esterne sulle scelte politiche sono inaccettabili: occorre trovare un'intesa con la Russia per evitare di abbandonarsi a futili rivalità geopolitiche.

Non è necessario rilanciare la politica relativa al partenariato orientale, ma si stanno valutando gli insegnamenti tratti per farlo progredire in modo più efficace tenendo conto della situazione dei singoli paesi partner. Sarà fondamentale introdurre una maggiore differenziazione nelle relazioni bilaterali pur mantenendo la natura inclusiva del partenariato.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-000440/14
to the Commission (Vice-President/High Representative)
Pino Arlacchi (S&D)
(17 January 2014)

Subject: VP/HR — EU strategy vis-à-vis the Eastern Partnership Countries

The recent developments in European Eastern Partnership countries have shown the failure of EU policy towards them. It could in fact be said that the major flaw of our eastern policy is that it passively follows the US strategy in the region, and its anti-Russian and clash of civilization profile. Euro-American policies are also characterised by other mistakes. First, there was the pretence of exporting something — free-market democracy — which cannot be exported because, while on the one hand it is already potentially present everywhere, since it is universal, on the other it needs its own timeframe and its own tools to develop and establish itself.

Secondly, the EU gave its support and trust to local forces that were interested in the values and institutions of the West in appearance only, but were actually only craving power and money, and were ready to change sides and use ultra-nationalism and chauvinism to keep afloat.

Many observers believe that, in order to promote successful cooperation with the EaP countries, the EU and the US should have adopted a totally different attitude towards Russia and Iran, the two major regional powers.

Given the latest events, and following the Vilnius summit:

1. what measures is the EU planning to take in order to change and relaunch its relationship with the Eastern Partnership countries?

2. does the High Representative believe that the EU should learn from past mistakes and detach its policies from those of the US by abandoning the Cold War approach and making a U-turn towards cooperation and peace?

Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission
(14 March 2014)

The Eastern Partnership (EaP) is a commonly agreed joint initiative between the EU, member states and the 6 partners, underpinned by a shared commitment to international law, fundamental values and freedoms, the market economy, sustainable development and good governance, and contributing to enhancing democracy, stability, security on the continent, strengthening Europe's competitiveness and creating sustainable, modern economies. The EaP is not directed against Russia or aimed at countering Russian interest in the region. The EaP is not based on geopolitical rivalry or a zero sum game.

The EaP Vilnius Summit was productive despite the non-signature of the AA/DCFTA with Ukraine. It was an important step in the development and advancement of the EaP and the EU's relations with the 6 partners. The first set of deliverables was attained. All 6 partners attended and reiterated their commitment to the EaP.The EU reiterated that external pressures on policy choices are unacceptable, a common understanding with Russia is necessary to avoid being drawn into a mentality of futile geopolitical rivalry.

A re-launch of the EaP policy is not necessary. However, an assessment of lessons learnt is underway to help the EaP advance more effectively taking into account the situation on the ground in partner countries. Greater differentiation in bilateral relations whilst maintaining the inclusive nature of the partnership will be key.

(Versiunea în limba română)

Întrebarea cu solicitare de răspuns scris E-000444/14
adresată Comisiei
Daciana Octavia Sârbu (S&D)
(17 ianuarie 2014)

Subiect: Tendințele alimentare

Obiceiurile alimentare au un impact direct asupra sănătății, a utilizării terenurilor și a mediului. Prin influențarea tendințelor alimentare se poate, prin urmare, acționa la nivelul tuturor acestor aspecte interconectate.

Unele studii recente indică faptul că creșterea economică și globalizarea au un efect limitat în ceea ce privește convergența obiceiurilor alimentare și că politicile publice pot influența într-o foarte mare măsură alegerile în materie de alimentație ([1]).

Există exemple, în afara normelor referitoare la etichetarea produselor alimentare și a Programului de încurajare a consumului de fructe în școli, de inițiative luate la nivelul întregii Uniuni care ar putea influența alegerile alimentare ale consumatorilor și aduce beneficiile corespunzătoare la nivelul sănătății și al mediului?

Răspuns dat de dl Borg în numele Comisiei
(10 martie 2014)

Strategia pentru Europa privind problemele de sănătate legate de alimentație, excesul de greutate și obezitate ([2]) din 2007 promovează o alimentație echilibrată și un stil de viață activ pentru toți cetățenii. Strategia încurajează parteneriatele orientate pe acțiune care implică statele membre (Grupul la nivel înalt în materie de alimentație și activitate fizică ([3])) și societatea civilă (Platforma UE privind regimul alimentar, activitatea fizică și sănătatea ([4])).

Grupul la nivel înalt a creat un plan de acțiune coordonat de statele membre pentru combaterea obezității infantile (2014-2020) care urmărește să abordeze, printre altele, promovarea consumului de fructe și legume, precum și disponibilitatea unor produse sănătoase.

Comisia a lansat trei proiecte-pilot ([5]): două dintre acestea urmăresc creșterea consumului de fructe și legume proaspete în comunitățile în care venitul gospodăriilor este sub 50% din media UE, în timp ce unul dintre proiecte urmărește promovarea unei alimentații sănătoase în rândul copiilor, femeilor însărcinate și persoanelor în vârstă.

În plus, proiectul „LiveWell for LIFE" ([6]) abordează legăturile dintre sănătate, alimentație, emisiile de carbon și accesibilitatea prețurilor. Acest proiect subliniază faptul că un regim alimentar sănătos, cu emisii scăzute de carbon, poate reduce emisiile de gaze cu efect de seră ale lanțului de aprovizionare cu alimente din UE. De asemenea, acesta a identificat oportunități și piedici sociale și economice esențiale în ceea ce privește adoptarea unor regimuri alimentare durabile.

Pentru a contribui la inversarea tendinței de scădere a consumului de fructe, legume și produse lactate și pentru a oferi, de asemenea, o alternativă la creșterea consumului de alimente prelucrate cu un conținut ridicat de zaharuri, sare și grăsimi adăugate, Comisia a adoptat în luna ianuarie o propunere ([7]) privind o nouă schemă de ajutoare a UE referitoare la distribuirea anumitor produse agricole către copiii din instituțiile de învățământ.

În cadrul PC7 ([8]), diferite proiecte au examinat factorii determinanți în ceea ce privește alegerea alimentelor, comportamentul alimentar și preferințele consumatorilor (de exemplu, e.g. I.Family ([9]), CLYMBOL ([10]), EATWELL ([11])). În cadrul inițiativei „Orizont 2020" vor exista oportunități de finanțare viitoare.

([1]) http://www.odi.org.uk/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications-opinion-files/8776.pdf
([2]) COM(2007) 279.
([3]) http://ec.europa.eu/health/nutrition_physical_activity/high_level_group/index_ro.htm
([4]) http://ec.europa.eu/health/nutrition_physical_activity/platform/index_ro.htm
([5]) SANCO/2011/C4/01, SANCO/2012/C4/02 și SANCO/2013/C4/02.
([6]) http://livewellforlife.eu/, finanțat de programul LIFE al DG ENV.
([7]) COM(2014) 32 din 30 ianuarie 2014.
([8]) Al șaptelea program-cadru pentru activități de cercetare, de dezvoltare tehnologică și demonstrative (PC7, 2007-2013);http://cordis.europa.eu/fp7/home_en.html
([9]) Determinanții comportamentului alimentar al copiilor și adolescenților europeni și al părinților acestora; http://www.ifamilystudy.eu/
([10]) Rolul mențiunilor de sănătate și al simbolurilor de sănătate în ceea ce privește comportamentul consumatorilor; http://www.clymbol.eu/
([11]) Intervenții pentru promovarea obiceiurilor alimentare sănătoase; www.eatwellprojecteu.eu

(English version)

Question for written answer E-000444/14
to the Commission
Daciana Octavia Sârbu (S&D)
(17 January 2014)

Subject: Dietary trends

Diets have a direct impact on health, land use and the environment. Influencing dietary trends therefore has the potential to address these interlinked issues.

Recent research suggests that growth and globalisation have a limited effect on the convergence of diets and that there is considerable scope for public policy to influence dietary choices ([1]).

Other than food labelling regulations and the School Fruits Scheme, are there any examples of EU-wide policy initiatives which could influence consumers' choice of diet and bring the associated environmental and health benefits?

Answer given by Mr Borg on behalf of the Commission
(10 March 2014)

The 2007 Strategy for Europe on Nutrition, Overweight and Obesity-related Health Issues ([2]) promotes a balanced diet and active lifestyles for all. The strategy encourages action oriented partnerships involving the Member States (High Level Group for Nutrition and Physical Activity ([3])) and civil society (EU Platform for Action on Diet, Physical Activity and Health ([4])).

The High Level Group has shaped a MS-led Action Plan to tackle childhood obesity (2014-2020) which seeks to address, among others, the promotion of the consumption of fruit and vegetables and the availability of healthy foods.

The Commission has launched three pilot projects ([5]): two aim to increase consumption of fresh fruits and vegetables in communities where the household income is below 50% of the EU average; one aims to promote healthy diets among children, pregnant women and elderly.

In addition, the LiveWell for LIFE project ([6]) looks at links between health, nutrition, carbon and affordability. It notes that low carbon, healthy diets can reduce greenhouse gas emissions from the EU food supply chain. It has also identified the key social and economic opportunities and barriers for adopting sustainable diets.

To help reverse the declining consumption of fruit, vegetables and milk products and also provide an alternative to the increasing consumption of processed foods high in added sugars, salt and fat, the Commission adopted a proposal on January ([7]) for a new EU scheme for financing the supply of selected agricultural products to children in educational establishments.

Under FP7 ([8]), various projects researched the determinants of food choice, behaviour and consumer preference (e.g. I.Family ([9]), CLYMBOL ([10]), EATWELL ([11])). Future funding opportunities will exist under Horizon 2020.

([1]) http://www.odi.org.uk/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications-opinion-files/8776.pdf
([2]) COM(2007) 279.
([3]) http://ec.europa.eu/health/nutrition_physical_activity/high_level_group/index_en.htm
([4]) http://ec.europa.eu/health/nutrition_physical_activity/platform/index_en.htm
([5]) SANCO/2011/C4/01, SANCO/2012/C4/02 and SANCO/2013/C4/02.
([6]) http://livewellforlife.eu/ funded by DG ENV's LIFE programme.
([7]) COM(2014) 32 from 30 January 2014.
([8]) Seventh Framework Programme for Research, Technological Development and Demonstration Activities (FP7, 2007-2013); http://cordis.europa.eu/fp7/home_en.html
([9]) Determinants of eating behaviour in European children, adolescents and their parents; http://www.ifamilystudy.eu/
([10]) Role of health-related claims and symbols in consumer behaviour; http://www.clymbol.eu/
([11]) Interventions to promote Healthy Eating Habits; www.eatwellprojecteu.eu

(Versión española)

Pregunta con solicitud de respuesta escrita E-000448/14
a la Comisión
Iñaki Irazabalbeitia Fernández (Verts/ALE), Ramon Tremosa i Balcells (ALDE) y Salvador Sedó i Alabart (PPE)
(20 de enero de 2014)

Asunto: Homenaje a miembro de la División Azul

La página web del Ministerio de Defensa del Reino de España informa de que, el pasado 17 de diciembre, el jefe de las Fuerzas Pesadas, General Alcañiz, y el presidente de la Hermandad de Veteranos de Burgos acudieron al domicilio del teniente de infantería Germán Pérez Casado con el fin de entregar el presente conmemorativo al soldado más veterano de la provincia de Burgos ([1]).

En dicha web se destaca que el teniente Pérez Casado, que realizó toda su carrera militar durante la dictadura franquista, fue en la segunda Guerra Mundial componente de la unidad de 18 000 voluntarios españoles de la «250 Infanterie-Division» de la Wehrmacht, más conocida como División Azul ([2]).

¿Conoce la Comisión los hechos?

¿Considera la Comisión que estos hechos están en consonancia con los valores y las políticas señaladas por la Comisaria Reding en su respuesta a la pregunta E-005756/2013?

¿Cree la Comisión que el Gobierno del Reino de España está aplicando políticas eficaces para evitar y, si es el caso, perseguir comportamientos y hechos como el descrito?

Respuesta de la Sra. Reding en nombre de la Comisión
(18 de marzo de 2014)

La Comisión remite a Su Señoría a su respuesta a la pregunta E-013527/2013. Corresponde a los Estados miembros y a las autoridades nacionales garantizar la aplicación de la Decisión marco. La Comisión iniciará diálogos bilaterales con los Estados miembros durante 2014, con el fin de garantizar la incorporación íntegra y correcta de la legislación al Derecho nacional.

([1]) http://www.ejercito.mde.es/noticias/2013/12/2922.html
([2]) http://es.wikipedia.org/wiki/Divisi%C3 %B3n_Azul

(English version)

Question for written answer E-000448/14
to the Commission
Iñaki Irazabalbeitia Fernández (Verts/ALE), Ramon Tremosa i Balcells (ALDE) and Salvador Sedó i Alabart (PPE)
(20 January 2014)

Subject: Tribute to member of the Blue Division

The website of the Spanish Ministry of Defence states that, on 17 December last year, the head of the Heavy Forces, General Alcañiz, and the president of the Burgos Brotherhood of Veterans visited the home of infantry lieutenant Germán Pérez Casado to award a commemorative gift to the oldest veteran of Burgos Province ([1]).

This website further notes that during the Second World War, Lieutenant Pérez Casado, whose military career was pursued entirely under the Franco dictatorship, formed part of a unit of 18 000 Spanish volunteers who served in the '250 Infantry Division' of the Wehrmacht, better known as the Blue Division ([2]).

Is the Commission aware of these facts?

Does the Commission consider that these are consistent with the values and policies outlined by Commissioner Reding in her response to Question E-005756/2013?

Does the Commission believe that the Government of Spain is implementing effective policies to avoid and, where appropriate, prosecute conduct and actions such as that described?

Answer given by Mrs Reding on behalf of the Commission
(18 March 2014)

The Commission would like to refer the Honourable Member to the answer of Question E-013527/2013. It is up to Member States and national authorities to ensure implementation of the framework decision. The Commission will enter into bilateral dialogues with Member States in the course of 2014, with a view to ensuring full and correct transposition of the legislation into national law.

([1]) http://www.ejercito.mde.es/noticias/2013/12/2922.html
([2]) http://es.wikipedia.org/wiki/Divisi%C3%B3n_Azul

(Deutsche Fassung)

Anfrage zur schriftlichen Beantwortung E-000455/14
an die Kommission
Angelika Werthmann (ALDE)
(20. Januar 2014)

Betrifft: Antibiotika in Futtermitteln

Der Zusatz von Antibiotika zu Futtermitteln ist eine gängige Methode zur Wachstumsförderung bei der Aufzucht gesunder Tiere. Die zu häufige Verwendung dieses Medikaments ist aus gesundheitlichen Gründen äußerst bedenklich. Die EU hat bereits 2006 ein Verbot für diverse antibiotische Futtermittelzusätze erlassen.

1. Warum gibt es noch immer antibiotische Futtermittelzusätze, welche in den Mitgliedstaaten der EU zugelassen sind? Wie kann sichergestellt werden, dass diese Zusätze weder der Gesundheit des Tieres noch der Menschen schaden?

2. Was weiß die Kommission über den illegalen Antibiotikazusatz in Futtermitteln, und wie gedenkt sie dagegen vorzugehen?

Antwort von Tonio Borg im Namen der Kommission
(14. März 2014)

Antibiotika, die keine Kokzidiostatika oder Histomonostatika sind, dürfen seit dem 1. Januar 2006 in der Europäischen Union nicht mehr als Futtermittelzusatzstoffe in der Tierernährung verwendet werden ([1]). Rechtmäßig dürfen Antibiotika über das Futter daher nur zur Behandlung eines kranken Tieres verabreicht werden. Dazu muss es sich bei dem Antibiotikum um ein zugelassenes Tierarzneimittel zur oralen Verwendung handeln und es muss dem Tier auf tierärztliche Verschreibung verabreicht werden.

Seit 2003 empfiehlt die Kommission den zuständigen Behörden der Mitgliedstaaten, im Rahmen ihrer koordinierten Kontrollprogramme auch die Einhaltung des Verbots der Verwendung von Antibiotika als Futtermittelzusatzstoffe zu kontrollieren ([2]). Außerdem überprüft das Lebensmittel- und Veterinäramt der Generaldirektion Gesundheit und Verbraucher der Kommission, dass die Mitgliedstaaten das Verbot ordnungsgemäß durchsetzen. Beide Maßnahmen haben ergeben, dass das Verbot der Verwendung von Antibiotika als Futtermittelzusatzstoffe in der Union gut durchgesetzt wird.

([1]) Artikel 11 der Verordnung (EG) Nr. 1831/2003 (ABl. L 268 vom 18.10.2003, S. 29).
([2]) Empfehlung der Kommission vom 14. Dezember 2005 zum koordinierten Kontrollprogramm für das Jahr 2006 im Bereich der Futtermittel gemäß der Richtlinie 95/53/EG des Rates einzusehen unter: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/de/oj/2005/l_337/l_33720051222de00510059.pdf

(English version)

Question for written answer E-000455/14
to the Commission
Angelika Werthmann (ALDE)
(20 January 2014)

Subject: Antibiotics in animal feed

Adding antibiotics to animal feed is a common method of promoting growth in the rearing of healthy livestock. Overuse of these medicines is extremely alarming for health reasons. The EU previously banned a number of antibiotic additives to animal feed in 2006.

1. Why are some antibiotic additives to animal feed still permitted in EU Member States? How can it be ensured that these additives harm neither the health of the animals nor the health of humans?

2. What does the Commission know about the illegal addition of antibiotics to animal feed and how does it intend to combat it?

Answer given by Mr Borg on behalf of the Commission
(14 March 2014)

The use of the antibiotics, except coccidiostats and histomonostats, as feed additives in animal nutrition is forbidden in the European Union since 1st January 2006 ([1]). Consequently, the only legal administration of antibiotics via the feed is the therapeutic use to treat an animal disease. This requires that the antibiotic is an authorised veterinary medicine for oral use and that a veterinary prescription is issued for the treatment of the animals.

Since 2003 the Commission has recommended to the competent authorities of the Member States to include the control of the ban on the use of antibiotics as feed additives into their coordinated inspection programmes ([2]). Furthermore, the Food and Veterinary Office of the Commission's Health and Consumers Directorate General verifies that the ban is properly policed by the Member States. Both actions revealed that the ban of antibiotics as feed additives in the Union is well enforced.

([1]) Article 11 of Regulation (EC) No 1831/2003 (OJ L 268, 18.10.2003, p. 29).
([2]) COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION of 14 December 2005 on the coordinated inspection programme in the field of animal nutrition for the year 2006 in accordance with Council Directive 95/53/EC, available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/oj/2005/l_337/l_33720051222en00510059.pdf

(Ελληνική έκδοση)

Ερώτηση με αίτημα γραπτής απάντησης E-000457/14
προς την Επιτροπή
Nikolaos Chountis (GUE/NGL)
(20 Ιανουαρίου 2014)

Θέμα: Μεταλλαγμένο καλαμπόκι στην ΕΕ — Έκθεση CEO για ΕΑΑΤ

Η εκκρεμούσα από το 2001 αίτηση της εταιρίας DuPont Pioneer, για έγκριση καλλιέργειας του γενετικά τροποποιημένου καλαμποκιού «1507», έχει προκαλέσει ιδιαίτερες ανησυχίες στους Ευρωπαίους πολίτες.

Η θετική εισήγηση της Επιτροπής, σε αντιπαράθεση με την αρνητική γνωμοδότηση της Επιτροπής Περιβάλλοντος και Δημόσιας Υγείας και το ψήφισμα του Ευρωκοινοβουλίου της 16.1.2014 (P7_TA(2014)0036), δημιουργεί εύλογα ερωτηματικά, σχετικά με τη στάση της Επιτροπής απέναντι στους ΓΤΟ.

Οι ανησυχίες αυτές εντείνονται και από το γεγονός ότι πρόσφατα η Corporate Europe Observatory (CEO) έφερε στη δημοσιότητα στοιχεία, σύμφωνα με τα οποία, «Μετά από τη διαμάχη για τους στενούς δεσμούς της Ευρωπαϊκής Αρχής για την Ασφάλεια των Τροφίμων (ΕΑΑΤ) με τη βιομηχανία, ο οργανισμός έχει θέσει σε εφαρμογή μια νέα πολιτική για τη διασφάλιση της ανεξαρτησίας των επιστημονικών ομάδων του. Ωστόσο, οι σοβαρές συγκρούσεις συμφερόντων παραμένουν. Πάνω από τους μισούς από τους 209 επιστήμονες του οργανισμού διατηρούν άμεσους ή έμμεσους δεσμούς με τις βιομηχανίες που προορίζονται για τη ρύθμιση. Μια πολύ πιο σαφής και αυστηρότερη πολιτική ανεξαρτησία θα πρέπει να συσταθεί και να εφαρμοστεί αυστηρά ώστε να αποκατασταθεί η φήμη και η ακεραιότητα της Αρχής».

Ερωτάται η Επιτροπή:

Σε ποια στοιχεία στηρίχθηκε ώστε να εγκρίνει την καλλιέργεια του γενετικά τροποποιημένου καλαμποκιού «1507» στις χώρες της ΕΕ; Θεωρεί ότι με μία τέτοια απόφαση εξασφαλίζεται «υψηλού επιπέδου προστασία του περιβάλλοντος και της υγείας ανθρώπων και ζώων κατά των πιθανών κινδύνων που παρουσιάζουν οι ΓΤΟ και λαμβάνεται υπόψη η αρχή της προφύλαξης», σύμφωνα με την έκθεση 16882/08 του Συμβουλίου για τους ΓΤΟ;

Προτίθεται «να μην προτείνει την έγκριση νέας ποικιλίας ΓΤΟ και να μην ανανεώσει παλαιότερες έως ότου βελτιωθούν σημαντικά οι μέθοδοι αξιολόγησης κινδύνου», όπως ρητά ζητά το Ευρωκοινοβούλιο με το ψήφισμα P7_TA(2014)0036 της 16.1.2014;

Πώς σχολιάζει την έκθεση της CEO; Προτίθεται να λάβει μέτρα, και τι είδους, ώστε να αποκαταστήσει την αξιοπιστία της ΕΑΑΤ αλλά και της ίδιας της Επιτροπής στο θέμα της ασφάλειας τροφίμων;

Απάντηση του κ. Borg εξ ονόματος της Επιτροπής
(13 Μαρτίου 2014)

Η Επιτροπή υπέβαλε στο Συμβούλιο πρόταση απόφασης του Συμβουλίου για την έγκριση της καλλιέργειας του αραβοσίτου 1507, που βασίζεται σε 6 ευνοϊκές γνωμοδοτήσεις της Ευρωπαϊκής Αρχής για την Ασφάλεια των Τροφίμων (EFSA). Η Επιτροπή, ως διαχειριστής του κινδύνου, οφείλει να προτείνει στο Συμβούλιο την έκδοση απόφασης έγκρισης που να επιτυγχάνει το υψηλό επίπεδο προστασίας της υγείας του ανθρώπου, των ζώων και του περιβάλλοντος το οποίο απαιτείται από την οδηγία 2001/18/ΕΚ ([1]) και τη Συνθήκη.

Η EFSA εξέδωσε επικαιροποιημένο έγγραφο καθοδήγησης σχετικά με την εκτίμηση του περιβαλλοντικού κινδύνου των γενετικά τροποποιημένων φυτών το 2010, η οποία εφαρμόζεται στις αιτήσεις που υποβάλλονται μετά την εν λόγω ημερομηνία. Επί του παρόντος η Επιτροπή, σε στενή συνεργασία με την EFSA και τα κράτη μέλη, βρίσκεται στο στάδιο ενοποίησης της υφιστάμενης νομοθεσίας, λαμβάνοντας υπόψη του επικαιροποιημένου εγγράφου καθοδήγησης. Η Επιτροπή ζήτησε από την EFSA να επανεξετάσει διάφορες γνωμοδοτήσεις σχετικές με τις αιτήσεις καλλιέργειας που εγκρίθηκαν πριν από το 2010, προκειμένου να ληφθούν υπόψη οι πιο πρόσφατες επιστημονικές εξελίξεις.

Το αξιότιμο μέλος καλείται να ανατρέξει στις απαντήσεις που έδωσε η Επιτροπή στις γραπτές ερωτήσεις P-012838/2013 και E-014197/2013 οι οποίες αφορούν τις υποχρεώσεις της Ευρωπαϊκής Αρχής για την Ασφάλεια των Τροφίμων (EFSA) όσον αφορά την ανεξαρτησία και τις συγκρούσεις συμφερόντων και δηλώνουν ότι η Επιτροπή απορρίπτει τους ισχυρισμούς που διατυπώθηκαν στην έκθεση του Corporate Europe Observatory (CEO).

([1]) ΕΕ L 106 της 17.4.2001, σ. 1.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-000457/14
to the Commission
Nikolaos Chountis (GUE/NGL)
(20 January 2014)

Subject: Genetically modified maize in the EU — CEO report on the EFSA

The application by DuPont Pioneer for authorisation to grow genetically modified maize 1507, which has been pending since 2001, is a cause of particular concern to European citizens.

The Commission's positive recommendation contrasts with the negative opinion of the Committee on Environment, Public Health and Food Safety and the resolution adopted by the European Parliament on 16 January 2014 (P7_TA(2014)0036), giving rise to reasonable questions concerning its position on GMOs.

These concerns are exacerbated by a report published by the Corporate Europe Observatory (CEO), which states that, 'Following controversy over its close ties with industry, the [European Food Safety] Authority has implemented a new policy designed to ensure the independence of its scientific panels. Yet serious conflicts of interest remain. Over half of the 209 scientists sitting on the agency's panels have direct or indirect ties with the industries they are meant to regulate. A much clearer and stricter independence policy needs to be set up and rigorously implemented to restore the Authority's reputation and integrity'.

In view of the above, will the Commission say:

What data did it use as the basis for its decision to authorise the cultivation of genetically modified maize 1507 in the EU? Does it consider that such a decision safeguards the 'high level of protection of the environment, human and animal health with respect to potential risks of GMOs and taking into account the precautionary principle', referred to in the Council conclusions on GMOs (16882/08)?

Does it intend 'not to propose to authorise any new GMO variety and not to renew old ones until the risk assessment methods have been significantly improved', as expressly demanded by the European Parliament in resolution P7_TA(2014)0036 adopted on 16 January 2014?

What are its comments on the CEO report? Does it intend to take measures and, if so, what sort of measures, in order to restore the credibility of both the EFSA and the Commission on the issue of food safety?

Answer given by Mr Borg on behalf of the Commission
(13 March 2014)

The Commission has submitted to the Council a proposal for a Council Decision on the authorisation for cultivation of 1507 maize that is based on 6 favourable European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) opinions. It is the duty of the Commission as risk manager to propose to the Council a decision of authorisation which achieves the high level of protection of human and animal health and the environment required by the directive 2001/18/EC ([1]) and the Treaty.

EFSA published an updated guidance on the Environmental Risk Assessment of genetically modified plants in 2010 which applies to applications submitted after this date. The Commission, in close collaboration with EFSA and Member States, is currently working on the consolidation of the existing legislation taking into consideration the updated guidance. The Commission has asked EFSA to review several opinions for cultivation applications that were adopted prior to 2010 to take into account the latest scientific developments.

The Honourable Member is invited to refer to the Commission's replies to Written Questions P- 012838/2013 and E-014197/2013 dealing with the obligations of the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) with respect to independence and conflicts of interest and stating that the Commission rejects the allegations made in the report of Corporate Europe Observatory (CEO).

([1]) OJ L 106, 17.4.2001, p. 1.

(Ελληνική έκδοση)

Ερώτηση με αίτημα γραπτής απάντησης E-000458/14
προς την Επιτροπή
Nikolaos Chountis (GUE/NGL)
(20 Ιανουαρίου 2014)

Θέμα: Προσωρινή σύμβαση ανάθεσης του έργου «Ολοκληρωμένη Διαχείριση Αποβλήτων Περιφέρειας Πελοποννήσου»

Στην Οδηγία 2008/98/ΕΚ του Ευρωπαϊκού Κοινοβουλίου και του Συμβουλίου, της 19ης Νοεμβρίου 2008, «για τα απόβλητα και την κατάργηση ορισμένων οδηγιών», τίθενται αυστηρές απαιτήσεις ώστε να επιτευχθούν προκαθορισμένοι στόχοι μείωσης των παραγόμενων αποβλήτων. Τα κράτη μέλη ήταν υποχρεωμένα να εκπονήσουν «Σχέδια Πρόληψης παραγωγής αποβλήτων» μέχρι τις 12.12.2013 και να τα ενσωματώσουν στις πολιτικές τους. (Μέχρι σήμερα η Ελλάδα δεν έχει θεσμοθετήσει ανάλογο σχέδιο).

Ο Οδικός Χάρτης για την αποδοτικότητα των πόρων (COM(2011)0571 EC2011A), ο οποίος θέτει ως στόχο την μετατροπή της οικονομίας της ΕΕ σε μια βιώσιμη οικονομία μέχρι το 2050, αποσκοπεί στην ουσιαστική μείωση της δημιουργίας αποβλήτων. Θέτει στόχους/ορόσημα έως το 2020, όπου ανάμεσα στα άλλα περιλαμβάνεται η κατά κεφαλήν μείωση την παραγωγής αποβλήτων και η οριστική κατάργηση της υγειονομικής ταφής.

Παράλληλα, η Ευρωπαϊκή Ένωση χρηματοδοτεί σειρά προγραμμάτων στην κατεύθυνση της πρόληψης παραγωγής αποβλήτων (ενδεικτική αναφορά LIFE «Πληρώνω όσο πετάω», LIFE «Υποστήριξη της πρόληψης αποβλήτων στην τοπική αυτοδιοίκηση», «Χαμηλό κόστος». Δήμοι με μηδενική παραγωγή αποβλήτων» κ.ά.). Όμως στην Περιφέρεια Πελοποννήσου υπεγράφη η προσωρινή σύμβαση ανάθεσης του έργου «Ολοκληρωμένη διαχείριση αποβλήτων περιφέρειας Πελοποννήσου με ΣΔΙΤ» και, ανάμεσα στα άλλα, προβλέπει την παροχή στην ανάδοχο εταιρεία εγγυημένης ποσότητας 150 000 τόνων απορριμμάτων/έτος για 28 χρόνια, από τους Δήμους της Περιφέρειας, γεγονός το οποίο καταστρατηγεί την ουσία της ευρωπαϊκής πολιτικής για την μείωση των παραγόμενων αποβλήτων, αφού παραβιάζει την οδηγία 2008/98/ΕΚ.

Ερωτάται η Επιτροπή:

1. Τι προβλέπει η σύμβαση ΟΕΔΑ Πελοποννήσου σε περίπτωση που επιτευχθούν οι στόχοι για μείωση των παραγόμενων αποβλήτων σύμφωνα με την κοινοτική νομοθεσία. Θα πρέπει να αποζημιώνεται ο ανάδοχος στην περίπτωση αυτή;

2. Θα επιτρέψει την έγκριση χρηματοδότησης ενός έργου που καταστρατηγεί εμφανώς την ευρωπαϊκή νομοθεσία για την μείωση των παραγόμενων αποβλήτων;

Απάντηση του κ. Potočnik εξ ονόματος της Επιτροπής
(18 Μαρτίου 2014)

1. Η οδηγία 2008/98/ΕΚ ([1]) δεν περιλαμβάνει στόχους σχετικά με την πρόληψη αποβλήτων, αλλά περιλαμβάνει στόχους οι οποίοι πρέπει να καθορισθούν στα προγράμματα πρόληψης. Η Επιτροπή θεωρεί ότι δεν υπάρχει ασυμβατότητα αυτή καθεαυτή μεταξύ των συμβάσεων ολοκληρωμένης διαχείρισης αποβλήτων και της οδηγίας 2008/98/ΕΚ. Οι εν λόγω συμβάσεις ολοκληρωμένης διαχείρισης αποβλήτων στο πλαίσιο συμπράξεων ιδιωτικού και δημόσιου τομέα μπορεί να λειτουργήσουν κατάλληλα για την αντιμετώπιση των θεμάτων διαχείρισης αποβλήτων, στο πλαίσιο μιας ολιστικής προσέγγισης για τη διασφάλιση τόσο των δημόσιων όσο και των ιδιωτικών κεφαλαίων για επενδύσεις. Τα ειδικά συμβατικά ζητήματα που έθεσε ο κύριος βουλευτής είναι ζητήματα εθνικής αρμοδιότητας.

2. Σε περίπτωση υποβολής αίτησης για μεγάλο έργο ολοκληρωμένης διαχείρισης στερεών αποβλήτων στην περιφέρεια της Πελοποννήσου, η Επιτροπή θα αξιολογήσει τη συμμόρφωση της με την οικεία νομοθεσία της ΕΕ, συμπεριλαμβανομένων των κανόνων περί δημόσιων συμβάσεων.

([1]) ΕΕ L 312 της 22.11.2008.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-000458/14
to the Commission
Nikolaos Chountis (GUE/NGL)
(20 January 2014)

Subject: Provisional integrated waste management contract in the Peloponnese region

Directive 2008/98/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 November 2008 on waste and repealing certain Directives lays down strict requirements designed to achieve predefined waste reduction targets. It requires Member States to establish waste prevention programmes by 12 December 2013 and integrate them into their policies (Greece has not adopted any such programme to date).

The Roadmap to a Resource Efficient Europe (COM(2011)0571 EC2011A), which targets the transformation of the EU economy into a sustainable economy by 2050, aims at substantially reducing waste production. It sets out targets/milestones up to 2020, which include a reduction in per capita waste and the elimination of landfills.

At the same time, the European Union is financing a series of waste prevention programmes (such as the LIFE 'Pay as You Throw', LIFE 'Waste prevention support tool for local authorities', 'Low cost', 'Zero-Waste Municipalities' and other programmes). However, in the Region of the Peloponnese, a provisional contract for integrated waste management has been signed with a PPP. This contract, which guarantees the contractor 150 000 tonnes of waste annually for 28 years from municipalities in the region, conflicts with the basic principles of European waste prevention policy and infringes Directive 2008/98/EC.

In view of the above, will the Commission say:

1. What arrangements will apply under the integrated waste management contract for the Peloponnese if waste prevention targets are met in accordance with Community law? Will compensation have to be paid to the contractor in this case?

2. Will it allow the release of funding for a project which clearly infringes EU waste prevention law?

Answer given by Mr Potočnik on behalf of the Commission
(18 March 2014)

1. Directive 2008/98/EC ([1]) does not include waste prevention targets, but includes objectives which need to be set out in the waste prevention programmes. The Commission sees no incompatibility per se between integrated waste management contracts and Directive 2008/98/EC. Such integrated waste management contracts under PPP arrangements can be appropriate to address waste management under a holistic approach securing both public and private funds for investment. The specific contractual matters raised by the Honorable Member are matters of national competence.

2. Should an application for a major project on integrated solid waste management be submitted for the region of Peloponnese, the Commission will assess its compliance with the relevant EU legislation, including public procurement rules.

([1]) OJ L 312 of 22.11.2008.

(Versione italiana)

Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-000466/14
alla Commissione (Vicepresidente/Alto Rappresentante)
Lorenzo Fontana (EFD)
(20 gennaio 2014)

Oggetto: VP/HR — Intolleranza religiosa in India: il caso del pastore evangelico Sanjeevulu

Secondo alcune fonti giornalistiche, l'11 gennaio scorso il pastore evangelico Sanjeevulu dell'Andhra Pradesh sarebbe stato accoltellato a morte nella sua casa a Vikarabad da quattro persone non ancora identificate.

Il pastore, dopo l'attacco, sarebbe stato portato in ospedale e sarebbe morto dopo alcuni giorni per le ferite da arma da taglio. Durante lo scontro la moglie, nell'intento di salvare il marito, sarebbe stata aggredita ma sarebbe riuscita a scappare riportando solo alcune ferite.

Considerando che alcuni fedeli cristiani sarebbero stati arrestati dalla polizia durante manifestazioni indette nella zona per chiedere giustizia e chiarimenti sulla vicenda,

può l'Alto Rappresentante riferire:

— se dispone di elementi ulteriori, utili a fare luce sulla vicenda;

— quale posizione intende prendere riguardo alle vicende che si stanno verificando nel paese contro la minoranza cristiana?

Risposta dell'Alta Rappresentante/Vicepresidente Catherine Ashton a nome della Commissione
(26 marzo 2014)

L'AR/VP è a conoscenza del caso del pastore evangelico Sanjeevulu, accoltellato l'11 gennaio 2014 e deceduto due giorni dopo. L'UE continuerà a seguire le indagini di polizia, che finora però non hanno dato risultati tangibili.

L'Unione attribuisce notevole importanza alla tutela dei diritti umani e delle libertà fondamentali in India; in tale contesto, la libertà di religione e di credo rappresenta, insieme ad altre questioni importanti come la non discriminazione, la parità fra i sessi e i diritti delle donne, uno dei temi più rilevanti affrontati regolarmente con le autorità indiane. La situazione in India viene discussa in modo approfondito anche a livello multilaterale, in particolare durante le riunioni del Consiglio dei diritti umani dell'ONU a Ginevra.

Il dialogo UE-India sui diritti umani è un'altra utile occasione di discutere e sollevare annualmente questioni importanti con il governo indiano: l'ultima riunione ha avuto luogo il 28 novembre 2013. La delegazione dell'UE in India è regolarmente in contatto con membri del Consiglio nazionale per l'integrazione e con la Commissione nazionale per le minoranze, due organismi istituiti per garantire che gli atti di intolleranza religiosa, i quali violano il principio della libertà di religione e di credo sancito dalla costituzione indiana, siano segnalati e gestiti dalle autorità competenti.

L'UE sostiene inoltre progetti relativi ai diritti umani e alle libertà fondamentali in India, specialmente attraverso lo strumento europeo per la democrazia e i diritti umani (EIDHR).

(English version)

Question for written answer E-000466/14
to the Commission (Vice-President/High Representative)
Lorenzo Fontana (EFD)
(20 January 2014)

Subject: VP/HR — Religious intolerance in India: the case of evangelical pastor Sanjeevulu

According to a number of press reports, on 11 January 2014 the evangelical pastor Sanjeevulu was stabbed to death at his home in Vikarabad, Andhra Pradesh, by four as yet unidentified persons.

After the attack, the pastor was taken to hospital, but died from his knife wounds a few days later. During the attack his wife was assaulted as she tried to save her husband, but she managed to escape with minor injuries.

In view of the fact that a number of Christians were arrested by the police at local demonstrations calling for justice and a proper investigation of the incident, can the High Representative say:

— whether she has any further information which could cast light on this incident;

— what stance she intends to adopt on the attacks on the Christian minority in India?

Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission
(26 March 2014)

The HR/VP is aware of the case of the evangelical pastor Sanjeevulu, stabbed on 11 January 2014 and passed away two days later. The EU will continue to follow the police investigation which, however, has not led to any concrete results so far.

The EU pays great attention to the necessity of protecting human rights and fundamental freedoms in India; in this context freedom of religion and belief is, together with other important issues such as non-discrimination, gender issues and women's rights, one of the most relevant topics that are regularly raised with Indian authorities. Thorough discussions on the situation in India also take place at the multilateral level, in particular at the UN Human Rights Council in Geneva.

The EU-India Human Rights Dialogue also provides a good opportunity to discuss and raise issues of concerns with the Indian government at regular annual intervals; the latest such meeting took place on 28 November 2013. Moreover, the EU Delegation in India is regularly in touch with members of the National Integration Council as well as with the National Commission for Minorities, bodies which were set up to ensure that acts of religious intolerance, which run counter the principles of Freedom of Religion and Belief enshrined in the Indian Constitution, are reported and dealt with by the relevant authorities.

The EU also supports projects on human rights and fundamental freedoms in India, especially through the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR).

(Versione italiana)

Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-000467/14
alla Commissione (Vicepresidente/Alto Rappresentante)
Lorenzo Fontana (EFD)
(20 gennaio 2014)

Oggetto: VP/HR — Attacchi contro minoranze cristiane in Bangladesh: il caso di Ovidio Marandy

Secondo alcune fonti giornalistiche lo scorso 11 gennaio in Bangladesh il giovane cattolico Ovidio Marandy sarebbe stato ucciso da alcuni radicali islamisti in seguito alle denunce mosse dal ragazzo per le violenze che si sarebbero verificate contro la minoranza religiosa cristiana.

Recentemente, soprattutto nel periodo pre-elezioni, ci sarebbero stati ripetuti attentati verso i non-musulmani con pestaggi e saccheggi nelle case e con attacchi vendicativi per coloro che non avrebbero boicottato le elezioni. Questi ripetuti attacchi avrebbero reso difficili anche le celebrazioni del Natale e il 7 gennaio un villaggio cristiano sarebbe stato dato alle fiamme.

Inoltre durante le elezioni sarebbero morte 21 persone e ci sarebbero stati più di 300 feriti.

Può l'Alto Rappresentante precisare quanto segue:

è al corrente della situazione di precarietà in cui si trova il paese a livello di tolleranza religiosa?

Intende adottare misure di sostegno alle autorità locali per aumentare il livello di sicurezza verso le minoranze religiose?

Risposta dell'Alta Rappresentante/Vicepresidente Catherine Ashton a nome della Commissione
(18 marzo 2014)

L'AR/VP è a conoscenza dei recenti atti di violenza contro religiosi e minoranze, che ha condannato con fermezza nella dichiarazione rilasciata il 9 gennaio a nome dell'Unione europea.

L'UE monitora la situazione in Bangladesh attraverso la sua delegazione a Dacca. L'UE solleva le questioni inerenti ai diritti umani, comprese quelle che riguardano le minoranze, nell'ambito del suo dialogo con il governo del Bangladesh e continuerà a farlo.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-000467/14
to the Commission (Vice-President/High Representative)
Lorenzo Fontana (EFD)
(20 January 2014)

Subject: VP/HR — Attacks against Christian minorities in Bangladesh: the case of Ovidio Marandy

According to some media sources, the young Catholic Ovidio Marandy was killed on 11 January in Bangladesh by some Islamist radicals following the young man's complaints about the violence said to have been perpetrated against the Christian religious minority.

Recently, particularly in the pre-election period, there have apparently been repeated attacks on non-Muslims with beatings and looting of houses and revenge attacks on people who did not boycott the elections. These repeated attacks are said to have even made it difficult to celebrate Christmas and, on 7 January, a Christian village is reported to have been set alight.

In addition, during the elections, 21 people are said to have died with more than 300 injured.

Can the High Representative answer the following questions:

Is she aware of the country's precarious situation as regards the level of religious tolerance?

Does she intend to take steps to support the local authorities to increase security for religious minorities?

Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission
(18 March 2014)

The HR/VP is well aware of the recent acts of violence against religious and minorities, which she strongly condemned in her Declaration on behalf of the EU on 9 January.

The EU monitors the situation in Bangladesh through the EU Delegation in Dhaka. The EU raises human rights issues, including issues affecting minorities, in its dialogue with the Government of Bangladesh and will continue to do so.

(Versione italiana)

Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-000468/14
alla Commissione
Mara Bizzotto (EFD)
(20 gennaio 2014)

Oggetto: Contraffazione di passaporti UE: aggiornamento

Con riferimento all' interrogazione E-007886/2011 della stessa autrice, può la Commissione fornire aggiornamenti sui risultati delle azioni illustrate nella sua risposta?

Risposta di Cecilia Malmström a nome della Commissione
(14 marzo 2014)

Le indagini svolte dalla Commissione a seguito dell'interrogazione scritta E-007886/2011 hanno confermato che in Moldova è stato smantellato un gruppo criminale composto da 5 persone specializzate nella contraffazione/falsificazione di documenti d'identità. Non sono tuttavia disponibili dati precisi sul numero di cittadini moldovi che sarebbero entrati nel territorio dell'UE utilizzando passaporti falsi/contraffatti prodotti da questo gruppo.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-000468/14
to the Commission
Mara Bizzotto (EFD)
(20 January 2014)

Subject: Forged EU passports: update

With reference to my earlier question (E-007886/2011), can the Commission provide an update on the impact the measures cited in its answer have had?

Answer given by Ms Malmström on behalf of the Commission
(14 March 2014)

The enquiries carried out by the Commission as follow-up to Written Question E-007886/2011 confirmed that a criminal activity of a group of 5 persons specialised on forged/falsified identity documents has been dismantled in Moldova. However, no precise figures are available on the number of Moldovan citizens that would have entered the EU with forged/falsified passports produced by this specific group.

(Versione italiana)

Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-000469/14
alla Commissione
Mara Bizzotto (EFD)
(20 gennaio 2014)

Oggetto: Buoni pasto e truffe ai consumatori europei: aggiornamento

Con riferimento alla mia interrogazione E-007882/2011 può la Commissione fornire aggiornamenti sui risultati dell'applicazione generale della direttiva 2005/29/CE sulle pratiche commerciali sleali?

Risposta di Viviane Reding a nome della Commissione
(18 marzo 2014)

Dal 2011 ad oggi la Commissione non è stata messa al corrente di altre pratiche sleali da parte di operatori nel settore dei buoni pasto.

La Comunicazione relativa all'applicazione della direttiva 2005/29/CE sulle pratiche commerciali sleali ([1]) e la relativa relazione ([2]) adottata il 14 marzo 2013, indicano che il quadro giuridico della direttiva sulle pratiche commerciali sleali si sta dimostrando adeguato per valutare la correttezza delle tecniche di vendita attuali e nuove.

Tuttavia, è necessario intensificare l'attività di contrasto per garantire un elevato livello di tutela dei consumatori negli scambi nazionali e transfrontalieri. Tra le principali priorità di azione vi è quella di sviluppare ulteriormente il documento di orientamento del 2009, espandere la base dati relativa alla direttiva sulle pratiche commerciali sleali, organizzare seminari tematici con le autorità nazionali preposte all'applicazione delle norme su settori di importanza fondamentale per i consumatori e avviare procedure d'infrazione qualora la Commissione abbia conferma del fatto che gli Stati membri non ottemperano adeguatamente ai loro obblighi di recepimento e attuazione della legislazione.

La Commissione avvierà una campagna di sensibilizzazione nel marzo 2014 per migliorare il livello di conoscenza generale dei diritti dei consumatori e delle opzioni di attuazione in diversi settori. Essa interesserà vari Stati membri, tra cui l'Italia.

([1]) «Raggiungere un livello elevato di tutela dei consumatori — Rafforzare la fiducia nel mercato interno» COM(2013) 138 final.
([2]) COM(2013) 139 final.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-000469/14
to the Commission
Mara Bizzotto (EFD)
(20 January 2014)

Subject: Luncheon vouchers and the defrauding of European consumers: update

With reference to my Question E-007882/2011, can the Commission provide updates on the results of the general application of Directive 2005/29/EC on unfair commercial practices?

Answer given by Mrs Reding on behalf of the Commission
(18 March 2014)

Since 2011, the Commission has not been informed about other unfair practices on the part of traders linked to the use of luncheon vouchers.

The communication on the application of Directive 2005/29/EC on unfair commercial practices ([1]) (the 'UCPD') and its accompanying Report ([2]) adopted on 14 March 2013 show that the legal framework of the UCPD is proving well suited to assess the fairness of current and new sales techniques.

However, further enforcement efforts should be made to guarantee a high level of consumer protection, both in national and cross-border trade. Key priorities for action include further developing the 2009 Guidance document, expanding the UCPD database, organising thematic workshops with national enforcers on areas of key concern for consumers and opening infringements procedures where the Commission has confirmation that Member States do not adequately comply with their transposition and enforcement obligations.

The Commission will launch an awareness raising campaign in March 2014 in order to increase the overall knowledge of both consumer rights and enforcement options in various areas. It will cover several Member States, including Italy.

([1]) 'Achieving a high level of consumer protection — Building trust in the internal market' COM(2013) 138 final.
([2]) COM(2013) 139 final.

(Wersja polska)

Pytanie wymagające odpowiedzi pisemnej E-000472/14
do Komisji
Konrad Szymański (ECR)
(20 stycznia 2014 r.)

Przedmiot: Przemysł wapienniczy na liście carbon leakage 2015-2019

Przemysł wapienniczy w Unii Europejskiej jest zagrożony ucieczką emisji, co oznaczać może całkowity regres tej branży w UE, a na przykład w Polsce utratę pracy dla 3000 osób.

Bezpośrednie koszty usunięcia wapna z listy carbon leakage są szacowane na 1 mld EUR.

Zgodnie z dotychczasową kwalifikacją wapna jako podsektora, według wskaźnika PRODCOM 6, wapno spełniało kryteria bycia na liście carbon leakage. Jednak, zgodnie z nowymi kryteriami kwalifikacji produktu jako narażonego na ucieczkę emisji i przy zastosowaniu wskaźnika naliczanego wg Eurostat NACE 4 23.52, wapno nie mieści się na liście carbon leakage.

Producenci wapna wskazują, iż uzasadnione jest wyodrębnienie sektora wapienniczego jako samodzielnego podsektora z uwagi na jego status B2B, inny proces produkcji niż w sektorze zapraw i gipsu, inne zastosowania i inne rynki docelowe. Ponadto przedstawiciele przemysłu wapienniczego przyznają, że 2/3 wydzielanej emisji to emisja procesowa z rozkładu kamienia, która powinna być wyłączona z kalkulacji emisji.

W związku z tym wapno powinno być klasyfikowane jako podsektor, wg wskaźnika PRODCOM 6, aby uzyskać koszt emisji, który jest rzeczywiście reprezentatywny dla sektora wapienniczego w UE.

Czy Komisja planuje pozostawienie przemysłu wapienniczego na liście carbon leakage 2015-2019?

Czy Komisja może powtórnie rozważyć wydzielenie wapna jako podsektora?

Czy Komisja nie obawia się, że wprowadzenie restrykcyjnych zmian zasad dotyczących listy carbon leakage 2015-2019, które pociągną za sobą dalszą ucieczkę emisji za granice UE, doprowadzi w ostatecznym rozrachunku do zwiększenia globalnych emisji CO_2?

Odpowiedź udzielona przez komisarz Connie Hedegaard w imieniu Komisji
(18 marca 2014 r.)

Komisja Europejska ma prawny obowiązek ustanowienia wykazu sektorów narażonych na ryzyko ucieczki emisji, który będzie ważny w latach 2015-2019.

W komunikacie „Ramy polityczne na okres 2020-2030 dotyczące klimatu i energii” ([1]) Komisja wyraźnie podkreśliła, że zamierza przedstawić odpowiedniemu komitetowi regulacyjnemu (Komitet ds. Zmian Klimatu) projekt decyzji w sprawie przeglądu wykazu dotyczącego ryzyka ucieczki emisji, w którym utrzymano obecne kryteria i założenia. Zapewni to ciągłość treści wykazu.

W nadchodzących miesiącach Komisja opublikuje projekt wykazu. To, czy konieczna będzie ocena na szczeblu podsektorów, zależy od niesfinalizowanej jeszcze oceny na poziomie sektorów. Dlatego też jest za wcześnie, aby mówić o tej możliwości.

Przepisy dotyczące bezpłatnych uprawnień i ucieczki emisji okazały się skutecznym zabezpieczeniem dla przemysłu UE. Komisja przywiązuje wagę do utrzymania obowiązujących przepisów do końca trzeciego etapu EU ETS.

([1]) COM(2014) 0015 z 22 stycznia 2014 r.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-000472/14
to the Commission
Konrad Szymański (ECR)
(20 January 2014)

Subject: Lime industry on the carbon leakage list 2015-2019

The lime industry in the EU is exposed to a risk of carbon leakage, which could result in the sector withdrawing entirely from the EU. In Poland, for example, this would mean the loss of some 300 jobs. The direct costs of removing lime from the carbon leakage list are estimated at EUR 1 billion.

In accordance with the previous classification of lime as a subsector, under PRODCOM 6, lime fulfilled the criteria for inclusion on the carbon leakage list. However, under the new criteria for classifying a product as being at risk of carbon leakage and applying Eurostat's NACE 4 23.52 index, lime is not on the carbon leakage list.

Lime manufacturers say that it is justified to single out the lime industry as an independent subsector in view of its B2B status, a manufacturing process that differs from those in the mortar and plaster sector, different applications and different target markets. Furthermore, representatives of the lime industry state that two-thirds of the emissions come from the process of breaking down the stone, which should be excluded from the emission calculation.

Consequently, lime should be classified as subsector, in accordance with the PRODCOM 6 index, to obtain the emissions cost which is actually representative of the lime industry in the EU.

Is the Commission planning to leave the lime industry on the carbon leakage list 2015-2019?

Could the Commission reconsider designating lime as a subsector?

Is the Commission not concerned that the introduction of strict changes to the rules relating to the carbon leakage list 2015-2019, which will entail further carbon leakage beyond the EU's borders, will lead ultimately to an increase in global CO_2 emissions?

Answer given by Ms Hedegaard on behalf of the Commission
(18 March 2014)

The European Commission has a legal obligation to determine a new carbon leakage list to be valid from 2015 to 2019.

The Commission has made it clear in its communication on a 2030 policy framework for climate and energy ([1]) that it intends to present a draft decision on the review of the carbon leakage list to the appropriate Regulatory Committee (the Climate Change Committee) which would maintain the current criteria and existing assumptions. This would guarantee continuity in the composition of the list.

The Commission will publish in the coming months a draft carbon leakage list. The question whether an assessment at the subsector level will be necessary or not depends on the still not finalised assessment at the normal sector level, and it is therefore too early to comment on such a possibility.

Free allocation and carbon leakage rules have proven to be an effective safeguard for the EU industry. The Commission is committed to maintain the existing rules until the end of the third phase of EU ETS.

([1]) COM(2014) 15 of 22 January 2014.

(Versión española)

Pregunta con solicitud de respuesta escrita E-000474/14
a la Comisión
Francisco Sosa Wagner (NI)
(20 de enero de 2014)

Asunto: Protección del mar Mediterráneo

Hace ya seis meses que la Comisión Europea me indicó que preguntaría a las autoridades españolas sobre las garantías ambientales en las actuaciones que se pretenden realizar en el mar Mediterráneo. De ahí que me interese conocer lo siguiente:

1. ¿Cuál ha sido la respuesta recibida? ¿Cuáles serán las garantías que se han promovido?

2. ¿Considera la Comisión que dichas actividades son conformes con los acuerdos suscritos mediante el Protocolo para la protección del mar Mediterráneo contra la contaminación resultante de la exploración y explotación de la plataforma continental, del fondo del mar y de su subsuelo, publicado en el Diario Oficial el pasado 9 de enero de 2013?

3. ¿Qué otras actuaciones sobre el preciso cumplimiento de dicha normativa relativa a la estrategia marina sigue realizando la Comisión tras la publicación del informe COM(2012)0662 sobre la ejecución de las obligaciones, los compromisos y las iniciativas que tienen los Estados miembros o la Unión a nivel de la UE o a nivel internacional en el ámbito de la protección medioambiental de las aguas marinas?

Respuesta del Sr. Potočnik en nombre de la Comisión
(13 de marzo de 2014)

En mayo de 2013, la Comisión pidió a las autoridades españolas que explicasen cómo se estaba aplicando la legislación ambiental pertinente de la UE en relación con las actividades de exploración mencionadas por Su Señoría. Según la información facilitada por las autoridades españolas, se está procediendo actualmente a la evaluación de impacto ambiental (EIA) de las actividades propuestas. Una vez concluida la EIA, deberá ser evaluada por la autoridad nacional competente antes de que se pueda tomar ninguna decisión definitiva para autorizar actividades sísmicas. No se ha tomado aún ninguna decisión al respecto. En este momento, no hay indicios de infracción alguna de la legislación de la UE ni de las disposiciones del Protocolo del Convenio de Barcelona. La Comisión ha solicitado que se la informe de los resultados de la EIA, que se prevé esté terminada avanzado el año, y de cualquier decisión de autorización que se tome con posterioridad a ella. Una vez que reciba esa información, la Comisión sopesará si son necesarias otras actuaciones.

En febrero de 2014, la Comisión publicó un informe ([1]) de evaluación de la conformidad de los Estados miembros con los artículos 8, 9 y 10 de la Directiva marco sobre la estrategia marina ([2]), en el que presenta un marco y una serie de recomendaciones para la mejora de la aplicación de la Directiva, con objeto de alcanzar un buen estado medioambiental en 2020.

([1]) Véase http://ec.europa.eu/environment/marine/eu-coast-and-marine-policy/implementation/reports_en.htm
([2]) Directiva 2008/56/CE, DO L 164 de 25.6.2008.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-000474/14
to the Commission
Francisco Sosa Wagner (NI)
(20 January 2014)

Subject: Protection of the Mediterranean Sea

Six months ago the European Commission told me it would ask the Spanish authorities about environmental guarantees in the context of the activities to be carried out in the Mediterranean Sea. I would therefore like to know the following:

1. What reply has been received? What guarantees have been proposed?

2. Does the Commission consider that these activities comply with the agreements entered into under the Protocol for the protection of the Mediterranean Sea against pollution resulting from exploration and exploitation of the continental shelf and the seabed and its subsoil, published in the Official Journal on 9 January 2013?

3. What other measures is the Commission continuing to adopt regarding exact compliance with this legislation on marine strategy, following publication of report COM(2012)0662 on the implementation of existing obligations, commitments and initiatives of Member States and the Union at EU or international level in the ambit of environmental protection in marine waters?

Answer given by Mr Potočnik on behalf of the Commission
(13 March 2014)

In May 2013, the Commission asked the Spanish authorities to clarify how the relevant EU environmental legislation was being implemented in relation to the exploration activities referred to by the Honourable Member. According to the information provided by the Spanish authorities, the proposed activities are currently the subject of an Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) procedure. Once completed, this EIA must then be assessed by the competent national authority before any final decision can be taken to authorise seismic activities. No authorisation decision has yet been taken. At this stage, there is no evidence of a breach of EU legislation or of the provisions of the Protocol of the Barcelona Convention. The Commission has requested to be informed of the results of the EIA, due later this year, and of any subsequent authorisation decision. On receipt of such information, the Commission will consider whether further action is necessary.

In February 2014, the Commission published a report ([1]) assessing the compliance of Member States with Articles 8, 9 and 10 of the Marine Strategy Framework Directive ([2]). Therein, the Commission outlines a framework and a series of recommendations for the improved implementation of the directive, with a view to achieving Good Environmental Status by 2020.

([1]) See http://ec.europa.eu/environment/marine/eu-coast-and-marine-policy/implementation/reports_en.htm
([2]) Directive 2008/56/EC, OJ L 164, 25.6.2008.

(Versión española)

Pregunta con solicitud de respuesta escrita E-000475/14
a la Comisión (Vicepresidenta/Alta Representante)
Francisco Sosa Wagner (NI)
(20 de enero de 2014)

Asunto: VP/HR — Relaciones con Cuba

Los medios de comunicación han difundido la intención de la Unión Europea de promover la modificación de las relaciones con Cuba, la denominada «posición común», a pesar de que subsisten las violaciones de derechos fundamentales. Sólo en el último mes se han denunciado por la Comisión cubana de derechos humanos y reconciliación nacional centenares de detenciones.

De ahí que me interese conocer:

1. ¿Qué actuaciones está llevando a cabo la Alta Representante sobre «la posición común»?

2. ¿Se ha entrevistado con los grupos de la oposición cubana que defienden los derechos humanos o con las Damas de blanco?

3. En esas actuaciones: ¿se ha aludido al interés de promover una investigación internacional e independiente con el objetivo de esclarecer las circunstancias en que murieron Oswaldo Payá Sardiñas y Harold Cepero, defensores de los derechos humanos y disidentes pacíficos cubanos, en julio de 2012, como acordó el Parlamento Europeo en la Resolución de 11 de diciembre pasado, dentro del Informe sobre la situación de los derechos humanos en el mundo en 2012?

Respuesta de la Alta Representante y Vicepresidenta Ashton en nombre de la Comisión
(13 de marzo de 2014)

La Posición Común se mantendrá hasta que los Estados miembros decidan por unanimidad derogarla.

La UE está en contacto periódico con todos los sectores de la sociedad cubana, incluidos los defensores de los derechos humanos. Los servicios del SEAE en Bruselas y La Habana se entrevistaron recientemente con representantes de las Damas de Blanco, lideradas por Berta Soler.

La AR/VP insiste en su respuesta a la pregunta E-004347/2013 en el sentido de que el SEAE continúa supervisando de cerca la situación, pero no dispone de medios para efectuar investigaciones. Una ONG ha solicitado una investigación independiente al Consejo de Derechos Humanos de las Naciones Unidas. Corresponde ahora al Consejo de Derechos Humanos de las Naciones Unidas decidir sobre la pertinencia de iniciar una investigación al respecto.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-000475/14
to the Commission (Vice-President/High Representative)
Francisco Sosa Wagner (NI)
(20 January 2014)

Subject: VP/HR — Relations with Cuba

It has been reported in the media that the EU intends to modify its relationship with Cuba, habitually referred to as the 'common position', despite the continued existence of violations of fundamental rights. Only in the last month the Cuban Commission for Human Rights and National Reconciliation has denounced hundreds of arrests.

I should therefore like to know:

1. What action is the High Representative taking with respect to the 'common position'?

2. Has any interview taken place with the Cuban opposition groups that defend human rights or with the 'Ladies in White' (Damas de Blanco)?

3. In the course of these discussions, has any mention been made of the EU's interest in promoting an independent inquiry at an international level with a view to clarifying the circumstances surrounding the deaths in July 2012 of Oswaldo Payá Sardiñas and Harold Cepero, who were peaceful Cuban dissidents and supporters of human rights? This was the position adopted by the European Parliament in its resolution of 11 December 2013 on the Annual Report on Human Rights and Democracy in the World 2012.

Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission
(13 March 2014)

The Common Position will remain in place until Member States decide by unanimity to abrogate it.

The EU is in regular contact with all sectors of Cuban society, including human rights defenders. EEAS services in Brussels and in Havana met representatives of the Damas de Blanco headed by Berta Soler recently.

The HR/VP reiterates her reply to Question E-004347/2013, that the EEAS continues to monitor closely the situation, but does not have mechanisms at its disposal to conduct any investigations. A NGO has made a demand for an independent inquiry to the UN Human Rights Council. It is now up to the UN Human Rights Council to decide on the pertinence of launching an investigation into the matter.

(Versión española)

Pregunta con solicitud de respuesta escrita E-000476/14
a la Comisión
Francisco Sosa Wagner (NI)
(20 de enero de 2014)

Asunto: Contaminación atmosférica

Hace meses trasladé ya a la Comisión Europea mi preocupación (pregunta E-003232/2013) por los datos recogidos en el informe de la Agencia Europea del Medio Ambiente sobre la contaminación atmosférica y el incumplimiento por varios Estados miembros de la Directiva 2001/81/CE, de 23 de octubre de 2001, que establece los techos nacionales de emisión de determinados contaminantes. Se destacaba también el incremento de las emisiones de óxido de nitrógeno, que procede fundamentalmente del tráfico de vehículos. Tal es el caso de Luxemburgo, Chipre y España.

Un reciente informe del Gobierno español insiste en este mismo sentido: el incumplimiento de los niveles de calidad del aire en varias ciudades españolas.

Resulta ocioso insistir en que la protección ambiental es una de las finalidades de la Unión Europea, como destaca en muchos de sus preceptos el Tratado de Funcionamiento de la Unión Europea. Y la Carta de Derechos Fundamentales de la Unión Europea establece que las políticas de la Unión garantizarán «un nivel elevado de protección del medio ambiente y la mejora de su calidad» (artículo 37).

Por todo ello, me interesa conocer lo siguiente:

1. ¿Ha iniciado la Comisión alguna investigación para que, con profundidad, analice las causas de tanto incumplimiento?

2. ¿No cree la Comisión que deben incrementarse las actuaciones que reduzcan el tráfico contaminante, como incrementar las ayudas para potenciar el transporte por ferrocarril o los coches eléctricos?

Respuesta del Sr. Potočnik en nombre de la Comisión
(17 de marzo de 2014)

La Comisión está totalmente de acuerdo con Su Señoría en que la protección medioambiental es uno de los objetivos de la UE ([1]). Querría, sin embargo, recordarle una serie de aspectos.

— En diciembre de 2013 la Comisión adoptó un paquete de medidas sobre el aire puro ([2]) destinado a profundizar en la reducción de emisiones perjudiciales a la atmósfera, lo que incluye las procedentes del tráfico. Este paquete se basaba en una sólida evaluación de impacto y en él se tenían en cuenta las deficiencias identificadas en las estrategias tanto nacionales como de la UE y se ponían a punto medidas que garantizaran el cumplimiento de las normas de la UE vigentes en materia de calidad del aire. Se confirmaba que la responsabilidad principal a la hora de hacer cumplir la normativa relativa al tráfico recae en los Estados miembros, que aún tienen un amplio margen de maniobra para intensificar su acción.

— Los Fondos Estructurales y de Inversión Europeos ([3]), y en particular el FEDER ([4]), tienen marcados algunos objetivos temáticos que permiten facilitar financiación con el fin de reducir la contaminación del tráfico, especialmente en zonas urbanas ([5]).

— El programa de investigación e innovación Horizonte 2020 concede dotaciones financieras significativas a la lucha contra las fuentes de contaminación atmosférica, especialmente del tráfico y en las ciudades. Por primera vez se trata el problema de la calidad del aire singularizando explícitamente determinados aspectos de los vehículos que funcionan mediante la combustión de carburantes, como es la reducción de emisiones en condiciones reales de conducción y la reducción de emisiones de partículas no procedentes de la combustión (especialmente, de los frenos). Horizonte 2020 seguirá financiando la exitosa iniciativa Civitas, centrada en proyectos y redes para una movilidad y un transporte urbanos mejores y más limpios.

— La Comisión reconoció la necesidad de promover los vehículos limpios con el Plan de acción CARS 2020 ([6]); los Estados miembros deben respaldar activamente la penetración de tales vehículos mediante instrumentos financieros y no financieros. Los principios que rigen los incentivos financieros se presentan en un documento de trabajo de los servicios de la Comisión ([7]).

([1]) Su Señoría puede encontrar más información sobre las acciones e iniciativas de la Comisión en lo relativo a los objetivos del artículo 37 del TFUE en: http://ec.europa.eu/environment/index_en.htm
([2]) http://ec.europa.eu/environment/air/clean_air_policy.htm
([3]) Fondos Estructurales y de Inversión Europeos.
([4]) Fondo Europeo de Desarrollo Regional.
([5]) Incluida la promoción de la movilidad multimodal sostenible urbana, las medidas medioambientales para reducir la contaminación del aire y fomentar el transporte sostenible y la eliminación de obstáculos en las principales infraestructuras de redes.
([6]) COM(2012) 636 final.
([7]) SWD(2013) 27 final.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-000476/14
to the Commission
Francisco Sosa Wagner (NI)
(20 January 2014)

Subject: Air pollution

It was months ago that I informed the European Commission (Question E-003232/2013) of my concern regarding the data set out in the report of the European Environment Agency on air pollution and non-compliance on the part of several Member States with Directive 2001/81/EC of 23 October 2001, which lays down the national emissions ceilings for certain air pollutants. The Agency also highlighted an increase of nitrogen oxide emissions, largely as a result of vehicle use. This is the case in Luxembourg, Cyprus and Spain.

A recent report by the Spanish Government confirms this situation, namely non-compliance with air quality levels in various Spanish cities.

I should not have to remind the Commission that environmental protection is one of the aims of the European Union, as highlighted in many provisions of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. Moreover, the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union provides that the policies of the Union shall guarantee 'a high level of environmental protection and improvement of the quality of the environment' (Article 37).

Accordingly, I should like to know the following:

1. Has the Commission initiated any in-depth inquiry in order to analyse the causes of so many infringements?

2. Does the Commission not think that it should adopt further measures to reduce polluting traffic, such as increasing funding for the promotion of rail transport or electric cars?

Answer given by Mr Potočnik on behalf of the Commission
(17 March 2014)

Whilst thanking the Honourable Member for reminding that environmental protection is an aim of the EU ([1]), the Commission is pleased to make him aware that:

— In December 2013 the Commission adopted a clean Air Policy Package ([2]) designed to further reduce harmful emissions to air, including from traffic. This was based on a robust impact assessment and identified shortcomings of current EU and national air policies and outlined appropriate action to ensure compliance with existing EU air quality standards. It confirmed that the main responsibility for resolving compliance problems related to traffic lies with Member States who still have substantial scope for enhanced action.

— European Structural and Investment Funds ([3]) and in particular the ERDF ([4]), have several thematic objectives which allow funding actions to reduce pollution from traffic in particular for urban areas ([5]).

— The Horizon2020 research and innovation programme targets significant investments to tackling the sources of air pollution particularly from traffic and in cities. For the first time, air quality is addressed by explicitly targeting, for all fuel-burning road vehicles, significant reductions in real driving emissions and non-exhaust particle emissions (in particular from brakes). Horizon2020 will also continue to fund the successful CIVITAS initiative for projects and networks in cleaner and better urban mobility and transport.

— The Commission recognised the key importance of clean vehicles in the CARS 2020 Action Plan ([6]) and their uptake should also be actively supported by Member States via financial and non-financial instruments. The principles governing financial incentives are set out in a Commission staff working document ([7]).

([1]) The Honourable Member can find further information on the Commission's actions and initiatives in pursuit of the objectives of Article 37 of the TFEU at: http://ec.europa.eu/environment/index_en.htm
([2]) http://ec.europa.eu/environment/air/clean_air_policy.htm
([3]) European Structural and Investment Funds.
([4]) European Regional and Development Fund.
([5]) Including promotion of sustainable multimodal urban mobility, environmental measures to reduce air pollution and sustainable transport and removal of bottlenecks in key network infrastructures.
([6]) COM(2012) 636 final.
([7]) SWD(2013) 27 final.

(Magyar változat)

Írásbeli választ igénylő kérdés E-000480/14
a Bizottság számára
Gáll-Pelcz Ildikó (PPE) és Gyürk András (PPE)
(2014. január 20.)

Tárgy: A tagállamok jogainak és kötelezettségeinek tiszteletben tartása

A Magyar Energetikai és Közmű-szabályozási Hivatal létrehozásáról és működéséről szóló magyar jogszabály értelmében a hatóság elnökének feladata a rendszerhasználati díjak rendeletben történő megállapítása. A rendeletet a rendszerüzemeltetők nem támadhatják meg a magyarországi rendes bíróságok előtt; azt csak az Alkotmánybíróság vizsgálhatja felül.

A Bizottság 2009/72/EK és 2009/73/EK irányelvekről szóló értelmező feljegyzése szerint „a kormányok vagy minisztériumok előtti fellebbezési vagy felülvizsgálati eljárások nem állnának összhangban a villamos energiáról és a gázról szóló új irányelvek rendelkezéseivel. […] A nemzeti szabályozó hatóságok döntéshozatali autonómiájára és az összes állami szervtől való függetlenségére tekintettel a nemzeti szabályozó hatóságok által hozott határozatok felfüggesztésének joga kizárólag a bíróságok és bírók által, illetve bármely más, az érintett felektől és minden kormányzattól független testület előtti jogorvoslati mechanizmus keretében gyakorolható”.

A harmadik energiaügyi csomag tartalma, az értelmező feljegyzésben foglalt iránymutatás, más tagállamok jelenlegi gyakorlata és a szubszidiaritás elve ellenére a Bizottság ún. „pilot” eljárást indított Magyarország ellen a szabályozó jellegű határozatok elleni fellebbezés jogát érintően.

Hogyan fogja biztosítani a Bizottság a tagállamok európai jogszabályokban rögzített jogainak és kötelezettségeinek pártatlan tiszteletben tartását?

Hogyan fogja biztosítani a Bizottság a szubszidiaritás elvének megfelelő alkalmazását?

Günther Oettinger válasza a Bizottság nevében
(2014. március 18.)

A Bizottság felügyeli a belső energiapiaci szabályok megfelelő alkalmazását valamennyi tagállamban, és párbeszédet kezdeményez a nemzeti hatóságokkal abban az esetben, ha esetleges összeegyeztethetetlenségek miatt aggályok merülnének fel.

A szóban forgó EU Pilot vizsgálat keretében a Bizottság tájékoztatást kért a magyar hatóságoktól, hogy megállapíthassa, léteznek-e Magyarországon olyan megfelelő mechanizmusok, amelyek biztosítják a szabályozó jellegű határozatok hatálya alá tartozó felek hatékony jogorvoslathoz való jogát.

A vizsgálati eljárás egy szabványos mechanizmus, amelynek keretében a Bizottság az érintett tagállam nemzeti hatóságaival megvitathatja az uniós jogszabályok alkalmazása során felmerülő esetleges problémákat. Az említett EU Pilot eljárás azzal a céllal indult, hogy a Bizottság felmérje, Magyarország teljesíti-e a belső energiapiacra vonatkozó jogszabályokból eredő kötelezettségeit.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-000480/14
to the Commission
Ildikó Gáll-Pelcz (PPE) and András Gyürk (PPE)
(20 January 2014)

Subject: Respecting the rights and obligations of Member States

Pursuant to Hungarian legislation regarding the set-up and functioning of the Hungarian Energy and Public Utility Regulatory Authority, the President of the Authority is required to set the network tariffs by means of law-decrees. Such decrees cannot be appealed against by network operators in ordinary courts in Hungary but can be reviewed only by the Constitutional Court.

According to the Commission's interpretative note on Directives 2009/72/EC and 2009/73/EC, 'an appeal or review procedure before the government or a ministry would not be in line with the provisions of the new Electricity and Gas Directives. […] Given the NRA's autonomy in decision making and given the NRA's independence from any public entity, the power to suspend NRA decisions belongs only to courts and judges or appeal mechanisms before any other bodies independent of the parties involved and of any government'.

In spite of the content of the Third Energy Package, the guidance contained in the Commission's interpretative note, the existing practices of other Member States and the subsidiarity principle, the Commission has initiated a Pilot Procedure against Hungary concerning the right to appeal against regulatory decisions.

How will the Commission ensure that the rights and obligations of Member States laid down in European legislation are impartially respected?

How will the Commission ensure that the subsidiarity principle is duly applied?

Answer given by Mr Oettinger on behalf of the Commission
(18 March 2014)

The Commission oversees the correct application of internal energy market rules in all Member States and initiates discussions with the national authorities, should concerns about possible incompatibilities arise.

In the referred investigation the Commission has requested information from the Hungarian authorities to be able to assess whether there are suitable mechanisms in place in Hungary to ensure that parties affected by a regulatory decision can seek effective remedy.

The investigation process is a standard mechanism by which the Commission discusses with the national authorities of a Member State possible problems arising in the application of EC law. The EU Pilot procedure at reference was precisely initiated to understand whether Hungary fulfils its obligations under internal energy market legislation.

(Magyar változat)

Írásbeli választ igénylő kérdés E-000481/14
a Bizottság számára
Gáll-Pelcz Ildikó (PPE) és Gyürk András (PPE)
(2014. január 20.)

Tárgy: A Bizottság által az energiaellátás biztonságának és a fogyasztók védelmének biztosításához nyújtott támogatás

Bár az európai energiapiacok integrálása terén jelentős előrelépés történt, a belső energiapiac még nem működik eredményesen. Az átlagos nagykereskedelmi árak tagállamonként igen eltérőek, több nemzeti piac rendkívül koncentrált, emellett sok tagállamban nem megfelelőek az összeköttetések.

A villamosenergia-ágazatbeli szabályozási fórum (Firenzei Fórum) 25. ülésén a Bizottság erőteljesen bírálta az e területen történő állami beavatkozást, és sürgette a tagállamokat, hogy tegyék meg a szükséges lépéseket a piacot torzító intézkedéseik kiigazítása érdekében.

Tekintettel arra, hogy a belső energiapiac még nem működik teljes körűen, és az energiaellátás biztonságáért, illetve a hazai fogyasztók érdekeinek védelméért a tagállamok minisztériumai és nemzeti szabályozó hatóságai felelnek és számoltathatók el, a meglévő piaci hiányosságok korrigálására irányuló állami beavatkozás elkerülhetetlen, és maradéktalanul összhangban áll az uniós jogszabályokkal.

Miként veszi figyelembe a Bizottság a tagállamok minisztériumainak és nemzeti szabályozó hatóságainak véleményét az említett fórumokon?

Hogyan támogatja a Bizottság a tagállami minisztériumok és nemzeti szabályozó hatóságok által az energiaellátás biztonságának szavatolása és a fogyasztók hatékony védelme érdekében tett erőfeszítéseket?

Günther Oettinger válasza a Bizottság nevében
(2014. március 14.)

A villamos energia belső piacának megteremtéséről szóló, 2013. novemberi bizottsági közlemény [1] útmutatással szolgál a tagállamok számára az energiatermelés megfelelőségével és a villamosenergia-ellátás biztonságával kapcsolatban. A Bizottság az útmutatást nyilvános konzultációt [2] követően dolgozta ki, és a Tanács energetikai munkacsoportjával, valamint a villamosenergia-ügyi koordinációs csoporttal [3] is megvitatta.

A villamosenergia-ügyi koordinációs csoport feladata, hogy a villamosenergia-kereskedelemmel és az ellátásbiztonsággal kapcsolatos kérdésekben fokozza a tagállamok és a Bizottság közötti együttműködést és koordinációt, segítse a szakpolitikai kezdeményezések előkészítését, és reagáljon az esetleges ellátási válságokra. A csoport megvizsgálta a termelési megfelelőség értékelését és a kapcsolódó biztonsági előírásokat.

A Bizottság létrehozta a lakossági energiafórumot, amelynek célja a kiszolgáltatott fogyasztói csoportokkal kapcsolatos kérdésekben elősegíteni a strukturált párbeszédet a tagállamok, a nemzeti szabályozó hatóságok, a fogyasztói szövetségek, a tagállami ombudsmanok és az ágazat képviselői között, és ennek révén hozzájárulni egy versenyképes, energiahatékony és méltányos lakossági piac létrehozásához [4].

A Bizottság jelenleg konzultációt tart, amelynek keretében a kiskereskedelmi energiapiac működésével és a fogyasztói részvétellel kapcsolatban kívánja megismerni az érdekeltek véleményét [5].

Mivel a különböző fórumok sikeréhez elengedhetetlen a tagállamok és a nemzeti szabályozó hatóságok részvétele, a Bizottság többször is felkérte a tagállamokat az eszmecserékben való aktív részvételre.

A fórumok keretében lehetőség van a különféle kérdések megvitatására, és a résztvevők szabadon véleményt nyilváníthatnak. E tekintetben tehát az egyes tagállamokat a Bizottság ugyanúgy kezeli, mint bármely más érdekeltet. A következtetések nyílt folyamatok eredményeképpen születnek meg, és nem az egyes tagállamok, nemzeti szabályozó hatóságok vagy más érdekeltek véleményét, hanem a fórumok egészének véleményét tükrözik.

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[1] (C(2013) 7243).
[2] A konzultáción számos tagállam részt vett. A konzultációra beérkezett összes hozzászólás megtekinthető a következő internetes oldalon: http://ec.europa.eu/energy/gas_electricity/consultations/20130207_generation_adequacy_en.htm
[3] A csoportot a C(2012) 8141 bizottsági határozat hozta létre.
[4] E folyamat eredményeképpen született meg a kiszolgáltatott fogyasztói csoportokra vonatkozó iránymutatásokat tartalmazó dokumentum, az uniós kiskereskedelmi energiapiacok átláthatóságáról szóló munkacsoporti jelentés, továbbá az e-számlázásról és az egyéni energiafogyasztási adatok kezeléséről szóló jelentés.
[5] http://ec.europa.eu/energy/gas_electricity/consultations/20140416_energy_retail_market_en.htm

(English version)

Question for written answer E-000481/14
to the Commission
Ildikó Gáll-Pelcz (PPE) and András Gyürk (PPE)
(20 January 2014)

Subject: Commission support for ensuring security of energy supply and consumer protection

Despite the significant progress made towards integrating European energy markets, the internal energy market is not yet operating effectively. Average wholesale prices vary widely from one Member State to another, several national markets are highly concentrated, and many Member States' interconnections are insufficient.

During the 25th meeting of the Electricity Regulatory Forum (Florence Forum), the Commission strongly criticised state intervention in this area and urged Member States to take the necessary steps to rectify their distortive measures.

In light of the fact that the internal energy market is still not fully functioning and Member States' ministries and national regulatory authorities (NRAs) are responsible and accountable for maintaining security of energy supply and protecting domestic consumers' interests, state intervention to correct existing market failures is inevitable and is fully in line with EU legislation.

In what ways does the Commission take into account the opinion of Member States' ministries and NRAs in these forums?

How does the Commission support the efforts of Member States' ministries and NRAs to ensure security of supply and effective consumer protection?

Answer given by Mr Oettinger on behalf of the Commission
(14 March 2014)

The November 2013 Communication on *Delivering the internal electricity market* ([1]) provides guidance to Member States on generation adequacy and security of electricity supply. This Guidance was developed following public consultation ([2]) and was discussed at the Council's energy working group and at the Electricity Coordination Group ([3]).

The Electricity Coordination Group works to strengthen cooperation and coordination between Member States and the Commission in electricity trading and security of supply issues, to help prepare policy initiatives and react to potential supply crises. The group has examined generation adequacy assessment and associated security standards.

The Commission organises the Citizens' Energy Forum to facilitate structured dialogue on vulnerable consumer issues between Member States, national regulatory authorities, consumer associations, national ombudsmen, and industry in creating competitive, energy-efficient and fair retail markets for consumers ([4]).

The Commission is currently holding a consultation to seek the views of stakeholders on the functioning of the retail energy market and consumer participation ([5]).

The input of Member States and national regulatory authorities is critical to the success of the various Fora, and Member States have been repeatedly invited to participate actively in the discussions.

These are Fora for discussion; all participants exchange their views openly. Hence, in this context, individual Member States are treated like all other stakeholders. The conclusions are agreed in a transparent process and reflect the opinion of the Fora rather than individual Member States, NRAs or other stakeholders.

([1]) (C(2013) 7243).
([2]) Several Member States responded to the consultation. All consultation responses can be found at http://ec.europa.eu/energy/gas_electricity/consultations/20130207_generation_adequacy_en.htm
([3]) Established by Commission Decision C(2012) 8141.
([4]) This has led to the Vulnerable Consumer Guidance Document, the Transparency in EU Retail Energy Markets report, and the e-Billing and Personal Energy Data Management report were developed on the basis of this work.
([5]) http://ec.europa.eu/energy/gas_electricity/consultations/20140416_energy_retail_market_en.htm

(English version)

Question for written answer E-000482/14
to the Commission
Sir Graham Watson (ALDE), Sharon Bowles (ALDE) and Malcolm Harbour (ECR)
(20 January 2014)

Subject: Amendments to Regulation (EC) No 900/2008

The Commission has recently presented a draft implementing regulation amending Regulation (EC) No 900/2008 laying down the methods of analysis and other technical provisions necessary for the application of the arrangements for imports of certain goods resulting from the processing of agricultural products. This draft implementing regulation seeks to address some anomalies in the test set out in Article 2(3)(b) with regard to its application to whey protein products, anomalies that have been confirmed through scientific analyses. The draft regulation has already been discussed on three occasions on the Customs Code Committee, but no vote on it has yet taken place, presumably because of opposition from a number of representatives of the Member States attending the Customs Code Committee meetings.

1. As the draft regulation simply seeks to correct the effects of a test that has been scientifically proven to give erroneous results when applied to whey protein products, can the Commission explain on what basis the vote is being delayed and the reasons given by the Member States for opposing the proposed measure?

2. Does the Commission agree that, under general principles of law, errors in legislation should be amended, especially when these are proven through scientific analyses?

3. Finally, given that the issues were brought to the Commission's attention almost three years ago, what are the Commission's views on the timelines for resolving the issue, and what is its understanding of 'reasonable time'?

Answer given by Mr Šemeta on behalf of the Commission
(21 March 2014)

The Commission has indeed presented to the Committee a draft Commission Regulation amending Commission Regulation (EC) No 900/2008 [1], with retroactive effect in order to make the alternative procedure introduced by this amending Regulation applicable to processed agricultural products for which the determination of the milk fat content by using the analytical method presently in place may have resulted in an unjustified increase of the customs duties.

— A number of Member States seems to view very critically the possible retroactive application of the alternative procedure as well as the fact that this procedure implies a self-declaration by the economic operator on the content of fat, other than milk fat.

— The Commission aims to ensure legal certainty and therefore to amend the regulation (EC) No 900/2008. Of course, until the moment such an amendment enters into force the provisions of Regulation (EC) No 900/2008 as it stands today remain applicable.

— The Commission has put the draft proposal on the agenda of the Customs Code Committee meeting in March 2014 as a possible voting item. The envisaged solution was explained in length to delegates. The vote will take place by written procedure after having concluded the discussion between the Commission services and translations in all EU languages are forwarded to Member States.

— Notwithstanding, the Commission's Joint Research Centre has started scientific research on the issue. This research is expected to run until autumn 2014. The results of such a research could possibly lead to an improvement of the methods for the determination of the milk fat content in some processed agricultural products.

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[1] Commission Regulation (EC) No 900/2008 of 16 September 2008 laying down the methods of analysis and other technical provisions necessary for the application of the arrangements for imports of certain goods resulting from the processing of agricultural products (Codified version) OJ L 248, 17.9.2008, and its last amendment Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 617/2011 of 24 June 2011.

(Deutsche Fassung)

Anfrage zur schriftlichen Beantwortung E-000485/14
an die Kommission
Andreas Mölzer (NI)
(20. Januar 2014)

Betrifft: Bankenrettung — Skandal um griechische Postbank

Mit fünf Milliarden Euro von EU und IWF wurde die griechische Postbank vor der Pleite gerettet. Nun steht dieses Institut im Mittelpunkt eines Finanzskandals. Die Staatsanwaltschaft in Athen hat gegen 25 Personen Anklage erhoben. So soll die Postbank — zwecks Bereicherung bestimmter Personen — unter anderem zwischen 2007 und 2012 diverse Kredite ohne ausreichende Garantien vergeben haben. Der Skandal soll nur durch die Beteiligung des Staates (beispielsweise wurde der Chef des Instituts einst von der jeweiligen Regierung ernannt) möglich gewesen sein. Angeklagt ist auch die Geschäftsführerin des griechischen Bankenrettungsfonds.

Wie steht die Kommission zu diesem Skandal, insbesondere hinsichtlich der vermuteten Beteiligung der Geschäftsführerin des griechischen Bankenrettungsfonds?

Antwort von Herrn Rehn im Namen der Kommission
(11. März 2014)

Da der Fall von den griechischen Justizbehörden gerade geprüft wird, wird sich die Europäische Kommission nicht dazu äußern.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-000485/14
to the Commission
Andreas Mölzer (NI)
(20 January 2014)

Subject: Rescue of banks — Scandal involving Hellenic Postbank

Hellenic Postbank was saved from bankruptcy with EUR 5 billion from the EU and the IMF. Now this institution is at the centre of a financial scandal. The public's prosecutor's office in Athens has preferred charges against 25 individuals. The Postbank — for the purpose of enriching certain individuals — is said for example to have awarded various loans between 2007 and 2012 without sufficient guarantees. Allegedly, the scandal was only possible due to the participation of the state (for example the head of the institution was once appointed by the respective government). The managing director of the Greek bank rescue fund has also been charged.

What is the Commission's position regarding this scandal, particularly with regard to the suspected participation of the managing director of the Greek bank rescue fund?

Answer given by Mr Rehn on behalf of the Commission
(11 March 2014)

The European Commission understands that this case is still under examination by the Greek judicial authorities and will therefore not comment on the issue.

(Versione italiana)

Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-000489/14
alla Commissione
Mario Borghezio (NI)
(20 gennaio 2014)

Oggetto: Affidamento all'esterno della rassegna stampa UE

Corrisponde al vero che la Commissione non intende procedere, nel quadro della spending review, a riaffidare ai funzionari UE la predisposizione della rassegna stampa internazionale che nell'ultimo quadriennio (a partire dal 18.11.2010) è costata ben 1,238 milioni all'anno, bandendo ad un nuovo appalto esterno?

Ritiene essa che il congruo numero di funzionari interni, con la collaborazione dei funzionari delle numerose sedi esterne di rappresentanza dell'UE, potrebbe agevolmente produrre la rassegna stampa internazionale facendo risparmiare al contribuente europeo diversi milioni di euro?

Risposta di Viviane Reding a nome della Commissione
(17 marzo 2014)

Il servizio di base necessario per produrre la rassegna stampa è prestato da più di dieci anni da contraenti esterni.

Occorrerebbe un numero cospicuo di personale interno per realizzare una selezione adeguata dei principali articoli a stampa. Ciò è dovuto al numero di paesi (negli ultimi dieci anni si sono aggiunti 13 Stati membri) e di lingue da seguire e ai tempi brevi che intercorrono tra la pubblicazione dei giornali e la consegna tempestiva della rassegna stampa.

In un contesto che vede una riduzione del 5 % del personale in un quinquennio la Commissione non ritiene possibile destinare il personale necessario per prestare questo servizio attingendolo all'interno della casa.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-000489/14
to the Commission
Mario Borghezio (NI)
(20 January 2014)

Subject: Outsourcing of the EU press survey

Is it true that the Commission does not intend, as part of the spending review, to bring the work of compiling the international press survey, which, over the last four years (from 18 November 2010) has cost EUR 1.238 million per year, back in house and plans instead to issue a new call for tenders?

Does the Commission not agree that a sufficient number of in-house staff, working in cooperation with officials posted to the many external EU delegations, could easily produce the international press survey, thereby saving the European taxpayer several million euros?

Answer given by Mrs Reding on behalf of the Commission
(17 March 2014)

The basic service necessary for producing the Press Review has been delivered by external contractors for more than 10 years.

A significant number of in-house staff would be required for a proper selection of main press articles. This is due to the number of countries (13 Member States have been added over the last 10 years) and languages to be monitored and the short timeframe between the publishing of the newspapers and the early delivery of the Press Review.

In the context of a 5% staff decrease over five years, the Commission does not consider it possible to allocate the necessary staff to provide such a service in-house.

(Versione italiana)

Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-000494/14
alla Commissione
Sergio Paolo Francesco Silvestris (PPE)
(20 gennaio 2014)

Oggetto: RC Auto in Italia

Un recente studio condotto in Italia ha stimato che la media nazionale della polizza RC auto per cliente è di 491 euro, 231 euro in più rispetto alla media di 278 euro nei quattro maggiori Stati membri europei: Francia, Spagna, Germania e Regno Unito. Se si prendono in considerazione solo le auto, gli italiani pagano 526 euro, tariffa che nei 4 citati paesi europei scende a 291 euro mentre per le moto siamo a 279 euro in Italia contro 150 euro.

Le compagnie assicurative italiane sostengono che a incidere sull'incremento dei prezzi sono due fattori: il costo del sinistro stradale che ammonta al 60 % del prezzo e le frodi che causano un rialzo del 40-45 % dei prezzi.

Alla luce di ciò, può la Commissione chiarire se:

1. è a conoscenza di questa disparità tra l'Italia e gli altri Stati membri;

2. intende svolgere un'indagine conoscitiva per verificare le cause dell'eccessivo aumento dei prezzi del mercato delle assicurazioni RC auto in Italia;

3. esistono misure adottate in altri paesi europei che abbiano favorito una riduzione dei prezzi delle assicurazioni nel mercato delle assicurazioni RC Auto?

Risposta di Michel Barnier a nome della Commissione
(14 marzo 2014)

1. La Commissione è a conoscenza del persistere delle problematiche inerenti il mercato italiano delle assicurazioni RC auto individuate nell'indagine settoriale dell'Autorità italiana Garante per la Concorrenza e il Mercato (AGCM) del 22 febbraio 2013.

2. La Commissione sta vagliando l'opportunità di avviare uno studio per esaminare il funzionamento dei mercati delle assicurazioni RC auto in tutta l'UE. Non è previsto uno studio mirato specificamente al mercato italiano, poiché sarebbe di competenza dell'autorità nazionale garante della concorrenza. Al riguardo è opportuno ricordare che il summenzionato studio condotto dall'AGCM non ha messo in evidenza una violazione delle norme dell'UE in materia di concorrenza.

3. Le differenze fra i premi assicurativi degli Stati membri sono dovute a une serie di fattori, fra cui differenze nell'estensione della copertura della responsabilità civile, tasso di incidenti, densità della rete stradale nazionale, differenze tra i regimi di risarcimento, livello di circolazione di veicoli non assicurati, ecc. Poiché dalla direttiva 2009/103/CE deriva l'obbligo per gli Stati membri di contrastare la circolazione di veicoli non assicurati, la Commissione si sta concentrando su questo elemento, che non solo serve come indicatore di attuazione della direttiva ma contribuisce anche a ridurre i premi assicurativi RC auto. A tal fine, la Commissione raccoglie periodicamente i dati relativi alla circolazione di veicoli non assicurati nell'UE.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-000494/14
to the Commission
Sergio Paolo Francesco Silvestris (PPE)
(20 January 2014)

Subject: Third party motor insurance in Italy

A recent survey conducted in Italy has estimated that the national average cost of a third party motor insurance policy per customer is 491 euro, 231 euro more than the average of 278 euro in the four major European Member States: France, Spain, Germany and the United Kingdom. For cars alone, Italians pay 526 euro, a figure which falls to 291 euro in the above four European countries. The figures for motorcycles are 279 euro in Italy compared with 150 euro in the other four countries.

Italian insurance companies maintain that the price increase is influenced by two factors: road accident costs, which account for 60% of the price, and fraud, which has caused prices to rise by 40-45%.

In the light of the above, can the Commission clarify whether:

1. it is aware of this disparity between Italy and the other Member States;

2. it intends to carry out a fact-finding survey to establish the causes of the excessive price rise on the third party motor insurance market in Italy;

3. measures have been taken in other European countries which have contributed to a reduction in the price of third party motor insurance policies?

Answer given by Mr Barnier on behalf of the Commission
(14 March 2014)

1. The Commission is aware of the persisting issues as regards the Italian motor insurance market as identified in the sectorial enquiry of the Italian Competition Authority (AGCM) of 22 February 2013.

2. The Commission is considering launching a study that would examine the functioning of motor insurance markets across the EU. A study that would specifically target the Italian market is not envisaged as this would be the competence of the national competition watchdog. In this context it should be recalled that the abovementioned study by the Italian Competition Authority did not indicate a breach of EU competition rules.

3. There is a variety of factors that influences the prices of premiums between the Member States, which include differences in the extent of the third party liability cover, accidents rate, density of national road network, differences in compensation schemes, levels of uninsured driving, etc. Since it follows from Directive 2009/103/EC that Member States are obliged to combat uninsured driving, the Commission is focusing on this factor that not only serves as an indicator of the implementation of the directive, but also contributes to lowering motor insurance premiums. To that end, the Commission regularly collects data on the levels of uninsured driving across the EU.