

JUDGMENT OF THE COURT

28 March 2000 *

In Case C-7/98,

REFERENCE to the Court pursuant to the Protocol of 3 June 1971 on the interpretation by the Court of Justice of the Convention of 27 September 1968 on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters by the Bundesgerichtshof (Germany) for a preliminary ruling in the proceedings pending before that court between

Dieter Krombach

and

André Bamberski

on the interpretation of Article 27, point 1, of the abovementioned Convention of 27 September 1968 (OJ 1978 L 304, p. 36), as amended by the Convention of 9 October 1978 on the Accession of the Kingdom of Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (OJ 1978 L 304, p. 1 and — amended version — p. 77) and by the Convention of 25 October 1982 on the Accession of the Hellenic Republic (OJ 1982 L 388, p. 1),

* Language of the case: German.

THE COURT,

composed of: G.C. Rodríguez Iglesias, President, J.C. Moitinho de Almeida, D.A.O. Edward, L. Sevón, R. Schintgen (Presidents of Chambers), P.J.G. Kapteyn, C. Gulmann, J.-P. Puissochet, G. Hirsch, P. Jann (Rapporteur) and H. Ragnemalm, Judges,

Advocate General: A. Saggio,
Registrar: L. Hewlett, Administrator,

after considering the written observations submitted on behalf of:

- Mr Bamberski, by H. Klingelhöffer, Rechtsanwalt, Ettlingen,
- the German Government, by R. Wagner, Regierungsdirektor in the Federal Ministry of Justice, acting as Agent,
- the French Government, by K. Rispal-Bellanger, Deputy Head of the Legal Directorate of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and R. Loosli-Surrans, Chargée de Mission in that Directorate, acting as Agents,
- the Commission of the European Communities, by J.L. Iglesias Buhigues, Legal Adviser, acting as Agent, assisted by B. Wägenbaur, of the Brussels Bar,

having regard to the Report for the Hearing,

after hearing the oral observations of the French Government and the Commission at the hearing on 2 March 1999,

after hearing the Opinion of the Advocate General at the sitting on 23 September 1999,

gives the following

Judgment

- 1 By order of 4 December 1997, received at the Court on 14 January 1998, the Bundesgerichtshof (Federal Court of Justice), Germany, referred to the Court for a preliminary ruling pursuant to the Protocol of 3 June 1971 on the interpretation by the Court of Justice of the Convention of 27 September 1968 on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters three questions concerning the interpretation of Article 27, point 1, of the above-mentioned Convention of 27 September 1968 (OJ 1978 L 304, p. 36), as amended by the Convention of 9 October 1978 on the Accession of the Kingdom of Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (OJ 1978 L 304, p. 1 and — amended version — p. 77) and by the Convention of 25 October 1982 on the Accession of the Hellenic Republic (OJ 1982 L 388, p. 1) (hereinafter 'the Convention').

- 2 Those questions have arisen in proceedings between Mr Bamberski, who is domiciled in France, and Mr Krombach, who is domiciled in Germany, relating

to the enforcement, in the latter Contracting State, of a judgment delivered on 13 March 1995 by the Cour d'Assises de Paris (Paris Assizes) which ordered Mr Krombach to pay to Mr Bamberski, the plaintiff in a civil claim, compensation in the amount of FRF 350 000.

The Convention

- 3 The first paragraph of Article 1 provides that the Convention 'shall apply in civil and commercial matters whatever the nature of the court or tribunal'.
- 4 With regard to jurisdiction, the rule of principle, set out in the first paragraph of Article 2 of the Convention, states that persons domiciled in a Contracting State shall, whatever their nationality, be sued in the courts of that State. The second paragraph of Article 3 prohibits a plaintiff from relying on certain rules of exorbitant jurisdiction, in particular, so far as France is concerned, those based on nationality which derive from Articles 14 and 15 of the Code Civil (Civil Code).
- 5 The Convention also sets out special rules of jurisdiction. Thus, Article 5 of the Convention provides:

'A person domiciled in a Contracting State may, in another Contracting State, be sued:

...

4. as regards a civil claim for damages or restitution which is based on an act giving rise to criminal proceedings, in the court seised of those proceedings, to the extent that that court has jurisdiction under its own law to entertain civil proceedings’.

6 In matters relating to the recognition and enforcement of judgments, the rule of principle, set out in the first paragraph of Article 31 of the Convention, provides that a judgment given in a Contracting State and enforceable in that State is to be enforced in another Contracting State when, on the application of any interested party, it has been declared enforceable there.

7 Under the second paragraph of Article 34, ‘[t]he application may be refused only for one of the reasons specified in Articles 27 and 28’.

8 Article 27, point 1, of the Convention states:

‘A judgment shall not be recognised:

1. if such recognition is contrary to public policy in the State in which recognition is sought’.

9 Article 28, third paragraph, of the Convention states:

‘Subject to the provisions of the first paragraph, the jurisdiction of the court of the State of origin may not be reviewed; the test of public policy referred to in point 1 of Article 27 may not be applied to the rules relating to jurisdiction’.

10 Article 29 and the third paragraph of Article 34 of the Convention provide:

‘Under no circumstances may a foreign judgment be reviewed as to its substance.’

11 Article II of the Protocol annexed to the Convention (hereinafter ‘the Protocol’), which, according to Article 65 of the Convention, forms an integral part thereof, provides:

‘Without prejudice to any more favourable provisions of national laws, persons domiciled in a Contracting State who are being prosecuted in the criminal courts of another Contracting State of which they are not nationals for an offence which was not intentionally committed may be defended by persons qualified to do so, even if they do not appear in person.’

However, the court seised of the matter may order appearance in person; in the case of failure to appear, a judgment given in the civil action without the person concerned having had the opportunity to arrange for his defence need not be recognised or enforced in the other Contracting States.’

The dispute in the main proceedings

- 12 Mr Krombach was the subject of a preliminary investigation in Germany following the death in Germany of a 14-year-old girl of French nationality. That preliminary investigation was subsequently discontinued.
- 13 In response to a complaint by Mr Bamberski, the father of the young girl, a preliminary investigation was opened in France, the French courts declaring that they had jurisdiction by virtue of the fact that the victim was a French national. At the conclusion of that investigation, Mr Krombach was, by judgment of the Chambre d'Accusation (Chamber of Indictments) of the Cour d'Appel de Paris (Paris Court of Appeal), committed for trial before the Cour d'Assises de Paris.
- 14 That judgment and notice of the introduction of a civil claim by the victim's father were served on Mr Krombach. Although Mr Krombach was ordered to appear in person, he did not attend the hearing. The Cour d'Assises de Paris thereupon applied the contempt procedure governed by Article 627 et seq. of the French Code of Criminal Procedure. Pursuant to Article 630 of that Code, under which no defence counsel may appear on behalf of the person in contempt, the Cour d'Assises reached its decision without hearing the defence counsel instructed by Mr Krombach.
- 15 By judgment of 9 March 1995 the Cour d'Assises imposed on Mr Krombach a custodial sentence of 15 years after finding him guilty of violence resulting in involuntary manslaughter. By judgment of 13 March 1995, the Cour d'Assises, ruling on the civil claim, ordered Mr Krombach, again as being in contempt, to pay compensation to Mr Bamberski in the amount of FRF 350 000.
- 16 On application by Mr Bamberski, the President of a civil chamber of the Landgericht (Regional Court) Kempten (Germany), which had jurisdiction

ratione loci, declared the judgment of 13 March 1995 to be enforceable in Germany. Following dismissal by the Oberlandesgericht (Higher Regional Court) of the appeal which he had lodged against that decision, Mr Krombach brought an appeal on a point of law ('Rechtsbeschwerde') before the Bundesgerichtshof in which he submitted that he had been unable effectively to defend himself against the judgment given against him by the French court.

- 17 Those are the circumstances in which the Bundesgerichtshof decided to stay proceedings and to refer the following questions to the Court for a preliminary ruling:

1. May the provisions on jurisdiction form part of public policy within the meaning of Article 27, point 1, of the Brussels Convention where the State of origin has based its jurisdiction as against a person domiciled in another Contracting State (first paragraph of Article 2 of the Brussels Convention) solely on the nationality of the injured party (as in the second paragraph of Article 3 of the Brussels Convention in relation to France)?

If Question 1 is answered in the negative:

2. May the court of the State in which enforcement is sought (first paragraph of Article 31 of the Brussels Convention) take into account under public policy within the meaning of Article 27, point 1, of the Brussels Convention that the criminal court of the State of origin did not allow the debtor to be defended by a lawyer in a civil-law procedure for damages instituted within the criminal proceedings (Article II of the Protocol of 27 September 1968 on the interpretation of the Brussels Convention) because he, a resident of another Contracting State, was charged with an *intentional* offence and did not appear in person?

If Question 2 is also answered in the negative:

3. May the court of the State in which enforcement is sought take into account under public policy within the meaning of Article 27, point 1, of the Brussels Convention that the court of the State of origin based its jurisdiction solely on the nationality of the injured party (see Question 1 above) and *additionally* prevented the defendant from being legally represented (see Question 2 above)?'

Preliminary observations

- 18 By its questions, the national court is essentially asking the Court how the term 'public policy in the State in which recognition is sought' in point 1 of Article 27 of the Convention should be interpreted.
- 19 The Convention is intended to facilitate, to the greatest possible extent, the free movement of judgments by providing for a simple and rapid enforcement procedure (see, *inter alia*, Case C-414/92 *Solo Kleinmotoren v Boch* [1994] ECR I-2237, paragraph 20, and Case C-267/97 *Coursier v Fortis Bank* [1999] ECR I-2543, paragraph 25).
- 20 It follows from the Court's case-law that this procedure constitutes an autonomous and complete system independent of the legal systems of the Contracting States and that the principle of legal certainty in the Community legal system and the objectives of the Convention in accordance with Article 220 of the EC Treaty (now Article 293 EC), on which it is founded, require a uniform application in all Contracting States of the Convention rules and the relevant case-law of the Court (see, in particular, Case C-432/93 *SISRO v Ampersand* [1995] ECR I-2269, paragraph 39).

- 21 So far as Article 27 of the Convention is concerned, the Court has held that this provision must be interpreted strictly inasmuch as it constitutes an obstacle to the attainment of one of the fundamental objectives of the Convention (*Solo Kleinmotoren*, cited above, paragraph 20). With regard, more specifically, to recourse to the public-policy clause in Article 27, point 1, of the Convention, the Court has made it clear that such recourse is to be had only in exceptional cases (Case 145/86 *Hoffmann v Krieg* [1988] ECR 645, paragraph 21, and Case C-78/95 *Hendrikman and Feyen v Magenta Druck & Verlag* [1996] ECR I-4943, paragraph 23).
- 22 It follows that, while the Contracting States in principle remain free, by virtue of the proviso in Article 27, point 1, of the Convention, to determine, according to their own conceptions, what public policy requires, the limits of that concept are a matter for interpretation of the Convention.
- 23 Consequently, while it is not for the Court to define the content of the public policy of a Contracting State, it is none the less required to review the limits within which the courts of a Contracting State may have recourse to that concept for the purpose of refusing recognition to a judgment emanating from a court in another Contracting State.
- 24 It should be noted in this regard that, since the Convention was concluded on the basis of Article 220 of the Treaty and within the framework which it defines, its provisions are linked to the Treaty (Case C-398/92 *Mund & Fester v Hatrex Internationaal Transport* [1994] ECR I-467, paragraph 12).
- 25 The Court has consistently held that fundamental rights form an integral part of the general principles of law whose observance the Court ensures (see, in particular, Opinion 2/94 [1996] ECR I-1759, paragraph 33). For that purpose, the Court draws inspiration from the constitutional traditions common to the Member States and from the guidelines supplied by international treaties for the protection of human rights on which the Member States have collaborated or of

which they are signatories. In that regard, the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (hereinafter ‘the ECHR’) has particular significance (see, *inter alia*, Case 222/84 *Johnston v Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary* [1986] ECR 1651, paragraph 18).

- 26 The Court has thus expressly recognised the general principle of Community law that everyone is entitled to fair legal process, which is inspired by those fundamental rights (Case C-185/95 P *Baustahlgewebe v Commission* [1998] ECR I-8417, paragraphs 20 and 21, and judgment of 11 January 2000 in Joined Cases C-174/98 P and C-189/98 P *Netherlands and Van der Wal v Commission* [2000] ECR I-1, paragraph 17).
- 27 Article F(2) of the Treaty on European Union (now, after amendment, Article 6(2) EU) embodies that case-law. It provides: ‘The Union shall respect fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms signed in Rome on 4 November 1950 and as they result from the constitutional traditions common to the Member States, as general principles of Community law’.
- 28 It is in the light of those considerations that the questions submitted for a preliminary ruling fall to be answered.

The first question

- 29 By this question, the national court is essentially asking whether, regard being had to the public-policy clause contained in Article 27, point 1, of the Convention, the court of the State in which enforcement is sought can, with respect to a

defendant domiciled in that State, take into account the fact that the court of the State of origin based its jurisdiction on the nationality of the victim of an offence.

- 30 It should be noted at the outset that it follows from the specific terms of the first paragraph of Article 1 of the Convention that the Convention applies to decisions given in civil matters by a criminal court (Case C-172/91 *Sonntag v Waidmann and Others* [1993] ECR I-1963, paragraph 16).
- 31 Under the system of the Convention, with the exception of certain cases exhaustively listed in the first paragraph of Article 28, none of which corresponds to the facts of the case in the main proceedings, the court before which enforcement is sought cannot review the jurisdiction of the court of the State of origin. This fundamental principle, which is set out in the first phrase of the third paragraph of Article 28 of the Convention, is reinforced by the specific statement, in the second phrase of the same paragraph, that 'the test of public policy referred to in point 1 of Article 27 may not be applied to the rules relating to jurisdiction'.
- 32 It follows that the public policy of the State in which enforcement is sought cannot be raised as a bar to recognition or enforcement of a judgment given in another Contracting State solely on the ground that the court of origin failed to comply with the rules of the Convention which relate to jurisdiction.
- 33 Having regard to the generality of the wording of the third paragraph of Article 28 of the Convention, that statement of the law must be regarded as being, in principle, applicable even where the court of the State of origin wrongly founded its jurisdiction, in regard to a defendant domiciled in the territory of the State in which enforcement is sought, on a rule which has recourse to a criterion of nationality.

- 34 The answer to the first question must therefore be that the court of the State in which enforcement is sought cannot, with respect to a defendant domiciled in that State, take account, for the purposes of the public-policy clause in Article 27, point 1, of the Convention, of the fact, without more, that the court of the State of origin based its jurisdiction on the nationality of the victim of an offence.

The second question

- 35 By this question, the national court is essentially asking whether, in relation to the public-policy clause in Article 27, point 1, of the Convention, the court of the State in which enforcement is sought can, with respect to a defendant domiciled in its territory and charged with an intentional offence, take into account the fact that the court of the State of origin refused to allow that defendant to have his defence presented unless he appeared in person.
- 36 By disallowing any review of a foreign judgment as to its substance, Article 29 and the third paragraph of Article 34 of the Convention prohibit the court of the State in which enforcement is sought from refusing to recognise or enforce that judgment solely on the ground that there is a discrepancy between the legal rule applied by the court of the State of origin and that which would have been applied by the court of the State in which enforcement is sought had it been seised of the dispute. Similarly, the court of the State in which enforcement is sought cannot review the accuracy of the findings of law or fact made by the court of the State of origin.
- 37 Recourse to the public-policy clause in Article 27, point 1, of the Convention can be envisaged only where recognition or enforcement of the judgment delivered in another Contracting State would be at variance to an unacceptable degree with the legal order of the State in which enforcement is sought inasmuch as it infringes a fundamental principle. In order for the prohibition of any review of the foreign judgment as to its substance to be observed, the infringement would have to constitute a manifest breach of a rule of law regarded as essential in the

legal order of the State in which enforcement is sought or of a right recognised as being fundamental within that legal order.

- 38 With regard to the right to be defended, to which the question submitted to the Court refers, this occupies a prominent position in the organisation and conduct of a fair trial and is one of the fundamental rights deriving from the constitutional traditions common to the Member States.
- 39 More specifically still, the European Court of Human Rights has on several occasions ruled in cases relating to criminal proceedings that, although not absolute, the right of every person charged with an offence to be effectively defended by a lawyer, if need be one appointed by the court, is one of the fundamental elements in a fair trial and an accused person does not forfeit entitlement to such a right simply because he is not present at the hearing (see the following judgments of the European Court of Human Rights: judgment of 23 November 1993 in *Poitrinol v France*, Series A No 277-A; judgment of 22 September 1994 in *Pelladoah v Netherlands*, Series A No 297-B; judgment of 21 January 1999 in *Van Geyseghem v Belgium*, not yet reported).
- 40 It follows from that case-law that a national court of a Contracting State is entitled to hold that a refusal to hear the defence of an accused person who is not present at the hearing constitutes a manifest breach of a fundamental right.
- 41 The national court is, however, unsure as to whether the court of the State in which enforcement is sought can take account, in relation to Article 27, point 1, of the Convention, of a breach of this nature having regard to the wording of Article II of the Protocol. That provision, which involves extending the scope of the Convention to the criminal field because of the consequences which a judgment of a criminal court may entail in civil and commercial matters (Case

157/80 *Rinkau* [1981] ECR 1391, paragraph 6), recognises the right to be defended without appearing in person before the criminal courts of a Contracting State for persons who are not nationals of that State and who are domiciled in another Contracting State only in so far as they are being prosecuted for an offence committed unintentionally. This restriction has been construed as meaning that the Convention clearly seeks to deny the right to be defended without appearing in person to persons who are being prosecuted for offences which are sufficiently serious to justify this (*Rinkau*, cited above, paragraph 12).

- 42 However, it follows from a line of case-law developed by the Court on the basis of the principles referred to in paragraphs 25 and 26 of the present judgment that observance of the right to a fair hearing is, in all proceedings initiated against a person which are liable to culminate in a measure adversely affecting that person, a fundamental principle of Community law which must be guaranteed even in the absence of any rules governing the proceedings in question (see, *inter alia*, Case C-135/92 *Fiskano v Commission* [1994] ECR I-2885, paragraph 39, and Case C-32/95 P *Commission v Lisrestal and Others* [1996] ECR I-5373, paragraph 21).
- 43 The Court has also held that, even though the Convention is intended to secure the simplification of formalities governing the reciprocal recognition and enforcement of judgments of courts or tribunals, it is not permissible to achieve that aim by undermining the right to a fair hearing (Case 49/84 *Debaecker and Plouvier v Bouwman* [1985] ECR 1779, paragraph 10).
- 44 It follows from the foregoing developments in the case-law that recourse to the public-policy clause must be regarded as being possible in exceptional cases where the guarantees laid down in the legislation of the State of origin and in the Convention itself have been insufficient to protect the defendant from a manifest breach of his right to defend himself before the court of origin, as recognised by the ECHR. Consequently, Article II of the Protocol cannot be construed as

precluding the court of the State in which enforcement is sought from being entitled to take account, in relation to public policy, as referred to in Article 27, point 1, of the Convention, of the fact that, in an action for damages based on an offence, the court of the State of origin refused to hear the defence of the accused person, who was being prosecuted for an intentional offence, solely on the ground that that person was not present at the hearing.

- 45 The answer to the second question must therefore be that the court of the State in which enforcement is sought can, with respect to a defendant domiciled in that State and prosecuted for an intentional offence, take account, in relation to the public-policy clause in Article 27, point 1, of the Convention, of the fact that the court of the State of origin refused to allow that person to have his defence presented unless he appeared in person.

The third question

- 46 In light of the reply to the second question, it is unnecessary to answer the third question.

Costs

- 47 The costs incurred by the German and French Governments and by the Commission, which have submitted observations to the Court, are not

recoverable. Since these proceedings are, for the parties to the main proceedings, a step in the proceedings pending before the national court, the decision on costs is a matter for that court.

On those grounds,

THE COURT,

in answer to the questions referred to it by the Bundesgerichtshof by order of 4 December 1997, hereby rules:

Article 27, point 1, of the Convention of 27 September 1968 on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, as amended by the Convention of 9 October 1978 on the Accession of the Kingdom of Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and by the Convention of 25 October 1982 on the Accession of the Hellenic Republic, must be interpreted as follows:

- (1) The court of the State in which enforcement is sought cannot, with respect to a defendant domiciled in that State, take account, for the purposes of the

public-policy clause in Article 27, point 1, of that Convention, of the fact, without more, that the court of the State of origin based its jurisdiction on the nationality of the victim of an offence.

- (2) The court of the State in which enforcement is sought can, with respect to a defendant domiciled in that State and prosecuted for an intentional offence, take account, in relation to the public-policy clause in Article 27, point 1, of that Convention, of the fact that the court of the State of origin refused to allow that person to have his defence presented unless he appeared in person.

Rodríguez Iglesias	Moitinho de Almeida	
Edward	Sevón	Schintgen
Kapteyn	Gulmann	Puissochet
Hirsch	Jann	Ragnemalm

Delivered in open court in Luxembourg on 28 March 2000.

R. Grass

Registrar

G.C. Rodríguez Iglesias

President